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Βιβλιοθήκη  
Michael H. Jameson



Edward Clark Crossett Professor of Humanistic Studies

ARISTOTLE

TEXT

*AND COMMENTARY*

HEIMHOLZ  
LEIPZIG

KS  
CAMBRIDGE

AND CO.  
NEW YORK

1904

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1



# THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

A REVISED TEXT

*WITH INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY*

BY

FRANZ SUSEMIHL

PROFESSOR IN GREIFSWALD

AND

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\*

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## PREFACE.

IN the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl's edition of the *Politics* in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a *nova impressio correctior* was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the *impressio* of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.

Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the *Politics* as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society* and *Journal of Philology* by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilleto in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-

ant of the references to the recently discovered *Constitution of Athens*. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman's, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Susemihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of *Quaestiones Aristoteleae* I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven Quaestiones are combined, as *Quaestiones criticae collectae*, although the last word *collectae* forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of *Home Life of the Greeks*, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors' initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel's recent work on that subject reached me.



The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

R. D. HICKS.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

*Oct. 15, 1894.*

ON REFERENCES TO THE *POLITICS* BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS,  
SECTIONS, PAGES.

THE text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight **books** in the old order, viz. A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ H Θ Δ Z E). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldines and other early printed editions, any more than in the mss. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text 'is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus the second edition of Victorius (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of **chapters** here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the **left** hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the *Index Aristotelicus* to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1582), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolinus), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanius (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner's "vulgo." In this now obsolete arrangement Book I. made eight chapters, not thirteen, Book II., ten, not twelve, Book III., twelve, not eighteen.

The **sections** into which Bekker's chapters are divided are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker's pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the *Politics* by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with § prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the **right** side of the page are these introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g. 5 in Book I., 9 in Book II. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Götting

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879) : Grote in his history always cites the *Politics* by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the **chapter, page, column, and line** of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the *Politics* occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the *Index Aristotelicus* 1252<sup>a</sup>18, 1276<sup>b</sup>4) are used to denote, the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the **left** hand side of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded : (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, *not* of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the **right** hand margin, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus : (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence *δεῖ δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι χρηρὴ προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ* upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the *Index Aristotelicus* would be Πβ5, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 § 16 (or II. 5. 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections : or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879 : but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. ii § 10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, 1 f.

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## CORRIGENDA.

Page 8, line 2 : for **M.** read **Isaac**

P. 18, note 7, line 5 : for πολιτικων read πολιτικῶν.

P. 56, line 14 : for Stageira read Stagira (cp. Meisterhans<sup>3</sup> p. 43, n. 373)

P. 69, note 2, line 3 : for νόμον read νόμων

Ib. line 4 : for πολιτειων read πολιτειῶν

P. 82, line 2 : for ἀπορίαν read εὐπορίαν (cp. below p. 312)

P. 144, text, 1252 b 16, 17 : for μάλιστα δ' εἰκε κατὰ φύσιν  
read μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἰκε

Ib. commentary, right column, last line : for coediche read coediche

P. 146, critical notes, line 3 : after 28 insert ἥδη]

P. 147, text, 1253 a 3 : omit ἐστὶ

Ib. critical notes, line 6 : transpose

δ omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> Bk

to precede || 3 ἐστὶ M<sup>a</sup>

That is, the δ omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> Bk is in 1253 a 2 before ἄνθρωπος. Stühr reads  
ἄνθρωπος : cp. Addenda p. 663

P. 150, crit. notes, line 5 : for Quaest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read Quaest. crit. coll.  
(Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff

Ib. line 8 : dele Ar.

P. 151, crit. notes, line 8 : after Quaest. Cr. II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. insert Quaest. crit.  
coll. p. 336 ff

P. 153, crit. notes, line 4 : after Quaest. Cr. II. 7 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 339 f

P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin : for (p. read (p. 6)

P. 157, text, 1254 a 27 : for ἀπὸ read ὑπὸ

Ib. crit. notes, line 3 : for Dittographia read Dittography

crit. notes, line 9 : after ἀπὸ read ΓII Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

P. 160, text, 1254 b 14 : omit καὶ

P. 161, crit. notes, line 1 : after 18 insert ἐστὶν]

P. 176, crit. notes, line 9 : after Quaest. Cr. III. 5 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 352 f

P. 178, comm. left column, line 9 : for κέκτησθαι read κεκτῆσθαι

P. 180, crit. notes, line 3 : for ἦν read ἦν

P. 182, text, 1257 a 38 : for καὶ εἰ read κἀν εἰ

P. 183, comm. left col. line 8 : for 5, read see

Ib. line 9 : for μετατιθεμένων read μεταθεμένων

P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below : after selling insert and

- P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: *after citizens insert a comma*  
P. 197, text, 1259 b 32: *for [καί] read καί*  
P. 200, text, 1260 a 30, right margin: *remove 9 from line 30 to line 31*  
Ib. comm. left col. line 5 from below: *for μέρος read μέρος*  
P. 201, text, 1260 a 35, right margin: *remove 10 from line 35 to line 36*  
P. 209, *To Excursus II. also belong remarks on B. I. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672*  
P. 213, text, 1260 b 31: *for καί εἰ read καὶ εἰ*  
P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: *for III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, read III. 16 § 2,*  
IV (VII). 8 § 4,  
P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: *for Bk. read Bk.<sup>1</sup>*  
P. 232, text, 1263 a 2: *for ἔχει, πᾶσι read ἔχει πᾶσι,*  
P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: *for 1. 126 read 1. 141 § 3*  
P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: *for 1. 9. 9 read 1. 7. 2, 1255 b 24 f*  
P. 235, text, 1263 a 29: *for προσεδρεύοντες read προσεδρεύοντος*  
P. 265, text, 1267 a 11: *for δύναιντο read βούλουντο*  
P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: *for II. § 9 read c. 11 § 9*  
P. 279, crit. notes, last line: *after Ephesus insert op. o. fol. 186<sup>a</sup> p. 610, 16 ff.*  
ed. Hayduck  
P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: *for evidences read evidence*  
P. 282, text, 1269 b 18: *for δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι read εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν*  
P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: *read διασφύεται*  
P. 287, comm. left col. line 21: *for 8 § 6 read 7 § 6*  
P. 297, comm. left col. line 13: *for p. 9 read p. 20*  
P. 300, comm. left col. last line: *for Ottfried read Otfried*  
P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: *for πολεμίων read πόλεων*  
P. 305, text, 1272 b 9: *for δυναστῶν read δυνατῶν*  
Ib. crit. notes, line 7: *after Schneider || add δυναστῶν Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> ||*  
P. 306, text, 1272 b 13: *for τι read τί*  
Ib. text, 1272 b 23: *for τοσαῦθ' ἡμῶν εἰρήσθω read εἰρήσθω τοσαῦθ' ἡμῶν*  
P. 312, text, 1273 b 6 (*bis*, line 4 and line 18): *for ἀπορίαν read εὐπορίαν*  
Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *for 6 εὐπορίαν P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup>Ar. read*  
6 ἀπορίαν ΓM<sup>a</sup>Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>  
P. 314, text, 1273 b 25, left margin: *dele (12)*  
P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: *dele Aristeides*  
P. 326, line 9: *for IV. 130 read IV. 180*  
P. 331, heading, line 13: *for II. 7. 1 read II. 8. 1*  
P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: *for βολαῖαι read βόλαιαι*  
P. 359, text, 1275 b 17, left margin: *dele (2)*  
P. 362, text, 1276 a 5: *for φαμέν read ἐφαμεν*  
Ib. text, 1276 a 10: *read δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ*  
P. 363, text, 1276 a 13: *dele \* \**  
*and read συμφέρον)· ἐπερ οὖν*  
*The parenthesis extends from 1276 a 10 (τότε γὰρ to 1276 a 13 συμφέρον)·*  
Ib. text, 1276 a 14: *for καί read [καί]*  
Ib. text, 1276 a 15: *omit <οὐ>*  
Ib. text, 1276 a 16: *for τυραννίδος. read τυραννίδος;*  
Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *after 14 read [καί] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)*  
Ib. crit. notes, line 4: *dele incorrect*  
Ib. crit. notes, line 5: *after Hayduck add Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>*

- P. 364, text, 1276 a 26: *for τὴν read [τὴν]*  
 Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *before 27 add [τὴν]* Schneider Niemeyer *Jahrb. f. Phil.*  
 CXLIII. 1891, p. 414 ||
- P. 367, text, 1276 b 30: *for διόπερ read διό*  
 P. 370, comm. left col. last line: *for δυνανται read δύνανται*  
 P. 380, text, 1278 b 8: *for καὶ εἰ read καὶν εἰ*  
 P. 382, crit. notes, line 2: *after (corrector) add a semicolon*  
 P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: *for VII(V) read VIII(V)*  
 P. 396, text, 1281 a 16: *with change of punctuation read ἐστὺν (ἔδοξε γὰρ...δικαίως)*  
 P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: *transpose φαῦλον to precede ἔχοντα and read*  
*φαῦλον ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον.*  
 P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: *for αρχεὺν read ἀρχεὺν*  
 Ib. line 23: *for ἐπιθυμία read ἐπιθυμία*  
 Ib. line 26: *for δ read ὁ*  
 P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: *for πιστευθέντας read πεισθέντας*  
 Ib. crit. notes, line 10: *after right insert a comma and read πιστευθέντας Π fr.*  
 Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>
- P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: *for εὐ read εὖ*  
 P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: *after turn out insert anyhow," i.e. "*  
 P. 441, text, 1287 a 39: *for πειστευθέντας read πεισθέντας*  
 P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: *for dittographia read dittography*  
 P. 464, line 44: *for 24 read 23*  
 P. 467, line 5 ff.: *dele the sentence* Again, one might have imagined...πολιτεία.  
 Not so.
- P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: *for καὶ read [καὶ]*  
 P. 497, text, 1327 a 23: *for πρὸς read [πρὸς]*  
 Ib. crit. notes, line 2: *for ὑπάρχοντα read ὑπάρχοντα*  
 P. 503, text, 1328 a 16: *for οἱ δὲ read οἷδε*  
 P. 521, text, 1330 b 30: *for πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν read μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν*  
 P. 529, text, 1332 a 13: *omit καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι*  
 P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: *for 1284 read 1254*  
 P. 535, text, 1332 b 31: *for τούτων πάντων read πάντων τούτων*  
 P. 537, text, 1333 a 26: *transpose διηρῆσθαι to precede καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος*  
 Ib. comm. right col. line 17: *for correlation read correlative*  
 P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 f.: *for VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 read VIII(V). 1 § 10, 7 § 4*  
 P. 541, text, 1334 a 8: *for ἀνιάσιν read ἀφιᾶσιν*  
 P. 545, head line: *for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40*  
 P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: *for πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι read ἐγγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν*  
 P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: *for χρόνος ὠρισμένος read ὠρισμένος χρόνος*  
 P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: *for ὅσα αὐτῶν read αὐτῶν ὅσα*





## INTRODUCTION.

### I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF *THE POLITICS*.

ARISTOTLE'S *Politics* has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>b</sup> (Bekker's I<sup>b</sup>), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Aretinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century<sup>1</sup>. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274<sup>2</sup>, by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex<sup>3</sup> which we will call T; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date<sup>4</sup>. This translation<sup>5</sup> primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P<sup>1</sup>.<sup>2</sup>.<sup>3</sup>, one at Milan M<sup>a</sup>, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Aretinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Aretinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

<sup>1</sup> Very likely Francesco Filelfo brought it from Constantinople in 1429 at the request of Palla Strozzi: see the evidence for this in Oncken *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1870. 8vo) vol. I. p. 78. Compare my large critical edition, *Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Gulielmi de Moerbeke* (Leipzig 1872. 8vo) p. xv.

<sup>2</sup> See Susemihl *op. cit.* p. VI. with note 4. [Von Hertling places it about 1260, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. 1884. p. 457.

Thomas Aquinas twice quotes it in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, writing probably A.D. 1261—1265. Tr.]

<sup>3</sup> The best manuscript of this 'Old Translation' expressly states it. See Susemihl *op. cit.* XXXIV. See also below p. 49 n. 2, p. 71 ff.

<sup>4</sup> On the date see Susemihl *op. cit.* XII.

<sup>5</sup> With the text restored from manuscripts and old printed editions in my edition above mentioned.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the better, but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century<sup>1</sup>, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides Γ the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two:

M<sup>s</sup> = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105<sup>2</sup> (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand; collated by R. Schöll and Studemund:

P<sup>1</sup> = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p<sup>1</sup>, those made in the same black ink as the original text by (corr.<sup>1</sup>), corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P<sup>1</sup> was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P<sup>1</sup> the two families are blended<sup>3</sup>, so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P<sup>2</sup>, the principal manuscript of this second family<sup>4</sup>; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P<sup>4</sup>; so also of Aretinus' translation and especially of P<sup>3</sup>; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

<sup>1</sup> On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 485) upon Plato's *Republic* is quoted in a gloss on VIII (V). 12. 8, which in all probability (see note<sup>4</sup>) proceeds from this archetype: on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncials (particularly III. 14 §§ 12, 13 οὐσιῶν and οὐσίαι for θουσιῶν and θουσίαι). Now uncial writing ceased generally in the eighth century. Cp. Susemihl *op. c.* XIV f., XLVI f.

<sup>2</sup> Ordinis superioris.

<sup>3</sup> Or in its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension—in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text—already made.

<sup>4</sup> For the same glosses which in P<sup>1</sup> can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in P<sup>2</sup>, and a similar origin may be proved for others in P<sup>2</sup> in another way. On the other hand P<sup>2</sup> has few glosses in common with P<sup>3</sup>, and the number in P<sup>2</sup> is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susemihl *op. c.* VIII f., XVIII f.



Aristotle's *Politics* in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups: an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Aretinus and in a different way by C<sup>4</sup>. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

I. Better class: II<sup>2</sup>.

P<sup>2</sup> = Coislin. 161 (brought originally from Athos: now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker's I<sup>b</sup>; last collated by Susemihl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red ink: these are indicated hereafter by (corr.<sup>1</sup>), (corr.<sup>2</sup>), (corr.<sup>3</sup>) and p<sup>2</sup> respectively: where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.<sup>4</sup>). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P<sup>3</sup> = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P<sup>2</sup>, especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P<sup>2</sup> than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P<sup>3</sup>, like P<sup>2</sup>, was last collated by Susemihl.

II. Worse class: II<sup>3</sup>.

1. First group.

P<sup>4</sup> = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin; last collated by Susemihl.

P<sup>6</sup> = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos, a priest from Crete; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthélemy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by Johannes Rhosos, but as early as 1457: collated by Bekker for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by R. Schöll and E. Rohde.

M<sup>b</sup> = Marcianus Venetus 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by Bekker for i. c. 1—c. 6 § 8 and again by Rohde for i. cc. 1—4.

U<sup>b</sup> = Marcianus Venetus, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by Bekker for ii. cc. 1—7; iii. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; vi (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; viii (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by Rohde for i. cc. 1—4.

L<sup>s</sup> = Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinae) 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to U<sup>b</sup>, collated by Patzig for i. 1—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books i. ii. and v (viii). from Stahr and Schneider.

C<sup>c</sup> denotes the codex used by Camerarius.

Ar. = Aretinus, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

## 2. Second group.

C<sup>4</sup> = Florentinus Castiglionensis (in the Laurentian library at Florence) iv. (Acquisti nuovo), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. 1—4; ii. 1—2 § 3; vi (iv). 1: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q<sup>b</sup> = Laurentianus 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. 1—4 and single passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books ii. iii. vi (iv).

R<sup>b</sup> = Laurentianus 81, 6, written by Johannes Thetталos in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by Schöll for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books vii (vi). viii (v). It bears a great resemblance to Q<sup>b</sup>, particularly to the corrections of Q<sup>b</sup> in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S<sup>b</sup> = Laurentianus 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after Q<sup>b</sup>, to which it bears an extraordinary resem-



blance; collated by Bekker for Books I. IV (VII). V (VIII), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. I, and for single passages elsewhere.

T<sup>b</sup> = Urbinas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. V (VIII), then again by Hinck for Bk. I. 1—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to V<sup>b</sup> than to Q<sup>b</sup>, R<sup>b</sup>, S<sup>b</sup>.

V<sup>b</sup> = Vaticano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thettalos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. IV (VII). VI (IV). VIII (V), by Hinck for Bk. I. 1—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. I. 1—4) are in striking agreement with C<sup>4</sup>.

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup>, than to the second.

W<sup>b</sup> = Reginensis 125 (Christinae reginae—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. VIII (VI), by Hinck for Bk. I. 1—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

Ald. = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. I. 1—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by P<sup>s</sup> = Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

<sup>1</sup> Nor is P<sup>s</sup> now quoted under II<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> or II<sup>3</sup> in the critical notes of this edition.

manuscript now contains only Bk. VIII (v). from c. 6 § 9<sup>a</sup> onwards, Bk. VII (vi). Bk. IV (vii). and Bk. V (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Susemihl<sup>1</sup>.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides  $\Gamma$   $M^s$   $P^{1,2,3,4}$  Ar., are:

for I. 1—4: $P^s C^4 Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b W^b L^s$ Ald.	
I. 4—6 § 8: $Q M^b S^b T^b$ .	for VI (iv). 1: $C^4 Q^b V^b$ .
I. 6 § 9—13 § 16 (end):	VI (iv). 2—3 § 7: $Q^b V^b$ .
$Q S^b T^b$ .	VI (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 4: $Q^b U^b V^b$ .
II. 1, 2: $C^4 Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VI (iv). 4 § 4—7 § 1: $Q^b V^b$ .
II. 3—7 § 21: $Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VI (iv). 7 § 2—8 § 6: $Q^b U^b V^b$ .
II. 8—III. 2 § 3: $Q^b T^b$ .	VI (iv). 8 § 6—16 § 8 (end):
III. 2 § 3: $Q^b T^b U^b$ .	$Q^b V^b$ .
III. 2 § 3—14 § 1: $Q^b T^b$ .	VII (vi): $P^s R^b W^b$ .
III. 14 §§ 2—10: $Q^b T^b U^b$ .	VIII (v). 1—3 § 5: $R^b V^b$ .
III. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end):	VIII (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10: $R^b U^b V^b$ .
$Q^b T^b$ .	VIII (v). 4 § 11—6 § 8: $R^b V^b$ .
IV (vii): $P^s S^b V^b$ .	VIII (v). 6 § 9—12 § 18 (end):
V (viii): $P^s S^b T^b$ .	$P^s R^b V^b$ .

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Barthélemy St Hilaire.

$\Pi$  denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,

$\Pi^1$  that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including  $\Gamma$ ,

$\Pi^2$  that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding  $P^s$ ,

$\Pi^3$  that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (*i. e.* all the mss. known *except*  $\Gamma M^s P^1 P^2 P^3 P^4$ ), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

Bas.<sup>1,2,3</sup> denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

<sup>1</sup> For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Susemihl *l. c.* pp. v—xxviii.



though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Götting's time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P<sup>1.2.3.4.5</sup> and of a few leaves of M<sup>s</sup>, which had been made by Hase; and Bekker, while completely ignoring P<sup>1.3</sup> M<sup>s</sup> and almost completely P<sup>4.5</sup>, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P<sup>2</sup> (Bekker's I<sup>b</sup>) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the *textus receptus*. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon II<sup>1</sup>, the consensus of the MSS. of the first family, viz. Γ, M<sup>s</sup>, P<sup>1</sup>: failing that, upon P<sup>2.3</sup>. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus' extract (*Ecl. eth.* II. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch *περὶ εὐγενείας*, etc.<sup>1</sup>

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

**Sepulveda.** Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.

**Camot.** The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.

**Vettori** (Victorius). First edition of the *Politics*; Florence, 1552. 4: a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori's own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori<sup>1</sup>, Vettori<sup>2</sup>.

**Morel.** Edition, Paris, 1556. 4; closely following the first edition of Vettori.

**Lambin.** Latin translation; first edition, Paris, 1567. 4.

**Camerarius.** *Politicorum et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis interpretationes et explicationes*; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.

**Zwinger.** Edition of the *Politics*; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori's 2nd ed.

<sup>1</sup> Further particulars in Susemihl's larger edition as quoted above, p. XLV ff. References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.



- Sylburg.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Frankfurt, 1587. 4.
- M. Casaubon.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Lyon, 1590. fol.
- Montecatino.** Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the *Politics*; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. I), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider's edition, II. p. v.
- Ramus** (Pierre de la Ramée). Edition and Latin translation of the *Politics*; Frankfurt, 1601. 8.
- Giphanius** (Van Giffen). *Commentarii in politicum opus Aristotelis*; Frankfurt, 1608. 8. A posthumous work: wanting the whole of Bk. V (VIII). and Bk. IV (VII). from c. 7 § 5 to the end.
- Scaliger.** See *Scaligerana* published by Oncken in *Eos* I. 1864. 410 ff.
- Piccart.** In *Politicis Aristotelis libros commentarius*; Leipzig, 1615. 8.
- D. Heinsius.** Edition of the *Politics*; Leyden, 1621. 8.
- Conring.** Edition, Helmstädt, 1656. 4.
- Reiske and Gurlitt.** In the *addenda* to Schneider's edition, II. 471 ff.
- Reiz.** Edition of IV (VII). 17 and the whole of V (VIII), *περὶ τῆς πόλεως μακαρίας* κτλ, Leipzig, 1776. 8.
- J. G. Schlosser.** German translation of the *Politics* and *Oeconomics*; Lübeck and Leipzig, 1798. 8 (3 vols.). The notes appended are in every respect of great interest for the reader even now, and have proved especially valuable. The memory of this excellent man should ever be cherished in Germany.
- Garve.** A German translation of the *Politics* edited by Fülleborn; Leipzig, 1799. 1802. 8 (2 vols.).
- J. G. Schneider.** Edition of the *Politics*; Frankfurt on the Oder, 1809. 8 (2 vols.).
- Koraes.** Edition, Paris, 1821. 8.
- F. Thurot.** French translation of the *Ethics* and *Politics*; Paris, 1823. 8.
- Göttling.** Edition of the *Politics*; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations; *Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco* (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. *De machaera Delphica quae est ap. Arist.* (I. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. *De loco quodam Arist.* (I. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings *Opusc. acad.* ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)
- Barthélemy St Hilaire.** Edition of the *Politics* with French translation; Paris, 1837. 8. A second edition of the translation appeared, Paris, 1848. 8.
- A. Stahr.** Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
- Lindau.** German translation (Oels, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.
- Spengel.** *Ueber die Politik des Aristoteles*, in the *phil. Abhandl. der Münchner Akad.* v. 1 ff. *Aristotelische Studien III.* (ib. XI. 55 ff.); Munich, 1868. 4. Compare *Arist. Stud. II.* (ib. X. 626 ff.); Munich, 1865. 4. 44 ff.

- Bojesen.** *Bidrag til Fortolkningen om Aristoteles's Bøger om Staten*; Copenhagen, 1844. 1845. 8 (Two Soröer Programmes).
- Nickes.** *De Aristotelis Politicorum libri*; Bonn, 1851. 8 (Degree dissertation).
- Eaton.** Edition of the *Politics*; Oxford, 1855. 8.
- Congreve.** Ed. of *Politics*; London, 1855. 8. A second edition (unaltered), London, 1874. 8.
- Engelhardt.** *Loci Platonici, quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse*; Danzig, 1858. 4. 24 p. (In a collection of essays celebrating the jubilee of the Danzig Gymnasium).
- Rassow.** Short Gymnasium-Programmes: *Observationes criticae in Aristotelem*, Berlin, 1858. 4. *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik*; Weimar, 1864. 4. Comp. also his *Emendationes Aristoteleae*, Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and *Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik*, Weimar, 1862. 4.
- C. Thurot.** *Observationes criticae in Arist. politicos libros*, an article in *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, LXXXI. 1860. 749—759; and especially *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860. 8.
- Schütz.** Gymn.-Programmes: *De fundamentis reipublicae, quae primo Politicorum libro ab Aristotele posita sunt*, I. II.; Potsdam, 1860. 4. 18 p., III. Potsdam, 1860. 4. 12 p.
- Oncken.** Degree dissertation: *Emendationum in Arist. Eth. Nic. et Polit. specimen*; Heidelberg, 1861. 8; and the large work in two volumes *Staatslehre des Aristoteles*; Leipzig, 1870, 1875. 8.
- Bonitz.** *Aristotelische Studien II. III.*; Vienna, 1863. 8. *Zur Aristot. Pol.* II. 3. 1262 a 7, an article in *Hermes*, VII. 1872. 102—108.
- Bernays.** *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*; Berlin, 1863. 8. A German translation of the first three books, Berlin, 1872. 8. *Zu Aristoteles und Simonides*, an article in *Hermes*, V. 1870. 301, 302; *Aristoteles über den Mittelstand* in *Hermes*, VI. 1871. 118—124.
- Hampke.** Gymn.-Programme: *Bemerkungen über das erste Buch der Polit.*, Lyck, 1863. 4; and four articles in *Philologus*, on *Arist. Pol.* IV (VII). cc. 2, 3 in vol. XIX. 1863. 614—622, on II. 5, XXI. 1864. 541—543, on Book I. XXIV. 1866. 170—175, *Zur Politik* XXV. 1867. 162—166.
- Schnitzer.** *Zu Arist. Pol.*, an article in *Eos*; I. 1864. 499—515. His German translation was published in the series of Osiander and Schwab at Stuttgart, 1856. 16.
- Böcker.** Degree dissertation, *De quibusdam Pol. Arist. locis*; Greifswald, 1867. 8. 45 p.
- Susemihl.** Three editions, see *Preface*: articles in *Rheinisches Museum*, XX. 1865. 504—517, XXI. 1866. 551—571; in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIII. 1866. 327—333, CIII. 1871. 790—792; in *Philologus*, XXV. 1867. 385—415, XXIX. 1870. 97—119; in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—595; and *Indices Scholarum, De Polit. Arist. quaestionum criticarum part. I—VII.*; Greifswald 1867—9. 1871-2-3-5. 4.
- Büchschütz.** An article on I. cc. 8—11 in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCV. 1867. 477—482, 713—716.



- Chandler.** *Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions*; London, 1866.
- Madvig.** *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graecos*; Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.
- H. Sauppe. Hayduck. M. Vermehren.** In communications made to me for my first critical edition of 1872, together with one or two conjectures of **Godfrey Hermann** sent me by Sauppe. Cp. also Sauppe's *Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannum*.
- Bücheler.** In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my *Quaestiones criticae*; Greifswald, 1867. 4.
- Mor. Schmidt.** In communications for my first critical edition; also an edition of Book I. *Arist. Pol. Liber I.*; Jena, 1882. 4 (2 parts); and an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. 1882. 801—824.
- Vahlen.** *Aristotelische Aufsätze* II.; Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1872. 673—676; and an article on II. 5, 1264 a 1, in the *Zeitschrift f. d. östr. Gymn.* XXI., 1870. 828—830.
- Polenaar.** Degree dissertation; *Tirocinia critica in Arist. Politica*; Leyden, 1873. 8.
- Trieber.** In communications with me by letter.
- Henkel.** *Studien zur Geschichte der Griechischen Lehre vom Staat*; Leipzig, 1872. 8.
- Riese.** An article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIX. 1874. 171—173.
- Diebitsch.** Degree diss., *De rerum conexu in Arist. libro de re pub.*; Breslau, 1875. 8.
- Heitland.** *Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.*; Cambridge, 1876. 8.
- Broughton.** Edition of Books I. III. IV (VII) with short notes, Oxford and London, 1876. 16.
- Bender.** *Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen*; Hersfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.
- Freudenthal.** In communications with me by letter.
- H. Jackson.** Articles in the *Journal of Philology* on I. 3. VII. 1877. 236—243; on IV (VII). 13. 5—7, X. 1882. 311, 312: also in communications by letter published in the Addenda of my third edition, Leipzig, 1882.
- Postgate.** *Notes on the text and matter of the Politics*; Cambridge, 1877. 8.
- Von Kirchmann.** German translation with notes; Leipzig, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).
- Tegge.** In oral communications to me.
- J. Cook Wilson.** Article in the *Journal of Phil.* x. 1881. 80—86.
- Busse.** Degree diss., *De praesidiis Arist. Pol. emendandi*; Berlin, 1881. 8. 52 p.
- Ridgeway.** *Notes on Arist. Pol.* in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, II. 1882. 124—153.
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## II. THE COMPILATION AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE TREATISE.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself<sup>1</sup>. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the *Poetics* he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, εἶρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδιδόμενοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely *On Poets*<sup>2</sup>. Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, 'histories' of plants and animals. But not the *Poetics*, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up "our Aristotle," to use Grote's phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle's own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecture-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle's master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*<sup>3</sup>. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master's

<sup>1</sup> [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper *On the composition of Aristotle's Politics* in *Verhandlungen der xxx. Philologen-Versammlung*, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1876), and from the Introduction to the *Poetics* (Greek and German), edited by Sussehl (Leipzig, 1874. ed. 2) 1-6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* ii ii chap. 3. 126-138, which should be compared.] See also *Jahrbücher f. Phil.* ciii. 1871. 122-124;

*Bursian's Jahresbericht* xvii. 1879. 251-254; and Zeller *On the connexion of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching* in *Hermes* xi. 1876. 84-96.

<sup>2</sup> 15 § 12, 1454 b 17: see note (108) to Sussehl's edition of the *Poetics*.

<sup>3</sup> 276 D: εἰς αὐτὰ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυρίζομενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἴκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταῦτόν ἔχοντι μετιόντι, 278 A: ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῶν τοῖς βελτίστοις εἰδότην ὑπόμνησιν γεγενῆσθαι.



death Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the *Physics* in his possession<sup>1</sup>. Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the *Metaphysics*<sup>2</sup>, and that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* in writings of his own bearing the same titles<sup>3</sup>: this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the *Physics* and *Ethics* of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were designed to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils: they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the *Nicomachean Ethics*<sup>4</sup>; the latter part of *Politics* iv (vii). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of *De Soph. Elench.* are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the *Politics* appears as πολιτικὴ ἀκρόασις<sup>5</sup>, while φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις is still the title borne by the *Physics* in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources:—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove<sup>6</sup>.

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at

<sup>1</sup> See Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften* 12. Eudemos wrote to Theophrastos to enquire concerning the reading of a passage in the *Physics*, Θεοφράστου γράψαντος Εὐδήμου περὶ τίνος αὐτοῦ τῶν διημερημένων ἀντιγράφων κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον "ὕπὲρ ὧν" φησὶν "ἐπέστεilas κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἧτοι ἐγὼ οὐ ξυνήμι, ἢ μικρὸν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἀναμέσον τοῦ ὅπερ ἡρεμῶν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον." Simplicius *Comm. in Arist. Physica*, 231 a 21, *Schol. in Arist.* (Brandis), 404 b 11 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias in his com-

mentary on the *Metaphysics* 483. 19 ed. Bonitz: καὶ οἶμαι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκείνοis εἶδει συντάττεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους συντάκται... ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ Εὐδήμου κεχώρισται.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander, *Schol. in Arist.* 158 b 8, 161 b 9, 184 b 36, and *Simplicius ib.* 509 a 6: see Zeller 11 ii 71.

<sup>4</sup> *Staatslehre des Arist.* 1. 60 (1).

<sup>5</sup> Diog. Laert. v. 24.

<sup>6</sup> See the arguments advanced against Oncken by Susemihl *Jahrb. für Phil.* CIII. 1871. 122—124.

first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be *either* that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side<sup>1</sup>, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakeable, as when we compare the *Posterior* with the *Prior Analytics*, or the third book of the *Psychology* with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle<sup>2</sup>. If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire Encyclopaedia to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation<sup>3</sup>, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero<sup>4</sup>. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

<sup>1</sup> As in the *Metaphysics*, K cc. 1-7 = B. Γ. E; A cc. 1-5; M cc. 4, 5 = A c. 9.

<sup>2</sup> In the *Physics*, Bk. VII, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, are other instances only less striking than those named.

<sup>3</sup> So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (XIII. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastos' library contains a gross exaggeration: see now *Bursian's Jahresber.* IX. 338; XVI. 253 f.

n. 5, Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 187 f., 215 ff., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 138-154.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo l. c., Plutarch *Sulla* 26, Porphyry *Vita Plotini* 26, Gellius XX. 5. 10; Ptolemaeus as cited by Ibn el-Kifti and Ibn Abi Oseibia, Rose (in vol. V of the Berlin ed.) p. 1473, Casiri *Bibliotheca Arab.-Hispana* p. 308 b, Wenrich *De auctoribus Graec. versionibus* p. 157; also by David and Simplicius *Scholae in Arist.*



arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in some measure in the *Poetics*<sup>1</sup>; or where excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the *Physics* in the latter part of Bk. XI (K) of the *Metaphysics* and in part of what is now Bk. V (Δ) of the same work<sup>2</sup>.

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfactorily to interpret the present condition of the *Politics*, where traces of its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations, glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the finest details<sup>3</sup>, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based upon written materials from Aristotle's own hand<sup>4</sup>. There is only one

(vol. IV of the Berlin ed.) 25 b 42 f., 81 a 27 f., 404 b 38 f.; Zeller *op. c.* II ii 50 ff. 139 nn. (1), (2), III i 620 ff.; Heitz *Die verlorenen Schriften* 1—53.

<sup>1</sup> See Susemihl's ed. of the *Poetics*, pp. 3—6.

<sup>2</sup> The hypotheses above noticed may thus be recapitulated. Aristotle did not himself publish his scientific works. They may have been edited *primarily*

(1) from Aristotle's own drafts as revised after his lectures for the use of his pupils: supplemented by the use, as

(11) *subsidiary* sources, of

(a) Aristotle's own sketches, prepared for use at his lectures:

(β) lecture-notes taken by pupils (with or without supplements of their own):

(γ) passages from works by his pupils:

(δ) additions by editors: very rarely

(ε) excerpts from his own works.

<sup>3</sup> Sober criticism will not be deterred from attributing the plan to Aristotle simply because at the beginning of Bk. III there is no *δέ* in the received text to correspond to a preceding *μὲν οὖν*, or because a connecting *δέ* is sought in vain in II<sup>1</sup> at the opening of Bk. II, and should at least be altered to *γάρ*, if this opening and the close of Bk. I are to be kept side by side. Such twofold transitions from one book to another are found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between IV and V, VII and VIII, IX and X; while between VIII and IX Grant has good ground for suspecting the words *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσούτων ἐλήσθη* 1163 b 27. [On the

transition from *Metaph.* VI (E) to VII (Z) see Bonitz II 294.]

<sup>4</sup> That the work in its present shape is as late as Cicero's time is the opinion of Krohn *Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriften* I 29 ff. (Brandenburg 1872. 4), and Polenaar *Tirocinia critica in Aristotelis Politica* (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense they are not far wrong; cp. the introduction to my edition of the *Poetics*, 4 n. (1). They suppose the compiler or compilers to have had mere fragments of Aristotle's own composition before them, which they arranged and pieced together for themselves into a whole full of contradictions by borrowing from the writings of Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, or, as Polenaar thinks, by additions of their own. Polenaar's arguments, however, rest almost entirely on misapprehensions, and this is partly true of Krohn's, while others do not in the remotest degree suffice to establish such sweeping assertions. Krohn does indeed allow that the first book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he infers that it was originally an independent work, not reflecting that, when taken in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage proves just the opposite; that further the first chapter has no sense except as an introduction to the whole of the *Politics*, of which we have also an express anticipation at the commencement of c. 3, where there is no trace of a change by another editor. The greater part of Bk. II, in which only "isolated pillars" of Aristotle's structure have been left

passage of any length, IV (VII). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil<sup>1</sup>. But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master's death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work<sup>2</sup>. Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the

standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated: and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable: see below p. 33 n. (4). The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos, *Περὶ βασιλείας*: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on III. 14. 9 (624). In the principal part of Bk. IV (VII) he finds "fragmentary sketches"; he agrees with Niebuhr (*Röm. Alterth.* 578 Isler) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. V (VIII) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. VI (IV), of which c. 15 together with VII (VI). 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. VIII (V) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos, *Περὶ καίρων*: comp. nn. on III. 14. 9 (624) and VIII (V). 11. 9 (1720\*). There are some resemblances to the *Areopagitikos* of Isocrates: see on III. 3 § 2, § 9, 6 § 10, 7 § 1, 11 § 20, IV (VII). 4 § 5, VI (IV). 9 § 7, VII (VI). 5 § 10, VIII (V). 1 § 2. Yet Spengel's assertion "totum Isocratis Areopagiticum in usum suum Aristoteles vertit, tam multi sunt loci, qui eadem tradunt" (*Aristotelische Studien* III. 59) is a gross exaggeration, as unproved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873. 676—680. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. V (VIII) is that *ἐνθουσιάζειν*, *ἐνθουσιᾶν* are elsewhere only found in spurious or semi-spurious Aristotelian writings, — *ἐνθουσιαστικός* only

in the *Problems*, *ἐνθουσιασμός* only in the dialogue *On Philosophy*, — whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

<sup>1</sup> But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see notes on IV (VII). 1 § 2 f., § 13. Another well-written chapter is VI (IV). 11, and this even Krohn reckons as part of "the well-preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought." His attempt even there to ferret out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Susemihl *loc. cit.* p. 679.

<sup>2</sup> To start from the internal connexion of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polenaar lose all solid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard mere unconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Susemihl *loc. cit.* p. 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly reminds us that "even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker's development." After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their excision the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reckoning glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows:



same topic<sup>1</sup>; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous *lacunae* of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether<sup>2</sup>. The right order has often been disturbed<sup>3</sup>. The two grossest instances are that Books VII and VIII should come before Bk. IV, and Bk. VI before Bk. V (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us)<sup>4</sup>. No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient<sup>5</sup>. For to all appearance

II. 8 § 1 (*ὁς...βουλόμενος*), 10 §§ 3, 4,  
12 §§ 6—14:

III. 17 §§ 3, 4:

IV (VII). 2 § 3—4 § 1, 10 §§ 1—9:

V (VIII). 7 §§ 13, 14:

VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19.

VII (VI). 2 § 7 (*ἐτι...βαραύσια*), 2 § 9—  
3 § 6:

VIII (V). 6 § 5, 6 §§ 12, 13, 7 §§ 5—10,  
12 §§ 1—6, perhaps also 12 §§ 7—18.

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from II. 6 § 18; III. 14 § 15, 15 § 11; VI (IV). 7 § 5, 14 § 5. On VI (IV). 14 §§ 11—15 see below p. 65 *n.* (1). Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master. As to the doubts recently cast upon IV (VII). 7 by Broughton, and upon IV (VII). 13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and *n.* on IV (VII). 13 § 8 (881).

<sup>1</sup> Besides the end of Bk. III and the beginning of IV (VII) see II. 7 §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—21, III. 15 §§ 7—10 = 16 §§ 10—13; IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2; VIII (V). 1 § 1; 7 § 1; 10 § 24 = 10 § 25.

<sup>2</sup> See particularly I. 8 § 3, 10 § 1, 12 § 1; II. 2 § 6, 5 § 2, 11 § 5;

III. 3 § 2, 12 § 6, 13 § 3, § 6, 16 § 2;

IV (VII). 11 § 2, 13 § 11, 14 § 7;

V (VIII). 7 § 15;

VI (IV). 8 § 7, § 8, 10 § 2, 11 § 1, 12 § 5;

VII (VI). 4 § 1, 8 § 24;

VIII (V). 1 § 7, 7 § 9, 10 § 25, 12 § 11, § 18. Conring saw this, but carried it too far: "noctem aristoteliam quasi stellis illustrare satagit" Götting sneeringly writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. LII.

<sup>3</sup> [On these transpositions see pp. 78

—95.]

<sup>4</sup> The one transposition was first made by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his French translation, not published until long afterwards (Paris 1489); and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Florence 1549). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Scaino da Salo *Quingue Quaestiones ad octo libros de republica* (Rome 1577), Conring, Barthélemy St Hilaire, Spengel *Ueber die Politik* Transactions of the Munich Acad. v. 1 ff. *Arist. Studien* II. 44 ff. (Munich 1865), Nickses *De Arist. Politicorum libris* (Bonn 1851), Brandis in his history *Griech-Röm. Philos.* II ii 1666 ff., 1679 ff. and by others. It has been disputed without success, amongst others by Woltmann in the *Rheinisches Museum* (New Series) I. 1842. 321—354, Forchhammer in *Philologus* XVI. 1861. 50—68, Bendixen in *Philologus* XIII. 1858. 264 ff., XIV. 332 ff., XVI. 408 ff. and in *Der alte Staat des Aristoteles* (Hamburg 1868. 4to), by Krohn *op. c.* 30, and Diebitsch *De rerum conexu in Arist. libris de re publica* (Breslau 1875).

The other transposition was very nearly assumed by Conring; the first who actually made it and tried to demonstrate it was St Hilaire. He was followed by Spengel and even by Woltmann, but was opposed not merely by Bendixen, Forchhammer, Krohn, and Diebitsch, but even by Hildenbrand *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* I (Leipzig 1860) 371 f., and by Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 672 f. *n.* (2), although they have accepted the first transposition. Hildenbrand under certain conditions and Zeller unreservedly. See below p. 58 *n.* 2.

<sup>5</sup> See *Jahrbücher für Philologie* XCIX. 1869. 593—610, CI. 1870. 343 f., 349 f. and the following paragraphs in the text.

even the epitome in Stobaeus<sup>1</sup> presents the traditional arrangement<sup>2</sup>; and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Areios Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas<sup>3</sup>. Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond all doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said<sup>4</sup>, the text of the *Politics* has come down to us. Yet, as we shall see<sup>5</sup>, in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the older edition Bk. iv (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. iii.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a *Politics* in the Alexandrian library attributed by some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos<sup>6</sup>; consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in Diogenes of Laerte<sup>7</sup> and in the Anonymus of Ménage<sup>8</sup>. The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippos of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and no doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library<sup>9</sup>. Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian *Politics*<sup>10</sup>; even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise<sup>11</sup>. And it is

<sup>1</sup> *Ecl. eth.* 326 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Henkel's careful investigation *Zur Politik des Aristoteles* (a Gymnasium Programme of Seehausen) Stendal 1875. 4. pp. 10—17. Büchschütz in his *Studien zu Aristoteles Politik* 1—26 (*Festschrift zu der 2ten Säcularfeier des Friedrichs-Werderschen Gymnasiums*, Berlin 1881) judges differently; but see the review by Cook Wilson in the *Philol. Rundschau* 1882. pp. 1219—1224.

<sup>3</sup> See Meineke *Zu Stobaeos in the Zeitschrift f. Gymnasialw.* XIII. 1859. 563 ff., Zeller *op. c.* III i 614 f., Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 69 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 13 n. 4.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 47 f.

<sup>6</sup> Zeller suggests that this confusion may be explained if Theophrastos edited the work: *op. c.* II ii 678 (1).

<sup>7</sup> v. 24: πολιτικῆς ἀκρόασις [ὡς] ἢ [for the ms. ἢ] Θεοφράστου ἀ—ἦ. Cp. Usener *Analecta Theophrastea* 16 (Leipzig 1858): Zeller *op. c.* II ii 679 (1); Susemihl's critical edition of the *Politics* XLIII n. (73).

<sup>8</sup> πολιτικῆς ἀκρόασις ἢ (so the Ambrosian MS. discovered by Rose: see

Berlin Aristotle v. 1467. No. 70). Ménage incorrectly gave K, which Zeller *op. c.* II ii 75 ed. 2 had conjectured to be a mistake for H. Rose suggests that the Anonymus was Hesychios of Miletus, fl. 500 A.D. In Ptolemy's catalogue the work occurs as No. 32, *liber de regimine civitatum et nominatur bulitikon tractatus* VIII (Berlin Aris. vol. v. p. 1471).

<sup>9</sup> See the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* (ed. 2) 19 f.

<sup>10</sup> He is quoted in Diog. Laert. I 26, cp. *Pol.* I. 11. 9 with the critical notes.

<sup>11</sup> See my third edn. of the *Politics* XIX note 7: *Eud. Eth.* VII. 2 1238 b 5 ff. should be compared with *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 §§ 5—7: *Eud. Eth.* VIII. 3 1248 b 26 ff., 1249 a 12, with *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 § 7. Compare further *Eud. Eth.* III. 2 1231 b 38—1232 a 5 with *Pol.* I. 9 § 2 1257 a 6—10; *Eud. Eth.* II. 11 1227 b 19—23 with *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 § 2 1231 b 26—38; *Eud. Eth.* VII. 10 1242 a 8 f. with *Pol.* III. 6 §§ 3—5 1278 b 21—30, esp. 21 f., 25 f. See also Zeller in *Hermes* xv. 1880. 553—556, who compares *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1218 b 32 ff. with *Pol.* IV



highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 B.C.—101 B.C.) which elapsed between Hermippos and Apellikon of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos<sup>1</sup>, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal<sup>2</sup>, while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero<sup>3</sup>. It is true he did not use it directly<sup>4</sup> and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition<sup>5</sup>: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources<sup>6</sup>. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; the traces of its use are extremely scanty<sup>7</sup>, and it is in

(vii). 1. 1323 a 23, b 18, b 27; and *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1219 a 33 with *Pol.* IV (vii). 8. 5, 1328 a 35.

<sup>1</sup> See Strabo *l. c.*, Plutarch *l. c.*

<sup>2</sup> Polenaar *op. cit.* p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.

<sup>3</sup> *De fin.* v. 4. 11, *ad Quint. frat.* III. 5. 1, *De leg.* III. 6. 14, *De rep.* I. c. 25 (comp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 § 3 f., 1. 2 § 9), c. 26 (cp. *Pol.* III. 1 § 1, 6 § 1, 7 §§ 1, 2), c. 27 (cp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 § 2), c. 29 (cp. *Pol.* VI (iv). cc. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (*op. c.* 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation *ad Quint. fr.*

<sup>4</sup> See Zeller *op. c.* II ii 151 n. (6).

<sup>5</sup> So Zeller *l. c.* Whether the author of the *Magna Moralia* in 1. 4, 1184 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with *Politics* IV (vii). 13. 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. *ad Att.* IV. 4 b § 1, 8 a § 2, *ad Qu. fr.* II. 4 § 2, III. 4 § 5, 5 § 6.

<sup>7</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias *On the Metaphysics* 15, 6 (ed. Bonitz); Eubulos, a contemporary of Longinus, *Ἐπισκέψις τῶν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς τὴν Ἰλιάδωνος πολιτικῶν ἀντιρρημένων* ed. Mai *Script. vet. nov. coll.* Vat. II. 671 ff.: Julian *Letter to The-*

*mistios* 260 D, 263 D: *Scholia Aldina* upon Aristoph. *Acharn.* 92, 980: *Scholia* on Lucian *Dream* 3 (ἐν πέμπτῳ): Michael of Ephesus *On the Nicom. Ethics* fol. 70 a, 186 a, 187 b, 188 b, 189 a: Pseudo-Plutarch *De nobil.* c. 6 932 B ff., c. 8 937 A ff.: Suidas and Photios *s. v.* ἐσχατῶν: Eustathios *On the Iliad* p. 625, 36, p. 126, 12 ff.: *De Thessal. urbe* p. 281, 60 (ed. Tafel): Theodoros Metochites *Miscell.* 644, 667 (ed. Kiessling).—Thus Dionysios of Halikarnassos in his description of the Greek ἀστυμνητεία *Roman Antiquities* v. 73 has not used Aristotle III. 14 §§ 8, 9 as his authority, but the similar account in Theophrastos *περὶ βασιλείας*. In his critical edition, p. XLIV and note (82), Susemihl wrongly followed Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57 n. (4) in maintaining that everything which Dionysios relates *l. c.* v. 73 f. exactly agrees with Aristotle III. 14 f., and consequently that Theophrastos *περὶ βασιλείας* is borrowed altogether from Aristotle. Meanwhile Krohn, *op. c.* 47, pointed out certain essential differences, and Henkel, *op. c.* 3 note 1, has more accurately explained where Theophrastos' line of thought diverges and becomes original. Hence what Dionysios has here borrowed from Theophrastos could not have been derived from Aristotle. But this only

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single ms. of the *Politics* of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke<sup>1</sup>: on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work<sup>2</sup>.

### III. GENERAL ESTIMATE.

At the time when the *Politics* was first made known to mediæval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood<sup>3</sup>, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it 'the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science'<sup>4</sup>. There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar's acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher's systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature<sup>5</sup>. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman's shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations

increases the improbability of Krohn's assertion mentioned p. 15 *n.* above, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that *Pol.* III. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastos. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

<sup>1</sup> See above p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain *Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d'Aristote* 393 f., 456 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition VI *nn.* (4) & (5). [Von Hertling in *Rh. Mus.* XXXIX. 1884. 446—457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that S. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus

died 1280.]

<sup>3</sup> On this subject generally see Oncken *l. c.* I. 64—80. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Oresme: cp. Roscher in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Staatswissensch.* XIX. 1863. 305 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 753 f. Compare Bradley's admirable exposition in *HelLENICA* (Oxford, 1880) 181—183. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Bolland's translation of Bks. I. III. IV (VII) p. 15 (London 1877. 8), 'Indeed, when we come to analyse his method we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally *sublimi ferit sidera vertice*, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature'. This thought is worked out more fully by Grant *Aristotle* 117 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 707, 708.



of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief: so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own<sup>1</sup> and Plato's<sup>2</sup> cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers<sup>3</sup>. The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

<sup>1</sup> 1. 3. 4 with *n.* (31), 1. 6 §§ 1—5 *nn.* (49 b) (50 b), 1. 9. 11 *n.* (88 b), 11. 6 §§ 17—19 *nn.* (219) (221), 11. 8. 16 *n.* (269), 11. 9. 33 *n.* (342), 11. 12 §§ 2—4 *nn.* (400) (404), 111. 3. 1 *n.* (454), 111. 13. 11 *n.* (596), IV (VII). 2. 5 ff., IV (VII). 6. 1 *n.* (770), IV (VII). 14. 16 *n.* (911), VI (IV). 1 § 5, § 6 *nn.* (1118) (1123). Comp. also 111. 4. 8 *n.* (476), VI (IV). 3. 7 *n.* (1158). To this list may be added Phaleas 11. 7, 12 § 12, Hippodamos 11. 8, Thimbron or Thibron, IV (VII). 14. 17 and perhaps Telekles VI (IV). 14. 4. *n.* (1321). Aristotle makes no mention of Xenophon: yet see *n.* on IV (VII). 14. 16

(911). In many of the passages cited above it is doubtful whether he means statements in writing. See L. Stein's paper *Greek theories of political science before Aristotle and Plato* in the *Zeitschrift f. d. gesammte Staatswissensch.* IX. 1853. 115—182.

<sup>2</sup> *Laws* 1. 630 E, XII. 972 E. Cp. on the latter passage *n.* on 11. 6. 17 (219), on the former Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 395 *n.* (2).

<sup>3</sup> See Henkel's exhaustive collection of facts *Studien zur Geschichte der griech. Lehre vom Staat* (Leipzig 1872, 8) p. 2 ff.

evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them<sup>1</sup>. Further, the *Laws* proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the *Republic* of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions'. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation<sup>2</sup>. But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

<sup>1</sup> I may refer to the notes on  
I. 13. 16 (127) IV (VII). 6. 5 (774),  
II. 5. 2 (153) IV (VII). 10. 13 (838),  
II. 5. 7 (158) IV (VII). 12. 2 (859),  
II. 5. 15 (166) IV (VII). 15. 10 (936),  
II. 6. 5 (192) IV (VII). 16. 1 (937),  
II. 6. 10 (208) IV (VII). 16. 12 (944),  
II. 6. 15 (215) IV (VII). 16. 14 (945),  
II. 7. 6 (236 b) IV (VII). 16. 15 (946),  
II. 9. 5 (285) V (VIII). 5. 4 (1024),  
II. 9. 23 (325) V (VIII). 5. 5 (1025):  
also to Thurot *Études sur Aristote* 109 ff.  
(Paris 1866. 8), Van der Rest *Platon et  
Aristote* 452 ff. (Bruxelles 1876. 8).

<sup>2</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II i 783 (Eng. tr. *Plato*  
p. 492). More precise details are given  
in Steinhart *Introductions to Plato's Works*  
v. 238 ff., Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 226 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Reference may be permitted to the  
notes on the following passages:

**Bk. I.** 2 § 2 n. (5); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8  
(54); 9 § 18 (93); 10 §§ 4, 5 (98); 11 § 6  
(103); 13 § 12 (121), 13 § 16 (127):

**Bk. II.** 5 §§ 1, 2 (153), 5 § 16 (167),  
5 § 17 (168), 5 §§ 19—24 (172); 6 § 5

(192), 6 § 6 (201), 6 § 9 (206 b) (207),  
6 § 15 (215); 8 § 21 (273) (274), 8 § 25  
(277); 9 § 2 (279), 9 § 5 (283) (285),  
9 § 11 (295 b), 9 § 13 (297), 9 § 20 (318),  
9 § 25 (330), 9 § 27 (335), 9 § 31 (341),  
9 § 34 (344):

**Bk. III.** 3 § 9 (466); 4 § 18 (499);  
7 § 1 (533); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 2 (673),  
16 § 11 (652):

**Bk. IV (VII).** 6 § 5 (774); 7 § 2 (781);  
10 § 13 (838); 12 § 2 (859), 12 § 3 (860),  
12 § 8 (866) (867); 14 § 13 (907), 14 § 14  
(908); 15 § 10 (936); 16 § 1 (937), 16  
§ 12 (944), 16 § 14 (945), 16 § 15 (946),  
16 § 17 (948); 17 § 1 (950), 17 § 5 (959):

**Bk. V (VIII).** 4 § 2 (1006), 4 § 7  
(1014), 4 § 9 (1015) (1016); 5 § 3 (1022);  
6 § 2 (1064), 6 § 9 (1071); 7 § 9 (1105):

**Bk. VI (IV).** 1 § 1 (1114); 2 § 3  
(1139) (1140):

**Bk. VII (VI).** 2 § 3 (1391):

**Bk. VIII (V).** 9 § 13 (1644); 11 § 10  
(1724) (1725), 11 § 11 (1727), 11 § 12  
(1729); 12 § 8 (1763), 12 § 9 (1764).



the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognises in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man<sup>1</sup>. Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages: hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting<sup>2</sup>. Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them<sup>3</sup>.

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

<sup>1</sup> I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff *Aus Kydathen* 47—54. (Berlin 1880. 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. on I. 2. 4 note (11), I. 2. 6

n. (19 b), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilamowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, *op. c.* 110—113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

<sup>3</sup> See the notes on I. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).

extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The former on the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole exposition, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato<sup>1</sup>, but in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular<sup>2</sup>. By exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding times a series of the most important laws of political and social life. Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premisses, from observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

#### IV. ECONOMIC (O'IKONOMIKH)—SLAVERY AND THE THEORY OF WEALTH<sup>3</sup>.

The opening chapters, Bk. I. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In opposition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family through the intermediate step of the clan-village<sup>4</sup>. At the same time he states what is the specific difference between the state and the family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature. He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important<sup>5</sup> that man, and

<sup>1</sup> See the notes on I. 1 § 2, 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup> See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14—26 and note on II. 2. 2 (131).

<sup>3</sup> On this and the following sections comp. Susemihl *op. cit.* *On the composition of the Politics* 17—29.

<sup>4</sup> Mommsen's account in the *History of Rome*, I c. 3, p. 37 ff. of the Eng. trans. (London 1877. 8), may be compared.

<sup>5</sup> Van der Rest *op. c.* 372. That from this proposition there follows for Aristotle the natural right of slavery, as Oncken (*op. c.* II. 29 f.) maintains, is undeniable: yet he deduces it only by the aid of his other assumptions. Oncken (p. 23) thinks no one would now subscribe the further proposition that he who is by nature outside the state, ἀπολις, is either exalted above humanity or a degraded savage. I am of the contrary opinion;



properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual combination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man's own spontaneous act<sup>1</sup>, quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out of its germs in man's inner nature and the first rude attempts to develop them<sup>2</sup>.

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (*οἰκονομική* 1. cc. 3—13), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this true of the account of slavery c. 4. ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase, or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes<sup>3</sup>, Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named theory was many centuries in advance of the age<sup>4</sup>; and beyond all doubt its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time<sup>5</sup>. Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him, that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

the proposition is just as true now as when Aristotle wrote it.

<sup>1</sup> Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 393 f., Oncken *op. cit.* II. 18 f. Comp. *n.* on 1. 2. 15 (28 b).

<sup>2</sup> *Poet.* c. 4 §§ 1—6.

<sup>3</sup> See on 1. 5 § 9 *n.* (46), 6 § 8 (54).

<sup>4</sup> Even in the time of the Roman empire voices like Seneca's remained unsupported. The whole order of ancient society was once for all established on the basis of slavery, and even Christianity, although it contained in itself the principle which must lead to its extinction, could make no alteration for the time being. The primitive Christian Church may have indirectly prepared for the abolition of slavery (see Lecky *History of Rationalism* II. 258 ff.), but it was directly hostile to such a change. See for proof and elucidation of this statement L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei* 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847. 4) and Oncken *op. cit.* II. 60—74. It should be remembered that even now all the traces of slavery have not as yet disappeared

amongst Christian nations, one of the most important having only been destroyed by the recent civil war in North America; that serfdom was but lately abolished in Russia, and the last remnants of it in Germany were not removed until the present century. [If the status of slavery is not tolerated openly in Christendom, there is much analogy to it in the position of uncivilized tribes in relation to European peoples in colonial settlements, *e.g.* that of the South-African natives to the Boers, under the guise of indenture. But the system of labour recruiting in the Western Pacific for Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that no irregularities occur, and the coolie traffic generally (whether in English, French, or Spanish possessions) have equally the effect of placing ignorant and unprotected natives entirely at the mercy of their employers, and that, too, in a strange country. H. W. J.]

<sup>5</sup> So Hildenbrand rightly thinks *op. c.* 405.

difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect; that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite<sup>1</sup>. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato's, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved<sup>2</sup>. 'The thought that slavery is incompatible with 'the dignity of man' has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet 'the thought of the universality of man's dignity'<sup>3</sup>. In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave's soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature's freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery<sup>4</sup>. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs<sup>5</sup>. Yet in all fairness it ought to

<sup>1</sup> See on I. 4 § 2, 5 § 8, § 9 n. (45), 6 § 3, § 8 n. (55), § 9 n. (56), § 10 n. (57). Compare also the notes on I. 4 § 5, 13 § 12.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. the notes on I. 5 § 10 (47), 6 § 8 (54).

<sup>3</sup> Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 404 f.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. the notes on I. 6 § 9 (56), and 6 § 3 (50).

<sup>5</sup> See the notes on I. 5 § 8 (43) and 5 § 9 (45).



be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used arguments in favour of slavery which are no better<sup>1</sup>, but that in all ages attempts have been made to justify serfdom or slavery by similar fallacies<sup>2</sup>. Nay more, Aristotle's arguments, when properly qualified, are well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views; and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction, which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the greatest spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the educated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to demand from him<sup>3</sup>.

The more general discussions on production and property<sup>4</sup> which follow the investigation into slavery, I. 8—11, cannot be said to be attached to it 'in a fairly systematic manner'<sup>5</sup>, but on the contrary quite loosely and lightly<sup>6</sup>. It is open to question, however, whether the passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little further on (I. 12. 1) did not originally supplement and complete the requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the family as a whole<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Oncken *op. cit.* II. 73 f.

<sup>2</sup> Oncken *op. cit.* II. 38.

<sup>3</sup> On this subject see some remarks of Lang, *op. c.* 60, and Bradley *op. c.* 215 f., 217 f., which are quoted in the notes on I. 5, 10 (47) and III. 5. 7 (511).

<sup>4</sup> [Both are included under *χρηματιστική*. The Greek *κτήσις* and the German 'Erwerb' more properly mean 'Acquisition'. Plato indeed, *Soph.* 219 c, d, opposes *κτητική* to *ποιητική*, classing all the 'arts'

under one or the other of these two divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English treatises on Political Economy, viz. 'Production', that is, production of wealth. TR.]

<sup>5</sup> As Teichmüller asserts *Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudämonie* 148 (St Petersburg 1859. 8).

<sup>6</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 693.

<sup>7</sup> See on I. 12. 1 n. (107).

However that may be, certain it is that the principle of exclusive slave labour, which Aristotle has adopted, has robbed his economic theory of precisely that which must be taken to be the soul of the modern science, the conception of economic labour. It has already been remarked that he cannot help sharing to the full the national prejudice of Greece against all industrial labour as something degrading and servile. As Oncken in particular has excellently pointed out<sup>1</sup>, his sort of distinction between direct or natural production and indirect acquisition by means of exchange, and further between the subdivisions of the two species, derives its peculiar colouring from this defect. 'The axiom 'that man must consider himself the born proprietor of all the treasures 'of the earth, we also hold to be true'; and the proposition, which Aristotle is fond of repeating and which we meet with once more here, that nature makes nothing in vain, should continue to be respected in spite of the thorough-going or half-and-half materialism of our times. But one essential side of man's relation to his planet and to the rest of its productions and inhabitants has escaped Aristotle altogether: of the important part borne by labour in determining this relation he knows nothing: in common with all the ancients he lacked the idea of the gradual acquisition of command over nature and of the gradual unfolding of human culture which accompanies it step by step. Hence it is that he has no presentiment of the epoch-making importance of agriculture as the transition to a settled life; he sets this occupation completely on a level with that of the nomad, the hunter, or the fisherman. He does not separate settled cattle-breeding from the pastoral life of the herdsman who wanders without a home; nor does he bring it into inseparable connexion, as he should do, with agriculture<sup>2</sup>. Agriculture moreover, he thinks, can be carried on by slaves just like other trades<sup>3</sup>, and 'the owner of a piece of ground tilled in this way stands to the 'fruits of the earth in much the same relation as the herdsman, the 'hunter and fisherman. He gets them ready made into his hands, and 'with even less trouble than they do: thus the notion of individual 'labour, of personal acquisition in agriculture, falls into the background 'in Aristotle's view. And this explains the gross inexactitude in his 'notion of property, which is disclosed when he treats plunder as a 'further natural species of production standing on the same footing with 'the former species.' Besides, in so doing he overlooks the fact that

<sup>1</sup> *op. cit.* II. 75—114: whence the passages with quotation marks are taken.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. also on VII (VI). 4. 11 n. (1422).

<sup>3</sup> See IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4 οὔτε βάνανσον βλὼν οὐτ' ἀγοραίων δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας...

οὐδὲ δεῖ γεωργούς εἶναι, § 8 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργούς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περὶ οἰκούς: 10 §§ 9—13: further Exc. III. on Bk. I and n. (282) on II. 9. 4.



plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men<sup>1</sup>. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith's distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated<sup>2</sup>, but the whole discussion is evidence 'how acutely Aristotle 'has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him 'seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in 'the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited 'with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here 'accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of 'the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so 'exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to 'add.' Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

<sup>1</sup> See on I. 8. 7 n. (71) and I. 9. 8 n. (82).

<sup>2</sup> Van der Rest *op. c.* p. 382.

him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature<sup>1</sup> in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: 'starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital.' He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself<sup>2</sup>, but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal<sup>3</sup>.

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, 'he nevertheless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas<sup>4</sup>. After the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclusively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it.' The insatiate nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that 'he endeavours to restrict productive labour in domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set by the powers and conscience of the individual<sup>5</sup>. Of industry as

<sup>1</sup> See on I. 9. 8 n. (82).

<sup>4</sup> Cp. on I. 9. 11 n. (88).

<sup>2</sup> See on I. 9. 8 n. (84).

<sup>5</sup> Comp. the notes on I. 9 § 13 (90),

<sup>3</sup> But see on the other hand the note on I. 9. 11 (87).

§ 18 (93).



'understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than 'of labour.' Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, 'that 'second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the 'forces of nature'. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible 'to accommodate' his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. 'Aristotle's freeholder,' in Oncken's words, 'is not a producer at all, but 'consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the 'true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to 'overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her 'smile and frown.' Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aristotle took of money<sup>2</sup> it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age<sup>3</sup>, he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that 'the free community of antiquity 'was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on 'the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.'

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the 'practical part'. What is here (I. 11 §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a knowledge of the market. Consequently 'the separation which Aristotle has 'made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly 'maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, 'for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a 'field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound 'remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while 'speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.' It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *n.* on I. 9. 18 (93).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *nn.* on I. 10 §§ 4, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Lecky *op. c.* II. 277—289,

Lang *op. c.* 59. [See however Cunningham *Christian Opinion on Usury* pp. 26—33, 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]

essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he mentions the *πολιτικός* who controls the finances of a state as well as the *οἰκονόμος* who manages the property of a household, and that too in a way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the procedure in both cases are completely similar': I. 8 §§ 13—15, 10 §§ 1—3, 11 § 11. With this agrees the decided irony<sup>1</sup> with which he speaks of those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a circle of several families (I. 9. 5). What changes then are to be anticipated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenableness of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and not merely one of degree, between the virtue (*ἀρετή*) of the man, the woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. 13 §§ 4, 5). On the other, his own subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue<sup>2</sup>, as soon as the question is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere quantitative variation than to really distinct species<sup>3</sup>—to say nothing of the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only defect which this enquiry displays<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Strangely misunderstood by Oncken *l.c.* II. 113, who in consequence unjustly accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradiction here. While admitting that many states need such devices, Aristotle does not thereby imply that he thinks this a proof of the excellence of such states.

<sup>2</sup> On the way in which Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from moral excellence see on I. 13, 6 *n.* (112).

<sup>3</sup> Van der Rest *op. c.* 378. Comp. also *nn.* on I. 13 § 7 (114 b) and on §§ 11—13 (120—122).

<sup>4</sup> See the *nn.* on I. 13. 12.



# V. THE REVIEW OF PRECEDING THEORIES AND APPROVED CONSTITUTIONS.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle's own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, III. 15 § 2, VI (IV). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable<sup>1</sup> that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamos, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses<sup>2</sup> of many of the positive features of Aristotle's own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato's *Republic* ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed 'the philosopher's practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions 'and laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human 'nature and of political and domestic life'. Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well-meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism<sup>4</sup> have disclosed very little that will

<sup>1</sup> If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (636) and (1130); also Hildenbrand *op. c.* 351 f., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 677.

<sup>2</sup> See II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), § 17 n. (168), § 25 n. (182): 6 § 7 ff. n. (207), §§ 10—14 nn. (208—211), §§ 16—19 nn. (216—219), § 22 n. (230): 7 § 5 nn. (234, 236), § 6 f. nn. (236 b, 237 b): 9 § 2 n. (279), § 5 n. (285) § 14 n. (300), § 18 n. (313), § 30 n. (339), § 31 n. (341): 10 § 8 n. (365), § 9 n. (368): 11 § 3 n. (381), § 4 n. (383), § 6 n. (388), § 7 n. (391), § 10 n. (393), § 15: 12 § 5 n. (413).  
<sup>3</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 677 f.

<sup>4</sup> The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulos, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich *De iudicio ab Aristotele de republica Platonica facto* (Halle 1868, 8). Amongst the moderns similar attempts have been partially made by Camerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schlosser, who displayed a singular and singularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Pinzger *De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politia reprehendit* (Leipzig 1822, 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.

stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out<sup>1</sup>. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious<sup>2</sup>; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought<sup>3</sup>.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's *Laws*. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible<sup>4</sup>. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children<sup>5</sup>. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phaleas, 7 § 6 f, Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property<sup>6</sup>. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the *Laws* disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other<sup>7</sup>. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character<sup>8</sup>. The refutation of

<sup>1</sup> See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142): 4 § 1 (145), § 2 (146) (147), § 9 (151) (152): 5 § 3 (154), § 10 (162), § 16 (167), §§ 20—23 (172), § 25 (181) (182), § 27 (184).

<sup>2</sup> See on II. 5 § 17 (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), § 27 (184): 6 § 3 (187) (189); also on 5 § 22 (177), 6 § 5 (195).

<sup>3</sup> See Zeller *Plat. Studien* 203 ff. (Tübingen 1839. 8).

<sup>4</sup> Even Zeller and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest *op. c.* 108 ff., 121 ff., 221 ff., 348 ff.: but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5. 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written §§ 10—15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.

<sup>5</sup> See on II. 5. 5.

<sup>6</sup> See on II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), 7 § 6 n. (236 b). How Van der Rest *op. c.* 349 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating

such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.

<sup>7</sup> It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Bröcker *Politiconum, quae docuerunt Plato et Aristoteles, disquisitio et comparatio* (Leipzig 1824. 8), Orges *Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis librorum de republica* (Berlin 1843. 8), Pierson *Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Ansicht vom Staate in the Rhein. Mus.* XIII. 1858. 1—48, 209—247, Rassow *Die Republik des Plato und der beste Staat des Aristoteles* (Weimar 1866. 4)—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the *Republic*, or, being left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the *Laws* and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: II. 6 § 5 (192), § 6 (201), § 14 (212); 7 § 5 (234), § 6 (236 b); 9 § 5 (285): IV (VII). 16 § 15.

<sup>8</sup> See the notes on II. 6 § 3 (188) (189), § 4 (190), § 5 (192) (193), § 6 (201), § 7



Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life<sup>1</sup>. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance<sup>2</sup>.

We may admit then with Oncken<sup>3</sup> that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and riper humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view: and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamos shows us how little, after all, he was disposed, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function<sup>4</sup>. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it<sup>5</sup>. However much to the purpose the

(106), § 9 (106 b), § 10 (108), § 13 (210),  
§ 14 (212), § 15 (213-215), § 18 (220),  
§ 19 (225-227).  
<sup>1</sup> See *op. cit.* II, 6 § 5 (167), § 10 (168),  
§§ 12, 13 (169) (210), 7 § 5 (224);  
<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.* II, 6 § 16 (165 b), 7 § 8

(228).

<sup>3</sup> *op. cit.* I, 191 f.

<sup>4</sup> See the Excursus II on Hippodamos at the end of Bk. II.

<sup>5</sup> See above p. 20; and further the Excursus on Hippodamos just cited.

objections which he brings against Hippodamos with regard to his division of the civic body<sup>1</sup>, they are defective from the jurist's point of view<sup>2</sup>; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the real foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to do so, just as in a later passage (III. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation as *ipso facto* disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of their constitutions<sup>3</sup>: indeed apart from it we should know next to

<sup>1</sup> Compare the notes on II. 8 § 2 (253), § 9 (264), § 24 (276): but on the other hand II. 8 § 12 n. (265).

<sup>2</sup> See the notes on II. 8 § 5 (258), § 15 (268).

<sup>3</sup> Trieber *Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte* 99 f. (Berlin 1871. 8) endeavours to prove that, in his account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephoros. Here I in the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. LXII f., with considerable qualifications however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert *Studien zur altspartanischen Geschichte* pp. 86—109 (Göttingen 1872. 8) endeavoured to show that on the contrary Ephoros made use of the *Politics* of Aristotle. Frick in the *Jahrb. für Philol.* cv. 1872 p. 657 made reply to him that Ephoros' work, as is well known, only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It would have been more correct if he had said to 355: for all that follows was added by Demophilos, the son of Ephoros, probably after his father's death.) But it can be proved that Aristotle wrote at his *Politics* as late as 331, and for the proof Frick refers to Müller *Fragm. hist. Gr.* II p. 121. Both Gilbert and Frick ought to have known that, from the dates there quoted by Müller on the authority of Meier, Rose *Aristoteles pseudopigraphus* p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason inferred that the *Πολιτεῖαι* did not appear until the period between the years 318 and 307, and further that it is only on account of the uncertainty of the dates themselves that Heitz *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1865. 8.) p. 247 sq., *Aristot. fragm.* (p. 242 in the Paris edition of Aristotle), rejects this inference. Even if Rose is right we should conclude from this, not as he does, that Aristotle cannot have been the true au-

thor, but only that the work was first published after his death with additions by the editor. For the genuineness of the groundwork at least has been sufficiently made out by Heitz and by Bergk *Zur Aristotelischen Politik der Athener* (On a fragment of the *Politics* found lately, treating of Athens), in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVI. 1881. 87—115: cp. Susemihl in *Bursian's Jahresber.* xxx. 1882. 20—22. If the matter rested thus Gilbert would be completely refuted. But leaving the correctness of these dates an open question, it is not very probable, to say the least, that Aristotle should have published thus early a work like the *Πολιτεῖαι* based upon such comprehensive studies. On another side Oncken *op. c.* II p. 330 f., by the help of fragments of this work which we still possess on the *Polity of Lacedaemon*, has tried to prove that Aristotle, quite independently of Ephoros, was the first to investigate Spartan constitutional history in true scientific spirit; that he probably visited Sparta himself for this purpose and drew information there from living oral tradition. The difficulties in connexion with this hypothesis are patent, and with reference to Crete at any rate the coincidence between Aristotle and Ephoros is of such a kind that in accordance with the line of argument above Aristotle must have used either Ephoros or his authority: see the notes on II. 10 § 1 (351), § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359), § 6 (360). Even with reference to Sparta hardly any other conclusion seems possible: see the notes on II. 9 § 17 (310); 10 § 1, § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359): VIII (v). 1 § 10 (1498), 7 § 2 (1592), 11 § 3 (1710), 12 § 12 (1771), and compare Rose *op. cit.* 398, 490. Only we are not to infer from this that Ephoros was Aristotle's only authority



nothing of the Carthaginian constitution: moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them<sup>1</sup>. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own pattern-states were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and

here. On the contrary while it is more than doubtful whether he has Ephoros in view when he quotes certain opinions and statements (see on II. 6. 17, II. 9. 11), it is quite certain that in regard to both states Aristotle diverges considerably in details from Ephoros, partly indeed from all other authorities. This divergence must be due to another source, and here and there to one which he alone has utilized: see on II. 10 § 6 (360), § 10 (369): VI (IV), II § 15 (1301).

<sup>1</sup> In spite of Oncken's opposition it will still remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Trieber *op. cit.* p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history in our time; while at the same time he would fain persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement? Why should not a part of the mischiefs discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not perhaps until after the Persian wars that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and

banefulness? And the procedure which Trieber commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on II. 9. 37 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Trieber and others—that the readiness of the Spartan ephors and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times—particularly credible; but first of all he will enquire, with what date these later times ought rightly to commence. Fulkeborn in a note to Garve's translation II p. 242 says most sensibly: 'Aristotle's remarks are very strangely contradicted by all the famous anecdotes of the heroism and chastity of the Spartan women. But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history.....and it should be borne in mind that Aristotle after all deserves more credit than scattered anecdotes of such a kind.' But should not this consideration be extended to other cases? Where Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the change, should we directly and unhesitatingly pronounce these later authorities right? See the notes on II. 9 § 14 (359, 360), § 15 (363).

<sup>2</sup> Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself II. 9 § 34 (cp. note). See further the notes on II. 9 § 5 (363), § 11 (365 b), § 10 (318), § 23 (324), § 25 (330), § 27 (338), § 31 (341).

Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialist elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough; like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle's model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato's.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon's as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book<sup>1</sup>.

#### VI. THE LEADING PROPOSITIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle's own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeness to Plato which was before remarked<sup>2</sup>, our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former<sup>3</sup> and much shorter portion, III. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others<sup>4</sup>. More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation<sup>5</sup> upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them: the true citizens cc. 1,

<sup>1</sup> See further the notes on II. 12 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427).

<sup>2</sup> p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> On what follows compare Susemihl *On the Third Book of Aristotle's Politics* in *Philologus* XXIX. 1870. 97—119.

<sup>4</sup> Hildenbrand, *op. c.* 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. III should follow closely on Bk. II; 'the latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive

'solution of the problem'—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. I—'whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organization for the common weal.'

<sup>5</sup> III. 1 § 9 n. (439 b), 3 §§ 1, 2 n. (456), 5 §§ 5—7 n. (508).



2: the essential identity of a state c. 3: the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 6—13, is, *firstly*, a definition of constitution (πολιτεία) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (πολιτεῖαι). As we are told in Bk. 1., the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common weal of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι): those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (παρεκβάσεις) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (Πολιτεία proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (τυραννίς), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider *secondly* a series of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries: (α) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13<sup>1</sup>. From the definitions just framed the first (α) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

<sup>1</sup> The subdivisions of III. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated:

- (A) First main division: cc. 1—5
  - (α) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
  - (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
  - (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.
- (B) Second main division: cc. 6—13
  - (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions: cc. 6, 7.
  - (II) Discussion of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι): cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8

The comparative merit of constitutions: cc. 9—13

- (α) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9
- (β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 10, 11
- (γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: cc. 12, 13.

(c. 9). This is followed by the inference ( $\beta$ ) that the higher the capacity of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (*ἀρχαίεσται*) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (*εὔθυναί*). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author's essential independence of Plato<sup>1</sup>, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles<sup>2</sup>, he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life<sup>3</sup>, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

<sup>1</sup> Spengel *Ueber Arist. Pol.* 15 n. 18, Henkel, *op. cit.* 80, n. 12, Oncken *op. c.* II 165 f., 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the conceit of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato 'nothing was so certain as that the Demos meant the sovereignty of folly, and the rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom itself.' But how can Congreve conceive of Aristotle's own ideal state if he thinks (p. 137) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange exegesis.

<sup>2</sup> For this reason Oncken's assertion *l. c.* 172, that the exposition given §§ 15, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles' time, is not correct.

<sup>3</sup> Whether Trendelenburg in *Natur-*

*recht* p. 463 ff (Leipzig 1860. 8) has really shown "the fallacy of his analogies" as Henkel thinks *l. c.*, may be seen from the note on III. 11. 2 (565 b). Zeller (*op. cit.* II ii 717) on the other hand finds them to the point, and Henkel himself continues; "However, as Spengel remarks '*Arist. Stud.* II. 56 n. 1, "even Aristotle is not disposed to allow the public "a correct judgment on that which is "strictly scientific. But of that which "concerns mankind at large—what the "Greeks denote by *κοινὰ ἔννοια*—every "one can judge, and the multitude "often judges more correctly than a specialist; who is often prejudiced without knowing it." Or as Goethe in "one passage expresses it, "There is no "doubt this public, so much honoured and "despised, is almost always wrong in "particulars, hardly ever in its broad "views." That Aristotle's confidence goes somewhat too far is shown in the note on III. 15. 8.



external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion<sup>1</sup>, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses: but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is 'far too well-trained a realist,' to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force<sup>2</sup>. He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders<sup>3</sup>; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit 'of the true statesman' 'who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who' 'has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *Fals. leg.* 135: ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἐστὶν ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς αὖ τύχῃ κινούμενος.

<sup>2</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. 168.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. VI. 39. 1: also Pericles *ib.* II. 40, Otanes in Herod. III. 80 s. fin.

'the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the body corporate to which he belongs; that his powers and intelligence can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected through being merged in a higher unity; and this is the only ethical point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3) which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more disputable than on that of public life, where the weal and woe of each individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees further than all the intelligence of the experts<sup>1</sup>. Plato is of quite another opinion (*Laws* III. 700 E ff.)<sup>2</sup>, and 'nothing is easier than by resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of mere cyphers<sup>3</sup>: but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be matched<sup>4</sup>. Spengel<sup>5</sup> is undoubtedly right: these chapters (III. cc. 9—13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere in the work, doctrines 'which deserve to be written in letters of gold.'

This section ends with the remark (III. 11. 20) that all this does not as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its complete form that of the degenerate varieties<sup>6</sup>, is not yet decided. We

<sup>1</sup> See however the notes on III. 11 § 2 (565 b), 15 § 8 (647).

<sup>2</sup> Yet on the other hand see *Symp.* 194.

<sup>3</sup> Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. *Memor.* III. 7 in the case of the popular assembly (Vettori).

<sup>4</sup> Oncken II. 165 f. 'What,' he rightly adds, 'would have become of the German drama of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, had its fate rested solely with the critics, from Gottsched and Nicolai down to the romantic school?' It is however a mistake to suppose that the further step from this 'passive' popular sovereignty to the 'active' sovereignty, which finds expression in the self-government of the *Demos* by the *Demos* was also taken by Aristotle, 'when he recognized Polity as a form of government on an equality with Monarchy and Aristocracy' (Oncken II. 169, 239 f.). For

(1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as standing on an equality with the other two forms of government, VI (IV). 8. 1; and (2) no greater rights are granted to the people in a Polity than in an aristocracy or a moderate democracy, VI (IV). 14. §§ 10, 14. And when Oncken made the assertion (II. 174) that Aristotle invariably subordinated to the law and the popular decree the wisdom and virtue of even the best individual citizen, he must surely have forgotten the substance of III. c. 13, c. 17 §§ 5—8.

<sup>5</sup> *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 54 (646).

<sup>6</sup> In general the result of the preceding statements is that Democracy is preferable to Oligarchy, and the latter preferable to a Tyranny; but whether and how far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank before an unrestrained democracy has not yet been decided.



naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution. But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed. Schlosser<sup>1</sup> was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed. After him Bernays<sup>2</sup> declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination. Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed the whole discussion *περὶ βασιλείας*, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and as it most naturally follows upon c. 13<sup>3</sup>, there would be a tremendous gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of c. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which on Bernays' view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it to its present place. For though the reference in 13 § 1 to c. 9 ff. as preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in 13 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, the latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all connexion with the earlier part as it at present stands<sup>5</sup>, might conveniently come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set forth, thus: 'if however an individual man is superior to all the 'citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law 'as absolute king and ruler.' The question of 11 § 20 noticed above<sup>6</sup> would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the answer. But graver considerations remain. From 11 § 8 it would

<sup>1</sup> In his translation vol. I. p. 296 n. 79. Cp. my note on III. 13. 12 (599).

<sup>2</sup> In the note to his translation, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, *φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην* i. e. *βασιλείαν* (III. 14. 1) finds no point of connexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there men-

tioned. But surely it is enough that in 13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24) merely at the antithesis of the *best* constitution and the corrupt forms.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.

<sup>5</sup> As Conring saw.

<sup>6</sup> P. 41: see also p. 43 n. 2.

follow, in contradiction to Aristotle's view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only<sup>1</sup>. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13, in its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—‘Are the best laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens or of the majority?’—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at 11 § 20<sup>2</sup>; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete<sup>3</sup>. There is then in any case a lacuna after 13 § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally<sup>4</sup>.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—11, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundancy noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (11 § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, 11 § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification<sup>5</sup>. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable<sup>6</sup>, but in such works as those of Aristotle's which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted

<sup>1</sup> See the note on III. 11. 8 (569).

<sup>2</sup> πότερον τῶν νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλευόμενῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων; III. 13 § 12. Compare ὁποῖους μέντοι τίνας δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον... πλὴν τοῦτο γε φανερόν ἐστι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους, 11 § 20.

<sup>3</sup> See Thurot's excellent and convincing analysis *Études* 47 ff., from which Susemihl should not have expressed par-

tial dissent in *Philologus* XXIX. 113—15 and in the critical edition. It requires correction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 13. 12 (599). Compare also Susemihl *Compos. der Arist. Pol.* 23 ff (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be rescinded) and in part Spengel *Arist. Stud.* III. 24.

<sup>4</sup> See again the note on III. 13. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. the note on III. 11. 1.

<sup>6</sup> See on III. 13. 12 n. (599).



in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (Πολιτεία)<sup>1</sup>; as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy<sup>2</sup>.

#### VII. MONARCHY AND THE BEST STATE.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. III cc. 14—17, the second Bk. IV and V. (in the old order VII, VIII), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle's conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective: but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle's time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

<sup>1</sup> See the note last quoted.

<sup>2</sup> See VI (IV). 2. 2 with *nn.* (1136, 1137). If this premiss be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in

ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.



produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phœnician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting-point of all subsequent development<sup>1</sup>. In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind<sup>2</sup>. It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility<sup>3</sup>. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in Polity (Πολιτεία) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king<sup>4</sup>, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

<sup>1</sup> Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57: "Βασιλεία is to Aristotle a historical tradition rather than a form with any further capacity for life in the mental development of his own nation;—and like all Greek philosophers and political writers he rarely notices any other. Thus he is careful to set forth in various ἀπολαί the difficulties involved in the practicability and proper limits of this government." Our astonishment at this defective method of treatment, which first surprised Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel put the question *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 16—<sup>2</sup> Did Aristotle conceive the theory of monarchy to be complete with the dis-

cussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings govern, their inner life, their influence on the people is quite lost sight of.<sup>3</sup> This must be answered in the affirmative with one exception, to be afterwards mentioned p. 46, for which we can easily account. The ideal king, the preeminently best man, can have no instructions given him (c. 13 § 14, c. 17 § 2).

<sup>4</sup> And therefore far from any idea that true popular liberty thrives best under wisely limited monarchy.

<sup>5</sup> See the notes on III. 13 § 14 (601), § 25 (615).

<sup>6</sup> See Henkel *op. c.* 95. n. 25; also VIII (v). 10 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1665).

than to base it exclusively upon personal merits<sup>1</sup>, so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions<sup>2</sup>. This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. VIII (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind<sup>3</sup>. It may be surprising that the philosopher's relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle's is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (*πόλις*) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (*ἔθνος*), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, IV (vii). 7. 3, that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world<sup>4</sup>. But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

<sup>1</sup> See the *n.* on III. 13. 9; also VI (iv). 2. 2, VIII (v). 1 § 11 with *n.* (1503), 10 §§ 36, 37 *n.* (1708).

<sup>2</sup> Henkel *op. c.* 86.

<sup>3</sup> So Hegel *Gesch. d. Phil.* II. 401, Hildenbrand *op. c.* 426. Recently Oncken (*op. c.* I. 16 f., 188 f., II. 261 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the *Politics*. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Torstrik *Litt. Centralbl.* 1870 coll. 1177—1179; Henkel *op. c.* 89 *n.* (19), 97 *n.* (26); Bradley *op. c.* 179, 238 f.; Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* III. 1871. 133—139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Bursian's *Philol. Jahresber.* III. (1874—5). 376 ff.; or to the notes on III. 13 § 13 (601), § 25 (615); 14 § 15 (633); 17 § 5 (678); VI (iv). 11 § 19 (1303). The

last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partizan, made by Bernays *Phokion*, pp. 40—42 (Berlin 1881), and Wilamowitz *Antigonos von Karystos* 182 f., 185 f. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see Bursian's *Jahresber.* xxx. 1882. 11, 15 ff. Compare also Hug *Demosthenes as a political thinker* (*Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum* I. 51—103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Wilamowitz in a review of Hug (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1882, col. 1081 f.) has already somewhat modified his position: see *Jahresber.* l.c. 18 f., where I have also explained why the passage IV (vii). 2. 11 (cp. the note) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. the note there (782).



of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the *Politics*, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle's notions are very defective: he is in truth still far removed from that 'which we ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which 'Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education 'of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development.' He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, 'the mightiest lever 'in this process.' Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions<sup>1</sup>. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on<sup>2</sup>. 'Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the 'separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional 'history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period: 'that the same development of mental culture, of social and military 'organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states 'and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. 'And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of 'development through which the political world of Hellas passed<sup>3</sup>.' The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy<sup>4</sup>.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle's design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III, c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

<sup>1</sup> Oncken II. 169, cp. 137 f.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the notes on III. 14 § 12 (627), 15 § 11, § 12 (662), § 13 (663).

<sup>3</sup> Henkel *op. c.* 94. But certainly this

description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Oncken's remarks. Cp. also the notes on III. 15 §§ 11—13.

<sup>4</sup> Henkel *op. c.* 96 f.



form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order<sup>1</sup>, but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who would investigate wherein the best constitution consists *must first determine what is the best life*,'—since on Aristotle's view of the end of the state the one serves as an aid to the other<sup>2</sup>. And this circumstance loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this written work<sup>3</sup>. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle<sup>4</sup>. To the genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really fundamental problem of his whole ideal of the state. The one side of it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when describing his ideal, IV (VII). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole practical philosophy. For here no less than in what follows<sup>5</sup>, as in the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*<sup>6</sup>, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim<sup>7</sup>. This

<sup>1</sup> In the text both versions will be found at the commencement of Book IV (VII).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. in particular Spengel *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. 60 (652) ff., and Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIX. 1869. 604 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 1 § 2, § 10 (704), §§ 13, 14.

<sup>4</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 2 §§ 3—6, § 11 (725), § 16 (729); 3 § 3, § 6 (741),

§ 8 (743), § 9 (745), § 10: 4 § 1.

<sup>5</sup> IV (VII). 15 §§ 8—10, V (VIII). c. 3, c. 5 § 4 with *nn.* (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14. Cp. the notes on IV (VII). 14 § 8 (903), 15 § 2 (921): V (VIII). 2 § 1 (977): also on c. 3 § 5 (991, 992), 5 § 10 (1032), and Excursus I upon Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>6</sup> See the passages quoted by Zeller II ii 614 n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle's ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle's<sup>1</sup>, to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution: yet by the end of Bk. v (VIII). it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided<sup>2</sup>. We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. II, but also in Bk. III. Thus in the latter we learn how this or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy<sup>3</sup>. And Aristotle's many previous intimations<sup>4</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 1 § 10 (705); 2 § 6 (717); 3 § 3 (736), §§ 8—10.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the note on V (VIII). 7. 1 (1081). Even William of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation: *residuum huius operis in greco nondum inveni*. Of older scholars Conring in particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing; of the moderns more especially Hildenbrand (*op. c.* 449 foll.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency

does not exist or is at any rate unimportant. So too Zeller *op. c.* II ii 676 f., 736 ff. Compare further Spengel *Ueb. die Pol. des Arist.* 8 foll.

<sup>3</sup> See III. 1 §§ 9, 10 *nn.* (440, 441); 4 §§ 4, 5 *n.* (471); *n.* (491) on 4 § 16; 5 §§ 2, 3 *n.* (504), § 5 *n.* (509); 7 § 3 *nn.* (536, 537); 11 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (569); 13 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (595), §§ 11, 12 *n.* (599), §§ 24, 25; 15 §§ 4—6, 9, 10; 16 §§ 2—12; 17 §§ 1, 2; c. 18 with the notes.

<sup>4</sup> I. 13. 15 with *n.* (126)—cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 *n.* (285)—II. 9 § 1, 10 § 9 *n.* (368),



taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle's ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character<sup>1</sup>, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction<sup>2</sup>. Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it<sup>3</sup>. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing<sup>4</sup>. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned IV (VII). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a 'cathartic' effect, V (VIII). 7. 3 ff.<sup>5</sup>. On this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy<sup>6</sup> as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the rhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle's ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, IV (VII). 15. 9, V (VIII). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from "which we indirectly learn that a chapter on

IV (VII). 5 § 2; 10 § 10, § 14; 16 § 12; 17 § 12—cp. 17 § 5 § 7: V (VIII). 3 § 10—cp. 7 § 3; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note on V (VIII). 2 § 2 (979). On II. 6 § 14, III. 3 § 6 foll. see below.

<sup>1</sup> See IV (VII). 14 § 8 foll. n. (903), 15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted on p. 48 n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> See V (VIII). 4 §§ 7—9 with Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>3</sup> See V (VIII). 5 §§ 4—7 with nn. (1024-5-7); § 15 foll. nn. (1044, 1045);

6 § 1 ff. nn. (1061-2-7-8, 1071-3); 7 § 3 ff. nn. (1086-7, 1098, 1104-5-9): also the Excursuses I, II, III, IV at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>4</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 should be corrected by this.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. V (VIII). 6 § 9 with n. (1073); also nn. on 7 § 4 and Excursus V at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>6</sup> See the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* pp. 8 f., 15, 64 f.



'scientific education was intended to follow'<sup>1</sup>. And the question, how far the 'higher' sciences are to be considered for educational purposes, is assuredly not proposed, v (viii). 2. 2, in order to remain unanswered. Lastly, in v (viii). 3. 10, a later investigation is expressly announced to decide whether one or more subjects should belong to the more refined training which aims at the highest intellectual satisfaction: but in the account which has come down to us we seek in vain for the fulfilment of this promise. On the other hand every direct influence in this direction is expressly excluded from the boys' education up to their twenty-first year, v (viii). 5. 4. Hence we may infer from his own words that Aristotle, like Plato<sup>2</sup>, intended a later training in the higher sciences for state purposes to follow this lower educational course<sup>3</sup>; and this would furnish the solution of the riddle<sup>4</sup>. Even as to the subjects of this higher instruction Aristotle can hardly have thought differently from Plato, except that perhaps he added poetry; Pure Mathematics, however, Astronomy, the Theory of Music, and lastly, for natures most scientifically endowed, Philosophy proper, were certainly the means of instruction enjoined. There is ample time for them, as the active duties of full citizens do not begin until military service is over, iv (vii). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; and no one will be eligible for a civil magistracy much before his fiftieth year, even if he enters the popular assembly earlier, 9 § 9 n. Thus their service in the army leaves the younger man leisure for scientific studies. Only Aristotle must have maintained, in opposition to Plato, that this extended course should be different for practical minds and for those whose bent is more towards theory; in order to make of the former officials for the state, and of the latter its men of science, who in other respects may, and indeed ought to rest satisfied with the fulfilment of their general civic duties<sup>5</sup>. In this particular Aristotle approached the modern idea of the state more nearly than any other ancient thinker. Yet when looked at in the light of his own premisses this solution of the problem cannot be said to be altogether happy. If in the best state the best man is to be at the same time the best citizen and statesman<sup>6</sup>; if moreover scientific activity

<sup>1</sup> Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See *nn.* on II. 5. 25 (181), IV (vii). 17. 15 (970).

<sup>3</sup> No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the means at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.

<sup>4</sup> This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections *op. c.* II 204 ff.,

218 f. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a mean which must not be exceeded; he never says a word to the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much: see Exc. I at the end of Bk. v (viii).

<sup>5</sup> See the note on IV (vii). 3. 8 (743).

<sup>6</sup> See III. c. 4 with the notes on § 1 (468), § 5 (471), § 16 (491); c. 5; 18 § 1:

is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of human virtue; then the only logical consequence is Plato's government by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, II. 5. 25<sup>1</sup>.

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete: this theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised I. 13. 15 (cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6)<sup>2</sup>, is wanting. We lack too the entire regulations for the external life of children and adults whether men or women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aristotle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued course of education<sup>3</sup>, and both alike to be the proper field of state-activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive subject. One special division which he mentions IV (VII). 16 §§ 12, 13, 17 § 12 (comp. 17 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of the boys and their education under Inspectors (*παιδονόμοι*), officers appointed on the Spartan precedent<sup>4</sup>. They are to have their official quarters near the gymnasium for the young, IV (VII). 12. 5: to take care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even under five years of age, c. 17 § 5; and that they have as little as possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precautions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pauson with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful must be kept at a distance: V (VIII). 5. 21<sup>5</sup>. In this part of the work too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring<sup>6</sup>; whether comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (*e.g.* *ᾠαῖ*) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking

IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, 9 § 3 *n.* (808): 13 §§ 9, 10; 14 §§ 7, 8; V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2 *n.* (974): VI (IV) 7 § 2.

<sup>1</sup> See the note on II. 5. 25 (182): *Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 7 (VI. 8 1144 b 14 ff.) *Metaph.* I. 1. 11 ff. (981 a 12 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> See the notes on both passages (126-7), (285).

<sup>3</sup> *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 9, 1180 a 1 ff. This is not expressly stated in the *Politics*; but the same thought forms the basis of

the remarks in IV (VII). 12 §§ 4—6; 17 §§ 8, 9, as Zeller *op. c.* II ii 739 *n.* 4 rightly reminds us. Cp. *nn.* on IV (VII). 12 § 5 (863), 17 § 9 (962).

<sup>4</sup> See Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 248, Eng. trans. by Mann and Hardy (London, 1880. 8).

<sup>5</sup> See the notes on IV (VII). 12 § 5, 16 § 12, 17 § 5, § 10, § 12; V (VIII). 5 § 21.

<sup>6</sup> See on IV (VII). 16. 12.



parties of adults are to be countenanced, IV (VII). 17. 12<sup>1</sup>. Inspectors for the women (γυναικονόμοι) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, VI (IV). 15. 13, VII (VI). 8. 23: they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy<sup>2</sup>. We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended<sup>3</sup>; and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary; II. 6. 10 ff., IV (VII). 16. § 15, § 17<sup>4</sup>.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, IV (VII). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato's *Laws*<sup>5</sup>, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, IV (VII). 5. 2; and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination<sup>6</sup>. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised IV (VII). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt *συσσίτια*; why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct; together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage<sup>7</sup>; also the consideration of the question postponed in II. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed<sup>8</sup>.

But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, II. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration<sup>9</sup>. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, *op. cit.* II ii 739 n. 3, assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this: see the note there.

<sup>2</sup> See the notes there.

<sup>3</sup> The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta: see n. on IV (VII). 16. 15.

<sup>4</sup> See the notes there; also II. 7. 5 with n. (236).

<sup>5</sup> Cp. the notes on II. 6. 15, IV (VII). 10. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. the note on IV (VII). 5. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. the notes there.

<sup>8</sup> Cp. n. on II. 10. 9 (368).

<sup>9</sup> Cp. the note there, (278).

<sup>10</sup> Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.



Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this best of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five<sup>1</sup> nor yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates<sup>2</sup>. Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability<sup>3</sup>. Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour<sup>4</sup>, and in respect of a public education from their seventh year<sup>5</sup>, all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves<sup>6</sup>. But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests, IV (VII). 9. 9, whereby almost entire leisure for science was secured to them in their old age<sup>7</sup>. The figures 50 and 70 which have been tentatively assumed will at least be not far removed from his view; and thus this governing civic body will be considerably in the minority when compared with the total number of citizens superannuated or not yet fully qualified, the boys, younger men, and the aged of the citizen order<sup>8</sup>. Only foreigners and resident aliens are allowed to engage in trade, industry, or manual labour: a pro-

<sup>1</sup> See *num.* on IV (VII). 9 § 9, 16 § 9.

<sup>2</sup> This follows from II. 11. 6, III. 11. 8 *num.*, taken in connexion with the other passages quoted in Exc. IV at the end of Bk. II.

<sup>3</sup> This may be inferred from II. 12. 5, III. 11. 8: see notes there: also Exc. V at the end of Bk. II. But Aristotle might have required that the jurors in these courts should be elected instead of being chosen by lot; see II. 11. 7 *num.* (391).

<sup>4</sup> II. 9 § 2 ff., 11 § 10: III. 5 § 2 *num.* (504), § 3, § 5 *num.* (509): IV (VII). 9 § 1, § 3 f., § 9; 10 § 13; 12 § 4: V (VIII). 2 §§ 3—6 *num.* (982); 4 § 1 *num.* (1004); 5 § 8 *num.* (1028); 6 § 4 ff.; § 16; 7 § 1 with notes. Cp. also Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII); *num.* on I. 11. 6 (103) with the passages there quoted.

<sup>5</sup> IV (VII). 17 § 7, and the note on § 4; § 15 *num.* (970): V (VIII). 3 § 13 *num.* (1003); 4 § 7 ff. and Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>6</sup> See I. 7 § 1 *num.* (58 b): III. 1 §§ 9, 10 *num.* (440, 441), 11 §§ 2 ff., 13 § 9 *num.* (595), 16 § 2 *num.* (672), § 13; 17 §§ 1, 2: IV (VII). 8 § 4; 9 §§ 7, 8; 13 § 9 *num.* (885), 14 § 5: VI (IV). 11 § 8: also II. 2 §§ 6, 7, and cp. the notes on II. 2. 4 (133) and III. 13. 12. Other passages seem to contradict this, as II. 2 § 2 ff. § 4 *num.* (133); III. 4 § 5 *num.* (471); 5 § 10; 6 §§ 1, 2; 7 §§ 1, 2; 15 §§ 8—10; 18 § 1: but see the notes: also *num.* on IV (VII). 9. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Because old men are no longer of service for government II. 9. 25. See the note there and on IV (VII). 9. 9 (816).

<sup>8</sup> Cp. *num.* on IV (VII). 9. 9 (817).

hibition which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts<sup>1</sup>. The soil is to be cultivated by serfs who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free<sup>2</sup>.

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture<sup>3</sup> makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, IV (VII). 6. 1 ff.<sup>4</sup>, as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword<sup>5</sup>. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, IV (VII). 9. 7. 'The messes (*συσσίτια*) 'are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta<sup>6</sup>, at once common meals 'and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guard-houses inside the city wall<sup>7</sup>. All boards of officials have their messes, 'each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the 'rangers and field-patrols in the country<sup>8</sup>. The rule of a common mess-table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate<sup>9</sup>. In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans<sup>10</sup>, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen<sup>11</sup>. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed<sup>12</sup> with their twenty-first year<sup>13</sup>, they are also per-

<sup>1</sup> Even vocal and instrumental virtuosi in music are classed with manual labourers (*βδραυγοί*), V (VIII). 5 §§ 8, n. (1028) 6, § 4 ff., §§ 15, 16; 7 § 6: comp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>2</sup> IV (VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13.

<sup>3</sup> ['Culture-state'; one which exists to promote the higher civilization: see p. 48. Tr.]

<sup>4</sup> Cp. notes on IV (VII). c. 6.

<sup>5</sup> See IV (VII). 14. 21 with n. (917).

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Schömann *op. c.* pp. 272, 279

Eng. tran., Trieber *op. c.* 1—26.

<sup>7</sup> IV (VII). 12. 1.

<sup>8</sup> IV (VII). 12 §§ 2, 7, 8.

<sup>9</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. 198.

<sup>10</sup> II. 5. 5 ff., IV (VII). 10. 9, cp. II. 5 §§ 15, 16, with notes, also the notes on II. 5 § 6 (156 b), § 7 n. (158): also VII (VI). 5. 10 with note.

<sup>11</sup> V (VIII). 4. 9, cp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

<sup>12</sup> See on IV (VII). 17. 11 n. (966).

<sup>13</sup> IV (VII). 17. 15.



mitted to attend drinking-parties<sup>1</sup> and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults<sup>2</sup>; further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds<sup>3</sup>.

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in II. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant<sup>4</sup>, but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, III. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in IV (VII). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark VIII (V). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution<sup>5</sup>.

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the 'nobility of mankind,' the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, IV (VII). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion<sup>6</sup>, by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage<sup>6</sup>, at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the *Laws*, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

#### VIII. THE PATHOLOGY OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTIONS.

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. IV. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the

<sup>1</sup> IV (VII). 17. 11.

<sup>2</sup> V (VIII). 5 § 8, 6 § 4 with notes: cp. n. on IV (VII). 17. 11 (966). No weight can be given to V (VIII). 7. 13 f., as the passage is conjectured to be spurious;

see n. (1113).

<sup>3</sup> IV (VII). 17. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. n. on II. 6. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. n. on III. 3. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. II.



description of the ideal state. The task of Politics, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (*ἀπλῶς*) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (*ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι*); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (*ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while those fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies<sup>1</sup>, Polity (*Πολιτεία*), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny<sup>2</sup>. The problems to be solved are as follows; to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are; (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy; and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it: and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word; just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the "discussions on Aristocracy" (*ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 §§ 1—19, which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly<sup>3</sup> be by

<sup>1</sup> αἱ ὀνομαζόμεναι ἀριστοκραταὶ VI (IV), 9. 10: see note on VI (IV). 2. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 1. 4 (1116).

<sup>3</sup> See the notes on VI (IV). 3 § 1, § 2,

§ 4 (1154), § 8; 4 § 1, § 4 (1164), §§ 5, 6, § 8 (1176), § 12 (1182, 1183), § 13 (1185) § 15 (1187), § 17 (1189), §§ 19, 20.

Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (Πολιτεία) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents Πολιτεία in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 12<sup>1</sup>: the passage which follows (12 § 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony: in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v; while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text<sup>2</sup>. If it is right

<sup>1</sup> See the note there, (1315).

<sup>2</sup> Hildenbrand *op. cit.* p. 372 ff. defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in vi (iv), cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book v of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book vi. Zeller on the other hand *op. cit.* ii 675 ff., evidently with the right view that thus to

interlace questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books iv and v of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles; in the (old) Book vi he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the *Jaarh. f. Phil.* ci. 1870. 343—346, 349 f. why

it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliest to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, VII (VI). 4. 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion<sup>1</sup>. Two of the others, VII (VI). 1 § 1 and 1 § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds<sup>2</sup>. But the fourth, VII (VI). 5. 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past<sup>3</sup>; an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation<sup>4</sup>. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. VI (IV) and the first seven chapters of Bk. VII (VI)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion<sup>5</sup>. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. VII (VI), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of *different* constitutions, VII (VI). 1. 3 f.<sup>6</sup> Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. VII (VI) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in VI (IV). c. 16<sup>7</sup>: but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there VI (IV). 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved; namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, VI (IV). 15. § 22<sup>8</sup>. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution: the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on VI (IV). 2 § 5 (1143), § 6 (1144).

<sup>1</sup> See the note there (1424).

<sup>2</sup> Only in the latter passage the δὲ which follows must be changed into δὴ, or else the whole of the following clause *νῦν δὲ τὰ ἀξιόματα...λέγωμεν* expunged.

<sup>3</sup> See the note there, and Spengel *Ueber die Politik* 36 ff.

<sup>4</sup> In that case the change of δὲ into δὴ, slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

<sup>5</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 2. 6 (1144). Oncken, *op. c.* II. 253, thinks these seven

chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on oligarchical, the lawcourts on aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1488) at the end of Bk. VII (VI).

<sup>7</sup> Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on VI (IV). 15. 1 (1343).

<sup>8</sup> Oncken *l. c.* complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Attic



proposed this book, VII (VI), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections: where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle's own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book VIII (V) it will be sufficient to refer to the *Analysis*; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the *Commentary*<sup>1</sup>. It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman<sup>2</sup>. In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, VIII (V). II. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (*τυραννίς*) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown<sup>3</sup>, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller's remarks<sup>4</sup>, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller's explanations. It is true that in III. 5. 9 ff., IV (VII). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which

government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook *ἀμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἰ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι* in the announcement of the contents VII (VI). I. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words *καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην*, but in reverse order. That the whole book is 'a regular medley of motley elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never stood in the same original connexion'

is therefore (see p. 59 n. 5) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on VIII (VI). I. 2 (1379 b).

<sup>1</sup> [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Hildenbrand *op. c.* 469—486; Zeller *op. c.* II ii 750; Oncken *op. c.* II. 241—252; Henkel *op. c.* 91; Van der Rest *op. c.* 519 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In *Die aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen* 12 ff (St Petersburg 1859. 8). Compare the review by Susmühl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.

<sup>4</sup> *op. c.* II ii 699, 705 foll., 749.

in various ways depend upon them: VI (IV). 4 §§ 20—22, 6 §§ 1—3, 12 § 2; VII (VI). 4 §§ 1—3, 8—14; cp. III. 12 § 7 f.; IV (VII). cc. 8, 9; VI (IV). cc. 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own: they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller<sup>1</sup> himself quite rightly observes, the word 'city' or 'state' (πόλις) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (III. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (III c. 8, see above p. 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself; and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see VI (IV). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, VI (IV). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements<sup>2</sup> without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (III. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated VI (IV). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

<sup>1</sup> *L. c.* 14 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 7. 4 (1238).



in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy; and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored VIII (v). 7. 1.<sup>1</sup> In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence<sup>2</sup>, while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; III. 7. 4, comp. VI (iv). 13. 7 foll.<sup>3</sup> This is just what Aristotle censures in Sparta, II. 9. 34 f., IV (vii) 14 § 15 ff. (cp. 2 § 9); and consequently he ought not to have reckoned the Spartan constitution, as he does, with spurious aristocracies, but with Polities. But on the other hand how should Polities be counted amongst normal constitutions of even the second rank unless a certain excellence of the citizens was also required in them? Or is the public education, for which Sparta is praised, v (viii). 1. 4<sup>4</sup>, to make the difference? But there was nothing of the sort at Carthage, and yet Aristotle classes the constitution there with aristocracies and not with Polities<sup>5</sup>. Again, the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, VI (iv). 4 §§ 5, 6; while in VIII (v). 7 §§ 5—9, VI (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 3 ff., Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Polities, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies<sup>6</sup>. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation<sup>7</sup>. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, VI (iv). 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in VII (vi). 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

<sup>1</sup> See note there, and on VIII (v). 7. 6 (1599).

<sup>2</sup> See the note on III. 7. 3 (536).

<sup>3</sup> See the note on III. 7. 4 (538).

<sup>4</sup> So *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 3, 1102a 10 f., x. 9. 13, 1180a 29 ff.

<sup>5</sup> VI (iv). 7 § 4. 11, VIII (v). 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In II. 11 § 5 the expression is more hesitating.

<sup>6</sup> It is a strange misconception of Oncken's *op.* c. II. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in VI (iv). 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.

<sup>7</sup> See the notes on VI (iv). 4 § 4 (1164); 7 § 4 (1238); VII (vi). 27 (1402); VIII (v). 7. 6 (1599).

amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments<sup>1</sup>. It is surprising how Teichmüller<sup>2</sup> could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmüller<sup>3</sup> himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Aristocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts)<sup>4</sup>, and finally Tyranny, this being the ultimate stage of development<sup>5</sup>, there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, III. c. 7, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing; so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle's political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Oncken *op. c.* II. 252, who however is not altogether right; he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a demo-

cracy from a polity.

<sup>2</sup> *op. c.* 18 f.

<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* 20 f.

<sup>4</sup> See *n.* on II. 10. 13.

<sup>5</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). 11. 21 (1305).



their strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true, sung the praise of the middle class<sup>1</sup>; 'but Aristotle is the first 'thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in 'politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his 'explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is 'nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here<sup>2</sup>.' He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, Πολιτεία. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with never-ending revolutions, 'and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: 'while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance<sup>3</sup>.'

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher's political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a 'polity' to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship VI (IV). 9. 5. At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, VI (IV). 15 § 19 f, is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears<sup>4</sup>; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, VI (IV). 14 § 10<sup>5</sup>, and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Polities the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably<sup>6</sup>. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy:

<sup>1</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). 11. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. p. 225.

<sup>3</sup> Oncken *op. c.* II. 227, 228.

<sup>4</sup> See the note on VI (IV). 15. 21

(1371).

<sup>5</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). 9. 5 (1255).

<sup>6</sup> See *n.* on VI (IV). 14. 15 (1340).

thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary Polities. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master's work<sup>1</sup>? Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, VI (IV) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to Polity? It may be that he is thinking only of those Polities in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way<sup>2</sup>. But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle<sup>3</sup>, and there is all the more reason to hold<sup>4</sup>, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his Πολιτεία is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, III. 15. 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in VII (VI). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then even the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like Πολιτεία. This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction VII (VI), 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; VIII (V). 8. 15 ff, 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken<sup>5</sup> has well said: "Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, compensate the poor for the service of watching over them. It was

<sup>1</sup> The practical proposals in VI (IV). 14 §§ 11—15, which Krohn refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.

<sup>2</sup> As Oncken thinks *op. c.* II. 239.

<sup>3</sup> Nor can it be inferred from the following words in VI (IV). 13. § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in

the Polity, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (1269); and on 9 § 3 (1254).

<sup>4</sup> With Oncken *op. c.* II. p. 240, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in *n.* 4 on p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> *op. c.* II. 259, 260.



"the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even  
 "an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian  
 "spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings  
 "it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes at-  
 "tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the  
 "heart and soul of the Hellenic race; with whose power and liberty the  
 "national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle  
 "watches the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling  
 "like an all-powerful monarch; few there are whose observation traces  
 "the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the  
 "idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed,  
 "described<sup>1</sup> Athens, its history and its organization, as no one ever  
 "did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only  
 "homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment  
 "escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom-  
 "age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take  
 "as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand-  
 "ing as a physician at a sick bed; but the patient revealed, what no  
 "healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state."

#### IX. DATE OF THE WORK AND ITS ASSUMED CONNEXION WITH THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

"There are notices in the *Politics* of the Sacred War, VIII. (v). 4. 7,  
 "as of something in the past; of Phalaecus' expedition to Crete, which  
 "took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)<sup>2</sup>, as a recent event,  
 "νεωστὶ πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, II. 10. 16: lastly, of  
 "the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), VIII. (v). 10. 16<sup>3</sup>, without any  
 "intimation that it had but very lately happened<sup>4</sup>." On the other hand  
 the passage II. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 333<sup>5</sup>.  
 The *Politics* as a whole must have been written later than the *Nico-*  
*machean Ethics*, which is quoted six times, II. 2 § 4; III. 9 § 3, 12 § 1;  
 IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7; VI (IV). 11. 3<sup>6</sup>, and earlier than the *Poetics* which is  
 announced as to follow in V (VIII.) 7. 3<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> In his *Constitution of Athens* in the *Πολιτεῖαι*: see above, p. 35 n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XVI. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. the note there (1673).

<sup>4</sup> Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 154 n. (4).

<sup>5</sup> See the note there (375).

<sup>6</sup> See *nn.* on these passages.

<sup>7</sup> Cp. the Introduction to my edition of

the *Poetics*, p. 11 f. Heitz' objection (in *Die verlorenen Schriften* 99 ff.) there mentioned in n. 2 on p. 12 has in the meantime been answered in detail by Vahlen *Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXVII. 1874. 293—298: he has made it tolerably certain that the chapter on *κἀθαρσις* in question, which is now lost,

It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain<sup>1</sup> to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were never really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the *Ethics*<sup>2</sup>, and yet that work itself<sup>3</sup> calls the theory developed in it not Ethics but Politics, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*<sup>4</sup>. For the intermediate expression of the *Rhetoric* (I. 4. 5, 1359 b 10 f.), ἡ περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτική, is here our guide, by making Ethics and Politics in the narrower sense appear as parts of Politics in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the *Magna Moralia* at the commencement of his work<sup>5</sup>, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the *Ethics* that a full realization of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.

stood at the conclusion of the whole treatise after the discussion on Comedy, and not where I looked for it. Yet my remarks *l.c.* p. 8 still retain their force.

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the notes on Bk. II. 4 § 4 (149); 5 §§ 1, 2 (153), § 14 (164); 6 § 15 (215), § 18 (220); 10 § 8 (366):

Bk. III. 4 § 5 (471), § 9 (478):

Bk. IV (VII). 13 § 4 (872), § 8 (881); 14 § 6 (899):

Bk. V (VIII). 3 § 6 (993), § 11 (1000); 5 § 4 (1024), § 15 (1041); 6 § 14 (1079):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 7 (1124—5); 2 § 3 (1140), § 5 (1143); 4 § 21 (1194, 1198), § 22 (1199—1201), § 24 (1203), § 25 (1204); 6 § 4 (1223); 7 § 1 (1230 b); 9 § 9 (1265); 14 § 3 (1319), § 9 (1331), § 10 (1334), § 13 (1337), § 14 (1338); 15 § 16 (1366), § 19 (1369), § 21 (1371):

Bk. VII (VI). 1 § 6 (1383); 7 § 1

(1450):

Bk. VIII (V). 1 § 2 (1493), § 13 (1504); 3 § 4 (1511); 5 § 9 (1559); 10 § 3 (1649), § 5 (1650), § 6 (1657); 11 § 16 (1731); 12 § 11 (1767), § 14 (1777).

<sup>2</sup> See however the notes on IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7 (876, 879, 881); and *n.* (1287) on VI (IV). 11. 3 in regard to the citations there.

<sup>3</sup> 1. 2. 3 1094 a 24 f.

1. 3. 5 1095 a 2,

1. 4. 1 1095 a 14 f.;

cp. 1. 13. 2. 1102 a 7 ff.,

VII. 11. 1. 1152 b 1 f.

<sup>4</sup> *Poet.* 6. 16. 1450 b 6 sqq. (cp. note 71 to my edition of this work). *Rhet.* 1. 2. 7. 1356 a 26 sqq.

<sup>5</sup> Brandis *op. c.* II ii 1335 *n.* certainly expounds his words differently; but see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 608 *n.*



To regard the *Ethics* and *Politics* however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct<sup>1</sup>. Yet this view is undoubtedly very old. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the *Ethics* appended that introduction to the *Politics* now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows<sup>2</sup>: "Since then previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take this subject into consideration together with the theory of the constitution generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its kind). Let us begin then with our discussion."

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark<sup>3</sup>: "there is no coherence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the *Politics*, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out." The opening of the *Politics* is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject-matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the *Ethics*; the state is here first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the highest good for its end; nor is there the least intimation that for the realization of unimpeded virtuous activity, the full meaning of this highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

<sup>1</sup> So recently by Nickses for example.

<sup>2</sup> *Nic. Eth.* x. 9 §§ 22, 23 1181 b 12 f. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερευνήτων τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ δῶκε δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς

πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντιον πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνιδώμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκδόσθαι ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένῃ. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

<sup>3</sup> In his translation of the *Politics* i. xviii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.

to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book<sup>1</sup>, making what is contained in Bk. VIII (v). come next, and then developing the contents of IV (VII), V (VIII), and lastly of VI (IV). and VII (VI). What must be understood by a 'comparison of constitutions' we see clearly from X 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7<sup>2</sup>; at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation: here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this 'comparison'<sup>3</sup>. That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue; and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down "the theory of the constitution generally"? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words *καὶ ὅλως δὲ περὶ πολιτείας* contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from *καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη* onwards we will say nothing: it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover "method in his madness."

That in spite of their close connexion<sup>4</sup> the *Ethics* and the *Politics* are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

<sup>1</sup> For the interpretation which Nickses, *l. c.* pp. 29, 30, puts upon the concluding words,—“Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing “a commencement dealing with other “matters,”—is not calculated to inspire confidence.

<sup>2</sup> οὐδ' ἂν φοντο (sc. οἱ σοφισταὶ) βῆδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκμοῦντας τῶν νόμων, and τῶν νόμων καὶ

τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαί, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no farther.

<sup>3</sup> This disposes of the unhappy attempt of Nickses *l. c.* 25 f. to interpret the passage. In his refutation of the earlier attempts he is on the whole successful.

<sup>4</sup> As Zeller observes *op. c.* II ii 104 f. n. (1).



is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. IV (VII). from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else<sup>1</sup>, the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' *ἑτέρας...σχολῆς*<sup>2</sup>, has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the *Prior* or *Pure* and *Posterior* or *Applied Analytics*, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, which even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state<sup>3</sup>.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller<sup>4</sup> and Walter<sup>5</sup> have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality<sup>6</sup>; but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant<sup>7</sup>. Yet practical insight (*φρόνησις*), without which there is no moral virtue<sup>8</sup>, can be materially promoted by Ethics<sup>9</sup>, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter<sup>10</sup>. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 15 n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the note there (709).

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Zeller *op. cit.* II. ii 104 f. n. 1, 182, 607 n. 3; Oncken *op. c.* I. 164 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *op. c.* II. ii 176—185.

<sup>5</sup> *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft* 537—554 (Jena 1874. 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.

<sup>6</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff., II. 2. 1 1103 b 26 ff. Cp. Walter *op. c.* 151 ff. Zeller *op. c.* II. ii 631.

<sup>7</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. I. 9. 10 1100 a 1 ff.; II. 1. 1 1103 a 14 ff.; II. 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 26—b 18; X. 9=X. 10 (Bekk.): cp. *Pol.* IV (VII). 13. 11 f., *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 §§ 4—8, § 15 1106 a

26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; II. c. 9. Comp. also Walter *op. c.* 151—162 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter II. 7.

<sup>8</sup> Cp. *nn.* in I. 5. 9 (45), I. 13. 6 (112).

<sup>9</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff., I. 3. 7 1095 a 10 f., I. 4. 6 1095 b 4—13, VI. 7. 7 1141 b 21 ff. Comp. Walter *op. c.* 157, 400 ff.

<sup>10</sup> As Zeller thinks, *op. c.* II. ii 608 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the *Nic. Eth.* adduced by Zeller, VI. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzsche and Rassow.

empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated it to himself. That the main value of πολιτικὴ consists in affording this important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated by Aristotle III. 1. 1; VI (IV). c. 1; VII (VI). 5. 1; IV (VII). 13. 5, and in other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as before; rather he demands of political theory III. 8. 1 (cp. VI [IV]. 13. 5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it can be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur<sup>1</sup>.

[X. THE MOST RECENT CRITICISM OF THE TEXT.

The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above<sup>2</sup>, has recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation *De praesidiis emendandi Aristotelis Politica*<sup>3</sup>. By a minute analysis of the old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Susemihl, and is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed<sup>4</sup>.

To begin with, William of Moerbeke's ignorance of Greek was something deplorable<sup>5</sup>. He renders *περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ κτλ.*, *de pronunciatis de optima civitate*; *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις apud alios*; *ἐπιτίθεσθαι praeferrī*; *ἐπιδημεῖν praefectum populi esse*; evidently arriving at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as *τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχῃτα bona quae circa res bellicas*<sup>6</sup>. But mere ignorance whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would seem as if, in II. 12. 8, he made Ὀλυμπίασιν an accusative after τοῦ νικήσαντος *qui vicit Olimpiasem*<sup>7</sup>; at any rate he gives *super tecta* for

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *nm.* on III. 8. 1 (542); III. 13. 13 (601); VI (IV). 15. 4 (1350); see also III. 2 §§ 1—3.

[Here Prof. Susemihl's own *Introduction* ends. The following section is mainly an attempt to present succinctly some results of his critical labours; but for its form, and for occasional divergences of opinion, he is not responsible. Tr.

<sup>2</sup> pp. 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Berlin, 1881. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl however in the large critical edition (1872) p. XXXIII f. had already pointed out inaccuracies and inconsisten-

cies in William's translation and the need of caution in inferences from it to the original. See also the edition of 1879, e.g. I p. 204 n. 1, 210 n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Yet it is an exaggeration when Roger Bacon writes "ut notum est omnibus Parisiis literatis nullam novit scientiam in lingua graeca de quo praesumit, et ideo omnia transfert falsa et corrumpit scientiam Latinorum." Cp. Jourdain *Recherches* p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Busse *op. cit.* p. 36 f. Space permits only a few typical instances to be selected from his stock.

<sup>7</sup> p. 9. The best ms. gives *Olimpiasem*.



ἀνὰ δώματα in v (viii). 3. 9<sup>1</sup>—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: γὰρ *autem* in ἔστι γὰρ II. 9. 18, ἕως γὰρ IV (VII). 17. 13, δεῖ γὰρ V (VIII). I. 2<sup>2</sup>; γὰρ *igitur*, III. 7. 5; δὲ *enim* I. 2. 1; οὖν *enim* I. 8. 6<sup>3</sup>, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings καὶ...δὲ *et...etiam*, καὶ τοι *et quidem*. Sometimes he omits particles (μέν, γάρ, δέ, οὐτε); sometimes, e.g. II. 5. 9 δικαίως *et iuste*, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in II. 3. 7 φράτορα φυλέτην *fratruelem aut contribulem*, etc.<sup>4</sup> He is careless of the order of words; thus II. 4. 6 καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα *et ambo fieri unum ex duobus existentibus*; IV (VII). 3. 8 κυρίως καὶ *et dominos* (*i. e.* καὶ κυρίους)<sup>5</sup>. His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives ἀριστοκρατικὴ, �λιγαρχικὴ by the nouns *aristocratia*, *oligarchia*<sup>6</sup>.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in VIII (v). 6. 3 ἐν θω (for ἐνθα) *in tho*, which he took for a proper name; III. 11. 3 κρίης (for κρίνουσι, so M<sup>s</sup>) *Kries*; II. 9. 30 φιλίτια (so M<sup>s</sup>) *amicabilia*; v (VIII). I § 4 M<sup>s</sup> αὐτ' *ipsorum* (he has read the compendium αὐτῶν); 6 § 9 M<sup>s</sup> ὁ αὐτός (for αὐλός) *id ipsum*<sup>7</sup>. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the *Politics*. Take for instance VIII (v). I. 3: P<sup>1</sup> gives ἀνίσους ἐ. τι ὄντας, with space for one letter; M<sup>s</sup> has slurred over this defect of the archetype by reading ἔτι; not so William; from the immediately preceding ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι οὖν ὄντας he derives *inaequales* in *quocunque existentes*. Similarly with *natura* for δύναμις in IV (VII). 11. 4 (from the adjoining φύσιν), *alia quidem esse eadem* for τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι VI (IV). 4. 25 (from the following τὰλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά); see also III. 16 § 5 *universale* borrowed from c. 15 § 4 τὸ καθόλου, IV (VII). I § 4 *quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant*, IV (VII). 11 § 1 *si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem* borrowed from 5 § 3 τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν; etc.<sup>8</sup> Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled M<sup>s</sup> though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In IV (VII). 14. 22 Γ had the same hiatus as M<sup>s</sup> has now, through the homoeoteleuton σπονδ-άζειν, σχολ-άζειν: William does what he can

<sup>1</sup> p. 12.<sup>2</sup> p. 30.<sup>3</sup> pp. 14, 27.<sup>7</sup> pp. 9, 12, 23. Compare the lacuna<sup>4</sup> p. 11.<sup>5</sup> pp. 29, 30.<sup>6</sup> p. 9.at v (VIII). 5. 17, where ἀκ... is all that stands in M<sup>s</sup> of ἀκροώμενοι.<sup>8</sup> Busse pp. 15—20.

to conceal this by translating *ἔνεκεν τάξεῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης gratia ordinis et pacis*, as if he had read *τάξεως*. In VI (IV). 4. 11 M<sup>s</sup> gives *τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦ* instead of *τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦ*; so too Γ, for William renders *<minus> quam* to make sense. Similarly V (VIII). 6. 11 M<sup>s</sup> has *ἦποντο* for *ἦποντο*; William *sequebantur*; which must be his attempt to make sense out of *ἦποντο*<sup>1</sup>.

Another source of divergence between the codices and William's Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in II. 9. 20 *δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς regere populum se ipsos* (he read *αὐτούς*) *cogebant reges*, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him; see VII (VI). 7 § 5 *προσκεῖσθαι apponere*, 8 § 1 *διηρησθαι dividere* etc.; and for the converse II. 7 § 6 *δείξῃ ostendatur*, 8 § 5 *γράφειν scribatur*, VIII (V). 8. 9 *παρειληφέναι comprehendantur*, etc.<sup>2</sup> Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Γ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: e.g. I. 5. 8 *εἴπερ τοῖς εἰρημένοισι si quidem et dictis <creditur>*, II. 9. 3 *κεκτημένας περὶ οἴκους* (so M<sup>s</sup> for *περιοίκους*) *possidentibus <praedia> circa domus*, etc.<sup>3</sup> Yet additions may be due to glosses, like *videro fugientem proelio*, (?) *ἀπάνευθε μάχης νοήσω* in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>, etc.<sup>4</sup> Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: I. 9. 1 *οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης neque longe <posita>*; II. 8. 13 *οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιῶν κτλ non bene autem neque de iudicio habet lex iudificare dignificans*, though here one might suppose he had *ὁ κρίνειν ἀξίων* before him<sup>5</sup>: II. 11 § 14 *ἕκαστον ἀποτελείται τῶν αὐτῶν unum quodque perficitur ab eisdem*<sup>6</sup>: C. 11 § 15 *τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις inditando semper aliquam populi partem emittentes super urbes*, suggested perhaps by *ποιουῶσιν εὐπόρους* in VII (VI). 5. 9<sup>7</sup>: III. 3 § 2 *εἴπερ οὖν δημοκρατοῦνται si quidem igitur in democratiam versae fuerant quaedam*: 13 § 2 *οἴκοι habetur*: IV (VII). 16. 14 *πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν ad deorum reverentiam hiis, quae sortitae sunt eum qui de generatione honorem* (as if *ταῖς εἰληχναῖς* were read)<sup>8</sup>.

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π<sup>1</sup> i. e. Γ P<sup>1</sup> M) than P<sup>1</sup>, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

<sup>1</sup> pp. 21—23: Γ may have had *εἰποντο*, but this is less probable.

<sup>2</sup> pp. 24—26.

<sup>3</sup> p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> pp. 43, 20, 41.

<sup>7</sup> pp. 24, 43.

<sup>8</sup> p. 41.



M<sup>s</sup>, but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text<sup>1</sup>. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P<sup>s</sup> derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family<sup>2</sup>.

These conclusions however are by no means warranted<sup>3</sup>. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke render it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of P<sup>1</sup> or of M<sup>s</sup>. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P<sup>s</sup> only: once in conjunction with P<sup>2</sup> only: 3 times with P<sup>1</sup> (or its corrections) only; once with Aretinus only: 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts<sup>4</sup>. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing<sup>5</sup>. Whereas the correct reading is due to P<sup>1</sup> alone 11 times, to P<sup>1</sup> in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar., P<sup>2</sup> margin, P<sup>a</sup>) 5 times: and several of these are such changes as Demetrios or Aretinus could

<sup>1</sup> pp. 45-47.

<sup>2</sup> In proof of this Busse quotes (p. 48)

from v (VIII). 8. 2—a passage where the second family II<sup>2</sup> exhibits an hiatus—

P <sup>1</sup> M	William	P <sup>s</sup> (margin)
παραδομένη	subintrans	ὑπεισδύουσα
παρανομία	praevaricatio	παράβασις
τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα	parvae expensae	αἱ μικραὶ δαπάναι
ἀναίρει	consumunt	δαπανώσιν.

There is nothing new in this observation. Compare Susemihl's large critical edition (1872) p. XIII: "mirum autem est in eis verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis co-dicibus omissa hic liber (P<sup>s</sup>) cum paucis aliis et vetusta translatione servavit, cum aliis illis interdum accuratius cum hac assentire aut alias eiusdem sensus voces quam illos hic illic offerre, ut propensus facile fias ad credendum hos in eo locos non ex codice Graeco anti-quiore, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina esse haustos."

<sup>3</sup> With what follows compare Susemihl *Politica tertium edita* (1882) Preface pp. VIII-XVIII.


<sup>4</sup> Γ alone gives 1258 b 40 *Χαρητίδης* 1260 a 4 *ἀρχόντων* *καὶ*, 1260 b 41 *εἰς ὃ* *τῆς*, 1266 b 2 *ὃ δ' ἦδη*, 1271 a 20 *κἂν*, 1276 a 33 *ἔθνος ἐν*, 1282 a 27 *μέγιστα*, 1285 a 7 *αὐτοκράτωρ*, 1332 a 42 *ἐνία δέ*, 1336 a 34

*σπουδασομένων*, 35 *κατὰ*, 1296 a 8 *συστάσεις*, b 38 *πλήθει*, 1320 b 9 *τὴν Ταραντίων ἀρχήν*, 15 *τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς*, 1321 a 12 *ὀπλιτικὴν*, 1303 a 24 *ἐγγὺς ὄν* (or *ἐγγίζον*?), 1311 a 6 *χρημάτων*: ΓP<sup>s</sup> 1328 a 5 *παρὰ*, 1336 a 6 *εἰσάγειν*, 1340 a 16 *ὁῦλον* *ὅτι δέ*, 1321 b 29 *τὰ* omitted, 1322 b 36 *προσευθύνας* (?), 1306 b 39 *καὶ* omitted: ΓP<sup>2</sup> 1259 b 28 *δέ*; ΓP<sup>1</sup> 1265 a 16 *παρὰ*, 1272 b 39 *καθ' αὐτό*: ΓP<sup>1</sup> (corrector) 1278 b 22 *παρ'*: ΓAr. 1289 b 38 *πολέμοις*; ΓP<sup>s</sup>Ar. 1336 a 5 *δέ*: ΓR<sup>b</sup> 1303 b 31 *τὰ*: Γ Aldine P<sup>2</sup> (corrector) 1332 a 33 *τῷ*: Γ Ar. P<sup>2</sup> (corr. 3) 1335 a 26 *σώματος*: ΓP<sup>2</sup> 1254 a 10 *ἀπλῶς* (*ἀπλῶς* *ὅπως* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, *ὅπως* cet.).

<sup>5</sup> Of the disputed cases 1260 b 20 *οἰκονόμοι*, 1262 b 32 *τοὺς φύλακας*, 1274 b 20 (*ἀποστίνειν* or *ἀποστίνεν*?), 1280 a 29 *ταλάωντων* may be mentioned.

easily make for themselves<sup>1</sup>. In 4, or perhaps 5, places P<sup>a</sup> has alone preserved the right reading: it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M<sup>s</sup> or to P<sup>a</sup> alone<sup>2</sup>. From P<sup>a</sup> and from Aretinus unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for P<sup>a</sup>, but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts<sup>3</sup>.

Further it must be noticed that while M<sup>s</sup> Γ are often found alone supporting a variant against P<sup>1</sup>, M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> are less frequently (the number of such cases being about  $\frac{3}{5}$ ) alone in agreement against Γ, and it is very seldom indeed that P<sup>1</sup> Γ alone support any reading against M<sup>s</sup>. What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that Γ and M<sup>s</sup> go back to one common archetype, and P<sup>1</sup> to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P<sup>4</sup> P<sup>a</sup>): only the immediate ancestor of M<sup>s</sup> had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with Γ or the authorities from which it is derived<sup>4</sup>. The genuine readings of the family Π<sup>1</sup> will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M<sup>s</sup> Γ), sometimes in the other (of P<sup>1</sup> and of the corrections in P<sup>a</sup> P<sup>4</sup>): and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.



<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> alone 1259 a 13 *ἐλαουργεῖων*, the right order of 1278 a 36 f. (corr.), b 4 *κάκεινης* corr.<sup>1</sup> (Γ *κάκεινος*), 1286 b 17 *μετέβαλον* (perhaps Γ also), 1287 b 38 *βασίλειον*, 1328 a 5 *ἀπάγχεαι*, 1335 b 20 *γενόμενων*, 1338 b 4 *πρότερον* (corr.), 1340 b 30 *παιδίων*, 1299 b 24 *ἐτέρων*, 1314 a 35 *τὸ ποιεῖν* (?): P<sup>1</sup> Ar. 1263 b 4 *τὸ*, 1280 b 19 *εἴησαν*; P<sup>1</sup> (corr.) Ar. 1255 a 37 *ἐκγονον*, 1299 a 14 *πολιτείας*; P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup> (margin) P<sup>3</sup> (later hand) 1284 a 37 *κολούειν*. Of these *ἐλαουργεῖων*, *πρότερον*, *παιδίων*, *τὸ ποιεῖν*,

*εἴησαν*, *ἐκγονον* are of slight weight.

<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 1253 a 25 *καὶ* omitted after *φύσει*, 1270 b 38 *εἴποι*, 1325 a 29 *αὐτὸ τὸ* (corr.), 1339 a 14 *εἴπειεν*: perhaps 1338 b 33 *ἀπαιδαγωγήτους*.

<sup>3</sup> 1267 b 33 *τὰ* L<sup>a</sup>, U<sup>b</sup> (corr.); 1274 b 20 *τὴν* *πταίσωσι* L<sup>a</sup>; 1275 b 39 *τοῦτο* L<sup>a</sup> Aldine and M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand); 1331 a 24 *θεοῖς* P<sup>4</sup> Ar., 1295 a 28 *ἡ* L<sup>a</sup>C<sup>o</sup> Ar., 1317 a 12 *τὴς* R<sup>b</sup> Ar. 1302 b 39 *τὸ ποσὸν* R<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> For proof of this see (beside the criti-



Few of the readings common to M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> or of those common to Γ M<sup>s</sup> have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving P<sup>1</sup> to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or M<sup>s</sup>, it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, e.g. III. 13. 15 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διώκειν for αὗται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν (δοκοῦσι having been omitted in the archetype of Π<sup>1</sup>): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ, solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas P<sup>1</sup>, alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where P<sup>1</sup> διακόπουσι is a trifle nearer right than M<sup>s</sup> διακονοῦσι Will. ministrant<sup>1</sup>.

All existing manuscripts of the *Politics*, when compared even with those of the *Ethics*, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ M<sup>s</sup>, other things being equal, in preference to P<sup>1</sup> sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of Π<sup>1</sup>, he would yet oftener go astray if he followed P<sup>1</sup> against Γ M<sup>s</sup>. The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects Π<sup>2</sup> is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in Π<sup>1</sup>: in such cases it is seldom Π<sup>2</sup> that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is Π<sup>1</sup> that is mutilated<sup>2</sup>. Yet as a general rule Π<sup>1</sup> should be followed in preference to Π<sup>2</sup>.

Coming now to Busse's view about P<sup>5</sup>, we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (VIII). 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.):

	P <sup>1</sup> M <sup>s</sup>	William	P <sup>5</sup>
	πρὸς ἀκριβείαν	ad perfectionem	πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
	εἰρημέναις	dictis	ῥηθείσαις
§ 6	ἔνεκεν	gratia	χάριν (Bekk.)
	τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ	ipsius quidem enim	αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)
	φίλων	amicorum	τῶν φίλων
c. 3 § 1	τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη	de musica autem	περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
§ 3	τέλος	finaliter	τελευταῖον
	ὅτι δεῖ ποιοῦντας	quod facientes oportet	τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ (Bekk.) <sup>3</sup>

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with

cal notes) Susemihl's Third edition (1882) Preface pp. xi, xi, where also the diagram is given, p. xvi.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Busse p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> The manuscripts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* show an equally perplexing discrepancy between K<sup>b</sup>M<sup>b</sup> and L<sup>b</sup>O<sup>b</sup> in

some parts of the treatise, K<sup>b</sup>O<sup>b</sup> and L<sup>b</sup>M<sup>b</sup> in others.

<sup>3</sup> Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1327 a 34, 1329 a 17, 18, 1334 a 37, 1336 a 34, b 18, 1320 a 10, 1307 b 32 f. Susemihl *op. c.* VIII.

the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of P<sup>5</sup>: 1330 a 32 *χρη* for *δε* c. c.<sup>1</sup>; 1333 b 2 *δε καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα* for *καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ* (Π<sup>1</sup> omit *δε*); 1335 b 23 *παιδοποιίας* for *τεκνοποιίας*; 1336 b 5 *γὰρ τοῦ* for *τοῦ γὰρ*, 1339 a 16 *χάριν* for *ἐνεκα*, 1340 a 8 *δῆλον* for *φανερὸν*; 9 *ἄλλων* for *ἐτέρων*; 1342 a 6 *ἀπάσαις* for *πάσαις*; 1309 a 18 *οὐ* for *μή*. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with P<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>s</sup> against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 *λειπομένοις* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> *deficientes* William, 1318 b 31 *τιμημάτων τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ* omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> translated by Will.; 1326 b 4 *μὲν τοῖς* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1-5</sup> Ald., *τοῖς μὲν* Π<sup>2</sup>; 1332 b 1 *μεταβάλλειν* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1-5</sup> *μεταβαλεῖν* Π<sup>2</sup>; 1334 b 2 *τε* untranslated by Will., τὰ P<sup>1-5</sup>; 1335 a 16 *τὸ c. c. τοὺς* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup>; 1337 a 18 *βέλτιον* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar., *βέλτιστον* c. c. *optimus* Will.; 1319 b 24 *καὶ τὰ* P<sup>1-5</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, *κατὰ c. c. in* Will.; 27 *αἱ πρότεραι* Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>5</sup> and the corrector of P<sup>4</sup>, *αἱ πρότερον* Π<sup>2</sup>; 1322 a 22 *τοῖς εἰρημένοις* M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1-5</sup> (1st hand), *τῆς εἰρημένης* c. c. *dicto* Will.; 1306 a 22 *ἐγχειρίσωμεν ceteri, ἐγχειρήσωσιν* M<sup>s</sup>, *ἐγχειρήσουσιν* P<sup>5</sup> *manus iniecerint* Will.; 1313 b 2 *φρόνημά τε* P<sup>1-5</sup> R<sup>b</sup>, *φρονήματά τε* c. c. *sapientiae* Will.; 1316 a 32 *τῶν* c. c. *τοῦ* P<sup>1-5</sup> Ar., in Γ M<sup>s</sup> a hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 *δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας* c. c., *indigent iustitia et multa temperantia qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui* Will. Any one correcting the text from the Latin version would surely have written *ἀπολαύειν*; but P<sup>5</sup> has *δεόνται.....οἱ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες.....ἀπολαύοντες*. Or again, 1311 b 7 *διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχῦναι* (*αἰσχύναι* M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> *αἰσχύνεσθαι* Π<sup>2</sup>); *propterea quod aliqui monarcharum in corpus verecundiam fecerunt* would have suggested *αἰσχύναι*, not *αἰσχύνειν* which is what we find in P<sup>5</sup>. So again had the scribe wished to emend the corrupt *ὀπλίτην* of 1321 a 12, William's *armativam* would have suggested *ὀπλιτικὴν* or *ὀπλίτιν*, not *ὀπλιτικόν* which is the reading of P<sup>5</sup>. Far more probable is it that here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading *ἀφιεμένους* seems to have come down in P<sup>5</sup> as well as in P<sup>1</sup>: it is at least unlikely that William's *respuentes* suggested it. Even in VIII (v) 8. 2, the passage which Busse thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that *παραδνομένη* should supersede *ὑπεισδύουσα*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Consensus codicum.

<sup>2</sup> Bekker, who took P<sup>2</sup> of the second or worse family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from P<sup>5</sup>: in

some cases even, e.g. 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16 f., 34 f., where M<sup>s</sup>P<sup>1</sup> have a better reading. See p. 76.



## Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the *Politics*, when put into the more coherent shape which to the German editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention<sup>1</sup>, is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books<sup>2</sup>, but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(1) Bk. I. §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. I., was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δ' ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς, and the context. Piccart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow τῷ σώματι μόνῃ χρησίμων (l. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of χρηματιστικῇ could not be excluded from the ἐργασίαι of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται κτλ, are, περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρησίμων μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of χρηματιστικῇ, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, § 1): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ κτλ: or, which is the same thing, if the sentence περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν be transposed to follow ἀρετῆς. The argument too runs on better to the next sentence ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα κτλ, § 7. "I have here said what was necessary in a "general way on each of these various branches; to go accurately into "details would no doubt be useful for the various pursuits themselves, "but it would be a tedious subject to dwell upon. The reader is "referred for particulars to the separate works which have been written "upon them".

<sup>1</sup> As may be done by passing over the parts printed in Clarendon type and reading the duplicates of the same passages in their transposed place; where they stand in ordinary type between thick brackets

thus < >.

<sup>2</sup> See above p. 16 n 4.

<sup>3</sup> Susemihl *Quaestiones Criticae* 1 p. 9 (Greifswald 1867. 4).

(2) Bk. I. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thurot<sup>1</sup>, "that after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does not say one word of the ἀρεταὶ διανοητικαὶ which properly belong to it, while speaking three times, ll. 15, 17, 20, of ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ in the same sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who commands ought to have ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ in perfection, he says that the work belongs to him who directs it and that reason (λόγος) is a directing faculty: this reflexion evidently applies to the ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, elsewhere called φρόνησις, III. 4. 17, and not to the ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ of the ἄλογον." He proposes therefore to transpose ll. 14—17, ὁμοίως τοίνυν...ἔργον to follow ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς: to omit ἡθικὴ in line 20, and change ἡθικὴν to διανοητικὴν in l. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if ἡθικὴν be retained.) Now there is no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, φρόνησις inseparably involves ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13 §§ 2, 3, 6 (cp. *ib.* 12 § 6, ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετήν); so l. 20 ἡθικὴ may stand. The dianoetic virtue, in its perfection, seems to reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the present passage, ὁ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, and *Pol.* III. 4. §§ 17, 18, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθὴς with the notes.

(3) II. 4. 4. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον...μὴ νεωτερίζειν. "It is singular that Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1264 b 1, he supposes without saying "so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers more obedient" (Thurot)<sup>2</sup>. He therefore suggests that II. 4. 4 should follow κοινωνίαν in II. 5. 24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, 1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that ὕδαρὸς φιλία must result from the Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοῦναντίον ὧν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι; the application to the agricultural class would come in appositely to point this reversal of the effect intended<sup>3</sup>.

(4) II. 6 § 3 *sub fin.* καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινα δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion περὶ παιδείας to be extraneous to the main political subject of the *Republic*. Moreover

<sup>1</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* 18, 19. Comp. also Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VI. 9—11.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* 26, 27.

<sup>3</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* I p. 13.



in line 37 he exchanges the construction with *περὶ* for a new one *οἶεται δεῖν...πεπλήρωκε*. The clause *καὶ περὶ παιδείας...φυλάκων* should come amongst the subjects (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάντων*) on which Socrates in the *Republic* has touched, and therefore in § 1 after *κτῆσεως* 1364 b 30<sup>1</sup>.

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάντων*). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) II. 7 § 1, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν. Giffanius (Van Giffen)<sup>2</sup> comparing c. 12 § 1, ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ὠντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον... ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν...πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, proposed to omit φιλοσόφων καὶ. Spengel<sup>3</sup> simply transposed these words before ἰδιωτῶν.

(6) II. 7 §§ 10—13 = §§ 18—20.

The third objection to Phaleas' scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phaleas ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a reiteration of the former in different language.

<p>ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτῆσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοῦ- ναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον,</p>	<p>ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ χαρίεντες</p>
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<sup>1</sup> Compare Victorius *Comm.* p. 106 (ed. of 1576): adiungit autem in extremo disputasse etiam illic Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publicae: hoc enim coniungi debet cum iis quae nunc repetit facienti-

bus ad materiam eorum librorum indicandam, non cum inferioribus ut quidam falso putarunt.

<sup>2</sup> In his commentary p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> *Arist. Studien* III. p. 14 (66).

οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν,  
ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ

ἐν δὲ τῇ τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός),  
οὐ μόνον θ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγ-  
καῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὣν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει  
τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ  
λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινῆν,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ  
ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχω-  
σιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ  
τὴν ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν,  
οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ  
καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς  
ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδογαῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν  
τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα-  
χεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη·  
τρίτον δ', εἰ τινες δύναντο δι' αὐτῶν  
χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ  
φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἄν-  
θρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσιν γε  
τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ'  
οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν  
οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ  
μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτῃν  
ἀλλὰ τύραννον)· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικ-  
ρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρό-  
πος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. 7 §§ 10  
—13.

It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14  
ἐτι, to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and  
to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14<sup>1</sup>.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on  
the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy  
and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where  
wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices,  
must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in  
the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not  
be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: ὁρᾶν  
ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl in *Jahrb. für Philol.* xcvi. 1866. p. 330.



ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἰδιωτεύοντες. Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. "If he was "forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made "provision for poor men in office." Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: "at all events he should not have allowed these "high offices to be virtually put up for sale<sup>1</sup>."

(8) III. 7 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ πλείους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὄπλα. Spengel<sup>2</sup> first called attention to the difficulty of συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ἤδη χαλεπὸν) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot<sup>3</sup> supposed a lacuna to precede συμβαίνει, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τὸ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἀπλῶς ἀρίστους>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 πολιτικὸν πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικόν before πλῆθος in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβαίνει εὐλόγως refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία<sup>4</sup>. Schmidt lastly found such a remark, and the lost subject of the verb συμβαίνει, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὄπλα, which he would transpose to come after πολιτεία.

(9) III. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ...§ 21 κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους = πλὴν τοῦτο...νόμους<sup>5</sup>. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

(10) III. 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...ἐξ αὐτῶν. Thurot<sup>6</sup> sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows. Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Ph.* xcvi. 1866. p. 333.

<sup>2</sup> *Ueber die Politik* p. 23 n. 24.

<sup>3</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* p. 42, 43.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl *Philol.* xxix. 1870. 106 n. 16, *Quaest. Crit.* iii. p. 15, iv. p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* iii. p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* 47—51.

or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6. (ii) No superiority gives exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10. (iii) The best laws are adapted to the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. (iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminent virtue cannot be reduced to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on ostracism). Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost. A discussion of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), *i.e.* somewhere between ἀρετήν (§ 12, end) and εἰ δέ τίς ἐστίν, the beginning of § 13. For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite considerable suspicion to find that the important question started in § 6 is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13<sup>1</sup>.

(11) III. 13. 22. The sentence ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, if genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued to διορθοῦν in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all constitutions. The words cited ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, however, do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of monarchs. Hence, as Thurot<sup>2</sup> saw, they would be more in place in § 23 after διορθοῦν, at the end of the general reflexions. Bernays<sup>3</sup> however found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after ἔχει τρόπον.

(12) III. cc. 15, 16. On the question of absolute sovereignty, πότερόν ποτε ἓνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἢ οὐ συμφέρει, a succession of ἀπορίαι and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3. What follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as follows<sup>4</sup>: (α) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the rule of the best laws? §§ 3—6. (β) Assuming that in certain directions the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10. Then comes a historical or antiquarian appendix to this ἀπορία, contained in §§ 11, 12. (γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14,

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl in *Philol.* XXIX. 1870 pp.

<sup>3</sup> In his *Translation* p. 211.

<sup>113-4.</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* 51—53.

<sup>4</sup> For a fuller account see the *Analysis* p. 112 f.



and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words *κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς*). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 *δοκεῖ δέ τισιν... § 4 πάντων*, relates to a different *ἀπορία* altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (*ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλις*)? Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (*ἀνὰ μέρος*)?

Here the limit of *ἀπορίαί* distinctly discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, *ἀλλὰ μὴν... ὁμοίως*, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 *ἀλλὰ μὴν* as far as *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* in § 9 must belong to the first *ἀπορία* (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) *ἀλλὰ μὴν... § 5 τῶν κειμένων* could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow *κάλλιον* and precede *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν*; the remainder (β) 16 § 5 *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον... § 9 κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between *πᾶσαν* and *ἀλλ' ἴσως*. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (γ) §§ 9, 10 from *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον* as far as *συμφεράδμονες*, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β): and this might go in 15 § 10 after *ὁ εἰς* and before *εἰ δὴ*. To this same *ἀπορία* further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν* to the end *δεῖν ὁμοίως*; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 *καὶ γὰρ... ὁ εἰς*, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.

καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι  
καὶ βουλευόνται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὐταὶ  
δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν  
καθ' ἕκαστον. καθ' ἓνα μὲν οὖν συμ-  
βαλλόμενος ὅστισιν ἴσως χείρων  
ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ  
ἐστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς  
καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἁ-  
μεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὅστισιν.

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ  
κύρια κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ  
ᾧ ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζων, ἐπεὶ  
περὶ ᾧ γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-  
τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ  
νόμος ἀρξείη καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ  
τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς  
νόμοις τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ  
ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον

ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἑτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μὴδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο ῥᾶδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δὴλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ κἀκείνος ὁ εἰς. 15 §§ 7—10.

τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόνται νομοτεθῆσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτο γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινόμενον περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἓνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον τ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὄμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχου ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὃ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἶεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἶεται δεῖν ὁμοίως. 16 §§ 10—13.

Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr J. Cook Wilson<sup>1</sup>. "It may be that the two chapters belong "almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being "combined they should be still further resolved." Thus

- (i) 15 §§ 2, 3 τὸ μὲν οὖν...ἐνούσας = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ...ἐλαττον.
- (ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἀρχὴ...πάντας corresponds in subject to  
16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἄρα νόμον...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος + §§ 10, 11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ  
...περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
- (iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς corresponds in subject to  
16 §§ 11—13 ἀλλ' ὅτι...δεῖν ὁμοίως and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Philology* x. 1881. pp. 82, 83.



οὐδὲ ῥάδιον... συμφράδμονες. "Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second."

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected<sup>1</sup> (1) that the second version is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν to 16 § 2 ὁ βασιλεὺς. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition: for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα... τῶν κειμένων "interrupts the argument of the context: "it belongs to the same part of the subject as [§§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 "and may be read after τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν 1287 b 23" (in § 11).

Spengel<sup>2</sup> proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε... κατὰ τὸ ἔθος to follow κάλλιον, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μὴν, and there is an actual case, viz. the ms. A<sup>c</sup>, where the recurrence of a word (συλλογισμός in *Rhet.* 1. 2 1357 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert οὐ after ζητεῖν in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws<sup>3</sup>.

(13) IV (VII). I §§ 11, 12 = c. 2 §§ 1, 2

<p>ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς πράτ- τειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλά πράττουσαν. οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς</p>	<p>πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογή- σειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν</p>
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<sup>1</sup> Cp. Susemihl *Aristotelis Politica tertium* ed. p. XXI.

<sup>2</sup> *Arist. Stud.* III. 26 (78), f.

<sup>3</sup> ἄλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλευσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον. The reply is: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίξιν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπος

ἂν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. Objection: ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.

οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-  
νήσεως· ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιο-  
σύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει  
δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὣν μετασχω-  
ν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαι-  
ος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. C. I  
§§ 11, 12.

πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθεται ἐφ' ἑνός,  
οὔτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὄλην, εἰς ἣν  
πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν. ὅσοι τε τὸν  
τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν,  
οὔτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἀρ-  
χουσιν εὐδαιμονεστάτην εἶναι φαί-  
ναι. εἰ δέ τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν  
ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέ-  
ραν φήσῃ τὴν σπονδαιοτέραν. C. 2  
§§ 1, 2.

Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed<sup>1</sup>. If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of C. I. Susemihl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12<sup>2</sup>.

(14) IV (VII). 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanius (Van Giffen)<sup>3</sup> calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶωθε γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow εὐσύννοπος: in this way § 9 ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θείας γὰρ...τὸ πᾶν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koræ omitted διό: it is a smaller change, with Böcker<sup>4</sup>, to transpose ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι to follow ἀναγκαῖον in § 9.

(15) IV (VII). 8. 2 ὁλον εἶτε τροφήν τοῦτό ἐστιν εἶτε χώρας πλήθος εἶτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. Bojesen<sup>5</sup> saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν καὶ ταῦτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς ἄλλης κοινωνίας, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

(16) IV (VII). 8 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δ' ἡ...κτῆσεώς ἐστιν. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτείας at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινωνοῖς of § 2<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Ueber die Politik*, pp. 45, 48.

<sup>2</sup> *Jahrb. f. Philol.* xcix. 1866 p. 602.  
See also Böcker *De quibusdam Pol. Ar. locis* (Greifswald, 1867) p. 6f., Spengel *Arist. Stud.* iii. 30 (82).

<sup>3</sup> *Comm.* pp. 921, 2.

<sup>4</sup> *op. c.* 13, 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Bidrag* (Copenhagen 1845) pp. 24—26.

<sup>6</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. p. 15.



(17) IV (VII) cc. 13—15. Wilson<sup>1</sup> regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "In each the same question is proposed, what is 'happiness or the chief good?' (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); 'and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost 'the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with '15 §§ 6, 7 *ὅτι μὲν οὖν...ἦχθαι*).'" These transitional passages stand as follows:

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπονδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. (§ 11) τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶν, εἴτα καὶ ποῖόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὄφελος φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθῃ μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γάρ ἐστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. (§ 12) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶν μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἀνθρώπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον.

ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμους καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, εἰς πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

(§ 13) τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειρότους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μαθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 13 §§ 10—13.

... <τὴν ἀρετὴν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον, τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πρότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν.

ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἦχθαι. 15 §§ 6, 7.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τούτων δὲ ποίους...ἔθεσιν in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Phil.* x. pp. 84, 85.

to the *Ethics*. That there is an advance in the treatment of cc. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13: see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in III. c. 9 there is an elaboration of the earlier sketch in III. c. 6; in I. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in I. c. 4 are but amplified and supported<sup>1</sup>.

In 13 § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to his habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason<sup>2</sup>. Hence Böcker<sup>3</sup> proposed to transpose ὥστε ... ἀλλήλοις to follow βέλτιον at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to λόγος and ἔθῃ; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: "reason ought to work for "the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and "habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would "never do by nature or by habit."

(18) IV (VII). 16 §§ 4, 5 σχέδον δὲ πάντα...τούτους. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 πληθύνει ἔτι <ἢ μικρόν>. If this be done, (1) § 6 ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων κτλ will directly explain § 4 ἔτι δ' ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι...βούλησιν; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37(?) respectively<sup>4</sup>.

(19) IV (VII). 17 § 6 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...διατεινομένοις. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 ἄσκησιν; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred<sup>5</sup>.

(20) IV (VII). 17 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ...ἀναγκαῖον. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, i.e. after δυσμένειαν (? δυσγένειαν) in § 14<sup>6</sup>.

(21) V (VIII). 4 § 7. The clause δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι,

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Susemihl *Aris. Politica tertium* ed. pp. XXI, XXII.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Susemihl in *Philol.* xxv. 1867. p. 403.

<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* 15.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VII. p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Susemihl in *Philologus* xxv. 1867. pp. 408—9.

<sup>6</sup> Susemihl *l. c.*



πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case<sup>1</sup>. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to δὴ.

(22) V (VIII). V § 17 ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἔτι, should give a *second* reason ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοί τινες τὰ ἥθη διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς, the first being the 'enthusiasm' inspired by the melodies of Olympos. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: 'enthusiastic' strains inspire 'enthusiasm': and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that "rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities generally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the soul undergoes a change." But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully portraying morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: "because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody," *i.e.* a purely instrumental performance<sup>2</sup>.

(23) V (VIII). V § 25 καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς \* \* εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν). Böcker<sup>3</sup> recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, *i.e.* after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων § 24.

(24) VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. There are good grounds<sup>4</sup> for believing that this portion of Bk. VI (IV) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰς πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskilfully added by the compiler<sup>5</sup>, seems probable from the

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *ib.* p. 411, *Q. C.* IV. 20, also Böcker independently *op. c.* p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Susemihl *Philologus* XXV. 1867. 411—413, *Q. C.* IV. 20, Spengel *Arist. Stud.* 44, 45.

<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1866.

554—560.

<sup>5</sup> See Cook Wilson in *Journal of Philol.* X. 80, 81.

fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 διότι δὲ πλείους κτλ, is never redeemed: instead of this the main subject of c. 3 is treated over again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact correspondences adduced by Wilson in support of this view.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας  
αἷτιον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω  
πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. 3 § 1.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκῶν συγκει-  
μένας ὁρῶμεν πάσας τὰς πόλεις,  
ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοῦ πλήθους  
τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ  
τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ  
μὲν ὀπλιτικὸν τὸ δ' ἄσπλον. καὶ  
τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν  
ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ  
βάνανσον. 3 §§ 1, 2.

εἰτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον δια-  
φοραῖς ἔστιν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ  
κατ' ἀρετὴν. \* \* καὶ εἰ τι δὴ τοι-  
οῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι  
μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν·  
ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν  
ἀναγκαῖων ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις. 3 § 4.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγ-  
καῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἶδει διαφε-  
ρούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶδει  
διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. 3 § 5.

ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσ-  
αύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς  
ὑπεροχὰς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς  
τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.

ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος  
ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. 4 § 7.

καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀλλ'  
ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μορίων, ὥσπερ  
εἴρηται πολλάκις. 4 § 9.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφήν  
πλήθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί,  
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναν-  
σον, κτλ

τρίτον δὲ <τὸ> ἀγοραῖον, κτλ  
τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον  
δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων  
οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν ὑπάρ-  
χειν κτλ 4 §§ 9, 10.

ὥστε κτλ.....φανερὸν ὅτι τό γε  
ὀπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τῆς  
πόλεως μόνιον. \* \* ἔβδομον δὲ τὸ  
ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὅπερ καλοῦ-  
μεν εὐπόρους. ὀγδοον δὲ τὸ δημιουργι-  
κὸν κτλ

.....ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας  
εἶναι τινὰς ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν.  
4 §§ 15—17.

ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῶον προηροῦμεθα  
λαβεῖν εἶδη, πρῶτον μὲν ἂν ἀπο-  
διωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν  
ζῶον κτλ

εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα εἶναι δεῖ μόνον, τούτων  
δ' εἶεν διαφοραί, ... ὃ τῆς συζεύξεως  
τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει  
πλείω γένη ζῶων κτλ... ὥσθ' ὅταν  
ληφθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχό-  
μενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἶδη  
ζῶον, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἶδη τοῦ ζῶου ὅσαι  
περ αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαῖων μορίων  
εἰσὶν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν  
εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν. 4 §§ 8, 9.



μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 3 § 6.

ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς, ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτείας δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 4 §§ 18, 19.

Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. IV (VII), ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (whence it may be inferred that its author had the original order of the books before him), "the second version inserts, "instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. IV (VII) which the first version refers to."

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημίνην<sup>1</sup>: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.

(25) VI (IV). 6 §§ 2, 3. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν, ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν.

The clause διὸ...μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διὸ of which it could be the effect. Thurot<sup>2</sup> would find a place for it after προσόδων οὐσῶν, but he has to admit that ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν is forced and unusual; it is ἐξεῖναι μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow<sup>3</sup> gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατικὸν after ἐξεῖναι: "on general grounds to exclude from citizenship "those who have the requisite amount of property would be an "oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical." After this rule

<sup>1</sup> "The words may perhaps refer to Bk. IV (VII)" (Wilson). But he does not further explain.

<sup>2</sup> *Etudes sur Aristote* 60, 6

<sup>3</sup> *Bemerkungen* pp. 13, 14.

has been laid down the clause διὸ...μετέχειν comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert δ' after σχολάζειν.

(26) VI (IV). c. 12<sup>1</sup>. The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enumerated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, *ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἰρετή*: what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κρείττον whether their preponderance comes from τὸ ποιοῦν or τὸ ποσόν, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, *ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει...τούτων*; (2) when an oligarchy would suit better in the remainder of § 3, *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων...πλήθους*; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων...ὁ μέσος*. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words *δεῖ δ' αἰεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην...τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις*, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, *τίς κοινοτάτη κτλ.* Moreover from 12 § 6, *ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον* right on to the end of c. 13, *τὸ ἄρχεσθαι*, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry *τίς τίσιν αἰρετή*. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Polities (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12<sup>2</sup>.

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry *τίς τίσιν αἰρετή* is broken off abruptly at *ὁ μέσος* in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. VII (VI). I. 5, *καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εἴρηται πρότερον*—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, *δεῖ δ' αἰεὶ...τούτους*, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bücheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, *δεῖ...τούτους* + 12 § 6, c. 13 §§ 1—6, *ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον...ἐτέρων μόνον* in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between *ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος* and *τοῦ δ' εὖ μεμῖχθαι*, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, *δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν...ἄρχεσθαι*, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after *ὅλως*.

(27) VIII (V). I § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς· ὅτ' ἐν γὰρ...ἐκείνων, ὅτ' ἐν δὲ...

<sup>1</sup> See Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 564 ff.; also Böcker *op. cit.* § 11, pp. 24—32.

<sup>2</sup> The reader may satisfy himself of this by careful examination of the passage: cp. *Analysis* p. 121 f.



μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in *ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον κτλ.* and in § 10 another *ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κτλ.* Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other *ὅτ' δὲ κτλ.* where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holders of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative *ὅτ' δὲ οὐδὲ... ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν* is in § 11 between *πολιτεία* and *πανταχοῦ*<sup>1</sup>.

Wilson<sup>2</sup> discovers a parallel version of 1 §§ 2—7, *δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον... στάσεών εἰσιν*, in 1 §§ 11—16 *πανταχοῦ γὰρ... τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν*. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

<p>δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλὰι γεγένηται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου δ' ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὅτι οὖν ὄντας οἶεσθαι ἀπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἐν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.</p>	<p>ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἳ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἴσοι ᾖσιν, ἴσοι ὅλως εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἳ δ' ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἄνισοι, πάντων ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. §§ 13, 14.</p>
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Further "the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated "in a shorter form" in 2 §§ 2, 3: "there is here then perhaps another "re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book "and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3." Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. III; at 1 § 2, § 13, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c. 1 lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with 1 §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if 1 §§ 11—16 is another recension of 1 §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 § 14, *στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις... ἴσοι ὄντες*,

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Journal of Philology* x. 84.

should precede 1 § 11, πανταχοῦ γὰρ κτλ. At all events that passage is out of place where it stands in c. 3<sup>1</sup>.

(28) VIII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, γίνονται μὲν...ἐπηρεασθείς, have for their subject the cases where στάσις has arisen from dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλούς, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δι' αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This αὔησις may be κατὰ τὸ ποσόν or κατὰ τὸ ποιόν; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλούς (which contain examples of the latter kind) to follow δυναστείας at the end of 3 § 8<sup>2</sup>.

(29) VIII (v). 6 §§ 10—13, ὁμονοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία...ἡ Ἰφιάδου. In its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: (1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body, (2) §§ 5—7 rise of demagogues amongst them, (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered κατὰ γάμους ἢ δίκας, (5) § 16 refusal on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them is after § 16; while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated<sup>3</sup>.

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy<sup>4</sup>, transposition has been used with great effect in some authors (e.g. Lucretius) and has always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor dealing unskilfully with Aristotle's materials<sup>5</sup>. In proportion as this is

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Politica tert. ed.* p. xxiii; Böcker *op. cit.* 37.

<sup>2</sup> Böcker *op. cit.* 40, 41.

<sup>3</sup> Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. 12, 13.

<sup>4</sup> "Before we can prove that a transposition is correct, we must have shewn not only that the passage *cannot* be placed in its old position, but that it *must* be placed in its new." Postgate *Notes* p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> "Hoc est uerisimillimum: ipsum Aristotelem omnes has particulas, quas in altera Politicorum recensione siue uberius tractare siue continenti exposi-

tionis ordini inserere sibi proposuerit, in margine hic illic adnotasse; posteros autem, qui ediderunt libros, cum nescirent, quid notis illis uoluisset scriptor, ineptissime confusas in hunc, quem hodie tenent, locum contulisse, quem fortasse reuera mutilatum lacunosumue deprehenderant." Böcker *op. cit.* 32, 33. There was no place for footnotes in an ancient book: but some instances in the above list—e.g. (3) (11) (15) (21) (23) (27) (29)—have quite the look of marginal notes. Compare the remark of Welldon *Translation* p. 100 n. 2.



admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes: and room must always be allowed for the misgiving "ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristotelem corrigamus quam editores eius antiquos: certe cur ab eo ipso in libris celerrime scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, inchoatis potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem esse inuentam non sane scio cur credam<sup>1</sup>."

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the *Politics*<sup>2</sup> carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies<sup>3</sup>. The most important change introduced is to make Bk. I. cc. 8—11, *περὶ χρηματιστικῆς*, precede the discussion *περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου*, thus inserting them in I. c. 3 § 3 between *χρηματιστικῆς* and *πρώτον δέ*. That the topics of Bk. I. would be thus better arranged may be admitted: but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. I. in the following order: c. 1, c. 2 §§ 1—6 *παῖδας*: then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων κομῶν κοινωνία  
τέλειος πόλις ἦδη. γινομένη μὲν οὖν  
τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὗσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν  
<ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν>. [ἡ δὲ φύσις  
τέλος ἐστίν.] οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι  
τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην  
φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστων,  
ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. διὸ  
πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ  
πρῶται κοινωναίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη  
ἐκείνων. 2 § 8, 1252 b 28—34.

<ἡ δὲ> πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς  
αὐταρκείας, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 1252 b 28.

<μεγίστον ἀγαθοῦ> αἰτία<sup>4</sup>. τὸ  
<γὰρ> οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλ-  
τιστον. ἡ δ' αὐταρκεία [καὶ] τέλος,  
<ὥστε> καὶ βέλτιστον. 2 § 8,  
1252 b 34 1253 a 1.

Then follows 2 § 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον...τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

<sup>1</sup> Susemihl *Politica tertium* ed. p. xxvi. Cp. also p. xiii.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristotelis Politicorum liber primus* ex recensione M. Schmidt (Jena 1882. 4to). The arrangement adopted is justified in an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxxv. 1882. 801—824. Compare with

what follows Susemihl *Politica tertium* ed. (Teubner) pp. xxiv—xxvi.

<sup>3</sup> Even Krohn *Zur Kritik* 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the οἰκείων συναγωγῇ.

<sup>4</sup> *altri* <a> for *ἐτι*.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει ἢ πόλιν  
ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον  
εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. ἀναρουμένον γὰρ  
τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται [ποῦς οὐδὲ χεῖρ] εἰ  
μὴ ὁμωνύμως [ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγοι τὴν  
λιθίνην. διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ <οὐκ> ἔσται  
τοιαύτη.] πάντα γὰρ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται  
καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα  
ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ'  
ὁμώνυμα. 2 §§ 12, 13: 1253 a 19  
—25.

[ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότε-  
ρον ἢ ἕκαστος δῆλον.] εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρ-  
κης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς  
ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.  
ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μὴδὲν  
δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος  
πόλεως, [ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.] 2 § 14:  
1253 a 25—29.

ἃ τε περ ἄλυσεν ὡς ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.  
2 § 10<sup>1</sup>: 1253 a 6, 7.

What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, *i.e.* §§ 9, 10 ἐκ τούτων  
...ἐπιθυμητής, §§ 10—12 διότι...πόλιν, §§ 15, 16 φύσει...κρίσις: also  
c. 3 §§ 1—3 as far as χρηματιστικῆς. Then cc. 8—11 in the following  
order: 8 §§ 1—13 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν (the preceding sentence of  
8 § 1 ὅλως...ἦν is enclosed in brackets)...οἰκίας: 10 §§ 1—3 δῆλον...  
ζῶων: 8 §§ 14, 15; 9 § 1 καὶ ἔοικεν...γίνεται μᾶλλον: 9 §§ 12, 13 καὶ αὐτῇ...  
χρημάτων κτήσις: 9 §§ 2—12 λάβωμεν...ὁ κατὰ φύσιν: 9 §§ 14—18 τῆς  
δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ<σης> χρηματιστικῆς...ὄρον: 10 §§ 4, 5; c. 11; c. 12 § 1  
as far as γαμική. The rest of c. 3 follows, *i.e.* §§ 3, 4 πρῶτον [δὲ] περὶ  
δεσπότου...βίαιον γάρ: cc. 4—6 as usual; c. 7 §§ 2—5 ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπό-  
της...θηρευτική, after which ἢ δὲ χρῆσθαι...τὸν πόλεμον [καὶ πρῶτον]  
should be inserted from c. 8 § 12: then 7 §§ 1, 2 φανερόν δὲ...ἴσων ἀρχή:  
lastly cc. 12, 13 from καὶ γὰρ γυναῖκός (in 12 § 1) to the end. TR.]

<sup>1</sup> The parallel versions here given hardly deserve that name if compared with those pointed out by Spengel, Susemihl, Wilson. It is essential that the same thought, or something very similar, should be found repeated with a mere variation of language. Schmidt employs the two columns to separate genuine Aristotelian fragments from the additions of editors. In the right hand column above, the conception of αὐτάρκεια is found three times, and the passages where

it occurs are judged by him to be additions to the original Aristotle (*op. c.* 804) because, if the end of the state is εὖ ζῆν, it cannot be αὐτάρκεια. This then, he argues, is an instance of two independent definitions which have been blended into one. Similarly with other cases where, according to his view, the present text, or, as Krohn calls it, 'our old recension', has been formed by the comprehension of heterogeneous materials.]



## ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

### INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. I, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good: 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the *Politicus* of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state: 1 § 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life: 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy: 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong: 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual: 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes: 2 §§ 15, 16.

## PART I: OF THE FAMILY: B. I. cc. 3—13.

**A. Of the Family in general.** There being three fundamental constituents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (1) of master and slave, (2) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (3) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (*χρηματιστική*); the relation of this subject to that of the family (*οικονομική*)<sup>1</sup> is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

**B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.****I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 5.**

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(a) The nature and justification of Slavery: cc. 4—6.

(i) The nature and character of the slave: he is an animate chattel, c. 4.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature: cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5.

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6.

(β) The view quoted in the *Introduction* from Plato's *Politicus* that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 1, 2.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

**II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.**

(*περί πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς*: of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

<sup>1</sup> [No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term 'economic science', used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense.

The more common equivalents are, for *χρηματιστική* 'finance', 'money-making art'; for *οικονομική* 'household management', 'domestic economy'. TR.]



(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth (*χρηματιστική*) to a theory of the family or economic science (*οικονομική*): cc. 8—10.

(a) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Proof that the first is inadmissible: acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 2 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν...*).

(γ) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6,

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange simply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital: 9 §§ 7—18.

(δ) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the *natural* species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3.

(ε) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application: c. 11.

(a) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4.

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade: whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(b) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artisans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(β) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(γ) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to

the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been enriched : 11 §§ 7—13.

**III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations; also in the relation of master and slave : cc. 12, 13.**

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children : c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to inanimate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free : 13 § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it : that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, 13 §§ 2—12, since

(α) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, 13 §§ 5—9:

(β) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave : 13 §§ 10, 11.

(γ) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not in themselves, but in relation to another : 13 § 11 (*ἐν τῷ ὄντι*...).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists. It is the master's business to train him to it. The right mode of treating slaves : 13 §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity : 13 §§ 15, 16.



## PART II: OF THE POLITY OR CONSTITUTION: B. II.—VIII.

## A. CRITICAL PART.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. I §§ 1, 2.

II. CRITICISM OF THE IDEAL POLITIES: I § 3—8 § 25.

a. PLATO'S IDEAL STATE IN THE *Republic*: I § 3—5 § 28.

(a) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(β) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: cc. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word "all". Plato's view would not be correct if "all" meant "all collectively", but only if "all" meant "each individual":—a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike: their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.

(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest blood-relations: 4 §§ 2—6.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens: all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when thus generalized all specific affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a feeble attachment in the last degree 'watery' and attenuated: 4 §§ 5—9. < For Plato's purpose, then, these institutions would have been better adapted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disunited and more obedient: 4 § 4. >

(7) Plato's regulation for removing children, under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties: and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischiefs pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in their case: 4 § 9 (ἀλλὰ μὴν...), § 10.

(ii) Arguments against community of property: 5 §§ 1—13.

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state, the cultivators are not the owners of the soil: 5 § 3. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to *meum* and *tuum*, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. Far preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5—8.

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble: 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (*σωφροσύνη*), in respect of one's neighbour's wife, or liberality: 5 § 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c. are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption: 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato's procedure is unfair; he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism: the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(7) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14—28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the defectiveness of the end which they subserve, as pointed out above under (a). But so far as political unity within due limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common messes, &c. instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now: 5 § 16.



(iii) But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states : 5 § 17.

(iv) Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled ; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see 5 § 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory : 5 §§ 18—24.

(v) The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men : 5 § 24 (*ἄριστον δὲ καὶ...*).

(vi) To keep the same rulers always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato's part requires it : 5 §§ 25, 26.

(vii) Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state : 5 §§ 27, 28.

#### b. The ideal polity of Plato's Laws : c. 6.

(α) Comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws* ; the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works : 6 §§ 1—5.

(β) Criticism of the state in the *Laws* : 6 §§ 6—22.

(i) It would require far too large a territory : 6 §§ 6, 7.

(ii) It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people ; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded : 6 §§ 7, 8.

(iii) Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully : 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens : 6 §§ 10—13.

(v) We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist : 6 § 14.

(vi) It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands : 6 § 15.

(vii) The division of each citizen's real estate into two separate establishments is awkward : 6 § 15 (*καὶ τῇ τῶν οἰκοπέδων...*).

(viii) The constitution proposed in the *Laws* is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, *i. e.* a Polity (*πολιτεία*) technically so called. But

(1) this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme : 6 §§ 16, 17.

(2) Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect : 6 § 18.

(3) The oligarchical element is far too preponderant in this constitution of Plato's : 6 §§ 19—21.

(ix) The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe : 6 § 22.

## c. Phaleas' scheme of polity: c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme: 7 §§ 1—4.

(β) Criticism: 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 10, holds also against Phaleas: if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited: 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small: 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires: 7 §§ 8, 9, §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property: 7 § 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether unnoticed: 7 §§ 14—17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object: 7 §§ 22, 23.

## d. Hippodamos' scheme of polity: c. 8.

[(a) Introductory remarks on Hippodamos himself: 8 § 1.]

(β) Account of his model constitution: 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 § 2.

(ii) Division into artisans, farmers, soldiers, 8 § 2.

(iii) Division of the land; a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 § 3.

(iv) Legal regulations: 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4.

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurymen record their verdicts, § 5.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions: 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war: 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates: 8 § 7.

(γ) Criticism: 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible: 8 § 7 (*ἀπορήσειε δ' αὖ...*)—§ 10.



(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view: yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: 8 § 10 (*ἐτεῖ οἱ γεωργοί...*).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jurymen should vote, § 5, any better: 8 §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, 8 §§ 16—22, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: 8 §§ 23—25.

### III. CRITICISM OF THE BEST AMONGST ACTUALLY EXISTING POLITIES: CC. 9—12.

#### (a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General prefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: 9 § 1.

(β) The defects of the Spartan polity: 9 §§ 2—36.

#### (i) Social defects: 9 §§ 2—19.

(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: 9 §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: 9 §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dower, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned more-over terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: 9 §§ 14—19.

#### (ii) Political defects: 9 §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephoralty, 9 §§ 19—24:

(2) in the Council of Elders, 9 §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, 9 §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: 9 §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (*ναύαρχοι*), 9 § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, 9 § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, 9 § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, 9 § 36.

**(b) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.**

(a) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained: 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(β) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities: 10 §§ 5—16.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two: 10 §§ 7—14.

(1) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(2) How far again the magistracy of the *κόσμοι* is worse managed even than the ephorality: 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischiefs similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

**(c) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.**

(a) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephorality, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(γ) To what extent

(i) the democratical element: §§ 5, 6,

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta

(1) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7,

(2) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice mischievous to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10, § 12, §§ 10—12.

(δ) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices: 11 §§ 13, 14.

(e) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the insecure favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

**(d) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 2—6.**

(a) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(β) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 2, 3,

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 3—6, upon Solon's constitution,



## [IV. APPENDIX.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not: 12 §§ 6—14.

(a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycurgus, Zaleukos, Charondas: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Philolaos, 12 § 8,

(c) Charondas, 12 §§ 8—10,

(d) Phaleas, 12 § 11,

(e) Plato, 12 § 12,

(f) Draco, 12 § 13,

(g) Pittacus, 12 § 13,

(h) Andromadas, 12 § 14.]

## B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

## I. FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

## B. III. cc. 1—13.

**First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.**

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question 'What is a state?' and this introduces the further question 'What is a citizen?': 1 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (*δικασταί*), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens: 1 § 2—2 § 5.

β. The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.

γ. Is the excellence (*ἀρετή*) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.

(a) Not unconditionally the same, since

(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.

(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.

[(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.]

(b) Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, *i.e.* his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.

(c) But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first learnt properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (b), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their inmost nature really identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences (*ἀρεταί*) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or dianoetic excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical insight and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.

(d) In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artisans or labourers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 2.

**Second group of principles.** Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit: 6 § 2—13 § 25.

a. Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 6 § 2—7 § 5.



(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms: 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich; the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (*δίκαιον*) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (*τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, τὸ κατ' ἀρετήν*): c. 9.

(β) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend: cc. 10, 11.

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (*οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς*), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (*εἰς ὁ σπουδαιότατος*), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, 11 §§ 1—5: but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the

citizens should entrust the details of state business: 11 §§ 6—9.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, 11 §§ 10—12, and reply to the objection, 11 §§ 13, 14.

(iv) Second objection, 11 §§ 15, 16: how disposed of, §§ 16, 17.

(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the truly supreme sovereign: the unrestricted plenary powers of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: 11 §§ 19—21.

(γ) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: cc. 12, 13<sup>1</sup>.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (*ἀρετή*=capacity and virtue): to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with affluence: c. 12. Politics where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(ii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(1) the normal and best polity proper, True Aristocracy:

(2) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases.—*This whole discussion, (1) and (2), or something similar, is lost.*

(3) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state can only establish its right when this body is large enough numerically to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government resort to ostracism and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—25.

<sup>1</sup> [Bernays supposed cc. 12, 13 to be another version of cc. 9—11: see *Introd.* p. 42.]



## II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:

## B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).

## A. Monarchy and the best constitution in the strict sense, Pure Aristocracy: III. c. 14—V (VIII).

## MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

(a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (*διαφοράς*).

(b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (*ῥᾶδιον*...) —§ 15.

(a) The office of the Spartan kings; §§ 2—5.

(β) Despotic monarchy amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.

(γ) *Αἰσυμνηρία* or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.

(δ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age; §§ 11—13.  
Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.

(e) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15.

(c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place: 15 §§ 1—3.

(d) Objections to its utility: 15 §§ 3—16.

(a) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man: 15 § 3—§ 5 (*πᾶσαν*): 16 § 5 (*ὁ μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

(β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands:

15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἴσως...κἄλλιον*): 16 § 4 (*ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα .*)—§ 5: 15 § 6:

15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ...*)—§ 10=16 § 10 (*εἰσι δὲ*)—§ 13:

15 § 10 (*εἰ δὲ*)—§ 13 (*δημοκρατίαν*).

(i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual: 15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἴσως...*)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two: 16 § 10 (*εἰσι δὲ*)—§ 12.

(ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings; 15 §§ 8—10.

(iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves *ipso facto* allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.

(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 16 § 10.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 16 § 11.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (*δημοκρατῶν*).

(γ) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(δ) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 § 14 (*ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν*)—16 § 2 (*βασιλεὺς*).

(i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 15 §§ 14—16.

(ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(ε) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals: whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 § 2 (*δοκεῖ δέ τισιν*)—§ 4.

(e) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.

(a) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (*δεδουλωτά*) or a normal republican government (*πολιτεία*); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.

(β) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizen; yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 13 §§ 13—25): 17 § 2.

(γ) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.

#### PURE ARISTOCRACY: THE TRUE NORMAL FORM OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION: B. IV (VII), V (VIII).

##### Preliminary Questions: IV (VII) cc. 1—3.

(α) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—10. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12=2 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.



[(β) A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 § 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 2 §§ 8—18.

(ii) For the individual it is not the tyrant's life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other: c. 3.]

#### OUTLINE OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION:

##### B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

##### (a) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(i) The natural conditions; the land and the people: cc. 4—7.

(A) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(B) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(C) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(D) The position of the city, 5 § 3 (*τῆς δὲ πόλεως...*)—6 § 8,

(a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

(b) towards the sea: 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(E) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

(ii) The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(A) Exclusion of the citizens from work for a livelihood, and of all who work for a livelihood from citizenship: c. 8—10 § 8.

(a) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3, 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artisans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-

ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (*δοῦλοι ἢ περλοῖκοι*) of non-Hellenic descent: c. 9.

[(d) Such regulations are no mere innovation; they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 §§ 1—9.]

(B) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (*περὶ δέ...*)—§ 14.

(a) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9;

(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9:

(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10.

(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(b) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(c) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (*μὴ θυμοειδεῖς*), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners: or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (*περλοῖκοι*) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(c) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages: cc. 11, 12.

(a) The city: 11 § 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.

(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.

(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.

(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess, 12 § 1.

(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (*ἀγορὰ ἐλευθέρων*) with the principal temples and the gymnasia for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(β) **A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity:**  
IV (VII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (*incomplete*).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is as necessary as of the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.



(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellence, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellence can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator's disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (*φύσις*), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellence by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) **The Education of the citizens: IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7** (*left incomplete*).

Its unity: IV (VII): 14 §§ 1—8.

Its aim and end: 14 § 9—15 § 6.

The means to be employed: IV (VII) § 6—end of v (VIII).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(B) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(1) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(2) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquest the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellence as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (*ἔτι*)—§ 21 (*ἀνθρώπων*).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (*τῇν τε...δουλεύειν*).

(v) Another appeal to experience; states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.

(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the preëminence; all the others ought however to be practised, since without the means the end cannot be attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to practise in war than in peace. For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above virtue. But on the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a onesided military tendency as, for instance, amongst the Spartans: even capacity in war, which is all they strive to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of external goods: 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (<ᾠτι>...)—end of B. v (VIII).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that of the mind; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation must precede that of the rational soul through instruction: yet in such a way that the former always regards the latter as its aim and end: 15 §§ 6—10.

(b) Means to be employed before birth; the care requisite for the procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good capacity: c. 16.

(1) The proper age for marriage: 16 §§ 1—10.

(i) The leading principles which determine it: 16 §§ 2—4, §§ 6—8.

(a) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 2.

(β) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too small, § 3.

(γ) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (...βούλησιν). Whereas the offspring of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(δ) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7: and

(ε) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female morality: also

(ζ) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 4, 5, and thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37(?) for men and 18 for women: 16 §§ 9, 10.

(2) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage and its duties: 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents: 16 §§ 12, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child: 16 § 14.

(5) Exposure of deformed infants: procurement of abortion to be sanctioned, in order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded: 16 § 15.



(6) Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: 16 §§ 16, 17.

(7) Penalty for adultery: 16 § 17 (ὥστε...)—§ 18.

(c) Means to be employed directly after birth, 17 §§ 1—14.

(1) In infancy, §§ 1—3, § 6, § 4.

(2) In the subsequent period to the fifth year, § 4 (τῇν δ' ἐχομένην...)—§ 7. With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: § 7—§ 14, § 13, § 14, § 12.

(3) Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: § 14 (διεξελεθόντων...αὐτοῦς).

(d) The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: IV (VII). 17 §§ 15, 16, V (VIII).

(1) **General introductory remarks.** Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: IV (VII). 17, §§ 15, 16.

(2) It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2.

(3) It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: 1 §§ 3, 4.

(4) **The right educational course:** V (VIII). cc. 2—7.

(i) Fundamental considerations: 2 § 1—3 § 12.

(a) Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: 2 §§ 1, 2.

(β) The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: 2 §§ 3—6.

(γ) The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: 3 § 1.

(δ) The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and truest leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure: but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, 3 § 2—§ 11 (δῆλον); and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: 3 § 11 (ἐτι δεῖ)—§ 12.

## (ii) Athletic exercises (γυμναστική): cc. 3 § 13—4 § 9.

(a) As was stated above, IV (VII). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises: 3 § 13.

(β) But two errors should be avoided; the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done; the other, the Spartan practice of brutalizing them by excessive exertions: 4 §§ 1—7.

(γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training: 4 § 7 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν)—§ 9.

## (iii) Music: cc. 5—7.

(a) Statement of the question: Should music serve for pastime recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely æsthetic and theoretic enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification? 5 § 1—§ 4 (εἰρημύμων).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician oneself: 5 § 4 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν)—§ 8.

(γ) Answer to the first question: Music can and should subserve each of those three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also mere recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life this alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disallowed, as we supposed above (§ 4): yet it is only subordinate, 5 §§ 9—15: and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young: 5 §§ 16—25.

(δ) From this follows the answer to the second question:

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians: 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves: §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, as follows:

(a) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosi, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes: 6 § 6 (φανερὸν...)—§ 8.

(b) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young: 6 §§ 9—16.



(c) Lastly, as to the various modes (*áporoi*) and rhythms :

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homœopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed : 7 §§ 3—12. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing : also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young : 7 §§ 13—15.]

(2) *The elucidation of the further question stated in 7 § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.*

## B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS : B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

### Introductory remarks : B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity : 1 §§ 1—7.

ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight : 1 § 8.

iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions : 1 §§ 9—11.

iv. The department of constitutional theory which remains for treatment defined : 2 § 1. Order of merit of the degenerate forms of government : 2 §§ 2, 3. The arrangement to be followed in the succeeding exposition : 2 §§ 4—6.

The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions : VI (IV), c. 3—VIII (V).

### i Enumeration of all possible constitutions : VI (IV) cc. 3—10.

[(1) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.

(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined: 4 §§ 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state: 4 §§ 7—19.]

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: 4 § 20—6 § 11.

(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (...*διαφοράν*).

(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny: 4 § 22 (*δημοκρατία*)—§ 31.

(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (*δυναστεία*): 5 §§ 1, 2.

(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely: 5 §§ 3, 4.

(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species (a) of Democracy, 6 §§ 1—6, (β) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.

(v) The different species of Mixed Aristocracy and the forms of Polity: c. 7—9 § 5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy: 7 §§ 4, 5.

(c) Of Polity: c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.

(γ) Genesis and organization of Polity: 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 12 § 4.

(iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Polities or Mixed Aristocracies are established, it is a grave mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in appearance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of



illusory devices. Enumeration of such illusory measures and of the similar counter-measures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 12 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10. (v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (*πολεμεῖν*).

(vi) Peculiar constitution of certain individual Polities, 13 § 9. (vii) Historical remarks: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

**II The best constitution on the average** (*ἀρίστη ταῖς πλείστοις πόλεσι*): c. 11.

(1) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: 11 §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: 11 §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotic ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: 11 §§ 6—8 (*πόλεως*).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: 11 § 8 (*καὶ σφύονται*)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, 11 § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, 11 § 15.

(11) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: 11 §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, 11 § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, 11 § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: 11 §§ 18, 19.

(111) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: 11 §§ 20, 21.

iii What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (*τίς πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία ποίους συμφέρει*): 12 §§ 1—3, § 4 (*ὅπου...*)—§ 5.

(1) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.

(11) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 § 3,

(b) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 § 3 (*ὅπου...*), (c) to Polity, 12 § 4 (*ὅπου δὲ...*)—§ 5, (d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (*this is wanting*).

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

iv The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV). 14—VII (VI).

(1) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (IV). CC. 14—16.

(a) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(a) The department of the Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(β) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10;

(i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (*πάντες*);

(ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (*τὸ δὲ τινὰς...*)—§ 9;

(iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;

(iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 10.

(γ) Measures by which at all events to secure that the decrees passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most extreme Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratical principle is still retained: and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratical institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a procedure the reverse of that usual in Polities: 14 §§ 11—16.

(c) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistracies: c. 15.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 15 §§ 1, 2.

(β) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e. as ministers or authorities of the state: 15 § 2 (*ἔστι δὲ...*)—§ 4.



- (γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.
- (δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (...τὸν αὐτόν), and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistrates, 15 § 9 (καὶ πόρερον...)
- (ε) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.
- (i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.
- (ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different: i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.
- (iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.
- (ζ) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.
- (i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz. who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.
- (ii) These modes classified under (A) Democracy § 19, (B) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (C) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (D) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.
- (η) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 22.
- (d) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.
- (α) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.
- (β) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.
- (γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (οἱ δικαστοὶ); how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.
- (δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.
- (II) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: VII (VI) cc. 1—7.
- (a) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: 1 §§ 1—4.

## (b) The species of Democracy: 1 § 5—c. 5.

(a) Species are distinguished according to the various occupations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: 1 §§ 5—10.

(β) The principles of Democracy enumerated: 2 §§ 1—4.

(γ) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 2 §§ 5—8.

[(δ) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendation of a peculiar form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy: 2 § 9—3 § 6.]

(e) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy, 4 §§ 1—14:

(1) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15: and

(2) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (*τῇ τε τελευταίᾳ*...)—5 § 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 4 §§ 15—20.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: c. 5.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 5 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 5 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 3, 4:

(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (2) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(b) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum; 5 §§ 9—11.

## (c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 2;

(β) of the several intermediate species, 6 § 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 3, 4.

(δ) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 § 5—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army, 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 5—7.



(iii) The theory of the organization of public offices: a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (*incomplete*).

(a) The questions to be discussed, 8 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The officials necessary in every state, 8 §§ 3...21.

Superintendents (α) of the markets (ἀγορανόμοι), § 3, (β) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (ἀστυνόμοι) §§ 4, 5. (γ) Police officers in the country (ἀγρόνομοι, ὕλωροι); (δ) financial officers (ἀποδέκται, ταμίαι), § 6. (ε) Keepers of archives and registers (μνήμονες, ἐπιστάται), § 7.

(ς) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8—13. (η) Military officers (στρατηγοί, πολέμαρχοι, ναύαρχοι, κτλ), §§ 13—15.

(θ) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (εὐθνοί, λογισταί, ἐξετασταί), § 16. (ι) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (πρόβουλοι, βουλή), § 17.

(κ) Officers to superintend public worship (ιερείς κτλ), §§ 18—20. (λ) Recapitulation, § 21.

(c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, 8 § 22.

*The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.*

## v The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).

1 Preliminary Observations: 1 §§ 1—8, §§ 9—11, § 8:

3 § 14: 1 §§ 11—16.

(a) Statement of the whole question: 1 § 1.

(b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: 1 §§ 2—7.

(c) Two species of revolution, 1 §§ 8—11:

(a) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8—11: whether

(i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply

(ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or

(iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.

(β) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.

(d) Special application of the remarks in 1 §§ 2—7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds: 3 § 14, 1 § 11 (παρταχού...)—§ 15.

(e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, 1 § 16.

11 The causes of decay inherent in all polities in common : cc. 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry : the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 2—7). How far they are justified, or not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections : 2 § 3 (*πῶς... πόλεσιν*).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution : 2 § 4—3 § 8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(a) General enumeration : 2 §§ 4—6.

(β) Consideration of them in detail : 3 §§ 1—8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—8 ; 4 §§ 8—10 : and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues (*διὰ τὰς ἐπιθελίας*), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (A) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13 :

(B) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—7.

(c) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 12, 13 :

(a) force, (β) stratagem, (γ) stratagem succeeded by force.



III The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government: cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY, cc. 5—7.

(A) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8 (*ἐγίνοντο...πρόταυς*)<sup>1</sup>.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(B) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—5<sup>2</sup>.

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (*κινούνται...*)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people, 6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(β) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(γ) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps (2) should properly follow (3). a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people."

<sup>2</sup> If § 5, *καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς...πολιτείας*, be genuine we must add: "In the same way

(iii) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public means, thus embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private enmity owing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotical character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark: an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown from without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 11<sup>1</sup>.

[(d) Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled for war; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual distrust of the oligarchs; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13.]

(e) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(f) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another: 6 § 18.

**(c) In Mixed Aristocracies and Politics: c. 7 §§ 1—13.**

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4:

(1) especially when the large body excluded consider themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 2, 3;

or (3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 3;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 3,

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to attain supreme power, 7 § 4.

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Politics consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 5, 6. [Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place; that is, to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction: 7 §§ 7—10.]

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—13.

**(d) Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken in common.**

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.



## (ii) THE SAFEGUARDS: CC. 8, 9.

## (A) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction: 8 § 1.

## (B) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(a) In Politics and Mixed Aristocracies especial care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(b) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in VI (IV), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5: hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(d) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(e) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Politics and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated: in particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals: if this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14:

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14:

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.

(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, nay even higher, privileges must be conceded in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 8 § 21.

(k) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and lastly virtue and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification indeed in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification in a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(l) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(m) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(n) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which infallibly leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—§ 11 (*δημος*).

(o) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (*μεγιστον δε*)—§ 16.

## (β) Monarchies: c. 10—c. 12 § 6.

### (i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY: c. 10.

#### (A) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (*ἀναιρεῖν*).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Aristocracy, but Tyranny (*τυραννίς*) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(c) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(d) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 § 11—§ 13 (*ἀναιρεῖν*).

#### (B) Causes of the overthrow of monarchies and of monarchs in general: 10 §§ 13—28.

##### (a) General statement

(1) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 13, 14, and (2) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(3) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the usurper; in others the assailant desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(b) These points of view presented in detail; 10 §§ 15—28.

(1) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20;

(2) from fear of punishment, 10 § 20;



- (3) from contempt for the ruler, 10 §§ 22—25;
- (4) from greed of gain (*largely wanting*), 10 § 25;
- (5) from ambition, 10 §§ 26—28.

(c) **Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and kingships: 10 §§ 29—38.**

(a) **Tyrants and tyrannies: 10 §§ 29—34.**

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not tyrannies whether (i) under a royal or aristocratical, or (ii) under a democratical government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(b) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or

(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38,

or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new monarchies arise, 10 § 37.

(ii) **THE SAFEGUARDS: C. 11, C. 12 §§ 1—6.**

(A) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(B) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34,

(a) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(1) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5:

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6,

and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6:

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;

- (6) draining the means of all his subjects, 11 §§ 9, 10,
- and (7) perpetually creating wars, 11 § 10,
- (8) by suspecting his own friends most of all, 11 § 10,
- (9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, 11 §§ 11, 12;
- (10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, 11 § 13;
- (11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, 11 § 14.
- (12) The three leading points of view in this policy, 11 §§ 15, 16.

Or (*δ*) by demagogic devices joined with activity in war, when the tyrant poses as the friend of the people and makes his usurped power approximate to that of a king, 11 §§ 17—34.

(1) Careful management of the state funds; avoidance of lavish grants to mistresses, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented; no treasures accumulated for himself, 11 §§ 19—21.

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, 11 § 21.

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by capacity in war, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, 11 § 22.

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offences against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, 11 §§ 22, 23.

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, 11 §§ 23, 24.

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, 11 § 24.

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, 11 § 25.

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving, higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always bestow distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, 11 § 26.

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising character, 11 § 27.

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seduction accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to succeed in his intrigues by dint of impassioned persuasion alone, 11 §§ 28, 29.

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who imagine that they, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, 11 § 30.

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should yet prefer to rest his rule upon the poor where they are the stronger, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, 11 §§ 31, 32.



(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(c) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case: 12 §§ 1—6.]

### (b) Criticism of Plato's doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other: 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms: 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form; but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(B) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form: 12 § 10 (ὁ δ' αὐτὸς)—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition *from* Tyranny or *into* the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.

(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Aristocracy at Sparta or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes, but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold except under strict limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolution from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 16, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained, 12 § 18. (*This is almost entirely wanting.*)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. *The third main division of the work, treating of Legislation, is entirely wanting.*



### *Symbols and Abbreviations.*

Γ=codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit  
vetusta translatio latina Guilelmi de Moerbeka.

M<sup>a</sup>=cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 ord. sup.

P<sup>1</sup>=cod. Parisinus 2023.

P<sup>1</sup>(corr.<sup>1</sup>)=correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.

p<sup>1</sup>=correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

Π<sup>1</sup>=the agreement of ΓM<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup> in a reading, presumably that of their archetype.

P<sup>2</sup>=cod. Parisinus Coislinianus 161.

P<sup>2</sup>(corr.<sup>1</sup>)=correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.

P<sup>2</sup>(corr.<sup>2</sup>)=correctiones nigriores.

P<sup>2</sup>(corr.<sup>3</sup>)=correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

p<sup>2</sup>=correctiones rubrae.

P<sup>3</sup>=cod. Parisinus 2026.

P<sup>4</sup>=cod. Parisinus 2025.

P<sup>5</sup>=cod. Parisinus 1858.

P<sup>6</sup>=cod. Parisinus 1857.

Q=cod. Marcianus Venetus 200.

M<sup>b</sup>=cod. Marcianus Venetus 213.

Q<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurentianus 81, 5.

R<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurentianus 81, 6.

S<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.

T<sup>b</sup>=cod. Urbinas 46.

U<sup>b</sup>=cod. Marcianus Ven. append. IV, 3.

V<sup>b</sup>=cod. Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

W<sup>b</sup>=cod. Reginensis 125.

C<sup>c</sup>=cod. Camerarii deperditus.

Ar.=cod. Aretini deperditus.

Ald.=editio princeps Aldina.

Π<sup>2</sup>=the agreement of Ald. and all existing mss. *except* M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup> in a reading.

Π<sup>3</sup>= " " " " " *except* M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup>P<sup>3</sup>P<sup>6</sup> in a reading.

II=codex archetypus deperditus superstitum librorum et Aldinae.

Bas.<sup>1</sup>=Basel ed. of 1531. Bas.<sup>2</sup>=Basel ed. of 1539. Bas.<sup>3</sup>=Basel ed. of 1550.

Bk.<sup>1</sup>=the Berlin Aristotle in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.

Bk.<sup>2</sup>=the *Politics* reprinted in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).

Susem.<sup>1</sup>=Susemihl's critical edition, 1872. Susem.<sup>2</sup>=his edition of 1879.

Susem.<sup>3</sup>=his ed. in *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, 1882. Susem.<sup>4</sup>=the present work.

*Note that* P<sup>4</sup>.<sup>6</sup>(corr.)=the corrector of P<sup>4</sup> and the corrector of P<sup>6</sup>; *but*

P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup>(corr.)=the first hand of P<sup>2</sup> and the corrector of P<sup>4</sup>.

[*δρχων*] Bernays = Bernays proposes to omit *δρχων* from the text.

<*καὶ οἰκονομικῶ*> Rasso = Rasso proposes to insert *καὶ οἰκονομικῶ* in the text.

? Susem. = Susemihl conjectures; *but*

Γ(?) = Γ may have had the reading in question.

ἐστίν \* \* denotes a lacuna; that after ἐστίν some word, or words, has been lost.

*The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed twice over: where they occur in the mss. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would transpose them.*

# **ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ**



## ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α.

Bekker 4to.  
p. 1252 a

Schneider  
c. I. § 1

1 Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δὴλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ 5 καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας

1252 a 1 [Ἐπειδὴ...7 πολιτικῇ] Schmidt || 5 καὶ before τοῦ is omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>R<sup>b</sup>Ar. || κυριωτάτη before πασῶν M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup>

Introduction, cc. 1, 2: περὶ οἰκονομίας, cc. 3—13 (the latter a necessary preliminary to the rest of the work, πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν). The prevailing tone is dialectical, and the contents of Bk. I. are nearly exhausted by a list of the problems (ἀπορίαι) started for discussion; (1) the difference between a city-state and a family, between πολιτικός and οἰκονομικός, (2) the elements of the state, πόλις ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, c. 2, (3) the natural basis of slavery, ὅτι εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δούλοι, cc. 4—6, (4) the relation of χρηματιστική to ἔκονομος, πότερον ἢ χρηματιστική ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ κτλ, cc. 8—11, (5) the capacity of the slave (and the artisan) for moral virtue, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὁργανικάς, 13 § 2 ff. See further the *Analysis* and *Introd.* pp. 23—31.

c. 1 *The city is the highest form of association, having the highest good for its end:* § 1. *The city not an enlarged family, but an essentially distinct organization, as is evident when it is analysed into its simplest elements:* §§ 2, 3.

§ 1 i πόλιν] A 'city,' but at the same time a sovereign 'state.' κοινωνία—which includes any form of communication or social intercourse, κ. ἀλλακτικαί, commercial transactions, exchange *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 9; ταύτην τὴν κ.=τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμίλιν, the marriage union *Pol.* iv(vii). 16. 2—denotes chiefly in this treatise (1) the voluntary combination, association, or co-operation of free men with each other in

objects in which they have common interests (τόπου, ζωῆς, so ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας κοινωνεῖν), or, as it is sometimes put, formed with a view to certain common advantages (χρήσεως μὴ ἐφημέρου ἕνεκεν: τῆς μεταδόσεως, συμμαχίας, καλῶν πράξεων χάριν). Hence by a natural transition, concretely (2) the associated body, the members who compose the union; so that ἡ πολιτικὴ κ., 'civil society'=the community, τὸ κοινόν (e.g. II. 3. 1 compared with II. 2. 2, iv[vii]. 14. 1). See further on I. 2 § 12, 8 § 13, III. 9. 12.

3 δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ] seeming good, which may not really be the agent's true interest, although he thinks so, cp. iv(vii). 13. 2. (See this case fully elucidated *Nic. Eth.* III. 4 §§ 1—4, § 17, § 20, the solution being ὁ σπουδαῖος ἕκαστα κρίνει ὁρθῶς καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὰληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.) Both δοκεῖν and φαίνεσθαι are often opposed to εἶναι as semblance to reality, but while δοκεῖν = *putari* to be thought, φαίνεσθαι = *videri* to appear, of an object present to sense; hence τὸ δοκοῦν = subjective opinion, τὰ φαινόμενα = objective facts. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v.

4 πᾶσαι μὲν...μάλιστα δὲ] The clause with δὲ gives the true apodosis to ἐπειδὴ: 'while all aim at some good (κατὰ μέρος τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται), the highest and most comprehensive aims especially at the highest good.'

5 κυριωτάτου] Cp. III. 12. 1 and note SUSEM. (1)

Aristotle's proof, if we assume ἡ πολι-

περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις (I) καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.

- § 2 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν [εἶναι] τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ  
10 καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὥς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν· καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικόν, ὅταν  
15 δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν· ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ).

9 εἶναι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (added after τὸν by a later hand in M<sup>a</sup>) || 14 ἐφεστήκη M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand), ἐφέστηκε M<sup>a</sup> (corrector), ἐφεστήκει P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Aldine || 15 τοῦς is omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 16 [ἀρχων] καὶ ἀρχόμενος ζ<sup>1</sup> Bernays (cp. III. 17. 7) needlessly

τική to be the 'art' concerned with ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολ., is given *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 §§ 5—7; cp. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζον γὰρ καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως.....κἀλλιον καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνεϊ καὶ πόλεσιν, sc. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν: which is more precisely described in the case of the 'city' as justice and the interest of the community, τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.

ἡ πασῶν...πᾶσας περιέχουσα.] See n. on II. 2 § 7, where is explained, from *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9 §§ 4—6, how this supreme society embraces all the inferior as 'parts' (μέρη) of itself.

§ 2 8 ὅσοι μὲν κτλ.] Plato *Politicus* 258 E ff.; cp. c. 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2 nn. Socrates too expresses himself to this effect in Xenoph. *Memorab.* III. 4 § 6 f. § 12 ἢ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν. SUSEM. (2)

πολιτικόν.] A practical statesman, a magistrate in a free city, self-governed according to Greek ideas; so 8 § 15, 11 § 13, II. 7. 1 πολιτικοί (φιλόσοφοι καὶ ἰδιῶται, cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 18) (σοφισταί. Occasionally much more than this, for Aristotle requires that ὁ ὡς ἀληθῶς π. should know psychology, *N. E.* I. 13 §§ 2—7, legislation, and other sciences: hence joined with νομοθέτης, a theoretical statesman, student of politics: IV(VII). 4. 3, VI(IV). 1 § 3, VIII(V). 9. 9.

9 πλήθει κτλ.] They assume that a king differs from e.g. a householder only in having more numerous, not more heterogeneous, dependents. πλῆθος = numbers: 8 § 15, *Rhet.* I. 4. 10 (τὸ

πλῆθος τῆς φυλακῆς = the strength of the defensive force), cp. *Metaph.* I. 9. 24 ἀριθμὸς = τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον.

10 εἶδει] or κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, 'specifically,' 'in kind'; εἶδει διαφέρειν = to be essentially different, because division into species takes account only of essential qualities.

11 ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων] Schneider supplies ἄρχη here, and καλοῦσι before δεσπότην, but νομίζουσι (εἶναι) would do just as well in the latter case, and in line 14, while either ἄρχη or ἐφεστήκη must be understood to follow ὅταν δὲ in line 15.

12 ὥς οὐδὲν κτλ.] Whereas the state is composed ἐξ εἰδῶν διαφερόντων, II. 2. 3, where see n. SUSEM. (2 b)

Plato *Polit.* 259 B μεγάλης σχῆμα οἰκῆσεως ἢ μικρᾶς αὐ πόλεως ὄγκος μῶν τι πρὸς ἀρχὴν διοίσετον; NE. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν, ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν, ὃ μυνδὴ διεσκοπούμεθα, φανερὸν ὥς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερώμεθα.

13 καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν] sc. οὐκ εἶδει νομίζουσι διαφέρειν.

15 τῆς ἐπ. τῆς τοιαύτης] i.e. τῆς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ, not τῆς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, the regal science of government (Rassow *Bemerkungen* p. 3). SUSEM. (3)

Cp. n. on τοιαύτην c. 8 § 7. The one man supreme over the state is called a king; the ruler who follows out the principles of the same kingly science (when in office), but takes his turn (κατὰ μέρος) at governing and being governed, is a republican magistrate.



§ 3 δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑψη-<sup>(1)</sup>  
 γημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-  
 τον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλά-  
 20 χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται  
 σκοποῦντες ὁφίμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέ-  
 ρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ  
 ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

2 εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα βλέψειεν (Bk. 8vo. p.  
 25 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω  
 § 2 θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὲ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνεν 4

§ 3 17 τὸ λεγόμενον] sc. 9 ὅτι οὐ  
 καλῶς λέγουσιν, all between being paren-  
 thetical. When such side-notes are im-  
 bedded in the text the construction of the  
 main sentence is often difficult to follow:  
 e.g. 2 § 2, § 9, 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 §§ 4—6, perhaps  
 13 §§ 6—8: II. 10. 7—9: IV(VII). 3 § 1,  
 13 §§ 2—4, 16 §§ 2—4: V(VIII). 5 §§ 2—  
 4, §§ 18—24, perhaps 6 § 15—7 § 1,  
 7 §§ 6—8. In III. 9 §§ 6—8, VI(IV).  
 4 §§ 8, 9 and perhaps in III. 12 §§ 1, 2  
 the interruption of the original construc-  
 tion almost amounts to anacoluthia. See  
 Bonitz *Aristotelische Studien* II. III.

κατὰ τὴν ὑψημένην μέθοδον] in ac-  
 cordance with the method of inquiry  
 which has previously been 'started' or  
 'traced out' or 'followed,' and so the  
 usual method of inquiry (Bonitz): *De*  
*Gener. Anim.* III. 9. 1, 758 a 28 ff.: τὸν  
 ὑψημένον τρόπον *Pol.* I. 8. 1, *Nic. Eth.*  
 II. 7. 9. The participle is passive, as is  
 ὑψηγείται (ὑψηγεται Bk.) *Pol.* I. 13. 6.  
 See 3 § 1, 8 § 1 n. (66), III. 1. 2 with n.  
 (434) (Schneider). SUSEM. (4)

18 ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ] "As in other  
 subjects a compound has to be resolved  
 into its ultimate elements, these being  
 the smallest parts of the whole, so here  
 by inquiring of what elements a city,"  
 which is a compound III. 1. 2, "is com-  
 posed, we shall better discover the differ-  
 ence between the four types above-men-  
 tioned (πολιτικός, βασιλικός, etc.) and  
 whether systematic knowledge can be  
 attained about them severally." Although  
 he did not apply the mathematical method  
 of pure deduction to biological or political  
 sciences Aristotle derived both the pro-  
 cesses of Analysis and Synthesis and the  
 terms (ἀναλύνειν, σύνθετον διαιρεῖν) from  
 geometry: see the instructive passages  
*Nic. Eth.* III. 3 §§ 11, 12 ζητεῖν καὶ  
 ἀναλύνειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διά-  
 γραμμα (a geometrical problem), *Metaph.*

VIII (Θ). 9. 4 1051 a 21—29 εὐρίσκεται  
 δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖα, διαιροῦντες  
 γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν.

21 τούτων and 23 τῶν ῥηθέντων  
 should be taken as above and not referred  
 to ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται (πόλις) as the gram-  
 matical antecedent.

c. 2 *Origin of the city from the*  
*family through the village-community:*  
 §§ 1—8. *The city a natural institution*  
 §§ 8—12, *prior in the intention of nature*  
*to the family and individual* §§ 13, 14,  
*and of incalculable utility* §§ 15, 16.

We have here the Patriarchal Theory,  
 as it is called by Sir H. Maine, applied  
 to the origin of society. The family living  
 under the headship of the father is taken  
 as the ultimate social unit. Until quite  
 recently this was the accepted view: see  
 Maine *Ancient Law* c. 5 esp. 122—135,  
*Early History of Institutions* c. 3, *Early*  
*Law and Custom* cc. 7, 8. There are  
 certain difficulties of this derivation of  
 the state which Aristotle avoids 'by mak-  
 ing the combination of families of different  
 stocks (γέννη) depend on contiguity of  
 residence and on convenience.' See J. F.  
 McLennan's criticisms *Studies in Ancient*  
*History*, esp. 213—227, 235—309.

On the origin of civil society there is  
 something in Plato *Rep.* II. 369 B ff., *Laws*  
 III. 676—682, Polybios VI. cc. 4—7, Cicero  
*De Rep.* I. 25, 26 §§ 39—42 (with Lac-  
 tantius *Instit.* VI. 10), *De Off.* I. 17 §§ 53,  
 54, *De Fin.* III. §§ 62—67. A. C. Brad-  
 ley *Hellenica* 190—212 gives the best  
 commentary on cc. 1, 2; Oncken *Staats-*  
*lehre* II. 3—27 is also helpful.

§ 1 24 τὸ πράγματα φνόμενα]  
 "things in their growth or origin"  
 (Shilleto); Plato *Rep.* 369 A, *Laws* 757 C.

§ 2 26 συνδυάζεσθαι] *Nic. Eth.* VIII.  
 12. 7 ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν  
 μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν.

ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς (1)  
 γενέσεως ἔνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ  
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφλεσθαι,  
 30 οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ  
 ἀρχόμενον φύσει διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ  
 διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον [φύσει], τὸ δὲ  
 δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον φύσει καὶ  
 § 3 δούλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτ' οὐ συμφέρει). φύσει μὲν 5  
 1252 b οὖν διώριστα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ φύσις  
 ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πε-

28 *γεννήσεως* Stobaeus (p. 324) Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 32 *διανοία* <τὰ δέοντα> ? Susem. ||  
 δεσπόζον [φύσει] Thurot || 33 *ταῦτα* after τῷ σώματι II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || φύσει καὶ Ar., καὶ  
 φύσει Γ II Bk., ἀρχόμενον, [καὶ] φύσει Bernays

1252 b 2 *ol* is omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

27 οἷον] "namely," introducing the two relationships (each of which needs a long parenthetical explanation) into which the family can be analysed, § 5.

28 καὶ τοῦτο κτλ] Cp. Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II ii 511, who quotes *De Anima* II. 4. 2, 415 a 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἐργῶν τοῖς ζῶσιν ὅσα τέλεια...τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῶον μὲν ζῶον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχουσιν ἢ δύνανται. Individuals perish but the species, the kind, is immortal. So first Plato *Sympos.* 206 E, 207 C—208 B. SUSEM. (5)

οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως] not by design, or of deliberate purpose, ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας: instinctively.

30 ἄρχον κτλ] "governor and governed by nature" clearly="master and slave" not as I § 2 "political ruler and subject."

31 On Aristotle's conception of φύσις in general Zeller *Ph. der Gr.* II ii 384—389, 422—431; Grant *Ethics* I. 279—285. Various senses of the term *Metaph.* V(Δ). c. 4.

διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν] "for preservation": i.e. to secure the means of subsistence. How far this is true of the 'slave by birth' on Aristotle's view is explained § §§ 6—10, as Fülleborn has correctly observed: in the case of the master it should be remembered that without slaves in his household he can procure at best but a poor and uncertain subsistence: see § 5 n. (15), 4 §§ 1—4. SUSEM. (6)

τὸ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. § §§ 8—10, 11 § 6 n. (103). SUSEM. (6 b)

33 ταῦτα=αὐτὸ τὸ ἄρχον προορᾶ.

§ 3 34 διὸ δεσπότη κτλ] 'It is not simply, as Fülleborn (II. 75) supposes, that both master and slave are alike interested in the establishment of this relationship: Aristotle really means that the master's interest is advantageous for the slave, and conversely': cp. 6 § 10 n. (57). Only the advantage to the slave comes indirectly, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, III. 6. 6 n. (L. Schiller). SUSEM. (7) Cp. § § 2.

1252 b 1 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] "For nature never fashions things niggardly, for various and dissimilar purposes, as Delphic cutlers do their knife" (Shilleto).

2 τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν] "According to Hesychios, s.v., the Delphian knife had the upper part only of iron, λαμβάνουσα ἐμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηροῦν; the handle, perhaps also the back, was of wood. Götting *De m. D. quae est apud Aristotelem* (Jenae 1856. 4) maintains it was a knife and spoon combined, for sacrificial purposes" (Schnitzer). Hence Götting proposes *μύστρον* for *μέρος* in Hesychios, as above. Oncken, II. 25—27, dismisses the obscure words of Hesychios in favour of Oresme's explanation: "suppose a piece of iron with a thick end and a pointed end, with the back left rough and the other side sharpened to a blade. Then you have a knife for cutting, you can file with the rough back, and by turning it round use the thick end for a hammer. Such a rough sort of tool would certainly be cheap enough." Cp. *ὀβελισκολύχνη* VI(IV). 15. 8 n. SUSEM. (8) *Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοκερδῶν* Makarios ap. Walzium *Arsen.* 179: with which agrees the explanation



νυχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἔν' οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελεῖτο κάλλιστα (I)  
 4 τῶν ὀργάνων ἑκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεῦον·  
 § 4 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει

5 τὸ after καὶ is omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

in *arrend. prout*. 1. 94 (tom. 1. p. 393 of the *Corpus Paroemiograph.*, Gotting. 1839) Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα: ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοκερδῶν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς λαμβάνειν προαιρουμένων, παρόσον οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸ μὲν τι τῶν ἱερῶν ἐλάμβανον, τὸ δέ τι ὑπὲρ τῆς μάχαιρας (? for the use of the knife) ἐπράττοντο. Athenaeus IV. 74 p. 173: 'Ἀχαιοὺς δ' ὁ Ἑρετριεὺς ἐν Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ σατυρικῷ καρυκοποιούς καλεῖ τοὺς Δελφοὺς διὰ τούτων· Καρυκοποιούς προσβλέπων βδελύτταται· παρόσον τὰ ἱερῶν περιτέμνοντες ὅλην ὡς ἐμαγειρεύον αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκάρκευνον. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ ἀποβλέπων καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἔφη· 'Ἀλλ' ὦ Δελφῶν πλείστας ἀκονῶν | Φοῖβε μάχαιρας | καὶ προδιδάσκων τοὺς σοὺς πρόβλους. It was from Thomas Aquinas *ad locum* that Oresme derived the explanation cited above. See Von Hertling *Rhein. Mus.* xxxix. p. 447. Mr W. Ridgeway thinks the name given to "a large kind of knife, which could be used for either fighting or carving, from the sacrificial knife having been used as a weapon to slay Pyrrhus, Pindar *Nem.* VII. 42."

3 ἐν πρὸς ἔν] There are of course exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself allows *De Part. Anim.* IV. 6. 13, 683 a 22 ὅπου γὰρ ἐνδέχεται χρῆσθαι δυοῖν ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐδὲν ἢ φύσις εἴωθε ποιεῖν ὥσπερ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ πρὸς εὐτέλειαν ὀβελισκολύχνιον· ἀλλ' ὅπου μὴ ἐνδέχεται, καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα. SUSEM. (9) See *De Anima* II. 8, 10, 420 b 16. We shall find the rule applied to political offices II. II. 13, VI(IV). 15, 6.

4 μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις κτλ] "if restricted in use to a single function." Fülleborn asserts that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, even supposing there is no exception to the rule (see preceding note). But surely the propagation and the preservation of the species are two different ends. At the same time Aristotle should have emphasized the fact that woman is not nearly so far below man as the natural slave (see § 2) is below his master. SUSEM. (10)

§ 4 5 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις κτλ] "Whereas in Greece wife and slave are distinct, in *barbaria* they are not, because all—men and women—are slaves" (Jackson). In Thrace e.g. the women did farm-work *μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν*

δούλων Plato *Laus* 805 E. Fülleborn (II. 84) objects that this is an unsatisfactory reason to assign for the servitude of women outside Greece, since where all of both sexes are slaves we should rather infer that they are all equal. (In this last sense indeed Congreve seriously takes the words, supplying τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν sc. τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἄρσεσι καὶ τοῖς δεσπόταις.)

"Fülleborn's objections arise from his having been misled by the omission mentioned above, in *n.* (10), and so having misunderstood the real sense of the passage. Aristotle's meaning is this: because the barbarian nations are slaves by nature, the men are not capable of respecting the freedom of the female sex in the women, and of according to them the position which by nature belongs to the woman in relation to the man; but treat them as slaves. And hence necessarily arises the perversion of nature, that in the marriage relation you have one slave ruling despotically over another. To the same cause, the servile character of these nations, or at least of the Asiatics (I. 6. 8 n.), Aristotle attributes the fact that they themselves are ruled by their kings as slaves; or in other words that the form under which the state exists amongst them is despotism, III. 14. 6 n., which in reality cannot be considered to constitute a state at all, a state consisting of free citizens but not of slaves, 7 § 1, III. 9 § 6, 12 § 8; cp. VI(IV). 4 § 11, a passage which is probably not genuine. Such a despotism is only an abnormally expanded family: ('non civitas erit sed magna familia,' Grotius *De iure belli ac pacis* III. 8. 2). It is a species of that which Aristotle denotes by *ἔθνος*, i.e. a mere aggregate of men of the same race, a tribe population or nationality, as contrasted with *πόλις*, a city-state: § 6; II. 1 § 3; III. 3 § 5, 13 § 19, 14 § 15; IV(VII). 4 § 11; VIII(V). 10 § 8 with *nn.*; *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 8, 1094 b 10; *Rhet.* I. 5. 1360 b 31: cp. Schlosser I. 278. [Cp. *ἔθνος* = federation in Polybios and Diodoros, esp. of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues: *οἱ ἐθνικὰς χρεῖας* 'for federal purposes' Diod. XVIII. 13.] See further *n.* (13): 5 § 8, 6 §§ 4—6 with *nn.* (47), (54), (56): 7 § 5, 8 § 12; IV(VII). 2 § 15, 14 § 21 with *nn.*" SUSEM. (11)

6 τάξιν. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται (1)  
 ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ

βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνας ἄρχεω εἰκός,

§ 5 ὡς ταυτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν 6  
 10 δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας

οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναικὰ τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα

ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ  
 φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὗς ὁ μὲν Χαρώνδας καλεῖ ὁμοσιπνύους, Ἐπι-  
 15 μενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρήης ὁμοκάππους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία γ

9 ὄν before ταυτὸ Γ, omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 12 ἐστίν· \*\* Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly, see Dittenberger *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874 p. 1372 ff. || 15 ὁμοκάππους Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>b</sup> (corr.), perhaps rightly, but see Dittenberger p. 1357 ff. and Commentary n. (17): ὁμοκάπους = ὁμοκήπους Ridgeway (also Shilleto in unpublished *Adversaria*: 'si Epimenides *epicā poesi* utebatur, certe ὁμοκάππους. Nisi forte ὁμοκάπους = ὁμοκήπους')

8 Euripides *Iphigenia in Aulis* 1400 Nauck. The words following are ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους, μήτερ, Ἑλλήνων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δούλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι. SUSEM. (12)

9 ὡς ταυτὸ κτλ] In this Aristotle only expresses the view which had gradually become universal among the Greeks, and was not combated until a late period and then by but few: 3 § 4 n. (31). This view is explained by the justifiable consciousness they had of their mental superiority; it was especially fostered by the Persian war, and found external confirmation in the fact that the vast majority of Greek slaves were of barbarian origin, while in itself again it tended to hinder the enslavement of Greeks (L. Schiller). See also n. (47) on 1. 5 § 10. That slaves are non-Hellenes is assumed quite as an understood thing in Xenoph. *Memor.* II. 7. 6, Demosth. XXI (c. *Mid.*). 48. See however n. (64) on 1. 7 § 5. SUSEM. (13)

§ 5 10 πρώτη] predicatively, "from these two relationships,"—man and wife, master and slave,—"arises primarily the family." For the sense, πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως Nic. *Eth.* VIII. 12. 7. The three stages, οἰκία κόμη πόλις, are given by Plato *Laus* I. 626 c ff. Ἡσίοδος] *Works and Days* 405. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our texts, κτητὴν δ' οὐ γαμετήν, ἥτις καὶ βοῦσιν ἔποιτο. SUSEM. (14)

12 ὁ γὰρ βοῦς κτλ] "the ox supplies the place of a servant." Cp. 5 § 9

n. (46). If with both these passages we compare 4 §§ 1—4, it is evident that Varro's division *De re rustica* I. 17, which Grotius mentions *op. c.* I. 5. 3, is quite in the sense and spirit of Aristotle: alii in tres partes (sc. dividunt) instrumenti genus: vocale et semivocale et mutum. vocale in quo sunt servi: semivocale in quo sunt boves: mutum, in quo sunt plaustra. (L. Schiller.) SUSEM. (16)

12 ἡ μὲν οὖν κτλ] μὲν οὖν, not δέ, repeating after the quotation from Hesiod the clause 9 ἐκ μὲν οὖν κτλ. Take κατὰ φύσιν with συνεστηκυῖα: "thus then the society which in the order of nature has arisen to meet every-day needs is the household: sharers in one meal-jar as Charondas calls them; joint-holders of a piece of land in the phrase of Epimenides the Cretan. The union of a number of families first formed with a view to needs beyond those which are of daily recurrence is the village." Elsewhere in Aristotle ἐφήμερος = lasting for a day; so Bernays here, "for intercourse of less transitory duration."

14 Χαρώνδας] II. 12 § 7, § 11 n. (416); VI(IV). II § 15, 13 § 2 nn. Holm *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum* (Leipzig 1870) I. p. 153 ff., 401. SUSEM. (16)

Ἐπιμενίδης] See Excursus I at the end of this book, p. 204. SUSEM. (17)

15 ὁμοκάππους] The reading is doubtful. (1) The mss. of the better family give ὁμοκάππους. (2) If Aristotle is quoting from a collection of oracles (*Χρησμοί*)



§ 6 πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δ' ἔοικε (I)  
17 κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦσι τινες

16 ἔοικε after 17 κατὰ φύσιν P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 17 ἀπ' [οἰκία] Heitland, but see the Comm.

ascribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and *ὁμοκάπνους*, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For *ὁμοκάπνους* of the inferior MSS. is usually taken to be a compound with *κάπη* a *trough*, *crib*; hence *any feeding-place*; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable in *arsi* could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Götting, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the *families* of the Cretans 'mess-mates,' because the *συσσίτια* were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of *ὁμοκάπνους* Dittenberger urges that 'it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read *ὁμοκάπνους*) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But *ὁμοκάπνους* = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship.' Yet *ὁμοκάπνους* should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of 'hearths' meaning

homes or families\*; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. *Transactions* Feb. 23, 1882) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading *ὁμοκάπνους* (with *α*), Doric for *ὁμοκήπνους* (*κήπος*) = with a common plot of ground. SUSEM. (17)

"The Cretan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. *Θάλεια* I. 11. 12: *κήπος* is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (*σιπύνη*): cp. II. 5. 2 (*γήπεδον* and *καρπός*). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original *οἰκία*: (2) *οἶκος* = joint family of Hindus or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (*κήπος*) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine" (*Early Law* 237—255): after that, "(3) the *οἶκος* breaks up into separate *οἰκίαι* forming the *κώμη* (= the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (*ὁμογενεῖς*)" (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye *La propriété primitive* cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214), Hearn *Aryan Household* 176—191, and the criticism by D. McLennan *Patriarchal Theory* c. 8: also Caillemet *Droit de succession* p. 34 ff., Jannet *Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte* (Paris 1880) p. 88.

ἢ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ] Instances of services needed from time to time for which members of a village community unite (as distinct from the daily wants which originate the family) are, to repel a common enemy or to execute a great work of common utility (Fülleborn II. 95, 96). Add the exchange of commodities, which is unnecessary in the household: 9 § 5 with *note*. SUSEM. (18)

16 πρώτη = simplicissima, quae tamquam pars inest aliis (Bonitz).

§ 6 17 ἢ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας] i.e. all the rest of the village except the original

\* So Grote, "each society having its separate meal-bin and fireplace." Cp. Gaelic *teadhloch* and *coediche*, J. F. McLennan p. 123.

ὁμογάλακτας [παῖδός τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας]. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον (1)  
ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευμένων  
20 γάρ [συνῆλθον]· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου,

18 \* \* παῖδός Schmidt, [παῖδός.....παῖδας] Susem. || 20 συνῆλθον wanting in Π<sup>1</sup> (added by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || πᾶσα γάρ πᾶσα δ' Schmidt in a former conjecture, transposing 18 διδ.....20 συνῆλθον to follow 24 ἔκουν (now withdrawn)

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household. SUSEM. (18b)

18 ὁμογάλακτας] According to Philochoros *Frag.* 91—94 and *Frag.* 139 in Harpokration and Suidas (*s. v.* γεννῆται, ὁμογάλακτες, ὀργεῶνες) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένη who were afterwards called γεννῆται = kin, clansmen, were originally called ὁμογάλακτες = foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider *Addenda* II. 471). Pollux VI. 37, VIII. 9 οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γένους ἐκαλοῦντο γεννῆται καὶ ὁμογάλακτες, γένει μὲν οὐ προσήκοντες, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνόδου οὕτω προσαγορευόμενοι. SUSEM. (19)

Thus only is the γένος hinted at here. "The identity of the κῶμη and the γένος is apparently indicated III. 9 §§ 12, 14 where we have the πόλις defined as (α) ἡ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, and (β) ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία" (Heitland *Notes* 8). Even then no place in the development is found for φρατρία, φυλαί, or Aristotle's 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals' *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9. 5; cp. *Pol.* III. 9. 13 (Oncken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to συνοικισμός, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doubtless been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of ὁμογάλακτες, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if παῖδός τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the sense in which it was anciently applied to the clansmen (γεννῆται). For descent had long been reckoned through males in Athens,—indeed Dikaiarchos (*Fr.* 9 Müller) appears to denote by πάτρα what is usually called the γένος: and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine *Early Law* p. 272 ff.)

Or the word may have first meant 'those of kin by descent through females only.' On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the legends, it has been with good reason inferred that this system of kinship once prevailed in Greece, McLennan *op. c.* 225—309: cp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* c. 8 esp. 230—234. "If ὁμογάλακτες = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that this membership in the γένος depended on their having had the same mother's milk" (Ridgeway). If so, may we similarly interpret ὁμοσίπνοι and ὁμόκαπνοι as survivals from a time when eating from the same meal-jar or sharing the same smoke, and not inheritance of the same father's blood, constituted in a savage society the earliest idea of kinship? See *Exc.* I to B. II.

Another meaning proposed is: 'those who offer the same milk', from a comparison of Sanskrit sapiṇḍa, samānodaka = those who offer the same cake, the same water: *i. e.* 'near kin', 'distant kin' respectively (Hearn *op. c.* 171): but for this there is no evidence.

διὸ = hence: viz. because the 'city' arose through the village from the family. Thus Plato argues *Law* III 680 D ff.: ἐν οἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγενῆσθαι... βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλεύουμένοι.

19 αἱ πόλεις = Hellenic city-states, τὰ ἔθνη = non-Hellenic races or populations. As in IV(VII). 2. 10 ἔτι δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν... οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θραξὶ καὶ Κελτοῖς, Aristotle uses ἔθνη on the grounds assigned in II. (11) as equivalent to non-Hellenes, precisely as the word is used in the New Testament for Gentiles (Jews and Christians τὸ πρῶτον) Other reasons assigned III. 14 § 12, 15 § 11 nn. (657—9), VIII(V). 10 § 3 (1649). SUSEM. (19 b) Also, as Postgate suggests, VI(IV). 13 § 11. On the advantages of monarchy in a primitive society, see Bagehot *Physics and Politics* 65 f. (Jackson).



§ 7 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει (p. 3)

"Ομηρος,

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὥκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς  
 25 δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν  
 ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη  
 ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.  
 § 8 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἦδη, πάσης 8  
 ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν  
 30 οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει

21 *ai* is omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, whether rightly, is very doubtful || 24 *σποράδες γὰρ*  
*καὶ οὕτω* <ἀγγιγέτοντες> Schmidt edits, *σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι* [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and  
 26 ὥσπερ γὰρ Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn) || 28 ἡ δὲ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2</sup>.3.4.6. C<sup>a</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup>  
 Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Aldine Bk., ἡ δὲ U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> || ἡ δ'...1253 a 1 βέλτιστον transposed  
 by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδας. See his arrangement and alterations *Introd.* p. 96 ||  
 29 γενομένη Schneider || 30 οὖν is wanting in M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, but cp. IV (VII). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3

21 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπ. 'Wherefore like-  
 wise the colonies' [*i.e.* the villages] 'be-  
 cause of their kinship' sc. βασιλεύονται.  
 So § 11 ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).

§ 7 22 The quotation from Homer  
*Odys.* IX. 114 f. SUSEM. (20) Cited *N. E.*  
 x. 9. 13. Plato has it *Latius* 680 B. Cp.  
 Maine *Ancient Law* pp. 4—6, 125.

24 τὸ ἀρχαῖον] With the adverbial  
 use comp. Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2. 7 καθάπερ  
 τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὥκουν.

24 ff. "A reminiscence of the famous  
 saying of Xenophanes given by Clem.  
 Alex. VII p. 711 B: "Ἕλληνες δὲ ὥσπερ  
 ἀνθρωπομόρφους οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς  
 τοὺς θεοὺς ὑποτίθενται καὶ καθάπερ τὰς  
 μορφὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίως ἑαυτοῖς ἕκαστοι δια-  
 ζωγραφοῦσιν" (Ridgeway).

See still stronger statements about the  
 popular religion in *Metaph.* XIII(A). 8 §§  
 19—21, 1074 b 3 ff.

§ 8 28 τ' δ' ἐκ πλείονων κτλ] Cp. II.  
 2 § 8 with *note* and references, also *n.* on  
 III. 3 §§ 3, 4; 9 § 10 (554). SUSEM. (20 b)

"The union of several village-com-  
 munities forms, when complete, an actual  
 city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of  
 perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset a  
 union for a bare livelihood, it exists to  
 promote a higher life." See Grote *History*  
 II. 341—344 on city-state (villages: on  
 this deduction of the state generally A. C.  
 Bradley *Hellenica* 197—199, who observes  
 194 *n.* that "freedom", though not in a  
 mere negative sense, best answers to αὐ-  
 τάρκεια: a life which leaves no want of

man's nature, external or spiritual, un-  
 satisfied. In *N. E.* I. 7. 7 τὸ αὐταρκές = δ  
 μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μη-  
 δενὸς ἐνδεᾶ, the sole condition of a life  
 that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp.  
*N. E.* x. 6. 2 οὐδενὸς ἐνδεῆς...ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης.

29 ff. Compare c. 4 § 1; II. 2 § 8; III.  
 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3, 4 ff., 9 §§ 5, 6, 11—14, esp.  
 ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας  
 καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν, ὡς  
 φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν  
 καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν  
 πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν;  
 further III. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 1; IV(VII).  
 4 §§ 11—14, 5 § 1, 8 § 4, §§ 8, 9, 9 §§ 1, 2;  
 VI(IV). 4 §§ 9—11; VII(VI). 8 § 3. These  
 passages would prove (even if it were not  
 self-evident) that the perfected and beauti-  
 fied life, made complete self-sufficing and  
 satisfying, is one with the life of happi-  
 ness or well-being (εὐδαιμονία): cp. *n.*  
 (284) on II. 9 § 5. SUSEM. (21)

The implication of εὖ ζῆν and αὐτάρ-  
 κεια which disposes of Schmidt's athetesis  
 of the clauses where the latter conception  
 comes in (*Fuhrb. f. Phil.* CXXX. 1882.  
 804, cp. *Introd.* 97 *n.*) may also be studied  
 in *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 §§ 6—8. In *De anima*  
 II. 8. 10, 420 b 19—22, τὸ εὖ is op-  
 posed to ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης in  
*De part. animal.* III. 7. 18, 670 b 23.

30 διὸ κτλ] Two proofs that the 'city'  
 is natural. (1) It is the outcome and  
 realization, the final cause, of the previous  
 societies: they are natural, so also is the  
 'city'. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing;

ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, (I)  
 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἶον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως  
 τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ  
 § 9 ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτι-  
 1253 a στον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια [καὶ] τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φα-  
 νερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολι-  
 τικὸν ζῶον ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός

32 [ἡ δὲ...ἐστίν] Schmidt || 33 εἶναι after ἑκάστου M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

1253 a 1 καὶ before τέλος omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Bk. Bernays || τέλος. καὶ <γὰρ>  
 Bernays, αὐτάρκεια \* \* Bücheler; but see Comm. || καὶ before βέλτιστον omitted by  
 W<sup>b</sup> Ald. || ἡ.....βέλτιστον omitted by Q M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || \* \* ἐκ Schmidt, quoting 1278 b  
 19—28 || 2 [ὅτι.....πόλις ἐστὶ] and ὅτι φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ Schmidt  
 || 3 ἐστὶ M<sup>a</sup>, omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. perhaps rightly || ὁ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || φαν-  
 λότερος ? Oncken wrongly || ἦτοι κρείττων ἢ ἀνθ. ἡ φαῦλός ἐστὶν ἀνθ. Schmidt

but to be self-sufficing is end and highest good (and end=fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippias and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antisthenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilization and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: Zeller *Socrates and Socratics* p. 322—5. The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias*, of Thrasymachus and the speakers in *Republic* B. II, are not directly subversive of the state: like Hobbes, they are conservative in their aim.

32 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος] *Physics* II. 1. 8 193 a 30 f. φύσις in first sense=ἄλλῃ mere potency; in second sense=ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν: II. 2 § 8, 194 a 28 f. ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα· ὦν γὰρ συνεχούς τῆς κινήσεως οὐσης ἐστὶ τι ἔσχατον, τοῦτο τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα... βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. *De anima* III. 12. 3. 434 a 32 f. (Eaton). "Is it the bud, or the blossom, or the ripe fruit that is natural to a tree? All three: only it is unnatural and contrary to the design of the tree that the bud should wither before coming into bloom and bearing fruit" (Fülleborn). SUSEM. (22)

§ 9 34 f. ἔτι...βέλτιστον] The whole connexion requires that this should be a second proof (or at least an amplification of the first proof) ὅτι πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν. And so in fact it is, only it must

be supplemented from what precedes. It runs thus: 'the final cause, that is, the end, of a thing is best. Now self-sufficiency is the end and the best' (thus including under one both the subject and the predicate of the former premiss). With this must be mentally supplied from the foregoing; 'the end discloses the true nature of the thing', and 'political society alone' (i.e. no society short of the state) 'affords to its members true self-sufficiency'. Then the conclusion follows that the state is by nature. Similar abbreviations of the steps in an argument are found elsewhere in Aristotle, so concise sometimes as to be almost unintelligible: e.g. *Metaph.* XII(A). I § 2, § 5, 1069 a 24, b 5 (Freudenthal). SUSEM. (23)

1253 a 1 'From this then it appears that the city is part of the order of nature and man a social being'. *N.E.* IX. 9. 3: no one would choose the possession of every good to be by himself, πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. See also *ib.* I. 7. 6. "The dogma τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον, as interpreted by Aristotle, implies (1) that social organization is not a violation of nature, (2) that the πόλις differs from the οἰκία in something more than size, (3) that existing institutions are capable of improvement, (4) that there is a form or type or end towards which they may be improved. It is plain that the exposition of this dogma appropriately holds a prominent place in the introduction to a work which has for its main purpose the development of a scheme of the normal πόλις" (Jackson).

3 ὁ ἀπολις κτλ] "He who is cut



ἐστὶν ἡ κρείττων ἡ ἀνθρωπος (ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὀμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς (I)

5

ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος\*

- § 10 ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς), ἅτε περ  
 ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ζῶον ὁ ἀν- 10  
 θρωπος πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον,  
 9 δῆλον. οὐδὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ λόγον  
 § 11 δὲ μόνον ἀνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ

6 [γάρ] Schmidt || [καὶ] Spengel partly recognising the fault in the ordinary construction: that ὥσπερ...ἐπιθυμητῆς is parenthetical was first shown by Jackson (*Journal of Philology* VII. 1877, p. 236 ff.); see Comm. || ἅτε περ omitted by L<sup>a</sup>, erased in U<sup>b</sup> || ἅτε περ...7 πεττοῖς transposed to follow 29 θεός Schmidt || 7 ἄζυξ ὢν omitted by U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>; with vacant space left, by P<sup>3-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Ald. and 1st hand of P<sup>2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>; ἄζυξ.....πεττοῖς omitted by Ar., ὢν by R<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand); ἄζυξ ὢν was inserted by P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>3</sup>), ἄζυξ by a later hand in Q<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> and by a later hand in the margin of T<sup>b</sup>, ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων V<sup>b</sup> (a later hand), ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων C<sup>4</sup> also, ἀνευ ζυγούς Bas.<sup>3</sup> || πεττοῖς M<sup>b</sup>, πετεινοῖς Γ and P<sup>1</sup> in the margin, γρ. πετεινοῖς P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) in the margin, and a later hand in the margin of S<sup>b</sup> || ζῶον after ὁ ἀνθρωπος II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as ‘clanless lawless hearthless’; for he”, not the ἀπολις, but ὁ ὑφ' Ὀμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς, “is at once naturally unsociable and pugnacious”—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon” (Jackson).

§ 10 7 ἄζυξ] From an epigram of Agathias (*Anthol. Pal.* IX. 482, esp. 20—28) Götting (*De loco quodam Aris.* (Jena 1858) showed that ἄζυξ nearly resembles the ‘blot’ of our backgammon—an exposed piece as contrasted with pieces guarded or supported, i.e. standing close together\*. Bernays in his translation and Mahaffy (*Academy* Jan. 8, 1876) take ἄζυξ to mean a ‘rover’, i.e. a piece with special powers of aggression; but this is inconsistent with Agathias’ epigram. Moreover they mistake the sense of the quotation from *Iliad* IX. 63, 64, where ἐκείνος δὲ πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίον ὀκρυδέντος is the subject of which ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος are predicates. What Homer really says is, as Spengel rightly saw

(*Arist. Studien* III. 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clanless lawless hearthless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or ‘rover’ is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer’s πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς ἐπιδημίον who is a φύσει τοιοῦτος, i.e. an ἀπολις φύσει, in whom to the unsociable character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἀπολις is always or commonly aggressive; thus there is no reason for regarding aggression as a characteristic of the ἄζυξ (Jackson). SUSEM. (24) (25)

διότι here, like ὅτι, “that.”

διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν] *De hist. anim.* I.

1. 12: πολιτικὰ δ' ἐστὶ ζῷα ὧν ἐν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεταί πάντων τὸ ἔργον, ὅπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀγελαῖα. Not all gregarious animals form a community, but those which, like bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and lastly man, are engaged upon some common work (Eaton). SUSEM. (25 b)

9 For parallel passages consult Zeller II ii 424 n. (3); for Aristotle’s teleology, *ib.* 422—428, 488—497.

§ 11 On the physiological distinction between φωνή mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγος rational language, see *De hist. anim.* IV. 9. 536 a 20, b 8 ff., *Probl.* X. 39, 895 a 7 ff., *Poet.* 20 § 2, 1456 b 22 ff. στοιχείον=φωνὴ ἀδιάρετος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ

\* Whether πόλις was a name for this game or not, the πᾶμπολλαι πόλις of Plato *Rep.* IV. 422 E (cp. the scholion) makes it likely that a compact body of pieces was called πόλις; if an isolated piece was called ἀπολις, Aristotle’s allusion would be specially appropriate. Oncken, II. 27 f., has misunderstood Agathias’ epigram and Götting’s dissertation no less than the present passage (Jackson).

ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ- (I)  
χει ζῳοῖς (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ  
ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν  
14 ἄλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ  
§ 12 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ 11  
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ  
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν  
ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.  
19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν  
§ 13 ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναι- (p. 4)  
ρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμο-

11 λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος (ἡδέως P<sup>6</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and 1st hand L<sup>s</sup>) II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ἐστὶ σημεῖον... 13  
ἡδέος. These words are wanting in Q Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> (where † stands in the margin) S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and  
V<sup>b</sup> (1st hand; added by a later hand) || 12 ἐλήλυθεν W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. προήλθεν P<sup>4-6</sup> M<sup>b</sup>  
U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ P<sup>4-6</sup> M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ald. Bk. ||  
14 δηλοῦν διελθεῖν? Oncken, wrongly || 18 τούτων τῶν τοιούτων Schmidt || 19 καὶ  
πρότερον... 29 θεός transposed to follow 1252 b 27 θεῶν Schmidt. See his arrange-  
ment *Introd.* p. 97 || δὲ Schneider, δὴ I II Bk.

γίγνεσθαι φωνή. καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν  
ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί. SUSEM. (26)

15 τὸ δίκαιον governed by δηλοῦν:  
'and therefore also (for the purpose of  
signifying) justice.'

§ 12 16 πρὸς = when compared with.  
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ αἴσθησιν] moral per-  
ception, *N. Eth.* II. 9. 8; IV. 5. 13, ἐν τῇ  
αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις: not to mention passages  
in Bk. VI; as II § 4 τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ  
αἰσθῆσιν, αὐτῇ δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

18 ἡ δὲ τούτων κ.] An objective geni-  
tive with κοινωνία as in III. 9. 12 κ.  
τόποι, 'fellowship in goodness and  
justice'. The 'city' is regarded as a  
moral or spiritual society, church and  
state in one.

19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει] It is  
not in order of time γενέσει (in which  
sense *N. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7, quoted on § 5  
above, asserts the direct contrary), but in  
order of thought and of real existence  
φύσει, κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ εἶδει, τῇ οὐσίᾳ, that  
the state is prior to the family and to the  
individual. On this distinction see esp.  
*Metaph.* I. 8 §§ 3—7 989 a 15 ff.: IX(Θ).  
8. 8 1050 a 3 ff. ἡ ἐνέργεια προτέρα τῆς  
δυνάμεως (the realized and actual pre-  
cedes the possible) κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρό-  
νον. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν  
ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ  
οὐσίᾳ πρότερα οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδός· τὸ μὲν  
γὰρ ᾗδ' ἔχει τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δ' οὐδ': *Phys.* VIII.  
7. 12, 261 a 14 what is in process of de-

velopment appears imperfect, ὅπως δὲ  
φαίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ἀτελὲς καὶ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν  
ἰόν, ὥστε τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει  
πρότερον εἶναι. See below III. 1. 9, nor-  
mal constitutions are prior to the di-  
vergent, imperfect types. SUSEM. (27)  
Other passages in Grant *Ethics* I. 239.

§ 13 20 ἀναιρουμένου κτλ] "for  
if the whole body" except the foot or  
hand "is destroyed, there will be neither  
foot nor hand, except in an equivocal  
sense such as that in which we call the  
hand of a statue a hand; because a hand  
in such circumstances" i.e. after the de-  
struction of the rest of the body, "will be  
spoilt for use," cp. 5 § 5 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ  
φύσιν ἔχουσι, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρ-  
μένοις, "and all things are defined by  
their function and faculty, so that things  
which are incapable of exercising their  
functions and faculties (μηκέτι τοιαῦτα =  
μηκέτι ἐνεργα καὶ δυνατά\*) must not be  
said to be the things in question, but to  
be equivocally called by their names"  
(Jackson). Cp. *Manu* II. 157: 'as an  
elephant of wood, as an antelope of lea-  
ther, so is a Brahmin unread in the Vedas.  
These three bear the name' (Postgate).

If the text is correct, the above ex-  
planation, in which Hayduck and Jack-  
son independently agree, must be

\* "Such as they were before, when they  
formed part of the whole and fulfilled their  
functions" (Cope). See the quotations n. (28).



- νύμω, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται (I) τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισταί καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε  
 24 μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώ-  
 § 14 νυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει [καὶ] πρότερον ἢ ἕκα- 12  
 στος, δηλόν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθεὶς, ὁμοίως  
 τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὃ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος  
 κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος  
 29 πόλεως, ὥστε ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός.  
 § 15 φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμή ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνί-  
 αν· ὃ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ

22 λέγει Bk.<sup>2</sup> and Susem.<sup>1</sup> following P<sup>2</sup> and perhaps Γ || ἀλλὰ φθαρεῖσα Bender, apparently with the following construction: λιθίνην, ἀλλὰ (φθαρεῖσα γὰρ) ἔσται τοιαύτη· πάντα: hardly right || <οὐκ> ἔσται Rud. Schöll (*Comm. de legg.* XII. *tabb.* Bonn 1865, p. 43) which is not improbable: unless we are to bracket the words διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη. But see *Comm.* and *Quaest. Cr.* III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. || 23 <ἢ> τοιαύτη? Jackson || δὲ] γὰρ Γ apparently, adopted by Bender—rightly, if we accept his conjecture or reject διαφθ. κτλ || 25 καὶ omitted before φύσει in Π<sup>1</sup> and Paris. 963 || καὶ omitted before πρότερον by P<sup>2</sup> Ar. || προτέρα Γ P<sup>6</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, πρότερα P<sup>4</sup>, προτέρω Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> || 28 μηδὲν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. μηδενὸς Γ Ar. || οὐθὲν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. οὐδὲ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 31 πρῶτον P<sup>4-6</sup>, Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>

accepted: διαφθαρεῖσα must be, as Hayduck thinks, equivalent to τοῦ ἔργου ἐστερημένη καὶ τῆς δυνάμει: "in such a case the hand and the foot are really deprived of their force. But the essential nature of an object consists in its function and in its capacity to execute that function; so that where it no longer possesses the appropriate quality it can no longer be said to be the same, but only to bear the same name". But the parallel passages *De gener. anim.* I. 19. 7 726 b 22 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν ἀνεψυχῆς ἢ ἀλλης τινὸς δυνάμει ἔστι χεὶρ οὐδὲ μόνον οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμῶνυμον: II. I. 42, 734 b 24 ff. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι πρόσωπον μὴ ἔχον ψυχὴν, οὐδὲ σᾶρξ, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα ὁμῶνυμος λεχθήσεται τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρόσωπον τὸ δὲ σᾶρξ, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγγίγνετο λίθινα ἢ ξύλινα; *De anima* II. I. 9 412 b 18 ff. ὅψως ἥ ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμῶνυμος, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος: *Meteor.* IV. 12. 3, 390 a 10 ff. ἅπαντα δ' ἔστιν ὠρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἕκαστα, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμῶνυμος, οἷον ὁ τεθνεὺς ἢ ὁ λίθινος lead to the conclusion that διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and τοιαύτη is predicate. If so, and if τοιαύτη = a true hand, the sense requires the insertion of the negative, although

we should then expect ἀλλὰ πάντα rather than πάντα δὲ: "for a hand thus rendered useless <no longer> has the qualities of a hand, whereas the definition of every object is contained in its function." ὁμῶνυμος] Cp. III. I. 7 n. (438 b). SUSEM. (28)

§ 14 26 χωρισθεῖς] cut off from society, living in isolation, μονῶτη γὰρ χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος. Comp. the discussion in *N. Eth.* IX. c. 9 showing that friends are indispensable to Wellbeing: δεήσει τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων... ἡ ταύτη ἐνδεής ἔσται, i.e. not αὐτάρκης.

ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔξει κτλ] 'will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part': i.e., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be ὕστερον not πρότερον.

29 ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός] So § 9 ἦτοι φαῦλος ἢ κρείττων ἡ ἀνθρωπος. *N. Eth.* v. 9. 17 with Jackson's note, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή (τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν) οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθέν μόνον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνάτως κακοῖς, so that the sphere of particular justice is restricted to human society: *ib.* VII. 1. 2 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίον ἔστιν κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ.

§ 15 31 ὃ δὲ πρῶτος κτλ] Cp. *Introd.* 24, and notes on II. 9 § 8 (288), § 12 (296), § 14 (300). SUSEM. (28 b)

ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ] "Both the grammar and the sense of τελεωθὲν and χωρισθὲν

καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ (I)  
 § 16 χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χεীরιστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ  
 ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονή-  
 35 σει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀν-  
 οσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἀνευ ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια  
 καὶ ἐδωδὴν χεীরιστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη  
 πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν [ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις].  
 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, II

1253 b

32 [τελεωθὲν] and 33 [χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης] Jackson || τελεωθείς and 33 χω-  
 ρισθείς Spengel || ὁ wanting in II<sup>2</sup> Bk., but inserted in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> || 35  
 ἀρετῇ? due to 36 ἀρετῆς, having displaced a word like τέχνη Freudenthal (cp.  
*Met.* I. 1. 6 p. 980 b 27 f.) or καρτερίᾳ Susem.; not ἐρωτι Lindau, ὁρᾷεῖ Hampke,  
 nor ὀργῇ Schmidt: hardly κρᾷεῖ Schnitzer. [φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ] Conring Madvig,  
 [καὶ ἀρετῇ] Schneider, <ἐπὶ> φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ Welldon, \* \* φρονήσῃ Thurot,  
 φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ Reiske (this makes bad worse, Montecatino protested against it),  
 χρήσῃ κατ' ἀρετῇ Oncken. See Susem. *Quaest. Crit.* II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. || 38 [ἡ...  
 ...κρίσις] Hampke, [δίκη] Spengel || δίκη] δικαιοσύνη Reiske Thurot

νόμου καὶ δίκης appear strange, and 26  
 χωρισθείς is used in a different connexion"  
 (Jackson). Spengel (and lately Ridgeway)  
 would make the participles masculine.  
 But the concord is not too harsh; 'at  
 fortasse, ut saepius, liberiore construc-  
 tione utitur Aristoteles' (Susem.). For  
 the thought, Plato *Λαίω* 765 E, πάντος γὰρ  
 δὴ φύτου ἢ πρώτῃ βλάστῃ καλῶς ὀρμηθεῖσα  
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη  
 τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον...καὶ ἀνθρώ-  
 πων. ἄνθρωπος δὲ, ὡς φαμέν, ἡμερον...μὴ  
 ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφέν ἀγριώτατον  
 ὅπως φύει γῇ.

§ 16 34 ὁ δὲ κτλ.] 'Man is born with  
 weapons to be used by (i.e. to subserve)  
 wisdom and virtue; weapons which are,  
 however, especially liable to abuse' (Mon-  
 tecatino): φρονήσῃ the dative of reference  
 (Jackson). Most editors make it causal  
 or instrumental. "But (1) what can  
 'weapons for practical wisdom and virtue'  
 mean? Hardly weapons for the *exercise*,  
 but rather such as serve for the *attain-*  
*ment*, of these qualities. Yet ἀδικία  
 ἔχουσα ὅπλα shows that the former are  
 meant. (2) It is essential to the thought  
 that we should learn whence man, of all  
 creatures, gets these dangerous double-  
 edged weapons, so eminently adapted for  
 purposes mutually opposed (τὰναντία), for  
 good and for evil. Whereas that they  
 are for good needs not be stated: Aris-  
 totle's teleological standpoint implies it."  
 SUSEM. Cp. *Rhet.* I. 1 § 13 (Spengel).

37 ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν κτλ.]

III. 10. 2 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν.  
 SUSEM. (28 c)

Jackson keeping the last clause ἡ δὲ  
 δίκη κτλ (which he holds to be a paren-  
 thetical explanation of δίκη in ἡ γὰρ δίκη  
 κτλ, rightly placed last in a Greek sen-  
 tence) would translate: "now justice be-  
 longs to a state", i.e. can be found only  
 in a πόλις, "δίκη or the administration of  
 law—which is the determination of what  
 is just—being a regulation of the political  
 community." Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 4 ἡ  
 γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου  
 ff. with Jackson's notes.

c. 3 *Economic has three parts treating  
 of the relationships which make up the  
 household, (1) δεσποτική (2) γαμική  
 (3) πατρική: §§ 1, 2. The relation of (4)  
 χρηματιστική to economic is obscure:  
 § 3. Upon δεσποτική, which we take  
 first, there are widely divergent views § 4.*  
 Roughly speaking the rest of the book  
 treats of (1) δεσποτική in cc. 4—7, (4)  
 χρηματιστική in cc. 8—11, (2) and (3) in  
 cc. 12, 13.

c. 4 *The household needs implements  
 which may be animate or inanimate:  
 such an implement is called a chattel  
 (κτῆμα), and is πρακτικόν, for use  
 not for production: §§ 1—4. The thrall  
 (κτῆμα ἐμψυχόν) defined §§ 5, 6.*

c. 5 *But are there any persons answer-  
 ing to this definition, φύσει δοῦλοι? § 1  
 As it is advantageous to both and to each,  
 and therefore just and natural that body  
 should be subject to soul, appetite to reason,*



ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγ- (II)  
 κεται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν ἡ οἰκία  
 συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ  
 5 δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ  
 καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλος καὶ πόσις  
 καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκε-  
 § 2 πτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ  
 δεσποτική καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀν-  
 10 δρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ  
 ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὲ αὗται τρεῖς ἃς εἴπο-  
 § 3 μεν. ἔστι δὲ τι [μέρος] ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία,

1253 b 2 ἀνάγκη P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald., while Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> (which has—however † in the margin) S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and V<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) omit ἀναγκαῖον...4 συνέστηκεν (a later hand has inserted the words in the margin of V<sup>b</sup>) || περὶ οἰκονομίας (οἰκίας Bk.<sup>2</sup> following the mss. used by Accoromboni and Sepulveda) εἰπεῖν πρότερον P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk. in place of πρῶτον.....εἰπεῖν || σύγκεται after 3 οἰκιῶν P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk. || 3 οἰκονομίας] οἰκίας Γ P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Bk. Bernays || πάλιν ἡ οἰκία Γ apparently, πάλιν οἰκία P<sup>2.3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> and a later hand in V<sup>b</sup>, ἡ οἰκία πάλιν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, αὐθις οἰκία P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk. || 4 συνέστηκεν] συνίσταται P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk. || 5 πρῶτον] <καὶ> πρώτοις Bender || 7 τούτων σκεπτέον after 8 ἂν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 9 καὶ is wanting before γαμική in M<sup>a</sup> M<sup>b</sup> || 10 πατρική Ar. apparently (cp. c. 12 § 1), τεκνοποιητική Bk. following Γ and the mss. (W<sup>b</sup> Ald. omit ἀνώνυμον.....τεκνοποιητική), τεκνοποιική Dindorf (Steph. Thes.): πατρική was abbreviated πρική; this became ποιική or ποιητική, and was then wrongly emended || 11 δὴ Susem.<sup>3</sup>, δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. || 12 δ' ἐτι or δέ τι <ἐτι> Susem., δὲ <δ'> τι: i.e. δὲ <τέταρτόν> τι (after first suggesting δ' ἐτι <τέταρτόν> τι) Schmidt, probably right || [μέρος] Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 693 n. 4, ed. 3)

§§ 5, 6, *beasts to man, female to male*, § 7, *so it is better* (i.e. § 11 advantageous and just) *that a man whose function is bodily service, who is a mere adjunct of another, should be subject to his superior in excellence of soul*, §§ 8, 9. *Nature designs to mark this distinction upon the bodies of the two, but does not always succeed*: §§ 10, 11.

On the question of slavery cc. 3—7, consult *Introd.* pp. 24—26, the excellent dissertation of L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aris. von der Sklaverei* (Erlangen 1847. 4), Hildenbrand *op.c.* 395—406, Oncken II. 29—74, Becker and Hermann *Charikles* III. 1—12, Eng. tr. 356—373. SUSEM.

c. 3 § 1 1253 b 3 οἰκονομίας δὲ κτλ.] In his lax manner Aristotle means “the parts of Economic” or household-management “correspond to those of which the household consists”. This at least gives better sense than to read οἰκίας; see 12 § 1.

The οἰκίας μέρη, as enumerated just afterwards, are the three ‘pairs’ of relationships συζεύξεις (or, 2 § 5, κοινωνίαι).

4 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλ. κτλ.] by the method noticed I § 3 n., 8 § 1 n., III. 1. 2 n. (434). SUSEM. (29)

5 πρῶτα.] The ἀσύνθετα of I § 3.

§ 2 9 γαμική=‘conjugal’, πατρική=‘paternal’ relationship: senses obviously more precise than the ordinary use of the terms warranted. Thus ἡ γαμική ὁμιλία, the marriage union, IV(VII). 16 § 1= simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks ἀνδρική, Göttling ποσιακή (*sic*) would better express the former relation from the side of the stronger analogously to δεσποτική, or Latin *maritalis*. Strictly πατρικός= hereditary, as e.g. in III. 14. 6: but in *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8, VIII. 10. 4 it is used, as here, for ‘paternal’.

τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέον. (II)  
λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς. (p. 5)

- 15 πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἰπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε  
πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν ἴδωμεν, καὶ εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι  
περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανο-  
§ 4 μένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, 3  
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βα-  
20 σιλική, καθάπερ εἶπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ  
δεσπότην. νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλευθέρον,  
φύσει δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ.  
4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ [καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ] 4

15 [δὲ] Schmidt, who transposes πρῶτον [δὲ].....1256 a 1 τρώπον (cc. 3 § 3—7 § 5) to follow 1259 a 39 γαμική (c. 12 § 1): see *Introd.* p. 97 || 17 δυνάμεθα M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> C<sup>4</sup>, δυνήσμεθα Γ (?) Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, poterimus William || 23 ἐπεὶ οὖν εἴπομεν οὖν <δτι> Schmidt || [καὶ.....24 οἰκονομίας] Susem. On 23—33 cp. Susem. *Qu. Cr.* II. 7 ff.

§ 3 13 τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος] 8 § 1, 9 §§ 12—18, 11 § 13. SUSEM. (29 b)

15 ἵνα κτλ] 'first in order to observe what has a direct bearing upon practical use, and secondly for our theory, to ascertain any facts which may enable us to improve upon the views at present held'.

§ 4 20 καθάπερ εἶπομεν κτλ] 1 § 2 f. cp. 7 § 1 *nn.* SUSEM. (30)

τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν] Comp. below 6 § 1 foll. with *nn.* The only representative of this view of whom we have certain knowledge was the rhetorician Alkidamas of Elaia, a disciple of Gorgias (see III. 2. 2 *n.*), who gave expression to it in his 'Messenian' speech delivered on behalf of Messene after its restoration by Epaminondas, in order to overcome the obstinate refusal of the Spartans to recognize the new state: ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός, οὐδένα δούλον ἢ φύσιν πεποίηκεν, Aristot. *Rhet.* I. 13, 3, with scholiast. Compare Spengel (II. 179) [and Cope] on that passage; and esp. Vahlen *Der Rhetor Alkidamas* (Vienna 1864. 8). 14 ff. Possibly (see 7 § 3 *n.*) Aristotle was acquainted with the lines of the comic poet Philemon (*Fragm. inc.* xxiv Meineke, cp. Meineke's ed. p. 410) καὶ δούλος ἐστὶ, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει. | φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δούλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ· | ἢ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο. SUSEM. (31)

Zeller *Socrates* p. 322 *n.* 3 is inclined to attribute this view to the Cynics.

21 νόμῳ...φύσει] On this famous antithesis of the 'conventional' and the 'natural' see *Soph. Elench.* 12 § 6 173 a 7 ff.,

Grant *Ethics* I. 149—151, and esp. Sidgwick *Journal of Philology* v. 73—77.

22 διόπερ κτλ] Wherefore slavery (τὸ δεσπότην) is unjust also, as resting on mere force (Wyse).

c. 4 § 1 23 ἡ κτητικὴ = the theory of the acquisition of property. Götting and Bernays in a more general sense, 'the theory of property'; and certainly with this rendering the words in brackets would fit better into the context. But in what follows κτητικὴ everywhere denotes the same thing as χρηματιστικὴ in the wider sense, the 'science' or 'art' of acquiring wealth, first introduced 3 § 3, see 8 § 1 *n.* Property, as being indispensable for living, belongs to the household: hence by analogy it follows that every chattel is an instrument for the householder's use, and that the slave is an animate instrument of this kind. But from the fact that the theory of acquisition or even the theory of property is a part of the science of household management, no such conclusion follows, even when taken in connexion with the first premiss, which is sufficient of itself to prove it in the manner indicated above. Besides, the words bracketed anticipate the decision which at 3 § 3 is distinctly postponed to c. 8, and the way in which the question is raised 8 § 1 presupposes that no such decision by anticipation has yet been given. The statement made here does not agree with the results of cc. 8—11; for not the whole theory of property and its acquisition,



μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας] (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον (II)  
 25 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν)· ὥσπερ δὴ ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις  
 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει  
 § 2 ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν  
 δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερ-  
 νήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἶαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ  
 30 ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ <τῷ  
 οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτήσις

25 καὶ εὖ ζῆν wanting in ΓΜ<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (first hand, added in the margin) || δὴ  
 Susem., δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> M<sup>b</sup>, δὲ ἐν Q Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Bk.; wanting in P<sup>4-6</sup>. U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald.  
 Hence [δὲ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>. || 26 μέλλοι Koraes and perhaps Γ || 27 τῷ οἰκονομικῷ]  
 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν P<sup>2-3-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C<sup>4</sup>  
 and the 1st hand in V<sup>b</sup> (the dative in V<sup>b</sup> by a later hand); [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ]  
 and 30 οὕτω καὶ <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> Rassow Susem. Thurot once proposed to omit  
 30 οὕτω καὶ and transpose 27 οὕτω καὶ.....30 ἐστὶν to follow 31 ἐστὶ || 31 [ἡ...  
 ...32 ἐστὶ, καὶ] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the  
 'natural' part concerns *οἰκονομική*, and  
 that only indirectly. My defence of the  
 words, *Rhein. Mus.* XX. 510, is exposed  
 to objections not then foreseen: it would  
 seem that this is an un-Aristotelian in-  
 terpolation. SUSEM. (32)

24 ἀνευ γὰρ κτλ] Cp. 2 § 8 n. (21).  
 Mere life, bare existence, ζῆν, is of course  
 the immediate end of the household and  
 of household management: good life or  
 well-being, εὖ ζῆν, is the end which the  
 state has in view: but indirectly the state  
 and its end is the end of the household  
 2 §§ 2—9. Consequently we find that side  
 of *οἰκονομία*, which is directed towards  
 securing the fitness of those belonging to  
 the household, and so towards the per-  
 fecting of life, ranked above the use  
 and preservation of property, or the side  
 which is directed to mere living, 13 § 1 n.  
 SUSEM. (33)

25 ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις = the arts  
 which form distinct professions: 'as the  
 craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must  
 be provided with suitable tools &c.' Ber-  
 nays. In any case the phrase means 'the  
 arts' properly so called; immediately be-  
 low they are termed productive or creative  
 (ποίησις, ποιητικὰ ὄργανα § 4 with n.) as  
 contrasted with the merely practical ac-  
 tivities to which Economic and the art of  
 life belong. According to Aristotle these  
 productive arts are to be subdivided into  
 (1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or  
 'fine arts'. In the sphere of practice  
 the end lies in the activities them-  
 selves, ἐνέργειαι: in the sphere of the

arts, in certain definite special products,  
 ἔργα, distinct from the activities which  
 produce them: *Nic. Eth.* I. 1. 2, 1094 a  
 3 f., διαφορά δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν·  
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ'  
 αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά, I. 1. 5 1094 a 16 διαφέρει  
 δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη  
 τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθά-  
 περ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπιστημῶν, II. 4. 3  
 1105 a 26, VI. 2 5 1139 b 2, II. 5. 3  
 1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this dis-  
 tinction Schlosser prefers to explain  
 ὠρισμέναις τ. as arts *restricted* to de-  
 finite distinctive ends. But can this be  
 expressed by the one word ὠρισμέναις?  
 Fülleborn wavers between this explana-  
 tion and his own, which makes ὠρ. τέχ. =  
 definite *special* arts (the one all-em-  
 bracing art of life. But conduct or the  
 art of life—even if we include in it the  
 perfecting of life—embraces at the most  
 only the practical activities; and from  
 what has been said it follows that the  
 technical or productive activities, ποίησις,  
 would be excluded from it. Cp. also IV  
 (VII). 3. 3 n. SUSEM. (34)

§ 2 30 ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει] is classed  
 with, ranked under the head of, im-  
 plements: cp. τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει ἀρχὰς  
*Meta.* I. 3. 3 983 b 7, the material sort of  
 causes; ἐν μορίῳ εἶδει *De Caelo* I. 1. 7  
 268 a 5. The same idiom frequently  
 where εἶδος and the genitive are almost a  
 paraphrase for the thing in question: νό-  
 μων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας *Pol.* III.  
 15. 2, cp. VI (IV). 6. 9 ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος.

31 τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον κτλ] "the  
 chattel is an instrument to aid him in

πλήθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτήμα τι ἔμφυχον. καὶ (II)  
 § 3 ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς [ὁ] ὑπέρτης. εἰ γὰρ ἡδύ-  
 νατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀπο-  
 35 τελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ  
 'Ηφαίστου τρίποδας, οὓς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θεῖον  
 [ὑπο]δύεσθαι ἀγῶνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ  
 πλήκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν  
 § 4 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπότηταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα  
 1254 a ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ

32 [καὶ] before ὁ δοῦλος so that the apodosis begins here Thurot || 33 ὁ wanting in M<sup>9</sup>, erased in P<sup>4</sup> || 34 προαισθόμενον Koraes || 35 αὐτοῦ Π || 37 δύεσθαι P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || οὕτως <ελ> Susem.<sup>1</sup> following William's translation *sic si*, οὕτω καὶ Schmidt || αὐταὶ only Γ and a later hand in C<sup>4</sup>: the rest have αὐται.

1254 a 1 [τὰ μὲν... 4 μόνον] Schmidt

living." But it is not true conversely that every instrument of use for living is a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this; for the helmsman's assistant is not his property, and the difference between the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any reason for this distinction. See further I. 2 § 5 n., 6 § 10 n. SUSEM. (35)

33 ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων] an implement superior to other implements; see 7 § 3 and *De part. animal.* iv. 10. 21 687 a 21 ἐστι γὰρ (sc. ἡ χεὶρ) ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. For this relation δοῦλος = ἔμφυχον ὄργανον, ὄργανον = ἄψυχος δοῦλος Eaton cites *N. Eth.* viii. 11. 6

§ 3 35 Δαιδάλου] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet stepping apart (scholiast on Plato *Meno* 97 D, Suidas s. v. Δαιδάλου ποιήματα). When contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their illusive lifelikeness; and this, or rather his choice of attitudes of motion and action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here alludes, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent their running away (Plato *L. c.*). See Brunn *History of the Greek Artists* I. 14—23. SUSEM. (36)

36 ὁ ποιητὴς] Homer *Iliad* xviii. 376 ὅφρα οἱ αὐτόματοι θεῖον δυσάλαι' ἀγῶνα. SUSEM. (36 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lytton's *Coming Race*.

§ 4 1254 a 2 ποιητικὰ = for production (of fresh utilities embodied in material objects), πρακτικόν 'for action' = merely for use, i.e. as we see from 8 § 2 the consumption or utilization of commodities. In Political Economy consumption is either *productive* or *unproductive*, and the definition of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producers' or the consumers' point of view: Mill i. c. 3, Sidgwick *Principles* i. c. 3 § 7.

On the distinction here made between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* cp. *nn.* (34, 40) and Zeller *op. c.* ii 164, 177 ff., 580, 586, 652 ff. Consult also the special treatises Ed. Müller *History of the Theory of Art in Greece* II. 38 ff., 374 ff., Teichmüller *Forschungen (Aristotelian Researches)* II. 12—62, Reinkens *Aristotle on Art* 1—12, 169—179; Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cv. 1872. 319 f., Rich. Schultz *De poetices Aristoteleae principijs* (Berlin 1874. 8), Walter *Theory of Practical Reason in Gk. Philosophy* (Jena 1874. 8) p. 80 ff., 245 f., 276 ff., 296 ff., 504 ff.

Oncken very justly remarks, *op. c.* II. 39 f., that even from Aristotle's own point of view we must be surprised at a conception of slave-labour so one-sided that even its capacity for production (i.e. of fresh objects of utility) is denied. "This could not be maintained in view of the fact that in the art and industry of Hellas the whole of the unskilled labour engaged upon the



μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἑτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν (Π)  
 αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἢ χρῆσις μό-  
 5 νον. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἢ ποιήσις εἶδει καὶ ἢ πράξις, 6  
 καὶ δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν  
 § 5 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πράξις, οὐ ποιήσις ἐστίν·  
 διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν. (P.)

τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό τε γὰρ μό-  
 10 ριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου·  
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου  
 δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον  
 δεσπότης δούλος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου.

§ 6 τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων 7  
 15 δῆλον (ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὢν, οὗτος  
 φύσει δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ [δοῦ-

§ 5 δ' wanting in M<sup>a</sup> and perhaps also in Γ, hence [δ'] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 6 καὶ δέονται Π<sup>1</sup>  
 P<sup>2-3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald., δέονται δ' P<sup>4-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Bk. || 10 ἀπλῶς Γ  
 and p<sup>2</sup> (but ἐρμῆνεια [sic] ἐστὶ τοῦ ὅλως mg.<sup>3</sup> P<sup>2</sup>, i.e. a marginal note in dark yellow  
 ink), ἀπλῶς ὅλως M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ὅλως all other sources Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || The clause  
 15 ὁ...16 ἐστὶν is noticed by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the *Metaphys.* p. 15,  
 6 ed. Bonitz || 15 ὢν Π<sup>1</sup> Paris. 963 Alex. (apparently) and P<sup>4</sup> (corrector in margin),  
 δὲ P<sup>2-6</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and the 1st hand in P<sup>4</sup> C<sup>4</sup>: no  
 doubt also in P<sup>3</sup> (an erasure here), γρ. δὲ p<sup>1</sup> in margin, ἐστὶν a later hand in C<sup>4</sup> ||  
 16 ἀλλ' οὐδ' P<sup>1-6</sup>. W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald., ἀλλ' οὐδὲν M<sup>a</sup> || ἡ Γ M<sup>a</sup> || δοῦλος ἐστὶν or δοῦλος ᾗ Γ  
 apparently, δοῦλος ὢν M<sup>a</sup> C<sup>4</sup> and P<sup>1-2-3</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> (1st hand), ἄνθρωπος ὢν δοῦλος ὢν P<sup>4</sup>, ἄνθρω-

production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver's shuttle." SUSEM. (37)

§ 5 9 κτῆμα...μόριον] Eaton compares *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἔως ἂν ᾗ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ; a chattel and a child, until he reaches a certain age and becomes independent, are as it were parts of one-self.

10 ἀπλῶς ἄλλου] "belongs absolutely to another". To express relation to and dependence upon something else we find (1) the genitive with εἶναι, as here and Pl. *Rep.* iv. 433 B τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, or (2) ἐνεκα with the genitive, as in *Metaph.* i. 2. 19 quoted in n. on 14, or (3) πρὸς with the accusative, as in the technical term for the category πρὸς τι, and *Rhet.* i. 9. 27 ἐλευθέρου τὸ μὴ πρὸς

ἄλλον ζῆν.

12 ὁ δὲ...ὅλως ἐκείνου] *Eth. Eud.* vii. 9. 2 1241 b 19 οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἐστὶν (sc. δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος), ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός...τοῦ δεσπότητος ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος.

§ 6 14 δύναμις] essential quality, attribute: a sense the word acquires because 'the real nature of a thing is denoted by that which it πέφυκε ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν': Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 2. 6 ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἑτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, *Pol.* iv (vii). 1. 12 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, also iv (vii). 4. 10; Plato *Partm.* 134 D τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, *Rep.* ix. 588 B τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δικαῖα πράττειν ἢν ἐκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

15 ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ κτλ] Conversely in *Metaph.* i. 2. 19 982 b 25 we have a definition of the free man ἄνθρωπος, φάμεν, ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου (L. Schiller). SUSEM. (38)

5 λος ἐστίν], κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν)· πότερον (11)  
 δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινα  
 δουλεῖν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ  
 20 ταῦτα σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ 8  
 § 2 ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι  
 οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ.  
 καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἕνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι  
 τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ  
 25 ἀρχομένων ἐστίν (καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχῇ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων  
 § 3 ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον  
 ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει  
 τὸ δ' ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον)· ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλείονων 9

πος ὦν p<sup>1</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and, with γρ. before these words, corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>2,3</sup>, a correction in red ink on the margin of Q, and M<sup>b</sup> (corr. in margin); [ἀνθρωπος ὦν] Koraes. Dittographia, whichever of the two—δούλος ἐστίν or ἀνθρωπος ὦν—gave rise to all the other readings || 23 καὶ εὐθὺς.....24 ἀρχειν Susem.<sup>1</sup> transposed to immediately precede 28 ὅσα, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1375 f. who has now been followed in punctuation. Cp. Comm. || 24 [καὶ εἶδη ...28 ἔργον] Schmidt who thinks the proper context is before φανερόν 1259 b 18, and if so conjectures ἐπεὶ δὲ εἶδη || 25 [ἢ] ἀρχῇ Koraes || 26 ἀνθρώπων ἢ θηρίων Schmidt || 27 ὑπὸ Bk.<sup>2</sup> instead of ἀπὸ

17 χωριστόν] Hereby opposed to μόριον which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 13 (Shilleto).

Thus the definition of ὁ φύσει δούλος is ὄργανον ἐμψυχον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν, ὥς ἄλλου ὄν, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτῆμα 'chattel', 'thrall', as for instance in *N. E.* v. 6. 8 quoted above.

c. 5. To whom then does this definition apply? Are there any φύσει δούλοι, for whom a slave's estate is greater good and just?

§ 1 20 τῷ λόγῳ...ἐκ τῶν γινομένων] Aristotle emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is λογικῶς or διαλεκτικῶς ζητεῖν as opposed (a) to ἀναλυτικῶς or ἐκ τῶν κειμένων, (b) to φυσικῶς ζητεῖν or ἐπισκοπεῖν: Waitz *Organon* II. 354, Zeller *Phil.* II ii 171 n. 2. Eaton rightly compares IV (VII). 1. 6.

§ 2 22 τῶν συμφερόντων] Under the limitation laid down III. 6. 6, see n. (7).

24 εἶδη πολλὰ] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5: Plato *Laos* III. 690 A. The variety implies a gradation.

25 καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων κτλ] This passage is referred to IV (VII). 3. 2, see the note: cp. IV (VII). 14. 19 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς

ἀρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχῇ καλλίων καὶ μάλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. SUSEM. (38 b)

Cp. also VIII (V). 11. 34.

§ 3 26 τὸ γὰρ ἀποτ. κτλ] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* II. 6. 4 πᾶσα ἀρετῇ, οὗ ἂν ἢ ἀρετῇ αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν (Eaton).

28 τούτων ἔργον] The function proper to them, the work which they exclusively perform in their relation of government and governed, lies in the mere exercise of command and tender of obedience. See Plato *Rep.* I. 353 A: τοῦτο ἐκάστου ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνον τι ἢ καλλίστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται.

ὅσα γὰρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστὶ, not to the particular explanation attached to it καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων...ἔργον. SUSEM. (39)

The sentence is parenthetical as in I. 1. 3, where see note. "For wherever several parts, whether continuous or discrete, combine to form a single composite whole, in all such cases may be discerned a principal or ruling part and one subordinate which is ruled. This follows from the whole order of nature (ἐκ causal, as e.g. ἐκ προαιρέσεως, 2 § 2) and is seen to hold good of living things."



συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ (II)  
 30 διηρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχό-  
 § 4 μενον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐννύχχει τοῖς  
 ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τις  
 ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέ-  
 ρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς 10  
 35 καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχό-  
 § 5 μενον — δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον  
 τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-  
 τιστα διακεῖμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀν-  
 θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ

31 [καὶ τοῦτ'... 32 ἐμψύχοις] Schmidt || 33 <ἐν> ἀρμονία? Susem. || 35 ἀρχό-  
 μενον—(to mark a break in the construction) Bonitz || 39 μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς] *res-*  
*tilentium et prave* William; apparently Γ had φαύλως which Bücheler approves,

§ 4 31 ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως] The conclusion is based upon the whole order of nature: it is a universal natural law, not a special law applying to living organisms (Bernays). SUSEM. (38 c) It is not probable that ἐκ with genitive=a partitive genitive (Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 235 b 11), for the only support for such a use is the spurious treatise *Περὶ φυτῶν*, 836 a 39, τὸ φυτὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν στερουμένων ψυχῆς, and 828 b 27. It would be an improvement, but hardly correct, to render 'taking the whole of nature this is preëminently true of living things'.

32 τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι κτλ] αἰεὶ τὸ χειρόν τοῦ βελτιονός ἐστὶν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν IV (VII). 14. 10.

33 ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας] "Even in things without life there is a species of dominance, in music for instance": each musical 'mode' being ruled by its key-note, ἡ μέση (originally the note struck by the middle string of the heptachord\*). Compare *Probl.* XIX. § 33 920 a 21 ἢ γὰρ μέση καὶ ἡγεμών: § 36 920 b 9 τὸ ἡμῶσθαι ἐστὶν ἀπάσαις sc. ταῖς χορδαῖς, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς τὴν μέσην: § 44 922 a 23 ἐπειδὴ τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν ἀκρῶν τὸ μέσον μόνον ἀρχή τις ἐστὶν... 27 φθόγγοι ὧν ἡ μέση καλούμενη μόνη ἀρχή ἐστὶ θατέρον τετραχόρδου. On the technical sense of ἀρμονία=εἶδος διαπάσων see Exc. III. on Bk. V (VIII). Another political simile from the 'modes' *Eth.* *End.* VII. 9. 4: ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, inas-

\* The term 'dominant' for the fifth above the key-note in a modern scale is quite different.

much as some are ὀρθαί, others παρεκβάσεις. Giphanius and others wrongly take ἀρμονίας as qualifying ἀρχή=dominance in the sense, that is, of a blending or subordination of parts. Cp. *De Anima* I. 4. 1 τὴν ἀρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι. This would be the sense of συμφωνία, rather than of ἀρμονία, in music: *Probl.* XIX. 38 921 a 2.

ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως] "would perhaps involve a discussion somewhat outside the subject". Obviously the simple meaning here as in ἐξ. πράξεις IV (VII). 3. 8: not to be pressed (as by Thurot *Etudes* 219 f., Ueberweg *Hist. of Phil.* Eng. tr. I. 143) to signify 'those parts of Aristotle's strictly scientific works which are "dialectical" i.e. controversial, rather than "apodeictical" i.e. purely scientific.'

34 τὸ δὲ ζῶον κτλ] The enumeration is interrupted at ἀρχόμενον by the qualifying phrase in parenthesis δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν... ἔχειν in such a way that even the first member (ζῶον) is only quoted by its first division into soul and body, while the second subdivision into rational and irrational parts of the soul is not added until the enumeration is resumed, § 6. We should expect δεύτερον, τρίτον to correspond with πρῶτον, in place of them we find πάλιν and ἐτι δὲ in § 7. SUSEM. (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine what is κατὰ φύσιν. But Aristotle's meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελευτήσεως ταύτην φάμεν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου. Cp. *N. Eth.* IX. 9. 8, *Cic. Tusc.* I § 32 (Eaton).

1254 b μοχθηρώς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα (p. 7)

§ 6 τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. ἔστι 11  
δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῇ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δε-  
σποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώ-  
ματος ἀρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πο-  
λιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύ-  
σιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-  
χῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ  
9 λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερόν πάσιν.

erasing φαύλως καὶ just afterwards; μοχθηρώς, due to a mistaken correction written over μοχθηρῶν, may have displaced φαύλως, as Schmidt once suggested: now he suspects μοχθηρῶν ἢ: [ἢ μοχθηρώς ἐχόντων] Studemund

1254 b 2 καὶ παρὰ φύσιν wanting in M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), but added in the margin by p<sup>1</sup> || P<sup>2-3</sup> have περὶ for παρὰ || 6 [καὶ βασιλικήν] Oncken, perhaps rightly

§ 6 1254 b 3 f. This analogy is carried out in *Nic. Eth.* v. 11 § 9, i. 13 § 18, III. 3 § 18, 12 § 6. Cp. also Plato *Phaedo* 80 A ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὡς ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἀρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν; *Phaedrus* 237 f., not to mention *Rep.* ix. 589 e, 590 c, d (Eaton). Several characteristic phrases here come from Plato. For similar analogies turning on various forms of ἀρχή see *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8 f., 11 § 9 with Jackson's notes; VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 1—6.

8 τῷ παθητικῷ... λόγον ἔχοντος] Cp. iv (vii). 15. 9 with n. (935). More precisely Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul (1) the rational part or thinking soul, νοῦς, (2) the sentient appetitive soul, cp. iv (vii). 7. 5 n. (786), and (3) the nutritive or vegetative soul. The lower animals have the two latter merely, plants have only the third: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 497 f., 509 f., 566 ff. The nutritive soul is of no importance for the present inquiry, compare *Nic. Eth.* i. 13 §§ 11—14; here it is left entirely out of the question as in c. 13 § 6, iv (vii). 14 § 9 f., 15 §§ 9, 10, where see the notes, cp. also III. 4 § 6 n. (472). He further divides the rational soul into two parts: i cognitive reason (ἐπιστημονικόν), ii reflective or opining reason (λογιστικόν, δοξαστικόν). The latter includes that part of the speculative reason which attains to a mere idea or opinion (ὑπόληψις = unverified belief, assumption, δόξα) but

falls short of true knowledge, and more especially the practical reason with its peculiar faculty of taking counsel or deliberating with itself (βουλευτικόν, see 13 § 7 n.), or in other words the faculty of reflexion from which Aristotle has borrowed the name (λογιστικόν) for all this part of the reason. It was explained in n. (34) on 1. 4. 1 that the practical reason is again divided into (1) διάνοια πρακτική, practical reason in the strict sense, and (2) constructive, i.e. technical, reason, δ. ποιητική, which when developed becomes τέχνη, artistic skill\*: see *Nic. Eth.* vi. 1 § 5 f.; 2 § 3, § 5; 4 § 3, 5 § 8, 12 § 2; *Metaph.* vi. 1. 5 1025 b 25 f. Compare Walter and Zeller as above quoted, and in modification of their views Sussemihl *Studies in the Nic. Eth.* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879. 737 ff.


If we combine with the above the results stated in the note on 1. 13. 6 we obtain the following scheme of the rational soul according to Aristotle:

\* In the *Politics* however τέχνη generally denotes (1) Art as opposed to Nature, (2) the total activity in any department whatsoever of technical skill or the construction of new products:—the exercise of crafts and industries of all kinds, including occasionally even practical aptitudes such as Household Management (οἰκονομική). This is the sense in 4 § 1 above, where the former or 'arts proper' are accordingly distinguished from practical aptitudes by the addition of ὑπομενέαις, cp. n. (34). It is only in 11 § 6 that τεχνικώταται ἐργασίαι = occupation where artistic skill is most required: see n. (102).



§ 7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ 12  
 11 μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτοις δὲ  
 πᾶσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σω-  
 τηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν  
 κρείττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον.  
 15 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώ-  
 § 8 πων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος 13  
 καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων

13 ἔστι Ar. (?) *est igitur*, Susem.<sup>3</sup> (a misprint) || 14 Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. omit καὶ || 16 διε-  
 στᾶσι τοσοῦτον M<sup>3</sup>, διεστᾶσι τοιοῦτον P<sup>1</sup> || ψυχῆς σώμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου θῆριον? Thurot,  
 more correctly; but perhaps an improvement upon Aristotle himself || 17 δὲ  
 wanting in M<sup>3</sup> P<sup>1-3</sup>, Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>2</sup>)



Now in the *Politics* we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the *αἰσθητικόν* or *ὀρεκτικόν* (cp. *De Anima* III. 7. 2 οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὐτ' ἀλλήλων οὐτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο) in regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or percipient side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, *ἥθος*, Cp. I. 13. 6 n., *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 12 f., 13 § 10 f.; VI. 12 § 6. SUSEM. (40)

§ 7 10 πάλιν...13 ἔτι δὲ] See on § 4 a 34 above. ὡσαύτως] Here again, in man's relation to the animals we see the same thing: clearly, from what follows, the difference between ruler and ruled and the advantage derived by the one from the rule of the other. SUSEM. (41, 42)

Cp. 2 § 2 διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (Congreve). 11 τὰ ἡμέρα τῶν ἀγρίων] Plato *Politicus* 264 A, διήρητο τὸ ζῶον τῷ τιθασφ καὶ ἀγρίῳ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τιθασεύεσθαι φύσιν ἡμέρα προσείρηται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα ἀγρία. A division which Aristotle censures as unscientific *De part. animal.* I. 3. 13 643 b 3, πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὅσα ἡμέρα, καὶ ἀγρία τυγχάνει ὄντα.

13 τὸ ἄρρεν κτλ.] Cp. 12 § 1 n. (108, 109), 13 § 9 ff. (117, 120). SUSEM. (42 b)

14 κρείττον...χεῖρον] Elsewhere τὸ θῆλυ is declared to be ὡς περ ἄρρεν πενηρωμένον, or ἀναπηρία. This is Plato's doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sex: *Rep.* V. 455 E ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς, *Laos* VI. 781 B ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θῆλεια ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χεῖρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, *Timaeus* 42 A, B: τὸ κρείττον τοιοῦτον εἶη γένος...ἀνὴρ, 90 E f.

15 ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.

§ 8 16 ὅσοι...17 θηρίων] Cp. III. 11. 5 καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἐνιοὶ τῶν θηρίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; How is the existence of such men possible, on Aristotle's own psychology? There is a difference of kind between man and the brutes, the latter not having a rational part of the soul (see n. on § 6 above); but between the most perfect and the least perfect of men there is at most but a difference of degree, even when in the latter this rational part is reduced to the minimum immediately described, n. (45). We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when "he regards bestial limitation to sensual enjoyments, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition ἀνδραποδωδία" (Schiller, who quotes Orelli *Aris-*

ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν (II)  
 19 βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιον ἐστὶν  
 § 9 ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἐστὶ γὰρ  
 φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου  
 ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ  
 μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῶα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα ἀλλὰ

18 ἐστω M<sup>a</sup>, ἐστ' P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk., ἐσται S<sup>b</sup> || 20 ἥνπερ Bücheler for  
 εἴπερ, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1366 f. || ἐστω ἀρα ? Susem.; since no δὲ cor-  
 responds to the preceding μὲν οὖν and μὲν Thurot suspects some deeper corruption,  
 a lacuna, it may be, before ἐστὶ γὰρ || 21 ὁ δυνάμενος... 22 καὶ suspected by Schmidt  
 || 23 λόγου Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Schneider Spengel, perhaps rightly || [αἰσθανόμενα] Bender  
 [ἀλλὰ] Spengel αἰσθάνονται ? Schneider

*toles Pädagogik* 69). The passages to consult are III. 4 § 11, IV (VII). 17 § 7, § 9; also V (VIII). 6 § 8, IV (VII). 15 § 5 with the notes: *Nic. Eth.* I. 5 § 3; III. 10 § 8, II § 3; IV. 5 § 6; and the further references under ἀνδραποδώδης Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 54 b 30 f. SUSEM. (43)

19 οἷς βέλτιον κτλ.] Plato *Rep.* IX. 590 D ὡς ἀμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξωθεν ἐφεισώ-  
 τος: a passage which contains something more than the germ of Aristotle's whole doctrine of natural slavery.

20 τοῖς εἰρημένοις] τῷ σώματι, τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ, τῷ θηρίῳ, τῷ θήλει (Congreve).

§ 9 21 διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν] As a general rule slavery is due to a natural inferiority. But this must not be pressed too far: from c. 6 an unjust slavery is possible, cum hi sunt alterius qui sui possunt esse, Cic. *De Rep.* III. § 37 (Congreve). SUSEM. (44)

22 ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν] In c. 13 § 14 the capacity to admit reason or understand its commands (αἰσθάνεσθαι) is ascribed to these natural slaves in a higher degree than to children (see *note*), for children, while their reason is still undeveloped, attend too much to the mere suggestions of the instincts and passions of sense; *Nic. Eth.* I. 3. 6, III. 12. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here asserting more than his own psychology justifies: for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly attributed to the irrational soul, that is, to speak accurately (see *n.* on § 6), the appetitive soul, in IV (VII). 14 § 9, cp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 15 f.: namely, the capacity of allowing itself to be guided by

practical reason. As the power to reflect is to Aristotle amongst the most essential peculiarities of the practical reason—see *n.* (40) on § 6—this cannot with any consistency be wholly denied to the slave as it is here and c. 13 § 7 (where see *note*) if it be once granted that the slave's soul has a rational part under which is included the possession of practical reason. At the most there can be merely an approximation to the state here described. See further on c. 13 § 12.

Λόγος, which here=reason, is the βουλευτικὸν of 13 § 7 (see *n.*): more precisely, ὁρθὸς λόγος in the *Ethics*, right or sound understanding as the law and criterion of human action in the sphere of practice and morals. Preëminent skill in the exercise of this λόγος is φρόνησις=insight, prudence: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 652 f., Walter *op. c.* 353—503. Aristotle is consistent when he allows φρόνησις to none but the φύσει δεσπότης: I. 13. 8 *n.* (115), III. 4. 17 *n.* (497). But if the φύσει δοῦλος were wholly devoid of practical reason of his own he would, by Aristotle's own definition, cease to be a human being and to possess even the scanty remains of capacity for human and moral virtue which is left him according to c. 13 §§ 1—14: cp. *Poetics* c. 15 § 1 with my *note* (19 b). He would then be reduced to the level of the brute, in himself unable to resist the promptings of sensual desires. See *n.* p. 211. SUSEM. (45)

23 λόγῳ αἰσθ.] On αἰσθησις, αἰσθάνεσθαι see *n.* (570) upon III. II. 9. SUSEM. (45 b) If λόγῳ is the right reading, then the copula is omitted as if αἰσθανόμενα were an adjective: "the other animals (are) not attentive to reason, but obey their passions."



παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεῖα δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν<sup>14</sup>  
 25 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' ἀμφοῖν, παρὰ τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ξύων.  
 § 10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα  
 ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ  
 πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς  
 30 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν  
 βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν  
 χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τού-  
 ναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς (p. 8)  
 ψυχὰς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοντο διά-  
 35 φοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο-  
 λειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.  
 § 11 εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ  
 τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν  
 τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

28 ποιεῖ P<sup>3-6</sup>. QM<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and 1st hand of P<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || μὲν <ταπεινὰ καὶ>, or something similar, Schmidt with great probability; ὀρθὰ] νωθρὰ Reiske || 31 καὶ wanting in L<sup>1</sup>. [οὗτος...32 εἰρηνικὴν] Schneider and Schmidt, perhaps not unreasonably || 33 ἐλευθέρων] ἐτέρων or a little before <τῶν δούλων> τοὺς μὲν Heitland wrongly: Aristotle's meaning would have been clearer if he had added μόνον after σώματα or after ψυχὰς || 36 Oncken thinks the conclusion omitted after δουλεύειν; but it came first: βούλεται μὲν οὖν.....τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς

24 f. καὶ ἡ χρεῖα δὲ παραλλάττει κτλ] "Moreover the service afforded by the slave is not very far removed from that of domesticated animals; viz. bodily aid (note the dative) towards the necessities of life." Comp. Plato *Polit.* 289 B: slaves and domesticated animals as species of the same genus περὶ ζώων κτήσιν τῶν ἡμέρων πλὴν δούλων; also c. 2 § 5 above n. (15); and 6 § 10 n. (57). SUSEM. (46)

§ 10 27 βούλεται] Nature designs, but is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).

32 χρεῖαν] "including services in war as well as in peace."

34 ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε κτλ] Cp. IV (VII). 14. 2. Congreve and Eaton compare Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental worth is necessarily and naturally presented in a harmonious external form; and in the very beauty of the race, of which he was thoroughly conscious, Aristotle finds direct proof of its superiority to the barbarians. What a complete justification this for the slavery of the black

and coloured races! Zeller *op. c.* II ii 691 n. (2). See on I. 2 § 4 n. (13).

Lang however from another point of view justly remarks *op. c. Essays* 60: "we must remember no one would have been more bitter than Aristotle against the negro-slavery on plantations of modern days. To turn the servants of the noble life into tools of limitless money-making would have been, in his view, unnatural. We must remember also, that he would have held up the promise and reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in prospect, and friendship in the meantime, with every lovely rite of divine service performed for their sake, there may have been worse lives than those of the Greek slaves." SUSEM. (47)

§ 11 38 οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν κτλ] Eaton compares *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 16 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρώμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρώμεν. Should we not rather think of Plat. *Phaedr.* 250 D E, Xen. *Mem.* III. 10. 3?

<sup>1255 a</sup> ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰς φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦ- (II)  
λοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιον  
6 ἐστίν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγου- 16  
σιν ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν  
5 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. ἔστι γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ  
δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ  
§ 2 πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν. τοῦτο δὲ  
τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γρά-

1255 a 1 ὅτι... b 3 δύναιται is cited by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 6, p. 932 B sq.  
5 καὶ before κατὰ omitted in Π<sup>1</sup> M<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Plut. and in P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand—added by a  
later hand) || 6 ἐν ᾧ Bas.<sup>3</sup>, ἐφ' ᾧ omitting the following φασίν Bernays; Hampke  
punctuates δουλεύων (ὁ... τις ἐστίν), ἐν ᾧ κτλ, cp. *Hermes* XIX. 577 n.

c. 6 *There is then one species of slavery, which is natural. But there is another species, conventional slavery: § 1. The justice of the convention which allows prisoners taken in war to be sold for slaves is unconditionally challenged by some (A) and defended by others (B): § 2. The reason why there are these conflicting views, and why nevertheless they have a common ground, is the implication of virtue and superior force. The issue turns on what constitutes right and justice: § 3. Weakness of the one view (A), which implies a denial of the right of superior virtue to rule: § 4. Others (C), again, argue that all slavery, so far as it is legal, is just: but the war might be unjust, and they would refuse to apply their principle consistently to captive Greeks: § 5. This refusal leads them back to τὸ φύσει δοῦλον: § 6. Illustration from the conception of nobility: § 7. Men are marked off for true freedom and true nobility by virtue (ἀρετή): § 8. Recapitulation: §§ 9, 10.*

See Excursus II.; Hampke in *Philologus* XXIV. 1866. 172—175, who compares IV(VII). 2 §§ 12—18; in *The Transactions of Camb. Philol. Soc.* II. 1883 Jackson pp. 111—116, Postgate pp. 119—123, Ridgeway pp. 128—130; and Susemihl in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—588. The chapter reminds us of *N. Eth.* I. cc. 8—12, in so far as Aristotle is testing his theoretical conclusions by a comparison with various received opinions.

§ 1 1255 a 1 ff. "It is thus plain that in certain cases there are natural freemen and natural slaves, for the latter of whom the estate of slavery is both advantageous and just. And yet it is easy to see that those who maintain the opposite" viz. of

the doctrine of natural slavery (against Ridgeway 129 f) "do, to a certain extent, argue correctly. For the terms slavery and slave are used in two senses. <Besides the natural> there is also the conventional slave and conventional slavery; this convention being a species of agreement whereby the conquered in war are declared the property of their conquerors."

6 ὁ γὰρ νόμος... 7 φασίν] Xenophon *Cyr.* VII. 5. 73 νόμος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις αἰδιός ἐστιν, δταν πολεμούντων πόλις ἀλφ, τῶν ἐλόντων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα (Congreve). It is well known that customs and usages purely conventional and resting on mere tradition were called νόμοι by the Greeks and considered more sacred and venerable than the written laws: III. 16 § 9 ἐτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσιν, and VII (VI). 5 § 2. Yet these "unwritten laws" are regarded as if each of them could be derived from a definite law-giver: see on II. 9 §§ 12, 14. SUSEM. (48) Cp. Grote *Plato* I. 249 f., 252 n.

§ 2 7 "This conventional right is by many jurisconsults arraigned, like a demagogue, of unconstitutionality." Yet 'slavery among the ancients was at first an unmingled blessing—an important conquest of the spirit of humanity. When men were altogether barbarous they killed their prisoners.' Lecky *Hist. of Rationalism* II. 254.

8 γράφονται παρανόμων] 'This indictment was laid against any private citizen who had proposed or carried an unconstitutional law or popular decree, i.e. one which contravened laws or decrees in force at the time and not previously



φονται παρανόμων, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένον (II)  
 10 καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον  
 τὸ βιασθέν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἐκείνως, καὶ  
 § 3 τῶν σοφῶν. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ 17  
 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγ-  
 11 ἐκείνως [καὶ] Koraes, wrongly

repealed. Proceedings had to be commenced within a year from the day when the proposal was made or adopted; otherwise the proposer escaped a personal prosecution. The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. A decree (ψήφισμα) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the βουλή previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the βουλή on the same subject which it could contravene' (Meier and Schömann *Attischer Process* 283 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. SUSEM. (49)

9 ὡς δεινὸν κτλ] "on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over that which it subdues." The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature: see § 4, τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι and § 1, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν, where see note. SUSEM. (49 b) Note the genitive after ἀρχόμενον, "subject of the coercer".

11 "This then is their view: others again take the former view" (ἐκείνως): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1: δοκεῖ ἐκείνως repeats the φασίν of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (A) the opponents (τοῖς μὲν), and by (B) the defenders of conventional slavery (τοῖς δὲ); the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (C) the τινές of line 22.

§ 3 12 "The reason of the conflict" between (A) and (B) "and what" at the same time "makes the (two opposed) views overlap." The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (A) and (B) stand sharply opposed (cp. 19 διαστάντων χωρὶς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force.

Bernays differently, see p. 209. SUSEM. (51)

13 λόγους, often taken as = arguments, or again as = propositions, should be explained more widely as "the propositions [conventional slavery is just, is unjust] together with the arguments supporting them and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them," thus nearly = views or reasonings (Postgate *op. c.* 121, 123 n.), 'platforms' (Heitland), theories.

ἐπαλλάττειν, as in I. 9. 15, VI (IV). 10. 2, VII (VI). 1. 3; see Heitland's examination of these passages *Notes* 11—13, and the passages collected by Jackson *op. c.* 114 n. Bonitz *Index* s.v. compares ἐπαμφοτερίζειν and explains that from the sense of "to alternate" it comes to be applied *ad ea quae inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utroque cohaerant*. "Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion" (Susem.). Oncken took it of 'arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments.' Heitland and Jackson of 'propositions overlapping': but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (a) some slavery is just, (b) some slavery is unjust: the latter holds that it is the λόγοι of (A) and (B)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which 'overlap': because the "slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just." (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. II. p. 208.)

τρόπον τινὰ κτλ] "in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort." These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 122), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that βία carries with it ἀρετή: this is the common ground where the two contending parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of τὸ δίκαιον, as to when it is just to use force.

χάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ (II)  
 15 ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν  
 μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μό-  
 § 4 νον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία  
 δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν  
 κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λό- 18  
 20 γων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὥς

17 εὐνομία Lambin, wrongly: <μετ'> εὐνοίας? Schneider

14 χορηγία=means, resources: ἡ ἐκ-  
 τὸς χ. favourable external circumstances,  
 external goods *Nic. Eth.* x. 8 § 4; so of  
 the individual *Pol.* iv (vii). 13 § 3. In a  
 wider sense, anything with which the state  
 requires to be furnished, even population,  
 territory iv (vii). 4 § 2, § 4.

13—16 ὅτι...βίαν] Fülleborn remarks  
 with truth that the qualifications neces-  
 sary here (amounting in all to *ceteris*  
*paribus*) really make the whole theory  
 futile, because 'other things' in this  
 connexion are so seldom 'equal'. Bodily  
 qualities, superior numbers and wea-  
 pons, all sorts of external circumstances  
 often largely contribute to victory. Con-  
 quest is no valid proof of the higher  
 excellence of the conqueror: besides, the  
 one kind of mental capacity which has  
 contributed to his victory is no guarantee  
 that he also possesses the other which  
 qualifies him for wise government, above  
 all for the exercise of despotic rule over a  
 conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle  
 would be borne out by a belief in the  
 moral government of the world\*: in the  
 main, success attends upon the most  
 capable nations. SUSEM. (50)

15 ὥστε δοκεῖν κτλ] "hence it seems  
 that force to coerce is never independent  
 of virtue, but that the dispute turns on  
 the nature of right and justice."

§ 4 17 f. ("For this reason some take  
 the mutual goodwill" of governors and  
 governed "to constitute right, others stand  
 on the naked right of the stronger to  
 rule.") The parenthesis is due to Ridg-  
 way; Heitland saw that 'this remark  
 breaks the course of the argument' (p.  
 14). The grounds for the view of (B),  
 which had not been stated above §§ 1, 2,  
 are now given by διὰ τοῦτο.

τοῖς μὲν] Clearly again the unqualified  
 opponents of slavery. SUSEM. (50 b)

Jackson, 115 n., first proved that one  
 meaning of εὐνοία is 'loyalty: the will-

\* [And no less by the scientific doctrine of  
 the survival of the fittest.]

ing obedience which an inferior renders  
 to a kind and considerate superior'. To  
 take it solely to mean 'the goodwill of  
 governors to governed' seriously invali-  
 dates the protest of the anti-slavery party  
 παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ δεσπόζειν; masters  
 might always urge the plea that they held  
 their slaves from disinterested motives.  
 Giphanius notes well: benevolentia et  
 bona existimatio magistratus et dominos  
 peperit. Cp. vii (vi). 5 § 4, § 10; viii (v).  
 11 § 11: ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ταῖς τυ-  
 ραννίαις sc. τοῖς δούλοις καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας.

18 τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν] Cp.  
 Thuc. v. 105. 2, Plato *Gorgias* 483 c f.

19 ἐπεὶ answers the sentence 15 ὥστε  
 δοκεῖν... "If however these two views stand  
 opposed and apart, the former has neither  
 force nor plausibility, (implying as it does)  
 that the superior in virtue has no right to  
 rule and be master." χωρὶς is used pre-  
 dicatively, διαστάντων is the opposite of  
 ἐπαλλάττειν: if the point of contact be-  
 tween the two views be lost, if they  
 stand opposed without any community.  
 For the sense of *separation* the passage  
 quoted by Jackson (see p. 208) *De*  
*long. et brev. vitae*, 464 b 26, is most  
 instructive: πότερον ταῦτα μακρόβια καὶ  
 τὴν φύσιν ἡγεῖν τῶν φύσει συνεστῶτων,  
 ἢ κεχώρισται καὶ τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ  
 νοσῶδες, ἢ κατ' ἐνίας μὲν νόσους ἐπαλ-  
 λάττει τὰ νοσῶδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς  
 βραχυβίοις, κατ' ἐνίας δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει  
 νοσῶδεις εἶναι μακροβίους ὄντας. Others  
 (Schneider, Jackson, Postgate, Ridgeway)  
 take διαστάντων=si per se ponantur, 'if  
 disentangled,' each taken separately.

20 ἄτεροι λόγοι=one of the two sets  
 of arguments advanced, that of (A).  
 Postgate (*op. c.* 123) thinks ἄτερος λόγος  
 would be clearer. Schneider took it=  
*neutra ratio*: to which Hampke rejoined  
 that this sense requires οὐδέτεροι. Jackson  
 however still maintains that it is a true  
 plural 'as in 13 τοῖς λόγοις', but then  
 we should have ἀμφότεροι: his novel  
 and ingenious interpretation, *op. c.* 115 f.,



§ 5 οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως (II)  
 δ' ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος  
 δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν,  
 ἅμα δὲ οὐ φασιν. τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-  
 25 καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-  
 μῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς (p. 9)  
 εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν  
 § 6 συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται  
 λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-  
 30 γωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ  
 ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν  
 § 7 πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 19

24 ἅμα] ὅλως Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>6</sup> M<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> (γρ. ἅμα p<sup>1</sup> in the margin), ἀπλῶς apparently Ar. ||  
 27 καὶ ἐκ δούλων transposed to follow 1255 b 2 ἀγαθόν Schmidt || 28 αὐτοὺς Monte-  
 catino and perhaps P<sup>3</sup>. Over this word p<sup>2</sup> has the gloss τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ κρατηθέντας  
 which M<sup>a</sup> has in the text after ληφθέντας || 32 πανταχοῦ] ἐξ ἀρχῆς Π<sup>1</sup>, γρ. ἀπαν-  
 ταχοῦ p<sup>1</sup> in the margin

departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 τούτων τῶν λόγων as a singular of one view and hence infers that ἀπεροὶ λόγοι denotes one view also: M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adversaires'.

ὡς οὐ δεῖ, expegetical of λόγοι, 'the view namely that...'. But Jackson following Heinsius makes it depend on πιθανόν: "plausibility to shew that it is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule". Why does Aristotle expose the weakness of (A)? He admits εὐνοία as the principle regulating the relations of citizens in the normal πολιτεία, but as between master and slave it is not to supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take ὅλως with ἀντεχόμενοι. "Others again simply holding fast to something just and right as they suppose (for whatever is legal is just) admit the justice of slavery in accordance with the laws of war, but in the same breath withdraw the admission. For not only may the war have had an unjust origin, but further no one would call him, who is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave. Else it will follow that men who are held to be of the noblest birth are slaves or come of servile ancestry, if they" [or their ancestors] "happen to have been taken prisoners and sold":—as Plato was by Dionysios. The view of (c), 22 τινές, is substantially the common opinion in Greece, with its latent incon-

sistencies. ὅλως was taken by Hampke = 'embracing both the former views'. Ridgeway (*op. c.* 130) objects that 'if Aristotle was enunciating another theory here, he would have used ἐτι δέ'. It will be found upon comparison of *De Anima* 1. 5 §§ 10, 11 410 b 2 and *Meteor.* 11. 3 §§ 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that ὅλως and ἐτι δέ are used in parallel clauses to introduce *distinct* objections, the order of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 διόπερ κτλ] "Hence they refuse to call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to barbarians": αὐτοὺς used absolutely for αὐτοὺς < τοὺς Ἕλληνας > which comes to the same thing as 33 αὐτοὺς. Eaton compares the noble conduct of Callicratidas, *Xen. Hell.* 1. 6, 14.

30 οὐδὲν ἄλλο κτλ] In making this qualification they are really on their way to the principle of natural slavery laid down by us at the first: they are compelled to admit that in certain cases there is a distinction between two classes, the one who are everywhere, the others who are nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the intermediate view of (c) to its right sense Aristotle has no need to refute at length the extreme views of (A) and (B).

§ 7 32 πανταχοῦ] *Nic. Eth.* v. 7. 1, 1134 b 19, τὸ μὲν φύσει <δίκαιον> ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν (*Con-greve*). τὸν αὐτὸν κτλ] *Cr.* III. 13. 2 ἡ εὐ-  
 γένεια παρ' ἐκάστωι οἰκοίτιμος. SUSEM. (52)

περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐγε- (II)  
νεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μό-  
35 νον, ὡς ὃν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δ'  
οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶ

θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ῥιζωμάτων  
τίς ἂν προσπειεῖν ἀξιώσειεν λάτρην;

§ 8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδενὶ ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διο-  
40 ρίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς  
1255 b δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐκ

33 αὐτοὺς Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup> Plut., αὐτοῖς P<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and 1st hand of P<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) ||  
παρ' αὐτοῖς Γ M<sup>s</sup> Plut. and perhaps P<sup>1</sup> || 35 καὶ omitted in P<sup>2-3</sup>. Q M<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and  
P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), Ar. leaves καὶ ἐλεύθερον untranslated || 36 καὶ before ἡ is omitted by  
Bk. || ἐλελόγη for Ἑλένη Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 37 ἔκγονον Ar., ἔκγονοι P<sup>1</sup>, ἐκγόνοι Γ M<sup>s</sup>  
P<sup>3-4-6</sup>. Ald. Plut. ἐκ γόνου P<sup>2</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup>, ἐκγόνοι S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 38 ἀξιώσειε M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup>. Ald.  
Plut. and P<sup>3</sup> (a later hand) || 39 οὐθενὶ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Plut. Bk., οὐδὲν Π<sup>1</sup>

35 ὡς ὃν τι] "which implies the existence of an absolute, as well as a relative, nobility and freedom".

36 On the tragic poet Theodektes of Phaselis, a contemporary and friend of Aristotle who is rather fond of quoting from him, see Susemihl's note (103) on *Poetics* II § 1, Bernhardt *Griech. Literaturgesch.* II b p. 64 f., Welcker *Die griech. Trag.* III. 1069 ff. [also Cope *Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philol.* III. 260 f., *Int. to Rhetoric* 53 f., note on *Rhet.* II. 23. 3]. These lines are frag. 3 in Nauck's *Trag. Graec. frag.* SUSEM. (53)

§ 8 39 ὅταν δὲ] From VI(IV). 8. 9, VII(V). 1. 7 (cp. III. 13. 3, *Rhet.* I. 8. 5) we learn that true nobility is a combination of wealth with high excellence hereditary in a family, ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος.

How far this third or intermediate view of slavery and the limits within which it is justified as natural agrees with that of Aristotle himself, is more clearly seen from the discussion in IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, where see *nn.* (780, 781). The question there is, to what are we to ascribe the higher endowments and 'virtue' which distinguish the Greeks from other races and make the latter their born slaves? Only Aristotle there more precisely restricts this relation to the Asiatic portion of the non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does before III. 14. 6, δουλικώτεροι τὰ ἦθη οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν

Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑυρώπην. The other references are I. 2 § 4, 5 § 8 f., 6 § 4, 7 § 3 f., 8 § 12: IV (VII). 2 §§ 15, 16, 9 § 18, 14 § 21 with the notes.

In his whole doctrine Aristotle follows, in the main, the indications of his master. Plato in like manner condemns the enslavement of Hellenes by Hellenes; *Rep.* v. 469 B f., 471 A f. Ideas which Plato only suggested, *Rep.* VIII. 549 A, IX. 590 C, *Politicus* 309 A, Aristotle works out systematically: see on I. 5 § 9 n. (46) and the next note: *Introd.* p. 24 f.; Zeller *op. c.* II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 458 f.] SUSEM. (54)

1255 b i ἀξιοῦσι κτλ.] So above 5 § 10 βούλεται...πολιτικὸν βίον. Cp. III. 13 § 3 n., *Rhet.* I. 9 § 33, Theognis 535 f. οὐποτε δουλεῖν κεφαλὴν ἰθεὶα πέφυκεν | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ σκολιή, καυχένα λοξὸν ἔχει. | οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ σκέλλης ῥόδα φύεται οὐδ' ἄνακτος | οὔτε ποτ' ἐκ δούλης τέκνον ἐλευθέριον (Cammerarius): also Plato *Cratylus* 394 D (Schiller). Oncken remarks: "what Aristotle requires however as the visible and palpable mark of innate slavery is not the deformity which Theognis has in view, but a greater endowment of rough muscular force. He overlooks the fact that the domestic service of the slave hardly demands more strength than the military service of the freeman, who needs a good deal besides mere erect stature". SUSEM. (55)



θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. ἡ δὲ φύ- (II)  
 σις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ δύναται.  
 § 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ 20  
 οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον,  
 καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισι διώριστα τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ  
 δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν  
 ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἄρχειν, ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν, ὥστε  
 § 10 καὶ δεσπόζειν, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ  
 10 γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ  
 ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δούλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἐμψυχόν τι  
 τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος· διὸ καὶ συμφέρον 21  
 ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς

1255 b 2 γενέσθαι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.4.6. Q T<sup>b</sup> || ἀγαθόν, <καὶ ἐκ δούλων δούλον> Schmidt, cp. a 27 || 3 τοῦτο after ποιεῖν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ Ατ. πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι ΓΠ Plut. Bk. which, though unsatisfactory, might perhaps be defended: see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1371 f. || 5 The text can hardly be sound: <εἰσι καὶ> οὐκ Camot, Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps the best suggestion; οὐκ <ἀεί>? Susem.<sup>2</sup>, οὐκ <ἀναμφισβήτητος> or οὐχ <ἀπανταχοῦ>? Schmidt formerly: <ὅτι> Bojesen; οὐκ is omitted by W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Lambin Götting, εἰ for 4 καὶ and <ἡ οὐ> before δῆλον Lambin, οὐκ for 4 οὖν Götting, οἱ μὲν <εἰ μὴ> Thurot || οἱ μὲν φύσει| φύσει <τινὲς> οἱ μὲν and 6 <δῆλον δὲ> καὶ ὅτι Schmidt now edits || φύσει wanting in M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin by P<sup>1</sup>) || 7 τὸ is omitted before δεσπόζειν by Π<sup>3</sup> || τὸν μὲν and 8 τὸν δ' Ar. Nickses, who would prefer 6 τοῖς μὲν...7 τοῖς δὲ...τοὺς μὲν...8 τοὺς δ' || 8 In M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Ar. ἄρχειν and ἄρχεσθαι are transposed || 12 τοῦ σώματος in some older mss. probably came after μέρος where it is repeated by Γ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand)

2 ἡ δὲ φύσις κτλ] So above 5 § 10 συμβαίνει...ἐλευθέρων. Fülleborn remarks with truth that this admission quite invalidates all practical application of Aristotle's theory. It is even possible for a Greek to be a natural slave, for a barbarian, though an Asiatic (see on I. 2: 4 and above n. 54), to be a natural free-man: *c. g.* Hermeias, Aristotle's friend and the uncle of his wife, who had actually been a slave: see on II. 7. 17. Hence the non-Hellene may even prove to be the natural master of the Hellene. SUSEM. (56)

§ 9 οὐκ εἰσὶν] Fortunately we can check the text (see *Crit. Notes*) by the directly opposed statement with which c. 6 opens, by § 6, § 10, and the next words, line 6, ἐν τισι κτλ "in certain cases there is a clearly marked distinction of this sort, where namely....."

9 τὸ δὲ κακῶς] sc. ἄρχειν.

§ 10 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ κτλ] See I § 3 n. (7).

11 ὃ δὲ δούλος...12 κεχωρισμένον δὲ

μέρος] This is said of property (κτῆμα) generally and of the child Nic. *Eth.* v. 6. 8 quoted on 4 § 5 above. SUSEM. (57) See however Jackson's note *ad loc.*

12 διὸ...13 πρὸς ἀλλήλους] In Nic. *Eth.* VIII. II §§ 6, 7, 1161 a 32 ff., it is said that there can be no friendship between master and slave *quia* slave: ἐν οἷς γὰρ μὴδὲν κοινόν ἐστιν τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον. The relation is like that of a craftsman to his tools, of soul to body, of master to slave. ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων (cp. τὸ αὐτὸ συμφέρον of the text), φιλία δ' οὐκ ἐστίν...ὃ γὰρ δούλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἀψυχος δούλος. ἡ μὲν οὖν δούλος, οὐκ ἐστὶν φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἡ δ' ἀνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης, καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρωπος. Zeller II ii 692 f., following Ritter, rightly calls this an inconsistency which does the philosopher honour. The author of the

φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τούτων τὸν τρόπον, (II)  
 7 ἄλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τούναντίον· φανερόν δὲ  
 16 καὶ ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐ ταυτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολι-  
 τική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινὲς φα- (p. 10)  
 σίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ  
 19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομική μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος),  
 § 2 ἡ δὲ πολιτική ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπό- 22  
 τῆς οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι,

14 τούτων] τοιοῦτοις Susem.<sup>1.2.</sup>, τοιοῦτοις <εἶναι> ? Susem., τοιοῦτοις <καὶ>  
 Schmidt at one time: τούτων was suspected by Schneider and Koraes, οὕτως ὡκειω-  
 μένοις Koraes || ἡξιωμένοις transposed to follow 15 νόμον Schmidt || 15 φανερόν  
 ...20 ἀρχή transposed to follow 1256 a 1 τρόπον Schmidt || 16 καὶ before ἐκ τούτων  
 would perhaps come better after those words

*Eudemian Ethics*, VII. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff.,  
 withdraws the concession: since there is  
 the same relation between soul and body,  
 craftsman and tools, master and slave, in  
 these cases there is no association (κοινωνία)  
 possible. οὐ γὰρ δύο ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ  
 μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός (the two members of  
 such a relation are not independent). οὐδὲ  
 διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀμφο-  
 τέρων τὸ ἐνὸς οὐ ἐνεκά ἐστιν (the good of  
 the one is not separable from the good of  
 the other, the good of both is the good  
 of that one of the two for whose sake the  
 other exists). τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν  
 ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦ-  
 λος ὥσπερ μέριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαι-  
 ρετόν. That even a slave is a man is  
 emphasized in another fragment of Phile-  
 mon, besides the one quoted on 3 § 4,  
 viz. Ἐξοικισζόμενος 28: κἄν δούλος ἢ τις,  
 οὐθὲν ἦττον, δέσποτα, | ἀνθρώπος οὗτός  
 ἐστίν, ἂν ἀνθρώπος ᾖ. Cp. Becker *Charik-  
 les* III. 12 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 357. Con-  
 sult further *Pol.* IV (VII). 8 §§ 1—4 n.  
 (801); I. 2. 3 n. (7); III. 6. 6. SUSEM.  
 (57 b) Comp. F. A. Paley's Euripides,  
*Pref.* to vol. 1. pp. xiii f. with reff. there  
 given, esp. *Hcl.* 728, *Melanippe fr.* 506  
 (515), *Phrixus fr.* 823 (828); also Oncken  
 II. 33 ff.

c. 7 Δεσποτεία then, or rule over  
 slaves, is not the same as statecraft: § 1.  
 Nor does the relation of δεσπότης depend  
 upon science: § 2. In what sense there  
 may be a science of the duties (1) of slaves  
 (2) of slaveowners (the latter quite distinct  
 from ἡ κτητική, sc. δούλων): §§ 3—5.

§ 1 17 τινὲς] Plato. See on 1 § 1  
 n. (2). SUSEM. (58)

"It is plain that here and 1 § 1 Aristotle  
 is thinking of Plat. *Polit.* 258 E sq. esp.  
 259 B. It is however a mistake to attri-

bute the doctrine, without qualification,  
 to Plato, who at 268 D introduces a long  
 and elaborate myth with the express  
 intention of warning us, that though the  
 shepherd-king of the theocratic period  
 exercised all regulative functions indis-  
 criminately, this state of things ended  
 with the Saturnian age. See by all means  
 274 E sqq. From this point to the end of  
 the dialogue the Eleate is mainly en-  
 gaged in discriminating the πολιτικός  
 from a host of rivals. Clearly the doc-  
 trine in question is at variance with the  
 whole tenor of the *Republic*. May we  
 not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph.  
*Memorab.* III. 4 § 12, *Oecon.* 13 § 5, to  
 Socrates?" (Jackson).

19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομική...20 ἀρχή] Com-  
 pare IV (VII). 8 § 4 (ἐξ ὁμοίων), VI (IV).  
 II § 8 (ἐξ ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων), also II. 2 § 6,  
 III. 16 § 2, 17 § 1 and n. (133) on II. 2 § 4.  
 On the other hand see III. 4 § 5 with n.  
 (471). SUSEM. (58 b)

20 A similar distinction between ἡ τῶν  
 ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή and ἡ δεσποτική  
 is seen in *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, § 8, where  
 Jackson refers to *Pol.* IV (VII). 14 §§ 6, 7,  
 § 10. See his notes.

§ 2 21 οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην]  
 As is asserted in the passage of the *Politi-  
 cus*; cp. c. 1 § 2 n. (2), 3 § 4. ἀλλὰ  
 τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι] But does this latter  
 at once exclude the former? As was  
 shown in n. (54) on c. 6 § 8, Plato is  
 very far from denying the one because he  
 asserts the other. He too, like Aristotle,  
 regards the more capable as the natural  
 ruler, but for that very reason assigns the  
 perfect art of ruling, of whatever kind, to  
 those alone who in the strict sense have  
 knowledge, i.e. to the philosophers: for,  
 on the Socratic principle that all virtue or



ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δούλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος· ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν (II)  
εἴη καὶ δεσποτική καὶ δουλική, δουλική μὲν οἶαν περ ὁ ἐν  
24 Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευσεν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν  
§ 3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας), εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ  
ἐπὶ πλείον τούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὀψοποιητική καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ  
τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἐτέρων τὰ μὲν  
ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

29

δούλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

§ 4 αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι εἰσὶ· δεσπο- 23  
τική δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστική δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπό-  
της οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι  
δούλοις. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ  
34 σεμνόν· ἃ γὰρ τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνους δεῖ  
§ 5 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ ὅσοις ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς  
κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν, αὐτοὶ

23 ἐν ταῖς M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup>—wrongly, see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1362, ἐν [ταῖς]  
Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 24 ἐπαίδευσεν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 26 τούτων] τῶν τοιούτων Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ὀψοποιη-  
P<sup>2-3</sup> Q S<sup>1</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. ὀψοποιηκὴ P<sup>4</sup>, ὀψοποικὴν Ar. || 27 ἕτερα] ἔργα Q S<sup>1</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald.  
and 1st hand in P<sup>2-4</sup> (γρ. ἕτερα in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, the right reading is inserted in P<sup>3</sup>  
by a later hand, but subsequently erased)

excellence (*ἀρετή*) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect. Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the *Ethics* he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 627 f. SUSEM. (59, 60)

κατὰ=in virtue of, as in καθό. The term 'master' is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

§ 3 27 τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα κτλ] The latter are the conditions for bare existence, the former for the ennobling refinement and perfecting of existence. SUSEM. (61)

29 A verse of the *Pankratiast*, a comedy by Aristotle's younger contemporary Philemon, frag. 2. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; that thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls (*διαγωγὴ*) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupa-

tion (Ludw. Schneider). See IV (VII). c. 8 f.; c. 14 § 12 ff. SUSEM. (62)

§ 4 32 οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι] Below c. 8 § 2 τίς γὰρ ἔσται χρῆσομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκ.; III. 4. II τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα <ἀρχὴν δεσποτικὴν>, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον. SUSEM. (63)

33 οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα] IV (VII). 3. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλω, ἢ δούλος, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν, VI (IV). 15. 3 αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικαὶ <τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν> καὶ πρὸς αἵ, ἂν εὐπορώ-σι, τάττουσι δούλους. But see I. 13. 14 and n. (123). SUSEM. (64)

§ 5 36 The overseer, ἐπίτροπος, or house-steward, ταμίης, was himself a slave: Pseud.-Arist. *Oecon.* 1.5 § 1 1344 a 26, 6 § 5 1345 a 8 ff., Xen. *Oecon.* 12. 2, Aristoph. *Knights* 947 f.: Becker *Charikles* 111. 23 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 363. Yet no doubt Greeks by birth were readily taken for this office, as well as for that of παιδαγωγός. SUSEM. (64)

Translate: hence all who have the means of escaping personal discomfort employ an overseer to take this charge and themselves the while engage in public affairs or in study.

δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἢ δὲ κτητικὴ ἑτέρα ἄμ- (II)  
φοτέρων τούτων, οἷον [ἢ] δικάια πολεμικὴ τις οὕσα [ἢ θηρευ-  
τικῇ].

8 περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν III  
1256 a τρόπον ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεω-

38 [ἢ] Susem., ἢ Schnitzer wrongly: ?[δικαία] or ?[τις οὕσα] Susem. || [ἢ θηρευ-  
τικῇ] Susem.<sup>2</sup>, [ἢ] Jackson || Conring and Spengel suspect the whole sentence 37  
ἢ δὲ κτητικῇ...38 θηρευτικῇ, Schmidt all from 37 ἢ δὲ κτητικῇ...1256 a 3 μέρος τι ἦν

37 ἢ δὲ κτλ] With κτητικῇ supply  
δούλων. But it may be inferred from c.  
8 § 12, διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικῇ πως  
ἔσται (ἢ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς), ἢ δεῖ  
χρησθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
δοσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, that  
under the one genus 'offensive war' Ari-  
stotle includes two species: (1) the chase,  
a war against wild animals, (2) war con-  
ducted for the capture of slaves.

#### πολεμικῇ

πρὸς τὰ θηρία  
(θηρευτικῇ)

πρὸς τοὺς φύσει δούλους

If this be so, he knows nothing of an  
art of 'man-hunting': and the words at  
the end, 38 ἢ θηρευτικῇ, must be an inter-  
polation. Cp. further I. 2 § 4 n. (11), 6  
§ 8 nn. (54, 56), IV (VII). 2 § 15 οὐ  
δεῖ πάντων περᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ  
τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ  
θῆνην ἢ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸ  
πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτῶν nn. (727, 728): IV  
(VII). 14 § 21, where one object of military  
training is τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δου-  
λεύειν. SUSEM. (66)

This view, that θηρευτικῇ is a species  
of πολεμικῇ, Jackson cannot accept. On  
the contrary, from 8 § 12 (just quoted) he  
infers that to Aristotle (as to Plato *Soph.*  
222 B, *Latw* 823 B) πολεμικῇ is a species  
of θηρευτικῇ: see his note on that passage.  
He translates here, "the art of acquiring  
slaves, that is, the just art of acquiring  
slaves, is distinct from both of these,"  
from δουλικῇ and δεσποτικῇ, "being a  
species of the art of war or the art of  
hunting."

cc. 8—11 περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ  
χρηματιστικῆς.

c. 8 In what relation does χρηματι-  
στικῇ stand to Economic? Is it (1) the  
same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3)  
a subsidiary science? It is not the same,  
for it serves a different purpose, accumula-  
tion: §§ 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or  
not is disputed, and must be decided for

each of the various species of χρηματιστικῇ  
separately: § 3.

Review of the various natural modes of  
subsistence: §§ 4—12.

The natural art of production (κτητικῇ),  
which has for its object the accumulation  
of natural wealth within due limits, is a  
branch of Economic: §§ 13—15.

For this section of the work consult  
Ludw. Schneider *Die staatswirtschaft-  
lichen Lehren usw* (The theories of Po-  
litical Economy in the *Politics*), pt. I  
Deutsch-Krone, 1868, pt. II Neu-Rup-  
pin, 1873: Glaser *De Aristotelis doc-  
trina de divitiis* (Königsberg 1856. 4)  
with Bendixen's review in *Philologus*  
xvi. 498 f.: Hampke *Bemerkungen* (Re-  
marks on *Pol.* I.) Lyck, 1863: Schnitzer  
*Zu Aristoteles Politik in Eos* I. 1864.  
499—516: Susemihl on *Pol.* I. cc. 8—11  
in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 1865. 504—517:  
Büchschütz *Zu Aristoteles Politik* I. cc.  
8—11 in *Jahrb. für Philol.* xcvi. 1867.  
477—482, 713—6. SUSEM. (66)

There can be little doubt that Ari-  
stotle wrote with especial reference to  
Plato: *Rep.* II. 370 B—372 A, *Latw* XI.  
918 A—920 C (cp. VIII. 831 E, 849 D),  
*Soph.* 219 A f., 222 B ff., 223 C, D, *Politicus*  
287 C—290 A, etc.

§ 1 1256 a 1 χρηματιστικῇ is applied  
(1) to the whole art of acquisition, being  
thus completely identical with κτητικῇ.  
In this sense the term was introduced at  
3 § 3 (cp. 4 § 1 n.) and this holds through-  
out c. 8, and in 9 § 4. In a narrower  
sense it is used (2) for the acquisition by  
exchange, μεταβλητικῇ, of the kind of  
wealth which in Aristotle's view is un-  
natural, i.e. not for use, but to exchange  
again at a profit. In this sense χρημα-  
τιστικῇ 'money-making, profit-making'  
= καπηλικῇ 'trade.' So from c. 9 § 1  
onwards. Again in 9 § 12, 10 § 2 it is  
used (3) for that part of the art of ac-  
quisition which, as opposed to (2), is  
directed solely to natural wealth and is  
intimately connected with Economic.  
Plainly (3) = ἡ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστικῇ,



ρήσομεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦ- (III)  
 λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν  
 ἂν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστίν  
 5 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικὴ, πότερον ὥς ἢ  
 κερκιδιοποιητικὴ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ ὥς ἢ χαλκουργικὴ τῇ ἀν-  
 δριαντοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ὄρ-  
 § 2 γανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκεί-  
 μενον, ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια  
 10 ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν).

(p. 11)

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ,<sup>2</sup>  
 δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρῆσασθαι· τίς  
 γὰρ ἔσται ἢ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκono-  
 14 μικήν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμ-

1256 a 5 [ἦ] ὑπηρετικόν, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικόν Bender, certainly not right. That M<sup>a</sup> omits ἦ is quite unimportant || 6 κερκιδιοποικὴ P<sup>2-4</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P<sup>a</sup>, κερκιδιοποικῇ P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) || 9 ἔριον Γ P<sup>1</sup> Susem<sup>1-2</sup>. || 10 χαλκός Γ P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, χαλκ<sup>c</sup> M<sup>a</sup> || 11 τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ Sylburg for οἰκονομικῇ (ἢ οἰκonoμική corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>a</sup> and Bk.) τῇ χρηματιστικῇ || 13 παρὰ περὶ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>a</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

(2) = ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα of c. 9 § 18; and (1) the widest range of the term includes both, the getting of goods as well as the getting of gain. SUSEM. (69)

2 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] "in accordance with the procedure adopted," namely, that from part to whole. See 1 § 3 n. (4); 3 § 1 n. (29): III. 1 § 2 n. (434). SUSEM. (66)

ἐπείπερ... ἦν] "since the slave is, as we saw, included under the head of property," being defined as κτῆμα, a chattel.

5 καὶ εἰ ὑπὴρ. κτλ] The more precise way in which this third possibility is expressed leads us to anticipate a decision in its favour (Hampke). However when the decision comes to be made, 10 §§ 1—3, it only has a preference given it; it is not exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks. That the question, in which of the two senses χρημ. is auxiliary to Economic, is never taken up is most surprising. We can only conjecture the answer from passing hints: see on 10 § 2. SUSEM. (67)

7 ἢ μὲν ὄργανα... ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην] The one provides tools to work with, the other raw material to work up (Oncken). SUSEM. (67 b)

This distinction comes from Plato *Politicus* 287 c, ὁπόσαι <τέχναι> παρέχοντο ὄργανα περὶ τὴν ὑφαντικὴν... ἐτίθεμεν ὡς συναυτίους: 288 D, E τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τοῦτοις

σώματα παρέχον ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν ὁπόσαι τῶν τεχνῶν νῦν εἰρηνται (Jackson). So too the conception of ὑπηρετικαὶ τέχναι comes from the *Politicus* 281 E: ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργοῦσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν... ταύτας μὲν ξυναιτίους <τέχναις>. The Eleate quotes τὰς μὲν περὶ τε ἀπράκτους καὶ κερκίδας as the first examples of ξυναιτίαι τέχ. (Eaton).

§ 2 8 ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον κτλ] Plato denotes this by τὸ πρωτογενὲς ἀνθρώποις κτῆμα *Politicus* 288 E: but ὕλη occurs in *Phil.* 54 C φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἔνεκα... πᾶντ' ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσι.

12 τίς γὰρ κτλ] See n. (63) on c. 7 § 4. SUSEM. (68) What art is to use the household goods if it be not Economic (παρὰ = except)?

14 Two alternatives are given in § 1, ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ, and it is not easy to see what has become of the latter in the statement here πότερον μέρος αὐτῆς ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος and in § 3, 17 ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι ἢ ἕτερον γένος. For reasons given in Excursus III. on Bk. I. p. 209 g. v., both alternatives of § 1 should be supposed included under μέρος, that term being so loosely used as to include even an auxiliary science. SUSEM. (69)

- § 3 φισβήτησιν, εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρή- (III)  
ματα καὶ κτήσις ἔσται. ἡ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιέειλε μέρη καὶ ὁ  
πλούτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰ-  
κονομικῆς ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τρο-  
19 φὴν ἐπιμέλεια [καὶ κτήσις].
- § 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ 3  
τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε ζῆν ἄνευ  
τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασιν δια-  
§ 5 φέροντας τῶν ζώων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σπο-

15 εἰ γὰρ] *εἴπερ* Montecatino needlessly, since Vahlen (*Poetic* p. 128 f. ed. 3) has shown that *εἰ γὰρ* can be used in the same sense. Even then Vahlen's comma after 16 ἔσται must be a full stop. But perhaps *διαμφισβήτησιν. εἰ γὰρ... κτήσις ἔσται*, \* \* with the punctuation of previous edd., is right || 16 ἔσται, ἡ δὲ κτήσις Bernays || 17 \* \* ὥστε Conring Susem.<sup>1</sup> 'The lacuna began with ὡς or ὥσπερ,' Hampke Schnitzer. Other proposals fruitless: see my large critical edition, *ad loc.* and Addenda || *οἰκονομικῆς* Garve, *χρηματιστικῆς* Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 19 [καὶ κτήσις]? Susem.: καὶ κτήσιν? Stahr || 22 πεποιήκασιν after *διαφέροντας* M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23 τε omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>4</sup>

§ 3 15 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes *εἰ γὰρ* to mean "if namely" as in Alkidamas *De soph.* 11, 12 *ἀρ' οὐκ εὐθὺς ἡμᾶς ἄλλην τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι μελέτην λόγων; εἰ γὰρ οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐξεργασμένοι... ἀπιστίας καὶ φθόνου τὰς τῶν ἀκούοντων γνώμας ἐμπιπλάσι*, and Aris. *Rhet.* III. 17. 11 *εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς λέγων Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἰτα Διάκον, εἰτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν, ἡ (ms. ἦ) τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἡ τοῦνδε ἐστίν*. Elsewhere γὰρ appears redundant, or rather, no apodosis is expressed to the sentence introduced by it: *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 8. 6 *οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεον διαμένουσιν· ἔως γὰρ* (so long namely as) *ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις*; so *ἐπεὶ γὰρ Rhet.* II. 25. 10, *ἡ γὰρ Pol.* VI (IV). 8. 6, *ὅτε μὲν γὰρ VIII (V). 1. 8*. "See however Spengel *Aris. Poet.* u. *Vahle's neueste Bearbeitung* p. 13 ff." (Susemihl).

16 The elements of wealth enumerated in *Rhet.* 1. 5 § 7 (and *Pol.* II. 7 § 21) are γῆς, χωρίων κτήσις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων: also νομισματος πλήθος which, according to c. 9 below, is not true wealth.

17 πρῶτον] There is no word like *δεύτερον* which expressly corresponds to this, cp. *Poet.* 13 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (i) the expression is again inexact, and ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια must be extended to the industries concerned with all the other necessities of life—shelter

clothing tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls 'instruments for life and wellbeing,' including slaves—if directly produced or acquired by plunder without resort to exchange. If so, Exchange is the *δεύτερον*. This view is supported by the actual use of *τροφή* in a wider sense than food, for sustenance generally; "subsistence," § 8, 10 §§ 1, 3. (In these passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that branch of *χρηματιστικὴ* which, because directed to procuring the requisite subsistence, really belongs to economic science: but this does not affect the present question.)

Or, (ii) if all that is meant is direct production and appropriation of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for "secondly" in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the proceeds of the chase or from animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the grounds for supposing the text defective (see on § 12 n. 74), this is not one. SUSEM. (70)

*πότερον* is dependent, like *πόθεν* line 15, upon *ἔστι τοῦ χρ. θεωρῆσαι*.

§§ 4, 5 That the way in which animals support themselves determines their mode of life is more fully stated *Hist. animal.* I. 1. 23, 487 b 33 ff., VIII. 1. 11, 589 a 4 ff.; and the proof is given in detail *ib.* VIII. cc. 2—11. Under *καρποφάγα* are included animals who feed on berries,



ραδικά ἐστίν, ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ (III)  
 25 τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι,  
 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ φύσιν τοὺς  
 βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταὐτὸ ἐκάστῳ ἡδὺ κατὰ φύ-  
 σιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἐτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφάγων καὶ τῶν  
 § 6 καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ  
 30 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολλὴ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι.  
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσὶν (ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέ-  
 ρων τροφή ζῶων ἄνευ πόνου γίνεταί σχολάζουσιν· ἀναγκαίου  
 δὲ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομάς καὶ  
 34 αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν  
 § 7 γεωργοῦντες)· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἐτέ-  
 ρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λί-

25 τὰ δὲ παμφάγα omitted by the 1st hand in P<sup>1</sup> (supplied by P<sup>1</sup> in the margin), τὰ δὲ by M<sup>a</sup> || 26 καὶ κατὰ Bernays, perhaps rightly || 30 πολλοὶ πολλοὶ P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and probably also Q, *multis* (?) William || 31 οὖν γὰρ Γ apparently || 33 μεταβάλλειν after τοῖς κτήνεσι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 36 ἀλιείας Ald. ἀλιείας M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 2.3.4

roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than *πομφάγα* = herbivorous. In *Hist. animal.* *σαρκοφάγος* 'carnivorous' is chiefly used: *ζωοφάγος* hardly ever.

§ 5 26 ῥαστώνας facilities: "to enable them to get at their food and capture it." By τούτων understand ζῶα primarily, though *καρπός* would be included. Bernays reads *κατὰ* for *καὶ*: "to give them facilities for the capture of their food."

§§ 6-8 Smith *Wealth of nations* *Introduct. Chap.*, *Mill Pol. Econ.* 1. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lowest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of indolence. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, *Hist. anim.* 1. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff., he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. *n.* above on § 7.

31 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotus describes, *iv.* 186, would represent these *νομάδες*. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory *νομαῖς* of Hellenic democracies, *vii* (vi). 4. 11.

32 "The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land."

§ 7 36 ληστείας] It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. 1. 5 precisely informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful *οὐκ ἐχοντός πω αἰσχύνειν τούτου τοῦ ἔργου φέροντος δὲ τι καὶ δόξης μάλλον*, cp. *Hom. Od.* *iii.* 73, *ix.* 252: and even later it was usual amongst the Locrians and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. 1. 5, *ii.* 32, *iv.* 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, 2 § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see *Introduct.* 30), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schlosser (1. 47 *n.*) adduces as a parallel. See *Introduct.* 27 f. *SUSEM.* (71)

μνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμούς· ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοι- (III)  
 κούσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον  
 39 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῆ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρ-  
 § 8 πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βλοῖ τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτό- 5  
 φυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ κα-  
 1256 b πηλείας κομίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη- (p. 12)  
 στρικὸς ἀλιευτικὸς θηρευτικὸς. οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τού-  
 των ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον, ἢ  
 τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν  
 5 νομαδικὸν ἅμα καὶ ληστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευ-  
 § 9 τικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ὥς ἂν ἡ χρεία  
 συναναγκάξῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαίουσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη 6  
 κτῆσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πᾶσιν,  
 9 ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτως καὶ τελειω-  
 § 10 θεῖσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ-  
 τίκτει τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφήν ὥς ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις  
 οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα  
 σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ὥτοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳτοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις

41 [ἐργασίαν... b 1 τὴν] Schmidt

1256 b 1 πορίζονται Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. perhaps rightly || γεωργικὸς is wanting in Γ M<sup>2</sup>, and perhaps Spengel is right in transposing it to follow θηρευτικὸς || 3 τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον Bernays, τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον Γ II Bk.; τὸ ἐνδεὲς τοῦ βίου Bas.<sup>3</sup>, τὸ ἐνδεὲς κατὰ τὸν βίον Reiske (better) || [ἢ... 4 εἶναι] Schmidt || 8 δεδομένη Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 13 γενο- μένοις Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>

37 τοιαύτην] 'such as before de- scribed' i.e. 'suitable for fishing'. The same use of the pronoun in I. 1. 2, and in II. 4. 4 δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους (i.e. 'less friend- ly') εἶναι. See Cope on *Rhet.* I. 5. 6.

36—38 With this classification of the different modes of the chase cp. Plato *Latius* VII. 823 B: πολλὰ μὲν ἡ τῶν ἐνύ- δρων (sc. θήρα), πολλὰ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτη- νῶν, πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα, οὐ μόνον θηρίων... καὶ κλω- πεῖαι καὶ ληστῶν... θῆραι. See also *n.* on 7 § 5.

39 ἡμέρων] cultivated.

§ 8 40 ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον] "derive their employment from natural growth." Nature is used now for what is primitive || (the later development).

41 καπηλεία=retail trade; ἐμπορία= wholesale trade, commerce. The former is used as a contemptuous term, "huckster- ing", Plato *Latius* VIII. 849 D, XI. 918 D, *Soph.* 223 D.

1256 b 1 τὴν τροφήν = subsistence,

support: see *n.* (70) on § 3. SUSEM. (72)

2 οἱ δὲ κτλ] "Others select out of these some which they combine in order to pass an agreeable existence, supplying by an addition the deficiency in independence of a more meagre mode of life" (Cope).

§ 9 7 συναναγκάξῃ=constrain: σύν intensive as in συμπληροῦν.

§ 10 12 ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ὥτοτο- κεῖ] Aristotle erroneously believed that insects lay no eggs, but produce worms or maggots which are then transformed through several metamorphoses into the perfect insect: see Aubert and Wimmer *Introd.* to the *De generatione animal.* p. 14, Meyer *Thierkunde des Ar.* p. 201 f. What he says of the difference between worm and egg serves in particular to ex- plain this passage. Thus *De gener. anim.* II. 1 §§ 8—12, 732 a 25 ff.: one species of animals, the viviparous, bring forth young like themselves fully developed; others bear offspring not yet organized or of perfect form, and of these the vertebrates



- 14 ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά- (III)  
 § 11 λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ [γενομένοις] οἷη-7  
 τέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν  
 καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ  
 19 τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα  
 § 12 καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ  
 φύσις μηδὲν μῆτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.  
 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ θη-8

15 [γενομένοις] Götting, τελειωθείσιν Ar. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> γενομένοις ΓΜ\*Π² Bk.,  
 γεννωμένοις P¹ (1st hand), ἄλλως γενομένοις P¹ (corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin), γινόμενοις  
 (=the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the *Ethics* II. p. 405 f.), [καὶ γενομένοις] Bernays,  
 [δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις] Bender || 18 Before πάντα in Π¹ is another τὰ ἄλλα (τὰλλα  
 P¹), a repetition of the preceding: παν (sic) P⁴ (1st hand), τὰ πάντα P⁴ (corrector)  
 || 20 γένηται M\*P¹ || γοῦν Conring Susem.<sup>2</sup>, which suits the sense but is against  
 Aristotle's usage, γὰρ? Susem., οὖν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Bernays || 23 [διὸ...24 αὐτῆς] and  
 23 κτητικὴ φύσει πολεμικὴ also 24 [ἡ δὲ...26 πόλεμον καὶ πρῶτον] Schmidt, who trans-  
 poses the latter to follow 1255 b 39 θηρευτικῇ. See *Qu. Cr.* III. 5 ff.

(τὰ ἔναιμα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates  
 (τὰ ἀναιμα) breed worms. The difference  
 between egg and worm is this: if the  
 young animal is developed from a part  
 and the rest serves as nourishment for it,  
 it is an egg: but if the whole of the  
 young animal proceeds from the whole of  
 what is produced, it is a worm. Also  
*Hist. anim.* I. 5. 3 489 b 6 ff.: a perfect  
 germ (κῆμα) is called an egg when one  
 part of it serves for the formation and  
 another for the nourishment of the young  
 animal developed out of it, a worm when  
 the whole animal is developed out of the  
 whole of the germ by its organization and  
 growth: cp. *ib.* V. 19. 2 550 b 28 ff.  
 ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκώληκων οὐκ ἐκ μέρους τινός  
 γίνεταί τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν ψῶν, ἀλλ'  
 ὅλον ἀνέστανται καὶ διαρθρούμενον γίνεταί  
 τὸ ζῶον, and *De gener. anim.* III. 2. 4  
 752 a 27 f. οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ σκώληκες αὐτὰ  
 δι' αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ ψά) λαμβάνει τὴν ἀξίησιν.  
 It follows from these explanations that  
 what Aristotle asserts in the present  
 passage of worms is in reality only true  
 of eggs. All that the former receive  
 from the parent worm is that capacity for  
 perfect self-development which is wanting  
 in the egg. Cp. also 10 § 3 n. (96).  
 SUSEM. (73)

14 τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν =  
 the natural substance called milk. So τοῦ  
 ἀέρος, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις = air, heat respec-

tively: see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 838 a 8 ff.  
 with the examples 837 b 42 ff.

§ 11 15 γενομένοις "after they are  
 born." The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12  
 is common to all the Socratics and was  
 probably derived from Socrates himself:  
*Xen. Mem.* I. 4. 5 ff.

§ 12 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ κτλ] This  
 does not directly follow from the fore-  
 going. Some intermediate thought has  
 to be supplied: < it must further be as-  
 sumed that amongst men themselves the  
 less perfect are formed for the service of  
 the more perfect >. Cp. also n. (70) on  
 § 3. SUSEM. (74)

"There are at least four ways of taking  
 this passage. (1) Vettori Giphanius  
 Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἡ  
 both refer to πολεμικῇ. (2) Lambin,  
 Schnitzer, Stahr refer αὐτῆς to πολεμικῇ,  
 ἡ to θηρευτικῇ. This is plainly absurd: for  
 if θηρευτικῇ can be used against men as  
 well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος  
 πολεμικῆς, but at least as extensive as  
 πολεμικῇ. (3) Garve, followed by  
 Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητικῇ,  
 and ἡ to θηρευτικῇ. There are three  
 objections to this: (a) It proves too  
 much; for if we deduce the right to make  
 war from the right to hunt, why should  
 not captives be eaten?—a notion which  
 Aristotle (?) IV (VI). 2. 15 expressly repu-  
 diates with abhorrence. (β) Wars of


ρευτική μέρος αὐτῆς), ἥ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ (III)  
 25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουν, ὥς  
 φύσει δίκαιον ὄντα τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον.  
 § 13 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς  
 μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δεῖ ἥτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει,

26 ὄντα after τοῦτον Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. On τοῦτον p<sup>2</sup> gives the gloss τὸν θηρευτικόν, this θηρευ-  
 τικόν has crept into the text in Γ M<sup>2</sup> after τοῦτον τὸν || πρῶτον is added after πόλε-  
 μον by M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.), καὶ πρῶτον by Γ: but, as Schmidt observes, this πρῶτον  
 has arisen from ἀ=ἐν || 27 κτητικῆς after κατὰ φύσιν M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || τῆς οἰκονομικῆς] τοῦ  
 οἰκονομοῦ Thurot, [μέρος] Schneider Hampke Thurot: but see Comm. || 28 [ἐστίν  
 ...ὑπάρχει] Schmidt || δ] ὅ Thurot (*Revue critique*, 1869, p. 84 f.), δὲ δ Schnitzer, ἢ  
 Lambin Reiske, <καθ>δ Bernays: in *Revue critique*, 1872, p. 57 f. Thurot considers the sense given by the last three suggestions necessary: δ Rassow,  
 who transposing ἀ...ὑπάρχει to follow οἰκίας and reading οὐ for 29 ὥ has the  
 following order ἐστίν· οὐ ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς...ἢ οἰκίας ἀ δεῖ ἥτοι...ὅπως ὑπάρχει

defence or to regain liberty can hardly be called hunting: the notion of hostility is the wider. (γ) The clause ὥς φύσει δίκαιον assigns a separate justification for the kind of war in question, which is *not* therefore deduced from the chase. It depends upon the view of slavery laid down in cc. 5, 6. (4) Sepulveda renders: *quo fit ut opes bello etiam parandi ratio a natura quodammodo proficiscatur*, making πολεμική an epithet of κτητική and μέρος αὐτῆς=μέρος πολεμικῆς κτητικῆς; he also refers ἦ to θηρευτική. But though this gives excellent sense it involves transposing φύσει after κτητική: and there is hardly good evidence of two adjectives in -ική so combined, the one as attribute the other as substantive." SUSEM. *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 6 f. Then translate: "hence the natural art of war will belong in a sense to the art of acquisition (for the chase is only one branch of it)" viz. of natural warfare, and θηρευτική, § 7, is αὐτόφωτος ἐργασία. "It" i.e. war "has to be employed not only against wild animals but also against all such men as, though naturally slaves, refuse submission, this species of war having a natural justification."

The view given above as (3)—αὐτῆς=κτητικῆς, ἦ=θηρευτικῆς—is supported by Jackson, who would extend the parenthesis to πόλεμον. He translates: 'natural warfare will in a sense be a branch of acquisition: for (1) the chase is a mode of acquisition, and (2) can be applied either against wild animals (in which case it is θηρευτική proper) or against natural slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a

branch of war which has a natural justification.' He adds: "The διαίρεσις then is



From 7 § 5 it would appear that πολεμική is still further divided. So Plato, *Soph.* 222 C, includes ληστική, ἀδραποδιστική, and τυραννική under the general head of πολεμική, which is one of the two branches of ἡμεροθηρική."

25 ὥς φύσει δίκαιον] Consult the reff. given n. (65) on 7 § 5. SUSEM. (75)

§ 13 27 ἐν μὲν οὖν κατὰ] See Exc. III. on B. I. p. 210. SUSEM. (75. b)

28 With the changes proposed by Madvig and Rassow (see critical notes) translate: "one species of acquisition then is a branch of economic science, that branch namely whose task it is to collect a store of objects necessary for life and useful for civil or domestic society, objects which ought therefore to be at hand for the householder or to be provided to his hand by his science (Economic)." Others (Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays, Thurot) either change δ, or else extract from it the sense of 'since', 'in so far as', taking ὧν ἐστὶ θησ. χρημάτων=the means to a store of commodities (or possessions, κτημάτων): a rendering not very clear, see § 14. SUSEM. Jackson, for the most part agreeing with Bernays, interprets ὧν ἐστὶ θησ. χρημάτων 'things capable of being stored' (here perhaps anticipated by Götting ταῦτα τὰ χρήματα ὧν ἐστὶ θησ.); he



ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ (III)  
 § 14 χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ γὰρ ἀλη- 9  
 31 θινὸς πλούτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως  
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σό-  
 λων φησὶ ποιήσας

(p. 13)

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.

§ 15 κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπει-  
 36 ρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλούτος  
 ὀργάνων πλήθός ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκο-  
 νόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον·

9 ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ 10

29 ὧν ἐστὶ] ᾧ ἔνεστι Madvig (this I think needed whether we emend with  
 Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays or transpose with Rassow): μέρος ἐστίν· ᾧ ἔνεστι θησαυ-  
 ρισμὸς.....οἰκίας, ἃ δεῖ...ὑπάρχει Susem.<sup>2</sup> provisionally || ὧν] ὧν Schmidt || κτημά-  
 των Bernays (perhaps rightly) for χρημάτων || 32 ἀγαθῶν P<sup>2-3</sup>, Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. and P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand), ἀγαθῶν P<sup>1</sup> (corrector<sup>1</sup>) || 35 κεῖται omitted by M<sup>o</sup>, κεῖται γὰρ om. by P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand—supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 37 οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν Γ, οἰκο-  
 νομικῶν [καὶ πολιτικῶν] Schütz, but see Comm. || 38 [ὅτι...39 δῆλον] Schmidt ||  
 39 καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς Schütz also proposes to bracket, but see Comm.

translates “in so far as Economic must  
 either find ready to hand, or itself provide  
 that there may be found ready to hand,  
 necessities of life and utilities which are  
 capable of being stored for the common  
 use of state or family.”

30 True wealth is for use: ὅλως δὲ τὸ  
 πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν  
 τῷ κέκτησθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν  
 τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλούτος *Rhet.* 1. 5. 7.

§ 14 32 αὐτάρκεια = the amount of such  
 property absolutely necessary to secure  
 independence of all external aid.

οὐκ ἄπειρος] See 9 §§ 13, 14. The  
 notion of a limit to true wealth recurs in  
 Epicurus *arud* Diog. Laert. x. 144: ὁ  
 τῆς φύσεως πλούτος καὶ ὥριστα καὶ εὐπό-  
 ριστος ἐστὶ, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἀπει-  
 ρον ἐμπίπτει. The earlier political eco-  
 nomists believed in a possible “glut of  
 capital”: Mill *P. E.* 1. 5 § 3.

Σόλων] *Frag.* 13, 71 Bergk. SUSEM.  
 (76)

§ 15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. IV (VII).  
 1 § 5 n. (695), 1 § 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτός  
 ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ  
 χρήσιμον ἐς τι, ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάπ-  
 τευν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὠφέλιον εἶναι αὐτῶν  
 τοῖς ἔχουσιν. SUSEM. (76 b)

37 ὀργάνων πλήθος κτλ] in other

words, means and appliances for life, and  
 for the life of wellbeing and perfection  
 as the end of the household and of the  
 state. But cp. Exc. III. SUSEM. (77)

The definition of wealth as “instru-  
 ments” (given also 4 § 2) is commended  
 by J. S. Mill *Political Economy* 1. 10 as  
 adding distinctness and reality to the  
 common view. His definitions are “any  
 product both useful and susceptible of  
 accumulation”—with which comp. 1256b  
 29—and “all useful or agreeable things  
 which possess exchange value.” Mill too  
 restricts the term to material wealth.

38 τοῖς οἰκονόμοις κτλ] See again  
 Exc. III. p. 211 n. (2). SUSEM. 77 (b)

c. 9. The other species of κτητικὴ, viz.  
 χρηματιστικὴ, the art of money-making,  
 § 1. Origin of exchange in the infancy  
 of society, §§ 2—6. Origin and use of  
 money: §§ 7—11. Distinction between  
 natural κτητικὴ and this χρηματιστικὴ:  
 §§ 12—15. Cause of the confusion between  
 them: §§ 16—18.

§ 1 40 ἦν μάλιστα κτλ] “which is  
 especially called money-making” χρημα-  
 τιστικὴ (2) of 8 § 1 n. “and fairly so  
 called; to which is due the opinion that  
 wealth and property have no limit.” But  
 9 § 4 the first sense seems to recur.

41 δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικὴν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ (III)  
 1257 a πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἦν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν  
 αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γεινῶσιν  
 ἔστι δ' οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ'  
 4 ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας  
 § 2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μάλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 11  
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις  
 ἐστίν, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ'  
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος,  
 9 οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ. ἀμ-  
 § 3 φότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό-  
 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς  
 χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν  
 χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ  
 § 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ  
 15 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ  
 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν

41 οὕτω Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin

1257 a 1 [ἦν...5 μάλλον] Schmidt || 3 ἐκείνης] κειμένη Γ (?—posita William)  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 6 χρήματος Γ M\* and P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 7 καθ' αὐτό] after ὁμοίως  
 Koraes || 9 ὑπόδεσις M\* P<sup>1</sup> || 12 [ἢ ὑπόδημα] Koraes, Scaliger proposed to trans-  
 pose these words to follow χρῆσιν, which also occurred to Koraes, but see Comm.  
 n. (78)

§ 2 1257 a 6 ἐκάστου γὰρ κτλ]  
 "Compare *Eud. Eth.* III. 4, 1231 b 38,  
 where we find the same classification of  
 χρήσεις, though the use in exchange is

reckoned a species not of ἡ καθ' αὐτό  
 χρήσις, but of ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The two  
 classifications are as follows:—

*Politics*

καθ' αὐτὸ οἰκεία

καθ' αὐτὸ οὐκ οἰκεία

κατὰ συμβεβηκός

ὑπόδεσις

μεταβλητικὴ

ὡς ἂν εἴ τις

σταθμῷ χρῆσταιτο

τῷ ὑποδήματι

*Eud. Eth.*

καθ' αὐτό

κατὰ συμβεβηκός

κατὰ συμβεβηκός"

(Jackson).

9 ὑπόδεσις = wearing, ἡ μεταβλητικὴ =  
 the use in exchange. The shoe when  
 used as an article of exchange preserves  
 its proper nature, it is still to be worn by  
 somebody; although as it is not made to  
 exchange this use is οὐκ οἰκεία.

§ 3 10 καὶ γὰρ... 12 ὑπόδημα] This  
 is true. The question is always how  
 much money or food the shoe as such,  
 and not the leather used in making it, is  
 worth: the labour has to be paid for as

well as the materials (Göttling). Cp. n.  
 on § 8 (83) and *Introd.* 28. SUSEM. (78)

12 ἢ ὑπόδημα] as a shoe.

§ 4 14 ἔστι γὰρ... πάντων] sc. χρῆ-  
 σεις. "All things have a use in exchange."  
 We now speak of the two values of a  
 thing, value in use and value in exchange.

15 ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον] (τὸ δὲ  
 ὕστερον, derived in the first instance from  
 a natural origin [whatever it may after-  
 wards become].



ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς<sup>12</sup>  
 χρηματιστικῆς ἢ καπηλικῆς ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-  
 § 5 καῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ  
 20 κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔργον  
 αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ  
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκoinώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν  
 πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων \* \* \* ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον <ἦν>  
 24 ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ [καὶ] τῶν (p. 14)  
 § 6 βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ  
 χρῆσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλεόν δ' οὐδέν,  
 οἶον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβολή- 13

17 [ἢ καὶ...19 ἀλλαγὴν] Schmidt || φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] τις φύσει χρημα-  
 τιστικῇ Schmidt || 18 χρηματιστικῆς] μεταβλητικῆς Bernays || 20 [τοῦτο...οἰκία]  
 Schmidt || ἐστὶν] ἦν Schmidt || 22 τῶν omitted in II<sup>1</sup> and Ar., it is supplied  
 by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 23 καὶ was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koraes || ἐτέρων  
 <ἐδέοντο> Schneider, ἐτέρων <ἠπόρουσαν> Schmidt, ἐστέροντο Koraes, <ἔτεροι> ἐτέρων  
 Bernays (on which see Comm.): Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἐτέρων  
 <ἔτεροι ἠπόρουσαν>? Susem. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἐδέοντο || Koraes added  
 ἦν || 24 καὶ is wanting in Γ, [καὶ] Susem., καὶ <νῦν> Schmidt and Bernays (per-  
 haps rightly): Busse transposes καὶ to precede πολλὰ—not badly || 25 ff. Michael  
 of Ephesus in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. f. 70<sup>a</sup> refers to this passage

17 ἢ καὶ δῆλον...καπηλικῇ] Barter is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes on to show. Money is an artificial means of facilitating this, not of natural origin but only due to custom and convention, see §§ 8—11 *mm.* (82, 83): though when applied within due limits it is not contrary to nature. The whole explanation would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly observes, had Aristotle definitely stated what he means by 'trade' (καπηλική = huckstering, retail trade): viz. that it is a buying and exchanging "not for one's own wants, but in order to sell again". As it is, this is left to be inferred from the context. SUSEM. (79)

18 ὅσον γὰρ κατὰ] "For the necessity of exchange is confined, as we saw, to the satisfaction of the exchangers' own wants." Cp. *τοσαύτης* = only so much 13 § 12.

§ 5 21 ἀλλ' ἤδη] but not until the society extended. Since trade is introduced at a later stage it is not 'natural'. Possibly directed against Plato's primitive state, the *ἀληθινή, ὑγίης, ὑπὸν πόλις*, *Rep.* II. 371 A—D: ἀγορὰ δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ νόμισμα ξυμβολὸν τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐνεκα γενή-

σεται.

22 οἱ δὲ κεχωρ. κατὰ] Bernays thought the addition of a word for "lacked" unnecessary, 'because this idea is implied in κεχωρισμένοι'. If so, as κεχωρ. <ἔτεροι> ἐτέρων = separated (or divided) one from this thing, another from that, so κεχωρ. πολλῶν should mean 'separated from many things'. But as Bernays gives 'division of possessions' i.e. separate property 'was introduced for many things' he must intend κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν to stand for 'living in divided possession of', or *in respect of*, 'many things': a sense hardly possible in any case and quite inconceivable if the participle has a different construction with ἐτέρων. SUSEM.

Postgate would govern πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων by ἐκoinώνουν, supposing πολλῶν to be opposed to πάντων (as *πλείστον* is, II. 5. 27), and understanding ἐτέρων of the primary division of the joint-household into two: "again when the original household split into two, each half continued to hold in common a large part of the stock, viz. all that the other half left it".

23 κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις] Comp. 2 § 5 n. (18). SUSEM. (80)

29 *τικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἶδος οὐδέν* (III)  
 § 7 *(εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκειᾶς ἦν)· ἐκ*  
*μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ*  
*γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκ-*  
*πέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπο-*  
 § 8 *ρίσθη χρήσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν*  
 35 *ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο* 14  
*πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων*  
*αὐτὸ ὃν εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον*

32 γενομένης Koraes, γενομένης II Bk. || ἐνδεεῖς] ἐνέδει Bernays || 37 Koraes conjectured <οὐκ> ὄν, but see Int. p. 28 ff. and Comm. n. (87) || ζῆν] <μετακομῇ> ζεῖν Reiske, certainly right as to the sense, <βαστά> ζεῖν Bernays (less good)

§ 7 31 *κατὰ λόγον*, as one might have inferred. Lindau 'by agreement'. But can the words bear this meaning? The proof which follows seems to show that this phrase expresses subjectively the same thing as 33 *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* in objective fashion. SUSEM. (81) Similarly IV (VII). 16. 10. Bonitz commenting on 989 a 30: "quod rationibus ad rem pertinentibus accommodatum est et consentaneum."

ξενικωτέρας γὰρ...] "when the supply extended to foreign countries."

§ 8 34 *οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον κτλ*] Yet money is not by nature, but has its origin in mere convention! Here again Aristotle falls into the contradiction noticed in n. (71), seeking the true nature of man in violation of his own principle, before instead of in the normal development of civilization. Hence he ignores the fact which on other occasions (*Poet.* 4 §§ 1—6) by no means escapes him, that there is no unconditional antithesis between nature and art, nature and convention, nature and civilization: that innumerable arts institutions and conventions take their origin from man's inmost nature in the course of its development. It is precisely so with the state, and as with the state so with money. That in history too the law of a rational necessity controls chance is a thought not sufficiently acknowledged in his works: see *Poet.* 9 §§ 2, 10, with my notes, and Reinkens *op. c.* 289 ff., who somewhat exaggerates. Cp. also below on II, 9 § 12 n. (296), § 30 n. (339), III. 3. 9 n. (466). SUSEM. (82)

35 *διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς κτλ*] On the origin of money compare *Nic. Eth.* v. 5 §§ 10—16 (1133 a 19 ff.): of which the substance is as follows.

All things which are to be exchanged must be somehow commensurable; and for this purpose money has been introduced, which serves as a sort of medium, for it measures all things, e.g. how many pairs of shoes are equivalent to a given house. The standard or common measure is in reality demand; but demand is conventionally represented by money which gets its name (*νόμισμα* = currency) because it is not by nature but by convention (*νόμῳ*), so that it is in our power to change and demonetize it (i.e. render it no longer current). If we do not require a thing now, money is still the guarantee of a future exchange, to take place if we require the thing at some other time. And although the value of money itself occasionally changes, yet it tends to be more constant than that of any other thing. All other commodities should therefore have a price set on them, that so exchange may always be possible. SUSEM. (83)

36 *ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν*] Schneider thinks this is not implied by the nature of money, since certain tribes use cowries as a medium of exchange, and the Ethiopians stones with marks engraved upon them (*ἁλθοῖς ἐγγεγραμμένοις* Ps-Plato *Eryx.* 400 B). We admit the truth of this; yet only a metallic currency can fulfil the proper end of money, and from the nature of the case the really civilized races have always availed themselves of it. Aristotle however has failed to recognise this sufficiently: see § 11 n. (87) and *Introd.* 29. SUSEM. (84)

37 *χρεῖαν* recalls *χρησίμων*: a commodity useful in itself which adapted its use handily to the purposes of daily life.



σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ- (ΠΙ)  
τον ἀπλῶς ὀρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον  
40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἵν' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως  
§ 9 αὐτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτῆρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον. πορι- 15  
1257 b σθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς  
θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ  
μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας  
4 ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον  
§ 10 ποιήσῃ κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ  
νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν  
ἔσται πλῆθος [χρημάτων]· ποιητικὴ γὰρ [εἶναι] τοῦ πλούτου  
καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλούτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νο- 16  
9 μίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν  
§ 11 καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ  
νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μετα-

38 καὶ εἰ M<sup>a</sup> Π<sup>a</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 ἐπιβαλλόντων M<sup>a</sup> Π<sup>a</sup> Bk.

1257 b 3 οὖν omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup>· Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || γενόμενον  
? Susem. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanius || ποιητικὴν [γὰρ] Schmidt, who transposes  
ποιητικὴν...8 χρημάτων to follow 10 καπηλικήν || γὰρ] δ' Bernays, inserting γὰρ after  
the next following καὶ, thus: χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ δ' εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου· καὶ <γὰρ>  
χρημάτων· καὶ γὰρ κτλ. If so, 9 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ must also be omitted || εἶναι  
omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || τοῦ omitted by M<sup>a</sup>, bracketed by Koraes; ὁντως? Susem. || 8 Giphanius  
proposed to omit γὰρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow 9 διὰ || πολλάκις after τιθέασι  
M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 9 διὰ τὸ] διὸ? Susem. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καὶ before τὴν, καὶ  
<εἶναι>? Susem.; Schütz rejects καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (or τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ) ||  
11 νόμῳ Lambin, perhaps rightly; yet see Comm. n. (86)

38 σίδηρος] "Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money: cp. Plato Comicus *Peis.* 3 χαλεπῶς ἂν οἰκήσαιμεν ἐν Βυζαντίοις | ὅπου σιδάρεοις τοῖς νομίμασιν | χρώνται. These coins were commonly called οἱ σιδάρεοι, cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 249. εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyzicus" (Ridgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities: see Gardner *Types of Gk. Coins* p. 4 ff., Head *Coinage of Lydia* p. 11.

τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κτλ] This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta, Pseudo-Plato *l. c.* ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ σιδηρῷ σταθμῷ νομίζουσι. Cp. Xen. *De Rep. Laced.* 7. 5; Plutarch *Lys.* 17 (ὀβελισκοί, spits), *Lyc.* 9; Polybios VI. 49; and H. Stein *On the Spartan iron money* in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* LXXXIX. 1864.

332 ff. SUSEM. (85)

§ 9 1257 b 1 Take ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκ. ἀλλαγῆς with πορισθέντος rather than with ἐγένετο, "as soon as a currency was provided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but afterwards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities" not μεταβαλλόμενον < τὸ νόμισμα >, "will produce the largest profit".

§ 10 8 καὶ γὰρ...10 καπηλικήν] This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith *Wealth of Nations* B. IV. Cp. Mill *Pol. Econ.* pp. 1-4. Even in *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 νομίσματος πλῆθος is only one of many 'elements' of wealth.

§ 11 11 νόμος παντάπασι] An allu-

θεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς (III)  
οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλὰ-  
κίς ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον  
15 εἶναι πλούτου οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῶ ἀπολείται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν (p. 15)  
Μίδαυ ἐκείνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς  
§ 12 πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ 17  
ζητοῦσιν ἑτερόν τι τὸν πλούτου καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὀρθῶς  
ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἢ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλούτος ὁ  
20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομικὴ, ἢ δὲ καπηλική,  
ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ χρημάτων με-  
ταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ  
§ 13 νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν. καὶ ἄπει-  
ρος δὲ οὗτος ὁ πλούτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

12 οὐδὲ Bk., οὔτε Π. || 20 αὕτη] ἢ ? Schmidt || [καὶ αὕτη...24 χρηματιστικῆς]  
Schmidt, who transposes καὶ αὕτη...30 κτήσις to follow 1257 a 5 μάλλον || ἢ after  
μὲν corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> || 21 ἢ P<sup>4</sup>, Q (?) L<sup>2</sup> Ald., ἢ S<sup>b</sup>, ἢ Rasso || Bernays omits χρ-  
μάτων after διὰ || 24 δὲ Giphanius || οὗτος omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

sion to the derivation of νόμισμα=money, currency, from νόμος=convention, *current* custom: see n. (83). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be νόμος rather than νόμος, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato *Eryxias* l. c. 5, n. (85) (Schneider). SUSEM. (86) **ὅτι μετατιθεμένων κτλ**] Although Aristotle himself, § 12, adopts the opinion that this form of wealth is οὐδὲν φύσει, yet here the view is carried much farther than he goes in § 8, see n. (84). He must hold that money, when no longer current, loses its value as money, retaining only its value in exchange as this or that metal: its only use now is as metal, not as coin. SUSEM. (87)

With this comp. *N. E.* v. 5 § 11, ἐφ' ἡμῶν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον, § 14 πᾶσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ νόμισμα) τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ ἴσον δύναιται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μάλλον.

14 καίτοι κτλ] "And yet it is strange that there should be wealth of a kind that with abundance of it a man will nevertheless perish of hunger, as the legend runs about Midas of yore, when in fulfilment of his insatiate prayer everything that was served up to him turned into gold."

16 Μίδαυ] This mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenos and restored him to Dionysos, who in

return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas' request, see Ovid *Metamorph.* xi. 90—145. Aristotle must have had a version of the story in which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if all his food had been converted into drink, or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. SUSEM. (88)

§ 12 17 διὸ ζητοῦσιν κτλ] A possible reference to previous writers, see *Introd.* 20 n. (1). SUSEM. (88 b)

19 ἑτέρα ἢ χρ.] Getting of goods for use, χρηματιστικὴ (3) of 8 § 1 n.

21 διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς] "by exchange of commodities. And this species, i.e. ἡ καπηλική, is thought to deal with money, for currency constitutes and limits exchange:" i.e. trading begins and ends with money. στοιχεῖον, main constituent, seems to mean indispensable agent in exchange. Elsewhere called guarantee, τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς οἷον ἐγγυητής, *N. E.* § 14: and ὑπόλλαγμα τῆς χρείας, representative of demand *ib.* § 11.

§ 13 23 καὶ ἄπειρος δὲ] "In the words of the line from Solon, 8 § 14" (Bernays). SUSEM. (89)



- 25 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστι καὶ (III)  
ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ  
ἐκείνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπει-  
ρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς  
29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος  
§ 14 πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρη- 18  
ματιστικῆς] ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.  
διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας,  
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρῶμεν <μεν> συμβαῖνον τὸνναντίον· πάντες  
34 γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον αὖξουσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.  
§ 15 αἴτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected *εἰσι*: but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 1258 a 1) || 30 τῆς δ'...31 ἔργον suspected as an interpolation Schmidt || οὐ χρηματιστικῆ P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts δ καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Gurlitt recommend ταὐτὸ instead of τοῦτο); [οὐ] Bojesen Thurot Schütz, aB Bernays, οὐ<σης> Schmidt. The case is still undecided || 31 οἱ γὰρ .....ἔργον once transposed by Schmidt to follow 32 πέρας. This however really involves other and perhaps more serious difficulties || 32 μὲν <φύσει> ? Susem. || διὰ <τὶ δὲ> τῇ μὲν \* \* φαίνεται Schmidt || 33 ὁρῶμεν Sylburg, ὁρῶ Γ II Ar. || 34 νόμισμα, αἴτιον \* \* διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν depends on εἰς ἀπειρον: medicine is without end in respect of health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined.

27 τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος = means to the end.

28 πέρας...πάσαις] "For all arts are limited by their ends." True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, nay even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that: and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour: that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahr and others (*Introd.* p. 28), to recognise Aristotle's penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturity of many of his conclusions in this

9th chapter, "the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society". Cp. further IV (VII). 1 § 5 n. (695), n. (700). SUSEM. (90)

§ 14 30 If οὐ be changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l. 39 below, and undoubtedly § 18, 1258 a 17: "but to that branch" of accumulation "which concerns the householder there is a limit". See however n. on 8 § 12, p. 177.

31 τοῦτο = to attain this limit, χρήματα ποιεῖν as Schneider says. τῇ μὲν "in one sense", viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schütz Bernays take it as "to the one branch", viz. that which concerns the householder.

34 εἰς ἀπειρον] Cp. [Xen.] *De Vectigal.* 4 §§ 6, 7: ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδεὶς πω οὕτω πολλὸν ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μὴ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι.

οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι = those who are engaged in traffic.

35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστικῆ is the cause of this mistake.

§ 15 ἐπαλλάττει] See on 1. 6. 3. "The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστικῆ overlaps, through being concerned with the same article.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐσα ἐκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς (III)  
 ἐστὶ κτήσεως χρήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν  
 ἑτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισι τοῦτ' εἶναι  
 39 τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἢ σφῶζειν οἰόμενοι  
 § 16 δεῖν ἢ αὐξεῖν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον. αἷτιον 19  
 δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ  
 1258 a μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσης,  
 καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ  
 ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς  
 ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρ-  
 5 χεῖν, πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμόν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ (p. 16)

36 ἐκατέρας Ar. and the mss. used by Sepulveda, ἐκατέρα Γ Π Bk. ἐκατέρα  
 Schneider, ἐκατέρα and then τῇ χρηματιστικῇ Bernays, perhaps rightly || 37 κτή-  
 σεως χρήσις Götting (after Schneider, or rather Fülleborn, had proposed to omit the  
 whole clause 36 τῆς γὰρ...37 χρήσις), χρήσεως κτήσις Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 39 οἰκονομας  
 P<sup>4-6</sup>, Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

1258 a 1 οὐσης] *Ιούσης* Sylburg (but see on 1257 b 25) || 2 ὅσοι.....3 ἐπιβάλ-  
 λονται noticed by Eustath. on the *Iliad* p. 625, 36 || 4 ὑπάρχον Koraes (perhaps  
 rightly)

Here two χρήσεις ἐπαλλάττουσι because they have the same object in common". (Postgate).

37 τῆς μὲν κτλ] 'The one application has a different end' (viz. enjoyment, use) 'the other aims at mere accumulation'.

39 διατελοῦσιν κτλ] "persist through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely": νομίσ. οὐσίαν=their substance or capital in money, Bonitz s. v. Better thus taken than as a paraphrase of νόμισμα, for which idiom see Waitz *Org.* 1. 283 and cp. ἡ τοῦ δρνιθος οὐσία 693 b 6.

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external cause, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14: ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως=τοῦ διατελεῖν ἢ σφῶζειν κτλ. (Postgate).

40 αἷτιον δὲ κτλ] 'Perhaps the thought becomes clearer' says Fülleborn 'when expressed as follows: men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,' without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, 'they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this indefinite series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment' and for the ennobling

of life, 'their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited'. SUSEM. (91)

1258 a 2 ὅσοι δὲ κτλ] "those who set their hearts upon a life of happiness look for it in sensual enjoyments": whereas, on Aristotle's own theory, the true embellishment and perfecting of life, i. e. happiness, consists in the utmost possible cultivation of mental and moral excellence, of which the highest and noblest enjoyments are but a necessary consequence, a moderate share of external goods and bodily pleasures being required not as constituent element but merely as indispensable condition: all beyond this hinders rather than promotes true Wellbeing. See Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 609: cp. IV (VII). I §§ 7, 8. SUSEM. (92)

3 ἐπιβάλλονται] 'throw themselves upon' (cp. Hom. *Il.* vi. 68, ἐνάρων ἐπιβάλλόμενος) 'desire' in the same metaphorical sense as ὀρέγεσθαι, ἀντέχεσθαι. But otherwise II. i. 1 'to adopt'. For the intransitive use of the active see I. 13 §§ 8, 13. In *Nic. Eth.* 1. 5 §§ 1, 2 ὁ ἀπολαυστικός βίος is the life of sensual enjoyment. As Plato explains *Rep.* ix. 580 E f., money is the means to this life, so that φιλοκερδές, φιλοχρήματον are convertible terms with τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν: hence ὁ χρηματιστικὸς ἀνὴρ comes to be compared with ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλόσοφος.



§ 17 ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερ- (III)  
βολῇ γὰρ οὐσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς  
ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· κἂν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστι-  
κῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,  
10 ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρίας 20  
γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς  
§ 18 καὶ ἱατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ  
πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὥς τοῦτο τέλος ὄν, πρὸς δὲ  
τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς,  
16 καὶ δι' αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρεῖα ἐσμέν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ  
τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν  
ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἀπειρος ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα  
10 ὅρον· δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ 21

12 ὑγίαν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 15 [τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας] Schmidt || μὴ is transposed by  
Hampke and Rassow to precede 17 ἀναγκαίας—but wrongly || 16 [καὶ περὶ...19  
ὅρον] Schmidt || 17 <καὶ> κατὰ φύσιν Thurot || 18 ἢ Schneider (perhaps  
rightly, unless we prefer to omit ἡ.....τροφὴν) || αὐτῇ Welldon || 19 Bender  
considers the whole of c. 10 δῆλον...b 8 ἐστὶν to be spurious; but see Comm. n. (95)  
|| Schmidt transposes 19 δῆλον...38 ζῶων to follow 1256 b 30 οἰκίας

§ 17 8 κἂν μὴ κτλ] "And if they cannot procure this" (ἀπολαυστικὴν ὑπερβολήν) "by mere accumulation they attempt it by some other supposed cause, perverting each of their faculties to attain it."

§ 18 13 πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστ.] Compare Plato *Rep.* I 342 D: the true *ἱατρός* no *χρηματιστής*, and 346 C, D: *ἡ μισθωτικὴ* accompanies the other arts to provide remuneration.

14 ἀπαντᾶν=meet in, conspire, tend to: *referre ad*.

19 ὅρον=standard, limit. Properly 'boundary', 'definition', like *ὁρισμός*.

§§ 16–18 In the several points Aristotle is quite right, but in reality all this makes against him. For it shows that the fault lies with the men and not with the 'arts'. If men misuse not medicine merely, but moral virtues like courage, as a means to their own avarice and craving for pleasure; if they can follow agriculture, cattle-rearing, etc. in the same spirit; why are commerce trade and banking to be unceremoniously rejected merely because they can serve such men as a still readier and more successful means to the satisfaction of their desires? Why should it be culpable in any one to

carry on such pursuits merely to gain a living by them? (Glaser). It is true that if there were no stock exchange there could be no speculation in stocks, and then no one would be tempted to such excessive indulgence in it as is certainly liable at times to endanger the morality of whole nations [as *e.g.* at the time of the South Sea Bubble]. But without the shadow no light; civilization is impossible without luxury. 'In spite of many great evils which money has brought into the world it is to this invention alone that we owe the fact that nine-tenths of mankind are now no longer forced to serve that fortunate minority, the owners of real property. Think of the time when money was still scarce in Europe; the land then belonged almost exclusively to the clergy and the nobility. Money alone introduced a new species of commodity of inexhaustible ownership, which stands open to all to acquire' (Schlosser). "Aristotle forgets, too, that, even before money was invented, people might find no *limit* to wealth-seeking. The *ζῶὴ ἀσπετος* of Odysseus, *Od.* XIV. 96, went beyond the limit of his consumption, and its aim was, not nurture, but power, as he could make

20 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὐ, <ἀλλὰ \* \* > (III)  
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ  
ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ, ἀλλὰ λαβούσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται  
αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφήν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ

20 [καὶ πολιτικοῦ] Schmidt || οὐ, <ἀλλὰ ἐτέρον. οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ  
ἀναγκαῖα χρήματα ποιεῖν> or something similar ?Susem. (see Comm.), οὐ \* \*  
Schmidt. Conring and Schneider suspected some loss || 21 τοῦτο] ταῦτα (a  
conjecture retracted by Schneider) Schmidt Bender; if taken here, it must be  
repeated in 35, and so Bender || 23 <els> τροφήν ? Schneider, τρέφον Oncken, but  
wrongly

grants to his *comitatus* out of his herds and flocks" (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising, namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole householder (*οἰκονόμος*); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (*Introd.* pp. 22, 29 f.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, aesthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: "when agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow" (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despised physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (*banausic*), as intellectually and morally degrading: see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (103). Consequently, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. III on Bk. I, and Plato *Laws* VII. 806 D f.—all paid labour, see n. (102), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freemen. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme de-

velopments of Plato's social and political theories, yet after all he is taking the same line with more prudence and reserve. See *Introd.* p. 21 nn. (1) and (3), p. 33 n. (7). SUSEM. (93)

c. 10 *Decision of the question raised in c. 8 § 1: §§ 1—3. Usury the most unnatural form of gain, §§ 4, 5.*

§ 1 19 δῆλον δὲ κτλ.] "But it will now be easy to decide the further question started at the outset, namely, whether the art of wealth is the concern of the householder and statesman or not, but" ... Then comes a lacuna which may tentatively be filled as follows: "but, <so far as in general needed for the management of a household, is the concern of a subordinate science. Plainly the latter is the case, and the former only so far as the head of the house has to see that the art of acquiring wealth is practised, without exercising it himself; for it is his function, as we said, to use and not to acquire. Furthermore it is an auxiliary science for procuring instruments for living and not the mere materials: these> must be given already." But the briefer and somewhat different restoration given in the critical notes is also admissible: "but <of some one else. For it is not his business to procure all that is necessary for living:> nay there must be definite materials found him beforehand." SUSEM. (94)

23 οὕτω καὶ τροφήν κτλ.] "so nature must provide land or sea or something else as means of support." Lambin and Götting make γῆν ἢ θάλατταν epexegetic of τὴν φύσιν and Jackson shows that this is not impossible by citing Plato *Laws* 891 c, τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, sc. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα. But the above rendering best agrees with 8 §§ 9, 12, 10 § 3.



24 θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖ- (III)  
 § 2 ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια  
 ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γινῶναι δὲ τὸ ποῖον  
 χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ 22  
 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, διὰ τί ἢ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς  
 29 οἰκονομίας, ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ οὐ μόριον· καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς  
 § 3 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχοντος καὶ περὶ  
 ὑγείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ  
 τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ  
 τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ  
 35 φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον τροφὴν τῷ

24 ταῦτα] αὐτὴν Glaser (wrongly), πάντα ? Oncken, τᾶλλα Bender (both better, but hardly correct) || 25 οὐ] οὐδὲ ? Schmidt || 29 δεῖ after ὑγιαίνειν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, δεῖν P<sup>4</sup> || 32 ὑγείας Ald. ὑγείας M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.2.3.4. || τοῦ ἱατροῦ] τῆς ἱατρικῆς P<sup>6</sup> Q L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand—γρ. τοῦ ἱατροῦ in the margin), while in S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> ἀλλὰ.....οὐ is omitted || ἰδεῖν <ἐστίν> and 33 οἰκονόμου <ἐστίν> Welldon || 33 τῶν omitted by P<sup>4-6</sup>. Q L<sup>a</sup> || χρημάτων] χρηματιστικῆς P<sup>4</sup> and γρ. P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin), χρηματιστικοῦ P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, χρηματιστικῶ Q || 34 After τῆς P<sup>4-6</sup>. C<sup>a</sup> Q L<sup>a</sup> Ar. (probably also M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup>) insert κέρδους || 35 ταῦτα Bender for τοῦτο, cp. n. on I. 21

24 ἐκ δὲ τούτων] afterwards, *postea* (Bonitz): answering τοῦτο μὲν. "And then it is the householder's duty to dispose of these materials to the best advantage (ὡς δεῖ)."

§ 2 25 οὐ γὰρ κτλ] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of χρηματιστικὴ is related to οἰκονομική as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed 8 § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of χρηματιστικὴ provides the household with the needful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature's stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessities of life are certainly called elsewhere, 8 § 15, 4 §§ 1—4, the *instruments* (ὄργανα) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly

procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic χρηματιστικὴ, and therefore it stands to Economic in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is c. 10 required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though indemonstrable, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. SUSEM. (95)

28 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν] χρηματιστικὴ (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economic as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic.

§ 3 34 μάλιστα] if possible, this must be found by nature, i.e. without the trouble of acquiring it.

35 φύσεως γὰρ κτλ] It was explained in n. (73) on 8 § 11 that on Aristotle's own theory it is impossible to see how far

γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή τὸ (III)  
 § 4 λειπόμενον ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστική (p. 17)  
 πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων.

διπλῆς δ' οὕσης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλι- 23  
 40 κῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινου-  
 1258 b μένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ  
 φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολο-  
 στατική διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν  
 § 5 καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορισάμεθα. μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν,  
 5 ὃ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλεόν. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' εἴληφεν·

38 <ῆ> ἀπὸ Schneider || 39 [καπηλικῆς...40 μὲν] Schmidt

1258 b 1 μεταβολικῆς II<sup>2</sup> Bk. and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> (in margin); [μεταβολικῆς] now, perhaps  
 rightly, μεταβλητικῆς <καὶ> formerly, Schmidt || 3 ἐπ' Jackson, ὑπ' Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ἀπ'  
 ceteri || τὴν omitted by M<sup>1</sup>, [τὴν] Jackson (unnecessary) || κτήσιν, <ἐπὶ τόκῳ  
 χρωμένους> now, <ἐπὶ τ. χρωμένη αὐτῷ> formerly, Schmidt || 4 ὅπερ ἐπορισάμεθα]  
 ὅπερ ἐπορισθῇ II<sup>2</sup> Bk., ὅπερ ἐπορισθῇ Schmidt || 5 αὐτὸ] αὐτὸν Γ Ar.

this is intended to apply to the animals  
 which according to him are produced  
 from worms. SUSEM. (96)

36 παντὶ γάρ κτλ] "for every animal  
 has for its sustenance the remainder of the  
 matter out of which it grows." Hence  
 the animal and vegetable world is nature's  
 reserve for the support of man.

§ 4 1258 b 1 τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψε-  
 γομένης] Attested in equally general terms  
 by Plato *Laus* xi. 918 D: compare  
 Andoc. i. 137, Diog. Laert. i. 104. An  
 Athenian would find capital for mercan-  
 tile concerns, but he considered it on the  
 whole disreputable to engage in them  
 personally (Becker *Char.* II. 134 ed. 2,  
 Eng. Tr. p. 281). SUSEM. (97)

2 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων] If *neuter*, the profit  
 made from mutual exchange. But more  
 likely *masculine*, derived from men de-  
 frauding and overreaching one another;  
 the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection  
 to trade altogether.

μισέται] Demosth. XXXVII *Adv. Pan-*  
*taenetum* § 52: μισοῦσι, φησὶν, 'Ἀθηναῖοι  
 τοὺς δανείζοντας. SUSEM. (97 b)

ἡ ὀβολοστατική = obol weighing, petty  
 usury; Lysias *adv. Theomn.* i. § 18 p. 117  
 explaining the law τὸ ἀργύριον στάσιμον  
 εἶναι ἐφ' ὅπόσῳ ἂν βούληται ὁ δανείζων  
 says τὸ στάσιμον τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐ ζυγῶ  
 ἴσταναι ἀλλὰ τόκον πράττεσθαι ὅπόσον  
 ἂν βούληται. Cp. also Aristoph. *Clouds*  
 1146, Antiph. *Not. frag.* i, Meineke 92  
 in Athen. i. 108 E (Cope). The insecurity  
 of the principal lent was the main

cause of a high rate of interest. Thus  
 upon bottomry the average rate charged  
 was 20 per cent., which would go to  
 cover insurance, [Xen.] *De Vectigal.* III.  
 9. On house-rents the return was only  
 8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of  
 a paper medium of the nature of bills of  
 exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contri-  
 buted to the same result: Büchsen-schütz  
*Besitz und Erwerb* pp. 98, 496 ff.

3 διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κτλ] "According  
 to the texts both of Bekker and Susemihl  
 ὀβολοστατική is hated because it draws a  
 profit from coin instead of from commodi-  
 ties exchanged by means of coin. But  
 the explanatory sentence—μεταβολῆς γὰρ  
 ἐγένετο χάριν, ὃ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλεόν  
 —seems to show that ὀβολοστατική is  
 hated because it seeks to accumulate coin  
 instead of using it in the furtherance of  
 exchange. In order to reconcile the  
 explanatory sentence and the sentence  
 explained, read in the latter ἐπ' instead  
 of ἀπ' or ὑπ', omit τὴν with M<sup>1</sup>, and restore  
 Bekker's ὅπερ. In this way we obtain  
 an appropriate sense: 'ὀβολοστατική is  
 hated because it is directed to the acqui-  
 sition of coin, instead of to the end with  
 a view to which coin was invented: for it  
 was to further exchange that coin was in-  
 troduced, while interest multiplies coin  
 itself'" (Jackson).

§ 5 5 τόκος] "Perhaps from Plato  
*Rep.* VIII. 555 E, οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύ-  
 ψαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τοῦτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν  
 λοιπῶν τὸν αἰεὶ ὑπείκοντα ἐνέκτες ἀργύριον



ὅμοια γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτὰ ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ (III) τόκος γίνεταί νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἔστιν.

- 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ IV  
 10 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δὲ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν  
 μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.  
 ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα  
 ἐμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον  
 14 ἵππων κτήσις ποῖα τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ  
 § 2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε  
 τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις·

7 ἐκ is omitted by II<sup>3</sup> Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), perhaps rightly: it is added by P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) || 10 δὲ] γὰρ Γ Ar., perhaps rightly || 11 ἐλευθέριον? Jackson || 12 δὲ] δὴ Lambin, perhaps rightly || τῆς omitted by II<sup>3</sup> Bk. || κτήματα] κτήνη Bernays

τιτρώσκοντες καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους τόκους  
 πολλαπλασίους κομίζόμενοι πολὺν τὸν κη-  
 φήνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει. Still  
 earlier in Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 846, ἀξία  
 γούν εἰ τόκον, τεκούσα τοιούτου τόκον"  
 (Ridgeway). Cp. also Plato *Rep.* VI.  
 507 A, *Politic.* 276 A.

With 3—8 διὰ τὸ κτλ comp. Plato *Laws*  
 v. 742 C, VIII. 842 B. Every one will agree  
 with Fülleborn that this proof is sophis-  
 tical. But Stahr rightly observes: 'it  
 was not until capital itself attained its  
 complete development, that is, only in  
 recent times, that the justification and  
 reasonable necessity of interest became  
 clear. The history of capital recounts  
 the gigantic efforts that had to be made,  
 the difficulties that had to be surmounted,  
 in order to its formation. From the point  
 of view of universal history the high rate  
 of interest in ancient times has perhaps  
 been a favourable means to that end; yet  
 its immediate effect, in conjunction with  
 a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was  
 to excite repulsion in men with moral  
 natures and this led them decisively to  
 condemn interest altogether, as Plato  
 did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole  
 theory of exchange the following shape:  
 'he first includes under the term Ex-  
 change (ἀλλαγή) all buying and selling  
 barter. Next he subdivides this genus  
 into two species, the one good and praise-  
 worthy, the other not so. The former  
 belongs to Economic. It exchanges the  
 surplus stock of the household for commo-  
 dities which the household needs; or if

this surplus stock be sold for money it is  
 with no intention of making a profit, but  
 only to purchase other necessities with  
 the proceeds. The other species is dis-  
 tinguished by the intention of making a  
 profit, and this exchange with a view to  
 gain is χρηματιστικὴ in the narrower sense  
 or trading proper. It is again subdivided  
 into two branches: the one includes all  
 traffic in commodities whether in ex-  
 change for other commodities or for  
 money, the other is traffic in money  
 alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle  
 regards this last as wholly detestable: the  
 former as less bad, but still bad enough'  
 (Schlosser). SUSEM. (98)

c. 11 *Production viewed on the prac-  
 tical side.* Cp. *Analysis* p. 100.

§ 1 10 *χρήσιν*=practical application,  
 as in 9 § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτλ] The theory has its  
 limitations solely in the nature of the  
 case generally; but in practice the nature  
 of the particular locality where we live,  
 and therefore the climate, the character  
 of the soil, &c, determine whether we are  
 chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-  
 rearing, to mining or commerce by sea,  
 whether there can be preserves of fish  
 and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or  
 of cattle must be procured, and so on  
 (Schütz). SUSEM. (99)

11 For ἐλεύθερον] (ἀναγκαίαν, strictly  
 limited, cp. *Metaph.* I. 2 § 11 982 b 27:  
 αὕτη (First Philosophy) μόνη ἐλευθέρα  
 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, and § 14 983 a 10, ἀναγ-  
 καιώτεροι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῆς.

ἀλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), εἴτα περὶ γεωργίας, (IV)  
καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελι-  
19 τουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ'  
§ 3 ὅσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρη-  
21 ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς  
μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία  
φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῶ  
τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-  
§ 4 καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία (ταύ-  
26 τῆς δ' ἢ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων  
καὶ τῶ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων)· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρημα-  
τιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς  
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς

26 τεχνῶν] τεχνιῶν Vermehren, perhaps rightly || 27 τρίτον] τέταρτον Π<sup>1</sup> and  
P<sup>4</sup> (corrector), ἄλλως τρίτον p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 29 ὅσα] οὕσα Bernays

§ 2 17 εὐθηνεῖ=thrive, have abundant  
offspring: see Verrall *Trans. of Camb.*  
*Phil. Soc.* II. p. 165.

18 ἤδη and here (when we come to this)  
we find two kinds: agriculture proper and  
fruit-growing. The technical terms per-  
haps of Apollodoros, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and in  
particular of the vine would be included  
under ἡ πεφυτευμένη; see Steitz *Hesiod's*  
*Works and Days* (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f.  
SUSEM. (100)

§ 3 23 φορτηγία=inland trade. SU-  
SEM. This is the view of the commen-  
tators generally, but Cope disputes it.  
He remarks: "φορτηγός and its deriva-  
tives φορτηγεῖν, φορτηγικός, φορταγωγός,  
φορταγωγεῖν, seem to be always applied  
to commerce carried on by sea, whether  
ναῦς or πλοῖα be expressed or not (the  
sense of 'porter' given in the lexx. seems  
not necessary in any of the passages, cp.  
Theogn. *Frag.* 679, Aesch. *Frag. Phryg.*  
242). For this reason, and because  
commerce by land at Athens and in  
Greece generally was so utterly insigni-  
ficant in comparison that it might well be  
passed over without notice, I rather think  
that Aris. means by ναυκληρία building  
and letting out ships for traffic, and by  
φορτηγία commerce proper, the transport  
of goods on board of them, perhaps in-  
cluding also land transport. On this  
view Xenophon's distinction *De Rep.*  
*Laced.* 7 ὁ μὲν γεωργεῖ, ὁ δὲ ναυκληρεῖ, ὁ  
δὲ ἐμπορεῖται, would correspond to Ar-

istotle's here."

παράστασις virtually =καπηλική, sta-  
taria mercatura, hominum nimirum in foro  
consistentium.

24 ἀσφαλέστερα] For definition of  
ἀσφάλεια in this connexion, see *Rhet.* I. 5.  
7 τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτηῖσθαι ὥστ' ἐφ'  
αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν (Jackson).

ἐπικαρπία = profit additional to the  
principal (τάρχαϊον): see on § 11.

25 μισθαρνία κτλ] Cp. § 6 below.  
In any case the division is incomplete.  
The occupations distinguished in § 6 as  
τεχνικώταται, which are not unskilled  
manual labour nor service for wages, are  
here omitted: see *nn.* (102, 103). More-  
over in V(VIII). 2. 5, where μισθαρνικαὶ  
ἐργασίαι are said to be degrading and  
βάνανσοι, the term has quite a different  
meaning, see *n.* (981). SUSEM. (101)

§ 4 26 By ἀτέχνου καὶ τῶ σώματι  
μόνον χρήσιμοι Cope understands the  
θῆτες in a general division of the popula-  
tion; farm-labourers, porters, etc.

29 ὅσα κτλ is in loose apposition to  
εἶδος χρημ., "all the wealth or property  
derived from land and such of its useful  
products as are employed by the prop-  
rietor himself," like the καρποί of ἡ πεφυ-  
τευμένη γεωργία. Even if Bernays' ὅσα  
is right, we cannot accept his punctuation  
(a colon after 28 πρώτης, no parenthesis,  
but a single sentence from ἔχει to 31  
μεταλλευτικῇ) or his translation of οὕσα  
ἀπὸ γῆς; 'directed to the land'. SUSEM.



30 καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, <sup>(IV)</sup>  
 § 5 οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ  
 ἤδη περιεῖληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλ-  
 λευομένων ἐστίν. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται 3  
 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρῆσιμον μὲν  
 § 6 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ  
 36 τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,  
 βανανσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,  
 δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείσται χρήσεις, ἀγενέ-

31 ὑλοτομία] ἡ λατομία Thomas Aquinas and Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but wrongly || 33 περὶ...  
 35 ἐνδιατρίβειν Susem. transposes to follow 39 ἀρετῆς; see *Introd.* p. 78 || δὴ Susem.,  
 δὲ Γ II Bk., omitted by Ar. || 35 εἰσὶ...39 ἀρετῆς was first seen by Montecatino to  
 be out of place, it was erroneously transposed by Piccart to precede 27 τρίτον δὲ ||  
 36 P<sup>4.6</sup>. Q Ald. S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk. insert τῆς before τύχης || 38 ἀγενέσταιται M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1.4</sup>. Q Ald.,  
 perhaps rightly

30 ἀκάρπων] Compare *Rhet.* I. 5. 7: *κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι* (Jackson).

31 ὑλοτομία, the growing and cutting down of timber as distinct from the fruit-trees of ἡ πεφυτευμένη γεωργία.

§ 5 32 γένη, εἶδη interchanged: cp. 8 § 2 ἕτερον εἶδος with § 3 ἕτερον γένος.

§ 6 36 ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης] "where chance has least play": where nearly everything turns upon acquaintance with the facts, technical knowledge and skill; where the skilled craftsman's hand is guided by intellectual training, which is the all-important element. Cp. *Walter of* c. 505 f. Clearly Aristotle means what we call the fine arts and all the higher technical pursuits, including the sciences themselves and rhetoric, if followed or taught professionally for pay. In particular the art of the sophists, for which see n. (552) on III. 9. 8, also v(VIII). 2. 5 with n. (981). SUSEM. (102)

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην, *Metaph.* I. I. 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 βανανσόταται κτλ] This and many other passages—c. 13 § 13; III. 4 § 12, 5 § 4, § 6; IV(VII). 9 § 3, 14 § 7; v(VIII). 2 § 5, § 6, 4 § 6, 6 §§ 3—6, § 16, 7 § 7; VII(VI). 4 §§ 11, 12 with notes; Plato, *Laus* v. 741 E, 743 D f., cp. VIII. 831 c f., 846 D f.; Xenoph. *Oec.* 4 § 2 f., cp. 6 § 6, 10 § 10—show clearly how closely related were the conceptions of the servile (cp. n. 43) and the mechanical both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large

(see further Herod. II. 167). 'Servile' occupations like that of the hired labourer, § 4, form according to this description the proper antithesis to those which are 'artistic' (n. 102); mechanical trades are intermediate, yet even the artisan, to say nothing of the labourer, is only a superior kind of slave. Aristotle has really before him the "sedentary" crafts, τέχναι ἐδραῖαι *End. Eth.* I. 4. 2, 1250 a 30, which are not conducive to bodily health or a noble carriage; v(VIII). 2. 4 n. (980). Similarly we read in Plato *Rep.* VI. 495 D that manual labour disfigures the body and mars the soul; Xen. *I. c.* says that it hurts men's bodies by keeping them in a sitting posture (καθίσθαι) cooped up in-doors (σκιатραφεῖσθαι), or in other cases standing all day long over the furnace; and Pseudo-Plato *Erast.* 137 B that it makes them go about with stooping shoulders and backs bent *κυττάζοντα* ζῆν (the references from Eaton). This is totally unlike the way in which Socrates thinks and judges: 'he speaks as the son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon and Aristotle like men of rank and property', Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II i 142 (Eng. tr. *Socrates and Socratics* p. 170 n. 1). Compare Xen. *Mem.* III. c. 10. With the definition of servile employments compare c. 2 § 2 n. (6 b) and c. 5 § 7 ff. SUSEM. (103)

For λωβῶνται see v(VIII). 4. 1: the workmen themselves 'spoil' or 'deprave' their bodies; i.e. render them feeble and unfit to do service for the state in war.

39 σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. (IV)

33 <περὶ ἐκάστου δὴ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται

34 <καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς  
§ 7 <τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις 4

40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαρητίδῃ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ  
1259a Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Δημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ  
πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν

ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα  
4 σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι,

§ 8 δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι  
τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου·  
τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ 5

μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι  
§ 9 ὄν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς

10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν  
φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος

εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν  
ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου

μισθωσάμενον ἄτ'. οὐδενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς  
15 ἦκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα

40 χάρητι (χάρτι M\*) δὴ II Ar. Bk. Bernays

1259 a 6 οἷον.....18 σπουδάζουσιν seems to have been used by Hieronymos of Rhodes as quoted by Diog. Laert. I. 26 || 13 ἐλαιουργίων P<sup>1</sup> and Hieron. ἐλαιουργῶν Γ Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, ἐλαιούργων P<sup>4</sup>, ἐλαιουργιῶν M\* Q (?) S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, ἐλαιουργίων P<sup>2-3</sup>. Ald. Bk. Bernays, ἐλαιουργίων L\*

39 ὅπου ... ἀρετῆς] "where excellence" of any kind, and so, where bodily excellence "is least needed." No doubt lending money on interest is particularly meant, 10 § 4. Such business he includes under the servile occupations. SUSEM. (104)

§ 7 40 περὶ τούτων] With the transposition this aptly refers to 34 τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, exact particulars in detail.

1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Δημνίῳ] Also mentioned by Varro R. R. I. 1. 8, and several times in Pliny's *Natural History*. SUSEM. (105)

3 ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές= whoever is interested in the subject. We are referred to written works in *Rhet.* I. 4. 13, 1360 a 30.

§ 8 6 τὸ Θάλεω] *Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 5 1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller I. 168 ff. [Eng. tr. *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 211 ff.]

SUSEM. (105 b)

8 διὰ τὴν σοφίαν] Aristoph. *Clouds* 180, *Birds* 1009.

καθόλου τι] The device (κατανόημα) is of general application, depending (as explained in § 12) on the possession of a monopoly. See Boeckh p. 52 f. Eng. tr.

§ 9 12 ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι κτλ] "paid deposits in advance to engage the various oil-presses": ἀρρ.=earnest money, as guarantee for the execution of the contract: διαδ. because the sums were distributed, paid to various owners. Quite apart from the external authority for ἐλαιουργείων (Hieronymos), it seems more business-like to engage the oil-mills, six months beforehand, than the workmen.

13 ὀλίγου μισθ.] "taking them at a low rental, because there was no one to outbid him": ἐπιβάλλειν=add, make a higher bid, run up the price.



- ὃν τρόπον ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδείξει, (IV)  
 ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ'  
 § 10 οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον  
 τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ  
 20 εἵπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, εἰάν τις δύνηται  
 μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνιαι (p. 19)  
 τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορώσι χρημάτων· μονο-  
 § 11 πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὀνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος  
 παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ  
 25 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπο-  
 ρίων οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβο-  
 λὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις  
 § 12 ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ  
 μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι  
 30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὐρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ  
 πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο  
 ταυτόν ἐστιν (ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι  
 § 13 μονοπωλίαν)· χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολι-  
 τικοῖς. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων  
 35 πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκία, μᾶλλον δέ. διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολι-  
 τεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.  
 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δε-  
 σποτική, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ

16 συλλέξαντος P<sup>4</sup> Ald., συλλέξαντες S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 25 ἐμποριῶν P<sup>2-3</sup>, πορίων M<sup>a</sup> ||  
 28 τοῦτο S<sup>b</sup> Bk. || ὁ omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 30 αὐτοῦ II Bk. || 31 ὄραμα] εὐρημα  
 Camerarius, θεώρημα ? Koraes || Θάλη καὶ τούτῳ Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, Thali et huic William,  
 perhaps rightly || 37 μέρη omitted by II<sup>2</sup> (added by a later hand in S<sup>b</sup>) || 38 [περὶ  
 ...πρότερον] Schmidt

§ 10 21 ἔνιαι] Selymbria, Byzantium, and Lampsakos are instances given by Ps. Aristotle *Oeconom.* II. 18 1348 b 33, 4 § 4 1346 b 25, 8 1347 a 32.

§ 11 27 ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα] "on" or "in addition to his capital of fifty talents he received a hundred more": he made a profit of 100 talents on his original fifty. The preposition has the same force in τόκοι ἐπιτρίτοι *Rhet.* III. 10. 7, and the analogous fractions.

§ 12 28 Undoubtedly Dionysios the elder who is mentioned III. 15. 16 n. SUSEM. (106)

31 ὄραμα] 'discovery': cp. Dem. *adv. Mid.* § 60 533, 25, οὐδὲν πώποτε τοῦτ' εἶδε τὸ πλεονέκτημα 'had an eye to this

advantage' (Postgate). Also Plato *Phaedr.* 267 A εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα.

§ 13 35 διόπερ κτλ.] See Exc. III. and *Introd.* p. 31 n. (1). SUSEM. (106 b) Possibly an allusion to Eubulos.

c. 12 *The remaining branches of Economics: the relations of the head of the household (1) to his wife, (2) to his children.*

§ 1 37 ἐπεὶ... ἤν] c. 3 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (107) Comp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 9 διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον with Jackson's note, "in *Pol.* III. 6 § 7 however οἰκονομική as an epithet of ἀρχή is used to include all three relations." Justice between man and wife is really ἀνώνυμον, 3 § 2.

γαμική, \* \* καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέ- (V)  
 40 ρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ  
 1259 b γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τό τε γὰρ  
 ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μὴ που συνέ-  
 στηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεω-  
 § 2 τέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς 2  
 5 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἴσου  
 γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως  
 δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δὲ ἀρχῇται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι  
 καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις εἶπε

39 γαμική \* \* καὶ γὰρ Conring; Bernays by altering ἄρχειν into ἀρκεῖν, Ar. by translating ἀρχει, ignore the lacuna: ἐστὶν ἄρχειν, a Paris ms. 2042. See the Comm.  
 1259 b 2 πω] πως II<sup>1</sup> (emended by p<sup>1</sup>)

39 γαμική\*\*] There is here a considerable lacuna. For the sense some such restoration as the following may be proposed: "Economic science has, we saw, three branches, treating of (a) the relation of master and slave which has been discussed above, (β) the paternal and (γ) the conjugal relation. <Further we saw that in general a slave is only a piece of property, persons as well as things being included under that head; and it is not the acquisition but the use and maintenance of property which is properly a part of economic science. This science may therefore be divided into (1) the guidance and rule of the *persons* of the household, (2) the right use of the *property*. The former includes the treatment of the conjugal and paternal relations: the relation of master and slave would come partly under the one, partly under the other. The householder has to care for the improvement and excellence of all that belongs to the household, and hence for the improvement and excellence of the property; but property is only a means to the end which the household seeks to attain, and the living chattel is more important than lifeless objects. It is therefore the householder's main task to direct aright the free members of the house." > In c. 12 the differences in this rule as exercised over the different free members of the family are parenthetically specialized, but in c. 13 the leading thought itself is resumed and explained. Cp. Thurot *Études* p. 14 f., Susseml in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. pp. 212—215 (where however some mistakes need

correction), Büchschütz *op. c.* 716. SUSEM. (107 b)

1259 b 1 πολιτικῶς] like a magistrate in a republic, or, more precisely, an aristocracy, *Nic. Eth.* viii. 10 § 5, 11 § 4. Cp. Zeller II ii 619 n. (1). SUSEM. (108)

§ 2 4 ἐν μὲν οὖν κτλ] Here follows a discussion, as to (1) how far the rule of the husband over the wife may fitly be compared with republican government, despite certain differences between them; (2) how far the rule of a father over his children may be compared with monarchical government. Cp. further I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b) and 13 § 9 n. (117). SUSEM. (109)

"In most cases where citizens rule over citizens rulers and subjects change places, for they (τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον nom. to βούλεται and to ζητεῖ) tend to be on an equality in nature and to differ not at all": τὴν φύσιν an adverbial accus. as II. 2. 6 τὴν φύσιν ἴσους, IV(vii). 1. 10 παῖς τις τὴν φύσιν, cp. 15 below φύσει διαφέρειν. Yet some have taken τὴν φύσιν, as subject of εἶναι, to mean the spirit of republican citizenship, or the 'natures' of the citizens.

8 σχήμασι, outward signs, insignia: λόγοις, titles.

ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις κτλ] Herodotus tells this story, II. 172. Amasis, who had deposed his predecessor Apries (Hophra), was at first despised by the Egyptians on account of his low birth. Whereupon he had a statue of gold made out of a foot-bath, in which he and his guests had been accustomed to wash their feet. When this statue was set up the Egyptians paid it due reverence, and



§ 3 τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον· τὸ δ' ἄρρεν αἰὲν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ (V)  
 10 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική·  
 τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρε-  
 σβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἵδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς Ὁμη-  
 ρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπῶν

πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε

(p. 20)

15 τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα δια-  
 φέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ  
 πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.  
 13 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἢ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 3  
 περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτήσιν, καὶ  
 20 περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν  
 πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων.  
 § 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἔστιν  
 ἀρετὴ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμι-  
 ωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ  
 25 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ  
 § 3 τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε  
 γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσιν τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων  
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον)· σχεδὸν δὲ 4

15 After ἀπάντων P<sup>2</sup> adds as a gloss *δηλονότι πατέρα εἰπῶν*, and this *πατέρα εἰπῶν* has crept into the text of Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 17 τὸν Γ P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> Ar. before νεώτερον || 18 \* \* φανερόν [τοίνυν] ? Schmidt; see on 1254 a 24 || 26 εἴτε P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, εἴ τι P<sup>3.6</sup>. Ald. || 28 δέ] δὴ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1.3.4</sup>. Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>)

Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present adoration had once been put. Similarly he had risen from the common people to the throne, and as king he demanded their respect. SUSEM, (110)

§ 3 9 δὲ] (κατὰ μέρος 1 § 2. The husband holds, as it were, permanent office.

11 κατὰ φ.] by right of affection.

12 ὅπερ ἐστὶ κτλ.] = and this gives a form of monarchy, viz. hereditary monarchy, III. 14. 6. Bernays takes εἶδος as 'essential nature', but compare *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 4, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὲς κοινῶν βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα.

16 τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν] So too in Pindar's words, ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν μητρὸς ἀμφοτέροι *Nem.* 6. 1, men are of one race with the gods, earth being the common mother of both. The same is implied by Hesiod's verse ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασιν θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἀν-

θρώποι *Works and Days* 108 (J. G. Schneider). See Steitz *op. c.* 50 f. SUSEM, (110 b)

c. 13. Various degrees of excellence requisite in the different members of the household; §§ 1—11. The promotion of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in women and children, §§ 15, 16.

Cp. *Analys.* p. 101, *Introd.* p. 31.

§ 1 18 'τοίνυν traducendo ad novam cogitationem inservit' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* quoting *Physics* I. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3, 9. Perhaps it only resumes a thought previously expressed, 'then', 'accordingly': see n. (107 b). Bernays gives 'It is clear beforehand then.' SUSEM.

20 Here πλοῦτος = ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, but in 8 § 15 it is πλῆθος ὀργάνων.

21 μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων] Cp. n. (33) on 4 § 1 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν. SUSEM. (111)

§ 2 25 τῶν ἄλλων ἔξεων sc. τίς = τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν; *Rhet.* I. 6. 9 with Cope's n.

ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, (V)  
 30 πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα σώφρονα  
 εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστι καὶ ἀκό-  
 § 4 λαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; [καὶ] καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκε-  
 πτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτῇ  
 ἀρετῇ ἢ ἐτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλο-  
 35 καγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἀρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἀρχεσθαι  
 καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἶόν τε διαφέ-  
 ρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ  
 § 5 δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν). εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μὴ, ὁ  
 θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἀρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δι-  
 40 καιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθή-  
 1260 a σεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει  
 τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν  
 ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν  
 § 6 φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφηγεῖται πε-  
 5 ρὶ τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἀρχον τὸ δ'  
 ἀρχόμενον, ὃν ἐτέραν φαμέν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον (p. 21)  
 ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ

30 σώφρονα after 31 εἶναι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 31 καὶ before ἀκόλαστος omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 32 καὶ before καθόλου omitted by Γ M<sup>o</sup> || 37 διαφέρει τῷ Ar.

1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ omitted by Π Ar. Bk. || ὑφήγηται Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, ὑφηγεῖται <τὰ> Schütz; yet ὑφηγεῖται can also be used passively || 6 μὲν εἶναι φαμέν M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, μὲν φαμέν εἶναι P<sup>4</sup> (corrector)

§ 3 31 παῖς...σώφρων] Compare *Nic. Eth.* III. 12. 5 1119 a 33: we apply the term ἀκολασία to the faults of children so far as they bear a certain resemblance to the vice of intemperance (ἀκολασία). SUSEM. (111 b)

§ 4 37 εἶδει διαφέρει] see on 1 § 2.

§ 5 1260 a 3 ὥσπερ καὶ...ἀρχομένων] sc. διαφοραὶ εἰσὶ, as explained 5 § 2 ff.

§ 6 4 ὑφηγεῖται] "this is indicated (or, given in outline) in the case of the soul." The participle ὑφηγημένος (1 § 3) seems evidence that the verb is used passively (Bonitz *Ind. Ar.*); but Schütz' suggestion <τὰ> gives the middle a fair sense: "to this result the relations which exist in the soul at once lead us." SUSEM.

6 ὃν ἐτέραν...7 ἀλόγου] "and we say that a different kind of excellence belongs to the one and to the other of these, I mean to the rational and irrational parts of the soul." Namely intellectual or dianoetic virtue (ἀρετὴ διανοητική) to the

rational soul: moral virtue (ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, excellence of character) courage, temperance, etc. to the irrational appetitive soul; Zeller II ii 624—658. The dianoetic virtues are discussed in B. VI of the *Nic. Eth.* and the latest detailed investigation of this subject, Walter *op. c.* 283—537, gives the following results.

Each of the three kinds of reason, theoretic, creative, and practical in the narrower sense (see n. 40), has its particular dianoetic virtue, or it may be, virtues. Practical wisdom or insight (φρόνησις), if not the only virtue, is at all events the most indispensable and important virtue of the practical reason (Walter p. 356 ff.); see on 5 § 9 n. (45); III. 4 §§ 7, 8 nn. (474—6), §§ 16, 17 nn. To theoretic reason belongs (i) νοῦς in the narrower sense, intelligence, comprehending in itself the two extremes of all indemonstrable knowledge, which must be assumed for every syllogism and



§ 7 ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστ' <ἐπεὶ> φύσει πλείω τὰ [ἄρχοντα (V) καὶ] ἀρχόμενα (ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου 10 ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός), καὶ πᾶσιν

8 ὥστ' <ἐπεὶ> Bernays, while Susem.<sup>1,2,3</sup> had simply ὥστε || πλείω τὰ Ramus, τὰ πλείω Γ II Bk. || [ἄρχοντα καὶ] Susem.<sup>4</sup>, especially as otherwise the insertion of ἐπεὶ, l. 8, is untenable || 10 ἀνὴρ πατήρ ? Koraes

for scientific demonstration; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest: (ii) ἐπιστήμη, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysic; and

(iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Walter are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as dianoetic 'virtues', or whether, as Döring tries to prove against Walter in *Kunstlehre des Arist. (Aristotle's Theory of Art)* p. 62 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a dianoetic excellence, though it can lead to one. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 5. 7, 1140 b 21 f.<sup>1</sup>

For the 'excellences of character' cp. 5 § 6 n. (40): in regard to temperance in particular II. 6 § 9 n. (206 b), 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, III. 4 § 16 n. (491), IV (VII). 1 § 4 n. (693). SUSEM. (112) 7 τοῖνυν] See on § 1. 'But' or 'now it is clear' (Bonitz).

§ 7 8 ff. "Since then there are by nature various sorts of things subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being destitute of the deliberative faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

<sup>1</sup> Whether this is really Aristotle's theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this artistic excellence to the higher group of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this be so Walter's conception of them, p. 512, is unaffected by Döring's objection, p. 65 n. In *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 20 σύνεσις, apprehension,—see *Pol.* III. 4 §§ 16, 17 nn. (497, 8), VI(IV). 4. 14 n. (1186)—is adduced as a dianoetic virtue along with σοφία and φρόνησις. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood.

for this reason the ruler requires the intellectual virtue in perfection (for the work belongs simply to the master-workman, and here this is reason), while each of the others needs only his fitting share thereof. And so, too, must it be with the moral virtues: we must suppose all to need a share of them, though not equally, but only in so far as each requires for his work."

Bernays defending the order of the mss. translates from 14 ὁμοίως as follows: "A similar gradation must likewise be assumed for the moral virtues: all must possess them, though not equally, but only in such measure as is necessary for their respective duties. The ruler must have moral virtue in its perfection;—for every work depends in all its parts on the supreme master, and reason" i.e. *that which makes the ruler a ruler* "is supreme master"; if then the work is to be successful, the ruler must satisfy the demands of reason on all sides, and must therefore possess complete moral virtue. "Those again who obey need severally so much virtue as is proportional to their share of the total work." This however does not meet Thurot's objections, *Études* 16 ff. "The transposition is indispensable. From the proposition 'reason is the master-workman' it first follows that the ruler must possess the highest intellectual virtue, and only secondarily that he must have the highest moral virtue. Aristotle has been speaking (a 2—7) of a virtue of the rational, and of a virtue of the irrational, part of the soul, and he admits (a 10—14) that both these parts are possessed by slaves, women, and children. Before going on to inquire how they all share in the moral virtue of the irrational part he must have noticed the manner in which they share in the intellectual virtue of the rational part. Indeed the words which Bernays inserts 'the demands of reason on all sides' imply the dianoetic virtue." Cp. *Hermes* XIX. pp. 588—592, *Quaest. Crit.* VI. p. 9 f. SUSEM. 9 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον] See 12 § 1, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς. SUSEM. (113)

ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει δια- (V)  
 φερόντως (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν,  
 τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν,  
 § 8 ἀλλ' ἀτελές)· ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς 7  
 15 ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς· ὑποληπτέον δὲ μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'  
 16 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον·  
 διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν <διανο>ητικὴν  
 ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ  
 19 λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει  
 14 αὐτοῖς. <ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς  
 15 <ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς· ὑποληπτέον δὲ μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'  
 16 <οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον.>  
 § 9 ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν <ἐκάστου ἰδία ἢ> ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρη- 8  
 21 μένων ἀπάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,  
 οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ'

14 ὁμοίως.....16 ἔργον Thurot Susem. transpose to follow 20 αὐτοῖς: see *Introd.*  
 p. 79 || Bernays transposes ἀναγκαῖον, Welldon ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν to follow 16 ἀλλ' ὅσον,  
 and both punctuate 15 ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον δὲ μὲν, rejecting Thurot's proposed transpo-  
 sition. See Comm. || 15 After ὑποληπτέον corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> inserts γὰρ, Ar. δὲ (so also  
 Koraes in his commentary) || 16 αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ Γ II || 17 διανοητικὴν Thurot,  
 ἠθικὴν Γ II Ar. Bk. Bernays || 20 <ἐκάστου ἰδία ἢ> ἠθικὴ Susem.<sup>4</sup> ἰδία ἢ? Susem.  
 earlier, οἰκέα or οἰκέα ἢ Schmidt, [ἠθικὴ] Thurot || 21 ἀπάντων Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>, πάντων P<sup>2-3</sup>.  
 Q S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || 22 ὁ Σωκράτης P<sup>4</sup>, which Wilson (perhaps rightly) approves

12 ὁ μὲν γὰρ...βουλευτικόν] Just the  
 same thing is said in other words 5 § 9  
 n. (45). See also n. (115). SUSEM. (114)

13 ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον] Cp. n. (117).  
 This can establish a difference of degree  
 only, not a difference of kind, between  
 the virtue of a man and of a woman.

See III. 4. 17 n. (495). SUSEM. (114 b)

§ 8 17 τὴν <διανο>ητικὴν ἀρετὴν]

It is self-evident that only the 'dianoetic'  
 virtue of practical life, φρόνησις or prac-  
 tical wisdom, is here treated: see *Introd.*  
 (45) (112); IV(VII). I. 4 (693). Where  
 it is a question of executing another's  
 command, as it is always and uncondi-  
 tionally with the slave, there this virtue  
 belongs only to him who gives the com-  
 mand, he who obeys having merely 'right  
 opinion' about it. All the difference now  
 is, whether he can attain this right ap-  
 prehension more or less easily, thoroughly  
 or carelessly: III. 4. 18 n. (498). Com-  
 pare also n. on III. 4 § 16 (493), § 17  
 (497), §§ 7, 8 (474—6). But so far as a  
 natural slave, who is denied every ca-  
 pacity for deliberation, can be said to

have ever so small a share of approximate  
 intellectual virtue in the department of  
 practice, such virtue consists merely in  
 the fact that one slave understands his  
 master's commands and knows how to  
 execute them better, more quickly, and  
 more aptly than another. SUSEM. (115)

19 ἕκαστον] sc. ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν δ. ἀρ.  
 ἐπιβάλλει] 'so far as is incumbent on  
 them.' Impersonal; cp. *De long. vitae*  
 I. § 4, 461 b 33, λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει  
 τῇ φυσικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ: Herod. II. 180 τοὺς  
 Δελφούς δὲ ἐπέβαλλε παρασχεῖν.

16 ὅσον ἐκάστῳ] sc. ἐπιβάλλει.

§ 9 20 <ἐκάστου ἰδία ἢ> ἀρετὴ κτλ.]  
 "that the moral virtue of each of the  
 above classes is peculiar to itself." Ber-  
 nays translates as if he had before him  
 the words inserted.

22 Σωκράτης] The historical Socrates  
 unquestionably did so, Xen. *Symp.* 2. 9;  
 cp. Zeller *op. c.* II i 221 [Eng. tr. *Soc-  
 rates and Socratic* p. 145 n. 1]. But  
 here no doubt Aristotle has in view the  
 Platonic Socrates; amongst other pas-  
 sages in *Meno* 71 D f., to which he alludes



ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία ἡ δ' ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ (V)  
 § 10 περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπι-  
 25 σκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι  
 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, ἡ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιού-  
 των· πολὺ γὰρ ἁμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρε-  
 § 11 τὰς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ  
 ποιητὴς εἶρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων·  
 30 ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δὲ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι  
 γυναικὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει, 9

24 καί, which Ar. leaves untranslated, Lambin omitted || 26 ἡ τὸ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>a</sup>  
 W<sup>b</sup> Ald., καὶ τὸ Q Ar., τὸ P<sup>2-3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || τοιοῦτον for τῶν τοιοῦτων M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 31 ὁ  
 before παῖς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon *I. c.*, Plato (*Rep.* v. 452 E f.) holds that, apart from begetting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degree: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the *Latus*) in the public messes: see II. 5 § 1 n. (153), 6 § 5 n. (196), 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (II. 1 § 3 ff., 7 § 1) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (142) on II. 2 § 9, Zeller *op. c.* II i 775 [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 481], Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 168—170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations on the difference in temperament between the two sexes in *Hist. Anim.* IX. 1 § 5, §§ 7, 8 608 a 21 ff.: τὰ θήλεα μαλακώτερα καὶ κακουργότερα καὶ ἥττον ἀπλᾶ καὶ προπετέστερα καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν τέκνων τροφήν φροντιστικώτερα... ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἀρρενος καὶ δύσσελπι, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον, εὐαπατητότερον δὲ καὶ μνημονικώτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἀγρυπνώτερον κτλ. Cp. *De gener. anim.* IV. 6. 10 f., 775 a 12, and Zeller II ii 688 with n. (3). SUSEM. (116)

23 ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ κτλ.] Cp. III. 4 § 3 n. (470), § 16 n. (491), § 17 n. (495): also I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b), 12 §§ 1, 2 nn. See on the other side n. (120) on I. 13 § 11. SUSEM. (117)

§ 10 24 κατὰ μέρος] 'in detail'.

25 The same protest in *Nic. Eth.* II. 7 § 1, cp. 2 §§ 3, 4.

26 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν] Plato *Rep.* IV. 444 E ὑγίεια τῆς καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς: *Gorg.* 506 D

τάξει τεταγμένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου.

27 οἱ ἔξαρ. κτλ.] As Gorgias does in Plato's *Meno* 71 B f., where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle is here defending Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the *Meno* insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the *Ethics* Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to III. 2. 2. SUSEM. (118)

§ 11 28 ὁ ποιητὴς] Sophocles *Ajax* 293. See further n. (117). SUSEM. (119)

31 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ.] "Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his educator."

The slave's moral excellence is restricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child's to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (*Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, III. 12. 5 ff.); on this see IV (VII). 13. 5 n. (875): but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely ὑπηρετικὴ, as Aristotle inexactly puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8—11 compare *Poetics* 15 § 3 and note (191 b) in Susemihl's edition. SUSEM. (120)

τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς (V)  
 § 12 τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην.

ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δούλον,  
 35 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως 10  
 μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπο-  
 ρήσειε δ' ἂν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἄρα καὶ τοὺς (p. 22)  
 τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετὴν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι' ἀκολασίαν  
 § 13 ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ  
 40 δούλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπι-  
 βάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γὰρ βάναντος τε-

32 αὐτὸν Γ (*ad se ipsam* William) || 33 τὸ τέλος] τὸν τέλειον P<sup>4-6</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald.  
 Bk. || 36 ἐλλείψει P<sup>3</sup> (but ἐλλείψῃ corr.<sup>1</sup>) Göttl. Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1-3</sup> perhaps rightly  
 || [ἀπορήσειε...b 2 τεχνιτῶν] Schmidt || 37 ἄρα Γ Π<sup>2</sup> (yet Q perhaps has ἄρα) ||  
 39 ἡ<οὐ. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ> διαφέρει<ν> Schmidt. || τούτων Π<sup>1</sup> (emended apparently  
 by P<sup>1</sup>) || 40 Whether Ar. read αὐτῷ in his ms. after τοσοῦτον as I once assumed  
 from his translation, is more than doubtful: τοσοῦτον <αὐτῷ>? Schneider || ἐπι-  
 βάλλει] ἐπιβαλεῖται Schmidt || 41 <δουλικῆς> or <ὑπηρετικῆς> before ἀρετῆς  
 ? Susem. (see Comm.); yet in 38 ἀρετὴν alone expresses this || περ omitted by  
 Γ M<sup>a</sup>, hence [περ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>

§ 12 35 ἀρετῆς.....36 ἔργων] But how on Aristotle's own psychology and theory of virtue is even this minimum of moral virtue, which is the condition of his serviceableness, possible in the slave, if he shows no trace of deliberation or purposed action of his own? See *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 2, 3, Walter *op. c.* p. 169 ff., 212 ff., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 590 n. (3). Yet all goodness or badness of character and conduct is derived from the quality of the *προαίρεσις*, i.e. from the bent of the will in intention and purpose: *Poet.* 6 §§ 5, 6, 17, 15 § 1, n. (884) on *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 § 9. Plato speaks far more humanely on this subject *Latius* VI. 776 D, where he admits that ere now many a one has found in his slaves men on all points of more approved virtue than his brothers or sons. But in this he contradicts the fundamental assumptions which he makes in common with Aristotle; cp. Zeller II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 459]. Aristotle himself grants that even slaves may have a noble character, *Poet.* 15 § 1, καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐστὶ χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, καὶτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον τὸ δὲ ὅλως φαῖλον ἐστίν. If he is more consistent elsewhere, his consistency only involves the whole theory in self-contradiction in another way, and discloses all the more its untenableness on internal grounds: see § 8 n. (43),

§ 9 n. (45); also p. 211. SUSEM. (121)

39 ἡ introduces Aristotle's own view: "or shall we rather say..." more freely; "surely here is a very great difference."

§ 13 40 κοινωνὸς [ζωῆς] whereas the citizens are *κοιῖνωνοι βίου*: *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 4, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν: the slave is excluded from βίος, *ib.* x. 6. 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.

ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον] 'further removed', 'less dependent' on his master.

τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς] sc. αὐτῷ: just so much of virtue as of slavery falls to his share. The verb intransitive but personal. *Comp.* III. 6. 3, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς: IV (VII). I. 10, ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς: Herod. IV. 115, VII. 23, Dem. *De Cor.* § 254, p. 312, 2.

"This special virtue, i.e. excellence of function, of the free workman differs from the true virtue of man in being something inferior and approximating to that of the slave: see n. (103) on II § 6 with the references, esp. III. 4. 12 n. (486)." SUSEM. (122)

Mr T. L. Heath objects to this, that if τοσοῦτον is the subject of ἐπιβάλλει, the change of subject from ὁ δὲ is surely very harsh. "Indeed, *without αὐτῷ*, is it not inconceivably harsh? I think the sentence would go much better, if we could



1260 b χνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος (V) τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.

§ 14 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ 11 δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ <τὸν> τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν 5 ἔργων [δεσποτικῇν]. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

§ 15 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ

1260 b 4 <τὸν> Schneider following Ar.; τὸν for τὴν Scaliger Reiske || 5 [δεσποτικῇν] Giphanius (cp. the Comm.); Koraes conjectures ἐπιστήμην, Bender δουλικήν; δεσποτικῇ, transposed to follow ἐπιτάξει, Schmidt

make δ δὲ the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate 'the artizan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.' Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει *De caelo* I. 5 § 10, 272 a 25 ὅσον γὰρ ἡ ἐτέρα [γραμμὴ] ἐπιβάλλει τῆς ἐτέρας, καὶ ἡ ἐτέρα ἐκείνης τοσοῦτον, where ἐπιβάλλειν contrasts with ἀπολύεσθαι. Is there any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἐπαλλάττει?" In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require αὐτῷ with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1872). At the same time is not ἀρετῆς by itself also strange? (See *Critical Notes*). If something like δούλου or τῆς τοιαύτης has been lost, αὐτῷ may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect 'he shares in servile virtue in so far as his condition approximates to a slave's.' SUSEM.

1260 b 1 ἀφωρ. τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν = is under a definite, limited form of slavery. Comp. *Rhet.* I. 1 § 1, 1354 a 3, with Cope's note: also ὠρισμένας above 4 § 1, n. (34). Some interpret wrongly, 'detached from the master.' That the slaves should be ranked as a natural class and the artizans (who had largely sprung from them, III. 5. 3) as an artificial class, is significant of the Greek contempt for labour. See n. (93).

§ 14 4 <τὸν> τὴν διδασκ. ἔχοντα] "the person who instructs him in routine duties." This is the possessor of, or proficient in, the δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη which is more fully described above 7 § 2, where it is distinguished from δεσποτικῇ. The discussion on the 'virtue' of the slave results in a more precise determination of δεσποτικῇ and its elevation by an exten-

sion of its functions. The master may entrust his steward with the employment and direction of the slaves in his service, as Aristotle ironically remarks, 7 § 5: but he must himself develop in them the minimum of virtue which they require for this. Cp. n. (64) on 7 § 5. In line 5 δεσποτικῇν must be wrong: δουλικῇν is what we require, and Bender would accordingly insert it in the text. But neither δουλικῇν nor δεσποτικῇν is free from grammatical objections; I prefer therefore to bracket the word. SUSEM. (123)

Here δεσποτικῇ or δεσποτεία is the art of making good servants. The household like the state exercises a moral superintendence over its members, 13 § 1, and its head is responsible for their moral improvement.

5 οἱ λόγου... ὁ μόνον] "Those who permit no conversation with slaves, and hold that we should merely give them orders." Plato *Laus* 777 E, τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσρησιν χρὴ σχεδὸν ἐπιτάξιν πᾶσαν γίνεσθαι. Elsewhere Plato strongly recommends a humane treatment of slaves: see n. (121) on § 12. SUSEM. (124)

Plato's view is still from time to time approved, as notably by George Eliot.

6 νουθετητέον] Plato *ib.* κολάζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους δεῖ καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτειν ποιεῖν.

7 μᾶλλον] Because the slave, albeit unable to deliberate rationally himself, yet, as an adult, understands better than the child the rational admonitions conveyed to him by others (Fülleborn II. 184). Compare n. (120) on § 11 above, and n. (45) on 5 § 9. SUSEM. (125)

§ 15 8 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον] Compare the close of c. 7.

10 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, (V)  
 τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώ-  
 κειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ [τὰς] πολιτείας ἀναγ-  
 καῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα 12  
 δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν  
 15 ἀρετὴν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν  
 καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ  
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους  
 § 16 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν  
 γὰρ γυναῖκες ἡμῖς μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων  
 20 οἰκονόμοι γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων  
 διώριται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος  
 ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν,  
 καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφνημαμένων περὶ τῆς  
 ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

12 Nickes omits τὰς, following Ar. || 13 διελθεῖν Schmidt || 17 καὶ is omitted by P<sup>1</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1.2.</sup> || 20 οἰκονόμοι I, οἱ κοινωνοὶ II Bk., qui gubernant (οἰακονόμοι?) Ar. || [ἐπεὶ... 21 λεκτέον] and 22 [λέγωμεν καὶ] Schmidt || 24 πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

11 τί τὸ καλῶς sc. ὁμιλεῖν (Congreve). πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ <ὁμιλεῖν> διώκειν, how the right intercourse ought to be followed: cp. τὸ δὲ κακῶς <ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν> ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν, 6 § 10.

12 ἐν τοῖς... πολιτείας] This discussion means the scheme of the best state more especially, as is shown by the reason subjoined. But so far as that has come down to us in B. IV(VII) and V(VIII), this point was never reached, nor the question of the proper training and education of the women. Cp. *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (126)

15 ἀναγκαῖον] Probably because the family will then be treated as a part of the state, and will be better understood in relation to the whole. Comp. n. (33).

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ] Cp. V(VIII). 1. I, VIII(V). 9. 11 ff., and *Nic. Eth.* v. 2. 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν κτλ, with Jackson's notes. The all important term *politeia* will be fully explained in B. III (1 § 1, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c). It will

be found to be a much wider term than 'constitution' or 'form of government' (τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν), as indeed the English word 'polity' is still. See VI(IV). 11. 3, βλος τίς ἐστι πόλεως, and n. (466) on III. 3. 9.

16 διαφέρει πρὸς—is an important means towards the excellence of the city: literally "makes a difference with regard to..." So IV(VII). 14. 7, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις.

§ 16 18 αἱ μὲν... ἐλευθέρων] Cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 n. (285), Plato *Laus* VI 781 B, οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖς μόνον ἐστὶν, ὡς δόξειεν ἂν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. SUSEM. (127)

20 οἰκονόμοι, administrators, τῆς πολιτείας suits Aristotle's views elsewhere at least as well as οἱ κοινωνοί: see III. 4 §§ 14, 15; IV(VII). 14 §§ 4—6.

21 ἀφέντες κτλ] "let us dismiss the present discussion as complete, and carry on our subject from a fresh starting-point. And first let us review those theorists who have put forward a scheme for the best form of polity." With τοὺς νῦν λόγους cp. τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, III. 6. 3.



## EXCURSUS I.

## EPIMENIDES I. 2 § 5.

THE most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. I. 109—115 (cp. Suidas *s. v.*), whilst of modern writers Heinrich *Epimenides of Crete* (Leipzig 1801. 8), Höck *Kreta* III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess *De Epimenide Crete* (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 299 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having effected the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese *Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time* pp. 12—14 (in *Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet*, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjutor, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly<sup>1</sup> received the requisite religious sanction<sup>2</sup>. In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. 11. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Urlichs *On the Rhetra of Lycurgus* in the *Rhein. Mus.* VI. 1848. 217—230, Duncker *History of Antiquity* VI. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer *De ephoris Lacedaemoniis* pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert *Studien (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta)* p. 185, Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* p. 31 f. (Göttingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesy these wars, Plato *Laws* I 642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. I. 111—two epics, *Κουρήτων καὶ Κορυβαίων*

<sup>1</sup> If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see *n.* on II. 9. 23), they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

<sup>2</sup> Trieber (*Forschungen* Berlin 1871. 8) *Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution*, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a consider-

ably later period. Of course the ephors did not attain their new position at a single blow, as it were, by the mere fact that their election was taken out of the hands of the kings. On the contrary it must evidently have taken long and arduous struggles to change the disproportionate superiority of the kingly power into corresponding inferiority.

γένεσις καὶ Θεογονία, and Ἄργοις ναπηγία τε καὶ Ἰάσονος εἰς Κόλχους ἀπόπλους, with prose works *περὶ θυσιῶν* and *περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας*—never had any existence: they are a mere invention of the romancer Lobon of Argos in his work *περὶ ποιητῶν*, as Hiller has shown in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. 1878. 525 ff. Other works really appeared under the name of Epimenides, of which some were forgeries attributed to him, others the writings of a later Epimenides. The Fathers mention a work *On Oracles*, *περὶ χρησμῶν*, which can hardly be a prose writing by him, but rather a collection of his oracles; if it is here that the hexameter *Κρήτες αἰὲ ψεύσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἄργαί* occurs, which the writer of the *Epistle to Titus*, I. 13, attributes to one of the Cretan prophets, ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης, without mentioning his name. Theodoret indeed ascribes the verse to Callimachus, but in his hymn to Zeus (l. 8) only the first words are found: hence Epiphanius (*c. haer.* I. 14) and Hieronymus (T. VII A. p. 707 Vall.) remark that Callimachus on the contrary first took them from Epimenides: cp. Lübeck *Hieronimus* p. 12 f. However that may be, the word quoted by Aristotle most probably occurred in a hexameter, very likely in a collection of oracles which Aristotle had before him, of which Epimenides was the reputed author. Moreover, in *Rhet.* III. 17. 10, 1418 a 23 f., Aristotle says that Epimenides did not divine the future, but only interpreted the obscurities of the past, *περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν, ἀδῆλων δέ*; and this could hardly be affirmed except upon the evidence of such a collection. What connexion there was between this published collection of his oracles and the one which was jealously guarded at Sparta, it is impossible to say. SUSEM. (17)

## EXCURSUS II.

ON I. 6 §§ 1—8, 1255 a 5—b 3.

THE recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgeway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in *n.* (51) on 6 § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the *Philologus* XXIV. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of *εὐνοία*, and Ridgeway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words 17 *διὰ γὰρ*...19 *ἄρχειν* form a parenthesis, and hence that the *ἐπεὶ* following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondsmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude: the former though not in slave's estate deserve to be so; while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The (unwritten) law in question consists in the universal agreement that prisoners captured



in war are the slaves of their conquerors (*ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν*). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule<sup>1</sup>. This then is their view (11 οὕτως): the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, *ἐκείνως*, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (19 δίστανται χωρὶς) and in conflict (*ἀμφισβήτησις*), yet they have a common point of contact (*ἐπαλλάττονσι*), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written *ποιεῖ δὲ* in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (*ἀρετῇ*) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (*ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετῇ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν αἰ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός*); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (*χορηγία*). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (*ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (*ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν*). Just for this reason (*διὰ τοῦτο*) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: *i.e.* in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish "normal politics" from "degenerate forms" (*παρεκβάσεις*). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship,—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

<sup>1</sup> [Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words *ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός* are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle's explanation

of their common statement *μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in *ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ἀγαθοῦ τινός* as the *cause* but not the *matter* of the partial agreement between (A) and (B): and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously *δίστανται* and *ἐπαλλάττονσι*, (4) to the sense given to *ἄτεροι λόγοι*, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about *τὸ δίκαιον*.]

position 'virtue gives force' the defenders of all slavery argue that 'might is right'—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the better man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well assume this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the sole right of virtue to rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his course in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), *ἄτεροι λόγοι*, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result that those who stand higher in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters (*ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὥς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν*). Postgate correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written *ἄτερος λόγος* for *ἄτεροι λόγοι*.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (*ὅλως* to be taken with *ἀντεχόμενοι*) adhere to the principle "what is legal is right"; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Hellenes conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle's theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (see *Introd.* p. 25). SUSEMIHL.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson's interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1255 a 7—26: viz. i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just<sup>1</sup>: while Aristotle declares that in practice *some* slavery is just, *some* slavery unjust. "In 1255 a 12—21" he continues "Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own.

"Now the *λόγοι* of (A) and (B)

- i. All slavery is unjust
- ii. All slavery is just

<sup>1</sup> [Dr Jackson's notation X, Y, Z is here altered to (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]



ἐπαλλάττονται : i.e. slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι ἐπαλλάττονται? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as ἀρετή with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies ἀγαθόν of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is βία, there there is ἀρετή, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of δίκαιον. That is to say, on the assumption that βία is always accompanied by ἀρετή, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon 'loyalty', i.e. the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle 'might is right'.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they διεστῶσι χωρίς and no longer ἐπαλλάττονται, the theory which (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), ἄτεροι λόγοι, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine ὡς δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν<sup>1</sup>.

He adds in a note: "In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something ἰσχυρόν and πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has something ἰσχυρόν and πιθανόν to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything ἰσχυρόν or πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything ἰσχυρόν or πιθανόν to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take τοὺς λόγους and τῶν λόγων to be 'the theories of (A) and (B)', ἄτεροι λόγοι to be 'the theory adverse to (A's) theory and the theory adverse to (B's) theory', i.e. 'the theories of (B) and (A)'." He agrees with Heitland (*Notes* p. 11) that ἐπαλλάττειν means primarily to 'overlap', whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: "But when may propositions be said to 'overlap'? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) *All X is Y* might be said to overlap *Some X is Y*, and (2) *Some X is Y* and *Some X is not Y* might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that ἐπαλλάττειν marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that *All X is Y* could not be said to ἐπαλλάττειν *Some X is Y*. For this reason, as well as because ἐπαλλάττειν understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis

<sup>1</sup> Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words of § 4 (especially ἐπεὶ, ἄτεροι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ as constructed with πιθανόν) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fail to see what imaginable

interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against 'the modified doctrine.' SUSEM.

in διαστάντων χωρίς, I take ἐπαλλάττειν here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase διαστάντων χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of κεχώρισται in *μκ* 1, 464 b 27. Thus while I agree with Heitland that 'overlap' is the best English equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontraries stand to one another."]

Bernays' rendering of 6 §§ 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in *η.* (51), is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought).

"The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent intrinsic merit, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of some good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all nobler elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, *which precludes slavery*; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, *so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule*, then the view which impugns the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just *merely because the law sanctions it*; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust."

### EXCURSUS III.

#### THE RELATION OF χρηματιστική TO οἰκονομική: 1. 8. 2.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον...πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν. The most obvious course is to understand ἕτερον εἶδος as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (ὑπηρετική), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Hampke—see *η.* (67) on 1. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of χρηματιστική as stands in a natural relation to οἰκονομική, and consequently in c. 8 § 13 would set matters right by omitting μέρος, so that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is not there said to 'be a part of', but only 'to belong to', οἰκονομική, as that with which it is concerned:—and (2) those who with Büchschütz rely on the received text



of 8 § 13 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is really a part of οἰκονομική, but that the 'natural' part of indirect χρηματιστική, the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to οἰκονομική. But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of χρηματιστική, with which the householder is concerned, is related to οἰκονομική; the answer being that it is in one respect a part of οἰκονομική, in another respect an auxiliary science, 10 §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that οἰκονομική has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, χρηματιστική with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schütz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of χρηματιστική most closely allied to οἰκονομική cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense<sup>1</sup>. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 18; 10 §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III. 4. 17 n. (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that ἕτερον εἶδος denotes something which is not connected with οἰκονομική either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it: the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided; and μέρος is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of 10 § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus χρηματιστική has three meanings, (1) = κτήνη, in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8; and, in a narrower sense, (2) = μεταβλητική or κατηλυστική, ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = ἡ ἀναγκαῖα, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, 9 § 12, c. 10 (cp. n. on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly μεταβλητική or μεταβολική as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under αἰσθητική and

<sup>1</sup> If Büchsenhütts had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered

in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.

that which is alien to it : but sometimes it is found in the narrower acceptance of retail trade proper, *καπηλική*, as in 9 § 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 3. Teichmüller has some good remarks on the want of a strict terminology in Aristotle *Arist. Forschungen* II. 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οικονομική*, is, as Oncken has pointed out<sup>1</sup>, a perverse way of raising the question. For *χρηματιστική*, conversely, has a wider field than *οικονομική* : even the finances of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a *χρηματιστική* (8 §§ 13—15 ; 11 § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is so inconsistent as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of *οικονομική*<sup>2</sup>. Cp. the notes on 8 §§ 13—15, and on 11 § 13. SUSEM. (69)

#### NOTE ON I. 13 § 12: REASON AND VIRTUE IN THE SLAVE.

The difficulty pointed out in notes (45) and (121) on 5 § 9 and 13 § 12, may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls *τὸ βουλευτικόν*, he would be without reason altogether ; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression *ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν*, 13 § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolical and interpreted in the light of that other, and itself hyperbolical, statement *κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν* 5 § 9: reason is present in the slave only, so to speak, as a *δύναμις*, not as a *ἐξίς* ; and Aristotle avails himself of the

<sup>1</sup> *Staatslehre* II. 81: "It is just like putting the question: Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species? For that *χρηματιστική* has the wider generality and that *οικονομική* is the particular, is evident. We should have expected to hear, what *χρηματιστική* is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of *οικονομική* to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite" (?) "procedure, we can only with difficulty surmise that *χρηματιστική* is undoubtedly an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth; that *οικονομική* teaches us to apply to the maintenance

of the household the means, which the other science indicates." It must be observed in reply to this, (a) that only the smaller and less essential branch of *οικονομική* in Aristotle's sense has this function, 13 § 1, (b) that as it has to do with consumption, while *χρηματιστική* is concerned with acquisition, even this branch of *οικονομική* is not related to *χρηματιστική* simply as particular to universal.

<sup>2</sup> Schütz alone saw this difficulty and vainly tried to get over it by the omission of *καὶ πολιτικῶν* and *καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*, 8 § 15. He failed to see that it was also necessary to reject *πόλεως ἢ* in 8 § 13 *sub finem*, that these words indeed must be the first to go.



hyperbole μὴ ἔχειν to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the *Poetics*, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἥθη) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἀνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἀνευ δὲ ἡθῶν γένοιτ' ἂν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγωδίαί εἰσιν καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι. Comp. *Hermes* XIX. 1884, p. 592. SUSEM. Plato too, *Rep.* IV. 441 A, says λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.

## NOTE ON I. 2 § 13: 1253 a 20—24.

ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμώνυμος, ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (? γὰρ) τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα. The words of *n.* (28) p. 150 "if τοιαύτη = a true hand" will admit of further elucidation. Schöll, who maintains this to be the meaning of τοιαύτη, 'talis qualis esse debet vera manus' (Susem. *Quaest. Crit.* IV. p. 5), cites as analogous the use of τοιοῦτος in *De part. animal.* I. 1 §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. ἔτι δ' ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα <τὴν> ὀπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκὴν ἢ ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμώνυμος, ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἱατρόν. οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν τὸ ἐαυτῆς ἔργον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αὐλοὶ λίθινοι τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ' ὁ γεγραμμένος ἱατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιοῦτων ἔστί, λέγω δ' οἷον ὀφθαλμός, χεῖρ (where Schöll has himself added τὴν). The citation is the more apposite because Schöll takes διαφθαρεῖσα χεῖρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χεῖρ, 'manus corporis extincti, ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ ὅλου, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellanda.'

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Schöll contends, διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and τοιαύτη predicate, and that διαφθαρεῖσα means 'a dead man's hand,' may not τοιαύτη mean simply 'homonymous,' a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained ἔσται τοιαύτη is parallel to οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα, there is no need to insert οὐκ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettori p. 14 (ed. of 1576): "posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formatam, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur: neque enim fungitur munere manus. manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est."

## B.

1260 b 27 ἐπεὶ [δὲ] προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς (I)  
πολιτικῆς, τίς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μά-  
λιστα κατ' εὐχὴν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολι- (p. 23)  
30 τείας, αἷς τε χρῶνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι  
λεγομένων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρη-  
μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τό τ' ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ

1260 b 27 δὲ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., and γὰρ would make a better transition. See  
*Intr.* p. 14, n. 3 || 28 τίς Π<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr. in the margin over an erasure), ἡ Π<sup>2</sup>  
Bk. P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 31 κἂν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || τυγχάνουσιν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand)  
and perhaps Γ, τυγχάνωσιν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1.2.4</sup> C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk.<sup>1</sup> and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup> ||  
εὐρημέναι Schneider, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1368 f. || 32 τ' omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

Book II is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises, *Metaphysics Physics Psychology* &c. Here cc. 1—8 deal with **Political Thinkers**, cc. 9—12 with **Existing Constitutions**. See *Introd.* p. 32.

c. 1 Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing forms of government and the theories of our predecessors: § 1.

First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children and to property, as in Plato's *Republic*? § 3.

§ 1 1260 b 27 προαιρούμεθα] This is evidence (as against Göttling *Preface* p. xviii, and others) that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state: see Spengel *Ueber die Politik* p. 11, and compare IV (VII). 13. 4.

κοινωνίας τῆς πολ.] This takes us back to I. 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία, was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in B. 1.

29 κατ' εὐχὴν] For this expression see 6 § 7 n. (202); IV(VII). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3,

10 § 13, 11 § 1, 12 § 9, 13 § 9; VI(IV). 11 § 1 with notes. SUSEM. (128)

In Plato εὐχαῖς ὁμοία = a chimerical scheme, e.g. *Rep.* 456 c, οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὁμοία ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, 499 c, δικαίως ἂν καταγελοῖμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὁμοία λέγοντες; and in 540 D μὴ εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι is explained by ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πῃ. Thus εὐχή = an ideal, something visionary, impracticable, as in Demosth. c. *Timocr.* 722, 19, εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ καλῶς μὲν ἔχοι, μὴ δυνατὸν δὲ τι φράζει, εὐχῆς οὐ νόμου διαπράττοιτ' ἂν ἔργον. Similarly *optare* in Latin. By ζῆν μάλιστα κατ' εὐχὴν Aristotle implies that no restrictions are placed on the realization of the scheme by circumstances.

30 τινες τῶν πόλεων] See IV(VII).

14. 15 n. SUSEM. (128 b)

εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγομένων] e.g. by the historical Socrates Xen. *Mem.* III. 5. 15, IV. 4. 15: Plato *Crito* 52 E, Ps.-Plato *Minos* 320 B. Add Nic. *Eth.* I. 13. 3.

32 ἵνα κτλ] 'in order to note what they have of right and useful, and to show that it is from no love of ingenious speculation at all hazards (as the search for some new form of polity, distinct from these, might seem to imply) but from the



- καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ<sup>(1)</sup>  
δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ  
35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην  
δοκῶμεν ἐπιβάλλεσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.
- § 2 ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἥ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης<sup>2</sup>  
τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς  
πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενός  
40 κοινωνεῖν φανερόν ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις  
ἐστὶ, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς  
1261 a ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως).  
§ 3 ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον  
κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσιν οἰκῆσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν  
μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ  
5 γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις,  
ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης

33 τί P<sup>1</sup>, omitted by Γ M<sup>2</sup>, hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐπιβα-  
λέσθαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 πολιτεία Π, πόλις Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> Ar. (?) and Γ (?)  
civitas William || 41 τοῦ τόπου after κοινωνεῖν M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || εἰς ὁ τῆς Γ, ἰσότης Π  
Ar. ||

1261 a 2 ἀλλὰ... b 15 αἰρετώτερον. Eubulos, in Angelo Mai's *Script. vet. nov. coll.*  
*Vat.* II. p. 671 sqq., attempts to refute this passage || ὅσον M<sup>2</sup> C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> ||  
πάντων omitted by Γ, [πάντων] Susem.<sup>1</sup> but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1363 f. || 6  
πλάτωνος πολιτεία M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, πολιτεία τοῦ πλάτωνος Q<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>2</sup> Ald.

defectiveness of all schemes hitherto framed that we have undertaken this investigation.'

34 σοφίζεσθαι = affect wisdom, show one's cleverness, whence σοφιστής. Elsewhere in the treatise simply 'to devise,'

5 § 19, VI (IV). 13. 1, VII (VI). 14. 19.  
36 ἐπιβάλλεσθαι] Shilleto compares Thuc. VI. 40, Plato *Soph.* 264 B, *Tim.* 48 C, *Laos* X. 892 D, for this sense 'to take up.'

§ 2 37 ἡ περ πέφυκεν] The natural beginning, seeing that every state is a form of association, κοινωνία, I. I. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (129)

38 ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κτλ] The same alternatives are given IV (VII). 8 § 8—9 § 2.

41 τοῦ τόπου] The converse is not universally true. Mere contiguity of residence is not enough to constitute citizenship: III. I § 3, 9 § 9. Note here the idea of territory in the germ.

§ 3 1261 a 3 οἰκῆσεσθαι] Eaton proposes a reflexive sense, "direct itself

aright," comparing Thuc. VI. 18 τὴν πόλιν τρύψεσθαι αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν and other instances.

6 ἐκεῖ] *Rep.* IV 423 E f. V 449 C—466 D. This passage and V (VIII). 7. 9 justify the inference that ὁ Σωκράτης with the article V (VIII). 7. 9, means throughout ὁ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ., Socrates, the character in the Platonic dialogue, in keeping with Aristotle's cautious manner of referring controversially to contemporary thought. Not directly named, as a rule, Plato lurks under Socrates (cp. *nn.* 116, 199), as under τινές, τις τῶν πρότερον, and the like. See Campbell's apt remarks on similar reticence in Plato, *Introd.* to *Theaetetus* p. xxxiv, ed. 2.

cc. 2—5 An Examination of Plato's Republic.

c. 2 Communism would not secure Plato's end, which is the utmost possible unity. Excessive unification subverts the city, reducing it to a family or an individual: §§ 1, 2. The elements of the city are dissimilar, and thus it is differen-

φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς (I)  
κτῆσεις. τοῦτο δὴ πότερον ὥς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχει, ἢ  
κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτεῖα γεγραμμένον νόμον;

2 ἔχει δὲ δυσχερεῖας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς 3  
11 γυναῖκας κοινὰς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν  
τρόπον τοῦτον ὃ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.  
ἔτι δὲ πρὸς, τὸ τέλος ὃ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν

10 ἔχει...1269 a 27 διαφορὰν noticed by Mich. of Ephesus op. c. f. 188<sup>b</sup> || δὴ Γ P<sup>1</sup>  
Π<sup>2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 11 κοινὰς <καὶ τέκνα> Spengel || 13 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς, τὸ Bernays,  
cp. τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἔτι πρὸς, *De Soph. Elench.* 4 § 7, 166 a 34 f.: ἔτι δὲ [πρὸς] τὸ  
Susem.<sup>1-2-3</sup>, tracing it to a variant πρὸς δὲ τούτοις of ἔτι δὲ: yet the punctuation  
πρὸς τὸ τέλος with Thurot's construction ("as regards the end," making ὥς μὲν  
ἐρηται νῦν subject to ἀδύνατον) is not impossible: πρὸς δὲ τέλος φησὶ Busse

tiated from an offensive and defensive  
alliance (συμμαχία) and a race or tribe  
(ἔθνος): § 3. It is this which makes reci-  
procity the political safeguard, § 4, allowing  
the citizens to become alternately rulers  
and subjects, although a permanent govern-  
ing body would be better, §§ 5, 6; allowing  
also a change of functions among the offi-  
cials, § 7. Further, the greater independ-  
ence (αὐτάρκεια) secured in the city essen-  
tially depends upon a degree of unity  
lower than that of the family, § 8.

See Grote's *Plato* c. 35, III. pp. 160—  
242, Oncken I. 171—193 and various  
monographs quoted in the *Introd.* p.  
32 n. 4, p. 33 n. 7. The main defects  
of this criticism are at once apparent;  
Zeller, *Platonic Studies* p. 203, 290, has  
rightly traced them to an excessive  
striving after logical clearness; a tendency  
to reduce the Platonic utterances to a  
number of precise dogmatic propositions  
and to test the independent validity of  
each empirically, without regard to its  
inner connexion with the whole system of  
idealism. Hence it comes about that the  
spirit of the Platonic teaching is hardly  
ever adequately appreciated, while now  
and then there is a captious, almost pe-  
dantic, disposition to get at external  
results and to fasten on details with but  
little insight into their true relative im-  
portance. "Several objections urged by  
him turn more upon the Platonic lan-  
guage than upon the Platonic vein of  
thought, and if judged by Plato from his  
own point of view would have appeared  
admissions in his favour rather than objec-  
tions" (Grote). This is the sober fact,  
and serves to account for the piquant  
charges of injustice, sophistry, and *mala*

*fides* sometimes brought against Aristotle.

§ 1 10 πάντων and 11 κοινὰς are un-  
intentional misrepresentations of the kind  
just criticized. The 'marriage laws' in  
question affect only Plato's Guardians,  
and do not establish *community* of wives  
at all, in the strictly literal and unfavour-  
able sense of the term (which would  
be a gross libel, we are told, on the philo-  
sopher who made marriage, so to speak,  
a 'sacrament'). Indeed they 'seem to aim  
at an impossible strictness,' hardly less  
exacting than vows of celibacy (Zeller  
*Plato* p. 489 Eng. tr.). And this must  
have been Aristotle's judgment: he never  
attacks them on the score of license, but  
only on grounds of public expediency.  
Moreover the aim of these laws and the  
arguments by which they are defended  
are such as to lay them open to the  
inexact and invidious appellation even  
at the hands of impartial modern critics.  
See e.g. Dr Jowett's remarks *Plato* III.  
p. 160 ff.

11 δι' ἣν αἰτίαν = αἰτία δι' ἣν "that  
which he assigns as the reason why  
such legislation is necessary does not ap-  
pear to result from his proposals": συμ-  
βαῖνον following as if τοῦτο δι' ὃ had pre-  
ceded. In 4 § 5 is a similar attraction.  
The 'reason' in question is the funda-  
mental assumption of the Platonic state  
that the utmost possible unity is desir-  
able: communism, within certain limits,  
is a means to this unity.

13 Thurot would translate: "further  
*in view* of the end which he says ought to  
be set before the city his present statement  
(of his scheme) is impracticable." But it  
is simpler to take τέλος as subject; πρὸς  
may be adverbial (see *Crit. Notes*): "the



εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισταί. (1)  
 § 2 λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἄριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα  
 16 πᾶσαν· λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης.

καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊούσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλ- 4  
 λον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται· πλήθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις,  
 γινομένη τε μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἀνθρώπος δ' ἐξ  
 20 οἰκίας ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν (p. 24)  
 ἂν, καὶ τὸν ἓνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο  
 § 3 δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ  
 πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἶδει δια-  
 φερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμ-

14 εἴρηται] διήρηται Zwinger || δεῖ omitted by M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, inserted by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || διελεῖν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2,3</sup>. C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, εἰπεῖν ? Susem. || 15 ὃν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and the 1st hand of P<sup>4</sup> (inserted between the lines and by a later hand in the margin) || 16 πᾶσαν before 15 ὡς ἄριστον Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (in P<sup>4</sup> corrected by a later hand in the margin) || 18 οὐδὲ] οὐ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || ἡ omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>; hence [ἡ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 21 ἓνα <μᾶλλον ἓνα> ? Riese, needlessly || καὶ after εἰ omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>; notwithstanding Dittenberger's protest, *op. c.* p. 1361, καὶ is not indispensable, see III. 16 § 9, 1287 b 6 || 22 δ' ἐκ Π<sup>2</sup>, ἐκ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, δὲ [ἐκ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 23 εἶδει] εἶδους C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, εἰδείου P<sup>6</sup> U<sup>b</sup>, in P<sup>4</sup> the word stands over an erasure

end as there stated by Plato is impossible (to attain)." For νῦν=in the case supposed, see 3 § 2, 8 § 10: νῦν δ' (on the scheme of Hippodamos) ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν.

14 διελεῖν=analyse, define (by analysis), more nearly determine: III. 13 § 6, 14 § 2, *De gen. et corr.* I. 1. 1 τὰς τε αἰτίας διαιρετέον.

§ 2 16 λαμβάνει γὰρ κτλ] *Rep.* IV 422 D f., 423 D f.; V 449 B f., 462. The three general positions which Aristotle takes up against Plato in §§ 1, 2 are treated in reverse order in the sequel. The third, "the end is impracticable" in c. 2; then the second, "the means are unsuitable" in cc. 3, 4, 5 §§ 1-13: lastly, "the many other difficulties" in c. 5 §§ 14-28 (Thurot). *Comp. Analysis* pp. 102, 103. SUSEM. (130)

17 μία μᾶλλον] too much of a unity.

18 πλήθος γάρ τι] See 5 § 15, III. 1 § 2, § 12.

22 οὐ ποιητέον...πόλιν] With these words the polemic against Plato is resumed exactly where it had started at the commencement of the work, I. 1. 2 cp. note (2 b) and *Introd.* p. 23, i.e. with the specific difference between a state and a family; and this point of view is retained in §§ 7, 8, 3 § 4-4 § 10, 5 §§ 14-24.

The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family. SUSEM. (131)

§ 3 The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the *Republic*, the ground of Plato's analogy between the state and the individual.

24 οὐ γὰρ...ἐξ ὁμοίων] Apparently contradicted by III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, VI(IV). 11 § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ὁμοίων (Eaton). The present statement is repeated III. 4. 5 where *uniformity* of moral excellence is disclaimed: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by *N. Eth.* V. 5. 9, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο λατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ λατροῦ καὶ γεωργου, καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed *Pol.* IV(VII) cc. 8, 9. See on I. 7. § 1 n. (58 b).

συμμαχία] A confederation is a different thing from a state: see III. 3 § 5, 9 §§ 7, 10. It is not an organism but an aggregate of homogeneous members. The

25 *μαχία καὶ πόλις*· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ᾗ (I)  
τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάρις ἢ συμμαχία πέφυ-  
κεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείον ἐλκύσει (διοίσει δὲ τῷ  
τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνος, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρι-  
29 σμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἶον Ἀρκάδες)· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν  
§ 4 γενέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς

26 τῷ (τῷ P<sup>4</sup>) αὐτῷ P<sup>4</sup>C<sup>4</sup>Q<sup>b</sup>T<sup>b</sup>U<sup>b</sup> || 27 ἐλκύση Π<sup>2</sup>Bk., ἐλκύση M<sup>a</sup> || διοίσει...  
'Αρκάδες transposed by Susem.<sup>1</sup> to come before ἀλλὰ πότερον 1261 a 2, but wrongly ||  
28 καὶ πόλις πόλις καὶ ? Susem. || 29 ἀλλ' παλαιοί Schneider, [ἀλλ'] Schlosser Garve  
|| Ἀρκάδες \* \* Conring, οἶον <νῦν> Riese; but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1376 ff. and  
the Comm. below || 30 γίνεσθαι ? Susem. || εἶδει <δεῖ> διαφέρειν Bücheler (pro-  
bably right), εἶδει διαφέρειν M<sup>a</sup>

separate autonomous states, the Lacedaemonians and their allies, for example, are homogeneous.

25 τὸ μὲν answered by 29 ἐξ ὧν δὲ. The one (the alliance for war) will be of advantage from its mere size however much alike in kind, just as (it will be of advantage) if a weight shall pull more (than another): i.e. like a heavier weight which turns the scale. The more members the stronger the alliance.

27 διοίσει κτλ] "Upon something similar", the character of the constituents, whether *heterogeneous* (so as to allow of reciprocity) or *homogeneous*, "will depend the difference also between a city and a race, provided the race does not live with its population separated over a number of villages, but like the Arcadians." Not observing the parenthesis and taking ὅταν μὴ ὥσι κεχωρ. as epexegetical of τῷ τοιούτῳ the editors have referred this remark to the process of *συνοικισμός*, the change from village life by which a Greek *ἔθνος* was consolidated into one city. But (1) the Arcadians must surely be cited as an example of a race and not (as they would be upon that view) of a city: (2) this is not a distinction between *ἔθνος* and *πόλις* universally, but between one *ἔθνος* and another. (3) We should then expect *μηκέτι*, or *οἶον <νῦν>* or something equivalent: and the exact force of the future and of τῷ τοιούτῳ (not *τούτῳ*) would be missed. (4) In that case Arcadians means simply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegeatans, Mantineans and others might equally claim to belong to the Arcadian league (τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν). Hence Dittenberger, in *Gött. gel. Anzeigen* 1874 p. 1381, rejects the supposed reference to *συνοικισμός* and takes ὅταν μὴ κτλ as a

limiting clause, which excludes from the comparison the cases where the people live κατὰ κώμας and opposes to the city-state only such 'races' as the Arcadian.

29 Ἀρκάδες] Who are meant? The interpretation of the passage turns upon this. When Plato, *Symp.* 193 A, writes *διωκίσθημεν ὑπὸ θεοῦ καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων* the words spaced show that the Mantineans are meant. Demosthenes *Or.* XVI uses Ἀρκάδες nine times and Μεγαλοπολίται seven times of the same people whose city was entitled in full ἡ μεγάλη πόλις τῶν Ἀρκάδων. There everything is clear from the interchange of terms. But if the words "when they live like the Arcadians" indicate an *ἔθνος* so well known as to spare Aristotle further explanation the instance chosen ought, as Dittenberger urges, to be before all things perspicuous. Understand then neither the Mantineans with Schneider, nor the Megalopolitans with Camerarius, nor with Giphanius the Maenalians and Parrhasians in the southwest before the founding of Megalopolis; none of these exclusively; but the entire population of Arcadia, as the word naturally means. See *Note on Arcadia* at the end of B. II.

"Further compare I. 2 § 4 n. (11), § 6 (19): III. 13. 19 (607); IV (VII). 4. 11 (760)." SUSEM. (132)

ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ] Whereas (in the case of the city-state) the elements which must coalesce into one are (? must be, see *Crit. Notes*) specifically distinct. So that it would not make a single city, III. 3 § 5, 9 § 9, to join by an external tie two such similar units as the civic body of Corinth and that of Megara: the conditions for reciprocity would be wanting.

§ 4 30 τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς] Not 'equal retribution' but the propor-



31 σφύζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον (I)

tional adjustment of claims, i.e. reciprocity of services and functions.

"As 'reciprocal proportion' regulates the exchange of different wares in *Nic. Eth.* v 5, so here it regulates the relations between the magistrate for the time being and the ordinary citizen, who render, the one service, the other *τιμὴ καὶ γέρας* *Nic. Eth.* v 6 § 7, 1134 b 7. On the application of the principle of ἀντιπεπονηθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν, 'reciprocal proportion', to commerce, friendship, and exchange generally, see my edition of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics* p. 88 ff. In *Nic. Eth.* v 5 § 6, 1132 b 32 it is ἀντιπεπονηθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα, i.e. 'reciprocal proportion' as opposed to the 'retaliation' of the Pythagoreans, which is said to hold the πόλις together. The inconsistency is however only apparent. Here, where it is not necessary to emphasize the distinction between ἀντιπεπονηθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν, i.e. κατ' ἰσότητα λόγων, and ἀντιπεπονηθὸς κατ' ἰσότητα, i.e. κατ' ἰσότητα ἀπλῶς, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς is the equivalent of ἀντιπεπονηθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν in the other passage. By a similar inexactitude in *Nic. Eth.* ix 1 § 1, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν viii(v) 1, 1301 b 37, at vii(vi) 2 § 2, 1317 b 3 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικόν is said to consist in τὸ ἴσον εἶναι κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον. See my notes on *Nic. Eth.* v 3 § 7." JACKSON.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, *Ethics* i. p. 52 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the *Ethics* are a development and improvement of those in the *Politics*. The common source may be Plato's Διὸς κρίσις, the true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, of *Laus* vi 757 B, C: τῷ μὲν γὰρ μέλῳ πλεῖον τῷ δ' ἐλάττωι μικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδούσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέρω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μέλῳσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μέλῳσι κτλ.

31 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 6, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal pro-

portion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community A transfers to B the goods which he (A) has and B has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and B has: thus a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (κοινωνία) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible: it can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (*N. E.* viii. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands: and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state. Compare further i. 2. 16, iii. 10. 2, with notes (28 c, 562).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle's best polity no less than of Plato's—i. 7. 1 n. (58 b), iv(vii). 8. 4 (797), vi(iv). 11. 8 (1293); iii. 16. 2 (672), 17 § 2, i § 10 (440, 441), 13 § 9 (595), § 12 (597-9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also iii. 4. 5 n. (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4—7 διόπερ τὸ ἴσον...ἀρχάς are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle's argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of dissimilar members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (αὐτάρκεια) be also taken into account, § 8.

Camerarius, and long before him Eubulos, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato's unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From

ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι· ἅμα (1)  
 γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ  
 § 5 κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν  
 35 τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον  
 οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ αἰεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκυτοτόμοι  
 § 6 καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ \* \* βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ  
 τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ βέλ-  
 τιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν διὰ τὸ τὴν

32 ἅμα] ἀλλὰ P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 33 γὰρ] δὲ Γ M\* || 34 ἢ] καὶ Ar. (probably right) || 35 μετέβαλον M\* P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 36 αἰεὶ after οἱ αὐτοὶ P<sup>2-4</sup> C<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup> (omitted by the 1st hand in P<sup>3</sup>) || 37 ἐπεὶ] ἐκεῖ Bernays, who by omitting with Koraes τὰ which follows skilfully removes all traces of the lacuna after δὲ discovered by Conring and Schneider (viz. ἐκεῖ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν· καὶ περὶ τὴν κ. τὴν πολιτικὴν δῆλον): <οὐχ> οὕτως Schlosser—equally wrong: cp. the Comm.: <βέλτιον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ταῦτόν ἐργον αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ πέφυκε δὴ> βέλτιον or something similar Thurot

3 § 3; 4 § 5 ff., § 4; 5 § 11, §§ 14, 15, §§ 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it may easily be seen that this does not affect the soundness of his reasoning which, as even the language shows, is directed more especially against *Republic* v 462, where Plato is showing how the abolition of family life would be the means of making all the citizens of his ideal state feel as the members of a single family (cp. *n.* 140) or even of a single man (καὶ ἥτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, αὐτῇ sc. πόλιν ἀριστα διοικεῖται). Is this not, as Aristotle rightly puts it, to prescribe for the state the end of representing so far as possible an individual man? "Aristotle's argument is that unity when applied to the state is an analogical term, and that Plato's use of it subverts the very ground of the analogy" (Eaton). Comp. also Oncken I. 173 f. SUSEM. (133)

32 τοῦτο=τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός. There must needs be reciprocity even amongst free and equal citizens, as in the ideal state.

ἅμα γάρ... 39 δυνατόν] All cannot rule at once: the only possible alternatives are (a) a perpetual ruling body, αἰεὶ or καθάπαξ (cp. I. 13 § 4) τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν: (b) alternation or rotation of functions, μεταβάλλειν, ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος (cp. I. 1 § 2, III. 6 § 9). Comp. IV (VII). 14 §§ 1, 2 where this argument recurs.

§ 5 35 ὥστε apparently redundant

after συμβαίνει, as in VI (IV). 5. 3 συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν εἶναι, and so *De Sensu* 2 § 5, 437 b 8 οὐ συμβαίνει ὥστε δοκεῖν. Similarly with other verbs: *Pol.* VIII (V). 9 § 8 ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν ἱκανώς, *Phys.* VIII. 6. 2, 258 b 17 ἔστιν δ' ἐνδεχόμενον ὥστ' εἶναι ποτε.

§ 6 37 ἐπεὶ δὲ \* \*] The difficulty is that, if no lacuna be assumed, οὕτως properly refers to μὴ αἰεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ, and this is against the sense. To take οὕτως=ὡς νῦν οὕτως (see c. I § 3), with Lambin, ita ut sunt, is as forced as to insert οὐχ with Schlosser.

"The sense is satisfied if we supply something like this: But <as in fact the work of a carpenter is always done by a carpenter and never by a shoemaker, and from the nature of the case each work is more successful when executed by the same persons, who make this their sole business, and as therefore> it is better it should be so with political society"... (Thurot). SUSEM. (134)

39 ἐν οἷς δὲ κατ' ἄλλαν] "But where it is not possible, because all are naturally equal," τὴν φύσιν adverbial accus. with ἴσους; comp. *n.* on I. 12 § 2 "and at the same time therefore it is but fair, whether a good or a bad thing for ruling," as opposed to obeying, "that all should take a turn at it—this retirement in rotation of the equal citizens from office imitates an original dissimilarity." φαῦλον=an unsatisfactory arrangement, c. 7 § 5, the thought being perhaps different from Plato's in *Rep.* I. 345 D ff., whether office



1261 b φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν (I) εἴτε φαῦλον τῷ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἵκειν τὸ ἀνομοίους εἶναι § 7 ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἳ δ' ἄρχονται [κατὰ μέρος] 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἐτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερόν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς 7 οὐ πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς 9 πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τό γε ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν σφῶζει ἕκαστον.

1261 b 1 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk., δεῖ Bas.<sup>3</sup> || 2 τῷ Susem., cp. Pl. *Prot.* 334 A—C, *Euthyd.* 292 D; τὸ Γ Π Ar. Bk., <πρὸς> τὸ Thurot || τοῦτο] ἐν τούτοις Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (Montecatino), γρ. ἐν τούτοις p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || τοῦτο δὲ] οὕτω δὴ Welldon || δὲ μιμεῖται] δὲ μιμεῖσθαι Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. γρ. δὲ μιμεῖσθαι p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι Montecatino || 3 τὸ ἐν] τῷ ἐν Heinsius Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, a correction more plausible than sound, τὸ to be taken with τοῦτο || οἵκεῖν P<sup>2</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and C<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), οἵκειον C<sup>4</sup> (corrector), 'ἵκειν a later hand in P<sup>3</sup> (the 1st hand having left a lacuna) || τὸ ἀνομοίους Susem., τὸ δ' (τόδ' Γ) ὡς ὁμοίους Γ M<sup>a</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ὁμοίως P<sup>2-3</sup>, ὁμοίως Π<sup>3</sup> C<sup>4</sup> Bk., γρ. ὁμοίως p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, τὸ δυσομοίους Schmidt (possibly right; I should adopt it if the word occurred elsewhere in Aristotle) || εἶναι Γ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), τοῖς P<sup>2-3-4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and γρ. mg. p<sup>1</sup>, τῆς C<sup>4</sup> U<sup>b</sup> || 4 κατὰ μέρος omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, παρὰ μέρος Vettori Bk. || 5 καὶ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 7 οὔτε Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || οὕτως after εἶναι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

is or is not a source of individual advantage. τοῦτο τὸ εἵκειν = this yielding of the retiring magistrates to their successors, at the expiration of their term of office; μιμεῖται is the counterpart or reflexion of original heterogeneity, produces much the same effect as if rulers and subjects had always been distinct bodies of citizens.

1261 b 1 ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον κτλ.] Compare III. 16 §§ 2—4 with n. (672), IV (VII). 3 §§ 5, 6 n. (740); further n. (58 b) on I. 7. 1, n. (133) and (797) on IV (VII). 8. 4. SUSEM. (134 b)

2 τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ with the demonstrative resumes the δὲ with the relative 39 ἐν οἷς δέ: so IV (VII). 9 § 5, ἥ δὲ ... ταύτη δέ. The two recensions of the text here widely diverge; see the *Critical Notes*. Bekker's text is nearly that of P<sup>2</sup>: ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἵκειν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Thurot *Etudes* pp. 22—24 has shown the usual modes of interpreting this text to be unsatisfactory. The infinitive may indeed be governed by βέλτιον, and εἴξαι (or ἀρεῖσαι) may be understood with τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς: but whether τὸ...εἵκειν be taken as subject or object of μιμεῖσθαι the result

is equally futile. If *object*, the sentence means 'where men are naturally equal, there it is better to imitate—what happens in a state of natural equality'! If *subject*, there is nothing to express what, as a matter of fact, is 'imitated' by the rotation of office-holders, viz. natural inequality.

§ 7 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι] as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γένόμενος δ' ἄλλος in *Nic. Eth.* IX. 4. 4.

ἀρχόντων] gen. abs. "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation: τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον = 3 ἐν μέρει.

7 τινες] That is, Plato: see esp. *Rep.* V 462 B. Cp. n. (133). SUSEM. (135) Also 464 B μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν.

8 καί... (φανερὸν) ὅτι... is the construction.

9 καίτοι... σφῶζει ἕκαστον] οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ. "Cp. III. 10. 2 οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν with n. (561 b)." SUSEM. (135 b)

"What is this 'unity' which seems to Plato so beneficial, to Aristotle so

- § 8 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ζη- (I)  
 11 τεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστε-  
 ρον ἐνός, πόλις δ' οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη τότ' εἶναι πόλις, (p. 25)  
 ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβάλῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους·  
 εἴπερ οὖν αἰρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐν  
 15 τοῦ μᾶλλον αἰρετώτερον.

mischievous? It is not (1) 'unanimity', i.e. community of political principles and aims, the *ὁμόνοια* of *Nic. Eth.* IX. 6, 1167 a 22, as appears from c. 9 § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) 'uniformity', i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic πόλις. Hence it is not (3) 'organization', as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) 'centralization'. Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the πόλις, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior *κοινωνίαι* which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior *κοινωνίαι*—for example, οἰκία, σύμπλοι, συστρατιώται, φυλέται, δημόται, θιασώται, ἐρασισταί *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9 § 4 f, 1160 a 9, q. v.—as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior *κοινωνίαι*, which μορίοις ἐοικασί τῆς πολιτικῆς sc. *κοινωνίας* *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior *κοινωνίαι* to the supreme *κοινωνία*. He thinks, in fact, that the πόλις is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle's criticisms arise directly from the theory of the πόλις which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of φιλία in all its forms, which has led him to devote to it two out of the ten books of the *Nic. Eth.*" JACKSON.

§ 8 10 ἐνοῦν is infinitive, 'the endea-

vour to intensify the unity of the state is not so desirable.'

12 βούλεται = tends, means; the meaning of a state is then first realised or fulfilled when...

14 εἴπερ οὖν κτλ] Cp. I. I. 8 n. (20 b, 21); III. I § 12 πόλιν τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλήθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, n. (447), 9 § 14 n. (560), IV(VII). 4 § 11 (759), 5 § 1 τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς αὐταρκές (764), 8 § 8 ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλήθός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὐταρκές n. (804). SUSEM. (136)

Add IV(VII). 4. 14 δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολή πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύντοπος.

cc. 3, 4 Objections to communism, chiefly to the abolition of separate families. *Even supposing Plato's end*, i.e. the most perfect civic unity, *to be desirable, his communistic scheme is not the best means to secure it.* A series of detached remarks, so closely allied in some cases that it would not have been difficult to bring them together under one and the same head. See fuller details *Analysis* pp. 102, 103; and compare throughout *Pl. Rep.* v.

The Platonic scheme, as Grote (III. 207) reminds us, is only partial communism. Modern communistic theories contemplate individual producers handing over the produce of their labour to be distributed among themselves by official authority. But the producing and labouring classes in the *Republic* are not communists at all: they are private proprietors with separate families, taxed only with the maintenance of a body of public functionaries, the guardians. Hence the arguments advanced by Aristotle, however just in themselves, have little direct application to the scheme which he is ostensibly criticising; they belong to a far wider enterprise on which he has embarked, an advocacy of the principle of individualism against socialism in general, beginning (I § 2) with the inquiry into the limits of community and subsidiary



- 3 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά-<sup>8</sup>  
 λιστ' εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται  
 κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ  
 μὴ ἐμὸν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἴεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν  
 § 2 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν  
 21 ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω-  
 κράτης (ἕκαστος γὰρ οὖν εἰς αὐτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ-  
 ναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου  
 δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως)· νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως φήσουσιν  
 25 οἱ κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν-  
 τες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν  
 § 3 πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παρα-  
 λογισμὸς τίς ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γὰρ πάν-  
 τες καὶ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττόν καὶ

19 ὁ omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [δ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1359 || 25 τοῖς omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (? rightly) || 27 πάντες omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 28 τίς omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 29 διττόν καὶ <ἀμφίβολον> or else 30 τοῖς <κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν> λόγοις Thurot; an ingenious suggestion, but not (as I once thought) necessary

to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the *Republic* would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (3 §§ 5—8, 4 §§ 6—9), whereas it is Plato's avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (*esprit de corps*) to supersede nearer family relationships and extinguish private interests.

§ 1 16 τοῦτο=τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms *mine* and *not-mine*.

18 κατὰ τὸν λόγον] with ἀποδείκνυσθαι, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of *mine* and *not-mine*: ἐὰν πάντες...μὴ ἐμὸν is explanatory of λόγον. For κατὰ=by, cp. *Μεταφρ.* Θ. 8 § 14, κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι...1050 b 3.

19 ὁ Σωκράτης] In Plato's *Republic* V 462 c: ἐν ᾗ τινι δὴ πόλει πλείστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο λέγονται τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, αὕτη ἀρίστα διοικεῖται. SUSEM. (137)

§ 2 20 'All' has two senses, (1) each individual, *pro se quisque*; (2) the whole body collectively. If 'all' is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what Socrates means ("proposes to do").

24 συμβαινόντων] "circumstances": the joys and sorrows of life *Rep.* 462 E.

νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως] But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term 'all'. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say "mine" in this sense.

26 πάντες] (ὡς ἕκαστος) Another instance in III. II. 2. Also VI(IV). 4. 26 where the distinction is skilfully worked in: μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.

§ 3 28 τὸ γὰρ πάντες κτλ.] The terms "all" and "both" and "odd" and "even" by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια] See § 27: τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ ἄριον) ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, *De Soph. El.* 4 § 7, 166 a 33: παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ὅτι τὰ πέντ' ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, 'to (fallacious) division is due the instance, that five is two

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διό ἐστι τὸ πάν- (1)  
 τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥδι μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὥδι  
 § 4 δὲ οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ  
 λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων 10  
 κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν  
 35 ἥττον, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστω ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς  
 ἑτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκε-  
 τικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ὑπηρε-

30 ἔστη P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 34 φροντίσουσι ? Susem. || 35 ἥττον ἢ (less than) T. L. Heath || ὅσον] ὅσων P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> || 36 φροντίστοντος ? Susem.

and (is) three, odd and even' (Eaton). SUSEM. (138)

Walford and Postgate would take *περιττά* καὶ *ἄρτια* to be predicates of πάντες and ἀμφοτέρα. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of ἀμφοτέρα, 2+3, and of περιττά. As ἀμφοτέρα=sum of two things, so περιττά=an odd sum total, ἄρτια=an even sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotle admits *De Soph. El.* 20 § 2, 177 b 7, οὐ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ διαίρεσιν, unless the confusion of two things as distinct as *ὅρος* and *ὄρος* be said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ἐριστικούς] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider): in Aristotle's phrase they admit of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, illicit combination and disjunction. See *De Soph. El.* 4 § 6 166 a 22, 6 § 3 168 a 26, 20 § 1 177 a 33, 30 § 7 181 b 20: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀμφὺ καὶ τὸ ἅπαντα πλείω σημαίνει, the words 'both' and 'all' have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare VIII(V). 8. 3: παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἕκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα (illicit σύνθεσις). SUSEM. (139)

31 ὥδι μὲν] as ὡς ἕκαστος; ὥδι δὲ=collectively.

32 οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν] Since democrats may quarrel, although πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δὲ they are supreme in the state. The individuals whose unity is Plato's main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say "mine".

§ 4 Then comes a sensible practical suggestion. Comp. Jowett, *Introd.* to Plato's *Republic* p. 166 f., who refers to the statistics of mortality in founding

hospitals.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ] 'In the next place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property shared by the greatest number meets with the least attention. For men care most about their private matters and less for the public concerns.' The zeal and attention of individual owners are checked and chilled by division of ownership. So with the sons who are a 'common possession' of the Guardians.

35 ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστω ἐπιβάλλει] 'or (only at most) in proportion to their stake in them.' Since the whole clause answers to μάλιστα and ἥττον, the verb would seem to be impersonal: 'as much as it falls to each man's share' to care. For the impersonal use, see I. 13 § 8. For the meaning, Herod. VII. 23 μόριον ὅσον αὐτοῖσι ἐπέβαλλε: hence Herod. IV. 115 ἀπολαχόντες τῶν χρημάτων τὸ ἐπιβάλλον=their due share. Camerarius cites Ptolemy as using the word to express 'proportional parts' in astronomical calculations. The same thought recurs 1262 a 3 in the words ὁπόσους τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν. If the society consists of a thousand members, the interest of each is represented by the fraction  $\frac{1}{1000}$ . But such is the tendency of human nature that the interest felt and care bestowed will be even less than this.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτλ] 'Each is more likely to neglect them, amongst other reasons, because there is some one else to look after them; just as with the attendance of servants it sometimes happens that the work is not so well done by many as by few.'

§ 5 According to Plato's regulations, *Rep.* V 457 c—464 b, all the children of the Guardians, the two upper classes who are full citizens of his ideal state, are to be taken from their mothers directly after



§ 5 τοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ' ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν <sup>11</sup>  
 υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὥς ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν  
 1262 a ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός· ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγορήσουσιν, ἐπεὶ οὕτως  
 ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς,  
 ὅποστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦ-

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ Bücheler, ὅτι ? Susem., ἔτι Γ Π Ar. Bk. Bonitz seeks to prove that this alone is right (*Hermes* VII. p. 102 ff.), and in the Addenda to my critical edition, p. lxi, I somewhat hastily acceded. If ἔτι be accepted there must be a full stop before it || 2 λέξει Γ (?) Ar. (?) Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 3 τῶν ἀριθμῶν P<sup>3</sup> and the 1st hand in P<sup>1-2</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> (emended by a later hand in Q<sup>b</sup>), τῶν ἀριθμῶν T<sup>b</sup> || ὧν omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> Ar. || τοῦ δεῖνος Π Ar. and also probably Γ, *huius filius* William || In the whole passage 1—14 Schmidt proposes extensive changes thus: ὀλιγορήσουσιν. κρεῖττον ἄρα ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι (transposed from 13) ἐνὸς τὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον προσαγορεύοντος, <ἢ> δισχιλίων ἢ καὶ μυρίων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν. ἔτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον <υἱόν> λεγ<όντ>ων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων [ἢ] ὅσων ἢ πόλις ἐστίν, οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέξει <ὥς καὶ> τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς ὅποστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, καὶ τοῦτο διατάζων [εἰ μὴ ἐμὸν τὸν τοῦ δεῖνος]· ἀδελφον κτλ

birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardians alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. See n. (133). SUSEM. (140)

38 χίλιοι] Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by *Rep.* IV 423 A. 'Now each of Plato's citizens has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is *his* son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.'

39 οὐχ ὥς ἐκάστου] Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ οὕτως κτλ] Almost word for word from *Rep.* V 463 E, πασῶν ἀρα πόλειων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ξυμφωνήσουσιν ἐνὸς τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος, ὁ

νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς: i.e. when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all with one accord use the expression 'it is well with mine' or 'it is ill with mine.' Hence translate: "As [or if ἔτι be retained, "Further] each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term 'my son' to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says 'my son' or 'so and so's'; and this 'so and so's' applies equally to each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists." To take ἐμὸς=my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by υἱός in the preceding line, 6 τέκνον, 14 υἱόν (cp. 4 § 7). In spite of the χίλιοι υἱοί (b 38) it is the elder generation, the 'fathers', that are meant by τῶν χιλίων ἢ ὅσων κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To οὕτως corresponds ὅποστος...ὧν, as τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ δεῖνος; mine or A's or B's, and so on through all the thousand. When a 'father' uses the term 'my son' in Callipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other 'fathers'.

2 ἐμὸς] Editors compare *Soph. Antig.* 565, ἀλλ' ἦδε μέντοι μὴ λέγε.

3 οἷον = I mean.

τον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἢ ὅσων ἡ (I)  
 5 πόλις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων· ἄδηλον γὰρ ὃ συνέβη γενέ- (p. 26)  
 § 6 σθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πρότερον οὕτω 12  
 κρεῖττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύον-  
 τας δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἢ μᾶλλον ὥς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι  
 § 7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὃ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ὃ δὲ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ

7 [ἕκαστον...8 μυρίων] Schmidt (transposed as above) || μὲν] ὄνομα Bonitz, perhaps rightly: yet the instances in which μὲν in Aristotle stands without any δὲ following have not yet been sufficiently explained: μηδὲν with a comma after (instead of before) τὸ αὐτὸ Bernays || προσαγορεύοντα Bernays, perhaps rightly: yet the plural may be intentional although the participle goes with ἕκαστον || 8 καὶ] ἢ Susem.<sup>1</sup> aut William || 9 [τὸ ἐμὸν] Schmidt || υἱὸν αὐτοῦ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Ald. and apparently P<sup>1</sup> || ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Γ and apparently P<sup>1</sup>, ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Ald., ἀδελφὸν [αὐτοῦ] Schmidt

5 καὶ τοῦτο κτλ] 'And even this he says dubiously, for it is never certain who of the citizens actually had a son or whose son, if born, was reared.' At first sight this seems to make against Aristotle; for if less than the thousand had sons, the fractional interest of each elder citizen, or 'father,' in the younger generation is increased. But then his chance of being childless is proportionately increased.

§ 6 "And yet is it better in this fashion for each of the 2,000 or 10,000 elder citizens to use the term 'mine' (of any one), all calling him by the same name" viz. son 'or as it is used under the present system' with the addition of different names, as nephew, cousin, &c?

7 ἕκαστον...8 μυρίων] Of course only those citizens are meant whose age entitles them to call a boy 'son' and not 'brother' or 'grandson'. Here τὸ αὐτό=son. SUSEM. (141) With αὐτὸ μὲν κτλ may be mentally supplied *ὀλιγωροῦντας δὲ πάντων* (Thurot).

8 δισχιλίων] Is this genitive after ἕκαστον, as above? Is it not more forcible if taken after τὸ αὐτό=the same relation? Each calls him 'mine', (which will result in) the whole body (*plural*) calling one person the same relation of some 2,000 people (T. L. Heath).

A different construction of § 6 is proposed by Bonitz; viz. to take ἕκαστον as the object, instead of the subject, of λέγειν, and to make δισχιλίων the genitive after τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα, which is a correction for μὲν:—"is it better in this sense to call each (of the younger generation) 'mine', using the same name [i.e. son] for 2,000 or 10,000?" In the same essay

(*Hermes* VII pp. 102—8) Bonitz defends the MS. reading *ἐτι* (a 1) on the ground that a new objection, No. 3, is there introduced. The last, No. 2 (§ 4 *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς...ὀλιγωρήσουσι*) dwelt on the depreciation which the term 'my father' suffers. "The multitude of fathers, whom each of the younger men has, is prejudicial and fatal to the loving attention which a son otherwise receives from a father." In the passage which follows (1 *ἐτι οὕτως...14 υἱόν*) "the fact is viewed from the opposite side. The name 'my son' loses all value, as each one who uses it shares the problematic relationship with an indefinitely large number." With all deference to authority so weighty, it may be doubted if the two sides are opposed: at all events in a 13 (*κρεῖττον γὰρ κτλ*) the point of view is the advantage of the younger generation no less than in a 1 (*ὀλιγωρήσουσι*). Comp. Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VI p. 16 ff.

§ 7 9 δ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] "For one and the same person is called by one man his own son; by another his own brother, or cousin; (by another) according to some other kinship either by blood relationship or by some connexion and affinity to himself in the first instance or else to his kin; and furthermore by another his clansman, his tribesman. For it is better to be actually an own cousin than in Plato's sense a son." There is at present a kind of community in relationship: only it does not extend so far and is compatible with *dis-similar* individual interests.

"For φράτορα, φυλέτην consult the following references: 5 § 17 n. (169), 11 § 3 with Exc. IV; III. 2 § 3 (451), 9 § 13



10 προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὃ δ' ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ (I) συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἵματος ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδεῖαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερος φράτορα, φυλέτην. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-  
 § 8 τον υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μὴ τινὰς 13  
 15 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας, αἱ γίνονται τοῖς τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ  
 § 9 ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γὰρ τισι  
 20 τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἱ σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦ-  
 4 σιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλφ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος. ἔτι δὲ 14  
 25 καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ῥάδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόρους [ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] ἐκουσίους καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· ὧν

12 αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Γ II || ἢ] εἶτα? Susem. || ἕτερος Lindau, ἕτερον Γ II Ar. Bk., ἕτεροι Bernays, ἐταῖρον Spengel || 13 <ἢ> φυλέτην Bas.<sup>3</sup> Bk., aut contribulem William || ἐταῖρον <ἢ> φράτορα <ἢ> φυλέτην Schmidt || 27 [ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] Bender, ἀκουσίους [τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίους] Congreve; τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίους omitted by P<sup>2</sup>, which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted καὶ μάχας

(558); VI(IV). 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367); VII(VI). 4 § 19 (1427), 5 § 9 (1437); VIII(V). 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1526), 5 § 11 (1564), 8 § 19 (1626)." SUSEM. (141)

§ 8 Yet after all parents would suspect relationship from the likeness of their own children. Comp. Jowett on the *Republic* p. 165 ff.

17 λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις] derive their convictions; so in IV(VII). 1. 6.

§ 9 19 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους] Books of travel round the world, as in *Rhet.* 1. 4. 13 (where see Cope's exhaustive note), *Meteor.* 1. 13. 13, II. 5. 14. Such books were also called περίπλοι and περιγήσεις.

Usually πραγματεύεσθαι takes περί; but once, *Rhet.* 1. 2. 5, it has πρὸς. In *Pol.* IV(VII). 14. 8 we have τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως...

20 τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων] See Exc. I. to B. II p. 326 ff., as regards the evidence for these customs. Comp. also I. 2. 4 n.

(11) and n. (116). SUSEM. (142)

24 ὥσπερ...ἵππος] The same remark in *Hist. Anim.* VII. 6. 8, 586 a 12 (Schneider). Further compare *De Gener. Anim.* IV. 3. 1, 767 b 5: ὁ μὴ ἐοικὼς τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἤδη τρόπον τινὰ τέρας ἐστίν· παρεβέβηκε γὰρ ἢ φύσιν ἐν τούτοις ἐκ τοῦ γένους τρόπον τινὰ (Eaton). SUSEM. (143)

Δικαία here probably means "docile": Xenophon *Cyneg.* 7 § 4, *Memorab.* IV. 4. 5: φασὶ δὲ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδασκόντων (Jackson).

c. 4 § 1 25 τὰς τοιαύτας] the following.

27 [ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] ἐκουσίους] Can it be said that a divine law forbids involuntary homicide in the case of father, mother, &c, but permits it in other cases? On the contrary, responsibility ceases for involuntary acts; nothing but negligence is then punishable; nor can we talk of such acts being allowed. But

οὐδὲν ὅσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς (I)  
μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἄπωθεν  
30 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνοούντων ἢ γνω-  
ρίζοντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς  
§ 2 νομιζόμενας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν. ἄτοπον δὲ 15  
καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφε-  
λεῖν τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρή-

29 ἀποθεν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>·<sup>4</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. || 30 ἀλλὰ] ᾤ Π<sup>1</sup> (γρ. ἀλλὰ corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>) || 32 μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν Jackson, <μη> μηδεμίαν Schneider, μηδεμίαν Π<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1.2.3</sup>, μηδὲ μίαν Π<sup>1</sup> || 33 ποιήσαντας Γ Ar. and M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand)

intentional homicide is forbidden by the law of God and of nature in the case of the nearest blood relations, while under certain circumstances it is allowed in the case of strangers. So too outrage, blows, abuse are all intentional acts. On these grounds the words bracketed must be regarded as an interpolation (Bender). SUSEM. (144)

28 ὡν οὐδὲν ὅσιον] To this Plato might certainly reply, that where relationship is abolished, crimes (even if they are still committed) cannot be aggravated by the fact of being crimes against relations (Oncken). SUSEM. (145)

32 λύσεις = expiations. Editors compare *Rep.* II 364 E: ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδίας [ἡδονῶν] εἰσὶ μὲν ἐτι ζῶσιν εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν: *Eur. Or.* 510 φόνον φόνῳ λύσαι, 597 μίσμα λύσαι. Such purifications for homicide were unknown in the Homeric age. Grote, *Hist.* I. 34, compares *Thuc.* I. 126—128 for their great importance.

τῶν δὲ κτλ] "All the editors assume that the words τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν, whether with or without Schneider's addition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται μηδεμίαν γίνεσθαι λύσιν, as if Aristotle wished to say 'it is possible that no expiation should be made'. He ought however to say 'it is not possible that any expiation should be made'. Hence I conjecture τῶν δὲ μὴ, <οὐ>δεμίαν." JACKSON.

§§ 2, 3 ἄτοπον δὲ κτλ] *Rep.* III. 403 A, B: οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδὲ ξυγγενὲς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι. οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα αὐτῇ ἡδονῇ (sc. ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀπροβίβια) οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρώσιν τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις... οὕτω δὲ, ὡς εἴκοι, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκισμένῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι ὥσπερ

υἱὸς παιδικῶν ἐραστῇ, τῶν καλῶν χάριν ἐὰν πείθῃ... ἐλ δὲ μὴ, ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφείζοντα. With this compare V 468 C, where the gallant soldier is rewarded with the right to kiss his comrades upon the expedition, καὶ μηδενὶ ἐξείναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὅν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καὶ, ἐὰν τίς τοῦ τύχῃ ἐρών ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας, προθυμότερος ἢ πρὸς τὸ τάρμστεῖα φέρεται. See also Zeller's *Plato* p. 455 f. SUSEM. (146)

34 τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλύσαι κτλ] This objection might apparently be met, like the last, n. (145), by some sort of defence. It would however be open to reply on behalf of Aristotle that if the relation of Guardians to one another is seriously to be taken as that of parents and children, brothers and sisters, it is unseemly at any rate to make such strong concessions to sensual passion—whatever may have been Aristotle's own opinion on the direction it took in Greece (see on 10 § 9). Besides, the Platonic institutions take precautions against the "marriage" of those who are actually parents and children,—a fact overlooked by Oncken, who (i. 181) attributes to Aristotle an objection which he neither did nor could bring against Plato on that score—but none at all against the "marriage" of actual brothers and sisters: comp. *Rep.* V 461 E, ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δῶσει ὁ νόμος συνοικεῖν, Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 171. As Aristotle does not take especial exception to this it must be assumed that he did not feel his Greek sentiments excessively outraged, any more than Plato, by incest under this form. It is also significant that he has no word of blame for the deception whereby the rulers in the ideal state are directed to ensure that as many as possible of the ablest guardians of both sexes procreate children, and as few as possible of those who are inferior, *Rep.*



35 σεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν (I)  
 ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν  
 § 3 μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην (p. 27)  
 μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὥς λίαν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινο-  
 μένης· ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατήρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,  
 § 4 μηδὲν οἶσθαι διαφέρειν. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς  
 41 εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς πατ-  
 1262 b 24 ρας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἴττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων  
 τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ-  
 χομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νευτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ 16  
 § 5 συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τούναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὦν προσ-  
 5 ἡκεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι' ἣν  
 αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἶεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέ-  
 § 6 κνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἴομεθα μέγιστον  
 εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἦκιστα στασιάζ-  
 οιν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλιστα ὁ Σω-

35 εἶναι omitted by M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by P<sup>1</sup>) || 40 ἔοικε...b 3 νευτε-  
 ρίζειν Thurot transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 κοινῶν, Susem. to follow  
 1262 b 24 πολιτευομένοις, *Introd.* 79 || δὲ Γ II Bk., δὴ Susem.; the alteration stands  
 or falls with the transposition

1262 b 4 συμβαίνειν P<sup>a</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || 6 οὐ-  
 τως omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 7 τε omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, *quidem* William, but nothing can  
 be inferred from this with regard to Γ

V 457 C—461 E. See Zeller's *Plato* p.  
 455, 477—8: Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II 170.  
 SUSEM. (147)

χρήσεις = endearments.

35 ἃς πατρὶ.....ἀπρεπέστατον] But  
 the words ὥσπερ υἱός, *Rep.* III. 403 B, do  
 not bear this implication. Plato permits  
 to the ὀρθὸς ἔρως only such familiarities  
 as would be unimpeachable as between  
 father and son.

36 καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον (ἀπρεπέστατον  
 ἐστίν) according to Greek ideas. Such  
 power lay in a 'little word' to extinguish  
 the fiercest passions, *Laws* VIII 838 B.

§ 3 37 δι' ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδε-  
 μίαν] True there is no other reason  
 assigned, but there may well be irony  
 under the terms ἀμυνσιλία and ἀπειροκαλία  
 (see the quotation *n.* 146): especially  
 when viewed in connexion with the noble  
 conception of Socrates' moral character  
 and the language of gallantry at the same  
 time put into his lips by Plato. See *Ap-  
 pendix* I to Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus*,  
*esp.* pp. 153, 161 ff. The attempt to trans-

figure and etherialize gross passion was  
 pitched in too exalted a strain of romanti-  
 cism. Plato himself renounced it after-  
 wards. His matter-of-fact disciple simply  
 ignores it.

§ 4 is out of place here; perhaps it is a  
 later marginal note by the author.

§ 5 1262 b 3 ὅλως δὲ] *Comp.* I. 6.  
 5 *n.* "Such a law must bring about the  
 very opposite to that which ought to be  
 the result of well-framed laws and to  
 that which was Socrates' own reason (c. 2.  
 § 1) for thinking that the institutions re-  
 garding women and children ought to be  
 thus ordered."

This criticism seems unfair. Such  
 private friendships and affections as  
 Aristotle is thinking of do not, according  
 to Plato, promote concord in the state  
 generally, but rather divert men's atten-  
 tion from the whole community into  
 private channels, and by creating private  
 interests tend to selfishness and disunion.  
 So the Spartan love of domesticity is  
 censured; *Rep.* VIII 548 A, B.

10 κράτης, ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κακέϊνος εἶναι φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, (1)  
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀρι-  
στοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούν-  
των συμφυῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων [ἀμφοτέρους] ἕνα·  
§ 7 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἕνα, ἐν 17  
15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῇ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν  
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἕμὸν ἢ υἱὸν  
§ 8 πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολλὸν  
ὑδὼρ μιχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει  
καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομά-

13 συμφυῆναι P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. (perhaps more correct), συμφυῆαι P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), συμφυνηῆαι P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || [ἀμφοτέρους] Congreve || 14 εἰ τὸν ἕνα Conring, εἰ τὸν ἕνα <συμβαίνει> ? Susem., ἐς τὸν ἕνα Tyrrell || 19 καὶ κατὰ Lambin, καὶ <περὶ> Korae in his Commentary; καὶ <κατὰ> Bernays and independently, but hesitatingly, Vahlen (*Ztschr. f. d. östr. Gymn.* XXIII. 1872. p. 539), but Bernays makes ἀναγκαῖον ὄν (omitting the comma before διαφροντίζειν) depend on συμβαίνει, while Vahlen takes this as an absolute accusative. This slight alteration is certainly preferable to that proposed for διαφροντίζειν (see below), but, as Vahlen rightly judges, not absolutely necessary: either ἀναίσθητον εἶναι can be supplied with Vahlen, or the acc. τὴν οἰκειότητα κτλ taken as the object of διαφροντίζειν, with Congreve and Susem.<sup>1</sup>; then ἀναγκαῖον ὄν is to be construed, as Bernays does, omitting the comma; in the former case it is an absolute accusative. Bender (partly anticipated by Spengel) suspects ἀναγκαῖον ὄν || τὴν πρὸς εἶναι πρὸς Spengel

§ 6 10 φιλίας] Cp. vi(IV). II. 7: ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν. SUSEM.

11 ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις] Plato *Symposium* 192 c sq. comp. 191 a. Hug in p. x of his edition of that dialogue considers ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι to be another title for the *Symposium*; but this could only be allowed if the text read "Plato in the discourses on love" whereas it is "Aristophanes in the discourses on love," and there is nothing to hinder our supplying "contained in Plato's *Symposium*." Moreover Plato's own theory of love in its fulness and integrity is there given to Socrates alone, who expressly combats the suggestion made by Aristophanes that it is "seeking the other half of ourselves" 205 D; cp. 212 c. Yet no doubt, in so far as Aristotle here makes use of the thought expressed by Plato's Aristophanes, Plato agrees with the latter. This much is clear, that Aristotle intends to designate Plato as the author of the *Symposium*. SUSEM. (148)

12 ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων κτλ] The genitive absolute after λέγοντα instead of ὅτι or accusative and infinitive.

§ 7 14 ἐνταῦθα κτλ] "In this case either both will be spoiled or at least the one absorbed in the other."

15 ὑδαρῇ] watery, i.e. diluted )( unmixed, ἀκρατος: Aesch. *Agam.* 770 ὑδαρεῖ σαλινεὺς φιλότῃ, *Poetics* 27 § 13, 1462 b 7 ὑδαρῇ μῦθον, a tame spun-out plot.

16 ἥκιστα λέγειν=least likely to apply the term 'mine': 3 § 5. Owing to a feeble esprit de corps they would take little pains to assert the relationship. "Plato if called upon for an answer to this reasoning would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the 'diluted friendship' pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most nearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive affections between individuals he wishes to discourage; the unfriendly sentiments he is bent on rooting out." (Grote III. 220 n.)

§ 8 18 οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα] 'So too is it in the end with the mutual affection implied in these names': συμβαίνει sc. ἀναίσθητον εἶναι.



- 20 των τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (I)  
 τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς  
 § 9 ἀδελφούς ἀλλήλων. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι  
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν  
 24 οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. <ἔοικε  
 § 4 a 41 <δὴ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυν-  
 b 1 <ναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἦττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία  
 2 <κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι  
 3 <τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν.> ἀλλὰ 18  
 § 9 25 μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γενόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ

20 τούτων δι' ἃ φροντίζειν and [δὲ] Spengel: τούτων <διαφορηθῆναι>, διαφροντίζειν  
 Camerarius: τούτων <διαφορηθῆναι or διαφθαρῆναι, ὡς> διαφροντίζειν? Schneider:  
 τούτων δια<ρρεῖν>, φροντίζειν Madvig: τούτων, <ὡς> διαφροντίζειν Koraes in the  
 text, but the absolute accus. is also possible without ὡς || ἀναγκαῖον δὲ] ἀναγκάζειν  
 Bender (no comma before διαφροντίζειν) || 21 υἱοῦ] υἱῶν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. ||  
 ὡς after 22 ἀδελφούς Ridgeway || 25 γενόμενα Susem., γινόμενα II Bekk., γεννώμενα  
 ? Götting

The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradeship. This seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern *οἰκειότητα* by *διαφροντίζειν*; so that either *ἢ πατέρα κτλ* is the subject of *διαφροντίζειν*, as Congreve and Susemihl think, or as Ridgeway *Transactions* II. 132 proposes *ἢ πατέρα κτλ* is to be regarded as expegetical of the wider term *οἰκειότητα*. He translates: 'so the result is that in such a constitution as Plato's least of all is it necessary to have regard for the mutual family feelings implied in these names' (of father and son).

21 *πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ κτλ*] "that one citizen should care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another." Ridgeway aptly compares VIII(v). 11. 21 *ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδίων*, *Metaph.* M. 5 § 6, 1079 b 34 *τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν*, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the construction see *Critical Notes*.

§ 9 23 *τὸ ἀγαπητόν* has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique;=*μόνον* (Eaton, quoting *Odyssey* II. 365 *μόνος ἐὼν ἀγαπητός*): and (2) much desired, dearly prized, precious. SUSEM.

See Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 7. 41: *καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν (μειζον ἀγαθόν ἐστί), καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων*, where it must have the second meaning, as *unicus* in Catullus 64. 215.

§ 4 1262 a 40 *γεωργοῖς*] Here as often the farmers stand for the entire third class of citizens in Plato's ideal

state, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πλῆθος of 5 § 18, all who are neither *ἀρχόντες* nor *ἐπικούροι*; properly including (§ 9) *τεχνῖται* and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See 5 § 20, where all are enumerated. The strength of this class excites Aristotle's fears: see 5 §§ 19, 20, 22.

41 *χρήσιμον*] Comp. VIII(v). 11. 15 (Eaton). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5-9 are essentially a repetition, with certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3 §§ 4-7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them. Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must be content to set down to the occasional negligences of Aristotle's style this reiteration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred before. Comp. *n.* (164) on 5 § 14. SUSEM. (149)

1262 b 2 *τοιούτους*=*ἦττον φιλικούς*: cp. I. 8 § 7 n. Plato would altogether disclaim such a policy; see *Rep.* 416-7, 463 B. See *n.* on 5 § 20, 1264 a 27.

§ 9 25 *περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν*] In Plato's ideal state, as children of the Guardians grow up they are to be removed into the third class of citizens if they appear to degenerate. Conversely the rulers are to observe carefully any exceptional children of this third class,

26 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τού- (I)  
των εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν, τίνα ἔσται τρόπον·  
καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας (p. 28)  
§ 10 τίσι τίνας διδῶσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλοι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον  
30 ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόβους·  
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ  
μητέρας οἳ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλα-  
κας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας,  
ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.  
5 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας  
36 κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· ἐχόμενον II  
δὲ τούτων ἔστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα  
τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι

28 <γὰρ> γινώσκειν Bernays, perhaps rightly || 31 προσαγορεύουσιν  
Koraes || 32 τοὺς φύλακας before οἳ τε II<sup>2</sup> Bk.; omitted by M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 33 φύλαξι  
II<sup>1</sup>, φύλαξιν εἰς P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.

who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be received amongst the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See *Republic* III 415 B, IV 423 C. SUSEM. (150)

27 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν] Schlosser remarks that this requires a more detailed proof. SUSEM. (151)

There does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, *Rep.* 423 C, *Tim.* 19 A (τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρα διαδοτέον πόλιν, ἐπαν- ξανομένων δὲ σκοποῦντας αἰετὶ τοὺς ἀξίους πάλιν ἀνάγειν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀναξίους εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπανόντων χώραν μεταλλάττειν), and that other regulation about exposure *Rep.* V 460 C (τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπληρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατα- κρύψουσιν).

28 καὶ γινώσκειν κτλ] But what harm could this knowledge do in the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, these adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. SUSEM. (152)

Aristotle implies that jealousy and dis-

union would follow the recognition of the facts.

29 τίσι τίνας διδῶσιν] This clause depends on γινώσκειν.

§ 10 πάλοι=above, §§ 1—3. So in III. 14. 14 τὸν πάλοι λόγον, VIII(V). 11. 24. Obviously Aristotle shrinks with horror (as we should) from these crimes against blood relations: but there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote ascribes to him, "that serious mischief would fall upon the community if family quarrels or homicide remained without religious expiation."

34 ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι] "so as to be on their guard," as they might be if they used these terms of relationship.

c. 5 *Objections to community of property*: §§ 1—13. See *Analysis* p. 103.

§ 1 37 τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κτλ] This issue is not decided in what follows, for the conclusion adopted in §§ 5—8 excludes the first and third of these alternatives in their application to all the land, but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, IV(VII). 10. 10 n. (834), we perceive that even the second suggestion does not by any means correspond with Aristotle's view, which is more like the third, provided it be restricted to a part of the territory, whereas Plato had extended it to the whole. In Plato's Callipolis the Guardians are forbidden the possession of gold and silver and of money altogether, and so far they



τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν (II)  
 § 2 εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ  
 41 τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω  
 1263 a δὲ [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] πότερον κἂν ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς, καθ'  
 ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, πᾶσι τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλ-  
 τιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις \* \*, οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρὶς, τοὺς δὲ

39 ἢ μὴ κοινὴν after εἶναι M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup>. In Γ δεῖ was perhaps repeated before εἶναι ||  
 [πότερον—40 κτήσιν]? Schmidt and then a colon after νενομοθετημένων

1263 a 1 [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] Susem. || 2 πᾶσας Γ Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> Freudenthal (per-  
 haps rightly), πασῶν M<sup>s</sup> || πᾶσι <τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις ἢ> τὰς or πᾶσι <τὰς  
 χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ> τὰς Spengel, \* \* τὰς Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || τε] γε Koraes Oncken  
 Bernays which gives no sense || χρήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον ἢ τὰς κτήσεις Koraes  
 Oncken || 3 καὶ] ἢ Schlosser Koraes Oncken, κατὰ Bernays || χρήσεις <ἢ μόνως  
 τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις> Freudenthal, χρήσεις <ἢ τὰς κτήσεις μόνον ἢ  
 τὰς χρήσεις> Busse, χρήσεις <ἢ> Heinsius Hampke

have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connexion of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessities of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See *Rep.* III 416 c, IV 419, V 464 c, and comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians:—cp. *n.* (196) and I. 13. 9 *n.* (116). Thus, as Oncken I. 183 justly observes, "Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical fiat, while Aristotle B. I c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations." There is this difference between them that Aristotle believes community of property to be possible apart from community of families: whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term

without settled and independent house-keeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see *Introd.* p. 27. SUSEM. (153)

39 πολιτείαν] Cognate accus. after πολιτεύεσθαι. The phrase recurs VI(IV). I. 4. We find καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται, II. 7. 1; the accusative in I. 11. 13 ταῦτα πολιτεύονται, and in τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς II. 7. 14, is not quite similar.

§ 2 40 χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ] separately from=independently of. Comp. Plato *Phaedo* 98 c διαφύας ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, "to separate them." This is the sense of ἀπὸ in ἀπόφασις, negative predication, διηρημένον τοῦ ὄντος as Aristotle puts it. Compare πῶρρω ἀφ' ἡμῶν *Problems* XVIII. 10, 917 b 14, and *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8. 1 οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ πράττει, nothing away from, i.e. unlike, himself.

1263 a 1 ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς = the families are separate.

2 κτήσις) (χρήσις; ownership, fee-simple) (usufruct, income returned.

3 οἷον introduces the application of the three modes of communism to land and its produce. "I mean, (1) when the estates are held separately but the crops are brought into a common stock for consumption, or (2) when the land is held in common and cultivated by the state as

καρπούς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ (11)  
 5 τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἣ τούναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωρ-  
 γεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρπούς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρή-  
 σεις (λέγονται δὲ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν  
 § 3 βαρβάρων), ἣ καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρπούς κοινούς. ἐτέ-  
 2 ρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ  
 10 ῥάων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις  
 πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι

8 κοινούς] χωρὶς Hampke

public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common." Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill *Pol. Ec.* II. c. 1 calls thoroughgoing Communism: (2) to the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier.

γῆπεδα, plots of ground, farmsteads, like οἰκόπεδον, emphasizing the site of the property.  
 4 ἔνια] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tarentum VII(VI). 5. 10. But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism: and ἐθνη, see n. (11), would suggest here also non-Hellenic tribes, to whose customs Aristotle paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his Νόμιμα or Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά; cp. IV(VII). 2. 11. That work being lost, the most apposite references are from Diodoros v. 44, of the Vaccaeans, a Celtiberian tribe: v. 9, of the exiled Cnidians and Rhodians who colonized the Aeolian isles (Lipari): v. 41, of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Nearchus in Strabo xv. 1. 66 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain συσσίτια.

7 τινες] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodic partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glaris) and amongst the village communities (dessas) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar's account of the Suevi (*Bell. Gall.* VI. 19). Strabo VIII. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatians, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Diod. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the

ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation: Maine *Village Communities* p. 81. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Laveleye's *Primitive Property*: see pp. 109, 145 ff. (of the English trans. by Marriott). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. "They still held lands in common: the lands of each Aztec "group" could not be alienated. They constructed joint-tenement houses and lived in large households composed of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred families together: and there are grounds for believing that they practised common living in the household": i.e. something analogous to συσσίτια; L. H. Morgan *Anc. Society* pp. 187, 200 ff., 535—538.

§ 3 8 ἐτέρων] a distinct body. αὐτῶν = the citizens themselves; αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διαπονούντων = when they are αὐτουργοί, Thucyd. I. 126.

"This remark is quite true in itself, but it makes for Plato rather than against him. His guardians are a distinct body from the γεωργοὶ and are thus in the position described as most favourable to communism" (Oncken). SUSEM. (154)

10 τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις is nomin., the subject of ἂν παρέχοι and not the object of διαπονούντων.

11. "For where all have not equal shares in enjoyment any more than in work, indeed have very unequal shares, dissatisfaction must needs be felt with those who have much enjoyment and little labour, by those who get less and have more work to do." This is the standing difficulty of communistic schemes, see Mill *Pol. Econ.* II. 1 § 3.



καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἀλλ' ἀνίσων ἀναγκαῖον (II)  
 ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἢ λαμβάνον-  
 14 τας] πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι,  
 § 4 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν- 3  
 θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπὸν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων.  
 δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωναί· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ  
 πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ-  
 κρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα (p. 29)  
 20 προσκρούομεν οἷς πλείστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας  
 § 5 τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας  
 τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας· ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον 4  
 ἔχει [καὶ] ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μι-  
 κρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι. ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν.  
 25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτή-

12 ἀλλ' ἀνίσων omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand; added in the margin) || 13 [ἢ λαμβάνοντας] Congreve, μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας omitted by U<sup>b</sup> Ald. || 18 διαφέρονται Koraes || προσκρούουσι for προσκρούοντες Congreve || 20 χρώμεθα P<sup>1</sup> || 22 νῦν after τρόπον ἔχει M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23 καὶ after ἔχει omitted by II<sup>1</sup> || ἔθεσι II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.

§ 4 15 κοινωνεῖν governs τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων; "to share in all relations of human life, especially such as affect property."

17 συναποδήμων] *N. Eth.* VIII. 9 §§ 4, 5; συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον.

18 διαφερόμενοι...προσκρούοντες] Participial construction with ellipse of copula, as perhaps in I. 5. 9 αἰσθανόμενα.

τῶν ἐν ποσὶ] things near at hand, immediately before us: Herod. III. 79: ἔκτεινον τῶν μάγων πάντα τινὰ τὸν ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενον.

προσκρούοντες] *Comp. N. Eth.* IX. 4 § 1, τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες = friends who have broken with each other.

20 τὰς δ. τὰς ἐγκυκλίους] for the daily round of services. *Cp.* I. 9. 9 (Eaton), also II. 9. 9 n. 291. *SUSEM.* (155)

§ 5 22 ἄλλας τοιαύτας] Aristotle never urges (1) that communism will diminish the efficiency of labour, nor (2) that it will relax the checks on an increase of population. The Hellenic idea of the omnipotence of the state precluded these objections. The conclusion at which he arrives is endorsed in the remarks of Mill *Pol. Ec.* ib. p. 128: "We must compare communism at its best with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it

might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any country."

ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον κτλ] ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἔχει with the expegetical ἐπικοσμηθὲν κτλ is the subject of διενέγκαι: "the order of things at present existing if improved by good manners and the enactment of wise laws would be far superior": ἔθεσι, somewhat wider than morality, see § 15; ways, habits, instincts.

"This is in reality not so much proved as stated; still it is not laid down simply on the strength of § 4. Oncken I. 184 goes decidedly too far in saying the attacks on community of property lack all precision and point, and that the doctrine is not refuted on its own merits like the community of families. He fails to notice what is pointed out by Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 289 that the words of § 6—"all will thrive better under a system of private property because then each one labours assiduously for his own advantage"—apply to property exactly the same argument which was used with most effect to refute on its own grounds community of wives and children and was for that reason twice advanced, 3 §§ 4—7, 4 §§ 4—8 n. (149)." *SUSEM.* (156)

σεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ιδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινάς, ὅλως (II)  
 § 6 δ' ιδίας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα  
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδώσουσιν ὡς πρὸς  
 ἴδιον ἐκάστῳ προσεδρεύοντες· δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρη-  
 30 σθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν  
 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένοι,  
 ὡς οὐκ ὄν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις  
 § 7 τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν· ἰδίαν γὰρ ἕκαστος τὴν κτήσιν  
 ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρήται  
 35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρώνται  
 τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίῳις, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κἄν

28 μᾶλλον τε? Susem. || 29 ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντος P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) ||  
 33 γίνουτ' ? Susem. || 35 ὡς κοινοῖς Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, tamquam William || 36 ὡς ἐπίπαν ?  
 Susem. ὡς εἰς πᾶσαν ? Schmidt, ὡς [εἰπεῖν] Giphanius, ὥσπερ ? Koraes || ἂν (?) Γ

26 For ὅλως=in general, almost like  
 ἀπλῶς, comp. III. 9. 4, VIII(V). I § 3,  
 I § 13 where it is opposed to κατὰ τι as  
 here to πῶς.

§ 6 27 The division of attention will  
 remove mutual dissatisfaction: the ar-  
 ticle implies 'those grounds of complaint  
 specified above.' Each will set about his  
 own task, e.g. the cultivation of land.

29 δι' ἀρετὴν κτλ.] Public virtue will  
 ensure that, as the proverb has it, *in all*  
*that relates to use* friends go shares in  
 property.

"Comp. IV(VII). 10. 9 with n. (831).  
 Giphanius observes that this favourite  
 maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely  
 introduced here because Plato (*Rep.* IV  
 424 A) applied it to the absolute com-  
 munity of property. It is not Aristotle,  
 however, but Plato who misconstrues it:  
 in fact after the latter had misinterpreted  
 it, the former restores it to its original  
 sense. See Zeller's *Pre-Socratics* I, p. 345  
 n. 2, Eng. tr." SUSEM. (156 b)

31 ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν] See the com-  
 mendation passed on the Tarentines,  
 VIII(V). 5. 10. SUSEM. (157)

ὑπογεγραμμένοι] prescribed, laid down  
 as a rule to follow. Often in Plato.  
 Eaton refers to *Latius* V 734 E, νόμους πολι-  
 τείας ὑπογράφειν, *Protag.* 326 D ἡ πόλις  
 νόμους ὑπογράφασα; add *Repub.* 424 A,  
 449 C.

32 ὡς=implying that.

33 τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ] either is or might  
 become.

§ 7 34 τοῖς δὲ χρήται κοινοῖς]  
 Here even Aristotle's political theory  
 has a certain dash of socialism; only in

the main he stops short of the actual  
 facts as presented in Sparta particularly,  
 whereas Plato set out from these Spartan  
 institutions, but only to go far beyond  
 them. It is also justly observed by  
 Oncken I. 183, that in general wherever,  
 as was the case in Greece, the freemen  
 are principally supported by the labour of  
 strangers who are not free, there the  
 ruling caste as a whole stands in a certain  
 communistic relation as opposed to the  
 servile caste. Compare further n. (166).  
 SUSEM. (158)

35 οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κτλ]  
 Xenophon *De Rep. Laced.* 6 §§ 3, 4  
 relates in the main the same facts, first,  
 as to slaves and helots; and as to  
 horses, with the more precise limitation  
 that a sick man or any one requiring a  
 carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly  
 to a given place will, if he sees a horse  
 anywhere, take it and after using it return  
 it faithfully unhurt. As to dogs, he still  
 more definitely restricts this usage to the  
 chase. Those who require the dogs in-  
 vite their owner to go hunting; while he,  
 if he has not the time, readily sends  
 them off with the pack. There is no such  
 information in Xenophon about produce  
 growing in the fields: what he does say  
 is that after a meal in the country people  
 left the remainder of the food they had  
 prepared in store-chambers; others, de-  
 tained while hunting and in need of food,  
 might, if they had no provisions with  
 them, break the seals of these store-  
 chambers and take what they required,  
 leaving the rest behind and replacing the  
 seal. SUSEM. (159)



- § 8 δεθῶσιν ἐφοδίῳ, <τοῖς> ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερόν (Π) τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου  
 40 τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιον ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον 6  
 διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιον τί. μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς  
 1263 b αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο φυσικόν.  
 § 9 τὸ δὲ φίλαντον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν 5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἡδιστον· ὃ γίνεται τῆς  
 § 10 κτήσεως ἰδίας οὐσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ [οὐ] συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν 7  
 ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν φανερώς, σωφροσύνης μὲν [τὸ] περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας

37 ἐφοδίῳ] *pro viaticis* William || <τοῖς> or <πᾶσι τοῖς> before κατὰ Sauppe, before ἐν Susem., <τοῖς> ἐν had also occurred to Vahlen, *Ztschr. f. d. östr. G.* xxv. 1874. p. 487. [ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς Oncken, [ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς Bernays, <ταμείοις> ἐν or <ταμείοις> ἐν v. Leutsch, ἐν ταῖς ἀγραις Busse and Ridgeway independently || χώραν] θήραν Bücheler, perhaps rightly

1263 b 1 αὐτὸς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 3 τὸ omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand; added by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 4 καὶ τὸν P<sup>1</sup> Ar., καὶ τὸν Γ M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2</sup>.3.4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup>, τὸν Ald. || φιλοχρήματον <καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον> ? Koraes, accepted by Bernays || 5 ἕκαστος P<sup>3</sup>.4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand; emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 6 ἐτέροις Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || 7 οὐ after δὴ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 9 τὸ after μὲν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, τῷ Bernays

§ 8 39 τοιοῦτοι sc. οἳ τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. Above δι' ἀρετήν.

νομοθέτου ἔργον] Undoubtedly Aristotle hopes for results of human legislation which now we only expect from the training of the conscience by morality and religion; see on 9 § 12 n. (296). Herein he agrees with Plato; not however, like him, from any denial or underestimate of the rights or power of individuality (Oncken). See notes (161) and (162). SUSEM. (160)

40 ἔτι δὲ κτλ] "Again, even to the pleasure we feel, the difference that it makes to call a thing our own is unspeakably great." An expression like οὐράνιον ὄσον, θαυμάσιον ὄσον, nimum quantum.

41 μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην] By μὴ or μήποτε with the indicative, no uncertainty is intended; ibi quoque adhibita reperitur, ubi res affirmatur non negatur. "It may well be that our love for ourselves is not without a purpose."

§ 9 1263 b 2 οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* ix. 8. 1, 1168 a 28,

*Rhet.* i. 11. 26, 1371 b 18; also Plato *Laus* v 731 d (Eaton). Congreve quotes *Nic. Eth.* ix. 4. 1, where even friendship and benevolence are reduced to forms of self-love, τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους... εἰκεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. SUSEM. (161)

3 καθάπερ κτλ] "just as the love of money means to love it more than is right": Pl. *Rep.* i 347 b τὸ φιλάργυρον εἶναι θνείδος λέγεται (Vettori). Comp. also *Nic. Eth.* iv. 4. 4, φέρομεν τὸ φιλότιμον ἐπαυνοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

§ 10 7 συμβαίνει] of awkward consequences involved in a theory: συμβαίνειν dicitur ubi factis ex aliqua hypothesis conclusionibus ipsa hypothesis refutatur (Bonitz).

8 ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα] "destroy the functions."

9 σωφροσύνης] Even Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* ii p. 697, n. 7, thinks this an unfair objection, because in Plato's commonwealth a guardian is bound to continence

- 10 (ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὐσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφρο-  
σύνην), ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ [τὸ] περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται  
φανερὸς ἐλευθέριος ὢν, οὔτε πράξει πράξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδε-  
μίαν· ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθε-  
§ 11 ριότητος ἔργον ἔστιν). εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύ-  
15 τη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν·  
ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσε-  
σθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν πᾶσι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἄλ-  
λως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων  
ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοι-  
20 νῆν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους  
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων  
§ 12 κολακείας. ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ 9

11 ἐλευθεριότητα P<sup>1</sup>, ἐλευθεριότητα M<sup>a</sup> || τὸ after δὲ omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, τῷ Bernays  
|| 13 τῇ after γὰρ W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and perhaps Q<sup>b</sup> || 15 ἂν after εἶναι δόξειεν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> ||  
17 τινὰ (τῶν M<sup>a</sup>) before φιλίαν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic 'community of wives' being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true: but then neither is this the point of Aristotle's objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato's state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, *σωφροσύνη*. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual's moral freedom. Further, see n. (206 b). SUSEM. (162)

10 ἔργον καλόν] Strictly, a goodly deed, fair to contemplate; then a 'moral action' (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), with that peculiar implication of 'nobleness' which runs through the *Nic. Ethics*.

12 πράξιν ἐλευθέριον] for which private property, e.g. money, is required. Comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 8. 4 τῷ μὲν ἐλευθέρῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια; id. § 7. Can we ascribe acts of liberality to the gods? τίνοι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἀποπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

13 ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει... 14 ἔργον ἔστι] for the use of one's possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero's *usus virtutis*, *Acad. post.* i. 38 is analogous to ἔργον in this sense.

§ 11 17 φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν] Comp. Dante *Purgatorio* xv. 55—57, che per quanto si dice più il nostro, | tanto possiede più di ben ciascuno, | e più di caritate arde in quel chiostro; 73—75, e quanta gente più lassù s' intende, | più v' è da bene amare, e più v' s' ama, | e come specchio, l' uno all' altro rende.

ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις] Here he evidently has in mind Plato's expressions, *Republic* iv 425 c: τί δέ, τὰ ἀγοραῖα συμβολαίων τε πέρι κατ' ἀγορὰν ἕκαστοι ἂ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβάλλουσιν... τούτων τολμήσομεν τι νομοθετεῖν; 464 D δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχθήσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σώμα; Although not precisely the same evils are enumerated there and here, nor expressly derived from the institution of private property, yet in fact Aristotle's words quite accord with the view of the *Republic*. Comp. §§ 20, 21 with nn. (174, 175). SUSEM. (163)

Add *Rep.* 465 c: τὰ γε μὴν συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ὁκνῶ καὶ λέγειν ὧν ἀπῆλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσιῶν [πένητες] ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγυδόνας ὄσας ἐν... χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχωσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξαρθροῦμενοι. Eaton quotes Aristoph. *Eccles.* 657 sq.

§ 12 22 ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται] This is begging the question, though it may fairly be surmised that communism would not cure all these evils.



- διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι- (II)  
νωνοῦντας πολλῶν διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὀρώμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς  
25 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι-  
νωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη-  
§ 13 μένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν  
ὅσων στέρησονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων  
ἀγαθῶν· φαίνεται δ' εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος.  
30 αἴτιον δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν  
§ 14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὀρθήν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πῶς μίαν  
καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντη. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὥς  
οὐκ ἔσται προϋούσα πόλις, ἔστι δ' ὥς ἔσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ' οὖσα  
τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν  
35 συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.

25 τοὺς] τῶν P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>1</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. || 32 πάντως P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ἔσται M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 33 Walford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλις to follow ἔσται μὲν || 34 ἔσται was added after εἶναι by Vettori Bk. Susem<sup>1-2</sup>, *erit* William

23 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κτλ] "Since we see just those people who are joint owners and who share property quarrelling far more than those who have their estates separate." Are these the *συναπόδημοι* of § 4? Or is the reference to commercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κτλ] The cases of quarrels seen to arise out of partnerships are few, it is true; but then we compare them with the large number of those who have separate possessions.

§ 13 29 ἀδύνατος] Compare Grote III. pp. 217—222. "This supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance. Plato's project contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated: the reasons offered to prove it impossible are principally founded upon the very sentiment adverted to. The truly forcible objection is the sentiment itself." Plato impugns it and declares it to be inapplicable to his guardians: amongst whom as he conceives, a totally different sentiment of obligation would grow up. Similarly "if Sparta had never been actually established and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable."

30 παρακρούσεως] "fallacy" as in *De Soph. El.* 17 § 3, 175 b 1, Demosth. c. *Timocr.* § 194, 760 27 φανακισμοῦ καὶ παρακρούσεως ἐνεκα.

31 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ] the incorrectness of his first principle: see 2 § 2. Comp. Grote III. p. 215 f. 217 n., who from Aristotle's own admissions v(viii). 1. 4, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως· μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and 1. 4. 5 τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλον, argues that "the broad principle is common to him with Plato," though "each has his own way of applying it."

*General Objections to the scheme of Plato's Republic*: §§ 14—28.

§ 14 Here too it would have been as well to state that these remarks are nothing new, but only a repetition of c. 2, although as new points arise out of them (see *Analysis* p. 104) there is much greater justification than there was in the case of c. 3 §§ 4—7 and c. 4 §§ 4—8: cp. n. (149). SUSEM. (164)

33 προϋούσα] advancing (to a certain degree of unity), "if its unity be carried far"; explained by *γινουμένη μία μᾶλλον* in 2 § 2.

34 ὥσπερ κἂν κτλ] "as if one were to turn the concord of parts into unison, or the rhythm into a single step." See *Probl.* XIX. 38 § 3, 921 a 2, συμφωνία κρᾶσις ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχοντων ἐναντίων πρὸς ἀλλήλα.

35 συμφωνία = consonance of the voices singing one part with the instruments playing another: cp. *Probl.* XIX. 39,

§ 15 ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παι-<sup>10</sup>  
 δεῖαν κοινήν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδεῖαν  
 εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπου-  
 δαίαν, ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἶεσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς  
 40 ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ  
 τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ  
 1264 a  
 § 16 νομοθέτης ἐκοινώσεν. δεῖ δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρη<sup>(p. 31)</sup>  
 προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς  
 οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν, εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν  
 εὔρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρῶνται

39 <δεῖν> διορθοῦν Spengel || 40 ἦθεσι P<sup>1</sup>

1264 a 1 ἐκοινώσε P<sup>2-3-4</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.), ἐκοινώσεν M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || μὴ

Π<sup>1</sup> || Bk.<sup>2</sup> omits αὐτὸ || 2 ἔθεσιν Ar., ἔθνεσιν Bernays (hardly right)

Chappell *History of Music* pp. 11 f., 16. Whereas in *ὁμοφωνία* one or more sets of voices or instruments give the same notes. Similarly *ῥυθμός*, ἡ τῆς κινήσεως τάξις (Pl. *Laws* II 665 A), is the orderly succession of steps in dancing or notes of music of certain definite lengths. The unit or element of which long successions of 'times' are composed is *βάσις*, 'step' in dancing, 'foot' in metre. This is clear from *Metaph.* XIV (N) I. 10, 1087 b 33, τὸ δ' ἐν ὅτι μέτρον σημαίνει, φανερόν, καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐστὶ τι ἕτερον ὑποκείμενον, ὅσον ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ διέσις (in music a quarter-tone, the smallest interval), ἐν δὲ μεγέθει δάκτυλος ἢ ποὺς ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ ῥυθμοῖς βάσις ἢ συλλαβή. Instead of the regular orderly sequence of *βάσεις*, steps in dancing or feet in recitation, of various lengths, there will be only a single monotonous step or a single beat.

§ 15 36 πρότερον] §§ 5—8. SUSEM. (165)

37 κοινήν ποιεῖν] widen it so that all shall share in it.

τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδεῖαν κτλ] Comp. 7 § 8 n. (238), and below §§ 18, 19. SUSEM. (165 b)

39 τοῖς τοιούτοις=such direct, compulsory measures, as Plato proposes.

40 ἔθεσι, φιλοσοφίᾳ, νόμοις] Comp. *φύσις*, *ἔθος*, *λόγος* of IV(VII). 13. 11 n. (887). SUSEM. (166)

φιλοσοφίᾳ] in the wider sense, 'culture' as in 7 § 12. So *Rhet.* II. 23. 11 of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, perhaps a quotation from Alkidamas. An approximation to Isocrates' use of the word for 'literary training.'

τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις] Aristotle's fond-

ness for social institutions of the Cretan and Spartan type—see § 7, n. (158)—is here seen in a new direction, of which we shall hear more in c. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 §§ 7, 8, IV(VII). 10 § 9, 10 and notes. Compare further notes 168, 192, 208—11, 234, 236 b. SUSEM. (166)

§ 16 1264 a 3 οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν] An appeal to the evidence of history. It is like Aristotle to seek for the doctrines he approves some basis in tradition, authority, popular or wide-spread beliefs. "An institution which has flourished in many different ages and races must presumably fulfil some want and correspond to some deeply-seated instinct." Grote rejoins that the same objection (like the objection of impossibility) would apply to the novelties in his own ideal state. But Aristotle might fairly have argued that the long time which has elapsed without a communistic state makes it the less likely that one ever will be established, as no originating cause seems forthcoming adequate to start it.

4 οὐ συνήκται] have not been systematized. A 'synthesis' is wanting.

τοῖς δ' οὐ χρῶνται] Much that is known is not introduced because it is regarded as impracticable. Assuming that the earth, and doubtless the race of men upon it (8 § 21 n.), has always existed and always will exist Aristotle shares the conviction of Plato and most other Greek thinkers that there has not been one single historical development of humanity, but it has begun and been carried on, in a manner similar if not quite the same, for innumerable times over and over again. Hence to a greater or less



§ 17 γινώσκοντες.

μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔρ- 11

6 γοις ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ  
δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πό-  
λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς.

ᾧστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωρ-  
10 γεῖν τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-

§ 18 χειροῦσιν.

οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς  
ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὐτ' εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥάδιον

7 αὐτῶν Ald., αὐτὴν Thom., αὐτοὺς Böcker, αὐ Bernays, ἄττα Jackson, αὐτίκα  
Welldon || 8 φατρίας M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Susem.<sup>2,3</sup>, φατριάς P<sup>1</sup> || 9 οὐδὲν after  
ἄλλο M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 10 καὶ νῦν] τοίνυν Trieber

extent everything has existed before, and there is nothing new under the sun: all discoveries have been already made and then lost again, so that they need to be rediscovered. See Zeller II ii 792. Comp. Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* vol. CIII. 1871. p. 135 ff.: IV(VII). 10 §§ 7, 8 n. (828). Plato however would have had all the more right to reply to this objection that he himself has but made such a rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes, he has only followed Aristotle's advice and collected institutions hitherto widely scattered: that his innovation consists solely in this combination of old material, as all the elements of his ideal state were to be found previously isolated, some in Sparta and Crete, others amongst the Pythagoreans, and others again in Socrates. Comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 483 f. SUSEM. (167)

This view found a strong expression from K. F. Hermann *The historical elements of Plato's ideal of a state*, in *Gesam. Abhandl.* VII. 140; "Plato has drawn every single feature in his picture of the state from the actual political life of Greece: he has but applied the abstractions of science to produce a formal and harmonious combination." It is at least obvious that the Spartan ἀγωγή is, in a manner, the true starting-point of Plato, as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote III. 209—211); but some caution should be exercised in the choice of precedents. Thus L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 417 conjectures that the system of relationship propounded in *Rep.* v 461 D, *Tim.* 18 C, D was derived from "traditions not known to us"; and Curtius (*History of Greece* I p. 181 Eng. trans.) that the three orders of society *Rep.* IV were adopted from Crete (see n. 818):—two features of the scheme which bear in

a high degree the stamp of originality.

§ 17 5 τοῖς ἔργοις] "actually in process of formation." The plural is used as well as the singular ἔργῳ with or without the article, in prose or poetry.

8 εἰς συσσίτια] See n. (166). That Plato too intended this, was shown in n. (153) on § 1. From the expression here and in § 15 we might be led to believe that this was not the case. Comp. § 19 n. (170), § 24 n. (179), § 27 n. (184): 6 § 3 n. (187), § 5 n. (195). SUSEM. (168)

φρατρίας] The form φατρία (as in Aeschines II § 147), not φρατρία, is supported by the *Corpus Inscr. Att.* II. No. 599, l. 1 with Köhler's remark; Philippi *Contributions to a history of the Athenian citizenship* (*Beiträge u. s. w.* Berlin 1870) p. 177 nn. 55, 56; Bürmann *Three Studies in Attic Law* in *Jahrb. f. Phil. Suppl.* IX. p. 615. At the same time φρ is often written in the cursive MSS. with a small hook to φ, so that φ and φρ can hardly be distinguished with certainty from one another. In such a case therefore it may be advisable to depart from the one safe principle of following the oldest manuscript authority and to retain the only rational form φρ even against the codices. Comp. 3 § 6 n. (141). SUSEM. (169)

10 καὶ νῦν] Here again, as so often in these chapters and elsewhere, νῦν does not mean 'at the present time' but 'actually', and ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν is but a limiting expression for ποιοῦσιν.

§ 18 11 ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας κτλ.] "has never explained what is the nature of the entire polity which (these) members of the community share. Yet the bulk of the state is made up in effect by the bulk of citizens other than the guardians." For οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται, see § 20, and n. on 4 § 4.

εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλ- (II)  
λων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν διώριται, πότε-  
15 ρον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ [καὶ]  
καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἰδίους  
§ 19 ἢ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάν- 12  
των, τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἢ τί πλείον  
τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; ἢ τί παθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι  
20 τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰ μὴ τι σοφίζονται τοιοῦτον οἷον Κρήτες;  
ἐκείνοι γὰρ τᾶλλα ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μόνον ἀφη-  
§ 20 ρήκασιν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κτήσιν. εἰ δέ, κα-

15 καὶ after ἢ untranslated by William and Ar. || 16 καὶ after δὲ omitted by  
Π || 19 ἀρχοῦσι or something similar, in the place of ὑπομένουσιν, Lambin  
and Thurot: Bernays omits 18 ἢ τί πλείον.....ἀρχήν with Ar. and transposes  
αὐτῶν to follow 20 ἀρχήν || μαθόντες P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Bernays, but παθόντες P<sup>4</sup> (corr.)  
|| ὑπομενοῦσι Ar., ὑπομένουσιν Γ Π || 21 ταῦτα Γ, πάντα Ar. (?), Koraes || ἀφέντες  
Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || ἀπειρήκασιν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and apparently  
P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), perhaps rightly

§ 19 17 εἰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Aristotle might well have spared himself the consideration of this possibility. It is strange that he has not learnt from Plato whether this third order of citizens is to have community of families and of property; whether, in other words, just those characteristics which, like their education, are distinctive of the two upper classes in the ideal state, are to be extended to the third, or not. It is not easy to imagine a stronger case of inability to transport oneself to an opponent's sphere of thought. In fact he cannot be acquitted of very culpable carelessness in the use of the work he is criticizing. As regards community of property at any rate, Plato has most expressly said *Rep.* III 417 A, IV 419 that nothing of the kind is to exist amongst citizens of the third class, leaving room for no doubt whatever as to his real opinion. Nor is Aristotle even consistent. For in 4 § 4 above he has, with better reason, raised an objection which is only intelligible if these institutions are *not* supposed existing in the third class of citizens. Comp. § 24 n. (179); also n. (168) and the references there given. SUSEM. (170)

18 ἢ τί πλείον κτλ] See *Critical Notes*. The sense we require is not, "what compensation will those receive who submit to their rule?" (which is repeated in the next sentence), but "what

advantage will the rulers have over their subjects?" The older commentators endeavoured to extract this by taking τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν τὴν ἀρχήν=τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν ἀρχεῖν, "those who undertake to govern." But this is against the sense of ὑπομενοῦσι in the next clause: "or what inducement will (the rest of the citizens) have to submit to them?"

20 σοφίζονται]=devise or contrive (Eaton).

οἷον Κρήτες] See on 9 § 3 n. (281) and Exc. III. This statement is confirmed by the *skolion* of the Cretan poet Hybrias there quoted. See also IV (VII). 10. 1 n. (820). SUSEM. (171)

21 τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες] "while allowing their serfs the same rights with themselves in other things, have deprived them"...(*ἀπειρήκασιν* would be 'have prohibited'). As we now know, *olkees* was the proper term for these serfs, but they are called *δούλοι πασῖν* in the inscription of Gortyn.

"The arguments in §§ 20—24 (εἰ δέ, καθάπερ...γεωργῶν γυναῖκες) are in the main quite correct, but apply just as much to Aristotle's ideal state as to Plato's (Oncken). Yet see n. (177)." SUSEM. (172)

Comp. Grote III. pp. 213—215, who lays stress on the spiritual pride, and contempt for the *δήμος*, certain to be nurtured in the breasts of the guardians.



θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ (II)  
 τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πό-  
 25 λει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας  
 ἀλλήλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ  
 § 21 γεωργούς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλή- 13  
 ματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν  
 φησὶ κακά, πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σω-  
 30 κράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,  
 οἷον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν  
 § 22 τοιούτων, ἀποδιδούς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ  
 κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργούς ἀποφορὰν φέρον- (p. 32)

24 Congreve brackets μιᾷ

§ 20 23 ἐκείνοις=τοῖς ἄλλοις πολί-  
 ταις, the citizens of the third class. τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα] family life and separate pos-  
 sessions.

24 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας]  
 What will be the means of uniting them?  
 How will they associate as fellow-citizens  
 with the two upper classes, who have  
 such dissimilar institutions?

ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ κτλ] This is the very re-  
 proach which Plato levels at the existing  
 politics: ἐκάστη αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμ-  
 πολλαί, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλεις...δύο μὲν γὰρ κἂν  
 ὀτιοῦν ἢ πολεμία ἀλλήλοις, ἡ μὲν πενήτων,  
 ἡ δὲ πλουσίων *Rep.* IV 422 E; and VIII  
 551 D (Eaton). SUSEM. (173)

26 οἷον φρουρούς] *Rep.* III 415 D, E;  
 IV 419 ἄλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φαίη ἂν, ὥσπερ ἐπί-  
 κουροι μισθῶτοί ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται κα-  
 θῆσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες.  
 SUSEM. (174)

27 πολίτας is predicate: "his citi-  
 zens are the farmers and the artisans, &c."  
 As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger  
 and more generous conception of the  
 purpose of political institutions than any  
 we find elsewhere in Greece, even in  
 Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the  
 people as not members of the common-  
 wealth, IV(VII). 9. 3. Plato not only  
 treats them as integral parts of the state,  
 but in a sense makes them the ultimate  
 object of his solicitude. It is for them  
 that he sacrifices the private pleasure of  
 the guardians, and compels his philo-  
 sophic rulers to descend into the cave.  
 Both rulers and guardians are truly public  
 servants, whose duty it is to protect and  
 benefit their fellows, *Rep.* 463 B.

§ 21 29 φησὶ] *Rep.* V 464 D: τί δέ;  
 δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλή-  
 λους οὐκ οἰχρήσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν; *Cr.* n.

(163). SUSEM. (175)

καὶ τούτοις] just as much to the citi-  
 zens of Callipolis (*ib.* *δθεν δὴ ὑπάρξει τού-  
 τοις ἀσταςιδάστοις οὐσι*); for by I. 27 the  
 farmers, artisans &c. who make up the  
 third class, are citizens.

λέγει ὁ Σωκρ.] *Rep.* IV 425 C, D: ἡ  
 καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγορανομικά ἅττα ἢ  
 ἀστυνομικά ἢ ἐλλιμενικά ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα  
 τοιαῦτα, τούτων τολμήσομεν τινομοθετεῖν;  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον. *Cr.* n. (163). SUSEM. (176)  
 31 ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορ.] *Comp.*  
 IV(VII). 12. 7 n. (865). SUSEM. (176 b)

"Laws concerning city-police and  
 market-police." Dionysius says of the  
 Roman aediles (VI. 90) σχεδὸν ἐοικασί  
 πως κατὰ τὰ πλείεστα τοῖς παρ' Ἑλληνισιν  
 ἀγορανόμοις.

32 Take μόνον with τοῖς φύλαξιν. This  
 objection proceeds from an acute appre-  
 hension that in outward aspect the ideal  
 state would not greatly differ from an  
 ordinary Greek city, in spite of its stand-  
 ing army, half Amazons, and its govern-  
 ment of experienced military officers  
 distinguished as savants, who (like the  
 Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in  
 India) are at another stage of develop-  
 ment, and belong intellectually and mor-  
 ally to a wholly different world from  
 the mass of the population.

§ 22 33 κυρίους... φέροντας] How  
 precisely the connexion is to be under-  
 stood was explained in n. (153) on § 1.  
 Practically the result is much as Aristotle  
 represents it, and this is certainly man-  
 aged differently in his own pattern state.  
 SUSEM. (177)

Pl. *Rep.* V 464 C:  
 παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφήν λαμβάνοντας,  
 μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας ἀναλ-  
 σκεω, IV 416 D, E: τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων  
 δεόνται ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σώφρονες

τας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονη- (II)  
 35 μάτων πλήρεις ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνόις εἰλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας  
 § 23 καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὁμοίως εἴτε 14  
 μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισταί, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἢ  
 τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἔστι δ' οὔτε  
 39 εὑρεῖν ῥάδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρειν μικρόν, τὸ πόλους τινὰς εἶναι  
 § 24 τούτους πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ  
 1264 b μὴν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις  
 ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες  
 αὐτῶν; κἂν εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖ-  
 κες \* \*. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιέσθαι τὴν πα- 15  
 5 ραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς  
 § 25 ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ  
 τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης· αἰεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς

35 πενεστείας P<sup>2-3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 36 [καὶ δουλείας] or καὶ <τοιαύτας> δουλείας Susem.,  
 καὶ περιουκίας Schneider, μωίας or <κοινὰς> δουλείας Schmidt || 37 διώρισταί  
 <καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν> καὶ? Susem. || 39 ποιούς τινὰς P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> Bk. || εἶναι <δεῖ>  
 Scaliger <δεῖ> εἶναι Spengel

1264 b 3 κἂν...γυναῖκες. These words in II<sup>1</sup> come before 2 ὥσπερ (P<sup>1</sup> corrected  
 this in the margin): Syllburg and Bk. bracket them; Schneider and Koraes transpose  
 them to precede 2 τίς οἰκονομήσει, Koraes reading 1 εἴ τε for εἴ γε. Thurot first  
 discovered the lacuna

τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων  
 πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς το-  
 σοῦτον ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν  
 ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδεῖν.

ἀποφορὰν] a rent in kind.

34 χαλεποὺς κτλ] troublesome and  
 full of arrogance.

35 τὰς παρ' ἐνόις...πενεστείας] See  
 9 § 2 n. (280). SUSEM. (178)

36 δουλείας] Ridgeway *Transactions*  
 p. 132 thinks the word means "the serf  
 populations of states like Argos and Crete,  
 called Γυμνήσιοι at Argos, and Ἀφαιμῶται  
 in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 23 where the  
 word is used of the Helots, ἦν δὲ ἡ δου-  
 λεία ἐπανιστήται. So also by Plato, *Lysis*  
 776 D of the Mariandyni.

§ 23 εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα κτλ] We are re-  
 called to § 18; the question, περὶ ᾧ  
 οὐδὲν διώρισταί, is the tenure of property  
 amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether  
 it is equally necessary here" < as in the  
 case of the Guardians, to have com-  
 munitism > "or not, has certainly not  
 been determined, as matters stand." ταῦτα  
 = κοινὰ πάντα of line 17 above.

37 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων] "Nor  
 about the following points: what consti-

tution and education and code of laws  
 are in force in the case of the citizens  
 at large."

40 sc. διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι.  
 The construction as in 1260 b 16 n.

§ 24 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ] But supposing  
 he intends to leave their property in in-  
 dividual ownership, and yet to introduce  
 community of wives, where are the wo-  
 men to be found to superintend house-  
 hold matters as the men manage the  
 work in the fields?

"What was said in n. (170) applies  
 again to this argument in the mutilated  
 state of the text." SUSEM. (179)

1264 b 4 ἐκ τῶν θηρίων] *Rhet.* v  
 451 D. SUSEM. (180)

ποιέσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι] should  
 show by a comparison from the lower  
 animals that.... In *Rhet.* II. 20 § 2, § 5  
 παραβολή=simile.

§ 25 7 αἰεὶ γὰρ κτλ] In the Plato-  
 nic state the government is not actually  
 in the hands of the same individuals in  
 perpetuity. None except members of the  
 highest order, the philosophers, are eligi-  
 ble as rulers, but they enter the ruling  
 body by rotation. SUSEM. (181)



αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἷτιον γίνεται καὶ παρὰ (II)  
 τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἥπουθεν δὴ παρὰ γε θυ-  
 § 26 μοειδέσι καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ  
 11 ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις  
 ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυ-  
 σός, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γινομέ-  
 νοις μίξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον  
 § 27 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἔσσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 18  
 16 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν  
 εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ

9 ἡ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>5-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>), ἡ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), ἡ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>4</sup>, ἡ πουθεν δὴ P<sup>1</sup>, εἰπουθεν δὴ Γ M<sup>2</sup>, ἡ ποῦ γε δὴ Vettori Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ἡ που δὴθεν? Götting, ἡ δὴπουθεν γε Spengel || 13 δέ] γάρ? Susem. || εὐθὺς II<sup>2</sup> Bk. & P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand)

9 ἀξίωμα = dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, ἀξίωσις, and that of others, ἀξίωμα.

10 θυμοειδέσι...ἀνδράσι.] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians in the narrower and inexact sense (φύλακες = ἐπίκουροι) from whom the first class (ἄρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (διαλεκτική). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical life, after serving in higher commands, they are at length received into the highest order, the rulers proper: see *Rep.* VII 536 D ff., comp. n. (970) on IV(VII). 17. 15 and Zeller's *Plato* p. 480 n. (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on III. 1 § 10 n. (440), 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), IV(VII). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and Exc. I to B. V(VIII). As Eaton remarks, θυμοειδέις = 'men of spirit' is Plato's own term (*Rep.* II 375 B, 376 C) for his caste of warriors: comp. III. 16 § 1 n. (641), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790), 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (935). SUSEM. (182)

§ 26 ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκ. κτλ.] "Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato's myth does not answer its purpose, as it

does not recognize the promotion of ἐπίκουροι to be φύλακες." JACKSON.

13 φησὶ δέ] *Rep.* III 415 A. SUSEM. (183)

εὐθὺς γιν.] directly they are born, at the moment of birth: εὐθὺς of time is not good Greek.

§§ 27, 28 This relates to one of the most brilliant and striking episodes of the *Republic*: the objection of Adeimantus at the opening of B. IV that Socrates has insufficiently provided for the happiness of his guardians: 419—421 C.

15 ἔτι δέ...17 νομοθέτην] Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 420 B, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἐν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις: but Aristotle has not attended to another passage V 465 D—466 B, where this thread is taken up (μύμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν, ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῖμεν) and to the later discussion IX 680—692 B, whence it appears that the former statement is only provisionally made. Plato's ultimate decision is the very opposite: that his polity is the sole means whereby the Guardians can attain to perfect happiness (465 D ζήσουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, ὃν οἱ Ὀλυμπιονῆκες ζῶσι, μακαριώτερον). Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179): and there is another in 6 § 5 (195). Moreover in IV(VII). 9 § 7 Aristotle himself says εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος

εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ [μὴ] πάντων μερῶν ἢ (II)  
 τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαι-  
 20 μονεῖν ὥνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ  
 ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύ-  
 § 28 νατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, τίνες ἕτε-  
 ροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷ γε τεχνίται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων.  
 6 ἢ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν, ταύτας III  
 25 τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑτέρας· σχε- (P. 33)  
 δὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔχει τοὺς ὕστε-  
 ρον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπι-  
 σκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ  
 ὀλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν  
 30 καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, <καὶ  
 40 <περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων,> καὶ  
 § 2 31 τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαίρεται δὲ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ

18 μὴ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν Bojesen || εἰ μὴ Vettori, but then εἰ μὴ πάντων should be transposed to come after 19 τινῶν || [μὴ] πάντων Lindau Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 698 n. 2)—the easiest alteration. Busse transposes the second μὴ to precede τινῶν || ἢ τινῶν omitted by Bojesen || 20 ὥσπερ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand—emended by P<sup>1</sup>), and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), ὥνπερ the remaining authorities including Γ, rendered *quorum et* by William || 26 τὰ is omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 30 καὶ is inserted after τέκνων by Π<sup>3</sup> || After κτήσεως Susem, inserts the clause καὶ περὶ...φυλάκων from 1264 b 40, 1265 a 1; *Introd.* p. 79 f. || the last καὶ κατὰ ? Schmidt, accepting the transposition || 31 δέ] γὰρ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.

τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας: where see *note*. SUSEM. (184)

18 ἢ τινῶν κτλ] "or unless at least certain definite parts," viz. the most important, "attain happiness." SUSEM. (185)

19 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] "For happiness is not a thing of the same sort with evenness, which may be an attribute of the sum (of two numbers) where it is not an attribute of either of the numbers themselves." The sum of two odd numbers, 3 + 5, is even.

c. 6 **Comparison of the Republic and the Laws**: §§ 1—5. **Examination of the polity proposed in the Laws**: §§ 6—22.

See *Analysis* p. 104, *Introd.* p. 33 with *notes*; Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 203—207, and pp. 1—144 generally; Oncken I. 194—209; Van der Rest pp. 181—344.

§ 1 27 ἐνταῦθα] In the *Laws*. Evidently Aristotle assumes the work to

be genuine. According to Diog. Laer. III. 37 it was published by Philip of Opus after Plato's death.

28 περὶ ὀλίγων κτλ] "has precisely determined very few things." In this comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws* Aristotle's tendency to look for definite results (noticed above, c. 2) is especially prominent. He is in no way concerned to exhaust the differences between the two polities: indeed the whole discussion started with the dogmatic inquiry, "what are the limits of community in civil life?" I § 2. But one cannot help seeing that the deepest ground of this difference, the altered philosophical standpoint and the change in the conception of the state, has escaped him: had he clearly recognised this, he would not have expressed himself as he has in § 5 (Zeller). See however § 4 (T. L. Heath).

31 τὴν τάξιν] Understand διώρικε, though the change of construction is unusual.



32 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ (III)  
 προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ  
 § 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν,  
 35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα  
 δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τού-  
 των οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναικάς  
 οἶεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς  
 τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε

39 λόγοις after πεπλήρωκε Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> following William's translation: it is omitted by M<sup>1</sup>P<sup>1</sup> Bender

§ 2 32 For the repetition of *eis* compare IV(VII). 14 § 12, and possibly 12 § 6.

33 προπολεμοῦν] Plato's word *Rep.* IV 423 A.

τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων] Comp. n. 182 SUSEM. (186). Supply *ἐστὶ*. "The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of these latter." He quite correctly takes the *ἀρχοντες* to be a committee chosen out of the *ἐπικούροι*: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coöpted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the *λογιστικόν* and the other two parts which make up τὸ *διλογον*: but in the state the wide distinction is between *ἀρχοντες* and *ἐπικούροι* together, i.e. *φύλακες* in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and *οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται* on the other.

§ 3 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κτλ.] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on 5 § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), 6 § 5 (195). For at 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer: *à fortiori* it prohibits the artizan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling. See Zeller *Plato* p. 470 f. SUSEM. (187)

37 οὐδὲν διώρικεν] Yet see *Rep.* v 468 A.

ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν κτλ.] Consult the note following. SUSEM. (188)

38 συμπολεμεῖν] *Rep.* v 451 E, 457 A, 466 E, 471 D.

39 τοῖς ἔξωθεν κτλ.] But in the *Repub.* Plato treats of the community of children and wives v 457 B—466 D, of the regulation of property relations III 415 D—417 B, of education II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 535 A, X 595 A—608 B, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 367 E—376 E, III 412 C—IV 445 E, V 466 D—VI 502 C, VII 535 A—541 B (comp. II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 541 B), of the women's share in the duties of the guardians v 449 A—457 B, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul X 608 C—621 D nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the *Republic*? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? SUSEM. (189)

"In answering the question What is

40 τὸν λόγον· καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, πόαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι (III)  
 1265 a  
 § 4 τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι 2  
 τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν. καὶ  
 ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μι-

40 τὸν λόγον untranslated by William, Ar., [τὸν λόγον] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>; but Γ is uncertain and it is better to follow II<sup>2</sup>, as I now think, or else with M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> to omit λόγους

the subject of a given Platonic dialogue? it is convenient to distinguish the subject of the *conversation* from the subject or subjects of the *work*. Thus in the case of the *Republic*, though the thesis *ὡς ἀμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας* is the subject of the conversation between Socrates and his friends, it may fairly be said that the work is concerned with the *καλλίπολις*, the theory of ideas, and some minor matters. It is however the thesis *ὡς ἀμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας* which gives unity to the composition. Hence, although one of the incidental discussions may have, in consequence of its originality, both for the reader and for Plato himself (*περὶ πολιτείας ἢ τὸ κεφάλαιον Τιμαίους* 17 C), a special interest, it is unreasonable to regard what is alien to it as in any way irrelevant. In fact Aristotle's remark is no more than the expression of his characteristic dislike of Plato's indirect method of approaching the doctrines which he wishes to enforce." JACKSON.

§ 4 1265 a 1 τῶν δὲ νόμων κτλ.] This is quite incorrect: in the *Laws* about equal parts are taken up with constitutional theory and with legislation, and the constitution in the narrower sense is treated much more fully than in the *Republic* (Suckow *Form der Plat. Schriften* 132 f.). Aristotle (*n.* 466 on III. 3. 9) agrees with Plato in including under the constitution, in the wider sense, the regulation of education. From his point of view therefore the whole of the *Laws* from the middle of B. v to the end of B. VIII with a large part of B. XII may be said to be *περὶ τῆς πολιτείας*, while books IX, X, XI and the rest of B. XII are a code of laws, *νόμοι*. SUSEM. (190)

Oncken (I. 194—199) appeals to this passage in support of his view that the first four books of the *Laws*, and part of the fifth, are a later spurious introduction (*τὸ προσόμιον τῶν νόμων*, 734 E) with which Aristotle was wholly unacquainted.

2 καὶ ταύτην βουλ. κτλ.] "and while endeavouring to make it more universally applicable to the existing states he gradu-

ally works it round to the other polity once more." *κοινοτέραν*=common to many states, an average polity. Cp. § 16 and VI(IV). 2. 4.

"When he wrote the *Republic* Plato looked upon the pattern constitution there described as by no means impracticable. He declares that its immediate introduction might be secured without difficulty under a definite condition, which though not indeed easy, nor of frequent occurrence, was yet by no means impossible: V 471 C f., 473 C, VI 497 A f., 499 B—502 C. In the *Republic* moreover he knows nothing of any pattern state of the second rank, holding an intermediate position between the first and the existing constitutions. But in the *Laws* he has changed his view on this point. The form of the state described in the *Republic* (though he still holds it to be the best) is an impracticable ideal: V 739 A f., VII 807 B, IX 853 C, cp. 874 E f.; III 691 C f., 692 B f., IV 713 C f. For that reason he now replaces it by a second best scheme of constitution which approximates much more nearly to the actual constitutions, not without expressing the apprehension that if the attempt were made to call this into life much in it would have to be abandoned, so that the actual result would be only a pattern state of the third order: V 739 A—E, 745 E f., cp. VII 805 B. Here too the possibility of thus realizing it, though only to a limited extent, is made dependent on a condition, very similar though not entirely the same as the condition which is indispensable for the realization of the state planned in the *Republic*; namely, that it should be undertaken by an absolute prince (*τύραννος*) with an inclination for philosophy, young, of good disposition and as yet uncorrupted, in conjunction with a philosophic lawgiver: IV 709 E ff., V 735 D. Cp. Zeller *Plat. Stud.* 16 ff., *Plato* (Eng. tr.) p. 483, 522 f., 531, 538 f., 546; Suckow, *op. c.* 133; Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 619, German trans. of the *Laws* 976 ff. Aristotle seems to have rightly apprehended this relation between the two: at all



§ 5 κρὸν περιάγει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ (III)  
 5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα  
 ταῦτ' ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ  
 παιδεύει τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπε-

1265 a 4 els] πρὸς II<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 6 δίδωσιν P<sup>4</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald.

events he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken *op. c.* 1. 201, that the state of the *Laws* is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the *Laws* to frame something intermediate to that of the *Republic* and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the *Republic* so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained." SUSEM. (191)

§ 5 4 ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ.] But supposing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle's ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the *Republic* as does that of the *Laws*? At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 n. (238); 9 § 2 (279), § 31 (341); 10 § 8 f. (365); 11 § 10 (393): IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (834), *Introd.* p. 22 n. (3). His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the *Laws*: see on IV (VII). 17 § 1 n. (950), § 15 (970): V (VIII). 4 §§ 7—9, *nn.* True, Plato's divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 n. (213), 7 § 4 n. (233). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the *Laws*, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable

indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV [VII]. 10 §§ 9—11, see also *nn.* on II. 5 § 1, 6 § 15): and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, 7 § 5 *nn.* He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expedient of abortion, as a means of securing this (*Introd.* 34, 56, IV [VII]. 16 § 15 f. *nn.*); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the *Republic* (see on II. 3 §§ 5, 6 n. 140), had in the *Laws* abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a milder way: n. (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle's ideal state stands even nearer than that of the *Laws* to the state depicted in the *Republic*, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV [VII]. 16 §§ 1—10, *nn.* 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato's, and ethically regarded a modern view (Exc. 1. to B. II p. 327), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself. SUSEM. (192)

7 παιδεύει τὴν αὐτὴν] This is only relatively true. The all-essential feature in the state of the *Republic* is the rule of the philosophers; see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II i 761 f. (Eng. tr. *Plato* 466, 467 ff.); and in the *Laws* this is dropped. Aristotle overlooks this fact. Further, in the earlier scheme those engaged in trade and agriculture are at any rate free members of the state: in the scheme of the *Laws*, the former are aliens not settled permanently in the country, while the latter are slaves: *Laws* V 741 E ff.; VII 806 D ff.; VIII 842 C f., 846 D, 850 D; XI 915 B ff., 919 D ff., 921 C; XII 952 D ff. Thus the third class of citizens is done away with. The second class is all that is left and the training prescribed for it is the same only so far as it extends; that

χομένους ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως· πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ (III)  
 φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων  
 10 τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων.  
 § 6 τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους 3  
 λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ [τὸ] ζητητικόν, κα-  
 λῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλήθος

9 καὶ before γυναικῶν omitted by Γ (?) and by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup>) ||  
 12 τὸ before ζητητικόν omitted by M\* P<sup>1</sup>

is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics: *Latw* VII. However a certain survival of the philosophic rulers of the *Republic* is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called 'nocturnal assembly.' It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office; while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by cooptation, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavours thereby to guide public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. See *Latw* I 632 C, XII 951 D ff., 961 A ff. Cp. *n.* (970) on IV(VII). 17 § 15. SUSEM. (193)

καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων κτλ] *Latw* V 741 E, VII 806 D—807 D, VIII 842 D, 846 D, XI 519 D f. SUSEM. (194)

ἀναγκαίων = necessary for support, cp. III. 5. 3, IV(VII). 10. 7 where the antithesis is to τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν.

8 καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως] Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, 5 § 17 *n.* (168), § 24 *n.* (179), that even in the ideal state of the *Republic* Plato had required there should be common messes for the guardians. SUSEM. (195)

πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ κτλ] As a matter of fact messes common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the *Republic*, as was stated in *n.* (153) on 5 § 1; but in the changed sphere of the state in the *Latw* he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to

maintain it in the later scheme: VI 780 D ff., VII 806 E, cp. VIII 842 B, 847 E. Further compare I. 13 § 9 *n.* (116), II. 7 § 1 *n.* (231 b). SUSEM. (196)

9 χιλίων] *Repub.* IV 423 A, where however this number is given as only the minimum, ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἢ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων. SUSEM. (197) Yet Grote (*Plato* III. p. 206 *n.* b) observes that the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is one material evidence that this was intended by Plato. Comp. *Politicus* 292 E for the possible number of the rulers.

10 πεντακισχιλίων] More precisely 5040; *Latw* V 737 E, 740 C f., 745 B ff. etc. SUSEM. (198)

§ 6 11 τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ] "Now all the discourses of Socrates display genius acuteness originality research." περιττὸν, out of the common, extraordinary: cp. *Metaph.* I. 2. 13: κομψόν, ingenious, subtle, as VI(IV). 4. 11 κομψὸς τοῦτο οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἰρηται. Both better taken of the *thought* than with some editors of the style. (Thus Götting *Commentariolum de Ar. Pol.* II. 3 gives for κομψόν 'compta pulchritudo,' grace or finish.)

τοῦ Σωκράτους] Aristotle then erroneously takes the Athenian stranger in the *Latw* to be Socrates, although the time of the conversation falls long after his death. The ξένος should rather be considered as personifying enlightened Athens. See Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 667 ff., Trans. of the *Latw* p. 998 f. SUSEM. (199) Yet all the same this stranger, 739 C—E, apparently assumes responsibility for the proposals of "Socrates" in the *Republic*.

12 καλῶς δὲ πάντα] sc. ἔχειν, for everything to be right: "but to be right on all points may well be a hard task." χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ. Bernays however renders χαλεπὸν = too much to ask.

13 τὸ νῦν εἰρ. πλήθος] The construction changes; he begins as if δεῖσθαι were to follow.



δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας (III)  
 15 ἢ τίνος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ πεντακι-  
 σχίλιοι θρέφονται, καὶ παρὰ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόν-  
 § 7 των ἕτερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι (p. 34)  
 κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ τὸν 4  
 νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε  
 20 τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖ-  
 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν

14 δεήσει τοῖς τοιούτοις after 15 ἀπεράντου Γ, perhaps rightly || 16 παρὰ Γ P<sup>1</sup>,  
 περὶ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || τούτοις Welldon || 18 μηδὲν μὴ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, omit-  
 ted by Q<sup>b</sup> || 19 τε omitted by P<sup>1</sup>, τε τὴν by M<sup>1</sup> || 21 πρῶτον μὲν added before  
 εἰ by P<sup>1</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, adopted by Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>; a doubtful case, the words  
 would then bear the sense of *μάλιστα μὲν*. Schmidt inserts them after *προσθεῖναι* (μὲν  
 answered by δὲ 28)

14 Βαβυλωνίας] Cp. III. 3. 5 n. (462).  
 SUSEM. (200)

15 ἀπερ. τὸ πλῆθος] unlimited in  
 size.

ἐξ ἧς κτλ] But how does this cal-  
 culation agree with that made about  
 Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare *iii.*  
 (306), (311). Even granting that the  
 present is the more correct statement,  
 how much smaller must we imagine the  
 number of citizens to be in Aristotle's  
 own ideal state according to the data  
 given IV(VII). 4 §§ 5—14? (Schlosser).  
 Suppose these data reduce the number  
 by one half, one half the same objection  
 would still apply to Aristotle. On the  
 other hand it is interesting to observe  
 how near his penetrating intellect comes  
 to a discovery of the fact, that the idleness  
 which belonged as a right to a privileged  
 minority of freeborn landholders  
 was really the fundamental evil of the  
 Hellenic state. Confined however to the  
 circle of opinions current in his own age  
 and nation, the philosopher turns back  
 when on the very threshold of the truth:  
 and follows Plato in adopting this funda-  
 mental evil as an inalienable primary  
 good for his own model state. SUSEM.  
 (201)

§ 7 17 δεῖ μὲν οὖν...μηδὲν μέντοι  
 ἀδύνατον] "We should frame our scheme  
 on the most favourable supposition, yet  
 not so as to be impracticable." Cp. *Latw*  
 v 742 E: τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐτ' ἂν βούλοιοτο  
 [ματαιὰς βουλῆσεις], sc. ὁ διακοσμών.

ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν] A reference  
 to the expression used by Plato *Latw* IV  
 709 D εὐχασθαι δύναιτο...καὶ νομοθέτης,  
*Repub.* VII 540 D μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς

εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ  
 δὲ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ εἰρηται; cp. VI  
 502 A—C ἀριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ  
 γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ  
 μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. On his part  
 however Aristotle also appropriates the  
 expression: see the references in n. (128)  
 on 1 § 1, esp. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προὔποτε-  
 θεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι  
 μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον IV(VII). 4 § 2 n.  
 (750). SUSEM. (202)

18 λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ κτλ] This is  
 not expressly to be found anywhere in  
 the *Latw*, but Aristotle had a perfect  
 right to infer it from IV 704—709 and V  
 747 D. SUSEM. (203)

20 ἔτι δὲ καλῶς κτλ] But this even  
 Plato himself has by no means over-  
 looked; see *Latw* V 737 C βγκος δὲ πλῆ-  
 θους ἱκανὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ὁρθῶς γίγνεται ἂν  
 λεχθεὶς ἢ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν πλῆ-  
 σιοχώρων πόλεις (Schlosser). Aristotle  
 brings the same objection against Phaeas,  
 7 § 14 ff. (Eaton). Compare n. (210) on  
 6 § 13. SUSEM. (204)

Cp. IV(VII). 2. 18 τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν  
 ἰδεῖν, ἐὰν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα  
 πρὸς πόλιν ἀσκητέον.

21 εἰ δεῖ κτλ] See *Jahrb. f. Phil.*  
 XCIII. 1866. p. 329. The sense is clear  
 from the parenthesis: "if the state is to  
 be independent and secure against ag-  
 gression." Editors who retained the ms.  
*πολιτικὸν* extorted much the same sense  
 out of it, explaining it to mean simply a  
 "national" life, the life of a *pólis*; or a  
 "social" life, a life of activity, *πρακτικόν*.  
 Thus Victorius: a moribus aliarum civi-  
 tatum non penitus abhorrere quae fines  
 etiam imperii proferre conantur. Shilleto

βίον πολεμικόν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν αὐτὴν τοι- (III)  
 οὔτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὕπλοις ἀ χρῆσιμα κατὰ τὴν  
 § 8 οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω τόπους). εἰ δέ  
 25 τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν  
 κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἦττον δεῖ φοβεροὺς εἶναι τοῖς  
 πολεμίοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 ἀπ[ελθ]οῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρᾷν δεῖ, μὴ ποτε 5  
 βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τοσαύτην γὰρ  
 30 εἶναί φησι δεῖν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶπεν  
 § 9 ὥστε ζῆν εὖ (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ ἐστι σω-  
 φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν). ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ

22 πολεμικόν Muret, πολιτικόν Γ Π Ar. Bk. ὁπλιτικόν Montecatino, <ἡγεμονικόν  
 καὶ μὴ μόνον> πολιτικόν Thurot || πολιτικόν μὴ μόνωστικόν Γ, πολιτικόν μὴ μονωτι-  
 κόν P<sup>1</sup>, πολιτικόν μὴ μονώτερον M<sup>a</sup>, πολιτικόν μὴ μονοτικόν P<sup>4</sup> (in the margin):—all  
 glosses || 23 ὕπλοις] ὁρίοις Oncken, νομίμοις ? Susem. || 25 <καὶ> μὴ Schmidt ||  
 28 ἀποῦσιν Bender || 30 εἴ is omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>. Were this right εἶπεν would have  
 to be altered, with Bas.<sup>3</sup>, to εἶπειν || 31 ἐπειδὴ Susem. ἔτι δ' Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>

wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. *Protag.*  
 322 B πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἧς μέρος πολεμική,  
 absolutely political and having therefore  
 as one ingredient πολεμική." The expres-  
 sion recurs IV(VII). 2 § 3, §§ 5, 6 (a prob-  
 ably spurious chapter) and 6 § 7, where  
 see *Critical notes*.

23 ἀ χρῆσιμα κτλ] Cp. VII(VI). c. 7  
 §§ 1—3 (Eaton). SUSEM. (205)

§ 8 24 εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον κτλ]  
 "But if any one refuse to approve of a  
 life such as this" i.e. warlike "for the  
 state at large any more than for the indi-  
 vidual." Whether war is the end of the  
 state is a question debated IV(VII). 14  
 § 13 f., 15 §§ 1—6. Plato in the *Laius*  
 I 628 c, VII 803, VIII 829 A, holds that it  
 is not.

28 τὸ πλῆθος really belongs to the  
 dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it  
 might not be better to define otherwise,  
 by a clearer definition, the amount of  
 property which one man may hold." It is  
 characteristic of the writer to require  
 analysis and precise definition, τὸ σαφές,  
 τὸ διωρισμένον.

29 τοσαύτην γὰρ εἶναί φησι] *Laius*  
 V 737 D γῆς μὲν ἐπόση πόσουσιν σώφρονας  
 ὄντας ἱκανὴν τρέφειν πλείονος δ' οὐδὲν προσ-  
 δεῖ. With what follows compare 7 § 7 n.  
 (237 b). SUSEM. (206)

31 καθόλου μᾶλλον] "For this (term)  
 is too vague (cp. *μία μᾶλλον*, 2 § 2) since  
 men may live frugally and at the same  
 time wretchedly": literally, in hardships

and distress.

§ 9 σωφρόνως here and IV(VII). 5 § 1,  
 and σωφροσύνη III. 4 § 16 can only  
 mean 'parsimoniously', 'parsimony'. But  
 in II. 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12 n. (242),  
 I. 13 § 2 f., § 6 (112), IV(VII). 1 § 4 (691),  
 3 § 3, 15 §§ 2—4, 16 § 8 the meaning is  
 temperance or self-restraint in reference  
 to eating and drinking and the appetite of  
 sex: and it is from this side that the virtue  
 is depicted in *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 10, 11 (1117  
 b 23 ff.). There however Aristotle himself  
 explains how extravagance leads to pro-  
 fligacy and to excesses in this direction,  
 and that ἄσωτος, properly a spendthrift,  
 comes to mean a profligate; *ib.* IV. 1 § 3,  
 1119 b 30, § 35, 1121 b 17. In *Nic. Eth.* IV.  
 3 § 4, 1123 b 5, 4 § 4, 1125 b 13 σώφρων  
 has yet another meaning: viz. modest.  
 Lastly, Van der Rest observes that the  
 next objection brought against Plato  
 affects only a certain inexactitude of ex-  
 pression and not the thought, which is no  
 other than that followed by Aristotle, of  
 a right mean between excessive wealth  
 and excessive poverty: see esp. *Laius* V  
 741 E: χρηματισμὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ  
 τοιαύτῃ κατασκευῇ; and next note. SUSEM.  
 (206 b)

32 ὅρος] A better definition would be,  
 to live frugally and liberally. "Comp.  
 IV(VII). 5. 1 n. ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σω-  
 φρόνως; II. 7. 7 n. τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον;  
 VI(IV). 11. 4 τῶν εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτῆσις ἢ  
 μέση βελτίστη πάντων." SUSEM. (207)



σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ μὲν τὸ (III)  
 τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ'  
 35 εἰσὶν [ἔξεις] ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρήσιν αὐται, οἷον  
 οὐσία πρᾶως [μὲν] ἢ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ  
 καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 § 10 περὶ αὐτὴν ταύτας. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ  
 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖ-  
 40 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὥς ἱκανῶς ἂν ὁμαλισθησομένην  
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων,  
 1265 b  
 § 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ  
 τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν  
 νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς  
 ὅποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα-  
 5 ράξυγας μηδὲν ἔχειν, ἐάν τε ἐλάττους ὦσι τὸ πλῆθος ἐάν τε

33 ἑκατέρῳ Korais, ἑκάτερον Γ II Ar. Bk. || τῷ τὸ II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || τὸ τῷ II<sup>2</sup>  
 Ar. Bk. and M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand) || 34 τῷ τὸ II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || τὸ τῷ P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.  
 || ἐπιπόνως] *laboriose vivere* William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence ζῆν  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> erroneously || 35 [ἔξεις] Susem. || ἀρεταὶ] *αἰρεταὶ* written by an un-  
 known hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori  
 and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneider as a gloss  
 upon ἔξεις || χρῆσιν] ἔξιν II<sup>1</sup>. Apparently William translated from the following  
 order: αὐταὶ αἱ ἔξεις εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν ἔξιν τῆς οὐσίας, Ar. from the following:  
 αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσὶν ἔξεις περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by Γ II<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
 || 37 ἔξεις Susem.<sup>2</sup>, χρήσεις Γ II Ar. Bk., αἰρέσεις Madvig: Bernays conjectures περὶ  
 τὰς κτήσεις ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὰς εἶναι ταύτας, not happily || εἶναι after 38 αὐτὴν II<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
 || 40 ἀνομαλισθησομένην Madvig for ἂν ὁμαλισθησομένην

1265 b 2 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] Bender who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷον τε for δεῖ  
 δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ || 4 παρξυγας Γ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), and the scribe restored this after  
 P<sup>1</sup> had emended it to παρξυγας

33 χωρὶς] if the two be separated.

34 τὸ ἐπιπόνως (ζῆν).

35 ἀρεταὶ...αὐταὶ] These are the only virtues that have to do with the use of property. οἷον = I mean.

§ 10 38 ἰσάζοντα] *Latos* V 740 B—741 A. SUSEM. (207 b)

"Tis strange that while equalizing their properties he should not regulate the numbers of his citizens."

39 ἀλλ' ἀφεῖναι κτλ.] This too is very inexactly expressed. All that Plato in the *Latos* intends, indeed all that he is able to effect, is to keep the number of citizens unalterably the same: i.e. exactly 5040 elder men, as many younger men, with twice that number of women. All beyond that number must, as he expressly prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies.

One son and one daughter, then, is the normal family: only when there is childlessness or death does it become necessary that there should be other children in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and to be adopted by the childless (Schlosser). As it stands at present, the polemic does not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the means proposed by Plato to avoid an excess of the prescribed number to be impracticable or impossible to realize he should have proved his point, as he easily might have done. SUSEM. (208)

§ 11 1265 b 2 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς = ἀκριβέστερον: "whereas that requires to be fixed with a great deal more nicety in the supposed case than at present." Cp. 7 § 18 οὐκ ἴσων η.

4 παρξυγας] the cadets; like παρή-

- § 12 πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν ὀρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας 7  
τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν τοῦτο  
δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἂν (p. 35)  
συμβαίνειν τελευτᾶν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν  
§ 13 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ' ἀφεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς  
11 ἄλλαις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πο-  
λίταις, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φεῖδων  
μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς  
οἴκους ἴσους φήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,  
15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνίσους εἶχον τοὺς κλήρους πάντες κατὰ μέ-  
§ 14 γεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τὸναντίον ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ  
μὲν τούτων πῶς ἂν οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἔχειν, λεκτέον ὕστερον·  
ἐλλέλειπται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχον- 8

11 ἄλλαις Γ M<sup>1</sup>, πλείοις P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (πλ over an erasure P<sup>3</sup>) || 12 [Φεῖδων...  
17 ὕστερον] Schmidt || 14 καὶ] κατὰ Bernays || 15 τοὺς κλήρους before ἀνίσους P<sup>2</sup>  
Bk., before εἶχον M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || πάντας Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 17 ἂν after βέλτιον P<sup>2</sup> Bk.

οροι ἱπποὶ, supernumeraries outside the traces, the elder brother being the yoke-horse, ζύγιος ἱππος.

§ 12 6 Take μᾶλλον with τῆς οὐσίας.

7 ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινός] Statistics will have to be collected to determine on the average how many children die before reaching maturity and how many marriages are without issue. "Thus," says Schlosser, "the idea of political arithmetic is no novelty." Aristotle is a precursor of Malthus (Eaton). Comp. also Exc. II to B. II. SUSEM. (209)

Grote III. 228—231: Plato and Aristotle saw clearly the law of population, but did not recognise the common element in the positive and prudential checks sufficiently to coordinate them, as Malthus did.

8 These "accidents of life" are before Plato, *Laus* V 740 C—E, cp. Grote III. p. 229 n. (g). Perhaps what Aristotle deprecates is the 'laissez faire', ἀφεῖσθαι, to leave it to the citizens at their own discretion.

§ 13 10 τὸ δ' ἀφεῖσθαι κτλ] Aristotle(?) repeats this 7 § 5. SUSEM. (209 b)

12 ἢ δὲ πενία κτλ] See *Laus* V 744 D; also the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy *Rep.* VIII 555 D—557 A.

Φεῖδων ὁ Κορίνθιος] Nothing is known of any such ancient lawgiver of Corinth. He is supposed to be different from the better known Pheidon of Argos, about whom see VIII(v). 10. 6. Yet he is called

a Corinthian by the scholiast on Pindar *Olymp.* XIII. 20; τοῦτο δὲ φησιν, ἐπειδὴ Φεῖδων τις ἀνὴρ Κορίνθιος εὖρε μέτρα καὶ στάθμια. This is one of the serious difficulties in this chapter mentioned *Introd.* p. 33 n. 4, 14 (4). There is always the heroic remedy; see *Critical Notes* and M. Schmidt in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882. p. 822.

16 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] A decidedly unfounded assertion, as was explained in the note on § 10. Aristotle(?) repeats this objection against Phaleas, 7 § 5: comp. n. (204) on § 7. SUSEM. (210)

§ 14 17 ὕστερον] IV (VII). 10 § 11 f. and esp. 16 § 15 f. n. (946). From the latter passage it is seen of what means he is thinking. To prevent any increase in the fixed number of the citizens Aristotle sanctions the procuring of abortion. Cp. *Introd.* p. 56 and n. (192) on § 5. SUSEM. (211)

18 ἐλλέλειπται κτλ] *Laus* V 734 E: the warp is necessarily stronger and firmer than the woof, ὅθεν δὴ τοὺς μεγάλους ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρξοντας δεῖ διακρίνεσθαι τινα τρόπον ταύτῃ καὶ τοὺς μικροὺς παιδεῖν βασανισθέντας ἐκάστοτε κατὰ λόγον. As a matter of fact this objection of Aristotle's is altogether unfair. In the *Laus* Plato has done exactly that which Aristotle here requires: he has prescribed for all the citizens of his model state the same course of training, on the ground of which he expects them to discover for themselves which among them



τας πῶς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ (III)  
 20 δεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεταί τῆς κρόκης,  
 § 15 οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἔχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μελζονα μέχρι πεντα-  
 πλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός;  
 καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ' οὐ  
 25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστῳ ἔνευμε

19 ὅπως II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 20 δεῖν] δὴ Koraes; Conring would omit δεῖν here or in 21. Bergk, while defending δεῖν, suggested <οὐ> δὲν <ἄλλο ἢ> *Fünf. Abhand.* p. 65 n. 2 (Leipz. 1883) || 21 δεῖ II<sup>1</sup> || [ἐπεὶ... 26 οἰκεῖν] Schmidt, perhaps rightly, cp. *nn.* (213) (214) (215) || 25 συμφέρει M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>2</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2-3</sup> (1st hand), συμφέρη Γ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Bk. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>

are better fitted for the warp and which for the woof, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making especial provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed. SUSEM. (212)

It is the professed object of the *Epinomis* to expound the course of study for the Nocturnal Assembly which is to aim at controlling the election of magistrates. But nothing can be inferred from Aristotle's silence respecting it: Zeller *Plato* p. 616 n. (59) Eng. tr.

20 στημόνιον... κρόκης] Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 107 took these terms in the *Laws* to refer to the appointment of magistracies and of the laws for them. But in *Pl. Politicus* 283 B, 309 B, the brave and energetic natures are the warp and the gentler and weaker natures the woof.

21 δεῖν] Taking up the preceding δεῖν of line 20.

§ 15 It would certainly relieve the chapter to reject this section, as M. Schmidt proposes.

22 μέχρι πενταπλασίας] Here and 7 § 4 Aristotle (?) has mistaken Plato's meaning, as if he had permitted the accumulation of moveable property to the amount

of four times the value of the real estate belonging to the family. As a matter of fact in *Laws* V 744 E (cf. VI 775 E ff.) he only allows the increase of the total property to this fourfold value; consequently only the acquisition of three times as much personal property. The recurrence of the mistake at least favours the assumption that both passages are by the same author. SUSEM. (213)

23 διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κτλ.] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle's own ideal state: see IV (VII). 10 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (214)

25 δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα] One homestead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: *Laws* V 745 E, VI 775 E ff., cp. VIII 848. Aristotle (?) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar IV (VII). 10 § 11. We might assume that when he wrote Bk. IV (VII) he had changed his mind and then forgotten to expunge from his criticism of Plato the passage before us as no longer in point. Here however M. Schmidt's suggestion of interpolation is quite as obvious, although it may be met by an inquiry whether a later editor would not have carefully avoided introducing this inconsistency. SUSEM. (215)

But is the inconsistency proved? "Plato would assign to each man two οἰκῆσεις *Laws* 745 E, or, as Aristotle puts it, οἰκόπεδα, οἰκίας: Aristotle recommends two κληροί, not two οἰκῆσεις or regular establishments" (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-

§ 16 διελὼν χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἡ δὲ σύνταξις ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλιγαρχία, μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτεῖαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει 30 ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἴσως· εἰ δ' ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτεῖαν, οὐ καλῶς. τάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακωνῶν τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν § 17 ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεῖ 10

27 βούλεται after μὲν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 29 [εἰ μὲν...1266 a 6 δημοκρατικῇ] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. n. (223) || 30 πολιτεῖαν II<sup>3</sup> Bk. and P<sup>2-3</sup> (1st hand) γρ. πολιτειῶν P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin), in P<sup>3</sup> πολιτειῶν was written over it by a later hand, but again erased || 32 τις after ἂν II<sup>3</sup> Bk.

sion κληροῖ. Even supposing that, in contradistinction to him, Aristotle really intended to provide only one of the two estates with a dwelling-house, how can he have believed that to farm two estates in separate localities would thus be made easier than if they had dwellings upon them? Is it not clear that the opposite will hold good? Nay more, what idea are we to form of two such detached properties, one near the town and one in the country, unless there are farm-buildings and a house upon the latter? If this be so, the above supposition is *à priori* impossible. Even Plato does not arrange that the country house shall be a regular establishment in the sense of being *always* inhabited, but the son who inherits succeeds to it as soon as he is grown up and married, and so sets up the second establishment there (*Laws* VI 775 E f.). In Aristotle's best state such an appropriation of the second dwelling-house is certainly excluded, because there, when the heir marries, he succeeds his superannuated father as citizen and consequently as proprietor of both the family properties (see note and *Excursus* on IV[VII]. 16 § 10, 1335 a 32—35): but that is the sole point in which Aristotle diverges from Plato in this matter. To what purpose he would destine this second house can only be conjectured: it may be to lodge the superannuated father, perhaps with the lands belonging to it as a sort of retiring pension. In any case the inconsistency, as Aristotle's text has come down to us, is unquestionable. SUSEM.

26 διελὼν χωρίς = distinct, separate homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις] The entire arrangement of the constitution tends neither to

oligarchy nor to democracy but to something intermediate known as Polity. Plato's citizens are the heavy-armed men: *Laws* VI 753 B, πάντες μὲν κοινονούντων τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων αἰρέσεως, ὅποσοι περ ἂν ὅπλα ἱππικά ἢ πεζικά τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν. This is the criterion of a 'Polity'.

28 πολιτεῖαν] Compare III. 7 § 4 with the notes and references there given. SUSEM. (216)

29 ὡς κοινοτάτην κτλ.] "as the most universally adapted for cities at large" VI (IV). c. 11 with n. (1282) on § 1. SUSEM. (217)

31 πρώτην = highest, normal. So ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός. Comp. I. 2. 5.

32 Plato's arrangement *Rep.* B. VIII implies this.

33 ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν] i.e. a constitution which, like the Spartan, has the character of an Aristocracy to a greater extent than Polity. The term may be thus explained: true Aristocracy coincides with Aristotle's best constitution; but in a transferred and secondary sense this name is earned by such constitutions as combine aristocratical with oligarchical and democratical elements, like Carthage, or only with democratical elements, like Sparta; this is stated VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, cp. VI(IV). 9 § 6 ff., 2 § 1 n. (1133), § 4 n. (1141), 10 § 1, 11 § 2. Further consult *Excursus* I. on Bk. III and the notes to III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601), § 24 (614); 14 § 15 (633), 17 § 3 (677), § 5 (678): VI(IV). 2 § 2 (1136—7). Of course such mixed constitutional forms are nearer to the true Aristocracy than is Polity, which is a blending of Oligarchy and Democracy: VI(IV). cc. 8, 9. See on this the notes to



τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμι- (III)  
 35 γμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἶναι  
 γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-  
 κρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν  
 δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ  
 40 κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς  
 ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα- (P. 36)  
 τεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν  
 1266 a καθ' ἡμέραν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δεόν συγκ- 11  
 § 18

34 πολιτειῶν] πολιτῶν Γ T<sup>b</sup> || 35 τὴν omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> || τῶν omitted by P<sup>1</sup>  
 || 39 τῶν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τῶν] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 40 ἐφορίαν Π<sup>3</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand,  
 emended by a later hand)

III. 7 § 4 (536, 538); VI(IV). 2 § 4 (1141),  
 7 § 4 (1237). SUSEM. (218)

§ 17 33 ἐνιοι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Cp.  
 IV(VII). 14 § 16 n. (911), VI(IV). 1 § 6 n.  
 (1123). Thus we learn that two schools  
 of political theorists, to one of which  
 Ephors perhaps belonged<sup>1</sup>, dissented  
 from the writer's opinion and agreed in  
 regarding monarchy, oligarchy, and de-  
 mocracy as elements of the Spartan con-  
 stitution; while the second school (40 οἱ  
 δὲ) added tyranny as a fourth element.  
 It is strange that in this passage Ari-  
 stotle (?) takes up no definite position in  
 relation to the two views and does not  
 oppose to them his own. Presumably  
 he judged it sufficient, in order not to  
 enter on a longer digression, to have  
 denominated this constitution a mixed  
 aristocracy. From the explanations which  
 he has devoted specially to it we learn  
 that he looked upon the council of Elders  
 as the aristocratical, the Ephors as the  
 democratic element in it, 9 §§ 19—28,  
 but at the same time also as in a cer-  
 tain sense related to τυραννίς: see on 9  
 § 20. He finds another democratic ele-  
 ment, though such in intention only,  
 in the common messes, 9 § 32. He  
 regards the Spartan kingship as far too  
 limited to give the constitution any par-  
 ticular colouring: III. 14 §§ 3, 4; 15 §§ 1,  
 2; 16 § 1. It is still more strange then  
 that Aristotle (?) only mentions here the  
 views of those other theorists on this sub-  
 ject, passing over in total silence that ex-  
 pressed by Plato himself in the *Laos* IV  
 712 C ff. (cp. III 692 A f., 693 E), a view  
 which stands much nearer to his own,  
 representing the Spartan constitution as

<sup>1</sup> See on this *Introd.* p. 35 n. 3 and Susemihl's  
 critical edition p. LXII.

mainly a mixture of aristocracy and de-  
 mocracy, but with the addition of the  
 royal office and an element akin in one  
 view to τυραννίς, in another to democracy,  
 viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us,  
*Laos* XII 962 E, that he was not the first  
 to pronounce a mixed constitution the  
 most excellent in practice: οἱ δὲ σοφώ-  
 τατοι, ὡς οἴονται, πρὸς ταῦτά τε (liberty  
 and dominion over others) καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 ἐξυμῶντα [βλέποντες νομοθετοῦνται], εἰς  
 ἐν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημέ-  
 νον ἔχοντες φράζειν, εἰς δὲ τὰλλα αὐτοῖς δεῖ  
 βλέπειν; presumably his predecessors  
 were to some extent the same who are  
 here noticed. Compare further Excur-  
 sus I to Bk. III. SUSEM. (219)

Isocrates Lacedaemonios μάλιστα δημο-  
 κρατουμένους τυγχάνειν dicit *Areopag.* § 61  
 (Spengel).

§ 18 1266 a 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ]  
*Laos* III 693 D f. εἰσι πολιτειῶν οἶον μη-  
 τέρες δύο τινές...καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν  
 μοναρχίαν ὀρθόν, τὴν δ' αὖ δημοκρατίαν:  
 Persia is the extreme case of the one,  
 Athens of the other: δεῖ δὲ οὖν καὶ ἀναγ-  
 καῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτων: 701 E;  
 VI 756 E μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ  
 δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἥς αἰεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν  
 τὴν πολιτείαν: cp. IV 712 D f. However  
 what Plato really says in these passages is  
 somewhat different, viz. that a good con-  
 stitution must hold the mean between  
 democracy and monarchy. Moreover he  
 expressly guards against being supposed  
 to derive anything in his mixed form of  
 the state from τυραννίς, IV 712 C: τίνα  
 δὴ ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῶ τῇ πόλει  
 προστάττειν;...οἶον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ  
 ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλικήν,  
 οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἄν: and  
 in the *Republic* he has already himself

κεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννί- (III)  
δος, ἃς ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν τις θέλῃ πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας  
4 πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μιν γινύσcentes[· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ

1266 a 3 χειρίστους P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || πᾶσιν Γ ||  
4 [ἡ...5 βελτίων] Riese, see Comm.

pronounced democracy and *τυραννίς* to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls *Oligarchy* and *τυραννίς* the two worst forms of government, see on VI (IV). II § 21 n. (1305): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the *Laws* it is no doubt true that every unlimited, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with *τυραννίς*: III 691 D—701 E, IV 710 E, 712 C ff.: kingship or limited monarchy and limited democracy are intermediate or mixed forms. Hence it would certainly be no incorrect expression of Plato's thought in the *Laws*, that the right constitution should hold a mean between democracy and *τυραννίς*. But from this it does not in the least follow that it must be compounded of the two: for it would also be a mean between them if it were compounded of forms which approximate partly to the one partly to the other, in order thus to blend freedom with order or authority. 'In the passages in question Plato is speaking of monarchy and democracy as principles of all government, not of certain constitutions, since he finds the principle of authority more clearly stamped on the one, that of liberty on the other' (Henkel). Consequently, to make the state in the *Laws* a combination of *oligarchical* with democratical elements is not inconsistent with his requirement. Besides, it is also incorrect to call these the only constituents of the mixed form and so to make the constitution simply a Polity (*πολιτεία*): for it deserves to be called a mixed aristocracy with far greater right than the Spartan constitution: see on § 5 (193), § 14 (212), § 21 (229); Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 624—631, Translation of the *Laws* p. 980; also Zeller *Plato* p. 535 f. Eng. tr. Nor is this state of the *Laws* without a certain monarchical head; for in so far as it too is preeminently an educating institution, such a post is filled by the highest official who presides over education. However Henkel (*Studien* 65) is quite right in inferring from all the foregoing

that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken's remark (*op. c.* I. 209): "taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us." The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato's state of the *Laws*, the 36, or (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 *νομοφύλακες*, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them\*; in the sense in which Aristotle himself (?) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy, § 17, and the board of ephors a *τυραννίς*, though there were five of them: and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken literally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the *πολιτεία*, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. SUSEM. (220)

4 βέλτιον οὖν κτλ.] That is, in the particular case here given (cp. n. 223) they are more in the right: they either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy; or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution noticed in § 17, are doubtless intended. If it were true (1266 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one com-

\* Only Oncken's assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible, is a decided mistake, and all the inferences which he has attached to the assertion fall to the ground.



- 5 πλείονων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων]. ἔπειτα οὐδ' ἔχουσα (III)  
φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρα-  
τικά· μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.  
§ 19 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπόρω-  
10 τέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας  
ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀφείσθαι, τοῦτο δ'  
ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι

pounded of democracy and tyranny, then the general statement in a 4 might justly be made: for *any* three, or more, forms would make a better mixture than *these* two. SUSEM. (221)

ἢ γὰρ ἐκ πλείονων κτλ] 'This statement made thus universally is not in keeping with the philosopher's thought. He does not blame Plato for not combining elements enough, but because he would construct a polity out of the two corrupt elements' (Riese). On Aristotle's own principles a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, must be better than one of oligarchy, democracy, and *τυραννίς*. As was shown in the last note, the preceding sentence, rightly understood, is a simple deduction from what has been laid down above, and needs no additional reason, least of all one which erroneously extends it beyond the limits of this right interpretation and lays it down as universally true. The chapter contains difficulties enough, but this is beyond the limits of all that we dare attribute to Aristotle himself: surely this illogical generalization is interpolated. We shall however be obliged to go some way further than this, I think. For even one who, like myself, either rejects or mistrusts Schmidt's other *atheteses* in this chapter will nevertheless be unable to deny that the entire passages §§ 16—18, 1265 b 29 *εἰ μὲν*... 1266 a 6 *δημοκρατικά*, and § 22, 1266 a 22 *ὥς*... 25 *σκέψις*, do most violently interrupt the connexion and leave the impression that they are non-Aristotelian. This suspicion is strengthened by the strange statements noticed in *nn.* (219, 220). SUSEM. (222)

5 ἔχουσα sc. ἢ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις πολιτεία μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν. See *n.* (220).

7 ἐγκλίνειν = to betray a tendency towards, as in VIII(v). 7. 7.

§ 19 8 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοῦς] 'For selection by lot from a body elected previously by vote belongs

to both" i.e. the lot to democracy, the voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy]. This took place in the election of the council, of the magistrates charged with the police of the city (*ἀγορανόμοι* and *ἀστυνόμοι*), and of the superintendents of the games (*ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέται*): *Laws* VI 756 B—E, 763 D f., 765 B—D. SUSEM. (223)

See R. Dareste *Le système électoral des Lois de Platon in Annuaire de l'Association pour l'enc. des études grecques*. XVII. 1883. pp. 65—74.

9 τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κτλ] *Laws* VI 764 A: *ἔγω δ' εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ξύλλογον ὁ βουλούμενος, ἐπάναγκες δ' ἔστω τῷ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων, δέκα δραχμαῖς ζημιουμένῳ, ἐὰν μὴ παρὼν ἐξετάζηται τοῖς ξυλλόγοις, τρίτῳ δὲ τιμῇ καὶ τετάρτῳ μὴ ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ ἀσῆμιος ἀφείσθω*. SUSEM. (224)

10 φέρειν is *suffragium ferre*, to vote: with acc., to vote for certain candidates for office.

καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας] As a matter of fact this regulation only applies to the election of the superintendents of the games (*ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέται*) *Laws* VI 765 C, and of the council VI 756 B—E: but Aristotle does not come to speak of this latter election until § 20. SUSEM. (225)

11 τοὺς δ' ἀφείσθαι] Not however at the election of *ἀγορανόμοι* and *ἀστυνόμοι*, *Laws* VI 764 A: *χειροτονέτω δὲ πᾶς πάντα ὁ δὲ μὴ θέλων, ἐὰν εἰσαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ζημιούσθω*. SUSEM. (226)

τοῦτο δ'] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ in line 9. Cp. *τοῦτο δὲ μμεῖται*, 2 § 6.

12 καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους κτλ] Of these two statements the latter, viz. that the highest officers of state are to be elected from the highest classes of the census, is quite incorrect. Even for the Guardians of the Laws (*νομοφύλακες*) no such regulation is found: *Laws* VI 753 B, 766 A f.: nor for the supreme board of control (*εὐθύναι*) XII 945 E ff.: nor again for the military officers (*στρατηγοί, ὑπαρχοί, φύλαρχοι, ταξίλαρχοι*) 755 B ff. And as

13 τοὺς ἀρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων (III)  
§ 20 των. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν. αἰροῦν- 12

regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a majority of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only in the case of a minority, namely the *δοσυνόμοι*, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (*ἀθλοθέται*) must be elected from the third or the second class. SUSEM. (227)

13 τὰς μεγίστας sc. ἀρχάς. *τίμημα* is a property qualification, *census*. See *Laus* 744 B—E.

§ 20 14 τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν] Thus described in *Laus* 756 B—E: 'The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councillors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (*πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἅπαντας φέρειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τῇ δοξάσῃ ζημίᾳ*). When the candidates have been elected some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (*τῇ δ' ὕστερα φέρειν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταῦτά καθάπερ τῇ πρόσθεν*); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (*τρίτῃ δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρειν μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, ἐπ' ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τοῖς τῶν τριῶν τιμημάτων*); but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (*τετάρτῃ δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ σμικροτάτου τιμήματος ἅπαντας*); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple.' The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced

first, by election, to 180 of each class and next, by sortition, to 90 from each class. The passage continues: 'On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny: these are to form the council for the year' (Dr Jowett's translation).

Plato's object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only their half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided there are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, *Plato* III. 363 n. 9. (β) Stallbaum, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but omit to explain what takes place on the fifth day. (γ) Mr Cope supposed that on each successive day each class voted for 90 candidates belonging to a given class, so that the abstentions of classes III and IV might, in the extreme case, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 (360 + 360 + 270 + 180). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct; the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election: there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sending in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (*ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνεχθῶσι, τοὺς μὲν κατασημήνασθαι... πέμπτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τὰ κατασημανθέντα ὀνόματα ἐξελεγεῖν μὲν τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἰδεῖν πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις*). The voting on the fifth day is confined to these duly nominated candidates, and as 180 must be then selected from each class (*ἐκλέξαντας*) Plato appears to assume that more than that number will be nominated on each of the first four days.

αἰροῦνται μὲν κτλ.] For all are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally [i.e. in like manner] from the second: and next from the third, save that it is not compulsory on all (to vote),



15 ται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης [ἀλλ'] ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμῆ- (III)  
ματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἴσως ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἴτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων,  
πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες, <ἀλλ' > ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμη-  
μάτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου [τῶν τετάρτων] μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς  
§ 21 πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· εἴτ' ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἀφ' ἐκάστου τιμῆ-  
20ματος ἀποδείξαι φησι δεῖν ἀριθμὸν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ  
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ  
§ 22 αἰρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὥς μὲν οὖν 13  
οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-  
την πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθησομέ-  
25νων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις·

15 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, from Plat. *Laus* vi. 765 B ff. Schmidt (and probably Ar.), ἐπά-  
ναγκες Γ II Bk., [ἐπάναγκες] Schlosser Susem.<sup>1</sup> || [ἀλλ'] Madvig, ἀλλ' trans-  
posed to 17 before ἢ Susem.<sup>1</sup>; ἀλλὰ <πρώτον> Lambin, πρῶτον Bender, as Muret  
before him changed ἀλλ' into ε' (=90) || 16 ἴσως Nickses (Plato has κατὰ ταῦτά),  
ἴσους Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || τοῦ τρίτου Oncken || 17 [πλὴν] Madvig || οὐκ  
[πᾶσιν] Bender || <ἀλλ' > ἢ Susem., ἢ Γ II Ar. Bk. Bender, πλὴν Götting in his  
edition and Madvig, ἢ Götting in *Jenaer Lectiōnskat.* 1855, εἶτα <δ' > ἐκ τῶν τρί-  
των οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες <πλὴν ἀλλ' > ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμημάτων, ἐκ τε κτλ  
? Susem. Of course ἀλλ' ἢ or πλὴν would do just as well as πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ || εἴτ'  
ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν <ἀλλ' > οὐ πάλιν ἐπάναγκες ἦν τῶν τετάρτων τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων  
<φέρειν μὴ βουλομένοις>· ἐκ δὲ κτλ Schmidt || εἴτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες  
πλὴν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριῶν· εἴτ' ἐκ τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις Welldon || [ἐκ] Susem.  
(Plato omits it) || τριῶν τιμημάτων Götting *Jenaer Lectiōnskat. ut sup.*, from  
Plato; τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων Γ II Ar. Bk., τριῶν [ἢ τετάρτων] Götting in his edition,  
Madvig; Engelhardt Spengel Bender and Jowett omit τρίτων ἢ || 18 [τῶν τε-  
τάρτων] Engelhardt Bender Susem.; but [τοῦ τετάρτου] with Sylburg is perhaps as  
good: τῶν τετάρτων Camot Sepulveda's mss. Vettori<sup>2</sup> (and a marginal note from his  
own hand in the copy of his 1st edition in the Munich Library), τῶν τιμημάτων  
Götting in the *Jenaer Lectiōnskat. l. c.* || ἐπάναγκες <ἦν> Schmidt || 20 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup>  
(emended by p<sup>1</sup>) || [22 ὥς...25 σκέψις] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. n. (223) ||  
23 οὐκ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || μοναρχίας ὀλιγαρχίας Heinsius Schmidt  
|| <οἰεσθαι> δεῖ Schmidt || συνεστάναι Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), συνιστάναι Π<sup>3</sup>  
Bk. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand—altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>) and P<sup>3</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), perhaps rightly || 24  
<καὶ> ἐκ τούτων Schmidt

but only on those of the three (higher) classes, and (in electing candidates) from the fourth (class) it is compulsory only on the first and second.

§ 21 19 εἴτ' ἐκ τούτων κτλ] More accurately stated, there is *first* an election of 180 candidates belonging to each class out of the larger number first returned, and in a similar manner: *secondly*, a selection of one half of these, 90 from each class, by lot, to make up the whole number of 360. *Vide supra.* SUSEM. (228)

20 ἔσονται δὴ κτλ] Thus those who

belong to the highest classes and who are superior men will be a majority (of the voters); because through the absence of compulsion some citizens of the popular party will abstain from the election.

21 βελτίους] I.e. men who take a higher interest in political life. So far, then, even this oligarchical regulation contains an aristocratic element. SUSEM. (229)

§ 22 24 τῶν ὕστερον...σκέψις VI(IV). c. 7 and esp. cc. 8, 9, 11. SUSEM. (230)

25 ἐπιβάλλῃ=devolves (upon us): see

ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν (III)  
αἵρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον. εἰ γὰρ τινες συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέ-  
τριοι τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἵρεθῆσονται βούλησιν.  
7 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῦ IV  
30 τον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· εἰσὶ δὲ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι,  
αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι (p. 37)  
δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυῶν καὶ καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται νῦν  
ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε  
τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος  
35 κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν,  
§ 2 ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄρχονται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γὰρ  
τισι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [ἀναγκαῖον] μέγιστον τετά-  
χθαι καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάν-  
39 τας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·

30 Krohn pronounces the whole of c. 6 as far as τὸν τρόπον to be spurious and of late origin, but see *Int.* p. 33 n. 4 and *Comm. nn.* (213, 215) || 31 αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν Spengel, αἱ μὲν ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν I<sup>o</sup> II Ar. Bk., αἱ μὲν ιδιωτῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν Piccart. See p. 80 || 37 ἀναγκαῖον erased by p<sup>1</sup>, omitted by II<sup>o</sup> Ar. Bk., possibly a variant of μέγιστον || 39 Φαλλέας II<sup>1</sup>, and so throughout || πρῶτον Q<sup>b</sup> Ar. perhaps rightly, πρῶτως Piccart

on I. 13. 13 and reff. there given. A further use of the participle is seen in the Gortynian inscription lately found, οἱ ἐπιβάλλοντες = οἱ ἐπιβάλλει, the next of kin on whom certain obligations devolve. Cp. λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα λόγον *De gen. anim.* I. 2. 1, 716 a 3: and *Pol.* vi(1v). 13 § 7 τὸ πόσον ἐπιβάλλει.

26 τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοὺς] 'it is unsafe to elect from a larger number previously elected.' This would be done in the election to the Council, and in the election of νομοφύλακες. First 300 were chosen, then out of these a hundred, and out of the hundred thirty-seven. It was partially so in the election of the Supreme Board of Control. SUSEM. (231)

27 συστήναι] This apparently portends something like the wire-pullers and caucus of our day. Comp. VIII(v). 3. 9.

c. 7 Examination of the polity proposed by Phaleas. See *Analysis* p. 105.

§ 1 31 For the antithesis comp. I. 7. 5 πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφούσιν, II. 12. 1 οὐκ ἐκωνώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ὠντωνωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον: Pl. *Tim.* 19 ε τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἀστοχόν ἅμα φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ πολιτικῶν.

33 τούτων ἀμφ.] that of the *Republic* and that of the *Laws*.

35 συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. 6 § 5 with n. (196): also n. (153) on 5 § 2 and (116) on I. 13. 9. SUSEM. (231 b)

36 τῶν ἀναγκαίων] the necessary considerations of every-day life as opposed to its luxuries or ornaments: practical requirements )( fanciful theories.

§ 2 37 μέγιστον τετάχθαι] The sentence is inverted; with τετάχθαι καλῶς take τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας; the infinitive clause so formed, τὸ περὶ...τετάχθαι, is subject of δοκεῖ εἶναι μέγιστον. 'Some hold the right regulation of the relations of property to be of the utmost importance.' There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye *Primitive Property* Preface xxvii—xxxii, also pp. 149, 158 ff., 223.

39 διὸ Φαλέας...πρῶτος] From c. 8 § 1 (comp. Exc. II to B. II) it is clear that Phaleas was younger than Hippodamos: but if πρῶτος is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato published either of his. This conjecture finds support in the apparent meagreness of his proposal, its lack of all finished execution as com-



§ 3 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο <sup>2</sup>  
 1266 b δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο ποιεῖν, τὰς  
 δ' ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ' ἂν  
 ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν  
 λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-  
 § 4 νειν δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος  
 6 ᾤετο δεῖν εἶναι, πλεῖον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-  
 χίστης μηδεὶν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθά-  
 περ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.  
 § 5 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὃ λαν- <sup>3</sup>  
 10 θάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττοντας πλήθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν  
 τέκνων τὸ πλήθος τάττειν· ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγε-  
 θος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμὸς, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χω-

1266 b 2 δ' ἤδη Γ, δὴ Π<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>, δὲ Μ<sup>3</sup> Α<sup>4</sup>. || 3 τὰς omitted by Μ<sup>3</sup> Π<sup>1</sup>, [τὰς] Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 perhaps rightly || 5 [Πλάτων... 8 πρότερον] ? Susem. The brackets are necessary if  
 Schmidt is justified in rejecting 1265 b 21—26 (see Comm.) || 6 εἶναι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>,  
 [εἶναι] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1359 f. || 9 μὴ Bender || 12 τὸν τε  
 νόμον Bas.<sup>3</sup>, τὸν γενόμενον Μ<sup>3</sup> U<sup>b</sup>

pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. *nn.* 255, 256 on 8 §§ 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phaleas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform education which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the degradation of artisans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Böckh *Staats-haushaltung der Ath.* I. p. 65 and Roscher *Thukydides* p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian native town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel *Studien* p. 165 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, B.C. 390, and thence to Chalcedon, under the influence of the reviving strength of the Athenian Demos: Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 8. 27, Theopompus *Frag.* 65 in Athenaeus XII 526 D. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phaleas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great

hindrances to this hypothesis. SUSEM. (232)

§ 3 1266 b 1 εὐθὺς should be taken with the participle.

2 τάχιστα] The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 4 6 εἶναι = *laissez faire*.

8 καὶ πρότερον] 6 § 15 *n.* (213). Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. SUSEM. (233)

§ 5 9 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ κτλ] This remark was made before, 6 §§ 10—13, cp. *n.* (210). It is strange that Aristotle does not refer back to that passage. SUSEM. (234)

11 ὑπεραίρῃ = exceed, rise above. \*If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.'

12 ἀνάγκη...λύεσθαι] Schlosser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phaleas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phaleas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade. SUSEM. (235)

ρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας' (IV)  
 § 6 ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν 4  
 15 οὖν ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἢ τῆς οὐ-  
 σίας ὁμαλότητος, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνώκότες, οἷον  
 καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἔστι νόμος ὃς κωλύει  
 κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὅσῃν ἂν βούληται τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν  
 οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λοκροῖς νόμος  
 20 ἔστι μὴ πωλεῖν, εἰ μὴ φανεράν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβη-  
 § 7 κυῖαν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασφάζειν (τοῦτο δὲ λυ-  
 θέν καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν  
 αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινε ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρισμένων τιμημά- (p. 38)  
 των εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν)· ἀλλ' ἔστι τὴν ἰσότητά μὲν 5

18 ὁπόσῃν Ald. Bk., ὁπόσῃν or ὅσῃν Ar., ὁπόσῃν P<sup>2.3.4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> || 19 οἱ νόμοι]  
 ἐνιοι Bücheler, probably right || 24 ἔστι] εἰς τὸ P<sup>3.4</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand,  
 γρ. ἔστι corr.<sup>3</sup> in the margin), εἰς Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

χωρὶς=quite apart from the violation  
 of the law, it is a defect that many citi-  
 zens should decline from wealth to  
 poverty. Comp. 5 § 2, χωρὶς ἀπό.

13 φαῦλον κτλ] Comp. 6 § 13 n. and  
 IV(VII). 16 § 15 ff. n. (946). SUSEM. (236)

14 ἔργον to be taken as b 2 ἐργω-  
 δέστερον 'it is hard for such people not to  
 encourage sedition.' In III. 15. 8 also  
 ἔργον ἔστι=it is improbable, in the same  
 way as μόλις 'with difficulty' comes to  
 mean 'hardly ever.'

§§ 6, 7 The influence which equality  
 of possessions must exercise upon civil  
 society was recognized (1) by Solon's legis-  
 lation, (2) by laws which fix a limit to the  
 accumulation of landed property, (3) by  
 the law of Locri which forbids the sale of  
 land, (4) by a law of entail, as at Leucas,  
 where the disuse of the law altered the  
 constitution to an advanced democracy.  
 Yet the size of properties needs regulation,  
 if, when equalized, they are not to be over-  
 large or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Philolaos at  
 Thebes), VII(VI). 4. 9 (the Aphytaeans  
 and Oxylos in Elis), VIII(V). 7. 9 (Thurii).  
 See further Laveleye *op. c.* pp. 161—165  
 Eng. trans., A. Lang *Essay* XIII, esp. p.  
 89; 'all attempts to restrict the sale of  
 land and to keep it parcelled out in small  
 lots may be taken as survivals of early  
 custom.' An early equal distribution  
 (Maine's *Village Communities* p. 81),  
 perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a  
 tradition to the early lawgivers of Greece.  
 Long after them Phaleas, and Plato in

the *Laws*, 744 E, desire a return to the  
 old usage.

διότι μὲν...ὁμαλότης] At this point  
 then Aristotle's own socialism begins  
 to come out more clearly than before.  
 See notes on 5 § 7 (158), § 15 (166);  
 6 §§ 10—14 (208—211), and 7 § 5 (234).  
 Further comp. n. (192) and *Introd.*  
 p. 33. SUSEM. (236 b)

17 Like the law of Oxylos prohibiting  
 mortgage, VII(VI). 4. 9, Solon's σεισάχ-  
 θεια, or relief measure, restored mort-  
 gaged lands to their proprietors: γῆ  
 μέλαινα τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε | ὅρους ἀφείλον παν-  
 ταχοῦ πεπηγότας | τὸ πρόσθε δουλεύουσα  
 νῦν δ' ἐλευθέρα. His graduated assess-  
 ment must also have tended somewhat to  
 equality. But in addition to this Schö-  
 mann, *Antiquities* p. 330 Eng. tr., and  
 Curtius, *Hist.* i. 329 Eng. tr., represent  
 Solon as enacting a special law, that there  
 should be a maximum limit to the ac-  
 quisition of landed property: Grote (III. 182)  
 thinks no such inference borne out by  
 the present passage.

παρ' ἄλλοις] It is not known where.

19 ἐν Λοκροῖς] Presumably the Epi-  
 zephrian Locri, where Zaleucus was legis-  
 lator, c. 12 § 6.

§ 7 22 καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα] Cp. VII(VI).  
 4. 9 ἦν δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι  
 νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς  
 πρώτους κλήρους with note, and on the  
 custom at Sparta, c. 9 § 14 n. (300).  
 SUSEM. (237)

24 ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν κτλ] But then  
 there may be equality of possessions and



25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δὲ ἢ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε (IV)  
 τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ζῆν γλίσχρως. δῆλον οὖν ὡς  
 οὐχ ἱκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ  
 § 8 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ' εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν  
 οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας  
 30 ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις  
 ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλέας ὅτι  
 ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἶεται γὰρ δυοῖν τοῦτοις ἰσό-  
 τητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας.  
 § 9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἣτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν  
 35 εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν  
 εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται  
 προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμ-  
 § 10 φοτέρων, ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς  
 κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τὸνναντίον δὲ περὶ  
 40 ἐκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνι-  
 1267 a σον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ  
 ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός),

27 ποιῆσαι ἔσται Γ apparently || 28 τάξει M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 31 ἂν εἴποιεν M<sup>a</sup>, εἴποι ἂν  
 P<sup>2-4</sup>. Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>, εἴποιεν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) || 38 ἐπεὶ...  
 1267 a 17 πολιτείας = 1267 a 37 ἔστι... b 13 ἐατέον. See the text arranged in parallel  
 columns *Introd.* p. 80 f. || ἐπεὶ Spengel, ἔτι Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ὅτι  
 ?Susem. || 39 διὰ τὴν omitted by M<sup>a</sup>, διὰ by P<sup>1</sup>

1267 a 2 δ' M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1-2-3</sup> Ald. || καὶ omitted by Γ and M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand)

yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immoderately large or excessively small.

26 γλίσχρως] stingily, 'so as barely to make a living.' Demosth. c. *Arist.* 689, 25 ὡς μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα (δημοσίᾳ οἰκοδομεῖτε), c. *Plant.* γλίσχρως καὶ μόλις: Plato *Rep.* VII 553 c γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ συγκρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος, thriftily and gradually, by saving and working.

28 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον] See this more precisely defined in c. 6 §§ 8, 9; IV(VII). 5 § 1, with the notes: also VI(IV). 11 § 2 ff., as quoted in n. (207). SUSEM. (237 b)

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phaleas must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessities of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally,

(c) for higher gratifications. Phaleas can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambition which produces a tyrant.

30 τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ.] Compare with what follows 5 § 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 § 12 n. (296) and Exc. II on Bk. II p. 333. SUSEM. (238)

36 ἐξ ἧς = ὥστε ἐκ ταύτης.

§ 10 38 στασιάζουσιν] Cp. VIII(v). 1. 11 πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνίσον ἡ στάσις.

40 This opposition of οἱ χαρίεντες, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in *Nic. Eth.* I 5 §§ 3, 4. There joined with πρακτικοί, in *Pol.* VII(vi). 5. 10 with νοῦν ἔχοντες.

1267 a 1 ἐὰν ἴσαι sc. αἱ κτήσεις.

2 Homer *Iliad* IX. 319. SUSEM. (239)

The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.

- § 11 οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἅκος (IV)  
εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητά τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ  
5 ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν.  
ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν  
§ 12 ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν, οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν  
ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἅκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα- 8  
10 χεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτον δ', εἴ τινες  
δύναιτο δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῦεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ  
§ 13 φιλοσοφίας ἅκος. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ  
ἀδικοῦσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ  
τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν (διὸ καὶ

3 θ' Susem.<sup>2</sup>, δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1-3</sup> in the text || 8 ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν or ἀνεπιθυμητοί (cp. Clem. Al. *Strom.* VII. p. 742. A. B.) Bojesen, ἀν ἐπιθυμοῦν Γ II Ar. Bk., ἀν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν? Schneider following Lambin's translation, Bernays omits the words || 11 δύναιτο] βούλουτο P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. perhaps rightly || αὐτῶν P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτῶν Γ M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Ald. || 12 ἐπεὶ II Ar. Bk.: ἔτι or ἐπεὶ <δ'> Rassow. Then the apodosis begins with ὥστε. William does not translate ἐπεὶ: hence [ἐπεὶ] and ἀδικοῦσι δὲ Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> erroneously for ἀδικοῦσί γε

§ 11 Shilleto pointed out that these three causes of crime strongly resemble those which are mentioned in *Rhet.* I. 12. 17 ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν, where see Cope's note.

6 ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω] sc. τῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιθυμίας 'For if the desire goes beyond the necessities of life.' Compare *Nic. Eth.* VII. 4. 2 1147 b 23 ff. ἔστιν τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιοῦντων ἡδονῆν, (viz. τὰ σωματικά, e.g. τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν,) τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολὴν; these are οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα; νύκη, τιμὴ, πλοῦτος are examples: and VII. 14. 2 1154 a 15 ff. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν (sc. φαῦλος) ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαῖας (Congreve). SUSEM. (240)

§ 12 8 ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 12. 2 1152 b 36 ff. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι: X. 3. 7 1173 b 16 ff. ἄλυτοι γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὁσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνημαὶ καὶ ἐλπίδες. Taken from Plato *Phil.* 51 B—52 B where occur αἱ περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν αἱ πλείεσται, καὶ αἱ τῶν φθόγγων; also αἱ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδοναί. (Eaton.) SUSEM. (241)

One could hardly have supposed that this last was a fruitful source of crime.

9 ἅκος] Here is a digression into the region of practical suggestions and expedients, in the same spirit as VII(VI). c. 5, VIII(V). cc. 8, 9.

10 ἐργασία] constant employment. σωφροσύνη] Cp. n. (206 b) on 6 § 9. SUSEM. (242)

Here this word means self-restraint generally, and not thrift, as before.

11 παρὰ φιλοσοφίας] As in 5 § 15, 'culture.' The education of the citizens and the elevation of the masses are the leading ideas of B. V(VIII).

12 αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι sc. ἡδοναί. ἀνθρώπων δέονται] Compare *Nic. Eth.* X. 7. 4 1177 a 27 ff. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων..., τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοις viz. τοῖς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίοις, ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν... ὁμοῦς αὐταρκέστατος: IX. 4. 5 1166 a 26 f. (Eaton). SUSEM. (243)

§ 13 14 τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ρ.] 'It is not to keep out the cold that men become tyrants.' Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 7 1134 b 6 ff. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος <ἐπεὶ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος>, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ



- 15 αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαί, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ <sup>(IV)</sup> <sub>(p. 39)</sub> τύραννον· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον  
 § 14 ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται  
 κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς,  
 δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειννιῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.  
 20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολε-  
 § 15 μικήν ἰσχύν, περὶ ἧς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἶρηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ  
 περὶ τῆς κτήσεως. δεῖ γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς  
 χρήσεις ἱκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κιν-  
 δύνους· διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὧν οἱ  
 25 πλησίον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν  
 οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὔθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε μὴ δύ-  
 § 16 νασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἐκεῖ-  
 νος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, [δ'] τί  
 συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἄριστος ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσι-

17 ἔτι τὰ.....37 πολιρκίας transposed by Susem. to follow b 13 ἐατέον || δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly from William, <φι>λεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι? Schmidt, βούλεται κατασκευάζεσθαι? Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1365, βουλεύεται κατασκευάζειν M\* || 20 ἀρα] γάρ? Koraes, but see Dittenberger *l. c.* || 24 ὧν] ὥστε Spengel, but see Vahlen *Aristot. Aufsätze* II. p. 21 (Wiener Sitzungsber., phil.-hist. Cl. LXXII. p. 23) || 25 ἐπιθυμοῦσιν P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπιθυμοῦ M\* || ἀμύνεσθαι Ridgeway || 26 οὐτ' <οὐσίαν>? Schmidt, but κτήσιν can be understood from what precedes || 28 [δεῖ...b 13 ἐατέον] Bender, [δεῖ...37 πολιρκίας] Susem.<sup>2</sup>, probably right: see Comm. || τί Conring, ὅ τι Stahr Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ὅτι Γ II Ar. Bk., ᾧ τί Lindau. Bender retains ὅτι and suggests πλῆθος <τι>

τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι: IV. 1. 42, 1122 a 3 ff.: meanness is shown in petty gains,—those who take on a large scale, despots who plunder cities and not temples, are called πονηροί, ἀσεβεῖς, ἀδικοί, but not mean, ἀνελεύθεροι (Eaton). SUSEM. (244)

διδό] The crime is greater because the excuse is less: it is not διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Hence the higher reward given to those who punish it.

§ 14 19 δεῖ δὲ κτλ] The same criticism as was passed on the *Latous*, 6 § 7. That the constitution must necessarily have reference to the maintenance of the military force follows directly from the assumption of the military régime which Plato and Aristotle make without reserve. Cp. again VII(VI). 6. §§ 1—5.

§ 15 24 πλῆθος sc. τῆς κτήσεως. ὧν = ὥστε τούτων; as ἐξ ἧς, § 9.

25 οἱ πλησίον = οἱ πέλας, *Rhet.* I. 5. 17 where see Cope's note.

ἀμύνει τοὺς ἐπιόντας may perhaps

be defended by Plato *Phaedrus* 260 B πολεμίους ἀμύνειν. But see *Critical Notes*.

27 πόλεμον...ὁμοίον] to support a war even with an equal or similar power, ἴσοι καὶ ὅμοιοι = a state of the same standing, an equal.

§ 16 We should not fail to decide what limit to property is advisable.

28 δεῖ δὲ κτλ] This limitation has been sufficiently noticed in the preceding § 15, yet the repetition might be justified, if it now appeared under a new form, much sharper and better defined. This would not be the case unless the second explanation of 29 ἴσως οὖν κτλ, as given in the next note, were correct. But, as is there shown, this can hardly be accepted. That being so, there is certainly then fairly good reason to suspect, with Bender, that it is now appended solely for the purpose of introducing the anecdote about Eubulos. SUSEM. (246)

29 ἴσως οὖν...31 οὐσίαν] 'Perhaps the best limit of wealth is that its excess

30 τελεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλ' (IV)  
 § 17 οὕτως ὥς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οἶον Εὐβου-  
 λος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευ-  
 σεν αὐτόν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον,  
 λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην· ἐθέλειν γὰρ ἔλατ-  
 35 τὸν τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλείπειν ἤδη τὸν Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δ' εἰ-  
 πὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννουν γενόμενον παύσα-  
 § 18 σθαι τῆς πολιορκίας. || ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ 11

34 ἐθέλειν δεῖν Γ? (*debere* William) || 35 ἐκλείπειν Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 37 ἔστι μὲν... b 8  
 ἀδικῶνται, with which goes b 9 οὐ... 13 ἐατέον, is believed by Susem. to be another  
 recension of the preceding 1266 b 38 ἐπεὶ... 1267 a 17 πολιτείας. See *Introd.* p. 81

should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less.' The ellipse may be filled up thus, ἀλλ' οὕτως πολεμεῖν λυσιστελεῖν ὥς ἂν ἐπολέμησαν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων, sc. τῶν ἡττόνων, τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. Our wealth should never tempt aggression: we should then only be exposed to the same attacks as a poorer state in our place. That is, we should aim at being the 'lean wiry dogs' with whom their neighbours are glad to make common cause against 'fat and tender sheep': *Republic* IV 422 D.

A less simple rendering has been proposed: 'that is the best limit of wealth when a stronger power does not find it profitable to make war upon us for the sake of the excess of the booty to be gained over the costs of victory, but when (even if it conquers us) it is no better off than if it had not made so great an acquisition.' This suits the sequel better, but somewhat strains the meaning of ὑπερβολὴν and οὐσίαν, besides leaving a harsh genitive absolute: ἀλλ' οὕτως συμφέρειν ὥς ἂν συνέφερε μὴ ἐχόντων (τῶν κρείττόνων) τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. It can hardly be right.

§ 17 During the last years of Artaxerxes Mnemon and at the commencement of the reign of Artaxerxes Ochus, the confusion in Asia Minor, more particularly owing to the revolt of Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia Lydia and Paphlagonia, suggested the idea of wresting a part of the Hellenic lands on the coast of Asia from the Persians. The requisite means for effecting this were secured, and it was even possible to maintain the severance. Eubulos was a Bithynian by birth, a money-changer, i.e. banker, by trade, and at the same time ἀνὴρ φιλόσο-

φος, i.e. probably one of Plato's scholars, like his freedman and successor Hermias. Through the medium of his business he found he could execute such a scheme as this, and make himself absolute ruler (τύραννος) of Atarneus on the Aeolic coast of Mysia, and of the stronghold of Assos in the Troad with the adjacent districts: *Vita Aristotelis* in Westermann's *Biographoi* p. 402, Suidas s.v. Ἀριστοτέλης, Ἑρμείας, Strabo XIII. 610. Böckh (*Hermias of Atarneus* in his *Ges. Kl. Schriften* VI. 183 ff.) tries to show, as others have done, that this event happened before 359 B.C.; that in 359 Autophradates as general of the Persian king marched against Artabazos and took him prisoner, and that in the course of this same campaign he laid siege to Atarneus. The suggestion by which Eubulos raised the siege is, as Böckh remarks, one worthy of a banker. We know that he maintained his power down to his death: also that it was not before 345/44 that his successor, the eunuch Hermias, Aristotle's friend (see I. 6. 9. n. 56) was overthrown by the Rhodian Mentor, the Persian commander-in-chief, and that solely by stratagem deceit and treachery. SUSEM. (247)

Bergk's posthumous paper *On the chronology of king Artaxerxes III, Ochus*, in *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVII. 1882. pp. 355—362 fixes the fall of Hermias and the escape of Aristotle and Xenocrates to Mitylene (and thence to Athens) in the year 345/44. Comp. Susemihl in Bursian's *Jahresber.* XXX. 1882. pp. 4—7.

36 σύννουν γενέσθαι, to become thoughtful, to reflect.

That §§ 18—20 are parallel to §§ 10—13 has been explained *Introd.* p. 80 f.

§ 18 37 ἔστι μὲν... 38 πολιτείας] Comp. line 3 ἂν ἄκος... 4 οὐσίας.



τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (IV)  
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ  
 40 χαριέντες ἀγανακτοῖεν [ἂν] ὥς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ  
 § 19 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ'  
 1267 b ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκα-  
 νὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ἦ πάτριον, αἰεὶ δέον-  
 ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἀπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ  
 τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ  
 § 20 ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὅμα- 12  
 6 λίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευά- (p. 40)  
 ζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ  
 δύνασθαι τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἥττους τε ᾧσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶν-  
 § 21 ται. || οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἶρηκεν. περὶ  
 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων

38 ἴσας after εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> Bk., perhaps I; possibly right || 40 ἂν II<sup>2</sup> Bk., omitted by II<sup>1</sup>

1267 b 5 ἀρχή is corrupt: ἀκη Scaliger, ἄκος Schneider, ἀρωγή M. Vermehren, ἀλκή? Madvig probably right, <ἀπαλλαγῆς> or <λατρείας> ἀρχή Schmidt; ἀρκεῖ Koraes, certainly not right

38 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls στασιάζουσι of § 10.

39 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτλ] a 16 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας κτλ.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν κτλ] "For even then (ἐὰν ἴσαι αἱ κτήσεις, § 10) the higher classes would be discontented, as they lay claim to something more than an equal share, and hence are often found aggressive and factious."

40 οὐκ ἴσων] ἀλλὰ πλείονος: on the ground that they deserve something more than an equal share, something proportionately greater. Comp. III. 13. 13 and Thuc. VIII. 89. 4 πάντες γὰρ αὐθμερόν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺν πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι. In Thuc. I. 132 § 2 μὴ ἴσος=superior.

§ 19 1267 b 2 διωβολία] This refers to the so-called θεωρικόν, a grant of public money to provide for shows or public amusements introduced at Athens after Pericles' time. In the first instance at those festivals only at which plays were exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was paid from the state-chest to the lessee of the theatre for every citizen present. (Every one who went to the theatre received a counter which he gave up on going in; the lessee collected from the state the two obols for every counter; but

he had to pay a rent out of his receipts and to keep the theatre in repair. See Benndorf *Beiträge in Zeitschrift f. d. öst. Gymn.* XXVI. 1875. p. 23 ff.) Subsequently the poorer citizens received the like dole for all the other festivals, and these outgoings swallowed up no small part of the revenues. See Böckh *Public Econ. of Athens* p. 217 Eng. tr., Schömann *Antiquities* I p. 341, p. 438 ff. Eng. tr. An Attic obol=1/3d. of our money, a little more than five farthings, or 11 German Pfennige: Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 172. SUSEM. (245)

4 ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτλ] Comp. a 5 ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν. § 20 6 τὸ τοὺς μὲν...7 πλεονεκτεῖν] Substantially the same remedy as in § 12 τρίτον δ' εἰ τινες...ἄκος.

§ 21 The argument from inconsistency is pressed from opposite sides here and in 6 § 15. Phaeas must have meant to include personal property, § 3.

10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων κτλ] Comp. *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 πλοῦτον δὲ μέρος νομίσματος πλήθος, γῆς χωρίων κτήσεως, ἐτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσεως καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων, where Cope explains ἐπιπλά as "moveables" opposed to fixtures, such as houses and land. Hence furniture, even if of bronze, Xen. *Oecon.* IX. 6, Thuc. III. 68.

καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευῇ (IV)  
 πολλὰ τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων· ἢ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἰσό-  
 § 22 τητὰ ζητητέον ἢ τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, ἢ πάντα ἐατέον. φαί- 13  
 νεται δ' ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μι-  
 15 κρίαν, εἴ γ' οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ  
 § 23 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δη-  
 μοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν  
 Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ Διοφάντῳ ποτε κατεσκευάσεν Ἀθήνησι,  
 τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.  
 20 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἂν  
 τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει καλῶς εἰρηκῶς ἢ μὴ κα-  
 8 λῶς· Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφώντος Μιλήσιος, ὃς καὶ τὴν τῶν V

16 δεῖ] δὴ P<sup>3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) ||  
 17 δεῖ] καὶ with a comma after 16 εἴπερ Bernays; if so, ἐργαζομένους <μόνους>  
 Susem.; probably right, but see Comm. The same sense can be obtained by Well-  
 don's punctuation εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ, καθάπερ  
 provided ὡς be inserted after 18 τε καὶ || 18 ὡς inserted by Morel Bk. before Διο-  
 φαντος, omitted by II; the translations of William and Ar. are no warrant that they  
 had ὡς in their mss. || 21 τι] τις II<sup>2</sup> || 22 [ὅς ..... 28 βουλόμενος] Congreve; the  
 passage had been suspected by Fülleborn. See Comm.

§ 22 15 δημόσιοι=public servants. Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. 11. 11 δημιουργός=ιατρός): also ναυπηγοί and others, Plato *Gorg.* 455 B with Dr Thompson's note, *Politics* 259 A.

16 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως] Exactly Plato's expression *Rep.* 371 E πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεως εἰσι καὶ μισθωτοί (Eaton). SUSEM. (248)

Comp. III. 13. 13, VI(IV). 4. 12.

§ 23 17 ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ κτλ] "No one but a political dreamer or dreamy politician like Phaleas could hatch the thought that the handicrafts throughout the city should be carried on by public slaves. The proposal made at Athens by Diophantos, we do not know when, was that only the artisans who worked for the community were to be public slaves"; Böckh *Staatsh.* I. 65. [not in the Eng. trans.] This was certainly the case at Epidamnos. With the present text this sense can only be obtained by interpreting the words τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους to mean 'those who do common work for the whole community'; and we should be forced to assume that even Phaleas' proposal went no further than this, which is very improbable. Hence the alteration

suggested by Bernays is tempting. The archon of the year Ol. 96, 2=395/4 was named Diophantos, but he can hardly have been the man. "Aelian relates that the people of Epidamnos allowed any one who liked to settle amongst them as a resident, Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐπιδημεῖν καὶ μετοικεῖν παρέχον τῷ βουλομένῳ: V. H. III. 16" (J. G. Schneider). But this fact throws no light on the passage. On the constitution of Epidamnos see further III. 16 § 1, VIII(V). I § 10, 4 § 7 *nn.* SUSEM. (249)

Bernays renders: "But if (this proposal is to be tried), state-slaves ought only to be employed upon works for state objects, and the arrangement must be made as it is found in Epidamnos and as Diophantos wanted to introduce it at Athens."

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of Hippodamos of Miletus. This chapter is analysed p. 105 f.

§ 1 22 Ἰππόδαμος] See Excursus II to B. II p. 331 ff.; also K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo Milesio* (Marburg 1841). SUSEM. (250)

This chapter is treated slightly by Hildenbrand pp. 58—61, Oncken I. 213—218, Henkel 162—165. See also



πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὔρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος (V)  
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περίττοτερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως  
25 ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει  
καὶ κόμης, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεεινῆς δὲ οὐκ  
ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρό-  
νους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος,]  
πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησέ τι περὶ πολιτείας  
§ 2 εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκευάζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει 2  
31 μὲν μυρίανδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημένην· ἐποίει γὰρ  
ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προ-  
§ 3 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον. διῆρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη <καὶ> τὴν

23 περεᾶ (not παρεᾶ as Susem.<sup>1</sup> gave) P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> (?) U<sup>b</sup> || 26 κόμη] κόσμω πολυτελεῖ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Bernays and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, καλλωπισμῷ Bender, κόσμω Ridgeway, κοσμήσεω Welldon || ἔτι δὲ omitted by T<sup>b</sup> Sepulveda's codices Bender Ridgeway Welldon, ἐπ' Bernays || 28 λόγιος P<sup>2-3</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, σπουδαῖος W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald. || 32 μὲν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> || 33 τὰ L<sup>a</sup> and U<sup>b</sup> (corr.), τὸ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1-2-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and U<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) || <καὶ> τὴν Schmidt

M. Erdmann *On Hippodamos and symmetrical town architecture in Greece* in *Philologus* XLII. 1883. pp. 193—227.

22 δὲ καὶ...28 βουλόμενος] Fülleborn remarked long since: "every reader must be struck with one strange thing in this introductory notice by Aristotle, viz. the picture he draws of Hippodamos. With what object has he preserved for posterity these proofs of the man's vanity and effeminacy? Do they serve to explain the spirit of his work? I doubt it." And Congreve, who rightly holds that this description would be more consistent with Theophrastus than with Aristotle, suggests that here we may reasonably suspect a later hand. SUSEM. (252)

23 κατέτεμεν] cut out, i.e. laid out the streets; Pindar *Pyth.* 5. 84 εὐθύτομον κατέθηκε...σκυρωτὰν ὁδόν.

25 ζῆν περιεργότερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

In the following words ἐσθῆτος must be taken with πλήθει according to the reading of Π<sup>1</sup> adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κόσμω, the reading of Π<sup>2</sup> (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl. *Supp.* 246 for κόσμος, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλλωπισμῷ or κοσμήσεσσι, which are the conjectures of Bender and Welldon respectively.

τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ κόμης] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long

hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hegesippos, a contemporary and supporter of Demosthenes, was on this account nicknamed Κρωβόλος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μὴ φθονεῖθ' ἡμῖν κομῶσι, Aristoph. *Knights* 580. See Becker *Charikles* III. 233 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453—55. SUSEM. (251)

26 εὐτελοῦς] of cheap material, though warm.

28 λόγιος] a man of learning, as in IV(VII). 10. 3 and often in Herodotos (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετεωρολόγιος.

§ 2 30 τὴν πόλιν] Oncken I. 214 n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamos § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artisans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded to Aristotle's criticism §§ 8—12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (253)

§ 3 33 διῆρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη κτλ.] So too Aristotle IV (VII). cc. 9, 10. (Eaton.) Cp. n. (365) on II. 10 § 8. SUSEM. (254)

χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δ' ἰδίαν ὅθεν (V)  
 35 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἱερὰν, ἀφ' ὧν  
 δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν  
 § 4 ἰδίαν. ᾧτο δ' εἶδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον· περὶ  
 ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, <sup>(p. 41)</sup>  
 ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν  
 40 τὸ κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρί-  
 σθαι δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γε-  
 1268 a  
 § 5 ρόντων αἰρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ  
 ψηφοφορίας ᾧτο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον πι-  
 νάκιον, ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς [τὴν δίκην], εἰ

35 ἱερὰ P<sup>3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 37 δὲ καὶ εἶδη Γ  
 apparently, possibly right || 40 δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup>

1268 a 2 ᾧτο omitted by W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald., in P<sup>4</sup> inserted in the margin || 3 κατα-  
 δικάζει P<sup>1</sup> and 1st hand of P<sup>2-3</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || τὴν δίκην omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

35 ἀφ' ὧν δ' κτλ] Here there is just a germ of Plato's ideal state, when we consider that the soldiers answer to the second order, and the artisans and farmers together to the third order of citizens in the *Republic*. However even when viewed in this light the differences between the two schemes are as great as the resemblances. But the state proposed in the *Laws* may be described as hardly anything more than an improved working out of Phaleas' ideal. Comp. L. Stein *op. c.* p. 162 f. SUSEM. (255)

§ 4 37 ᾧτο κτλ] See Exc. II. to B. II p. 333 f. SUSEM. (255 b)

ὕβρις and βλάβη answer to crimes against the person and against property. Not precisely however; for ὕβρις implies insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings or honour, whether accompanied by violence or not. Whereas βλάβη implies loss or damage sustained, whether to person or property. See *Rhet.* I. 12. 26, II. 2. 5 with Cope's excellent comments.

39 ἐνομοθέτει δὲ...] This idea of a court of appeal is further evidence that Hippodamos had a fine sense for jurisprudence. It is appropriated by Plato also *Laws* VI 767 c—E, XII 956 c f. (Oncken). Cp. also Exc. II. SUSEM. (256)

40 τὸ κύριον = the supreme court.

§ 5 1268 a 1 οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας] In the Athenian courts the voting was secret: each juryman (δικαστής) received two ballots, one for condemnation, the other

for acquittal; and there were two urns, one of copper, into which the ballot containing the verdict was thrown, the other of wood, into which the other, unused ballots were thrown. The ballots for voting were either differently coloured stones or small metal balls, or even differently coloured beans or shells. At what time the one or other of these were used is not known. Stones were certainly the most common; a black stone served for condemnation, a white one for acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a hole in it served for the former purpose, a whole one served for the latter purpose. Equality of votes was counted as acquittal. (Meier and Schömann *Attische Process* 720 ff.) SUSEM. (257)

Aristotle himself is our authority for the voting at Athens: see *Frag.* 1548 b 5—41 of the Berlin ed.

2 ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον κτλ] Nearly the same arrangement was actually introduced amongst the Romans: a fact which shows how clearly this proposal testifies to a legal mind of great originality. At Rome the voting was by tablets in the manner here proposed, leaving it to the iudices to affirm not simply condemnation (C) or acquittal (A), but also a verdict of "not proven" (NL, non liquet). That Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is as yet quite unable to realize to himself the proper meaning of the proposal is a further proof of its originality. (L. Stein.) Comp. n. (268) on §§ 13—15. SUSEM. (258)



δ' ἀπολλοὶ ἀπλῶς, κενὸν <ἐάν>, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο (V)  
 5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾔετο νενομοθετῆσθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκά-  
 § 6 ζειν γὰρ ἐπιорκεῖν [ἡ] ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἔτι δὲ 4  
 νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὕρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον,  
 ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-  
 λευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὡς οὐπω τοῦτο  
 10 παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος  
 § 7 ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἐτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ  
 τοῦ δήμου αἵρετοὺς εἶναι πάντας· δῆμον δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία  
 μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' αἵρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν  
 καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν.  
 15 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἰππο- 5

4 ἀπολλοὶ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>, ἀπολλοῦσι L<sup>a</sup> || <ἐάν> Meier (*De bonis damnatorum* p. 58)  
 || <καὶ> τοῦτο Meier *l.c.* perhaps rightly || 6 ἡ omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup>, ἡ ταῦτα omitted  
 by L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, both words added by P<sup>1</sup>) [ἡ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Dittenberger  
*op. c. p.* 1360 f. || ἔτι δὲ ἐτίθει νόμον P<sup>4</sup> in the margin, in the text ἐτίθει is omitted,  
 ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk. || 9 τοῦτο] τότε and 10 Ἐλλῆσιν instead  
 of ἄλλοις Spengel, but see Dittenberger *op. c. p.* 1369 ff. and Comm. || 11 ἐτέροις  
 P<sup>2-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμον after 12  
 αἵρετοὺς Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 καὶ ξενικῶν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by P<sup>1</sup>  
 in the margin)

5 ἀναγκάζειν sc. τὸν νόμον.  
 § 6 9 ὡς οὐπω κτλ] "just as if this  
 law had not been made before elsewhere."  
 So K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo* p. 44,  
 who is defended by Dittenberger (*Gott.*  
*gel. Ans.* 1874 p. 1369) against Spengel.  
 It is true that ὡς with the participle  
 might equally mean (1) *because in fact*,  
 as in Pl. *Phaedr.* 245 E ὡς ταύτης οὐσης  
 φύσεως, or (2) *because as he thought* (ὡς  
 οὐκ ἔν ἀδύνατον § 6): but νῦν is not  
 decisive in favour of (1), see *n.* (259).

οὐπω, not μήπω; cp. Lysias 14 § 10  
 ἐτόλμησεν ἀναβῆναι, ὡς οὐκ ἐξεσόμενον τῇ  
 πόλει δίκην λαμβάνειν: 27 § 16 ὥσπερ τοῦ  
 ονείδους ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ζήμιας αὐτοῖς μέλον:  
 Xen. *Cyr.* v. 1. 13 ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ  
 κλέπτειν, αἰτία τὸν κλέπτοντα. The clause  
 is virtually oblique, and the negative is  
 reproduced unchanged.

10 ἔστι δὲ...νῦν] Here as often νῦν =  
 as things are, "under the existing system"  
 not simply = now, as Spengel explains it.  
 Unless one follows Spengel in an unten-  
 able alteration of the text, the drift of the  
 passage can only be a censure upon Hip-  
 podamos, which is even in this form  
 quite intelligible, though it would cer-  
 tainly have been more clearly expressed  
 as follows: "whereas a law like this was

already at the time in force at Athens."  
 We cannot however prove the date of  
 this Athenian regulation (on which Wil-  
 mowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 26 may also  
 be consulted), but the present passage  
 would seem to make it earlier than the  
 treatise of Hippodamos. It is quite pos-  
 sible that Aristotle's censure is unfair;  
 for who is to inform us that in its author's  
 intention the scheme of Hippodamos was  
 restricted to new proposals, never before  
 realized? Cp. Hermann *op. c. p.* 43 f.  
 SUSEM. (259) Cp. for νῦν § 5, c. 1 § 3,  
 3 § 6, 5 § 11, § 17, 6 § 11 οὐκ ὁμοίως τότε  
 (in Plato's supposed state) καὶ νῦν (as  
 things actually are), *Rhet.* I. 1 § 4, 1354 a  
 19 καθάπερ ἐν ἐλαίς γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων.

§ 7 11 τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας κτλ] All  
 officials (perhaps even the priests) were  
 consequently to be appointed by popular  
 election and not by lot; comp. *Excursus*  
 II p. 332. SUSEM. (260)

12 δῆμον...πόλεως] It would seem  
 that Hippodamos did not state whether  
 all three classes were eligible (Oncken).  
 See however *n.* (262). SUSEM. (261)

13 τοὺς δ' αἵρεθέντας] the magistrates  
 elected to have the charge of state mat-  
 ters and of the affairs of foreigners and  
 minors in the city.

δάμου τάξεως ταύτ' ἐστίν ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν (V)  
 § 8 διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἳ τε γὰρ τεχνῖται καὶ οἱ γε-  
 ωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες,  
 οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῖται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε  
 20 ὅπλα, ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων.  
 § 9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ  
 τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ πο-  
 λιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὥς εἰπεῖν· μὴ  
 μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἶόν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν  
 25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα  
 γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ' οὐ ῥάδιον  
 § 10 μὴ πολλοὺς ὄντας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέ-  
 χειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων κα-  
 ταστάσεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίτας  
 30 μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), (p. 42)  
 καὶ δύνανται διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε-  
 σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ  
 ὅπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφήν εὐλόγως ἂν ἦσαν τι τῆς πό-  
 λεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἰδίᾳ γεωρ-  
 § 11 γήσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινήν, ἀφ' ἧς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἔξουσιν  
 36 τὴν τροφήν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μά-

17 οἱ omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [οἱ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 25 καὶ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 26 γε  
 omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [γε] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 34 ἰδίᾳ] ἰδίαν Π<sup>1</sup> || γεωργοῦσιν Ar. Morel Bk.

16 τάξεως] scheme, polity: cp. 10  
 § 4, 11 § 8. The fuller phrase is τάξις  
 τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας 1. 2. 16, or τῆς  
 πολιτείας II. 6. 1, where the sense of  
*ordering, arrangement*, is as apparent as  
 in II. 2 § 4, or II. § 9, or III. 1. 1.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον] Aristotle  
 criticizes (§§ 8—15) (1) the entire division  
 into classes, (2) the special position of  
 the agricultural class, (3) the innovations  
 in the administration of justice.

§ 8 20 δοῦλοι] This partly explains  
 the proposal of Phaleas to make them  
 δημόσιοι.

§ 9 21 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν κτλ.]  
 Yet Aristotle seems to assume this to  
 have been the intention of Hippodamos.  
 SUSEM. (262)

Obviously he is applying his own  
 standard πολίτης ὁ μετέχων ἀρχῆς.

22 πολιτοφύλακας] what sort of ma-  
 gistracy Aristotle understands by this  
 word is not clear and is not sufficiently  
 explained by the notice, VIII(V). 6 § 6 n.

(1573), of a magistracy under this name  
 in Larisa. SUSEM. (263)

As τὰ γὰρ are attested by an inscription  
 for Larisa of 214 B.C. (Ridgeway *Trans-*  
*actions* II p. 138) it seems likely that Aris-  
 totle there uses a different term in order  
 to express the functions of the office.

24 μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ κτλ.] Aristotle  
 himself altogether excludes the farmers,  
 tradesmen, and artisans in his ideal state  
 from the rights of citizenship; which is a  
 much stronger measure. But possibly he  
 thinks it is not essential for those who  
 are thus excluded to be attached to the  
 constitution, but that if they are to be  
 citizens, it is. SUSEM. (264)

§ 10 31 διαγίνεσθαι = earn subsistence;  
 so καταζῆν, καταγίγνεσθαι.

33 εὐλόγως ἂν κτλ.] They would  
 then be in the position of the δῆμος of  
 the Republic.

34 νῦν δὲ = whereas what Hippoda-  
 mos proposes is that they shall have land  
 of their own.



χιμον ἕτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργούν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ (V)  
 δ' ἕτεροί τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν  
 μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μῦθον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδε-  
 § 12 νὸς μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ  
 41 τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τοὺς τε τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν  
 γεωργούντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν  
 1268 b ἕκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας, καὶ τίνος ἔνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς  
 ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφήν  
 λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πολ-  
 § 13 λὴν ἔχει παραχρῆν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως  
 5 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιρουντας τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς  
 γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο γὰρ  
 ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογούνται γὰρ  
 ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ  
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντίον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ

37 γεωργεῖν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || ἕτερον εἶναι after νομοθέτης Γ Μ<sup>a</sup>, a similar gloss τοῦτους  
 ἐτέρους εἶναι P<sup>2</sup> in the margin || 39 αὖ] οὖν Π<sup>3</sup> || τοῦτο after τῆς πόλεως Μ<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> ||  
 42 Spengel thinks καρπῶν corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἄπορον, for which δυσπρόριστον  
 seems to him to be required by the sense

1268 b i γεωργήσει Π Bk., ministrabit William, habeant ministrare Ar., doubtless  
 on mere conjecture; hence erroneously ὑπουργήσει Vettori Susem<sup>1,2</sup> and others ||  
 δύο οἰκίας can hardly be sound, δυσὶν οἰκίαις Ar. Camerarius, <eis> δύο οἰκίας Ber-  
 nays, δύο [oikias] Busse not happily || 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Böcker (not bad),  
 <δλης> τῆς Madvig, [καὶ] Bernays Susem.<sup>2</sup>; there is some corruption || 5 τὸ κρίνειν  
 ἀξιοῦν Π Bk., ὁ κρίνειν ἀξίων Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly from the translations of William and  
 Ar. || διαιρουντα P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk., διαιρουνται L<sup>a</sup> || δίκης Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., κρίσεως Π<sup>2</sup>  
 Bk. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) || 6 γὰρ Ar., δ' Γ Π Bk. || 7 καὶ <μή>  
 πλείοσιν? Koraes || 9 καὶ omitted by Γ Μ<sup>a</sup> || τούτω τῶν P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2,3,4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk.,  
 τούτων W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βούλεται κτλ] Comp. n.  
 (201) on δ § 6.

§ 12 42 τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον κτλ]  
 "the amount of produce will be in-  
 adequate for the maintenance of two  
 establishments." This again is a mere  
 assertion which ought to have been  
 proved. SUSEM. (265)

1268 b i γεωργήσει οἰκίας] See  
 Critical Notes. It is impossible to defend  
 the text as meaning to maintain two house-  
 holds by agriculture on the analogy of oi-  
 kias oikēn.

§ 13 4 ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law  
 about passing sentence.

5 τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν κτλ] "the require-  
 ment that a verdict shall be returned  
 upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. καταδι-

κάζει τὸ δὲ μή, § 5) when the charge in  
 the indictment is simple, whereby the  
 juror is turned into an arbitrator." ἀξιοῦν  
 is infinitive.

6 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] This is practic-  
 able in arbitration even (καὶ) where there  
 are several arbitrators, for they confer  
 with one another about the decision.

7 καὶ πλείοσιν] At Athens a single  
 public arbitrator decided each case, but if  
 private arbitrators were chosen by the  
 parties to the dispute themselves, a body  
 of 3 or 4 might well have been more  
 common. SUSEM. (266)

8 ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστ.] In this respect  
 then the practice in the Greek courts of  
 justice was just the reverse of that in  
 ours. SUSEM. (267)

10 παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται πρὸς (V)  
 § 14 ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν  
 ὀφείλειεν μὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δ' ὅσον ὁ δι-  
 καζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ  
 δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεόν ὁ δ' ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ  
 15 δὲ τέτταρας (καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δηλὸν ὅτι μεριού-  
 § 15 σιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρό-  
 πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι [δ'] οὐδεὶς ἐπιорκεῖν  
 ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἰ-  
 περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλημα γέγραπται δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μη-  
 20 δὲν ὀφείλειεν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς (p. 43)  
 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιорκεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὀφεί-  
 § 16 λειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσιν τι τῇ 10  
 πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τινα τιμὴν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-

12 μὲν after ὁ Π<sup>2</sup> and perhaps Γ || δὲ Π<sup>1</sup>, omitted by M\* and perhaps Γ ||  
 13 κρινεῖ Bk.<sup>2</sup>, κρίνει Γ Π Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 15 δὴ || δὲ Π<sup>2</sup> || 16 οὐδέν] οὐ Γ M\* and Π<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 17 δ' omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 19 γέγραπται δι-  
 καίως Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 21 ἀλλ'...22 μνᾶς omitted by M\* || 21 ἤδη  
 omitted by Γ M\* and Π<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup>), [ἤδη] Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly || 23  
 γενέσθαι M\* Π<sup>1</sup>

§ 14 12 ὁ δικαζόμενος may be either  
 litigant. If the participle is *passive*, it  
 denotes the defendant; if *middle*, the  
 plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

13 8 μὲν γὰρ...15 τέτταρας] "For he  
 (the plaintiff) claims 20 minae, but the  
 juror will decide for ten—or whatever  
 the larger sum may be which is claimed  
 by the former and the smaller sum which  
 is awarded by the latter—while another  
 (juror) will award five, and yet another,  
 four" (Bernays). This seems slightly  
 better than to understand πλεόν, ἔλασ-  
 σον, πέντε, τέτταρας of sums awarded by  
 different jurymen (dicasts).

15 μεριούσι] will estimate damages  
 according to a graduated scale. Comp.  
 Demosth. *adv. Lept.* 494, 4 δεῖ τοίνυν  
 μεμερίσθαι τὰ τῶν ὄψεων.

§ 15 16 τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what  
 way then are the votes to be counted, i.e.  
 sorted? διαλογή=collecting and arrang-  
 ing: *diribitio* Cic. *Pro Plancio* § 14.

19 εἴπερ ἀπλῶς...δικαίως] "if the in-  
 dictment has been framed (not condition-  
 ally but) absolutely with justice." (It  
 has also been proposed to put a colon be-  
 fore δικαίως: "and justly too; for &c.")  
 If the suit be for 20 minae, acquittal  
 means that the defendant does not owe 20  
 minae, it says nothing about liability for

a smaller sum.

21 ἤδη] when we turn to the judge  
 who condemns while not believing the  
 twenty minae to be owing, it is quite true  
 that he commits perjury. Comp. VIII  
 (v). 8. 6 ὥσπερ δῆμος ἦδη οἱ ὅμοιοι (Cope).

§§ 13—15 'L. Stein *op. c.* 162 n.  
 rightly calls this whole criticism a misap-  
 prehension. If the judges, or jurors, are  
 forbidden to converse with one another,  
 it is certainly impossible for them to find  
*non liquet* in concert: it is however pos-  
 sible for all to reach the same result with-  
 out consultation, and still more likely that  
 only in this way can some one of them  
 clear his conscience. And if, after the  
 fact of a pecuniary indebtedness has been  
 established, the jurors cannot agree upon  
 the amount, then a conditional verdict  
 is the only one possible, and in that case  
 certainly there can be no final decision  
 except by way of compromise. Thus this  
 objection makes for Hippodamos, rather  
 than against him' (Oncken). And lastly  
 how is it made out that the 'majority of  
 legislators' were right in excluding con-  
 sultation amongst the jurors? At any  
 rate our modern regulation (see n. 267)  
 has pronounced them to be wrong. Cp.  
 also n. (258) on § 5. SUSEM. (268)

§ 16 23 οὐκ ἀσφαλές] "the proposed



λὲς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει (V)  
 25 γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχη, πολιτείας. ἐμ-  
 πίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν· ἀποροῦσι  
 γὰρ τινες πότερον βλαβερόν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ  
 § 17 κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ᾗ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ  
 οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέ-  
 30 ρει κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἰσηγεῖσθαι τινὰς νόμων λύσιν ἢ  
 πολιτείας ὥς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, 11  
 § 18 ἔτι μικρόν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ,  
 ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ  
 κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,  
 35 οἷον ἱατρικὴ κινήσεισα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ  
 καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν  
 τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύ-  
 § 19 τὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ' ἂν γεγονέναι φαίη  
 τις ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λαν

27 τὸ <μῆ> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. || 30 γὰρ Spengel, δ' Γ II Bk. || 32 μικρὰ Π<sup>2</sup>  
 Ar. Bk.

legislation is not safe, but only specious to the ear,"—a curious confusion of metaphors.

24 ἔχει γὰρ κτλ] for it leads to false accusation and possibly to changes in the constitution (see n. on line 30 below). Informers would always claim to reveal facts highly useful to the state, as did the Roman delatores. ἂν τύχη=should it so happen; and so εἰ τύχοι, τυχόν, εἰ ἔτιχεν.

26 ἄλλο πρόβλημα] another question. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες] Can this have been in written works? SUSEM. (269)

§§ 16—25 *Is it expedient to alter the laws of a country in order to introduce improvements?*

With this interesting discussion compare *Rhet.* I. 15 §§ 4—12 (Spengel); also Plato *Polit.* 294 A—302.

28 τοὺς πατρίους νόμους] 'The ancestral laws' would include much that is unwritten: customs, institutions, those traditional practices of the society which serve as a basis (οἷον ἐρείσματα) to the written code, Plato *Lawes* III 680 A οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πῶς, ἀλλ' ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἐπόμνηοι ζῶσι. Comp. *Lawes* VII 793 B—D: see n. (48) on I. 6, 1, and II. 5 § 5, § 15.

§ 17 29 τῷ λεχθέντι=the proposal of Hippodamos.

εἴπερ μὴ συμφέροι κινεῖν] "in case it

turns out to be inexpedient": i.e. if on the wider question we decide against change.

30 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ] "Some may propose the repeal of the laws or the constitution as a public benefit." When thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμοι=the code of positive law. The revolution of the Four Hundred, it will be remembered, was effected by the suspension, in legal form, of the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the great safeguard against the subversion of the Athenian constitution.

32 διαστείλασθαι=enter into detail. It is used in *Topics* V. 3, 8, 131 b 15, 17, as synonymous with διορίσασθαι. Cp. Pl. *Rep.* VII 535 B ποῖα δὲ διαστέλλει;

§ 18 33 βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖν] This view is maintained §§ 18—22.

34 ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων κτλ] Cp. III. 15. 4, n. (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§ 7, 8: IV(VII). 2 § 13 n. (726); 13 § 2 n. (870): III. 6 § 7 n. (531). SUSEM. (270)

36 μίαν.....37 πολιτικὴν] It is Aristotle's invariable practice to rank Politics with the "arts and faculties": e.g. VI(IV). 1 §§ 1—3, *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 1.

§§ 19, 20 A most valuable line of inquiry. We could wish he had noted down a few more of these antiquated usages.

40 ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἑλ-<sup>12</sup>  
 § 20 ληνες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε  
 λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστὶ που νομίμων, εὐήθη πάμπαν ἐστίν,  
 1269 a οἶον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικά νόμος ἐστίν, ἂν πλήθους

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ P<sup>1-3</sup>, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντοτε γὰρ P<sup>2</sup>, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ P<sup>4</sup>, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο γὰρ Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τότε γὰρ Bas.<sup>3</sup>, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τε γὰρ Koraes, ἐσιδηροφόρουν γὰρ τότε Susem.<sup>1</sup> misled by William's version; see Dittenberger *op. c. p.* 1371

1269 a 1 κόμη ΓΜ<sup>a</sup>

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο] Thuc. 1. 5 § 3 τὸ τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τούτοις τοῖς ἡπειρώταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ληστείας ἐμμεμένηκε: 6 § 1 πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηροφόρει, διὰ τὰς ἀφράκτους τε οἰκίσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν διαίταν μεθ' ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (270 b)

41 τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο] The suitor purchased the daughter of her father by means of presents (ἐδνα): see Schömann *Greek Antiquities* 1. 52 [Eng. trans. by Mann and Hardy p. 48 ff.]. Schneider compares marriage by *coemptio* among the Romans. SUSEM. (271)

There is a valuable note on the ἐδνα or bride-price in the English translation of the *Odyssey* by Butcher and Lang. "The ἐδνα in Homer are invariably gifts made by the wooers to the father or kinsmen of the bride, that is, the bride-price, the *kalym* of the dwellers on the Volga... The father of the bride was thus said ἐδνοῦσθαι θυγατέρα (*Od.* II. 53), to accept certain ἐδνα as the price for his daughter,—what is called 'coming to terms about the marriage' in *Iliad* XIII. 381 (ἄφρα...συνώμεθα...ἀμφὶ γάμφ). As a rule the woman would go to the highest bidder, but in the case of a favoured wooer it seems to have been not unusual either to remit the price and give the bride ἀνέδνον (cp. Agamemnon's offer to Achilles, *Il.* IX. 141), or to return a portion of the ἐδνα after marriage (*Od.* I. 278, II. 196), as is still the custom among the Kanakas in New Caledonia." Homer also mentions gifts from the wooers to the bride, and μελῖα, gifts from the bride's father to his daughter: but φερνή, the later word for dowry, does not occur. Even in Pindar ἐδνα is used in the sense of φερνή: *Pylh.* 3. 94. (Eaton compares Tac. *German.* 18; but that is the 'Morgengabe,' something quite different.)

§ 20 1269 a 1 οἶον ἐν Κύμῃ] This forcibly recalls compurgation, the established legal usage in ancient times in

England and amongst other Teutonic peoples. That the oath might thus be employed on behalf of the accuser is sufficiently attested, although cases where it is taken on behalf of the accused are usually mentioned. The Greek custom is confirmed by the inscription of Gortyn, column 11, lines 36—44. The law has prescribed certain fines, the price to be paid for the ransom of an accused person charged with adultery and in the power of his captors. But he may plead that he was (wrongfully) seized by force: cp. [Demosth.] *c. Neaeram* § 66 1367, 10 ἀδίκως εἰρχθῆναι ὡς μοιχόν. If so, the captor must support his charge by compurgators, whose number depends on the amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Four are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200 staters: i.e. if the aggrieved husband is a full citizen. (β) Two are necessary if the aggrieved husband is an ἀφέταιρος, i.e. free but not a full citizen: while (γ) if the aggrieved husband is a serf (οἰκέας), the serf's lord (πάστας) and one other compurgator must appear. The fine for (γ) is 2½ staters, for (β) 10 or 20 staters. The Cretan text of the law runs thus: αἱ δὲ κα ποιεὶ δολοσασθῆναι [i.e. ἐὰν δὲ φωνῇ δουλῶσασθαι], ὁμοσαι τον ελοντα το πεντεκονταστατερο [τοῦ πεντηκονταστατήρου] καὶ πλιονος πεντον αυτον, Fw αυτοι [ἐαυτῶ] Fεκαστον επαριεμενον [ἐπαρώμενον], το δ' απεταίρο [τοῦ δ' ἀφεταίρου] τριτον αυτον, το δε φοικεος τον πασαν ατερον αυτον, μοικιοντ' ελεν [μοιχῶνθ' ἐλεῖν] δολοσασθαι δε με [μή]. And if he shall plead that (the captor) overmastered him, the captor shall swear—in the case of the 50 staters or more, himself with four others, each imprecating on himself: in the case of a clanless man, himself with two others: in the case of a house-thrall, his lord with one other—(an oath) that he took him in adultery and overmastered him not. See Zitelmann in *Das Recht von Gortyn*, pp. 101—107; and Mr H. J. Roby *The twelve Tables of Gortyn* in the



τι παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ (V)  
 § 21 συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσι δὲ  
 ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τὰγαθὸν πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς  
 5 πρῶτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν,  
 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ  
 λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς  
 τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἔαν  
 § 22 ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, (p. 44)  
 10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι·  
 καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γράφειν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ τῶν 13  
 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσίν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερόν ὅτι κινη-  
 τέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον  
 § 23 ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβείας ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ  
 15 ἢ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς  
 νόμους φαῦλον, φανερόν ὡς ἐατέον ἐνίας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν

6 ὁμοίως Π<sup>3</sup> Ar. || 7 τὸ omitted in Π<sup>3</sup> || 8 ἔαν Γ Ar. || 11 γραφῆναι  
 Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

*Latv Quarterly Review* II. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of δολοσασθαι 'beguiled,' as if from δολοῦν.

§ 21 5 εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν] It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, αὐτόχθονες; see Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. 62 f. Plato makes use of it for his myth *Polit.* 271 ff., cp. *Symf.* 191 B f. In *De Gen. Anim.* III. II. 25, 762 b 28 Aristotle expresses grave doubts on the question whether such a so-called 'generatio aequivoca' should be assumed for men and quadrupeds as well as for lower forms: yet he goes on to inquire how it must be supposed to take place. SUSEM. (272)

εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσ.] This agrees with the view explained in n. (167) on 5 § 16, and was much more Aristotle's real opinion, as it was the opinion of Plato *Timaeus* 22 C: πολλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γέγονασιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔσονται, πυρὶ μὲν καὶ ὕδατι μέγισται, μύριοι δὲ ἄλλοις ἑτεραι βραχύτεραι: *Latv* III 677 A ff. πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγενῆσθαι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχὺ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος. SUSEM. (273)

6 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ] "were much the same as the ordinary silly people" of today; cp. Vahlen *Beiträge* III. 314. ol

τυχόντες recurs in c. 9 § 23, 10 § 10, 11 § 3.

ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark *Politicus* 274 B f.: αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες διηρπάζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θηρίων), καὶ ἐτ' ἀμήχανοι καὶ ἀτεχνοὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους ἦσαν χρόνους... ἐκ τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλαις ἦσαν ἀπορίαις. SUSEM. (274)

Cp. *Protag.* 321 C: man naked and defenceless before the introduction of the arts (Eaton).

8 οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους] Positive law as contrasted with the δόγματα and ἀγραφα νόμματα discussed in §§ 19—21. See VII(VI). 5. 2 τιθεμένους δὲ τοιοῦτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους. The distinction is best explained by Cope *Introd. to Rhetoric* pp. 239—244.

§ 22 9 ὥσπερ γὰρ... 12 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσίν] See III. 16 § 11 with n. (652) f. and n. (637) on III. 15 § 4; also III. 11 § 19 n. (579): the ruler or rulers are supreme where the laws cannot prescribe exactly διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. SUSEM. (275)

10 καὶ (περὶ) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν] "So too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing."

§ 23 A sound argument, quite in Bentham's spirit.

νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται (V)  
κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθεῖς.

§ 24 ψεύδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐ<sup>14</sup>

20 γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχύει  
οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο  
δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλήθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥαδίως  
μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἐτέρους νόμους

§ 25 καινοὺς ἀσθενῇ ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δὲ

25 εἰ καὶ κινητέοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ  
οὐ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ἢ τισίν; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγά-  
λην διαφοράν.

9 διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν (ἄλλων γὰρ  
ἐστι καιρῶν)· περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς VI

30 Κρητικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν δύο

17 ὠφελήσεται τις M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ὠφελήσεται <ὁ> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> misled by the translations of William and Ar. || 18 βλαβήσεται ὁ Schneider || ὑπάρχουσιν Bernays, which I should unconditionally accept were it not for the addition of καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων after 17 νομοθετῶν || 21 παρὰ Π<sup>1</sup>, πλήν corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup>, πλήν παρὰ Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 23 νόμον P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand altered by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 25 καὶ before κινητέοι omitted by FM<sup>a</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || κινητέον Π<sup>3</sup> || καὶ πάντες P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Bk. || 28 διὸ...1273 b 24 ἡσυχ(ας noticed by Michael of Ephesus

17 οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον κτλ] Comp. *Rhet.* I. 15. 12 οὐ λυσitelεί παρασοφί-  
ζεσθαι τὸν ἱατρὸν (to outdo your doctor):  
οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία τοῦ ἱατροῦ  
ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἀρχοντι;  
Thuc. III. 37 χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις  
χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστίν (Eaton).  
Eur. *Bacchae* 971 f., οὐ γὰρ κρείσσον ποτε  
τῶν νόμων | γινώσκειν χρὴ καὶ μελετᾶν.

§ 24 19 ψεύδος δὲ κτλ] 'These re-  
marks are very true. This is a difference  
between the sciences or arts and the laws.  
In the former only he who follows the  
science has to act and his action on an im-  
proved method proceeds from conviction:  
whereas, if the laws are altered, all must  
act according to the new law and though  
unconvinced of the need for alteration'  
(Schlosser). SUSEM. (276)

21 παρὰ τὸ ἔθος] 'has no force to  
secure obedience apart from habit.' The  
*Critical Notes* show how the 'conflate'  
reading, πλὴν παρὰ, arose.

§ 25 24 ἔτι δὲ...27 διαφοράν] Plato's  
utterance *Laws* I 634 D exactly agrees  
with this: ὅμῳ μὲν γὰρ (Cretans and  
Lacedaemonians), εἰπερ καὶ μετρίως κατε-  
σκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἰς τῶν καλλίστων

ἀν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδ' ἐνα-  
εἶν, ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει,  
...γέρον δὲ εἰ τίς τι ξυνοεί τῶν παρ' ὁμῶν,  
πρὸς ἀρχοντά τε καὶ πρὸς ἡλικιωτῶν μηδεὶς  
ἐναντίον νέου ποιέσθαι τοιοῦτους λό-  
γους. Oncken, I. 252, strangely alleges  
this passage of the *Laws* as a proof of its  
author's design 'to strangle the healthy  
common sense of men in the name of  
political order.' SUSEM. (277)

28 νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν] See *Introd.* pp.  
49, 53. SUSEM. (278)

This implies that the question has to be  
decided elsewhere in the treatise.

c. 9 Examination of the Spartan  
polity.

See *Anal.* p. 106. Since Götting's  
*Excursus*, pp. 463—471 of his edition,  
this chapter has been most fully treated  
by Oncken I. 218—299, II. 317—376, who  
writes with especial reference to Grote's  
memorable chapter on Lycurgus and, in  
vol. II, to the later monographs by Trieber  
*Forschungen* and Gilbert *Studien*. See  
p. 35 note 3. The fragments of the *Politi-  
cies* 1557 b 38—1560 a 28 should be com-  
pared. See also Jannet *Les institutions  
sociales à Sparte*.



εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν (VI) ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

§ 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν 2  
35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενον ἐστίν·  
τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν. ἢ τε γὰρ Θετ-  
ταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως  
δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἴλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες

33 <ῆ> ὑπεναντίως Scaliger, ὑπεναντίως <ῆ μὴ ὑπεναντίως> Susem. would prefer: but no alteration is needed || αὐτοῖς] αὐτῆς M<sup>a</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), αὐτῶ P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτῷ P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), αὐτῷ Ar. || 34 <πόλει> πολιτεύεσθαι? Madvig || 37 πενεστία M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>4</sup> and P<sup>2,3</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> and a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>) || 38 οἱ omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, [οἱ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

§ 1 31 μία μὲν κτλ] The two points to consider are (1) its absolute, (2) its relative success: "whether its legislation is good or bad in relation to the best system; secondly, whether it is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption and scheme of the constitution proposed." πρὸς = when judged by a given standard.

32 εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν... ὑπεναντίως] sc. νενομοθέτηται. So § 18 ὑπεναντίος δὲ... πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

The Helots or Serfs: § 2—4.

§ 2 34 ὅτι μὲν οὖν... 35 ὁμολογούμενον ἐστίν] Here we are allowed a very important glimpse of the nature of Aristotle's own ideal state. Cp. also n. (192) on 6 § 5; c. 11 § 10 n. (393); IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 8; 10 § 9 with n. (813), and *Introd.* p. 22 n. (3). SUSEM. (279)

35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν] leisure free from imposed labour: I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5.

36 τε followed by 38 δέ.

ἢ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία κτλ] Compare 5 § 22 n. (178). Wherever in Greece bodies of serfs stood midway between freedom and slavery, it is well known that the relation invariably arose in consequence of a subjugation of the earlier inhabitants by victorious invaders. Thus the earlier inhabitants of Laconia obtained the freer lot of Provincials (Περλοικοί) or else were forced into a dependent position of this kind as Helots according as they submitted to the Spartans earlier or later, more or less easily, of their own free will or by compulsion. See Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* I p. 191—194, Eng. tr., to whose account of the Helots p. 194—200 it is sufficient to refer (comp. however Gilbert *Studien* p. 76 ff.). The Penestae

were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archemachos *Fr.* 1, from Athenaeus VI. 264 A: Βοιωτῶν τῶν τὴν Ἀρναίαν κατοικησάντων οἱ μὴ ἀπάραντες εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, ἀλλ' ἐμφιλοχωρήσαντες παρέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς Θετταλοῖς δουλεῖν καθ' ὁμολογίας, ἐφ' ᾧ οὐτε ἐξάξουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς χώρας, οὔτε ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν χώραν ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς συντάξεις ἀποδώσουσιν· οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας καταμεινάντες καὶ παραδόντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐκλήθησαν τότε μενέσται, νῦν δὲ πενέσται: and Theopompus *Fr.* 134 in Ath. VI. 265 B, C: Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Θετταλοὶ φανήσονται κατασκευασμένοι τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν οἰκούντων πρότερον τὴν χώραν, ἣν ἐκείνοι νῦν ἔχουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἀχαιῶν, Θετταλοὶ δὲ Περραιβῶν καὶ Μαγνήτων· καὶ προσηγόρευσαν τοὺς καταδουλωθέντας οἱ μὲν εἰλωτας οἱ δὲ πενέστας. On the similar relation between the Mariandynians and the people of Heracleia see n. (777) on IV (VII). 6 § 8. SUSEM. (280)

Plato compares Helots, Penestae and Mariandynians *Latius* VI 776 C, D.

38 ἐφεδρεύοντες] always in wait to pounce upon their misfortunes: Thuc. IV. 80 αἱ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς περί μάλιστα καθεσθίκει.

§ 3 τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδέν  
 40 πῶ τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αἴτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιῶσας  
 1269 b πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμ-  
 μαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς (p. 45)  
 κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες  
 ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες·  
 5 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ  
 πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περαιβοῖς καὶ  
 § 4 Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε τῆς  
 ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῆσαι  
 τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιούσιν  
 10 ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι  
 καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον <δ'> οὖν ὥς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον  
 § 5 τρόπον, οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰλωτείαν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ  
 περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πο-

1269 b 3 περὶ οἴκους M<sup>a</sup> and apparently Γ (*praedia circa domus* William) || 5  
 ἐφίσταντο Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin || 6 περραιβοῖς Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 9 ἀνιέμενοι  
 Trieber (perhaps rightly) || 10 κακοπαθοῦντες P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, perhaps rightly), γρ.  
 κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 11 <δ'> οὖν or γοῦν Susem., οὖν  
 Γ II Ar. Bk. || 12 ἔτι...1270 a 8 πάλιν Plut. *Lyk.* 14 quotes similar statements  
 from Aristotle, but, as Heitz (*Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* p. 30) rightly  
 judges, from his *Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία*

§ 3 40 αἴτιον δ' ἴσως] It might be  
 thought that one very material reason  
 was the much freer and less oppressed  
 position which, according to Aristotle's  
 own evidences 5 § 19 n. (171), the  
 Cretans granted to their dependants  
 (Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 n.  
 (355), § 5 (357), § 8 (364), § 16 (374).  
 SUSEM. (281)

1269 b 3 περιοίκους] See c. 10 § 3  
 and Exc. III.

5 τοῖς Θετταλοῖς] *dativus incommodi*.  
 ἀφίσταντο sc. οἱ πενέσται.

§ 4 7 τό γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας κτλ] "the  
 task of attending to this; how, namely,  
 we ought to associate with them"—the  
 sentence τίνα δεῖ...τρόπον being depen-  
 dent on the noun ἐπιμελείας, just as in  
 IV (VII). 16. 1 πότε χρὴ ποιῆσθαι τὴν ὁμι-  
 λαν is dependent on ἐπιμελητέον. We  
 may render: "It would seem too that  
 apart from everything else there is the  
 irksome task of seeing that we behave to  
 them as we ought: for when allowed  
 their freedom, they grow insolent and  
 claim equal rights with their lords: if  
 treated harshly, they plot revenge and

cherish hatred."

11 δῆλον κτλ] The truth of this re-  
 mark no one will wish to question. But  
 does Aristotle really know of a remedy?  
 He hopes to get over the difficulty in his  
 own 'best state' by taking men of non-  
 Hellenic race to till the soil, slaves or  
 serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent  
 freemen of different nations but only of  
 the gentler races: IV (VII). 10 §§ 13, 14,  
 n. (840): cp. IV (VII). 8 § 8 (815), and n.  
 (364) with Exc. III. Supposing all this  
 could be so fortunately arranged, would  
 it have been any real remedy? SUSEM.  
 (282)

*The women of Sparta*: §§ 5—12.

§ 5 13 ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις]  
 So Plato speaks *Λαῖος* I 637 c δεικνὺς  
 τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὑμῶν ἄνεσιν, and  
 Euripides *Androm.* 595 οὐδ' ἂν εἰ βού-  
 λοιτό τις | σώφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιατὶδων  
 κόρη (Eaton). SUSEM. (283)

πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας]  
 "judged by the intention of the constitu-  
 tion," the second point of view for criti-  
 cism as mentioned in § 1. The other, the  
 standard of the best constitution, is here



λιτείας βλαβερά καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ (VI)  
 15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς  
 τοῦ δίχα διηρῆσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἰς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλη-  
 θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις πολιτεαῖς φαύλως  
 ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως δεῖ νομί-  
 20 § 6 ζεῖν εἶναι ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν ὅλην γὰρ  
 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικὴν, κατὰ  
 μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρας τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν  
 ἐξημέληκεν· ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν  
 25 § 7 καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ  
 τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τύχῳσι γυναικοκρα-  
 τούμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολε-  
 μικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι φανερώς

14 εὐνομίαν P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar. Ald., corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup> and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin (wrongly) ||  
 15 [ἀνὴρ καὶ] Oncken || 16 εἰς τε] ὥστε M<sup>a</sup> and, with εἰς τε written over it, Γ<sup>1</sup>  
 apparently || 18 δεῖ νομίζειν after 19 εἶναι P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 21 τοιοῦτος ἐστίν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>,  
 φανερός ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος ὡς II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. perhaps rightly, φανερός ἐστὶ τούτου τυχῶν Bender  
 || 24 τυγχάνωσι Ald. and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup>, τύχῳσι καὶ M<sup>a</sup> || 26 [?] Schneider ||  
 φανερώς omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin); [φανερώς]  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup>

called the Wellbeing or Happiness (εὐδαι-  
 μονία) of the state (Congreve). This  
 then, and not εὐνομίαν, is the right read-  
 ing. For the best constitution is pre-  
 cisely that which most contributes to the  
 'best life' or Happiness. See I § 1 n.  
 (128): I. 2 § 8 n. (21); and especially III.  
 18 § 1 n. (683), IV (VII). I § 1 (685), § 2  
 (687), § 11: 2 § 2, § 5 (714), 9 § 3 f.  
 (806), 13 § 3. SUSEM. (284)

15 οἰκίας μέρος] So I. 3 § 1, 4 § 1,  
 13 § 15.

καὶ πόλιν...νομίζειν] "one must regard  
 the state as nearly divided into two."  
 But the construction is not plain: is it  
 ἐγγὺς <οὖσαν> τοῦ δίχα διηρῆσθαι? This  
 would be supported by VI (IV). 6. 11,  
 VIII (V). I. 16, where ἐγγὺς is almost an  
 adjective. Or it might also be νομίζειν  
 διηρῆσθαι ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα <διηρῆσθαι>.

16 From Euclid *Elem.* I. 10, I. 9,  
 III. 30 it is seen that δίχα διαιρεῖν = to  
 divide into two *equal* parts. Cp. *Nic.*  
*Eth.* v. 4. 8 with Jackson's note.

17 ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις κτλ] From this it  
 is seen, as indeed before from I. 13 § 16  
*nm.* (126) (127), that Aristotle intended to  
 introduce into his ideal state a public edu-  
 cation and training for women, although  
 this education was certainly not to be

common to boys and girls. Cp. *Introd.*  
 pp. 49, 52 (2). In the *Latins* VI 781 B  
 Plato had expressed himself still more  
 forcibly: οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστίν, ὡς  
 δόξειεν ἂν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀκοσμήτως  
 περιορώμενον, ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις  
 ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων,  
 τοσοῦτω διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλεῖν ἢ διπλάσιον  
 εἶναι. Aristotle however says quite the  
 same thing *Rhet.* I. 5. 6 1361 a 10 ff., ὅσοις  
 γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακε-  
 δαιμονίους, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἡμῖν οὐκ εὐδαι-  
 μονοῦσιν (quoted by Eaton). SUSEM.  
 (285)

§ 6 20 καρτερικὴν] of hardy endu-  
 rance.

22 ἐξημέληκεν] has disregarded his  
 aim. This picture of luxurious living is  
 indirectly confirmed by Plato *Rep.* VIII.  
 548 A, B; ἐπιθυμητὰ δὲ ἡ χρημάτων οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι ἀτε κεκτημένοι ταμεία καὶ οἰκίους  
 θησαυροὺς, καὶ αὐτοὶ περιβόλους οἰκίσεων  
 ἀτεχνῶς νεοττίας ἰδίᾳ, ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες  
 γυναῖξιν πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῶντο: cp. 550 D.

§ 7 23 ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον] Wealth  
 must needs be in esteem, because the  
 unbridled luxury of women is a very  
 costly business. SUSEM. (286)

26 Κελτῶν] See *Note on the Celts*  
 at the end of B. II. SUSEM. (287)

§ 8 *τετιμήκασιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε γὰρ* (VI)  
*ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεύξαι τὸν Ἄρην*  
*πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἥ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμίλῳ*  
*30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακώχσιμοι πάντες*  
*οἱ τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦθ' ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ*  
 § 9 *διωκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι*

28 πρῶτος M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || ἀρην P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || 32 διώκετο M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

§ 8 28 *ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος*] Aristotle imagines that myths, like laws and customs, *nm.* (296) (300) on § 12, § 14, are direct inventions of individuals, who consciously intended by means of them to represent to sense certain ideas and thoughts. Cp. also v(VIII). 6 § 13 *n.* 1078. SUSEM. (288)

29 *ἢ γὰρ κτλ*] 'In his assertion, that martial races are also the most amorous, Aristotle is supported by the views of modern anthropologists' (Fülleborn). SUSEM. (289)

30 *κατακώχσιμοι*] easily captivated, with *ὑπὸ* v(VIII). 7. 4, with *ἐκ Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 3; with *πρὸς* one might say "easily allured to."

31 *διὸ παρὰ κτλ*] Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 268 Eng. tr. is certainly right in saying that the social position and influence of women in Sparta was not higher than it is amongst the modern peoples of the west, and that the prevailing condition of things with us in this respect would have appeared to an Athenian of the best time to be a species of feminine rule (*γυναικοκρατία*), although it does not at all alienate our women from their natural and most appropriate calling of housewives and mothers. But this does not thoroughly answer the question proposed by J. G. Schneider (see *n.* 295 b) and by Oncken: whether true womanliness can have thriven under so rough a treatment of the marriage relation as was customary at Sparta: whether a family life and true domesticity could be found when the Spartan full-citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished from the family, lived continually with his comrades in arms, ate at the public table, slept in a tent, and only paid stolen visits to his wife; where consequently the household was without a head, the wife without a home of common duty and mutual improvement, where parental duty was removed and the natural field for the wife's activity abolished. If

in the latter respect Aristotle mistook the cause of the evil (as his retention of common messes for the men and his excessive public education prove), does this justify us in assuming that his description of the evil itself is wholly incorrect? In reference to the first question, if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to hand over one's wife to another, if, as Schömann himself thinks, *op. c.* p. 267, a Spartan woman, to whom proposals were made by another man, hardly felt herself insulted by them but referred the lover to her husband, then (as Fülleborn and Schömann after him have remarked) the boast of the Spartans, that adultery was never heard of amongst them, does not amount to much: adultery here only means an intrigue with another man without the husband's permission. The further boast of the Spartan women, that they were in an especial degree good housewives (Schömann *op. c.* p. 268), must accordingly be reduced to its proper dimensions. Plato however concedes (*Lysis* VII 805 *e. f.*) that though the Spartan women did not weave and spin, occupations which they left to their female slaves, they yet led an active life: since they had nearly half the responsibility for the management of the household and the education of the children. Certainly there is some exaggeration in the charges of license and love of power brought against them, and this must be moderated from the above points of view: but it is quite as certain that they are not all pure inventions. Oncken refers his readers to the proof given by him *Hellas and Athens* II. 85. Cp. *Introd.* p. 36 *n.* (1). SUSEM. (290)

32 *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς*] during their supremacy. Cp. § 10 *n.* (292): VIII(v). 6. 13. *ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλεναδῶν ἀρχῆς*, 7 § 14 *ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων*: and *De Caelo* III. 2 § 7, 300 b 30, *ἐπὶ τῆς φιλό-τητος*, during the reign of Love.



τί διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν (VI)  
 γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταὐτὸ γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ' οὐ- (p. 46)  
 35 σης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἶπερ,  
 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν  
 § 10 Λακῶνων ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς  
 χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐτέραις πόλεσιν,  
 θόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν 8  
 40 οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυ-  
 § 11 ναικῶν ἀνεσις. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας  
 1270 a ἀπεξενούντο πολλὸν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους  
 πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους.  
 σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδο-

35 εἴπερ II Bk.; ἢπερ Sylburg Susem.<sup>1</sup> misled by William's version *nisi ad bellum*  
 || 36 τοῦθ' τοῦτον Spengel

1270 a 1 τῆς οἰκείας (οἰκίας ? Γ Ar.) omitted by M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), added by P<sup>1</sup>  
 in the margin || 4 προωδοπεποιημένους Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> by a misprint (corrected by  
 Bender)

§ 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλίων] See 5 § 4 n.  
 and I. 7 § 2. SUSEM. (291)

§ 10 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς]  
 'at the time of the Theban invasion'  
 under Epameinondas 369 B.C. SUSEM.  
 (292)

38 χρήσιμοι κτλ] "For they were  
 of no use, any more than the women in  
 other cities, but they caused more con-  
 fusion than the enemy." It is significant  
 that the encomiasts of Sparta, Xenophon  
 (*Hellen.* VI. 5 28 αὶ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν  
 καπνὸν ὀρώσαι ἠνέχοντο, αἵτε οὐδέποτε  
 ἰδοῦσαι πολεμίων) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 31  
 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυνάμενων ἡσυχάζειν,  
 ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὐσῶν πρὸς τε  
 τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῶν πολεμίων)  
 speak much more strongly on this point.  
 Oncken observes quite rightly, that this  
 was the first opportunity the Spartan  
 women had for putting into practice the  
 brave speeches they had been making for  
 centuries; they might at least have dis-  
 played a quiet bearing, even if they were  
 not to be taken at their word. SUSEM. (293)

Bernays renders: 'although the women  
 in other cities are of use' [on such occa-  
 sions]. But is it so? The *Septem* of  
 Aeschylus scarcely bears this out.

Plato must allude to this, *Latius* 806 B.

§ 11 1270 a 1 ἔξω γὰρ κτλ] Accord-  
 ing to Plutarch *Lycurg.* 1, in his account  
 of the constitution of Sparta Aristotle  
 placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier  
 than the time of Iphitos, about the begin-

ning of the era of the Olympiads, 776 B.C.  
 (J. G. Schneider). See this passage  
 among the *Fragments* 490, 1558 a 13,  
 Rose=485 in *Rose Aristot. pseudop.* = 76  
 Müller. Further compare especially Gil-  
 bert *Studien* 72 ff. 158 ff. SUSEM. (294)

The passage is as follows: οἱ μὲν γὰρ  
 Ἰφίτῳ συνακμάσαι καὶ συνδιαθεῖναι τὴν  
 Ὀλυμπιακὴν ἐκχειρίαν λέγουσιν αὐτόν, ὃν  
 ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τεκμήριον προσφέρων  
 τὸν Ὀλυμπιασὶ διῆσκον ἐν ᾧ τοῦνομα τοῦ  
 Λυκούργου διασώζεται καταγεγραμμένον.  
 E. Curtius, *History* Eng. tr. i. p. 191,  
 adopts this date. Even so, there would  
 be a grave chronological difficulty if  
 these Arcadian wars be supposed to pre-  
 cede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war  
 is dated 743—723 B.C. But as to the  
 main fact Aristotle is correct. A long  
 period of camp-life, of war in which the  
 Spartans lived perpetually in the field,  
 must have preceded the complete estab-  
 lishment of the system and the institu-  
 tions which are referred to the Lycurgean  
 legislation\*. Such a period we find in  
 the tedious and difficult conquest of La-  
 conia by its Dorian invaders.

4 προωδοπεποιημένους] Note the dou-  
 ble formation of perfect.

\* I entirely agree with Wilamowitz *Homeri-  
 sche Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1884, p. 267 ff., that  
 Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the  
 supposed Lycurgean legislation never had an  
 existence; and I also regard the account which  
 he gives of the real state of things as altogether  
 correct. SUSEM.

5 πεπονημένους διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει<sup>(V1)</sup>  
 μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας φασὶ μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχει-  
 ρῆσαι τὸν Λυκούργου ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὥς δ' ἀντέκρουον,  
 § 12 ἀποστῆναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται τῶν γενομέ-<sup>9</sup>  
 νων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς  
 10 οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίτι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν,  
 § 13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-

7 ἐπὶ] ὑπὸ ? Koraes || 8 γενομένων M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 11 τοῦ] τὰ Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), γρ. τοῦ P<sup>4</sup> in the margin

5 πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει μέρη κτλ] Cp. Plato *Laus* I. 630 E οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μέριον καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον ἐτίθει [ὁ Λυκούργος] βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν: Thuc. I. 84. 3 πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ εὐβουλοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκοσμον γιγνόμεθα: V. 66. 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (294 b)

6 φασὶ] As to whether this is an anonymous quotation from Ephoros, or an appeal to oral tradition, see *Introd.* p. 35 n. (3). Cp. also below n. (310) on § 7. SUSEM. (295)

7 ὥς δ' ἀντέκρουον κτλ] Precisely so Plato *Laus* VI. 781 A τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας οὐδαμῶς ὀρθῶς ἀνομοθέτητον μεθεῖται... ἀλλ' ὁ καὶ ἄλλως γένος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικλοπώτερον ἔφην, τὸ θῆλυ, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο ἐλξάντος τοῦ νομοθέτου δύστακτον ὄν ἀφείθη. This Plutarch must have forgotten, when (*Lycurg.* 14) he attacks Aristotle alone on account of this same remark and tries to refute him. The facts which he adduces with this object prove simply nothing: but directly afterwards (c. 15) he gives a detailed account of the Spartan custom of lending wives, and this does not make the assertion, which he appends to it, very credible: viz. ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως πραττόμενα φυσικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς τότε τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχε τῆς ὑστερον λεγομένης γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εὐχερείας, ὥστε ὅλως ἀπιστον εἶναι τὸ τῆς μοιχείας παρ' αὐτοῖς. Even he does not venture to deny the subsequent laxity of the women at Sparta. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (295 b)

§ 12 8 "These then are the causes of the events which happened and therefore clearly of this mistake: but the question before us is not who is, or is not, excusable; but whether as a matter of fact (a legislator) is right or wrong."

9 ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς... 11 ὀρθῶς] Thus Aristotle is not unaware that the author of a code or a constitution is by no means able to proceed simply at his own good

pleasure, but is tied down to the given circumstances: cp. § 22 n. (322), 12 § 5 (409); VI (IV). 1 § 3 ff. n. (1116), c. 6, 11 §§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 ff.: VII (VI). c. 4. It is only in case these circumstances are highly favourable that he considers his own best constitution possible. But this is still a long way off the knowledge that a nation's constitution and code of laws are in general the product *primarily* of its individuality and history, and only *secondarily* of the legislator's wisdom or unwisdom. Nor does Aristotle omit forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of his own examination in that 'he never purposes to account for the constitution by the circumstances under which it arose, or to fathom the necessities which confronted the legislator. Instead of this, Lycurgus, who left behind him an actual state, is treated like Plato who constructed an imaginary state. Aristotle's criticism neither is nor claims to be historical criticism in our sense of the term, which is more concerned to explain the connexion of the facts than to award praise or blame. He is as one-sided in pointing out the defects of this political structure as the admirers of its excellences had been in earlier times and continued to be later on. Nor could it have been otherwise: for neither he nor they had the requisite historical data for appreciating the personal responsibility of Lycurgus.' Nor have we even now:—assuming that we still retain our belief in the existence of such a person as Lycurgus. Moreover in spite of his recognition of the force of circumstances Aristotle shares with Plato 'and all the political theorists of Greece the belief in the omnipotence of positive legislation, as if mighty historical developments which are not of today or yesterday could be simply swept out of the world by a command or prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus responsible for things for which no legis-



ναίκαας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, (VI)  
οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ'  
αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.

15 \* \*. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν 10  
§ 14 τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἂν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμ-  
βέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν  
μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἦκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ  
τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἢ πωλεῖν  
20 τὴν ὑπάρχουσιν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδό-

12 ἔοικεν omitted by ΓΜ\* || 13 αὐτὴν Μ\* Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτὰ Ar. || 14 αὐτὰ Ar. ||  
ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 15 \* \* μετὰ γὰρ Susem., see Comm.; μετὰ δὲ Zwinger ||  
17 λίαν omitted by Μ\* P<sup>1</sup> || τοῖς] τὸν Μ\*, τῶν P<sup>1</sup> || 18 ἦκει? Congreve || 19  
τὸν νόμον Μ\* and perhaps Ar. || 20 οὐκ before ἐποίησεν inserted by Π<sup>1</sup> (erased  
by corr. P<sup>1</sup>), οὐσίαν? Bender

lator can be responsible, and he partly blames him for effects of certain laws, when the *effects* could not be imputed to him even if the laws in question had really been his own work, and that in the sense in which Aristotle attributes them to him' (Oncken). Cp. also *n.* (82) on I. 9 § 8: *n.* (238) on II. 7 § 8; Exc. II on Bk. II; *n.* (339) on § 30 below; (466) on III. 3 § 9; (552) on III. 9 § 8: II. 5 § 8 *n.* (160): IV(VII). I 4 § 16 (916). Even that which rests on no express command or prohibition, but simply on the force of popular custom, that is, the so-called 'unwritten law' (cp. *n.* 48 on I. 6. 1 and Exc. II to Bk. II), is directly attributed by Aristotle, as by Plato, to the authorship of a definite individual lawgiver: this is especially clear from § 14 below, see *n.* (300). Exactly similar is his assumption of a first founder of the state: I. 2 § 15, ὁ πρῶτος συστήσας, *n.* (28 b): or his judgment as to the origin of the conceptions of popular mythology, § 8 above, ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος, *n.* (288).

\* In spite of these undeniable weaknesses the whole chapter may lay claim to a full measure of authority, as much as any other of Aristotle's historical statements. It is its merit to have most acutely corrected the aberration from sound intelligence revealed in the adoration paid to the Spartan state, and here also to have confronted romance with criticism' (Oncken). SUSEM. (296)

13 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see *nn.* 284—286. SUSEM. (297)

*The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.*

§ 13 15 μετὰ γὰρ κτλ] Possibly we should alter γὰρ into δέ, as Zwinger proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρότερον, see last *n.*), which is referred to in § 13, see *n.* (286). Yet it may equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion: this may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γὰρ κτλ served as reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γὰρ of the text is an inconsistency. SUSEM. (298)

§ 14 16 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. VIII(V). 7 § 10 ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται *n.* (1603). SUSEM. (298 b)

20 ἐποίησεν sc. Lycurgus. The name is not mentioned, but this is the only subject which can be understood (from § 11). From this then it follows that Aristotle was not as yet acquainted with the famous story according to which a certain Epitadeus carried the law which allowed the family estate to be given

ναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλευμένοις. (VI)  
καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως.  
§ 15 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν  
24 πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,

21 καταλείπειν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 22 ταὐτὸ P<sup>1</sup>, τοῦτο Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 23 ἔστι] ἔτι  
Bender very temptingly, yet ἔστι would then be required after τῶν πέντε μερῶν || δὴ  
Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly, see Comm. || καὶ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>: if we read ἔτι with  
Bender, it is not needed || 24 γινομένων Koraes

away or freely disposed of by will: Plutarch *Agis* 4, cp. Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 216 Eng. tr. As far as he knew, this had never been prohibited. Should we expect later writers to be really better informed? Or would it not be as well to consign the said story to the great lumber-room of historical fable which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us so richly furnished? See further the next note. SUSEM. (299)

ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν] Aristotle implies that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited, by a declaration of illegality and a penalty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the purchase of a new one. When translated into our mode of thought and expression this means that the force of usage and custom was against the practice; it was held dishonourable to sell. 'With this agrees the omission of Sparta, 8 § 6, from the list of states where alienation or enlargement of the inherited estate was prohibited by law' (Oncken), as one means of restoring, in a certain sense, equality of possessions; comp. n. (237). (This decisive circumstance was quite overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a fair inference that Aristotle was also unaware of any equal division of property amongst the Spartans, whether by Lycurgus or any one else, *with the design that this equality should be perpetual*? (This last is the only point here in question with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since such a division amongst those who are actual citizens was also his own ideal, IV(VII). 10 §§ 9—12 n. (835);—cp. nn. on II. 6 § 5 (192), § 15 (214)—would he not have expressly appealed to the authority of Lycurgus in support of it, and expressly commended him for this excellent design? Would he not also have expressly blamed him, no less than Plato or Phaleas—6 § 10 ff. (208—211), 7 § 5 (234)—for having neglected, to a still greater extent than these theorists, to take the appropriate means for bringing this about: nay more, for having taken

as good as no means whatever? The 7th fragment of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* attributed to Herakleides (Müller *Frag. hist. Gr.* II. 211) undoubtedly goes back to the Aristotelian work *On the Spartan constitution*, see n. (360) on 10 § 6. But this by no means proves that these extracts must be wholly free from foreign additions, or that τῆς δ' ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν is not one here. Cp. n. (310\*) on § 17. Gilbert, *op. c.* 162 ff., attempts in vain to show that it is quite natural that Aristotle should omit this limitation in the present passage. For, if he had known it, it is obvious how much it must have both weakened and again aggravated the blame he has here expressed. For whatever we may make of the 'ancient portion' (ἀρχαίας μοίρας), it would testify to a stronger care on the part of the legislator to preserve the family estates if the sale of this portion was absolutely forbidden by law and declared null and void, at the same time that it would be so much the stronger inconsistency if even this property was to be freely disposed of by will or given away. Besides Gilbert's whole method of explaining this ἀρχαία μοῖρα has already been briefly, but correctly, refuted by Frick in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CV. 1872. 667. SUSEM. (300)

21 διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν] Translated into our language this means: in all ages after Lycurgus usage and custom were often evaded by apparent free gift or by testamentary disposition of land. SUSEM. (301)

22 καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν κτλ] Cp. VIII(V). 8 § 20 s. fin. n. (1628). SUSEM. (301 b)

§ 15 24 τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο] two fifths.

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων κτλ] why the number of heiresses in Sparta was disproportionately large Aristotle considers it superfluous to show, because it is readily understood that in the many long wars an unusually large number of sons fell



25 καὶ διὰ τὸ προΐκας δίδοναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν (VI)  
 μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. \* \* νῦν δ' ἔξεστι (p. 47)  
 δοῦναι τε τὴν ἐπικλήρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται· καὶ ἀποθάνῃ  
 μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπῃ κληρονόμον, οὗτος ᾧ ἂν  
 § 16 θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἰπ-  
 30 πεύς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ  
 χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν 12  
 δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην·  
 μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο  
 § 17 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγαυθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-

25 ἦν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [ἦν] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> doubtfully || 26 \* \* νῦν Bücheler, see  
 Comm. n. (304): νῦν δ' ἔξεστι δοῦναι <ὁπόσην ἂν τις θέλῃ· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἔξεστι δοῦναι>  
 τὴν κτλ Welldon || 27 τε omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τε] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 28 ὃν ἂν καταλίπῃ,  
 <τὴν> κληρονόμον, οὗτος ὃν ᾧ ἂν καταλίπῃ <τὴν> κληρονόμον, οὗτος Korae || 30  
 τρισμυρίους] τρισχιλίους P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 33 οὐδὲ μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν ὑπήνεγκε  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> misled by William's version *nullam enim plagam pertulit* || 34 μὲν omit-  
 ted by Π<sup>1</sup>: [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

(Bender). Aristotle's statement concern-  
 ing the great wealth of Spartan women  
 is confirmed by Plutarch's from a yet  
 later time *Agis* 4. 7 ἦν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακω-  
 νικῶν πλούτων ἐν ταῖς γυναῖξι τὸ πλεῖστον.  
 (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (302)

The Spartan name for them is ἐπιπά-  
 μονες, ἐπιπαματιδές.

25 καίτοι βέλτιον] Here again later  
 authors are apparently better informed of  
 the facts than Aristotle. We are told that  
 dowries had actually been prohibited, and  
 that down to the time of Lysander none  
 were ever given; see Schömann *Anti-*  
*quities of Greece* p. 265 Eng. tr. SUSEM.  
 (303)

26 νῦν δ' ἔξεστι κτλ] It is obvious  
 that this sentence forms no antithesis to  
 the preceding and thus νῦν δὲ gives no  
 sense. All however is right if one ima-  
 gines something like the following to have  
 fallen out before νῦν δὲ: <'And besides  
 it would have been necessary to prescribe  
 who had the right and obligation of  
 marrying heiresses,> whereas at present  
 every father can marry his daughter to  
 any one he pleases, and if he die without  
 a will his heir at law bestows her upon  
 whom he pleases.' SUSEM. (304)

28 κληρονόμος usually means 'heir':  
 here it must mean the person entitled to  
 the rights of the deceased, the next male  
 relation of full age, or, if there were  
 more than one such, the eldest of them.  
 SUSEM. (305)

This privilege is assigned to the king  
 by Herod. vi. 57: δικάζειν δὲ τοὺς βασι-  
 λέας...πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν  
 ἱκνέεται ἔχειν, ἦν μὴ περὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτὴν  
 ἐγγυήσῃ.

§ 16 29 δυναμένης] Of course Aristotle  
 makes this calculation, as Oncken re-  
 marks, with regard to the total population  
 of Laconia, whether Spartan or of non-  
 Spartan descent. In any case it is rather  
 too high an estimate, as this total popula-  
 tion amounted to only 400,000 at the  
 most: see Schömann *Antiquities of*  
*Greece* p. 195 Eng. tr. But on the other  
 hand the reading, or rather conjecture,  
 τρισχιλίους would not merely give a  
 number far too small, but also one out of  
 all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry.  
 SUSEM. (306)

30 οὐδὲ χίλιοι] 'In the time of Agis  
 B.C. 241 (Plut. *Agis* c. 5) the Spartans  
 were but 700, and only 100 retained their  
 family allotments' (Eaton). SUSEM. (307)

33 μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν] The battle of  
 Leuctra. Cp. further § 34 n. (345),  
 IV(VII). 14 § 21 n. (916): V(VIII). 4 § 4,  
 § 7 n. (1008). SUSEM. (308)

οὐχ ὑπήνεγκε] The negative to be  
 taken closely with the verb: under one  
 blow the city sank. Cp. Aristoph.  
*Knights* 1377 δεξιῶς οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, Plato  
*Phil.* 23 Α ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν  
 νικητηρίων: and below *Pol.* VI(IV). 4. 30  
 οὐ πολυτελεῖν.

34 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγαυθρωπίαν] Here

35 ρων βασιλέων μετεδίδωσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι (VI)  
τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν πολεμούντων πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασιν  
εἶναι ποτε τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴτ'  
ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ ταῦτα εἴτε μὴ, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως  
§ 18 ὥμαλισμένης πληθύνειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ 13  
40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθω-

37 τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας Ar. Bücheler Susem.<sup>2</sup>, τοὺς Σπαρτιάταις II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and probably Γ; Thurot first suspected an error

again of course only Spartans proper are meant, not Provincials (Περλοῖκοι) and Helots. According to Xenophon, *Hellen.* VI. 4. 15, 1000 Lakedaemonians fell at Leuctra, including 400 out of the 700 Σπαρτιάται who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, *De Rep. Lac.* 1. 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (309)

§ 17 34 λέγουσι δ' ὡς κτλ] 'It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, IX. 35, is very positive in his assertion that Tisamenos the Elean and his brother Hegias μῦθοι δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγένοντο Σπαρτιήτησι πολῖται' (Congreve). Cp. also n. (312). (Plutarch *Instit. Lac.* 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the strangers who submitted to the Lycurgean discipline were by the ordinance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the 'ancient portion,' τῆς ἀρχαίας διατεταγμένης μοίρας, which they were not permitted to sell. Cp. n. 300.) Ephoros however, as Trieber shows, had the following story, *Frag.* 18 found in Strabo VIII. 364. The first kings Eurysthenes and Prokles had divided Laconia into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorized the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship: at that time the περλοῖκοι were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the authority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Trieber and Susemihl once supposed: but this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephoros. For Herodotus may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Aegidae and

Talthybiadae: see Schömann p. 193, 208, 225 f., 249 Eng. tr.; Gilbert p. 52 ff., 57 ff., 149 f.; Frick in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cv. 1872. p. 655 ff. It might again be said that Herodotus obviously has in mind only foreigners proper; whereas Aristotle might mean the μόθακες, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such μόθακες were not confined to the times of the earlier kings: even Lysander, Gylippos, Kleandridas, for example, belonged to their number, see Schömann p. 200 Eng. tr. Ridgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the νεοδαμῶδεις, i.e. Helots enfranchised for their services in war, and to their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of νεοδαμῶδεις is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, Schömann p. 198 Eng. tr.—Comp. § 11 n. (295) and esp. *Introd.* p. 35 n. (3). SUSEM. (310)

35 ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι] 'and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were at war for a long time.' The indicative would have been used in *oratio recta*: hence οὐ, not μή, in *obliqua*. Thucyd. V. 40 ὥστ' οὐχ ἡγείσθαι and Demosth. *De falsa leg.* §§ 166, 167, 351 with Shilleto's Appendix B.

36 καὶ φασιν εἶναι κτλ] Evidently here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demaratos in Herod. VII. 234 reckons them at about 8,000 (Eaton). SUSEM. (311)

37 εἴτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ...εἴτε μὴ] Aristotle himself then doubts it. SUSEM. (312)

38 βέλτιον...39 τὴν πόλιν] "It is better to fill the city with men by means of an equal division of property" than by the admission of aliens.

§ 18 40 ὑπεναντίος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν] is an obstacle to a correction of these evils of Sparta, viz. by equalization of property. See § 1 for



1270 b σιν. βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς (VI) Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς § 19 υἱοὺς ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῇ πάντων. καίτοι 5 φανερόν ὅτι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διηρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρ- 14 χὴ κυρία μὲν αὕτῃ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφό-

1270 b 2 προάγει Spengel || τοὺς πολίτας omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 8 αὕτη Ar., omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> Welldon || 9 παντός Sauppe (*Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannum* p. 94 f.), πάντες Γ Π Ar. Bk.

construction. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

1270 b 2 προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας κτλ.] 'stimulates the citizens.' Just the opposite of what Aristotle himself requires. Plato and Phaleas did not go anything like so far, and yet are blamed severely enough by him in this respect. See 6 § 10 ff. *μη.* (208—211), 7 § 5 *μη.* (234, 235). SUSEM. (313)

4 ἄφρουρον] not liable to military service, (ἐμφρουρον: φρουρά is a Spartan word for στρατιά, found frequently in Xenophon *Hellenics*, II. 4. 29 ἐξάγει φρουράν, so IV. 7. 2, V. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase φρουράν φαίνειν = to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 25, Βρασίδας φρουράν ἔχων.

τέτταρας] Aelian *Var. Hist.* VI. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso *Sparta* I. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the olden times, and the remission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Trieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus: see *n.* (321) on § 21. SUSEM. (314)

§ 19 4 καίτοι φανερόν κτλ.] Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting

men would be prevented by equality and inalienability of the estates. From the nature of the case the only effectual means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous surmise, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the μόθakes (see *n.* 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. 'The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Oncken). SUSEM. (315)

The Ephorality §§ 19—24. Amongst other monographs see A. Schäfer *De ephoris commentatio* (Greifswald 1863), H. Stein *The development of the Ephorality* (Jahresber. des Gymn. in Konitz, 1870), Urlichs in *Rhein. Mus.* VI. 1847. p. 221, G. Dum *Entstehung und Entwicklung des spartanischen Ephorats* (Innsbruck 1878).

8 αὕτῃ] in itself, simply as such.

9 ἐκ τοῦ δήμου] Thirlwall (IV. 377) supposed the δῆμος to include the ὑπο-

10 δρα πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὧνιοι ἦσαν. (VI)  
 § 20 ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν  
 τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τινές, ὅσον ἐφ'  
 ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρ-  
 χὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν αὐ-  
 15 τοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συν-  
 επιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστο- 15  
 § 21 κρατίας συνέβαινε. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ  
 ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο (ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς (p. 48)  
 μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ' εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τὴν  
 20 τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμα-

10 ἂν εἴησαν? Schneider || 12 Ἀνδρίοις Ar., ἀνδρίοις even Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ἀνδρείοις P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand), ἀντρείοις Γ' M<sup>4</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ἀνδρείοις corr. of P<sup>1</sup> (τ altered to δ), γρ. ἀνδρίοις p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 14 [αὐτοῖς] Oncken, αὐτοὶ Ridgeway || αὐτοὺς ἡνάγκαζον καὶ τοὺς Susem.<sup>2</sup>, *reges ipsos populares fieri compulerant* Ar.; *regere populum se ipsos cogebant* reges William, whence αὐτοὺς ἡνάγκαζον[το] καὶ [οἱ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 16 ἀριστοκρατίας Γ<sup>2</sup>.3.4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 19 τὴν om. by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

μειοῖνες as well as the ὅμοιοι, and so too K. F. Hermann. The opposite view is taken by Schömann *Antiquities* p. 245 Eng. tr. See Busolt *The Lacedaemonians and their allies* I. p. 21 f. (Leipzig, 1878). For παντός, not πάντες, see § 22, 10 § 10.

10 ἀρχεῖον=magistracy, board: so § 21, 10 § 10 τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον.

ὧνιοι] See below 10 § 12 n. (370 b) and Thuc. I. 131. 2 ὁ δὲ (Πανσανίας) πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσει τὴν διαβολὴν (Eaton); also *Rhet.* III. 18. 6, 1419 a 31 ff.; the Lacedaemonian Ephor called to account for his conduct says οἱ μὲν γὰρ (his colleagues) χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ γνώμη (Göttling). SUSEM. (316)

ἦσαν] were often. 'Why this tense? Is it that in Aristotle's time it mattered little whether they were so or not?' (Congreve). It is imperfect in § 14 ἦκεν, § 16 ἦσαν, § 20 ἡναγκάζοντο, συνέβαινε.

§ 20 11 ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις] what circumstance is meant we do not know. For the expression καὶ νῦν=recently, compare VIII(V). 10 § 31 καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον, n. (1699). SUSEM. (317)

14 καὶ ἰσοτύραννον] Cp. Plato *Laus* IV. 712 D καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι [ἡ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ πολιτεία]· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαναμαστῶς ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε. See c. 6 § 17 n. (219). SUSEM. (318)

δημαγωγεῖν=to conciliate, flatter an individual like a demagogue, in VIII(V).

6 § 6, 10 § 31. But, as Oncken remarks, it hardly serves to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. SUSEM. (319) If therefore αὐτοῖς be retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in §§ 16, 19, 24. The kings themselves were compelled to court the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the ephors.

"This seems to me impossible in this context. If then αὐτοῖς is right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously exaggerated. For I cannot agree with Busse who thinks that Oncken's objection is sufficiently removed by c. 6 § 17, 1265 b 38, δημοκρατεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς ἐφόρους." SUSEM.

16 ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας] See n. (536) on III. 7 § 3. SUSEM. (320)

§ 21 17 συνέχει=is the keystone of the constitution.

19 διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην] Not Lycurgus in this case but, on Aristotle's view, VIII(V). 11 § 2, Theopompos. See n. (314) on § 18. SUSEM. (321)

εἴτε διὰ τὴν τύχην] Aristotle is not unaware, then, that many good or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislator's intention: cp. 12 § 5 n. (409). SUSEM. (321 b)

20 συμπέπτωκεν] Cp. ἀπὸ συμπτώματος c. 12 § 5.



- § 22 σιν' δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σφῆζεσθαι πάντα (VI) βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταυτά· οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι διὰ τὴν γερονσίαν—ἄθλον γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴν  
 25 αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν—, ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν—κα-  
 § 23 θίσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων—· ἀλλ' αἵρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν 16 εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν νῦν (παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστὶ λῖαν). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεων μεγάλων

22 ταυτά P<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτα ΓΡ<sup>4</sup>, τὴν αὐτὴν or [ταυτά] Schneider, <κατὰ> ταυτά Bernays; either this or τὴν αὐτὴν is right || 24 ἄθλον...ἐστίν] Trieber considers these words to be a gloss from Demosth. *Lept.* § 107; even Giphanius remarks on the agreement of the two passages "valde miror": see Comm. || 26 ἔδει] ἦδη M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup> || 28 κρίσεων εἰσι μεγάλων Π<sup>3</sup> Bk.

§ 22 21 δεῖ γὰρ...22 διαμένειν ταυτά] Cp. VI(IV). 9 § 10 n. (1267), 12 § 1 (1307); VII(VI). 5 § 4 (1434); VIII(V). 9 § 5 (1634). SUSEM. (322)

The order (which Stahr, and apparently Congreve, have mistaken) is δεῖ πάντα τὰ μέρη (subject) τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μ. σ. (object of βούλεσθαι) εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν. If a constitution is to be preserved, all classes in the state must desire its existence and continuance. Hence we are led to Bernays' or Schneider's correction.

23 οὕτως ἔχουσιν=βούλονται τὴν πολιτείαν διαμένειν (Congreve). Comp. 10 § 10, of the δῆμος.

24 καλοὶ κάγαθοι] This expression in Aristotle—see e.g. VI(IV). 8 § 3 ff.—always denotes the more educated and capable men: and this meaning in the present passage is confirmed by the addition ἄθλον γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴν αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν, which Trieber hardly has sufficient grounds for regarding as an interpolation. Hence Unger in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873. p. 370 has rightly protested against the completely mistaken assertion of Gilbert *op. c.* 151 ff., and Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* 28 f. 7, who prefer to understand by it the nobles. From passages like 11 § 3, 4 and VI(IV). 7 § 4 (which Gilbert p. 153 incredibly mistakes) any one who reads without preconceived opinion will see beyond all doubt that Aristotle knows nothing of an election of Senators at Sparta, for which only certain families were eligible (as was the case in Crete c. 10 § 10), or of a privileged hereditary nobility within the pale of those pure Spartans who had the right to take part in the popular assembly. Nor can the

opposite of this be inferred from VI(IV). 9 § 9, see n. (1264). But the mode of election may very well have been such that in practice members of certain families were successful time after time: see VIII(V). 6 § 21 n. (1586). SUSEM. (322 b)

ἄθλον γὰρ κτλ.] To be a member of this body is a reward of special excellence, or at least it should be: see below § 25, Demosth. xx. *Adv. Leptin.* § 107 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ (at Lacedaemon) τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίως γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων: Plut. *Lyce.* 26. SUSEM. (323)

26 καθίσταται γὰρ sc. ἡ ἐφορεία ἐξ ἀπάντων. Cp. 10 § 10 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, n. (370). SUSEM. (323 b)

§ 23 28 παιδαριώδης κτλ.] Here Aristotle calls the whole method of electing the Ephors childish, yet he says of the election to the senate § 27, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, it is childish as to the means of ascertaining the results. Consequently the mode of election was probably not the same for the two offices. Plato again describes it in the case of the ephors as approximating to a nomination by lot *Λαγος* III 692 A, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως. This points to auspices (Ulrichs *Rhein. Mus.* N. S. VI. 1847. 223). But it is hardly possible to determine whether electors were chosen by the people and then, after observing certain signs, they appointed the new ephors, as Ulrichs thinks: or whether, according to Schömann's conjecture p. 240 Eng. tr., a larger number of persons were nominated by the people, and the five selected from them in accordance with certain auspices. SUSEM. (324)

Schneider had suggested that as in the election of the Senators (see n. 333)

λων εἰς κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώ- (VI)  
 30 μονας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς  
 § 24 νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαίτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη  
 τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν  
 ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκλη-  
 ρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρα τὸν νόμον  
 35 ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει 17  
 δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς.  
 § 25 ἐπεικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς  
 ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχα ἂν εἴποι τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει (καί-  
 τοι τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίους εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφι-  
 40 σβητήσιμον· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας

30 τὰ inserted after κατὰ by Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 32 πολιτείας Scaliger, probably right || αὐτῇ Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 38 εἴποι P<sup>1</sup>, εἴπη M<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.; what the 1st hand wrote cannot be determined), εἴπειε Bk.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (a later hand) and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, ε is erased), εἴποιε Q<sup>2</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), εἴπειν Bk.<sup>2</sup>

the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (i. 281 f.) adopts this view. Göttling (p. 468) assumed that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. Stein (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that electors designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators.

κρίσεων μεγάλων] The ephors had the greatest part of the administration of justice in private suits, especially in all actions arising from contracts; see III. i § 10 τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων <δίκας> δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας *nn.* (443-4), Schömann *op. c.* 237, 246, 250 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (325)

30 κατὰ γράμματα] There were no written laws in Sparta: Schömann *op. c.* 251 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (326)

Comp. μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀλλ' αὐτογνώμονας, 10 § 11.

§ 24 31 οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη] inconsistent with (the design of) the polity.

32 ἀνεμένη λίαν] The ephors had a separate mess-table to themselves, Schömann *op. c.* 245 Eng. tr., and there they were able, so great was their authority, amongst other things to provide a far more elaborate *cuisine* than the ordinary soup, the 'black broth' of Sparta (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (327)

34 ἀλλὰ λάθρα...ἡδονῶν] Cp. § 35 *nn.* (346-7), IV(VII). 15 § 6 *n.* (927). Thus amongst the Spartan men, too, the much-vaunted strictness of manners had its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan avarice even be explicable? SUSEM. (328)

§§ 25-28 The Senate or Elders.

§ 25 37 ἐπεικῶν...ἱκανῶς] 'If only honest men, sufficiently trained to manly excellence, entered the senate.' No doubt this was part of the original design of the institution; but frequently it was not carried out: see § 22 *n.* (323). SUSEM. (329)

39 κρίσεων μεγάλων] The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. i § 10 *n.* (443 b), VI(IV). 9 § 9, ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς *n.* (1266). SUSEM. (329 b)

40 ἔστι γάρ, κτλ.] In conformity with this principle Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests: IV(VII). 9 § 9 *nn.* (816-7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. In his state of the *Laws* he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magisterial office, the board of νομοφύλακες (see above *nn.* on 6 §§ 18, 19), under 50 or over 70 years of age: *Laws* VI 755 A f. 'Compare also *Rhet.* II. 14. 4 ἀκμάζει...ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἐνδὸς δέιν πενήτηντα: Herod. III. 134 αὐξανομένη



1271 a γήρας) τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν (VI)  
νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ  
§ 26 ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ κατα- 18  
χαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς ἀρ-  
5 χῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι  
νῦν δ' εἰσίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐ-  
θύνειν τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶ-  
ρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύ-  
§ 27 νας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ

1271 a 3 δὲ] γάρ Spengel || 5 ἀνευθύνους Sylburg, perhaps rightly || 9 καὶ  
ἣν αἵρεσιν ποιοῦνται...κρίσιν or rather κατὰ τὴν...γερόντων ἣ τε κρίσις Bender, much  
too violently

τῷ σώματι συναίξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες· γηράσ-  
κοντι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα  
πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται, Livy vi. 23 cum  
corporibus vigere et deflorescere animos,  
Lucret. III. 445 pariter cum corpore et  
una crescere sentimus pariterque senescere  
mentem (Eaton). SUSEM. (330)

1271 a 1 δὲ answers b 37 ἐπεικῶν  
μὲν, the intermediate words from καίτοι  
being parenthetical. Comp. 2 §§ 3, 4  
τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῶ...ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ κτλ.

ὥστε...ἀνδράσιν] 'But if they are  
trained in such a way that even the legis-  
lator cannot trust them.' Camerarius long  
since asked how Aristotle came to this  
conclusion. Presumably from the fact he  
mentions directly afterwards, § 26, that  
every senator (as well as all the other  
officials and even the two kings) was  
placed under the control of the Ephors.  
SUSEM. (331)

§ 26 3 φαίνονται δὲ κτλ] Cp. c. 11  
§ 4 μεγάλα βλέπτονται καὶ ἐβλάψαν ἡδὴ  
n. (384). SUSEM. (331 b)

5 δόξειε δ' ἂν κτλ] It might be held  
(cp. 8-§ 18) that the board of Ephors  
controls all the officials. But this is too  
vast a trust to commit to the Ephoralty  
and it is not in this sense that we assert  
the necessity for responsible control.

8 τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον] Because  
the superintendence and control exercised  
by the Ephors was far too unlimited and  
violent (J. G. Schneider). See above  
§ 20 n. (318). SUSEM. (332)

§ 27 9 κατὰ τε τὴν κρίσιν κτλ] 'The  
proceedings are described by Plutarch  
(*Lycurg.* c. 26) in the following manner.  
After the assembling of the 'people,' i.e.  
of all the Spartiates who possessed the  
right of voting, some men selected for

the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring  
building from which no view was afforded  
of the place of meeting, though the voices  
of the assembled crowd could easily be  
heard. Then the candidates for the vacant  
office passed silently one by one through  
the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while  
the people, according to the various de-  
grees of favour with which they regarded  
them, made their feelings known by  
correspondingly loud or feeble acclama-  
tions. The party confined in the building,  
to whom the order in which the candi-  
dates appeared by lot was unknown,  
observed on which occasion the acclama-  
tion was the loudest, and the candidate  
who was thus greeted was regarded as  
the popular choice.....Aristotle's judg-  
ment upon these proceedings is quite  
intelligible in an age in which the man-  
ners of the people had long degenerated  
from their ancient purity and simplicity.  
For obviously there was nothing easier  
than to turn the whole election into a  
mere fraudulent farce, and to determine  
the result beforehand" Schömann p. 231  
f. Eng. tr. One of the main questions  
that arise is, how the committee which  
decided on the loudness of the acclama-  
tions was itself appointed:—and on this  
point we have no information (Oncken).  
Besides, this mode of election is only a  
peculiar survival of the primitive election  
of chiefs by acclamation in a rude an-  
tiquity, retained in a time for which it  
had long since ceased to be adapted.  
In general the votes of the Spartans in  
the popular assembly continued to be  
taken *viva voce*, by acclamation, *βοῇ*:  
and only in case of a doubt as to the  
decision did an actual division of the

10 τε τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι (p. 49)  
 τὸν ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ  
 βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἀξίον τῆς ἀρχῆς.  
 § 28 νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης 19  
 φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολί-  
 15 τας τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων. οὐδεὶς  
 γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιο μὴ φιλότιμος ὢν. καίτοι τῶν γ'  
 ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκούσιων τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ  
 § 29 φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ 20  
 δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιον ἐστὶν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν  
 20 ἢ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ κἂν βέλτιον, \* \* γε  
 μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον

10 τὸ τὸν Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps through a printer's error || 14 κατασκευάζει P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 15 τοῖσι p<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 16 ἂν omitted by M<sup>4</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 17 τῶν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || διὰ omitted by M<sup>4</sup>, perhaps by Γ, [διά] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 19 βέλτιον...20 μὴ βέλτιον] μὴ βελτίον.....20 βέλτιον Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. (μὴ over an erasure P<sup>3</sup>) || 20 κἂν Γ, μὴν Π Ar. Bk., μὴν εἰ καὶ Schneider Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || <βελτίον γε> or <δεῖ> γε Susem., <συνολοί> γε Schmidt || 21 αὐτοῦ Bk. αὐτοῦ Γ Π

assembly take place. See Schömann p. 236 Eng. tr. Further compare § 23, n. (324). SUSEM. (333)

10 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι = (the obligation to) a personal canvass. Schlosser and Fülleborn think this a wise arrangement, since otherwise the proposers might nominate whom they liked;—as if it were Aristotle's meaning that any one who aspired to be a senator had the right to canvass, but need not do so unless he liked. But beyond all doubt, as is clear from n. (333), he means that the candidates are obliged to canvass personally. SUSEM. (334)

11 δεῖ γὰρ κτλ] This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination, Zeller *Plato* p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also 11 § 12 n. SUSEM. (335) Add *Rep.* 347 B ff., 517 D, 519 C.

§ 28 13 νῦν δ' ὅπερ κτλ] But here the legislator is evidently acting with the same object as in other provisions of his constitution: in the endeavour to make his citizens covetous of honour he has adopted this device for the election of senators (τούτῳ = τῷ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι, a personal canvass). See Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* IV. 2.

16 τῶν γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκούσιων] Here the term ἀδικημα is used in a sense

different from that of *Rhet.* I. 13. 16, 1374 b 8 ἐστὶ δ' ἀδικήματα ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἐστίν, or the un-Aristotelian passage *Nic. Eth.* v. 8. 2 where every ἀδικημα is also ἐκούσιον. SUSEM. (336)

Note esp. *N. E.* v. 8. 2: ἀδικημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκούσιῳ· δταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, φέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδικημα τὸν ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἐσται τι ἀδικον μὲν ἀδικημα δ' οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ; also *N. E.* v. 7 § 7, both with Jackson's notes; also the table, p. 109, of his edition of *Nic. Eth.* v.

17 τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει κτλ] Here Lycurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato c. 5 § 9: φέγεται δικαίως...τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ <χρήματα> φιλεῖν. Besides as no one could become senator until he was 60 years of age, 'an ambition which is contented with this prospect until then must have a very tenacious life, such as is only attained under strict discipline, and cannot easily become dangerous to the state' (Oncken). SUSEM. (337)

*The office of king:* §§ 29, 30.

§ 29 20 ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] III. cc. 14—17. SUSEM. (338)

21 κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον] 'that each king should be chosen in virtue of his life and conduct': an elective monarchy.



§ 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς (VI) οἶεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς καγαθοὺς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ οὔσιν ἱκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον  
 25 συμπρεσβευτάς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ 21 συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστή-  
 § 31 σαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύν-  
 δον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ  
 30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-

25 ἐφόρους Götting || 27 φιλία Π<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr. of P<sup>1</sup>)

§ 30 22 ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κτλ.] In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), § 25; 17 § 5 n. (678): VI(IV). 2 § 1 ff. nn. (1133, 1136—7); 10 § 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in him therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditary descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare 11 §§ 3, 4 nn. (381—3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (1. 287) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism: and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsmuth *The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* xcvi. 1868. 1—9; E. Curtius *History of Greece* 1 p. 186 ff. Eng. tr.: Schömann *op. c.* 208, 225 f., 541—4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject. SUSEM. (339)

24 ἐξέπεμπον κτλ.] Two ephors regularly accompanied the king on an expedition: see Schömann *op. c.* 242 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (340) Cp. Xen. *Rep. Lacéd.* 13 § 5, πάρεσι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐφόρων δύο, οἱ πολυπραγμονοῦσι μὲν οὐδέν, ἦν μὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς προσκαλῇ· ὁρῶντες δὲ ὅτι ποιεῖ ἕκαστος πάντας σωφρονίζουσιν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. Ten ἐόμβουλοι were given to Agis, Thuc. v. 63.

25 συμπρεσβευτάς] A less forcible word, like *συναποδημούντας*, might have been expected.

26 τὸ στασιάζειν] Grote II. p. 464. Schneider compares Plut. *Agis* c. 12, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἀρχεῖον (the Ephors) ἰσχύειν ἐκ διαφορᾶς τῶν βασιλέων τῷ τὰ βελτίονα λέγοντι προστιθέμενον τὴν ψήφον, ὅταν ἄτερος ἐρίξῃ πρὸς τὸν συμφόνον.

The public messes: §§ 31, 32.

§ 31 27 φιδίτια] The derivation is uncertain: Plut. *Lyc.* 12 guesses wildly. Perhaps √σεδ to sit; if indeed φειδίτια is the true form and φειδίτης=[ἐ]φ-εδ-ι-τη-s (?), see n. on 1272 a 22. Clearly ἀνδρεία was the older Doric name, and συσσίτια is only an Attic term.

28 ἴδμε γὰρ κτλ.] Cp. 10 §§ 7, 8 nn. (363, 365): IV(VII). 10 § 10 (834). Plato's criticism, *Latius* VIII 847 E, is precisely the same: τροφῆς δὲ καὶ διανομῆς τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐγγὺς τῆς τοῦ Κρητικοῦ νόμου εἴκειν ὁρθότης ἂν τις γιγνομένη κατὰ τρόπον γίγνεσθαι κτλ. 'But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὸ κοινόν) possesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money's worth' (Oncken): or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied; cp. Schömann *op. c.* p. 291 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (341)

For σύνοδον=πρόσοδον the lex. quote Herod. 1. 64 χρημάτων συνόδοισι=contributions. But here the singular (σύνοδον) and the entire phrase ἀπὸ κοινοῦ (sumptu publico) εἶναι, favour the rendering 'the gathering should have been a state affair.' Cp. VII(VI). 4 § 13, 1319 a 32; τῆς συνόδου ταυτῆς=τῆς ἐκκλησίας. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see Schömann pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr.

30 φέρειν=contribute.

λωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ νῆαντιον (VI)  
 § 32 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα-  
 τικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκευάσμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεταί δ'  
 ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νενομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν  
 35 γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας  
 οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πατριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ  
 § 33 τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρ-<sup>22</sup>  
 χους νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὁρθῶς ἐπιτι-  
 μῶντες. στάσεως γὰρ γίνεταί αἷτιος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν  
 40 οὗσι στρατηγοῖς ἀδίοις ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία  
 § 34 καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὥδι δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμή-  
 1271 b σιεν ἄν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετιμήκεν' (p. 50)

31 συμβαίνει, apparently M<sup>o</sup> (1st hand), συμβαίνειν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk. || 36 οὗτος after  
 ἐστιν (ἐστιν M<sup>o</sup>) M<sup>o</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 37 αὐτῶν P<sup>2</sup>, αὐτοῦ P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered  
 by a later hand), αὐτοῖς Π<sup>2</sup> || 40 ἀδίοις Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., ἄλλως ἀδίοις p<sup>1</sup> in the margin  
 || 41 καθέστηκεν was apparently omitted by Γ

§ 32 37 μὴ μετέχειν] That is, they  
 ceased to be full citizens (ὅμοιοι). They  
 were then, in all probability, included  
 under the term ὑπομέλεις, Xen. *Hell.* III.  
 3. 6. See Schömann *op. c.* pp. 217—220,  
 270 Eng. tr. Since Aristotle censures  
 the messes as ἥκιστα δημοκρατικόν, it is  
 not likely that the persons thus dis-  
 qualified were included in the δῆμος, as  
 Thirlwall supposed IV. 377.

The office of admiral: § 33.

§ 33 38 ἕτεροί τινες] See *Introd.*  
 p. 9. n. 1. SUSEM. (342)

39 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι=in addi-  
 tion to the kings. The command of the  
 army was the most essential feature in  
 the royal power at Sparta: see III. 14 §  
 3 n. (616), § 14, n. (631), § 15: also n.  
 (381) on II. 11 § 3, (630) on III. 14 § 13.  
 Compare also II. 10 § 6 n. (360). We  
 can hardly follow Oncken (I 293) in  
 assuming that Aristotle's criticism here  
 implies a further reference to Lysander's  
 plans for the entire overthrow of the  
 kingly power, VIII(v). 1 § 10 n. (1498).  
 A design entertained by one distinguished  
 holder of the office, such as Lysander  
 undoubtedly was, cannot be attributed  
 without further ado to the institution of  
 the ναύαρχος as a whole. Certainly a  
 startling anomaly was introduced into  
 the political structure of Sparta by the  
 necessity which gradually arose for the  
 employment of a fleet: and it is sig-  
 nificant 'that of four native Admirals  
 (ναύαρχοι) in whom Sparta trusted in

the last period of the Peloponnesian  
 war, two, Phrynus and Deinades, were  
 Provincials (περίοικοι) and two, Lysander  
 and Gylippos, were μόθακες' (Oncken).  
 Further compare VII(vi). 8 § 15 n. (1473):  
 Beloch *The office of ναύαρχος at Sparta in*  
*Rhein. Mus.* XXXIV. 1879. 117—130.  
 SUSEM. (343) The Spartan government  
 took the same view as Aristotle does here  
 when they nominated Agesilaos to the  
 command of the fleet as well as of the  
 army, in order to secure unity in the op-  
 erations, 395 B.C., Xen. *Hellen.* III. 4. 27:  
 ὄντι δ' αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τῷ ὑπὲρ Κόμης  
 ἔρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν οἴκοι τελέων [the ephors]  
 ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ὅπως γιγνώσκει καὶ  
 καταστήσασθαι ναύαρχον ὄντινα αὐτὸς βοῦ-  
 λοιτο. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίησαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι  
 τοιῷδε λογισμῷ, ὥς εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφοτέρων  
 ἀρχοί, τό τε πεζὸν πολλὸν ἂν ἰσχυρότερον  
 εἶναι, καθ' ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῆς ἰσχύος ἀμφοτέροις,  
 τό τε ναυτικόν, ἐπιφαινομένου τοῦ πεζοῦ  
 ἐνθα δέοι.

The military spirit: §§ 34, 35.

§ 34 1271 b 1 Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νό-  
 μοις] I 625 C—638 B, esp. 630 E, quoted  
 in n. (294 b) on § 11. Compare II 660 ff.  
 666 E, III 688 A f., IV 705 D: or even  
 earlier *Republic* VIII 547 E ff. τῷ δὲ γε  
 φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀγεῖν,  
 ...ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς θυμοειδέεις τε καὶ ἀπλουστεροὺς  
 ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μάλλον  
 πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, ...καὶ πολεμοῦσα  
 τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον διάγειν. The same  
 criticism in IV(vii). 2 § 9, 14 §§ 15—18,  
 15 § 6 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς: V(viii). 4 § 2



πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, (VI)  
 τὴν πολεμικὴν αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-  
 γαροῦν ἐσφίζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες  
 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδ' ἡσκηκέναι μηδε-  
 § 35 μίαν ἄσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ<sup>23</sup>  
 ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ-  
 γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ  
 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς  
 § 36 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ  
 11 κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ  
 τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις  
 πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρ-  
 τιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων

1271 b 3 αὐτὴ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || χρησίμη <μόνον>? Susem. || 5 ἡσκηκέναι] *ad virtutem exercitari* William doubtless on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἀρετὴν wrongly inserted by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 6 τοῦτο P<sup>1</sup>, τοῦτο P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> Ar., P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>), and perhaps also Γ || 7 μὲν omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup>, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || γίνεσθαι after τὰγαθὰ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 12 ἀναγκαζομένους P<sup>2,3</sup> Ald.

οὔτε πρὸς μίαν...οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην;  
 § 4, § 7, the reference being given in the notes. SUSEM. (344)

4 ἐσφίζοντο μὲν πολ. κτλ] Repeated in substance IV(VII). 14 § 16 ff. τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξεληλεγκται νῦν, § 22 τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀνιάσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγοντες. αἰτίος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, 15 §§ 5, 6: V(VIII). 4 § 4 τοῖς Λάκωνας ἴσμεν...νῦν...καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων: where references will be found in the notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution, in the *Πολιτεία*; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch *Lycurg.* 30 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the author: the passage begins *θανυμάξω τῶν λεγόντων, ὡς ἀρχεσθαι μὲν ἤδεσαν, ἀρχειν δ' οὐκ ἠπίσταντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι*. SUSEM. (345)

ἄρξαντες=after they had won their empire, when they had become a sovereign people.

§ 35 8 τὰ περιμάχητα] i.e. external goods: cp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8 § 4, 1168 b 15 ff. οἱ μὲν οὖν...φιλάτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς...ἐσπονδάκασιν [οἱ πολλοί] περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητα ἐστὶν: § 9

1169 a 20 f. προήσεται [ὁ σπουδαῖος] καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν. SUSEM. (346)

9 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς] They are right in thinking valour the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the goods which valour wins above valour itself.

"Cp. IV(VII). 1 § 3 n. (697), 15 § 6 nn. (927-8)." SUSEM. (346 b)

ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κτλ] See above § 24, n. (328) and again IV(VII). 15 § 6 nn. SUSEM. (347)

The finances: §§ 36, 37.

§ 36 12 ἀναγκαζομένοις] if they are compelled.

14 τὴν πλείστην γῆν] Only the smaller part of the land belonged to the Provincials (περίουκοι). SUSEM. (348)

οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν...εἰσφορὰς] Even at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides (I. 80. 4) makes the Spartan king Archidamos say: πολλῶ ἔτι πλεον τοῦτου (sc. χρυσοῦ) ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν (Vettori). Cp. also what Pericles says (I. 141. 3) αὐτοῦργοι εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. SUSEM. (349)

§ 37 τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ τε τούναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ- (VI)  
16 φέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς  
δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτων.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσού-  
τον εἰρήσθω (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἐπιτιμή-  
20 σειεν)· ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης, VII  
ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυ-  
ρῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα μεμιῆσθαι  
τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακωνῶν· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα

15 τε] δὲ Γ || 16 γὰρ omitted by P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 22 δὲ] τε M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, *quidem* Wil-  
liam, γε Γ?

§ 37 16 τοὺς δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημά-  
τους] As early as the first quarter of the  
sixth century B.C. Alcaeus (*Fr.* 50) quotes  
the saying of Aristodamos, a Spartan,  
'money makes the man' as in full force at  
Sparta: ὥς γὰρ δῆπὸν Ἀριστόδαμόν φαισ'  
οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ἐν Σπάρτῃ λόγον | εἰπὴν·  
χρήματ' ἀνὴρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδεὶς πέλει·  
ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος. Amongst well-known  
instances of peculation or corruption  
Eaton quotes Leotychides, Pleistoanax,  
Astyocho, Kleandridas, Gylippos, Ly-  
sander: to which he adds Plutarch's own  
admission, *Lycurg.* 30; Ἀγίδος δὲ βασιλεύ-  
οντος εἰσεργύη νόμισμα πρῶτον εἰς τὴν  
Σπάρτην καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομίσματος πλεονεξία  
καὶ πλούτου ζῆλος ἐπέβη διὰ Λύσανδρον, ὃς  
αὐτὸς ὦν ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἐνέπλησε  
τὴν πατρίδα φιλοπλουτίας καὶ τρυφῆς.  
Besides the corruption of the ephors,  
§ 19 n. (316), and senators, § 26 (331 b),  
11 § 4 (384), Aristotle might have  
spoken confidently of that of the kings  
and admirals. There was a well-known  
oracle, ἃ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν δλεῖ,  
ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν, quoted in Aristotle's *Polity*  
of Lacedaemon *Frag.* 501, 1559 b 28  
(= *Aristot. pseud. ep.* 496=88 in Müller's  
*Fr. hist. Gr.* II. p. 131), and even  
Tyrtaeus (?) seems to have cited it, *Fr.* 3.  
See further Xenoph. *De Rep. Lac.* 14. 3  
and the statement in Ps.-Plato *Alc.* I.  
122 E f., quoted by Eaton; χρυσίων καὶ  
ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν ὅσον  
ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ ἰδίᾳ. This may very well  
be an exaggeration; the writer of the  
dialogue is however generally well in-  
formed on historical matters, see Cobet  
*Mnemos.* N. S. II. 1874. 369 ff. Compare  
with this the instances of great wealth  
possessed by Spartans, some of which  
have been collected by Grote *Greece* IX.  
321 f., Gilbert *op. c.* 154 f. If the Spar-

tiatae, with the exception of the kings,  
ever were prohibited from possessing  
gold and silver—a statement which H.  
Stein in the dissertation quoted in n. (85)  
on I. 9 § 8 seeks to disprove—it was at  
a very early time that the prohibition  
was removed. For gold and silver money  
were first coined by Pheidon king of  
Argos (whose age is, I admit, very vari-  
ously estimated, 760 or 670 B.C.), and even  
down to the time of Croesus gold and  
silver were scarce in Greece; see n.  
(1653) on VIII(v). 10 § 6 and Böckh  
*Public Economy* I. p. 6 f. Eng. tr. H.  
Stein, Oncken, and others would reduce  
this supposed prohibition to the fact,  
that gold and silver money remained un-  
known for a longer time in the secluded  
valley of the Eurotas than in the trading  
districts on the coast; and thus the  
Spartans retained their old iron money  
in use for a long time, first in bars, and  
afterwards as a sort of coinage (see  
Schömann *op. c.* p. 275 Eng. tr.) and  
employed it even later *along with gold*  
*and silver money* for internal trade. See  
however Trieber *op. c.* III. SUSEM. (350)

#### c. 10 The Cretan polity.

Congreve refers to the article *Crete* in  
Smith's *Geogr. Dictionary*. See also  
Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece* I. 295  
—310 Eng. tr.; Oncken II. 377—409;  
Höck *Kreta* (Göttingen 1823—9. 3 vols.).  
21 γλαφυρῶς] neatly, 'less finished'  
(Congreve).

22 καὶ λέγεται δὲ] Ephoros *Frag.* 64,  
in Strabo X 481? This passage is: λέ-  
γεσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν, ὡς Λακωνικὰ εἶη τὰ  
πολλὰ τῶν νομιζομένων Κρητικῶν, τὸ δ'  
ἀληθές, εὐρῆσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων, ἡκριβω-  
κεῖναι δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας. Comp. nn. on  
§§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. *Introd.*  
p. 35 n. (3). SUSEM. (351)



§ 2 τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VII)  
 25 τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ  
 βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον δια-  
 τρήψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἄποι-  
 29 κοι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ  
 πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-  
 § 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν

25 ἐπιτροπείαν P<sup>1</sup> and 1st hand of M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (in P<sup>3</sup>, altered by a later hand) || τοῦ  
 Χαρίλλου P<sup>1</sup> || Χαρίλδου Bas.<sup>1</sup>, see Comm. || 26 τότε omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., [τότε]  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 27 περὶ περὶ τὴν Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 28 Λύκτιοι κρήτες Π<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλως λύκτιοι P<sup>1</sup> in  
 the margin || 30 [διὸ.....40 Κάμικον] Susem. see Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι]  
 Spengel

24 διαρθροῦν = quasi per membra et artus distinguere et certum in ordinem redigere (Bonitz): to articulate, *elaborate* (Wellدون).

§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Δ.] Ephoros l.c. (Strabo x. 482) relates that Lycurgus, as guardian of Charilaos the posthumous child of his brother Polydektes, for certain reasons which are stated went to Crete and did not return until Charilaos himself had assumed the government. Compare Plutarch *Lycurg.* cc. 2-5; Trieber *op. c.* p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel *Die Quellen in Plutarchs Lykurgos* 22 ff. (Marburg 1870.) SUSEM. (352)

25 Χαρίλλου] The form is Charilaos in VIII (v). 12 § 12 (see n.): probably we should restore it here, or else read Charillos there. SUSEM. (353)

28 κατέλαβον δ'...κατοικοῦσιν] "And the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos had found the system of the laws established at that time amongst the inhabitants." In just the same way Ephoros (l.c. 481) replies to those who claim a Lacedaemonian descent for the Cretan institutions on the ground that the Lyttians were a colony from Sparta and that colonists generally preserve the usages of the mother state. He urges that many colonies did not do this and that many Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta, yet had the same institutions as the Spartan colonies in Crete. On these considerations of Aristotle and Ephoros, then, the Lycurgian institutions at Sparta, so far from being genuinely Spartan, were not even of Dorian origin, but had belonged in the first instance to the pre-Dorian population of Crete; unless indeed even these earliest inhabitants of Crete are to be regarded as Dorians (as they are by Ottfried Müller *The Dorians*

i. p. 36 ff. Eng. tr.). But this view has been refuted by Trieber p. 81 ff. In opposition to the view of Ephoros and Aristotle, which is in itself improbable, he has sought to maintain the truth of that combated by Ephoros, that Spartan institutions actually passed over into Crete with the Spartan settlers. Compare n. (356) on § 4. Polybios moreover IV. 54. 6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the reading there also) as the oldest of the Cretan towns and likewise as a colony of Lacedaemon. Trieber has shown conclusively p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there never really existed any specially 'Dorian' political or social principles, such as are presumed to have found their highest and completest embodiment in Sparta. SUSEM. (354)

§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι] Why mention merely the περίοικοι i.e. the descendants of the pre-Dorian population, if after all the Spartan and other Dorian settlers had accepted the same institutions? Aristotle cannot have contradicted himself in such a manner as this, or have written such nonsense. It is much more likely that some learned Peripatetic added this in order to tack on the following remarks about Minos, his maritime power, and his death. He did not however perceive that they are not at all appropriate to this connexion, and that to speak of Crete as favourably situated for maritime supremacy over the Hellenes agrees but ill with Aristotle's own statements §§ 15, 16: where the remoteness of the island is said to have shut it off from external complications and from foreign dominion. SUSEM. (355)

Grote II. 484 n. 2 has another way out of the difficulty. He takes the word as in Thuc. I. 17, "the neighbouring

- 31 αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω (VII)  
 πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς 2  
 τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς (p. 51)  
 πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπικείται τῇ θαλάσσῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων  
 35 ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν  
 τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον  
 § 4 τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέ-  
 σχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς  
 δ' ᾤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύ-  
 40 τησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.]  
 § 5 ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικὴν. γέ- 3  
 1272 a ωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἴλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι,

32 [τὴν.....νόμων] Stahr || 34 πάσῃ.....35 πάντων noticed by Theodoros Metochit. Miscell. p. 644 ed. Kiessling || 34 πάσῃ] μέση Bücheler wrongly || 35 τῇ μὲν τῆς] τῆς μὲν Γ<sup>M</sup> || 36 μικρόν] ὀλίγον before τῆς Πελοποννήσου P<sup>4</sup> || τῆς.....τῇ δὲ omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin by a later hand and then again erased) || 37 Ῥόδον Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 40 Κάμικον Vettori, Καμικόν Bas.<sup>1</sup> in margin, perhaps rightly, κάμινον Γ<sup>M</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup> Ald., καμινον P<sup>3</sup>, κάμεινον Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, Camerinam Albertus Magnus and Ar.

1272 a 1 τε omitted by M<sup>4</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

states" (?). The words of Ephoros in Strabo X. p. 737 are: τοὺς δὲ Κρήτας ὀλιγωρήσαι (sc. τῶν νομίμων) κακωθεῖσιν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Κνωσίων, τῶν πολεμικῶν μείναι δὲ τινα τῶν νομίμων παρὰ Λυκτίους καὶ Γορτυνίους καὶ ἄλλοις τοῖς πολυχίνους μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνοις. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ Λυκτίων νόμιμα ποιεῖσθαι μαρτύρια τοὺς τὰ Λακωνικὰ πρεσβύτερα ἀποφαίνοντας: ἀποίκους γὰρ ὄντας φυλάττειν τὰ τῆς μητροπόλεως ἔθνη· ἐπεὶ ἄλλως γε εἴηθες εἶναι τὸ τοὺς βέλτιον συνεσιώτας καὶ πολιτευομένους τῶν χειρόνων ζηλωτὰς ἀποφαίνειν.

34 ἐπικείται = commands the whole sea (Congreve).

§ 4 After the Dorian invasion Crete lost its fleet and maritime supremacy. Cp. Thuc. I. 4: Ephoros *Fragm.* 64 (Müller I. 250) καὶ γὰρ ναυκρατεῖν πρότερον τοὺς Κρήτας...νῦν δ' ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ ναυτικόν.

41 ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον...Λακωνικὴν] Trieber p. 86 ff. shows that, although the points of difference as well as of resemblance are not brought out forcibly enough, yet in the main the whole comparison is just. He tries to make it probable that from its quite peculiar character the similarity can only be explained by a real transference from Sparta to Crete. Oncken on the other hand, II.

377, finds a reason both for the resemblance and the limitations to it in the one point which Aristotle has not mentioned, "the fact that in Sparta as in Crete a dominant race of the same Dorian descent broke in from a foreign land upon an old political order, overcame it by violence, and then directed their whole energies to the task of maintaining themselves uncontaminated and *unassailable* at the head of their new settlement." Polybios VI. 45, 46 goes still farther and even denies that there were any resemblances at all between the two polities. SUSEM. (356)

He insists (1) on the absence of any legal restriction on the possession of land or money, and (2) on the annual tenure of offices (as contrasted with the life-long tenure of Spartan Kings and Gerusiasts) and the democratic character of the Cretan governments. Undoubtedly as we approach Roman times the power of the ἐκκλησία increases: Höck III. pp. 64—97, who supports his case from inscriptions, infers that a democratic revolution had subverted the governments of Aristotle's time.

§ 5 1272 a 1 οἱ περίοικοι] See n. 355 and esp. Exc. III. to this book p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (357)



καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ (VII)  
 Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἣ καὶ  
 § 6 δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. οἱ  
 5 μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ  
 καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀρι-  
 θμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρονσιν,  
 οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες βουλήν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότε-  
 ρον μὲν ἦν, εἴτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν  
 § 7 οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέ-  
 11 χουσι πάντες, κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ συνεπιψηφίσαι  
 τὰ δοξάντα τοῖς γέρονσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς  
 Λάκωσιν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέ-  
 15 ρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολι-  
 § 8 τείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως·

3 φύλτια Γ M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, apparently altered by P<sup>1</sup>) || ἀντρεῖα M<sup>s</sup>, ἀν-  
 δρια Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., ἀλλως ἀνδρια P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 8 βουλήν "a gloss under which  
 lurks a Cretan name" Spengel || πρῶτον Γ Thomas Aquinas and Ar., perhaps  
 rightly || 11 ἄλλη P<sup>3</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>)

3 ἀνδρεῖα = meals of men: or more  
 precisely, clubs or companies of men who  
 messed together: see n. (378) on 11 § 3.  
 SUSEM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες] The same re-  
 mark is found in Ephoros *l.c.* 482, with  
 the object of proving the same conclusion.  
 Comp. also Plut. *Lycurg.* c. 12. But  
 that Ephoros repeats this argument  
 three times, is a very inexact statement  
 of Trieber, p. 100: for at p. 480 the ex-  
 pression is only ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἀ-  
 καλοῦσιν ἀνδρεῖα and p. 483 εἰς τὰ συσσί-  
 τια ἄγουσι τὰ ἀνδρεῖα. SUSEM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of  
 Sparta was the constitution of every inde-  
 pendent Cretan town. We learn from  
 the inscriptions that little places like  
 Hierapytna, Priaios (Praesus), Saxos,  
 Allaria, had each its own κόσμοι, βουλή,  
 and ἐκκλησία.

§ 6 On the analogy between the Ephors  
 and the κόσμοι, see Exc. III. p. 335 f.  
 SUSEM. (360)

7 οἱ δὲ γέροντες] See § 11. SUSEM. (361)

§ 7 10 ἐκκλησίας δὲ κτλ.] Cp. 11  
 §§ 5, 6 with Exc. IV. Although the  
 simple verb ἐπιψηφίζειν does not mean  
 "to vote," but "to put to the vote," yet  
 so far as I know συνεπιψηφίζειν is  
 everywhere found in the sense of "vote

approvingly," i.e. "confirm by a vote,"  
 auctores fieri: Polyb. XXII. 13. 1, Plu-  
 tarch *De Garrulitate* 511 F. Here it can  
 have no other meaning. The only doubt  
 is whether we should take it literally (1)  
 that the popular assembly was bound to  
 ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had  
 the right, without proper debate and  
 without amendment, simply to confirm  
 or reject the proposal previously decided  
 by others. That question will be dis-  
 cussed in n. (389). SUSEM. (362)

Aesch. *De Fals. Leg.* 35 has the middle  
 voice in the same sense. Compare κατα-  
 σιωπᾶν with both meanings (1) to be very  
 silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In  
 the Gortynian inscription the assembly  
 in the market-place and the stone from  
 which the speaker addressed the people  
 are twice mentioned X. 34, ἀμπαινεθαι  
 δε κατ' ἀγορὰν καταφελμενον τομ πολια-  
 ταν απο το λαο, ο απαγορευοντι, i.e. ἀνα-  
 φαίνεσθαι [he must adopt] δε κατ' ἀγορὰν  
 κατελεμένων (Hom.) τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ  
 λάω (cp. Soph. *O. Col.* 196) οὐ ἀπαγορεύ-  
 ονσι, adoption shall be in the market-  
 place, when the citizens are assembled,  
 from the stone where they make speeches:  
 and again XI. 10.

16 εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31.  
 Cp. n. (341). SUSEM. (363)

ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά- (VII)  
 των ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ \* \* φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περί-  
 οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-  
 20 νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέ-  
 § 9 φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας· πρὸς 5  
 δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὡς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφιλοσόφηκεν ὁ  
 νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ  
 πολυτεκνῶσι, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμίλιαν, (p. 52)  
 25 περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ δια-

18 καὶ ἐκ Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Lambin Bk., perhaps Γ; [ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] Göttling, [ἐκ] Congreve || καὶ <ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν>? or καὶ <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν>? Susem., see Comm., [καὶ] Lambin, καὶ <ἐκ τῶν> Congreve || καὶ ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων before ἀπὸ πάντων or else after ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ by transposition, Schmidt || 21 [καὶ γυναῖκας..... 26 διασκέψασθαι καιρὸς] Oncken; but see the Comm. || 21 πρὸς δὲ..... 26 καιρὸς transposed by Susem.<sup>1</sup> to follow 27 φανερόν, but wrongly || 24 ποιήσας is corrupt, <νομήμην> ποιήσας or something similar? Susem., better πορίσας Schmidt

κοινοτέρως] ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον of 9 § 31, in a more public fashion.

18 ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] "from the public domain." Zitelmann pp. 139, 140 conjectures that the citizens had the right of pasture on this domain-land. By the law of inheritance in the Gortynian inscription, certain of the cattle with the house in the town pass to the sons as *praecipuum*; but the daughters have a share of the land which is cultivated by κλαυτά.

οἱ περίοικοι] See Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (364)

§ 8 19 τέτακται μέρος] Partly on this model, partly on that of Hippodamos (8 § 3 n.), is based the division of the land in Aristotle's ideal state, IV(VII). 10 § 10 n. (834), into property (1) of the temples, (2) of the syssitia, (3) of private individuals, (1) and (2) together forming the public land. In the state of the *Laws* there is no public land, although Plato mentions the Cretan institution with approval, VIII 847 E quoted in n. (341) on 9 § 31. SUSEM. (365)

20 ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ κτλ.] If we understand this as e.g. Schömann does, *op. c.* 307 Eng. tr., that the mess-funds maintained the members of the family, wives daughters younger boys and slaves, who had their meals at home, then the whole of Oncken's proof (II. 385), that καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας is a spurious addition, falls to the ground. Such slight inaccuracies of expression, due to excessive brevity, are no uncommon thing in

Aristotle. The sense might be made clearer by a slight insertion thus: 'one part is set apart for the worship of the gods and for the state expenditure, the other for the public messes <and the entire maintenance of the households of the citizens>, so that all, men women and children, are kept at the public cost.' Schömann rightly remarks that this explains why an Aeginetan stater had to be paid for each slave: see Exc. III. p. 337. Oncken however gives a different explanation (II. 387), he makes each of the subject population (?) contribute an Aeginetan stater. SUSEM. (366)

§ 9 22 ὀλιγοσιτίαν] Our only authority for a Cretan *ἀνδρείον*, Heracleides Ponticus, and the writers quoted by Athen. IV. 142 f., Dosiadas and Pyrgion, do not enable us to verify this statement: Schömann p. 308. They kept up the old practice of sitting at table: Cretes quorum nemo gustavit unquam cubans, Cicero *pro Murena* § 74. Their moderation in drinking: [Plato] *Minos* 320 A.

23 πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν κτλ.] See Schömann p. 304 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (367) Also Zitelmann *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 101 and the inscription itself II. 1, 6, 8, 9.

25 ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκ. καιρὸς] Since Aristotle thought it so important for his own ideal state to maintain uniformity in the number of citizens (see c. 6 § 10 ff., 7 § 5: IV(VII). 16 § 15 ff. with notes), and is not too nice about the means of securing that end, it would



σκέψασθαι καιρός)· ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον (VII)  
 τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν, τὰ δὲ  
 § 10 περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ  
 ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις  
 30 (γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες)· ὁ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν  
 πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν  
 αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης  
 ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάν-  
 34 των αἱροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς  
 § 11 γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἂν τις  
 εὔπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων (τὸ  
 γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζον ἔστι γέρας τῆς  
 ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχεῖν ἀλλ' αὐ-  
 § 12 τογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές). τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα τὸν  
 40 δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμ-

26 δὴ Lambin, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. || 29 τούτων II<sup>2</sup> Bk., τούτῳ ? Sylburg, <τῷ>  
 τούτων Bernays || 34 γενῶν] γερόντων Γ || 35 ἐκ τῶν] ἐκ τινῶν II<sup>1</sup> || 36 εἴ-  
 πειν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), εἴποιε M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., εἴποι P<sup>4</sup> and  
 P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>2</sup>) || τῶν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, ὧν II || γερόντων Congreve, γινομένων II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2,3,4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar.  
 Ald. Bk., γενομένων Q<sup>b</sup> || 37 γέρας] γηρας Γ || 40 καλῶς· οὐδὲν] καλῶς· οὐδὲ Γ Bk.  
 and perhaps Ar.

have been strange if he had not intended to take this question into consideration when describing the best state. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. 4, p. 53. How he would have decided it, we have no means of knowing. For, taken alone, *Nic. Eth.* VII. 5. 3 hardly justifies an immediate inference that he would have disallowed such means. Thus the grounds on which Oncken, II. 389 ff., tries to prove that § 9, as far as *καιρός*, is interpolated, are wholly untenable: and it is a misapprehension on his part that I bracketed the clause. But he is right in one point, that the introduction of this subject is not very fitting here; we must however put up with it, as it would be still less appropriate in any other part of the chapter. SUSEM. (368)

§ 10 30 γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες] Ephoros *Fr.* 64 (in Strabo p. 482) gives the same statement as Aristotle here, that the senators were chosen from those who had been *Κόσμοι* but adds that only tried and approved men were selected. There is no divergence in the facts here, but only in the judgment upon them: though it is of such a kind that, as is

stated in Exc. III. p. 336, Aristotle must have depended upon other accounts than those of Ephoros for the facts on which he based his judgment. Furthermore even in Sparta those who had been Ephors must frequently, to say the least, have entered the senate. SUSEM. (369)

32 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν κτλ.] See c. 9 § 22 n. (323 b). SUSEM. (370)

34 ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν] Called *στρατός* in the Gortynian inscription v 5 οὐκ' οὐ αἰθα-  
 λενσταρτος εκοσμον οι συν κυλλωι = when it was the turn of the 'troop' of the Aethalians to assume office and Kyllōs was *κόσμος ἐπώνυμος*. Comp. Hesych. *στάρτοι* (*sic*) = αἱ τάξεις τοῦ πλήθους. Similarly in the oath of Dreros, Cauer *Delect. inscrip.* 38, ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰθαλέων κοσμοῦντων τῶν σύγ Κυλῶι.

35 κεκοσμηκότων] like ὁ ἀρξας, ὁ βασιλεύσας, the aorist being more usual.

§ 11 38 μὴ κατὰ γράμματα] without written rules to guide them. Cp. 9 § 23.

§ 12 See I I § 2.

40 λήμματος] They make no private gains, such as bribes from allies and dependent states, or from hostile powers (comp. Pericles' bribe to the ephor Kleon-

ματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ' (VII)  
 § 13 ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων. ἦν δὲ ποιοῦνται  
 τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἰατρείαν, ἄτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ  
 δυναστευτικὴ. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς  
 κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· ἔξεστι  
 5 δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα δὲ  
 πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βού-  
 § 14 λησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ  
 τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἦν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις οἱ ἂν μὴ δίκας βούλων-  
 ται δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν· ἢ καὶ δήλον ὅτι ἔχει τι πολιτείας  
 10 ἢ τάξις, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰώ-  
 θασι γὰρ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρ-

41 γ'] τ' apparently Ar., γὰρ Susem.<sup>1</sup> wrongly, *enim* William, whence nothing is to be inferred about Γ

1272 b 1 διαφερόντων Γ M<sup>a</sup> and perhaps Ar., διαφερόντων P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 5 δὲ] δὲ Congreve, rightly, I think || 6 πάντα πάρεστι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), πάρεστι P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 8 οἱ ἂν Κοραεῖς, ὅταν Γ II Ar. Schneider Bk. || 9 τῶν δυνατῶν (not here but before 8 ἦν καθιστᾶσι) II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in margin; so transposed, δυνατῶν <τινὲς> or even better <ὑπὸ> τῶν δυνατῶν? Schneider || Heinsius transposes εἰώθασι ... 12 ἀλλήλους before 9 ἢ καὶ δήλον κτλ. || 11 γὰρ Susem. following Bernays' translation, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || διαλαμβάνοντες] suspected by Bonitz (*Ind. Arist.* 182 b 6), καὶ λαμβάνοντες Susem.<sup>1</sup>, ἰδίᾳ λαμβάνοντες Schmidt, needlessly if we alter μοναρχίαν into ἀναρχίαν || ἀναρχίαν Bernays, μοναρχίαν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

dridas, *Plut. Per.* 22). Hence the office is not such a prize as to excite the cupidity of the commons.

41 τοῖς ἐφόροις] Cp. 9 § 19 n. (316). SUSEM. (370 b)

1272 b 1 τῶν διαφθερούντων goes with πόρρω: at a distance from any who are likely to corrupt them.

§ 13 3 δυναστευτικῇ] A δυναστεία is the worst and most extreme form of Oligarchy, standing nearest to a Tyranny, and, after it, the worst of all forms of government: VI(IV). 5 § 2 ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσὶ καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχόντες n. (1215); 6 § 11 n. (1228); 14 §§ 7—9 nn. (1328, 1331): VII(VI). 7 § 3 n. (1447): VIII(V). 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (1509); 6 §§ 11, 12 nn. (1586, 9); 7 §§ 12, 13 n. (1606); 8 § 7 n. (1613), § 11 n. (1617). SUSEM. (371)

Thebes at the time of the Persian war is an instance: *Thuc.* III. 62. 3.

5 μεταξὺ...ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν] to resign office before their term (of a year) expires. The verb is ἀποστήναι in the Gortynian inscription ε κ' ἀποστῆναι=τὴν ἀποστήν; or (?) ἀ=τὴν (after) ἂν ἀποστήν.

§ 14 8 τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας=the fact of the suspension of the office of Κόσμος, often brought about by cabals of influential families who did not want to have trials against themselves proceeded with.

For the construction cp. *Thuc.* I. 138 καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἦν ὑπετίθει αὐτῷ δουλεύσειν; II. 42 πενίας ἐλπίδι, ὡς κἂν ἐτι διαφυγῶν αὐτὴν πλουτήσειεν (*Shilleto*).

οἱ ἂν μὴ κτλ] Oncken (II. 393) is quite wrong in inferring from this passage that even the judicial office probably passed from the kings to the Κόσμοι. From the complete analogy which Aristotle finds between the Spartan and Cretan senators, and between the Ephors and Κόσμοι, in all the essential features of the authority of these offices, it is clear on the contrary that, as in Sparta III. 1. 10 nn. (443-4), so in Crete, the Senate had criminal jurisdiction over the most serious offences, and the Κόσμοι appeared, like the Ephors, as accusers in the case of crimes against the state. Where there is no prosecutor there is of course no judge. SUSEM. (372)

11 διαλαμβάνοντες=by forming parties



- § 15 χίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καί-<sup>8</sup>  
 τοι τι διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τινος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν  
 εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (p. 53)  
 15 ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις \* \* τοῖς  
 βουλομένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένοις. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ  
 εἴρηται, σφύζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω  
 § 16 πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν, οἱ  
 δ' εἰλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς  
 20 κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέ-  
 βηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθένειαν  
 τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τοσαύθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω τῆς πολι-

15 ἐπικίνδυνος] *valde periculosa* William on his own conjecture probably, hence  
 λαν ἐπικίνδυνος Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly || τῶν βουλομένων and 16 δυναμένων II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk.  
 "because those who wish to attack it can also (easily do so)" Bernays; <δυναν> τῶν  
 βουλομένων Bas.<sup>3</sup>, <ἀπὸ> τῶν β. Busse. If the dative is right an infinitive has  
 dropped out, as Bücheler saw || 21 φανερόν Bk.<sup>1</sup>, a misprint || 23 εἰρήσθω before  
 τοσαύθ' P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

from amongst the people and their own friends. SUSEM.

§ 15 17 ξενηλασίας] Acc. plur. 'The distance has kept out aliens as effectually as a formal prohibition.' No foreigner could come to Sparta and live as a resident alien (μέτοικος): strangers stopping there for a time were strictly watched and, as soon as it seemed advisable to the Ephors, dismissed: see Schömann p. 276 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (373)

§ 16 18 διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν π. κτλ] Consult however n. (281) on 9 § 3: where also a different reason, it should be observed, is assigned by Aristotle himself, viz. that the Cretan states, even if at war, assist one another against the revolted περλοῖκοι. SUSEM. (374)

19 οὔτε γὰρ] It is the isolation, not the strength, of the Cretans that secures their independence; for (1) they are not strong enough to acquire foreign dominion (ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς), while (2) their internal weakness is now patent.

20 νεωστί τε πόλεμος κτλ] There are two events to which this passage, taken by itself, may refer. (1) With Höck, *Kreta* III. 61 f., we may understand it of the Phocian war. Phalaecus, the last leader of the Phocians, after withdrawing from Phocis came at last with his mercenaries to Crete: by a stratagem he conquered Lyktos and drove out the inhabitants who turned to their

mother city, Sparta, for aid. This aid they received under the command of Archidamos, who beat the mercenaries and reestablished the Lyktians in their city. Phalaecus however stayed in the island and fell at the siege of Kydonia B.C. 343. See Schäfer *Demosthenes* II. 339 f. Or (2) we might with Fülleborn (II. 253) refer it to the despatch of Agesilaos with the mercenaries of his brother Agis II, who was allied with the Persians and sent the expedition directly after the battle of Issos (333) to conquer Crete. The Lacedaemonians with their mercenaries effected a landing successfully and met with no material resistance; see Schäfer III. p. 163 f. As therefore both events suit, if, when he wrote the passage, Aristotle had been acquainted with the second he would certainly have spoken of *two* foreign wars, and not of one only: thus it seems as if this passage were composed before the latter of the two events took place. But it need not be inferred from this that the completion of the book, so far as Aristotle did at all complete it, could not have been of a much later date. Aristotle often worked at several of his treatises at the same time. Cp. *Introd.* p. 66. SUSEM. (375)

ξενικός = of mercenaries (Congreve). Better, 'foreign.' For III. 14. 7 ξενικόν as opposed to οἱ πολῖται means a foreign force, though a force of mercenaries.

- 11 *τείας· πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ VIII*  
 25 *πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ' ἓνια παρα-*  
*πλησίως τοῖς Λάκωσιν. αὗται γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλλή-*  
*λαις τε σύγγενός πῶς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρου-*  
*σιν, ἥ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτῃ τούτων ἡ τῶν*  
 29 *Καρχηδονίων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῖς*  
 § 2 *καλῶς· σημείον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν δῆμον*  
*ἐκούσιον διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μῆτε στά-*  
*σιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι μῆτε τύραννον.*  
 § 3 *ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτεία τὰ μὲν συσ-* 2

24 καὶ καρχηδόνιοι after καλῶς M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 28 ἡ before Λακωνικὴ omitted in M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [η] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 30 σημείον τε? Susem. || <εὖ> συντεταγμένης Schneider, εὖ τεταγμένης Bergk (*Comm. crit. spec.* VI, Marburg 1850), one or other seems necessary; *bene institutae* Ar.: πῶλεως for πολιτείας Bender || 31 ἐκούσιον Spengel, ἔχουσιν Γ II<sup>2</sup> Bk., omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, untranslated by Ar.; ἔκοντα Bergk, ἡσυχά Hampke, ἐκουσίως W. Wagner (*De Plauti Aulul.*, Bonn 1864 p. 37), all before Spengel: ἔχ<οντα> ἔξ<ουσίαν> Sauppe, ἔχουσιν <κύριον> Bender following Lambin's translation *populum rerum compotem* || ἐν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, crossed out by p<sup>2</sup>

#### C. 11 The constitution of Carthage.

On this chapter consult Kluge *Aristoteles de politia Carthaginiensium. Accedit Theodori Metochitae descriptio reipublicae Carthaginiensis* (Breslau 1824): Heeren *Ideen* vol. II. pt. 1, *Works* XIII. 108—147: Movers *Die Phönizier* (Berlin 1849) vol. II. pt. 1. p. 479 ff.; Mommsen *History of Rome*, vol. II. pp. 15—23 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (376)

§ 1 24 *πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ κτλ* ["are thought (a) to enjoy a good constitution, (b) with many features of unusual relative excellence, and (c) some which most nearly resemble the Spartan constitution." Of these three points Aristotle adopts two, (c) and (a), in the next two sentences giving more definite reasons for (a) in § 2, and passing on to (c) in § 3. But the further discussion § 3 ff. proves sufficiently that he also accepted the second point. Isocrates III. 24, and Julian, *Or.* I. p. 14 (Spanh.), also point to a similarity between the Carthaginian and Spartan constitutions which they declare to be the best actually established. Polybios VI. 51 f. and Cicero *De Rep.* II. 23 § 41 ff. compare them both with one another and with the Roman constitution, while Eratosthenes (in Strabo I. p. 66) praises the admirable character of the Carthaginian and Roman constitutions. SUSEM. (377)

The exciting struggle with Dionysios for Sicily must have called attention to the government of Carthage: see note on

1273 a 36 (Wyse).

§ 2 30 It is a sign that a government is thoroughly <well> organised when the popular element is attached to the system of its own free will.

31 *διαμένειν*, like *μένειν* 10 § 16, = abide by, remain loyal to, a government.

32 *μῆτε τύραννον* This assertion seems true. For the efforts of Hannon (about B.C. 344) to make himself tyrant, mentioned by Aristotle himself VIII(v). 7 § 4, met with no success, see n. (1597); while the attempt of Bomilcar was not until after Aristotle's time, B.C. 308. That also ended at last unsuccessfully: see the same note. Lastly there was one Malchus between 600 and 550 B.C., who having been banished because he had been defeated in Sardinia procured his return by force of arms. He then summoned the popular assembly, justified his conduct before it, and had ten senators put to death, but made no change in the existing constitution. However he fell under suspicion of aiming at tyrannical power; in consequence, and as a punishment for his former violent proceedings, he was executed, Justin. XVIII. 7, so that this instance does not contradict Aristotle's statement. With regard to VIII(v). 12 § 12 see n. (1772). SUSEM. (377 b)

§ 3 "The points of analogy to the Spartan polity are the common meals of the clubs like the *φιλῖτια* at Sparta, and



σίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν (VIII)  
 35 καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ μὲν  
 γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ, ταύτην δ' αἰροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν  
 ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον  
 § 4 τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασι-  
 λεῖς μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος μῆτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, †εἴ τι  
 40 διαφέρων ἐκ τούτων† αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν. μεγά-  
 λων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ᾧσι, μεγάλα βλά-  
 1273 a ππουσι, καὶ ἐβλαψαν ἤδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.  
 § 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν διὰ τὰς 3

34 φιλιτίοις Π<sup>1</sup>, corrected by p<sup>1</sup> || τὴν.....35 ἀρχὴν is noticed by Theodoros Metoch. *Miscell.* p. 667 Kiessl. || 35 <δ>οὐ Bernays || 36 γὰρ omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. Bernays || 38 ἐκεῖ inserted after τοὺς by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> || 39 καθ' αὐτὸ Γ and γρ. p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, κατ' αὐτὸ P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) κατ' αὐτὸ M<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), κατ' αὐτὸ M<sup>4</sup> (correction), κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> above the line, κατὰ τὸ Ar. (?) || μῆτε before τοῦτο Schneider, μὴδὲ Π Bk. || εἴ τι Γ, εἴ τε M<sup>4</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, ἢ Ar. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), εἴ τέ τι Welldon || εἴ τι διαφέρων ἐκ τούτων is corrupt: \* \* ἐκ τούτων Conring, who first saw that from ἐκ τούτων onwards Aristotle is speaking of the senate and not the kings: but this is true of the whole clause from εἴ τι. With approximate correctness τοὺς δὲ γέροντας τῷ Schneider, τοὺς δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον J. Brandis (*Rhein. Mus.* xi. 595 f.) which is closer to the mss., εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων Bernays. On grammatical grounds I prefer Brandis' suggestion with Bücheler's slight change εἴ τι δὲ τοὺς γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, or better still εἴ τι δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, though I have not ventured to introduce it into the text

1273 a 1 καρῆδοιῶν or καλῆδοιῶν Γ

the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit)." See Excursus IV. pp. 340—347. SUSEM. (378-9-81-2)

36 ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων] See c. 10 § 10 n. (369). SUSEM. (380)

§ 4 38 "And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity," like the Heracleid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartiate is obscure. See Hdt. v. 72, Curtius *History* i. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 208, 226, 541—544 Eng. tr.

39 μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ κτλ] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. SUSEM. (383) εἴ τι διαφέρων] See the *Critical Notes*. The sense required is "and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority."

40 καθ' ἡλικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Congreve renders boldly "elected rather than hereditary": Cope more cautiously "according to age." But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerusiasts, at Sparta.

μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι κτλ] The Spartan senators were venal, 9 § 26 n. (331 b). But the conditional praise here given to the constitution of Carthage is sensibly modified § 8 ff. SUSEM. (384)

41 εὐτελεῖς=cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in *Rhet.* ii. 15 § 3; here, in moral character also.

§ 5 1273 a 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα κτλ] "Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences" sc. from the best type "are common to all the constitutions mentioned." And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge). SUSEM. (385)

παρεκβάσεις \* \* κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὄντα ταῖς εἰρημέναις (VIII)  
πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας  
5 καὶ τῆς πολιτείας \* \* τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον,  
τὰ δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσάγειν (p 54)  
τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι  
μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἃν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ,  
§ 6 τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ἃ δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι οὐ δια-  
10 κοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόασιν τῷ δῷ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρ-

3 παρεκβάσεις <τὰς τῆς ἀρίστης τάξεως> or something similar Susem., cp. 9 § 1. Fülleborn first suspected a defect || 4 ὑπόθεσιν <ὑπεναντίων> Bernays; cp. also 9 § 1 || 5 πολιτείας <τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις> Susem., ἐκκλίνει <τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις> Thurot, who discovered the lacuna || ἐκκλίνει P<sup>3</sup>, ἐκκλίνειν M<sup>3</sup> (corr.) || 6 γὰρ τὸ Morel Bk. Bernays || 7 τὸ δὲ μὴ II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Bernays. In Q<sup>b</sup> τὸ is a correction of τὰ, apparently by the scribe himself || 9 τούτων καὶ Susem., καὶ τούτων Γ II Bk., καὶ τούτων Bernays || εἰσφέρουσιν II<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>2</sup>) || οὗτοι omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [οὗτοι] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 10 τὰ δόξαντα] τάξαντα M<sup>3</sup>, ταξαντα P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup>), τάξαντι Γ

4 With τῶν δὲ supply ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν, and take πρὸς=when judged by.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ.] The whole passage requires to be read in the light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards of the criticism are more definitely stated: μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νενομοθέτῃται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. The second, then, which is now under consideration is, how far the Carthaginian constitution, although not the best, that is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains faithful to its own distinctive principle. It is still to be regarded as an aristocracy: i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristocracy: more precisely a combination of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy: see VI(IV). 2 § 4 n. (1141); 7 § 4 n. (1235), and cp. VIII(V). 7 § 4 n. (1597), 12 § 12 n. (1772), § 14 n. (1780): or else at any rate as a polity (πολιτεία) i.e. a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now the principle or fundamental assumption (ὑπόθεσις) or proper basis of every aristocracy is excellence and capacity: see esp. § 9 τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἰρεῖσθαι ἀρ., § 11 μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, VI(IV). 8. § 7 ὅροι ἀρετῆ and n. (536) on III. 7 § 3. Even in a nominal aristocracy, regard at least for these must stand highest: hence the more concessions are made to the oligarchical principle of wealth, or again to the democratic principle, at the expense of excellence or merit, the more the aristocracy

departs from its own standard. Polity takes for its standard the complete adjustment and neutralization of Oligarchy and Democracy; hence the more the oligarchical principle on the one hand makes itself felt at the expense of the democratic or the democratic principle on the other at the expense of the oligarchical, the more violently does a Polity diverge from its own principle in the one or the other direction: see VI(IV). c. 9.

Cato quoted by Servius on Vergil's Aeneid IV. 682, Polybios VI. 51. 2 and Cicero *l. c.* call the constitution of Carthage, less accurately, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy (Cato, *optimatum potestas*; Cicero, *genus optimas*), and democracy. SUSEM. (386)

6 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] "For the kings in conjunction with the senators have full powers either to bring certain matters before the people or not, provided they are both agreed: otherwise in this case the people, too, have a voice."

8 πάντες=both; viz. the *Shofetes* on the one side, the *Senators* on the other. For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of the word: "πάντες ubi de duobus tantum agitur, i. q. ἀμφοτέροι ὀποτεροσούν" (*Ind. Ar.*). Comp. *Anal. Priora* I. 28. 44 b 21 ὅσα πᾶσιν ἔπεται "h. e. ὀποτεροσούν, et maiori termino et minori" (Waitz): also VI(IV). 4. 2. See also Exc. IV. ὁ δῆμος, p. 347. SUSEM. (387)

Add *Anal. Priora* I. 27 § 12, 43 b 36, *Meteorol.* II. 4 § 1, 359 b 33, IV. 5 § 8,



χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλευμένῳ τοῖς (VIII)  
 12 εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἕξεσιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολι-

382 b 17, and *De Anima* III. 6 § 2, 430 b 4 (Vahlen).

§ 6 11 ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν] Here then in reality the final decision rests with the popular assembly; and Aristotle, judging by the standard of Aristocracy or Polity, disapproves of this, which furnishes another indication of the character of his own best state, in so far as that also is Aristocracy: see on 6 § 16 n. (218) and Exc. 1 to B. III. In keeping with this (he says) in the most moderate democracy the people are best restricted to electing the council and the officers of state and to holding them responsible, VII (VI). 4. 4 n. (1415), perhaps with a share in legislation and the decision upon changes in the constitution VI (IV). 14. 4 f.: at least only the most indispensable meetings of the popular assembly are held VI (IV). 6. 1, the administration being left to the council and the officers of state. Or even the magistrates may be elected by a mere committee of the whole people upon which all the citizens serve by rotation, VII (VI). 4. 4; or it may come to this that no popular assembly is held but it is represented by the aforesaid committee, which moreover has in many cases simply to hear the resolutions of the magistrates, VI (IV). 14. 4 n. (1322). And these are the forms of democracy which Aristotle regards as the best. SUSEM. (388)

12 ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις κτλ.] In the Spartan assembly only the kings, the senators, and at a later period the ephors were allowed to take part in the debate: other persons needed special permission in order to do so (see Schömann *Antiquitates* p. 235 Eng. tr.). Undoubtedly it was similar in Crete. But when Aristotle says, or seems to say, here that in Sparta and Crete the popular assembly had merely to listen to the resolutions of the government without really having the final decision in its own hands, and 10 § 7 (cp. n. 362) that it had in those states no greater powers entrusted to it than to ratify the decrees of the Cosmi, or the kings, and the senators, all this certainly looks at first sight as if the assembly had not the right to reject these decrees, and indeed many have so understood it [e.g. Höck *Kreta* III. 59 ff., Ridgeway *op. cit.* p. 134]. But that these expressions should not be thus pressed is shown by the simple consideration that if the assembly

had merely to "listen to" these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to convoke it in case the Shofetes and the senate were agreed: whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing it must be conceded to Oncken (i. p. 279 f.) and Gilbert (p. 137 f.) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch *Lycurg.* 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (Rhetra) by the kings Theopompos and Polydoros (αἱ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δῆμος ἔλοιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατήρας ἡμεν) is, that it was left to the discretion of the kings and senators whether they should respect a vote in the assembly refusing ratification, or not;—supposing further that Aristotle's language really agrees most easily with this meaning (which is hardly the case, after what has been said), yet the whole hypothesis is simply wrecked by the fact that Gilbert himself explains this to be a quite abnormal Spartan institution, while Aristotle asserts that the powers of the Cretan and Spartan assemblies were altogether similar. Thus we are forced to be content with the interpretation of the additional clause given by Plutarch, τοῦτ' ἔστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλύειν τὸν δῆμον, ὡς ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιούντα τὴν γνώμην παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, i. e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. SUSEM. (389)

§ 7 *τείαις οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὔσας πολλῶν*  
*καὶ μεγάλων ὑφ' αὐτῶν αἰρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν*  
 15 *ταύτας αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας*  
*πλέονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες*  
*ἄρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ*  
*μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτε-*  
*ρον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πά-*  
 20 *σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.*  
 § 8 *παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἢ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο-*  
*νίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ*  
*συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ*  
 24 *πλουτίνδην οἴονται δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον*  
 § 9 *γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἴπερ οὖν*  
*τὸ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι πλουτίνδην ὀλιγαρχικόν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρε-*  
*τὴν ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθ' ἣν-*  
*περ συντέτακται [καὶ] τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο-*  
*λιτείαν· αἰροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-*  
 30 *λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς.*  
 § 10 *δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ὑμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι*

16 πλέον M<sup>a</sup>, πλείονα P<sup>2-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>3</sup> (later hand), πλείονα P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand) || 17 μένοντες? Sylburg wrongly || τὸ] τὰς P<sup>4-6</sup> and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, τοὺς Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 18 καὶ εἴ.....ἕτερον Kluge thinks interpolated or out of place || 19 τινῶν Koraes (cp. III. 1. 10), τῶν II Ar. Bk., τῶν <αὐτῶν> Vettori: τῶν ἀρχείων πάντων P<sup>4-6</sup> Ar. || 20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Bender thinks not genuine || 28 [καὶ] Susem., untranslated by Ar., καὶ συντέτακται Congreve transposing, καὶ <παρεκβέ-βηκε> or something similar Thurot

§ 7 13 *τὰς πενταρχίας*] See Exc. IV. p. 348 f. SUSEM. (390)

19 *ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχείων*] Aristotle says "courts" in the plural; see Exc. IV. He regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as aristocratic provided (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of justice are mere appendages to different offices of state. Further cp. III. 1 §§ 10, 11 *τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος...τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδὸνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινας κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας, νη.* (443, 4): also *νη.* (325) on 9 § 23 above, p. 348 and *Introd.* p. 54 n. 3. SUSEM. (391)

20 *καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι*] On the jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors at Sparta, see *νη.* (325, 329 b) on 9 §§

23, 25; on that of the kings Schömann p. 229 Eng. tr.; on that of the other magistrates *op. c.* 250 ff. SUSEM. (391 b)

§ 8 23 *ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτίνδην*] Yet apart from the ideal state—see *νη.* (885) on IV(VII). 13 § 9 *πάντες οἱ πολῖται*—Aristotle himself approves of Solon's moderate census in this respect 12 §§ 5, 6: III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (392)

§ 9 30 *τοὺς στρατηγούς*] See Exc. IV. p. 349 f. SUSEM. (392 b)

§ 10 31 *δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν κτλ*] See 9 § 2 *νη.* (279): compare IV(VII). 9 § 3, § 7, 10 § 9 *νη.* "But if Aristotle demands of the legislator that he is to free the magistrates from all anxieties about their support, this can only be done by paying them. And yet in § 7 above he had himself declared it a better regulation not to combine such offices with payment." (Fülleborn). See however Exc. IV. p. 348. SUSEM. (393)



τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὅρᾱν ἐστι (VIII)  
 τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν  
 34 καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἰδιω-  
 b 6 τεύοντες. <βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν  
 b 7 <ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.>  
 a 35 εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-  
 λῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὀνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν,  
 § 11 τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἔντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος  
 οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν (p. 55)  
 ὅλην φιλοχρήματον. ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ τ  
 40 κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολου-  
 θεῖν τούτοις. ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην  
 1073 b  
 § 12 οὐχ οἷον τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐθί-  
 ζεσθαι δ' εὐλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὠνουμένους, ὅταν δαπα-  
 νήσαντες ἄρχωσιν ἄτοπον [μὲν] γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὦν ἐπιεικῆς  
 δὲ βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ὦν οὐ βουλήσεται  
 5 δαπανήσας. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ' ἄρχειν, τούτους  
 ἄρχειν. βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν  
 ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.

32 ταῦθ' Bk.<sup>2</sup>, a misprint probably || 33 βέλτιστον P<sup>2-3</sup>

1273 b 6, 7 βέλτιον.....σχολῆς transposed by Susem., *Introd.* p. 81 f. ||  
 6 εὐπορίαν P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. || 7 ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ possibly

1273 a 35 δεῖ δὴ T<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, corrected by later hand), δὴ δεῖ P<sup>2-3</sup> ||  
 39 ὅ τι P<sup>2</sup>, ὅτι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1-4</sup> Ald. Bk. and perhaps P<sup>3</sup> || γὰρ Ar., δ' Γ II (for which II<sup>2</sup> in  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup> is a misprint) Bk. || 40 πολιτειῶν Γ M<sup>a</sup>

1273 b 1 τε.....τὴν] τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 2 δ'] γὰρ Spengel ||  
 τοῦτ' ὠνουμένους Γ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin), [τοῦτ' ὠνουμέ-  
 νους] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, τοὺς ὠνημένους Ramus || 3 μὲν is rightly omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 4  
 ὦν] ἂν Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 5 ἄριστ' ἄρχειν Spengel, ἀρισταρχεῖν Γ II Bk.

35 εἰ δὲ...πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-  
 λῆς] "But even supposing that means  
 must be taken into account, in order to  
 secure leisure," i.e. magistrates who can  
 devote their whole time to their duties,  
 "it is a grave defect that the highest  
 offices, like that of Shofete or general,  
 should be purchaseable." Here he takes  
 up the condition postulated and justified  
 above § 8, a 23, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτινὴν κτλ.

36 τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὀνητὰς κτλ.] The  
 same thing is said by Polybios vi. 56. 4  
 (Schlosser). SUSEM. (394) Mr Wyse re-  
 fers to Plato *Rep.* 544 D: ὠνηταὶ βασι-  
 λείαι and such like intermediate polities  
 are to be found outside of Greece (περὶ  
 τοὺς βαρβάρους).

§ 11 40 τὸ κύριον] the supreme autho-  
 rity, i.e. the government: III. 6. 1 n. (523).

41 τούτοις=τῷ κυρίῳ. In c. 5 § 15,  
 7 § 8 he has dwelt on the comparative  
 weakness of direct enactments and go-  
 vernment interference. But public opi-  
 nion can be legitimately educated and  
 influenced, and this is τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς  
 τὰς πολιτείας. See VIII(v). 9 §§ 11-15.

§ 12 1273 b 1 ἐθίζεσθαι κτλ.] "Nor is  
 it strange that the purchasers of place  
 should be accustomed to make a profit out  
 of it, when it has cost them dear." The  
 article with the participle need not be  
 suspected; the sense is "buying office as  
 they do." Cp. c. 8 § 10 οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ  
 πορίζοντες=if they supply, whereas οἱ  
 πορίζοντες would be 'supplying, as they  
 do'=as they supply (Tyrrell).

5 διὸ δεῖ κτλ.] Cp. 9 § 27 n. (335).  
 SUSEM. (395)

- § 13 φαῦλον δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχὰς τὸν<sup>8</sup>  
 αὐτὸν ἀρχειν ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ  
 10 ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἔργον ἄριστ' ἀποτελεῖται. δεῖ δὲ ὅπως γίνηται τοῦτο  
 ὁρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν  
 § 14 καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλεις, πολιτικώτερον  
 πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον κοινότερόν  
 τε γάρ, καί, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖ-  
 15 ται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολε-  
 μικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις διὰ  
 πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.  
 § 15 ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὐσης τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα <στάσιν> ἐκ-<sup>9</sup>  
 φεύγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες

6 βέλτιον.....7 σχολῆς. See on 1273 a 35 || 10 δὲ Susem., δ' Γ II (δὲ M<sup>a</sup>) Bk.  
 || 14 καὶ before καθάπερ Susem., καὶ after εἶπομεν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>: Bender,  
 with Bernays, accepts Susemihl's transposition, or else would omit καθάπερ  
 εἶπομεν || 15 τὸν αὐτῶν M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand), ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν? Γ, ab eisdem William;  
 <οὕτως ἢ ὑπὸ> τῶν αὐτῶν? Susem., τῶν ἔργων Bernays, tempting but not certain;  
 [τῶν αὐτῶν] Bender, as due to the τῶν ναυτικῶν following: not bad || 18 kal in-  
 serted after οὐσης by P<sup>4</sup>-6 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || <στάσιν> Bernays, *illud effugiunt* Ar.: Schnei-  
 der saw an object was required for ἐκφεύγουσι, <τοῦτο> Kluge after Ar., <ἐριδας>  
 for ἄριστα Hampke. Cp. 11 § 2 || 19 τῷ πλουτεῖν Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> following Schneider,  
 misled by William's rendering *inditando*

§ 13 Plato's principle of the division of labour, with the stock Socratic examples of shoemaker and flute player: cp. c. 2 § 5, 3 n., Pl. *Rcp.* II. 374 C.

§ 14 12 πολιτικώτερον] more to the advantage (or, in the interest) of the state, which is in this way better administered (κάλλιον οὕτως ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολιτικῶν).

13 κοινότερόν τε γάρ] sc. ἐστίν. For thus the government concerns wider interests, is more comprehensive. This is given as the reason for δημοτικώτερον; the next sentence justifies πολιτικώτερον. On this paragraph consult further vi(IV). 15 §§ 5—8 n. (1352). SUSEM. (396)

15 τῶν αὐτῶν] Each of the invariable tasks incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath).

16 ἐν τούτοις γάρ κτλ.] The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Piccart). SUSEM. (397)

§ 15 19 αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου] Cp. vii(VI). 5. 9, φῖλον κέκτηνται τὸν δήμον.

δεῖ γὰρ τινὰς ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. The subjects of the Carthaginian rule in Africa may be classified as follows: (1) the so-called Liby-Phoenicians, i.e. the old Phoenician settlements and others recently founded by Carthage: unfortified towns, partly no doubt inhabited by a mixed Phoenician and Libyan population, which had to pay a fixed tribute and furnish contingents. Utica alone escaped a similar fate, and had its independence and its walls preserved to it from the pious feeling of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protectors. (2) The agricultural villages of native Libyans who had been transformed from free farmers into fellahs: they had to pay a fourth part of the produce of the soil as land-tax (Polyb. I. 72. 2) and were subjected to a regular system of recruiting. (3) The roving pastoral tribes (νομάδες) who had to pay tribute and to furnish contingents. In the treaties of the Carthaginian state preserved by Greek writers (3) are called *ἔθνη*, "tribes," and the villages occupied by (2) are called *πόλεις*, "towns," of subjects (Mommsen II.



- 20 ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ γὰρ ἰῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν (VIII)  
 πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τουτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιά-  
 § 16 στους εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἂν ἀτυχία γένηται  
 τις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἐστι φάρ-  
 μακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας.
- (12) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ Κρη-  
 26 τικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἵπερ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι,  
 12 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· τῶν δὲ ἀποφνημαμένων τι περὶ πο- IX  
 λιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ'  
 ὠντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ (p. 36)  
 30 ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρηται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἔνιοι δὲ  
 νομοθέται γηγόνασιν, οἳ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἳ δὲ καὶ  
 τῶν ὀθνείων τισί, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί· καὶ τούτων οἳ μὲν ἐγέ-  
 νοντο δημιουργοὶ νόμων, οἳ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυ-  
 κοῦργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέ-  
 § 2 στησαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δ' 2  
 36 ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαῖον. ὀλυγαρχίαν

25 περὶ...1274 b 26 ἄν (c. 12) is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188<sup>b</sup>.  
 Göttling pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. *nn.* (399, 423, 427)  
 || κρήτης M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 26 αἵπερ] εἴ[περ]? Susem. (Γ may have omitted περ, quae Wil-  
 liam) || 27 τι omitted in Π<sup>1</sup>, hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 32 νόμων inserted after μὲν  
 by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 33 νόμων] μόνον Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθέτην Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

p. 9 f. Eng. tr.). See esp. Diod. xx.  
 55-4. It is the latter which are here  
 meant (ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). We are not to  
 understand the passage, with Heeren (p.  
 42) and Movers (p. 358), of the foundation  
 of new colonies; but of appointments  
 like that of governor and assessor of  
 taxes which gave the holders the oppor-  
 tunity of enriching themselves at the ex-  
 pense of their subjects. (See Kluge p.  
 192 ff., who however incorrectly assumes  
 that such officers were sent to Liby-  
 Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.)  
 It was in accordance with the principles  
 of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to  
 give these appointments to decayed  
 nobles (as might be inferred from  
 Mommsen's account II. p. 17 Eng. tr.),  
 but according to Aristotle's explicit state-  
 ment to plebeians, or citizens who did not  
 belong to the ruling houses. SUSEM.  
 (398)

§ 16 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἡσυχίας] "No  
 spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e.  
 no means of terminating civic strife.  
 Comp. the judgment of Polyb. vi. 51  
 on the second Punic War.

c. 12 The Solonian Constitution: §§  
 1-6.

For the historical bearings of this pas-  
 sage consult especially Grote cc. 11, 31;  
 Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 322-342 Eng.  
 tr. and *Athenian Constitutional History*  
 translated by Bosanquet (Oxford 1878).  
 Also *Case Materials for the History of*  
*Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1874):  
 Oncken *Athen und Hellas* pp. 161-173,  
*Staatslehre* II. 410 ff.

§ 1 28 οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν κτλ] see  
 1. 7. 5, 11. 7. 1. Here legislation is ap-  
 parently a branch of practical politics;  
 cp. *n.* on πολιτικός, 1. 1. 2.

33 νόμων, οἳ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας] This  
 distinction, which is quite in place here,  
 induced the author of the suspected pas-  
 sage, §§ 6-14, to believe that in Aris-  
 totle's opinion a list of mere legislators  
 was a further requisite. Whereas in fact  
 Aristotle intends with these words to  
 dismiss it as irrelevant. Finding no such  
 list drawn up by Aristotle the interpo-  
 lator supplied the supposed want on his  
 own account. SUSEM. (399)

§ 2 36 ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται] *Introd.* p. 20

τε γὰρ καταλύσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὔσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὴν (IX)  
 δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πατριον,  
 μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ  
 40 πάγῳ βουλήν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὺς ἀρι-  
 § 3 στοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον δημοτικόν. ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων  
 1274 a ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλύσαι, τὴν τε βου-  
 λην καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι,

37 γὰρ omitted by M<sup>p</sup>1 || 41 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., but see § 4, where  
 Schneider restored the plurals κύρια...τὰ δικαστήρια...κληρωτὰ ὄντα...ταῦτ'

n. 1. The context shows that these eulogists of Solon were eulogists of a mixed constitution, and not of Democracy, as Oncken strangely maintains. Such a combination of oligarchical and aristocratical elements they found in the "old-fashioned" Solonian democracy: in other words, not merely a moderate Democracy, but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least a kind of Polity. SUSEM. (400)

Diels *Ueber die Berliner Fragmente der Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* (Berlin 1885), p. 33, refers to Isocr. *Areop.* 16, *Antid.* 232, 312, for expressions of the current notion that Solon was the founder of Attic democracy; ὁ Σόλων ὁ παλαιὸς ἦν φιλόδημος τὴν φύσιν.

37 λίαν ἄκρατον] Too unqualified.

38 τὴν πατριον] The old-fashioned, as distinguished from the modern, democracy (ἡ νῦν δ.): comp. §§ 3, 4; VI(IV). 6 § 5; I 4 §§ 7, 11, 12; VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3; VIII(V). 5 §§ 10, 11 (μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην) with the references in the notes. Comp. also VII(VI). 7 § 7 n. "modern oligarchies": III. 6 § 9 n. (532). Aristotle quite accepts the distinction, cp. §§ 5, 6: III. 11. 8; VI(IV). 11. 19 n. (1303). For he has no objection to raise against these panegyrists of Solon, except that they referred even the aristocratical and oligarchical elements of the combination to Solon, whereas in fact only the democratic accession was his doing. With the following sentences compare Schömann *The Solonian Heliaea and Ephialtes' coup d'état*, an article in the *Jahrb. f. Phil.* XCIII. 1866. 585—594; and R. Schöll *De synegoris Atticis* p. 10 ff. (Jena 1876). SUSEM. (400 b)

"Inter eos qui Solonem laudant, ni fallor, Isocratem in Areopagitico intelligit; ita enim loquitur, ut Soloni et αἰρεσιν ἀρχῶν et βουλὴν tribut, at nihil ille de δικαστηρίοις" (Spengel).

39 "by a happy blending (of other

elements) in the polity."

39—41 Parallel to the account given, probably by the same writers, of the Spartan polity 6 § 17.

§ 3 On this battle-ground of contending opinions there are at least three issues. (α) Is Aristotle merely reporting the views of the panegyrists of Solon [Grote, Fränkel], or is he correcting them [Thirlwall, Congreve, Schömann *Ath. Const. Hist.* p. 37 Eng. tr.]? (β) What is the exact sense of the last clause? [See Exc. v. p. 350 ff.] (γ) Is the statement it contains historically true? [Grote, Curtius reject it: Thirlwall, Schömann accept it.]

41 ἔοικε] Schömann, Fränkel *Die attischen Geschworenengerichte* 62 f. (Berlin 1877. 8), and others lay far too much stress on this word ἔοικε = 'seems', here and below, § 5 l. 15. Aristotle often speaks in a qualifying manner about things of which, in reality, he has not the slightest doubt. Thus ἔοικε, l. 15, comes very close to *φαίνεται* l. 11; the force of which, as often in other writers besides Aristotle, is to express not so much what is merely apparent and probable, as what is obvious, what has come to light. SUSEM. (401)

See ἔοικε I. 1. 6, VIII(V). 3 § 16, 9 § 2. "The words express Aristotle's own opinion, because (1) the construction requires it (ἐνιοι μὲν οἰοῦνται...ἔοικε δέ), (2) the sense requires it; some thought that Solon established a mixed constitution, Aristotle contends that he only added a new element, the δικαστήρια" (Case).

1274 a 1 τὴν τε βουλήν] What powers Aristotle might ascribe to the council of the Areopagos which Solon found existing and left unaltered, it is not easy to see from this. SUSEM. (402)

2 καταστήσαι=laid the foundation for the democracy.



τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες<sup>3</sup>  
 § 4 αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστή-  
 ριον πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσε, ὥσπερ  
 τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν  
 δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βου-  
 λὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια  
 9 μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον  
 § 5 ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὔξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δη-  
 μοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο<sup>4</sup>  
 προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρ-  
 13 χίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρο-

1274 a 4 θάτερα Koraes, θατέραν Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, θάτερον Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. ||  
 5 ἴσχυεν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 7 μετέστησαν Tegge, κατέστησαν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 8  
 ἐκώλυσε Γ Ar., ἐκόλυσε Q<sup>b</sup> || [καὶ Περικλῆς] Sauppe, probably rightly, τὰ...  
 9 Περικλῆς omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup>

3 τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων] See Exc. v. p. 350 ff. SUSEM. (403)

μέμφονται τινες] See *Introd.* p. 20 n. 1. In representing that these critics of Solon were adherents of the oligarchy Oncken, II. 439, 440 n. (1), goes beyond Aristotle's own words. All that can be fairly inferred is that they were opponents of absolute democracy. But that does not prove them to be oligarchs; they might have been friends of a mixed constitution no less than Solon's panegyrists noticed just before or, comparatively speaking, Aristotle himself. SUSEM. (404)

4 λῦσαι γὰρ κτλ] For (they think) he neutralized the other forces in the state by making the court of law, a body chosen by lot, supreme over all matters.

§ 4 5 ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ] Cp. VI(IV). 4 § 27 ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἅτε μοναρχος ὧν ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός... καὶ ἐστὶν ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῇ τυραννίδι, with notes. SUSEM. (406)

6 τὴν νῦν δημοκ.] 'The democracy of the present day' i.e. the extremest and most unfettered species: cp. VI(IV). 4 § 25 ff., 6 § 5; 14 § 7, § 11: VIII(v). 5 § 10 and the other references given in n. (400 b). SUSEM. (406)

8 Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε] Schömann *Antiquities* p. 341 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (407)

9 μισθοφόρα] Böckh *Economy of Athens* p. 232 Eng. tr.; also notes on v(VIII). 5 § 23 (1055), VI(IV). 13 § 5 (1260). SUSEM. (408)

Aristotle is quoting the opinion of others, but without denying it (Case).

§ 5 11 φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σ.] Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon's panegyrists in respect of their judgment, but qualifies the historical grounds assigned for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely adopts<sup>1</sup> the historical statement of Solon's critics, but attacks the censure which they inferred from it as not justified. Compare furthermore 9 § 12 n. (296), § 21 (321 b). SUSEM. (409)

12 ἀπὸ συμπτώματος] accidentally, "in the course of events" (Susemihl). ναυαρχία=the supremacy at sea, like ναυκρατία; not found elsewhere in this sense.

13 ἐφρονηματισθῇ] acquired overweening confidence in themselves, became aware of their importance. Eaton compares v(VIII). 6. 11 μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά

<sup>1</sup> This is strangely overlooked by Oncken II. 440 n. (1). As against Schömann he appeals to the fact that Aristotle only makes these critics speak of Solon as having introduced the appointment of the Heliaea by lot. Oncken does not see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of these censorious critics the form used is the singular, τὸ δικαστήριον, which had given some show to the meaning which Schömann has refused: see Exc. v. This defence then is fatal to Oncken's position. Nor is there any ground for his rash assertion (II. 494) that Aristotle expressly exempts Solon from the reproach of having created anything like the later Heliaea. On the contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with Solon's critics and admirers in thinking that it was he who made the Heliaea, but that Pericles introduced the custom of paying them. It is a pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear.

νηματίσθη καὶ δημαγωγούς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευο- (IX)  
 15 μένων τῶν ἐπικεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιο-  
 τάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖ-  
 σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος  
 § 6 δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρί-  
 μων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιο- (p. 57)  
 20 μεδίωνων καὶ ζευγίων καὶ [τρίτου τέλους] τῆς καλουμένης

14 ἀντὶ πολιτευομένων Γ P<sup>2</sup> Ar. || 16 ἀποδοῦναι? Schneider, perhaps rightly ||  
 17 ὢν ὁ δῆμος κύριος M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>2</sup>, ὁ δῆμος ὢν κύριος [?] Γ Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 18 [τὰς δ'  
 ἀρχὰς... 21 μετὴν] Susem. *f. Philol.* XCIII. p. 331 Diels || 19 ἐμπόρων  
 P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || πεντακοσίων μεδίωνων Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 20 [τρίτου τέλους] Susem. doubtfully,  
 τοῦ τέλους Spengel, who afterwards transposed καὶ to follow τρίτου τέλους; [τρίτου  
 τέλους] and καὶ ζευγίων transposed to follow 21 ἱππᾶδος Oncken. But then we  
 should expect καὶ <τῶν> ζευγίων and might equally well conjecture καὶ τῆς καλου-  
 μένης ἱππᾶδος καὶ τρίτου τέλους <τοῦ τῶν> ζευγίων

φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, and  
 VIII(V). 4. 8 πάλιν ὁ ναυτικός ὄχλος γενό-  
 μενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ  
 διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ  
 θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυρο-  
 τέραν ἐποίησεν, where see n. (1521).  
 SUSEM. (410)

This is why in a fragment of his *Polity of Athens* Aristotle mentioned Themistocles' proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (see Polyaen. *Str.* I. 30 § 6; Diels *op. c.* p. 34.

14 Here as elsewhere Aristotle's sympathies go with the Athenian opposition to extreme democracy: the Moderates (ἐπικεικῆς) headed by Aristides, Cimon, Thucydides (ὁ Μελησίου), Nicias, and Theramenes (*Frag.* 369, Plut. *Nic.* 2), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon.

15 ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε κτλ] But above, § 3, Aristotle has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schömann remarks. Either before Solon's time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people; and then Aristotle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon's admirers, of inaccurately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated. Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the nobles to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other democratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided.

SUSEM. (411)

17 καὶ εὐθύνειν] By this control over the magistrates is meant, that during their tenure of office the magistrates could be brought before a popular court or perhaps even before the popular assembly direct; and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct. Cp. Exc. v.; further III. 11 § 8 n. (569), VI(IV). 11 § 19 n. (1303), 14 § 3 (1319), § 6 (1325), § 10 (1332); n. on 16 § 2; and VII(VI). 1 § 4 (1475). SUSEM. (412)

"With this statement of the ἀναγκαῖα of democracy, compare the summary of the characteristics of true ἱσνομία which Herodotus III. 80 puts into the mouth of Otanes: πάλω μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλευματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει [sc. τὸ πλῆθος]" (Jackson).

μηδὲ γὰρ...δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος] Here again is a substantial contribution to Aristotle's own views on the requirements of a good constitution. SUSEM. (413)

§ 6 18 τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς] The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the commons enjoyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded.

19 ἐκ τῶν πεντ. κτλ] On these four Solonian classes see Schömann *Antiquities* I. p. 329 ff. Eng. tr. Further see III. 11. 8 n. (569), VII(VI). 4. 5 (1417). SUSEM. (414)

The order of the classes is not correct even if we omit the words τρίτου τέλους



ἰππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν. (IX)  
 [νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζέ-  
 24 φυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνιδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ  
 ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ  
 § 7 Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δὲ [[καί]] τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὡς Ὀνομακρί-  
 του μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-  
 σθῆναι δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα  
 κατὰ τέχνην μαντικὴν· τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἐταῖρον,  
 Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατὴν Λυκούργου καὶ Ζάλευκου, Ζαλεύκου  
 30 δὲ Χαρώνιδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἄσκεπτιτερον τῶν  
 χρόνων ἔχοντες· ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος ο

22 [νομοθέται.....b 26 ἄν] Bojesen || 23 αὐτοῦ Γ P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτοῦ M\* II<sup>2</sup> || 24 ταῖς  
 before Χαλκιδικαῖς Schmidt would omit || 25 καὶ omitted by II<sup>1</sup> Ar. || 27 αὐτὸν  
 omitted apparently in Γ, perhaps rightly || κακεῖ or καὶ <εκεῖ> Tegge, per-  
 haps rightly || 28 μαντικὴν omitted in Γ M\* || ἐλῆτα (in Γ after ἐταῖρον)  
 and 29 θέλητος Γ M\* || 30 τῶν χρόνων Ar., τῶ χρόνῳ Γ II Bk. || 31 ἔχοντες  
 Susem., λέγοντες Γ II Ar. Bk., cp. Plat. *Gorg.* 501 c ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονος

or, with Spengel, transpose them to go  
 with ζευγίων. Cp. H. Landwehr in *Phi-  
 lologus* Supp.-Band v. 1885, pp. 118 ff.

21 Comp. Julius Pollux viii. 130 οἱ  
 δὲ τὸ θητικὸν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχὴν ἤρχον.

A list of legislators: §§ 6—14.

Many of the arguments with which  
 Götting *Comm.* p. 345 f., impugned the  
 genuineness of the whole chapter were  
 answered by Nickes *De Aristotelis politi-  
 corum libris* p. 55 ff., and Spengel, *Ueber  
 die Politik* p. 11 note, *Arist. Studien* iii.  
 p. 18 f. Götting was followed by Böckh  
 and Bernays *Ges. Abh.* i. 172. The case  
 must depend mainly on the language.

22 Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζευγίοις] i.e. the  
 Locrians living on the promontory Zephy-  
 rion in Lower Italy. The laws of  
 Zaleukos about (?) 664 B.C. are said to  
 have been the first which were committed  
 to writing: see Schömann p. 17 Eng. tr.,  
*Antiq. iur. publ.* 89 n. (8). SUSEM. (416)

23 Χαρώνιδας] Mentioned i. 2 § 5 n.  
 (16), vi (iv). ii § 15 n., 13 § 10. SUSEM.  
 (416) On his laws see Diod. xii. 15.

24 ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι] i.e. the  
 colonies which Chalcis in Euboea  
 planted in those countries: see E. Cur-  
 tius *Hist.* i. 436 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (417)

§ 7 25 πειρῶνται δὲ τινες] Ephoros  
 Strabo p. 482; cp. Plutarch *Lycurg.* 4,  
 Trieber *op. c.* 67, 72, 101. SUSEM. (418)

The construction after συνάγειν, ὡς  
 and genitive absolute in the one clause  
 balanced by an accusative with infinitive

in the other, is awkward; but it can be  
 nearly paralleled from Plato *Philebus*  
 16 c: τὴν φήμην παρέδωκεν ὡς ἐξ ἐνός  
 μὲν...δυντῶν, πέρας δὲ...ἐχόντων. δεῖν  
 οὖν ἡμᾶς κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* ii. 383 A λέγειν  
 καὶ ποιεῖν ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας,  
 μήτε ἡμᾶς παράγειν.

28 κατὰ with the accus. may mean  
 "for the purpose" κατὰ θεὸν ἦκειν, or  
 "in connexion with," almost "prac-  
 tising his mantic art."

Θάλητα] See Exc. vi. p. 352 f. SU-  
 SEM. (419)

29 'To the arguments advanced  
 against the genuineness of this portion  
 of the chapter may be added one derived  
 from the fact that here we have Θάλητος  
 as the form of the genitive, and Θάλητα  
 of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere  
 uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic  
 gen. Θάλεω 1259 a 7, the Doric Ἀρχότα  
 1340 b 26; comp. also the quotation from  
 Alcaeus iii. 14 § 10. Plato on the other  
 hand regularly changes quotations from  
 other dialects into Attic; cp. *Gorg.* 485 e,  
 505 e, with Dr Thompson's note<sup>1</sup> (*Ridge-  
 way op. c.* p. 135).

30 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κτλ] This criti-  
 cism is very just. SUSEM. (419 b)

The same date circa Ol. 29 or 664 B.C.  
 is the best attested for Thaletas, who  
 comes second, and Zaleukos, who comes  
 fourth, in this succession, with Lycurgos  
 between them whom the latest estimate  
 only brings down to 776!

§ 8 νομοθέτης Θηβαίοις. ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν (IX)  
 Βακχιδῶν, ἐραστής δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικῆσαντος  
 Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὥς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν  
 35 ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκούνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας· καὶ κεῖ  
 § 9 τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς  
 τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν  
 τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δ' οὐ συνόπτου  
 μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν  
 40 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπτος  
 ἔσται ἢ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὥπως  
 1274 b  
 § 10 ἀποπτος. ᾤκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ  
 τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δ' αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ  
 τ' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν  
 4 ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὑπ' ἐκείνου  
 § 11 νενομοθετημένον, ὥπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σφύζεται τῶν κλήρων. Χα-  
 ρῶνδου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδο-  
 μαρτυριῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ' ἀκρι-

33 βακχιδῶν Γ M<sup>a</sup> (unless Γ had βακχιδῶν) βακχιδῶν P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Susem. 1-2 ||  
 34 Ὀλυμπίασιν Götting, perhaps rightly || 35 μητρὶς? Spengel || 39 γραφὴν  
 Π<sup>2</sup>, corrected in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>

1274 b 1 τὴν omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> || 5 σφύζεται Bücheler || 6 οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον P<sup>1</sup>,  
 ἴδιον οὐδέν ἐστι P<sup>4</sup>, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || ψευδομαρτυριῶν Scaliger  
 and Bentley (Phalaris p. 358 Leip. ed.), ψευδομαρτύρων Γ II Ar. || 7 ἐπίσκηψιν Scaliger  
 and Bentley, ἐπίσκεψιν Γ II (in P<sup>3</sup> the scribe's correction conceals the original reading)

§ 8 32-33 τῶν Βακχιδῶν] The  
 ancient royal house at Corinth; see E.  
 Curtius *Hist.* I. 271-277, 434, Eng. tr.  
 Schömann pp. 114, 153 Eng. tr. Com-  
 pare also *nn.* (533) on III. 9 § 9, (1658) on  
 VIII(v). 10 § 6. SUSEM. (420)

34 Ὀλυμπίασιν] In the 13th Olym-  
 piad B.C. 728. See Grote II. 394.

§ 9 40 ἀποπτος = 'seen from far'  
 may be used for *visible*, as here, or *in-  
 visible*; but the former in late writers.

§ 10 1274 b 1 ᾤκησαν μὲν οὖν κτλ]  
 The interpolator here explains why he  
 has related the history of Philolaos at  
 such length, namely to make clear how  
 this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if  
 he really considered such a detailed ex-  
 planation necessary, when its necessity or  
 even utility is not further discoverable,  
 then he ought at any rate *a fortiori* to have  
 shown how a Corinthian stranger came  
 to give laws to the Thebans. SUSEM. (421)

4 θετικούς] laws of adoption. The  
 Cretan term for adoption, we now learn,

was ἀνάφανσις, ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως κτλ] Aelian  
*Vir. Hist.* II. 7 relates that at Thebes it  
 was forbidden under penalty of death to  
 expose a child; but in case of pressing  
 poverty the father might bring his child  
 in its swaddling clothes to the magistrate,  
 who then sold it by a regular contract to  
 the lowest bidder (τῷ τιμῇ ἐλαχίστην  
 δόντι), whom it had to serve like a slave  
 when grown up, in return for its mainte-  
 nance. Perhaps, thinks J. G. Schneider,  
 there is here a survival of the old laws  
 which tended to preserve the original  
 family estates unaltered by means of  
 adoption. Hardly so, for the purchased  
 child is bought as a kind of slave.  
 On the further constitutional history of  
 Thebes see Exc. 1 to B. VIII(v).  
 SUSEM. (422)

§ 11 7 ἐπίσκηψιν] sc. ψευδομαρ-  
 τυριῶν (Stobaeus says *συκοφαντιῶν*) pro-  
 secution for perjury. Editors quote Pl.  
*Lates* XI. 937 B, [Dem.] I 139, 7.



βεία τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. (IX)  
 § 12 Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ (p. 58)  
 10 τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ  
 τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος,  
 τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμι-  
 κοῖς ἀσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην,  
 14 ἄς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ  
 § 13 ἄχρηστον. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρ-  
 χούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν ἴδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδέν

8 τῶν νόμων omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., perhaps rightly || 9 φιλολάου Π<sup>1-3</sup> Ar. and 1st hand of P<sup>2-3</sup> (corrected by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || ἀνομάλωσις Bk., ἀνωμάλωσις Π, ὁμαλότης Spengel, ὁμάλωσις Chandler || 12 τὴν.....13 ἀσκησιν] Vettori first observed the harsh construction; either ἢ.....ἀσκησις or <ὁ περὶ> before τὴν would be expected. Schneider proposed to read the former and Schmidt the latter || 13 γίνονται P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 14 τοῖν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. (perhaps right), τὴν M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand)

§ 12 9 Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον κτλ] Even Fülleborn with good reason wonders what we want with Phaleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticisms. Cp. note (425). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phaleas Hippodamos he has said enough of the political ideas of mere theorists (εἰρηται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων): also that in § 1 f. he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Solon to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 399), wanted to append a list of legislators simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phaleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Götting, to the same interpolator as the rest of the chapter. SUSEM. (423)

ἀνομάλωσις] equalization: Rhet. III. 11. 5 καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι ('read ἀνωμαλίσθηναι; A<sup>o</sup>, our almost unique authority, has ἀνω μάλιστα εἶναι' SUSEM.) τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι ταῦτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ

καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον. See Cope's note. Not a *fresh* equalization, but a *breaking up* of the present distribution to restore equality; so ἀνανέμεν, ἀναδασμός, ἀναδιδόναι ψήφους.

10 ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ] Cp. 6 § 2 n. (153); 6 § 5 n. (196). SUSEM. (424)

11 ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην κτλ] Laws I 637 ff., 643 ff., II 664—672, 673 D ff. The fancy is strange enough; and Plato insists so much upon it that there is some justification for adducing it amongst the special peculiarities of his legislation. The next point however is not material enough for this, and much besides would have far greater right to be mentioned: cp. n. (423) just above. SUSEM. (425)

12 καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολ. κτλ] Laws VII 794 D—795 D. SUSEM. (426)

Fuit auctor, quod ad structuram verborum facit, durior: videbatur enim vel eodem casu, quo prima duo protulit, dicere debuisse καὶ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησις vel plene loqui hoc pacto: καὶ <ὁ περὶ> τὴν ἐν τοῖς π. ἀσκησιν (Vettori). One of these suggestions was taken up by Schneider, the other by Schmidt. SUSEM.

§ 13 15 πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ κτλ] From n. (423) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Zaleukos Charondas Philolaos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in n. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phaleas and Plato, which

ἐστιν ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζη- (IX)  
μίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς  
ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοῖς μεθύοντας,  
20 ἄν τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ  
γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν  
συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ  
§ 14 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ῥηγίνος νο-  
μοθέτης Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ περὶ τε <τὰ> φο-  
25 νικὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἰδιὸν γε οὐδὲν  
αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἄν.]

20 τι πταίσωσι L<sup>a</sup>, τι πταίωσι C<sup>o</sup>, τυπήσωσι Γ P<sup>1</sup>·3·3·4 Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.,  
τυπτέσωσι U<sup>b</sup>, τυπήσωσι M<sup>a</sup>, τι ποιήσωσι Bas.<sup>3</sup> || ἀποτίνειν Γ (?) Ar., ἀποτείνειν  
M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>·3·4 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. ἀποτίνων P<sup>3</sup> || 21 γὰρ omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 22 ἀπέβλεψαν P<sup>4</sup>  
Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 24 <τὰ> Koraes || 25 ἄλλο Koraes

were made for an ideal state. But this does not mend matters because, as Draco was not the author of a constitution, there is a marked antithesis between them of quite another kind. SUSEM. (427)

17 πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης κτλ.] Cp. *Rhet.* II. 23. 29, 1400 b 21 καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπων οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος· χαλεποὶ γάρ. Suidas s.v. Δράκων (Eaton). Aelian *Var. Hist.* VIII. 10, Plut. *Solon* 17, Gell. XI. 18. 1—4 (J. G. Schneider). On Draco, the Athenian legislator shortly before Solon, see further E. Curtius *History of Greece* I. p. 301 f., 663 n. 115 [Eng. tr. I. 313]. SUSEM. (428)

18 On Pittacus see III. 14. 10 with Exc. II. on B. III. SUSEM. (429)  
νόμων δημιουργός has been objected to; but Nickes cites ἀρετῆς δημ. IV(VII). 9. 7.

20 διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους κτλ.] Cp. *Rhet.* II. 25. 7, 1402 b 11 ἐνστάσις ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ ὁ Π. αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μέλουν ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνῃ: *Nic. Eth.* III. 5. 8, 1113 b 30 καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι (Eaton). SUSEM. (430)

§ 14 24 Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης] The inhabitants of the peninsula Chalcidice, which derived its name from its colonization by Chalcis in Euboea. This took place before the settlement of the western colonies of Chalcis, noticed in § 6 n. (417): see E. Curtius I. 428 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (431)

25 Laws of Charondas respecting heiresses are mentioned by Diodorus XII. 18.



# NOTE ON ARCADIA.

διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες: II. 2. 3.

"It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see *n.* 459). They were held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly differ from a *συνμαχία*, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something quantitative. To this kind of *ἔθνος*, however, conceived as analogous to a *συνμαχία*, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words *ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος*, 'provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages.' By the latter he means the *ἔθνος* which forms a political unity (usually with monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over the territory in detached villages or unwallied towns without political independence (*κῶμαι*). In other words it is the organization with which the Greeks became acquainted in most of the neighbouring non-Greek nations: whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a somewhat more Hellenic development. It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the *συνμαχία*, and that in its case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers and those whom they ruled (see *n.* 133), was as essential as in the separate Hellenic *πόλις*." Dittenberger in *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874, p. 1382. SUSEM. (132)

To Dittenberger's explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly supposed (1) that there is a reference to some *συνοικισμός* of Arcadians, and that the *πόλις* is distinguished from *ἔθνος* = *the unorganized race*. Then if it be granted that *ὅταν μὴ ὥσι* = *διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι* or *τῷ μὴ εἶναι*, the words will be rendered: "A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians." Thus *μὴ κατὰ*

κώμας κεχωρισμένοι will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the *συνμαχία* must consist in the isolated independence of the villages: the *ἔθνος* Ἀρκαδικὸν being composed ἐξ ὁμοίων, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tegea and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively: but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralization and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life.

It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note *ad loc.*, it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle *may* have interposed at this point the remark that as the *πόλις* differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. "No one," says Mr Postgate, "could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state; but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but *not* from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions" (*Notes* p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race *is* the *πόλις*; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confounding them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (II) to understand by *ἔθνος* the *organized* race or tribe, as something distinct from the *πόλις*, retaining the reference to the events of 370—369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows<sup>1</sup>: Xenoph. *Hell.* VI. 5. 6 τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὅ τι νικῶν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάσιππον ἔπραττον ἑὰν τε κατὰ χώραν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι: *ib.* VI. 5. 12 ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος...καταλαβὼν πόλιν ὁμορον οὖσαν Εὐταίαν καὶ εὐρὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῳ ἡλικία οἰχομένους εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ὅμως οὐκ ἠδίκησε τὴν πόλιν: *ib.* VII. 4. 2 ὁ Λυκομήδης πείθει τοὺς μυρίους πράττειν περὶ *συνμαχίας*. (Comp. Harpocr. p. 280 *μύριοι ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει...συνέδριόν ἐστι κοινὸν Ἀρκάδων ἀπάντων* διελεκται δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Ἀρκάδων πολιτείᾳ.) Xenoph. *Hell.* VII. 4. 12 καταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ἠλείοι Λασιῶνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι

<sup>1</sup> With what follows compare Freeman *Federal Government* pp. 197—207.



συντελοῦντα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν: § 38 εἰ δὲ καὶ τινες ἐπαιτιῶντο, ἔλεγον [οἱ Μαντινεῖς] ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ τῶν Μαντινέων πόλις ἐγγυῶτο ἢ μὴν παρέξειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσους τις προσκαλοῖτο: VII. 5. 5 ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐλογίζετο σφίσιν ὑπάρχειν... Ἀρκάδων τοὺς τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντας. ἦσαν δ' οὗτοι Τεγεᾶται καὶ Μεγαλοπολίται καὶ Ἀσεᾶται καὶ Παλλαντιεῖς, καὶ εἴ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικραὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταύταις οἰκεῖν ἡναγκάζοντο.

From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινόν, the League, was a federal state, trenching in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγός and other officers, an assembly (μύριοι), a federal army (ἐπάριτοι) paid out of a common fund (Xen. *Hell.* VII. 4. 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (πόλις), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again one as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch. III. 165, Quint. Curt. VI. 1. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammenes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. xv. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of 'villages' of Megalopolis<sup>1</sup>.

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words κατὰ κώμας κεχωρισμένοι. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the *unorganised* race, which lives κατὰ κώμας τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the south-west of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Philop.* 13; Paus. VIII. 27. 7; Freeman p. 626 n. 4.

is it that (a) the league embraced Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraea, πόλεις which were not absorbed in Megalopolis: while (β) most of the townships or tribes whose coalition provided the population of the capital are unmistakably called πόλεις, not κῶμαι, in respect of their previous existence<sup>1</sup>. It was after the foundation of the capital and the formation of the new league that these places became κῶμαι: previously they had been πόλεις<sup>2</sup>. Nor is this the only difficulty. For if Aristotle is really desirous of distinguishing the πόλις (1) from a *συνμαχία* or federation of states (*Staatenbund*) and (2) from a federal state (*Bundesstaat*), and if Arcadia is the illustration of (2) which he has chosen, he must regard the federal state as still existing in his own times, which in face of its manifest disruption would only be possible if he judged Arcadian politics exclusively from the point of view of Megalopolitan interests. A zealous partizan might hold no doubt that the opposite faction had cut themselves off from the Arcadian race. Yet even with the scanty evidence at our command we can discern that the league of all Arcadia must have been reduced, at certain times, to the single federal city Megalopolis, in which case the distinction between the organized tribe and the πόλις, *ex hypothesi* all-important, disappears.

(III) Some of the older commentators inferred from the passage that the condition of Arcadia was one of extreme disintegration, an organization so low in the scale as to contrast unfavourably with that of the village-community. Bernays perhaps adopts this view when he translates: 'when the tribe is not divided into villages with a definite number of inhabitants, but lives scattered and without political organization.'

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example of a πόλις or an ἔθνος. The view cited as (1) makes them both. Victorius<sup>3</sup> and Camerarius apparently consider them adduced as exemplifying the πόλις, implying that distribution of the population over villages or 'demes'<sup>4</sup> (κατὰ κώμας) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how *any* tribe or region of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

<sup>1</sup> Paus. VIII. 27 §§ 3, 4, describing the founding of Megalopolis: πόλεις δὲ τοσαύτῃς ὅσας...πατρίδας σφίσιν οὖσας ἐκλιπεῖν ἐπέθοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδες. Then follows a list of forty names. Mr Wyse however rightly remarks that not much stress can be laid on the term πόλεις which is often interchanged with κῶμαι: cp. Thuc. II. 15 κατὰ πόλεις ᾤκειτο, but Isocrates X. 35 σποράδην καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκοῦσαν (both of Attica before Theseus).

<sup>2</sup> Ib. VIII. 27. 7, τῶν κατειλεγμένων πόλεων αἱ μὲν ἐς ἅπαν εἰσὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔρημοι, τὰς δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται κώμας, Γόρτυνα, Διποῖνας, Θεισοῖαν τὴν πρὸς Ὀρχομένῳ, Μεθύδριον, Τεῦθιν, Καλίας, Ἐλίσσοντα: 12 § 2 Μεθύδριον πόλιν μὲν οὐκέτι κώμην δὲ ἐς τὸ Μεγαλοπολι-

τικὸν συντελοῦσαν (cp. the similar language of Xen. *Hell.* VII. 4. 12, as quoted above, with regard to a single city, Lasion, as a member of the Arcadian League).

<sup>3</sup> Excipio, inquit, cum cives ipsius totaque illa multitudo, quae civitatem conflant, non fuerint per pagos distincti;...ut sunt autem, addidit, nunc Arcades, e quibus distantibus inter se intervallis locorum, domiciliaque habentibus valde diiuncta, conficiebatur tamen civitas. Victorius *Comm.* p. 78.

<sup>4</sup> οὗτοι [sc. οἱ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ] μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιουκίδας καλεῖν φασίν, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δῆμους, *Poet.* 3 § 6, 1448 a 36. Dr Jackson has supplied this reference.



## EXCURSUS I.

ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διακρίσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. II. 3. 9.

‘Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them.’ From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be adduced; only Herodotos (IV. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auseans (Αὔσειες) living near Lake Tritonis, west of the Lesser Syrtis. Of later writers Mela I. 8 relates it of the Garamantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Göttling): Nicolaus Damascenus, *Frag.* III. in Stob. *Flor.* XLIV. 41 (Müller *Frag. hist. Graec.* III. p. 458), of the Liburnians<sup>1</sup> (Eaton). Diodoros III. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Troglodytae on the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotos (IV. 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathyrsi community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view ‘in order that they might all be brothers,’ ἵνα κασίγνητοὶ τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι καὶ οἰκίῳι ἐόντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτ’ ἔχθει χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους. The case of the Massagetae, cited by Congreve, Herod. I. 216, is still less in point. Other stories of community of wives and children adduced by Oncken, I. p. 134 f., p. 178 n. 1, border on the fabulous; as those related of the Tyrrhenians by Theopompos *Frag.* 222 in Athen. XII. 517 D, E, Müller *Frag. hist. gr.* I. 315<sup>2</sup>, and of the Scythian Galaktophagi by Nicolaus Damascenus *Frag.* 123 in Stob. *Flor.* v. 73, Müller *Frag. h. gr.* III. 460<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Λιβύριοι κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχουσι καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐν κοινῷ τρέφουσι μέχρι ἐτῶν πέντε, εἴτα τῷ ἐκτῷ συνενέγκαντες ἅπαντα τὰ παῖδια τὰς ὁμοιότητας πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰκάσουσι καὶ ἐκάστῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδόασιν πατρί.

<sup>2</sup> Θεόπομπος δ’ ἐν τῇ μγ’ τῶν ἱστοριῶν καὶ νόμον εἶναι φησὶ παρὰ τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς κοινὰς ὑπάρχειν τὰς γυναῖκας· ταύτας δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σφόδρα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι πολλάκις καὶ μετ’ ἀνδρῶν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἐαντάς·...τρέφειν δὲ τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς πάντα τὰ γινόμενα παῖδια οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτου πατρός ἐστιν ἕκαστον. ζῶσι δὲ καὶ ὅττοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς θρεψαμένοις κτλ. The description seems to owe much to Plato’s republic.

<sup>3</sup> εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ δικαιοτάτοι, κοινὰ ἔχοντες

τὰ τε κτήματα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν πατέρας ὀνομάζειν, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους παῖδας, τοὺς δ’ ἡλικίας ἀδελφούς. [This is the system of nomenclature (in use in Hawaii and Rotuma and other islands of the Pacific), classifying and not describing the person addressed, which Morgan calls Malayan. See *Ancient Society* pp. 401—423. If there is anything fabulous in the account of Nicolaus it must be sought in his further statements παρὰ τοῖς τοῖς οὐδὲ εἰς οὔτε φθονῶν, ὡς φασὶν, οὔτε μισῶν οὔτε φοβούμενος ἱστορήθη διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην. μάχιμοι δ’ οὐχ ἦττον αὐτῶν αἱ γυναῖκες ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ συμπολεμοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ὅταν δέη.]

It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken *l. pp.* 179—181. 'Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside, a passage in the *Ethics* shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship; for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose; whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct; by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other's diverse excellence<sup>1</sup>. Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents; for what is possessed in common strengthens their union: and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

'Further, § 3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves; for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions *one blood, one stock*, and the like. Again, § 5, 1162 a 4; the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors; for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.' Comp. also Zeller, *op. c.* II. ii. p. 688. 'Hence it is not simply its impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato's view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals'—and to use Zeller's apt expression (*Plato* p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals 'degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population'—'Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most

<sup>1</sup> διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετὴ, καὶ χαίρουεν ἀν τῷ  
δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' τοιοῦτον.  
ἀν καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν, εἰ ἐπιεικέως εἴεν· ἔστιν



primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to develop out of the family a higher unity<sup>1</sup>. That these considerations do not recur in the *Politics*, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his own premisses. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose.<sup>2</sup> SUSEM. (142)

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's conceptions<sup>3</sup>, understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approximately the modern or monogamous family<sup>4</sup>. From the time of Plato<sup>5</sup> and Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost universal<sup>6</sup>. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory untenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonies and social usages discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure: for the family is a *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*, and what he assumes to be its simple and primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests. Beginning with the Auseans, Troglodytes, &c. adduced in this Excursus, nearly all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself<sup>6</sup>. The phrase *εἶναι κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας* is not likely to have been literally true, or to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases<sup>7</sup>. Few tribes are so

<sup>1</sup> It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice happily married.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Susemihl is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus, and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the *Politics*.

<sup>3</sup> But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that maternal instinct, however important in Callipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan custom in question which attempts, in a rough fashion, to settle paternity.

<sup>4</sup> B. III. of the *Laws* is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.

<sup>5</sup> McLennan's epoch-making work

*Primitive Marriage* is here followed. Down to the year 1857 its author accepted the Aristotelian account of the origin of society. See *Enc. Brit.* (8th ed.) Art. LAW, vol. XIII. p. 255 f.

<sup>6</sup> That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much Aristotle collected in *Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά*, we cannot tell: the few extant fragments are of little value.

<sup>7</sup> What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller information we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.

backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is incestuous to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the 'group' being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object)<sup>1</sup>. It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thebe, and Messene, in the use of *μητρὶς* for 'motherland' by Cretans and Messenians<sup>2</sup>. Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race)<sup>3</sup> and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain<sup>4</sup>. Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother's side<sup>5</sup>. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager<sup>6</sup>. Exogamy must anciently have been the rule of the Roman gentes<sup>7</sup>. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half-sister by the father's side. The levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Called a totem in North America and a kobong in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The asparagus was the totem of an Attic *γένος*; Plut. Theseus c. 8 § 7 ὅθεν Ἰωξίδαυς καὶ Ἰωξίσι πάτριον κατέστη μῆτε ἀκανθαν ἀσφαράγουν, μῆτε στοιβὴν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν. See 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' in the *Fortnightly Review* Oct. 1869—Feb. 1870.

<sup>2</sup> Plato *Rep.* ix. 575 D, Pausan. iv. 26 § 3.

<sup>3</sup> Herod. i. 173, Nicolaus Damasc. *Frag. Hist. Gr.* iii. p. 461 (Müller) Λύκιοι τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἀνδρας τιμῶσι καὶ καλοῦνται μητρίθεν, τὰς τε κληρονομίας ταῖς θυγατρῶσι λείπουσιν, οὐ τοῖς υἱοῖς. Comp. the genealogies of Sarpedon and Glaucus, Hom. *Il.* vi. 150 ff.; the daughter's son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo iii. 4 § 18, p. 165 τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Καντάβροις τοὺς ἀνδρας διδόναι ταῖς γυναῖξι προῖκα, τὸ τὰς θυγατέρας κληρονόμους ἀπολείπεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδελφοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκδίδοσθαι γυναῖξιν. ἔχει γὰρ τινα γυναικοκρατίαν. The *couvade* among the same people, *ib.* § 17 p. 164 τεκοῦσαι τε διακονοῦσι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐκείνους ἀνθ' ἐαυ-

τῶν κατακλίνασαι. From Herod. ii. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were suspected amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.

<sup>5</sup> Varro apud Augustin. *De civ. Dei* xviii. 9: cp. Justin 18. 2, Suidas p. 3102. For the Locrians, Polyb. xii. 5 πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐνδοξα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἴη: Aristotle apud Polyb. xii. 6, 1560 b 8 ff. διὸ καὶ τὴν ὀνομασίαν τῇ πόλει τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εἰκότως ἐπέθεσαν καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν κατὰ τὰς γυναῖκας προσεποιήθησαν, ἐτι δὲ τὰς φίλας καὶ τὰς συμμαχίας τὰς προγονικὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνενοῦντο.

<sup>6</sup> Hom. *Iliad* ii. 661 ff. (Tlepolemos), xxi. 95 cp. xxii. 49 (Lykaon). Hyginus *Fab.* 229, 174 implies that Meleager's maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence arose the feud narrated in Homer *Iliad* ix. 562 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch *Quaest. Rom.* § 6 p. 265 D ἢ μὴ νενομισμένον συγγενίδας γαμεῖν... πρότερον γὰρ οὐκ ἐγάμουσιν τὰς ἀφ' αἵματος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς τιτθίδας οὐδ' ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὅψε συνεχώρησαν ἀνεψιαῖς συνοικεῖν: § 108 p. 289 E διὰ τί δὲ τὰς ἐγγυὲς γένους οὐ γαμοῦσι;

<sup>8</sup> Deiphobos is an instance. Lycurgus declined to take his brother's wife. This is a survival of polyandry which, though



The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the 'stocks' (γένη) and 'brotherhoods' (φρατρίαι) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first become known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see *n.* 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved<sup>1</sup>. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epimenides, ὁμοσίπνυοι and ὁμόκαποι or ὁμόκαπνοι? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this *v. l.* The ὁμογάλακτες (*I. 2 § 6*) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a γένος (for ὁμογάλακτες = γεννήται, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother's milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive *family* (οἶκος: *I. 2 § 5*) may have been known as 'sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.' This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning 'those who eat together' (coedich), and 'those who have a common residence' (teadhloch)<sup>2</sup>. There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in ὁμογάστριος and ἀδελφός, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier φράτωρ, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek φράτωρ continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association<sup>3</sup>.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. *Comp. Polyb. XII. 6* παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πατρίον ἦν καὶ σύνθηες τρεῖς ἀνδρας ἔχειν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδελφούς ὄντας, καὶ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννήσαντα παῖδας ἱκανοὺς ἐκδόσθαι

γυναῖκά τινα τῶν φίλων καλὸν καὶ σύνθηες.

<sup>1</sup> The form of capture a marriage ceremony at Sparta, Herod. vi. 65, Plut. *Lyc.* 15, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* i § 5. In Crete, Ephoros apud Strab. x. p. 482 D. The Ionian etiquette (one consequence of capture), Herod. i. 146.

<sup>2</sup> *Studies in Ancient History* p. 123; *Lang Essays* p. 97 n.

<sup>3</sup> This explanation seems the most

Aristotle with his healthy respect for facts would doubtless have modified his own theory, if this line of inquiry had been suggested to him. He had a poor, though just, opinion of the lower varieties of mankind<sup>1</sup>; he has to admit that γάμος, γαμικός fail to express his own conception of marriage (I. 3 § 2); and he speaks with contempt of the κοινωνία δούλης καὶ δούλου, the different species of which he can hardly have examined with attention. Here, therefore, as upon the question of slavery, while the advanced thinkers of Greece had caught an early glimpse of truth<sup>2</sup>, he is content with a cautious conservative attitude, partly idealizing the actual relations of husband and wife and assuming the social development to have begun from a point where its course was well-nigh complete.]

## EXCURSUS II.

## HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS: II. 7. 1.

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV(VII). 11 § 6 n. (850), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiraeus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiraeus was called after him ἡ Ἰπποδάμειος ἀγορά; Xen. *Hell.* II. 4. 11, Andoc. I. 45, Harpocr. p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.C., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Thurian. Considerably later in 406 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654<sup>3</sup>. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent

satisfactory, though we might have expected some ruder mark of comradeship, such as tattooing (or better still a common totem) to have come down, rather than the σιπύη, from the times before the idea of blood relationship had arisen. "The apparent bond of fellowship between the members of such a group would be that they and theirs had always been companions in war or the chase—joint-tenants of the same cave or grove." *Studies in Anc. Hist.* p. 122.

<sup>1</sup> See I. 2 § 23, II. 8 § 20 f., and III. 11 § 5 καὶ τοὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἐνιοὶ τῶν θηρίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;

<sup>2</sup> An Orphic poet had described primitive men as cannibals, Sext. Emp. IX. 15. Kritias began his famous analysis of the causes which led to the origin of religion thus; ἦν χρόνος δὲ ἦν ἀτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ' ὑπερέτης, *Frag.* I. 2 of *Sisyphus*, Sext. Emp. IX. 54. Cp. Moschion *Frag. inc.* VI (9) apud Stob. *Ecl.* I. 9. 38 p. 240 ff. Epicurus pursued further the same line of inquiry: Lucretius v. 922 ff.

<sup>3</sup> ἐκτίσθη κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὡς φασίν, ὑφ' οὗ καὶ ὁ Πειραιεύς. [A very cautious statement.]



of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (*περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*) under the name of Hippodamos the Thurian, and one on Government (*περὶ πολιτείας*) under the name of Hippodamos the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle: and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamos which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamos, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. 'It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs' (§§ 2, 7, 9 *nn.* 253, 261, 262), 'to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property' (§ 4 s. f. *n.* 255 b) 'and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice' (§ 5). 'It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state' (§ 7 *n.* 260 b), 'to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal' (§ 4 *n.* 256), 'whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible: hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenoph. *Oecon.* 4 § 3) leads its partizans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, Plut. *Pel.* 23). Hippodamos, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property.' It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamos and the sophist Lycophron (III. 9. 8 *n.* 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to

attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere surety of mutual rights' in Lycophron's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippodamos preceded Lycophron in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly probable: still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with old Greek notions of law and justice; but the supposition that this is so derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does<sup>1</sup>, with originating an important idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered, 'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippodamos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a fundamental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual budget of children' (II. 6 § 10 ff. cp. *un.* 209 and 211). After its full and logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and religion the training of citizens in virtue.' The Greek political theories would be very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destructive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for education, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle in so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal obligation to military service. It is significant that even Isocrates, the admirer of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclusively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff. From the above point of view we see why

<sup>1</sup> *Staatslehre* I. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quotation marks indicating actual citations.



Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 f.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henkel): see 7 § 1. SUSEM. (250)

## NOTE ON THE CELTAE: II. 9. 7.

On the Kelts see also IV(VII). 2 § 10 n. (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, 1115 b 26 ff. where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Celtorum amoribus puerorum testatur etiam Athenaeus XIII. 603 A' (J. G. Schneider). 'See also Ammian. Marcell. XXXI. 9' (Fülleborn). Plato *Laws* I 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. *Hell.* VII. 1. 20. There were others again in Hungary and Servia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian *Anab.* I. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle *Meteor.* I. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Keltic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotos (II. 33) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, his pupil Eudemos III. 1 § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea.' The same story was told by Ephoros *Fr.* 44 (see Nicol. Dam. *Fr.* 104, Aelian. *V. H.* XII. 23): Strabo (VII. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff *Deutsche Alterthums-kunde* I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same

time undoubtedly fell into the other mistake of taking them to be Scythians: see Müllenhoff *op. c.* 474—495. Although Müllenhoff's views in regard to the amber island described by Pytheas and the neighbouring coast of the Teutons, and their position in and on the coast of the North Sea about the mouths of the Eider, allow of considerable doubt, yet this much at any rate seems certain, that in Pliny *N.H.* xxxvii. 35 Pytheas Gutonibus Germaniae genti etc., the words Germaniae genti are an addition by Pliny himself, and the word 'Gutonibus' is wrong. Pytheas himself meant the same tribe 'Teutones' who are mentioned further on in the passage (*proxumisque Teutonibus*). SUSEM. (287)

## EXCURSUS III.

## THE EPHORS AND THE Κόσμοι.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν: II. IO. 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element; but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny: and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle's authority: the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other: both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp: see *n.* 340 on 9 § 30 (Trieber). Compare *n.* (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers; all they do is to observe the com-



manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the *ἐφοροι* are 'overseers'; the *κόσμοι* are 'orderers' (Oncken). Ephoros (Strabo p. 481 f.) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephors and *Κόσμοι*. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle's is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle *could* not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephoros. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephoros and that in the so-called *Πολιτεία* which we have under the name of Heracleides<sup>1</sup> of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle's *Πολιτεία*, as Schneidewin who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his *Cretan Polity*. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephoros the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter's verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. SUSEM. (360)

#### THE CRETAN *περίοικοι*.

φόρων οὗς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι: II. IO. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan *περίοικοι* (see n. 355) with the Spartan *περίοικοι*, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. n. 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosiadas (*Frag.* 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus VI. 263 E f., that there were *three* dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the *Mnoitae*, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the *Aphamiotae*, and (3) the *περίοικοι*, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them "subjects<sup>2</sup>." Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. xv. 695 F (in Bergk *Poet. lyr. Gr.* no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hybrias boasts that the *Mnoitae* call him their lord<sup>3</sup>. Kallistratos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. VI. 263 E, describes the *Aphamiotae* as

<sup>1</sup> Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.

<sup>2</sup> τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοῖαν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαμιώτας, τοὺς δὲ περίοικους ὑπηκόους.

<sup>3</sup> Spear and sword are my great treasure and my goodly shield withal, my body's safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whoso durst not carry

spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship (me) addressing me as lord and mighty prince.

ἔστι μοι πλοῦτος μέγας δόρυ καὶ ξίφος  
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισθήϊον, πρόβλημα χρωτός·  
τούτῳ γὰρ ἀρῶ, τούτῳ θερίζω,  
τούτῳ δεσπότης μνοῖας κέκλημαι.  
τοὶ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντ' ἔχειν δόρυ καὶ ξίφος  
... πάντες γόνυ πεπτηῶτες ἀμόν  
... προσκυνεῖν τί (με) δεσπότην  
καὶ μέγαν βασιλῆα φωνέοντες.

'the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called Clarotae'<sup>1</sup>: and earlier still Ephoros (*Frag.* 32 a, in Athen. vi. 263 F) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called their slaves Clarotae<sup>2</sup>. It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called *ἀφαιμιαί*, as well as *κλᾶροι*, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land: see Schömann *Antiquities* p. 298 Eng. tr. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan Helots either (α) both the clarotae and mnoitae; or (β) the mnoitae, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain; or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the clarotae alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term *περίοικοι* in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the clarotae. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans: nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the words *φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι* would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (*Fr.* 1) in Athen. iv 143 A, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the mess-table to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage<sup>3</sup> I interpret to mean that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these its contributions amongst the various mess-associations; and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see n. 366 on § 8 *extr.*), Aristotle's account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his *περίοικοι* the clarotae. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if *φόροι οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι* can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the clarotae which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessities of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the

<sup>1</sup> καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ Κρήτες τοὺς μὲν κατὰ πόλιν οἰκέτας χρυσωνήτους, ἀφαιμώτας δὲ τοὺς κατ' ἀγρόν, ἐγχωρίους μὲν ὄντας δουλωθέντας δὲ κατὰ πόλεμον· διὰ τὸ κληρωθῆναι δὲ κλαρώτας.

<sup>2</sup> κλαρώτας Κρήτες καλοῦσι τοὺς δούλους ἀπὸ τοῦ γενομένου περὶ αὐτῶν κλήρου.

<sup>3</sup> I read: ἕκαστος τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν ἀναφέρει τὴν δεκάτην εἰς τὴν ἑταιρίαν, καὶ τὰς τῆς πόλεως προσόδους [ἀς] διανέμουντιν

οἱ προεστηκότες τῆς πόλεως εἰς τοὺς ἐκάστων οἴκους with Haase (*Miscell. Philol.* prefixed to the Breslau *Winterkatalog* 1856—57), being unable to accept either the interpretation of the passage which Schömann doubtfully advances, for the reasons given by Haase, or Haase's own explanation of his conjecture, for the reason advanced by Schömann p. 307 n. 3 Eng. tr.



common meals, but the extract is our sole authority for this statement. And on grammatical grounds merely the assumption of a lacuna before φόρων is unavoidable, whether we supply <ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν>, or in agreement with Dosiadas <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν> φόρων.

The term *περίοικοι* is adopted by Aristotle in order to characterize the freer position which these peasants occupied (cp. II. 5 § 19 n. 171, 9 § 3 n. 281) as compared with the Spartan Helots, since they were not obliged to contribute to their landlords anything beyond the rent before-mentioned, and in particular they had no personal service to render. For this latter purpose, in fact, the Cretan Dorians in the cities made use of purchased slaves: Schömann p. 298 Eng. tr. In IV(VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13 (cp. *nn.* 815, 840 and 282 on II. 9. 4) Aristotle expressly draws a distinction between the two cases when the land is cultivated by δούλοι and by *περίοικοι*: and this would be a reason for invariably rendering the term *περίοικοι* by 'villeins' or 'vassal-tenants', which is just what the Cretan *περίοικοι* are, whereas the Helots are δούλοι pure and simple<sup>1</sup>. The former might very well get the name *περίοικοι*, i.e. "dwellers around", from living in the flat country round the cities which the ruling Dorians inhabited; as Schömann suggests p. 229 E. tr.<sup>2</sup> And seeing that Aristotle never mentions the Laconian *περίοικοι*, the attentive reader will be less likely to misunderstand him as meaning by the Cretan *περίοικοι* a class corresponding to them. SUSEM. (364)

[The discovery of the civil code of a Cretan state (for so the Gortynian inscription copied in 1884 by Halbherr and Fabricius may roughly be described) has thrown fresh light upon these problems<sup>3</sup>. It is gratifying to find the conclusions of the Excursus confirmed by most unimpeachable authority<sup>4</sup>. We recognise the *περίοικοι* of whom Aristotle speaks in the *Φοικέες* of the code<sup>5</sup>, and the *περίοικοι*=*ἐπήκοοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates in the *ἀφέταιροι* of the code, both these classes of the population being legally distinguished from the full citizens (*πολιταί*) and from purchased slaves<sup>6</sup>: of the *μνοῖται* the inscription says nothing. Thus the threefold

<sup>1</sup> [Blackstone himself compares unemancipated villeins with the helots, *Commentaries* B. II. c. 6 vol. II. p. 92. Prof. Susemihl renders δούλοι by Leibeigene, *περίοικοι* by Hintersassen. The Gortynian *οἰκέες*, though a specially privileged class of villeins, are nevertheless called δούλοι: *vid. infra*.]

<sup>2</sup> But when Schömann continues "and are actually once so called by Aristotle," he should have dropped the "once", for the term occurs three times, viz. 10 § 5, § 8, § 16 as well as in the interpolated passage § 3 [also in c. 9 § 3]. It is only in c. 5 § 19 that Aristotle calls them δούλοι. Höck (*Kreta* III. p. 28) should not have censured Aristotle; he had simply his own misapprehension to complain of: and, as a climax, the mistakes of Oncken II. 381 f. 387 ff. may be taken

to be sufficiently refuted by the above.

<sup>3</sup> The text with English translation and commentary was published by A. C. Merriam in the *American Journal of Archaeology* I. pp. 324—350, II. 24—45.

<sup>4</sup> "Susemihl rightly recognised that Aristotle's *περίοικοι* are not the *περίοικοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates, but on the contrary the *κλαῶται*: i.e. those who in the code are called *Φοικέες*." Zitelmann in *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 63 n. 56.

<sup>5</sup> We find *οἰκέες* for *οἰκέτης* in Homer, Sophocles, and an Attic law quoted by Lysias x. 19, *οἰκῆος καὶ δούλης* (Bücheler). Comp. Kallistratos as cited above p. 337 n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> The *ἐνδοθιδία δώλα* or "maidservant that is within the house," mentioned in the code II. 11, is obviously a 'purchased slave' (*χρυσώνητος*): Zitelmann *ib.* p. 64.

distinction of *πολιταί*, *ἀφέταιροι*, *Φοικέες*, answering to that of *Σπαρτιαταί*, *περίοικοι*, *ἔλωτες* at Sparta, is vindicated against the doubts of Höck, Grote, Oncken, and others.

The full citizen of this Cretan city was necessarily a member of an *ἐταιρία*; he lived in his house in the town, this house and certain cattle (*τὰ καρταίποδα*<sup>1</sup>, *Code* IV. 36), which he pastured doubtless on the common lands (*δημόσιοι*), passing at his death to his sons. He had besides an estate (*κλᾶρος*) outside the town, consisting of a certain allotment of land and the *Φοικέες* who tilled it. To these *Φοικέες* he stood in the capacity of *πάστας*, 'lord' or *patronus*. The rent in kind which they paid him secured him leisure to devote to the civil and military duties of political life.

The *ἀφέταιρος* was also a freeman like the *πολιτῆς*, but his name implies that as he did not belong to any *ἐταιρία*<sup>2</sup>, he was excluded from the citizenship. The law ordained that the money-fine which he was to receive in compensation for an offence committed against him was only one-tenth that of a full citizen, but four times that of a *Φοικεύς* (100 staters, 10 staters, 5 drachmai = 2½ staters, *Code* II. 3—9: in other cases the proportion between the serf and the freeman is 1:2 and 1:5, Zitelmann p. 102 n. 8).

The *Φοικέες* were not free men: *Φοικεύς* and *δῶλος* are used indifferently in the code<sup>3</sup>, and the terms *ἀφαιμῶται* and *κλαρῶται* do not occur. The Cretan peasants were in a state of villenage or serfdom, but assuredly their condition was far superior to that of the ordinary bondman or slave<sup>4</sup>. They were annexed to the lands which they cultivated, on which they had houses: they are accounted as part of the household and together with the lands which they tilled are entitled *κλᾶρος*<sup>5</sup>. They could acquire property and are assessed at a money-fine for the offences they commit. Strange as it may appear, a villein possessed a subsidiary right of inheritance to his lord's property in default of nearer heirs<sup>6</sup>. His family rights were legally protected, and he could marry without his lord's consent. He could even marry a free woman, and if he was received into her house the children of the marriage were free<sup>7</sup>. In legal proceedings he was represented by his lord. Thus his status was something altogether far removed from that of the *servus*, if indeed it be not that of the *cliens*, at Rome.]

<sup>1</sup> By the 'strong-footed' may be meant (1) all large beasts, as opposed to sheep and goats; or (2) oxen (cp. Pind. *Ol.* XIII. 81, where the scholiast says the word means a bull in the Delphic speech); or (3) horses and mules, like *μῶνυχες ἵπποι*.

<sup>2</sup> It is probable that the *ἐταιρία* as a division of the *φυλή* answered to the Attic *φρατρία*, and that admission to it was an indispensable condition before any one could become a full citizen. See *Athen.* IV. 22 p. 143, Zitelmann pp. 55, 161. In the Dreros inscription fines paid by the *Κόσμοι* are to be divided amongst the *ἐταιρίαι* (p. 337). At the foundation

of these close mess-companies lay, no doubt, an earlier and ruder tribal association (p. 330 f.); cp. Höck *Kreta* III. p. 126.

<sup>3</sup> In the code, as by Aristotle, *δῶλος* is used to include any form of servitude.

<sup>4</sup> Their tenure of the land might almost be compared with that of the privileged villeins who by gradual emancipation are on their way to becoming copyholders.

<sup>5</sup> *Code* V. 26 *tās Foukias ol tines k' louti* (= *an wsi*) *o klāros*.

<sup>6</sup> V. 27, Zitelmann pp. 64, 144.

<sup>7</sup> VII. 1, 2 Zitelmann p. 65 f. That the children follow the status of the mother is probably a survival of the matriarchate and female kinship; see above p. 329.



## EXCURSUS IV.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE: II. II §§ 3-8.

τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patrians, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek φυλαὶ and the three ancient Roman *tribus*, the latter to the Greek *φρατρίαι* and the 30 Roman *curiae* (see below on *γερονσία*, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or 'gentes' that are here called *ἑταιρίαι*, 'mess-associations'.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the *φιδίτια* in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the *ὠβαί*, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. trans.), were called *συσσίτια*: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables 'in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence' (*ib.* p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the *ἀνδρεία* in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. 'In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20. 6, 29: c. 9. 12, 23: 1 Kings 1. 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the *συσσίτια* of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festal occasions by the *curiales* in their places of assembly or *curiae*.' It is also to be remembered that *ἑταιρία* was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table: at least Dosiadas specially used the term in reference to the Lycians, *διήρηται δ' οἱ πολῖται πάντες καθ' ἑταιρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεία* (*Frag.* 1 in Athenaeus IV. 143 B). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens; 'probably guilds under oligarchical management' (II. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the *συσσίτια* at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchical clubs were certainly called *ἑταιρίαι* in Greece (cp. *n.* 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake

of having compared a Spartan *public* institution with the arrangements of merely *private* associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The *circuli* and *convivia* at Carthage are further mentioned in Livy XXXIV. 61 § 5; their 'meetings' (σύνοδοι) also in Theodoros Metochita *Hypomn.* c. 104 § 11 (cited by Kluge p. 215): but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. SUSEM. (378)

ἡ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχή.

Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of 'The Hundred' mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form: or possibly, as Movers conjectures, p. 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 10 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?): to these were added the highest magistrates, the two Shofetes (see below βασιλεῖς) and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle's statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin XIX. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen *out of the number of the Senators*, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: *dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicaret, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent.* Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals 'but beyond doubt the Shofetes [kings] and Gerusiasts [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless



cruelty,' comp. Diod. XX. 10. 3: since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen II p. 17 Eng. tr. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (*ibid.*) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people; and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate<sup>1</sup>: see below *γερονσία* and *n.* (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (XXXIII. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (quaestor) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then Shofete and probably invested with extraordinary powers (praetor, cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6, *tum temporis consulem*: see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: *iudicum ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant. res fama vitaeque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis obfendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat. horum in tam impotenti regno... praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit. quaestor id pro nihilo habuit, nam... quia ex quaestura in iudices, potentissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit subductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animadvertit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam*

<sup>1</sup> In Diod. XIV. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 103, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; nor, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words are: *ἡς ἀναγνωσθείσης ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, and *σύγκλητος* is therefore the same as *γερονσία*, the

smaller senate of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called *σύγκλητος* by Polybios. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybios' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of *γερονσία* for the small council and *σύγκλητος* for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (*n.* 382). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called *σύγκλητος*.

eorum, legem extemplo promulgavit pertulitque, in singulos annos iudices legerentur, neve quis biennium continuum iudex esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephoralty. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (9 § 23 *n.* 325): and as such civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who insist that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis. To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest office in the state (μεγίστη ἀρχή, 9 § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, 11 § 7 (comp. also 9 § 19 ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστί). In particular what is said of the Ephors, 9 § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύ-ναι τὰς ἀρχάς), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred. Even the remark (9 § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials: thus we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaestor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it: and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. SUSEM. (379).

## οἱ βασιλεῖς.

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title shofetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two shofetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos alone (*Hannib.* 7. 4), but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy XXX. 7. 5, Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius v. 11, Nep. l. c., cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6): and Polybios also VI. 51. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of shofetes at Gades



(XXXVIII. 37. 2), remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleidae, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 *n.* (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election 'of a king' (Zonaras *Ann.* VIII. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. XX. 10. 1 *n.* 1597; comp. however on the other side Diod. XIII. 80. 2)<sup>1</sup>. It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad<sup>2</sup>. It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (10 § 6)—see the parallel passages given in *n.* (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were dissevered. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin XXII. 7. 7, Diod. XIII. 43. 5, XIV. 54. 5<sup>3</sup>, XV. 15. 2, XX. 29. 2, cp. 33. 2, Polyæn. I. 27. 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

<sup>1</sup> It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet *De Rep. Laced.* speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).

<sup>2</sup> Only the incorrect statement of Zonares l.c. remains without justification on this view: but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Oros. IV. 6. The words *κατὰ νόμον* added to the title of King in these passages of Diodoros (*κατὰ νόμους τότε*

*βασιλεύοντα* and *βασιλέα κατὰ νόμον*) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king *βασιλεὺς κατὰ γένος*, as is clear from pseudo-Plato in Diog. Laert. III. 82 f. *τῆς δὲ βασιλείας ἡ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχηδόνι, κατὰ νόμον· πολιτικὴ γὰρ ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.*

still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3) a sort of priestly office: (2) in any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office; although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,—whose members were also called “judges” or shofetes (see above, also Cato as cited by Festus s.v. *mansues*), but no doubt, with some distinguishing addition,—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them directed the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 3, Livy XXX. 7. 5, 46. 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings praetors: but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l.c. expressly distinguishes the Praetor at Carthage from the King in a passage which is, it is true, in the last degree confused<sup>1</sup>, we find that the term praetor is only used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal B.C. 195 and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 *tum temporis consulem*, Zonar. IX. 14 s.f. τὴν μεγίστην τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀρχήν). According to Cicero's statement, *De Rep.* II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily suppose with Heeren that the shofetes were elected for life: but this is disproved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§7)<sup>2</sup>; and not merely Zonaras VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l.c. definitely states that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship. SUSEM. (381).

ἡ γερονσία: § 3.

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. tr.), it is doubtful whether along with the senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: *triginta seniorum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis*. It may be conjectured that one of these thirty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above). And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate, because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see above). Such a larger council is usually called σύγκλητος, even by Aristotle III. 1. 10 (cp. *n.* 442), and although the terms γερονσία, σύγκλητος, and συνέ-

<sup>1</sup> Praetor factus est, postquam rex fuerat anno secundo et vicesimo. Heeren, p. 138 n., proposed to alter rex into dux: but that here also rex denotes the Shofete and that the alteration is there-

fore unnecessary is shown, apart from all other reasons, by the very next words: ut enim Romae Consules sic Carthagine quotannis annui bini reges creabantur.

<sup>2</sup> πλέονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων.



δριον are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage<sup>1</sup>, yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms *γερουσία* and *σύγκλητος* X. 18. 1 *δύο μὲν...τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου* and XXXVI. 2. 6 *τριακοσίους ὁμήρους...τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας*. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Movers that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 300 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance; and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta<sup>2</sup>; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. 'It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general<sup>3</sup> and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts [senators] from whom'<sup>4</sup> probably, see Polyb. I. 21. 6, 'the subordinate commanders were taken; to it despatches were addressed' (Mommsen II. p. 15 E. tr.), 'to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors' (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see II § 5, *n.* (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (*n.* 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators<sup>5</sup> (Valer. Max. IX. 5. 4 *ext.*

<sup>1</sup> As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misunderstood, viz. Diod. XIV. 47. 2 (see p. 342 *n.* 1) and XX. 59. 1 *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς γερουσίας ἐν Καρχηδόνι βουλευσαμένης περὶ τοῦ πολέμου [καλῶς] ἔδοξε τοῖς συνέδροις τρία στρατόπεδα... ἐκπέμψαι*. The *σύνεδροι* are the members of the *γερουσία* itself: the transaction takes place in the *γερουσία* alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senates combined. The word *συνέδριον* is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

<sup>2</sup> Duncker (*Hist. of Antiquity* II. p. 185, ed. 4, 1875) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. II. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators *exclusive of the kings*.

<sup>3</sup> See above *n.* (381), also *n.* (392 b) below.

<sup>4</sup> Whether it was so "regularly", as Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

<sup>5</sup> For the senators Mommsen (II. p. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Four, although it may certainly be quite true

insolentiae vero inter Karthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi aemulatio fuit: ille enim separato a plebe balineo lavabatur; cp. Juven. v. 90 propter quod Romae cum Bocchare nemo lavatur, also Movers p. 501 n. 57). The deputies of the senate (σύνεδροι) with the army formed part of the general's council of war, Polyb. III. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the treaty concluded with Philip, next to 'Hannibal the general' and his three lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of their names, καὶ πάντες οἱ γερουσιασταὶ Καρχηδονίων μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντες Καρχηδόνοι οἱ στρατευόμενοι μετ' αὐτοῦ, Polyb. VII. 9 § 1, § 4. Movers, p. 498, prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former names, and only members of the larger council by the γερουσιασταὶ; but this title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for Movers to assume (p. 522 n. 308) that these plenipotentiaries of the senate also belonged to the Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the ephors sent into the field along with the Spartan king (cp. *nn.* 340, 360). SUSEM. (382)

#### ὁ δῆμος.

'The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their own power to bring any given question before the people or not: if however they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not allowed under the other constitutions; at Sparta and in Crete: §§ 5, 6.

Kluge was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought before the popular assembly; that this was not the case may be seen from Livy XXI. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—11 § 2, XXIII. c. 12 ff. However the senate and the shofetes might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (*n.* 382), to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the time of the second Punic war, according to Polyb. VI. 51. 6, the popular assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations, whilst the senate held this position at Rome (τὴν πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς διαβουλίαις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ὁ δῆμος ἤδη μετεἰλήθει, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀκμὴν εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος). And yet even this very war was decreed by the shofetes and the senate alone, Polyb. III. 33, Livy XXI. 18. SUSEM. (387)

that the latter are also called "senators" being elected, as a matter of fact, from  
by the Greek and Roman writers, as the (smaller and larger) senate.



## αἱ πενταρχίαι.

This is all we know of these Boards of Five; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. *n.* 53), but a number of boards: it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards *entered* the council of the Hundred, but only that they *elected* that council: nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elect beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed: but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them: consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the shofetes at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy XXVIII. 37. 2), and the censor (praefectus morum: Nep. *Hamilc.* 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by *principibus quibusdam et magistratibus* mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—*vectigalia publica partim negligentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant*, XXXIII. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (II § 7 s. f., III. I § 11 cp. *nn.* 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two shofetes as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (1) the Boards of Five and (11) the Council

of the Hundred Aristotle goes on to treat of the exclusive administration of justice by boards appointed expressly for this purpose; and this fact favours the supposition that these boards were simply and solely the two already mentioned together with the two shofetes or chief judges. Moreover in their election of the Hundred and Four the Boards of Five were by no means entirely free, but obliged at least in part to select from certain officials of the previous year: at any rate it appears to follow from Livy's account (see above *n.* 379), that the state treasurer had a right to be elected to the Hundred and Four in the following year, and the Boards of Five could only pass him over for very special reasons. But they evidently could not elect members of their own body to the Hundred and Four, as would else have happened frequently; and the reason for the prohibition may perhaps have been that in the following year they had to continue to discharge their own official duties, as described above: unless we are bound to suppose, that here too the principle of concentrating various offices upon one person (§ 13) was applicable. SUSEM. (390)

οἱ στρατηγοί.

The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above *n.* 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above *n.* 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (III. 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian 'kings', exercised such a government: whereas Movers (p. 540) takes it to mean that 'the Shofetes were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals.' The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin XIX. 1. 7<sup>1</sup>, Cato cited in Gellius X. 24. 7, Frontin. *Strateg.* II. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy XXIII. 13. 8<sup>2</sup>. The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of shofete and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. VI. 56. 4, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly: yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

<sup>1</sup> There is no ground for assuming with Kluge, p. 92 f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once shofetes and generals, or

that the Hasdrubal in question filled both offices in conjunction eleven times.

<sup>2</sup> At least I take this to be the most probable view.



senate: see Diod. XIII. 43. 5 (κατέστησαν; cp. above *n.* 381), XX. 10. 1 (ἡ γερονσία...στρατηγούς...ἀπέδειξε). But it may be conjectured that the election required to be confirmed by the popular assembly. At least when Hannibal was elected by the army the Senate was not satisfied with an approval of the act on its own part, but invited the popular assembly to confirm it, Polyb. III. 13. 4; and such a confirmation may have been requisite for the appointment of the senators and shofetes, in case it did not entirely rest with the popular assembly to elect them (see above *n.* 382). SUSEM. (392 b).

## EXCURSUS V.

## THE SOLONIAN CONSTITUTION: II. 12, 3.

ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων...τὸν δῆμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show<sup>1</sup>, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Müller and Oncken<sup>2</sup> have put upon the singular form τὸ δικαστήριον here twice used, as if it did not mean the Heliaea, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—'a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure.' It is another matter when Fränkel *The Attic δικαστήρια* p. 63 f. infers from III. 11. 8 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Heliaea to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Fränkel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Müller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates; that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon's legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Fränkel not severed the passage in B. III. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotle is saying

<sup>1</sup> This exposition Fränkel has not quite fairly passed over.

<sup>2</sup> The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his asser-

tions over again. Cp. *n.* (409). I do not defend everything which Schömann has stated, as is clear from the sequel.

precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or decreeing) and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them to render an account<sup>1</sup>. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception. If then, as Fränkel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if Fränkel's explanation be consistently applied to VI(IV), 14 § 3, § 6, § 10 (see *nn.* 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity; that wherever a popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which invariably followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference to the Areopagus or some similar board; and that in no case was the matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of accusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to procure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not 'obscure', but from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens, brought about not through Solon's fault but by the course of events<sup>2</sup>: though Fränkel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view<sup>3</sup> that to entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian Heliaea consisted, as Fränkel very ably proves (pp. 1—21), of all Attic citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff., cp. pp. 21—51) not only this Heliaea as a complete body but even each separate court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another *ἐκκλησία*<sup>4</sup>, as

<sup>1</sup> Fränkel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalcis (445 B.C.) *εὐθυναί* has the wider sense of "trials" generally, and not the later, narrower sense of "trials" of state officers because when presenting their accounts they have not been granted a discharge; Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 88 f. shows that the word has not even the former

sense in that place but means "punishments."

<sup>2</sup> ἀπὸ συμπτώματος.

<sup>3</sup> For in any case it is not from such point of view that we can decide what Aristotle may or may not have said.

<sup>4</sup> It is indeed more than questionable whether *ἀλία* = *ἐκκλησία*, popular assembly, is really only a shorter form of *ἡλία*



a representation of the popular assembly<sup>1</sup>. All the more readily and fittingly could Aristotle, if he ascribed their foundation to an author so early as Solon, characterize them as a boon granted to the people itself and to democracy<sup>2</sup>. All this however does not exclude the *possibility* that on Aristotle's view even Solon at the same time granted to the popular assembly also certain plenary powers with reference to the deposition, punishment, and control of the officers of state: indeed on the analogy of VI(IV), 14, 6 (*n.* 1325) there is a certain *probability* even, that by his remarks in II. 12 § 5 Aristotle intends to refer back to Solon the right of laying complaints or information, brought against officers of state during their time of office, directly before the popular assembly for immediate decision or with a view to further proceedings<sup>3</sup>. SUSEM. (403).

## EXCURSUS VI.

THALETAS: II. 12. 7.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Gortyn (or according to Suidas, of Elyros) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paeonian and cretan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaukos cited in Plutarch *De Music.* 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (Athenae. v. 181 B), which were called Paeans and Hyporchemes, and it was songs of this kind which he himself wrote and set to music and brought to their artistic perfection (Heracleid. Pont. quoted in Plut. *De Music.* 9. 1134 C, Schol. on Pind. *Pyth.* 11. 127), availing himself in them not only of paeonian rhythms and metres, but probably of dactylic rhythms and rhythms compounded of successions of dactyls and trochees. According to the story which dates from so early a writer as Ephoros, Lyscurgus while staying in Crete despatched Thaletas, a man well versed in politics, to Sparta, in order that he might by means of his songs spread the spirit of political harmony there and thus pave the way for the Lyscurgean reforms in the constitution. But another and far more credible legend informs us that Thaletas was summoned to Sparta by the order of the Delphic oracle in order to assuage a pestilence by his musical art (Pratinas fr. 8 in Plut. *De Music.* 42. 1146 C, Plut. *Philos. cum principibus* 5 p. 779 A, Aelian. *Var. Hist.* XII. 50; cp. Strabo p. 482). It can hardly be decided whether the only signification

or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation: see Wilamowitz *op. c.* pp. 87—94.

<sup>1</sup> Fränkel, pp. 21—27, endeavours to show that the Heliaea possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

<sup>2</sup> And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon's times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.

underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. I to B. I): the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Γόρτυς). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paeans and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sosibios, *frag.* 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 C, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopaidia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knosian rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrios of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. I. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger *De Thaleta poeta* Essen 1851. 4, Höck *Kreta* III. 339 ff., Bernhardt *History of Greek Literature* 3 ed. I p. 378, Christ *Metrik* p. 415 ff., also E. Curtius *History of Greece* I p. 182 Eng. trans. SUSEM. (419)



# Γ.

1274 b 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς  
 28 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρίτον τοῦ-  
 32 § 1 τον' τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ  
 ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτέ  
 ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἳ μὲν φάσκοντες 1  
 35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἳ δ' οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ  
 τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον' τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ  
 νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὀρώμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν,  
 ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τίς.

In the notes to this book fr. denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by Heylbut in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. p. 102 ff. See Exc. III. p. 454. As a rule it is without accents or breathings, nor are the words in a sentence separated.

1274 b. The first sentence, 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν..... 28 τοῦτον, was by all previous editors appended to B. II || 28 εἰρημένας Koraes; cp. II. 1. 1, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* 1368 f. || τοῦτον \* \* Thurot; τῷ <δὲ>? Susem. This δὲ is all that we require; whether its loss is due to the copyists or to some ulterior cause is uncertain, see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || 32 καὶ before τίς ἐκάστη omitted in Γ Ar., perhaps rightly || 38 ἡ τε? Susem. || ἐστὶν (ἐστιν P<sup>1</sup>) after τάξις τις M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

B. III includes two parts: a statement of *General Principles*, cc. 1—13, followed by a review of *Monarchy*, cc. 14—18, the first of the forms of government examined in detail. See *Analysis* p. 108 ff., *Introd.* 37 ff. The former part is the most valuable exposition of Aristotle's positive political theory to be found in the whole work. Comp. Oncken II pp. 117—174.

cc. 1, 2. *The definition of constitution to be obtained by reference to a city and citizen: §§ 1, 2. Neither (i) residence, § 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights, § 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition applies to a varying extent in different states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a rough mode of defining citizens by descent 1 § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic rights by persons not entitled to them: 2 §§ 3—5.*

Mr A. C. Bradley has some valuable remarks on Aristotle's conception of citizenship in *Hellenica* pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίας] Constitutions "proper," i.e. those actually in force or 'valid' in existing states as opposed to schemes on paper. So κυρίως with ἐπίστασθαι, to know properly or unconditionally, is opposed like ἀπλῶς to ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

35 ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν] "that it is not the state which has done this or that but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. III. 62 § 4 (Eaton) and n. (455) on c. 3 § 2 below. SUSEM. (432)

36 πολ. καὶ τοῦ νομ.] See above on I. 1. 2, II. 12. 1.

38 τάξις τις] "a certain ordering of the inhabitants." The character of this organization is explained 6 § 1 πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων, n. (522). Comp. VI

§ 2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄλων<sup>2</sup>  
 40 μὲν συνεστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον  
 ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλήθος ἐστίν.  
 1275 a ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκε- (p. 59)  
 πτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ γὰρ  
 τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἔστι γὰρ τις  
 ὃς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις οὐκ  
 § 3 ἔστι πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πῶς τυγχάνοντας ταύ-<sup>3</sup>  
 6 τῆς τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον·  
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν πρὸς πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέ-  
 § 4 τοικοὶ καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκῆσεως), οὐδ' οἱ τῶν  
 δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικά-  
 10 ζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινω-

1275 a 10 καὶ τοῖς <μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς> Bücheler, most likely right.

(IV). 1. 10 τάξις ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νεμένηται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον κτλ, n. (1129), VI(IV). 3. 5 n. (1156). SUSEM. (432 b)

§ 2 39 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ] "Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts" (Jebb).

41 τι πλήθος] "a body of citizens": namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, *ικανὸν εἰς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς*, § 12 (Eaton). See notes (434), (447). SUSEM. (433)

1275 a 1 ὥστε τίνα κτλ] Schlosser's censure of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, I. 1 § 3 n. (4), 3 § 1 (29), 8 § 1 (66), is certainly out of place here. "There is far more truth in the remark at I. 2 § 12" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define *πόλις* by reference to *πολίτης*; on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state" (Schlosser I. 218). In reality it is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes: so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. 1. 12 n.) as a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i.e. comparing I. 2. 8 n. (21), *adequate for the end of the state*. And just because this

is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in I cc. 1, 2. But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering to this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Herein he is certainly right: the error is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See nn. (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUSEM. (434)

§ 3 6 τοὺς ποιητοὺς] "honorary citizens" (Susemihl). But probably cases like those of 5 §§ 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Demosth.] c. *Neaer*. 1376, 15, *τῇ ποιήσει πολίτας*.

7 οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν πρὸς] "Domicile does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand 9 § 12, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινὴν τόπον*, with n. (357): on the other 9 § 10 n. (554). SUSEM. (434 b)

§ 4 8 οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων] "nor the advantages of common jurisdiction, in the sense of the capacity to bring, or defend a civil action": *δίκαια* = *iura*.

10 τοῦτο] these civil rights, *δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι*.

τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων] "the parties to a commercial treaty." More fully explained below 9 §§ 6, 7 (Schneider) nn. 549, 550. SUSEM. (435)



νοῦσιν—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει—πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν (I)  
οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν  
§ 5 ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πῶς μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύ-  
της κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μήπω δι' 4  
15 ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους  
φατέον εἶναι μὲν πῶς πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ  
προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακώτας ἢ τι  
τοιούτου ἕτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγό-  
μενον). ζητοῦμεν δὲ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα  
20 τοιούτου ἐγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν  
ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ  
§ 6 λύνειν. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μάλ-  
λον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν [κρίσεως καὶ] ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ  
μὲν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δις

11 καὶ γὰρ.....ὑπάρχει omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar.: [γὰρ] Göttling, [καὶ γὰρ.....ὑπάρχει] Susem.<sup>1</sup>; Thurot proposed to transpose the words to follow 12 μετέχουσιν. Bender considers the whole passage 11 καὶ γὰρ.....22 λύνει spurious || μὲν οὖν here, as in IV(VII). 10 § 7, in the sense of μέντοι, which Schmidt proposed. This makes Bücheler's insertion all the more necessary || 12 ἀλλὰ νέμειν..... 13 μετέχουσι omitted in Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, inserted in the margin) || 13 ὥστε] διὰ Vettori Bk. || 16 λίαν untranslated by Ar., [λίαν] Koraes, πολίτας Spengel, πλὴν Göttling (in his lectures). Schmidt would transpose λίαν to follow 17 τοὺς δὲ. Possibly due to a variant πλὴν of ἀλλὰ: yet I do not venture to decide against λίαν ἀπλῶς='quite absolutely' || 17 ἀτελεῖν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || \* \* ἢ Thurot Susem.<sup>1</sup>: Conring assumed a lacuna higher up before 14 ἀλλὰ, Spengel proposed to omit καθάπερ there: but see Vahlen *Poetics* p. 276 ed. 3, cp. Comm. || 19 δὲ Ar. Conring, γὰρ Γ II (including fr.) Bk. || 23 κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς] πολιτικῆς Stobaeus p. 328, [κρίσεως καὶ] Thurot || 24 διηρημέναι Γ II Bk., διωρισμέναι Scaliger, Susem.<sup>2</sup>, probably right: *determinatae* Ar. ||

The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states: such perhaps as μὴ εἶναι μὴθ' εἰρᾶι μὴτε δῆσαι ἐλευθέρων, Pseud.-Andoc. 4. 18. See [Demosth.] *De Halonneso* §§ 9—13, Pollux VIII. 63, 88; Harpocration s. v. and Aris. *Frag.* 380, 1541 b 1: whence some infer that αἱ ξυμβολαῖαι πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαι of Thuc. I. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckh *Publ. Econ. of Athens* pp. 40, 403 Eng. tr. and Grote c. 47 vi. 57 n. See also Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in *Amer. Journal of Phil.* 1880. I. pp. 3—11.

12 νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην] "they must procure a patron." So at Athens: Meier and Schömann *Att. Process* p. 315 ff.,

561, 572: Schömann *Antiquities* I. p. 353 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (436) Cp. Harpoc. τῶν προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων μετοίκων (Wyse).

§ 5 13 τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας = a franchise limited to participation in legal rights.

14 καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας κτλ.] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases adduced, viz. children too young to be enrolled, and superannuated old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but only with a qualification. SUSEM. (437)

17 τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς] Cp. 5 § 2, n. (505). SUSEM. (437 b) Add I. 13. 7.

20 ἐγκλημα διορθώσεως δεομ.] flaw or defect requiring correction, viz. by an added qualification, as *citizen under age*.

25 τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὀρισμένων χρό- (1)  
 § 7 τῶν δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα 5  
 μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους,  
 οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτά-  
 τους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν· περὶ ὀνόματος  
 30 γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ  
 ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὲ διορισμὸς  
 § 8 χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὲ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέ-  
 χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάν- (p. 60)  
 τας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτος ἐστίν· δεῖ δὲ 8  
 35 μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα

μὲν omitted by Γ, perhaps rightly, unless it be changed to ἦ with Spengel: Ar. leaves it untranslated || 27 ἂν φαίη Γ P<sup>1</sup> 4-6 fr., φαίη M<sup>1</sup>, ἀντιφαίη P<sup>2</sup> 3 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., ἂν ἀντιφαίη? Götting || 28 καίτοι..... 29 ἀρχῆς omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, added by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup> || 32 οὕτω] ταύτων or ταύτης? Spengel || 34 πολίτου <λόγος>? Schneider.

§ 6 26 8 δ' ἀόριστος sc. ἄρχων: in other cases the officer holds an undefined office; i.e. one of uncertain or indefinite duration and frequency. The context would be equally well suited by 'life-long' or 'perpetual': but from c. 11 § 13 f., § 18 f., we learn that even when discharging judicial or legislative functions no one would regard the δικαστὴς and ἐκκλησιαστής as themselves ἄρχοντες but only as parts of the complex ἄρχων, the δικαστήριον or ἐκκλησία. A fortiori, the mere qualification for discharging these intermittent functions cannot make an ἄρχων when the actual discharge of them is not enough (Shute). In Aristophanes ἄρχων = δικάζειν, e.g. *Plutus* 916, οὐκ οὐκ δικαστὰς ἐξεπλήθηδες ἡ πόλις ἄρχειν καθίστησιν; cp. n. (438).

§ 7 28 οὐδὲ... διὰ ταῦτα] that to serve on a court of justice or as member of the legislature does not constitute office; and yet it seems absurd to deny to those who wield the highest authority a claim to hold office.

καίτοι γελοῖον] Comp. Plato *Latius* 767 A, B: "in a certain sense to appoint courts of justice is to choose officers of state. For every member of the executive must needs be a judge of sundry matters, and a dikast, without really holding office, does virtually assume an office of no mean importance on the day when he decides the suit he is trying (δικαστὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄρχων καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἄρχων οὐ πάνυ φαῦλος γίγνεται τὴν

τόθ' ἡμέραν, ἥπερ ἂν κρίνων τὴν δίκην ἀποτελῇ). Hence the dikasts may also be regarded as holders of office." For "at Athens the obligation to render an account of his conduct was necessarily presupposed in the case of every state official (cp. Aeschines III. 17), but the heliast is not obliged to render an account (Aristoph. *Vespae* 587 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀνυπεύθυνοι δρώμεν· τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδὲμί' ἀρχῇ). Again, no one could hold an office for two terms in succession, as in that case he must have been reelected before he had rendered his account, which was illegal: whereas the heliast could go on discharging his functions time after time, uninterruptedly" (Fränkel p. 21 f.), SUSEM. (438).

29 ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω κτλ] "But let us waive the point, which after all is verbal, since we can find no common term applicable alike to the judge and the ekklesiast. For the sake of distinction, we will call theirs an 'indefinite' magistracy" (Jebb).

§ 8 33 ἐφαρμόσας is intransitive. "Such then is [the notion, or definition of] the citizen which best applies to all who are so called." We find ἐπὶ with gen. after this verb, 2 § 3 and 11 § 5 below: but the dat. (4 § 2) or πρὸς with acc. is more usual.

35 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς κτλ] "Where classes of things (like πολίτης) contain individual members distinct in species" i.e. essentially different, like the several



διαφέρει τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ (I)  
 δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἔνεστιν, ἢ  
 § 9 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν  
 εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ  
 1275 b προτέρας οὕσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας  
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκ-  
 βεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ  
 4 τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἐκάστην πολι-  
 § 10 τεῖαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ τ  
 πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγ-

37 οὐδ' ἔνεστιν Madvig, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν Γ II Ar. Bk., ουδνεστιν fr. || [ἢ τοιαῦτα] Bas.<sup>2</sup>

πολιτεία and, consequently, the πολίτης as determined in each of them, "one of these being primary, another secondary, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen." If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ὁμώνυμα. Here however πολίτης is probably παρώνυμον, like ἀγαθόν in *Nic. Eth.* 1. 6 §§ 8—12, where also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as 'good' are such. See Zeller *Plato* p. 259 n. 103 Eng. tr. In *Ind. Ar.* ὑποκείμενα is explained (1) res singulae quae continentur notionis alicuius universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas ea notio refertur et a quibus suspensa est: e.g. *Met.* A. 2. 4, 982 a 23, ὁ τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οὐδὲ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πραγμάτων (ut πολίτου) ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα (singulae πολιτεῖαι ad quas refertur τοῦ πολίτου notio) διαφέρει.

35—38 "See *Categ.* 1. 1 f.: things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the name being different (ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὡν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος). Things are said to be synonymous or univocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense (J. G. Schneider). Comp. Waitz *ad loc.*, Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. ὁμώνυμος [*Grote Aris.* 1. 81 f.]; also 1. 2. 13 above n. (28)." SUSEM. (438 b) Hence obviously πράγματα 'things' must be taken in the not uncommon sense of 'classes': comp. *De Interpret.* c. 7 § 1, 17 a 38, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον. Any general notion,

however loose the connexion between the particulars which come 'under' it, is treated as a whole or 'thing,' if it is denoted by a single term.

§ 9 39 ὑστέρας...προτέρας] Logically 'posterior' and 'prior.' Not 'later' and 'earlier' in time or historical development, but 'lower' and 'higher' in the order of thought and of real existence: the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See 1. 2. 13 n. (27). SUSEM. (439)

1275 b 1 ἡμαρτημένας] Plato's word *Rep.* v 449 A, viii 544 A. The participle 'perverted' has been converted into an adjective 'wrong, perverse': cp. 6 § 11, viii(v). 1. 5, *N.E.* iv. 9. 35, viii. 10. 4. In viii(v). 1. 15 it is a true passive participle. Compare ἀπονενομημένος = degenerate.

3 ὕστερον] cc. 6, 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (456). SUSEM. (439 b)

§ 10 5 ὁ λεχθεὶς] The citizen as thus defined.

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ κτλ] But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. If then Aristotle's conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 nn. (598, 599): iv(vii). 9 §§ 7—9, 13 § 9, 14 §§ 3—5 with nn. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 5 §§ 4, 5 nn. SUSEM. (440)

6 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις] With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which

καῖον. <έν> ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομί- (1)  
 ζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέ-  
 ρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει  
 10 τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς,  
 § 11 ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ  
 Καρχηδόνα· πᾶσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας.  
 ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ 8  
 ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἀρχὼν ἐκκλησιαστής  
 15 ἔστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρισμένος· τού-  
 των γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ  
 (2) § 12 δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν  
 ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν (ὃ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρ-  
 χῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύ-

1275 b 7 <έν> Koraes || 11 <ού> τὸν? Schneider (afterwards rejected by him), Koraes, Trieber; [καί] Trieber. But see Comm. n. (444) || 13 γὰρ after ἔχει omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>, possibly by Γ; erased in P<sup>4</sup> || 16 ἀποδίδεται Γ, perhaps right || βούλεσθαι Π<sup>2</sup> (emended by corr. of P<sup>4</sup>) fr. || 17 περὶ before τινῶν omitted by M<sup>4</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 19 καὶ Ar. Spengel, ἢ Γ II (including fr.) Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> (in text)

would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." SUSEM. (441)

8 συγκλήτους] Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in Exc. IV to B. II p. 345 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller council and the popular assembly. SUSEM. (442)

κατὰ μέρος] not "in turn" but "by sections."

καὶ τὰς δίκας...κατὰ μέρος] "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two 'indefinite magistracies', the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found: the larger council specially convened (σύγκλητος) replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judicature into a special government department. SUSEM. (443)

9 ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] Comp. II. 9. 25, VI (IV). 9. 9 *μη.* (329 b), (1266). SUSEM. (443 b)

τῶν συμβολαίων] II. 5. 11. Cp. Cope's note on Rhet. I. 1. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to σύμβολα which are κοινά." δίκας τῶν συμ. = civil suits, nisi prius cases.

§ 11 12 Καρχηδόνα] If we bear in mind what is said in n. (443) we shall

discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and II. 11. 7, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχῶν δικάζεσθαι πᾶσας καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι (cp. Exc. IV. p. 348 f. and *μη.* 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards as distinguished from that of δικάσται annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 23 n. 325. SUSEM. (444)

15 ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρισμένος] "the officer defined by his tenure of the office" (of judge or legislator). And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oncken's assertion, II. p. 121 n. 1, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between ἐκκλησία and βουλὴ on the one hand, Heliaea, νομοθέται, and Areopagus on the other.) SUSEM. (445)

§ 12 18 ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτι-



20 τῆς τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν (I)  
 2 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν· ὀρίζονται δὲ πρὸς τὴν  
 τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ  
 θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρός ἢ μητρός, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ'  
 ἐπὶ πλεόν ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους.  
 25 οὕτω δὲ ὀριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν  
 § 2 τρίτον ἐκείνων ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μὲν (p. 61)  
 οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος,  
 ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιθη-

21 δὲ Γ Ar., δὴ II (including fr.) Bk. || 23 τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τοῦτου ἐτι? Koraes ||  
 24 ἐπιπάππους P<sup>2</sup> and corr. of P<sup>3</sup>, ἐτι πάππους Camerarius, accepted by Schneider  
 and Koraes || 25 δὴ P<sup>3</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. || παχέως Camerarius, apparently right:  
 πολιτικῶς, ταχέως ἀποροῦσι Spengel

κῆς] "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aristotle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does virtually in § 7 (ἀόριστος ἀρχή). SUSEM. (446)

ἡδὴ is simply untranslatable: without going further, without anything more being necessary.

21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς] "a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. n. (21), II. 2. 8 n. (136) and the passage there cited. SUSEM. (447)

c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens: νόμον ἔγραψε μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυνεῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας.

25 πολιτικῶς] Like our word 'popular' or *popularis* in Cic. *De fin.* IV. § 24, v. § 12: i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation *παχέως*, *pingui Minerva*.

§ 2 26 Γοργίας] The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to I. 13. 10 (cp. n. 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leontini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he enchanted every one with his florid and rhythmical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style: at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics:

Alkidamas (n. 31), Polos, Likymnios, Protarchos and Lycophron (nn. 297, 552) were its most eminent names. See Foss *De Gorgia Leontino* (Halle 1828), Frei in the *Rhein. Mus.* VII. 1850. 527 ff., VIII. 1853. 268 ff., Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II. pp. 412—416 Eng. tr., Blass *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (Attic Oratory) I. p. 44, III. 2. 323 ff. Susemihl *Gorgias and Attic prose in Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXV. 1877. pp. 793—799, *De vitis Tisiae* etc. (Greifswald 1884) p. xx ff., Diels 'Gorgias and Empedocles' *Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad.* 1884. p. 343 ff. SUSEM. (448) Also Cope in *Journal of Sacred and Class. Phil.* III. 65—80.

The following passage, II. 26—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in *Transactions of the Camb. Philological Soc.* vol. II pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (*Journal of Philology* XV. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaeans by Lycophron of Pherae in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon *Hellen.* II. 3. 4.

27 εἰρωνευόμενος = ironically, though the word could have the meaning "jestingly." But we are told *Rhet.* III. 7. 11, 1408 b 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρωνείας ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει, that Gorgias used to be ironical in his speeches. SUSEM. (449)

28 ἔφη καθάπερ ὄλμους κτλ.] "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magistrates." This untranslatable play upon words turns on the double sense of *δημιουργοί*, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. n. 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or

29 μένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιη- (I)  
 § 3 μένους[. εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς]. ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν. εἰ  
 γὰρ μετεῖχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν  
 [ἂν] πολῖται· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατόν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου  
 ἢ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτισάντων.

ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι με-<sup>10</sup>  
 35 τέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν  
 ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολ-  
 § 4 λους γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δ'

29 *λαρισαιοὺς* fr., *Λαρισαίους* not *Λαρισσαίους* Bk.<sup>2</sup> (so throughout) || τῶν omitted  
 by M<sup>1</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 30 [εἶναι.....λαρισσοποιούς] Ridgeway || *λαρισσαιοποιούς* Camerarius,  
*larissaeorum factores* Ar., *λαρισσοποιούς* ΓII (including fr.) Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 32 ἦσαν ἂν  
 P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Bk., ἦσαν Π<sup>1</sup> fr. Ald. and, over an erasure, P<sup>4</sup>, ἢ ἂν U<sup>b</sup> || καὶ γὰρ  
 οὐ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Bk., οὐδὲ γὰρ Susem.<sup>1</sup> misled by William's translation *neque enim* ||  
 33 ἐκ omitted by P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps by Γ, [ἐκ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, perhaps rightly || *οἰκισάντων*  
 [ἢ κτισάντων] Bender || 34 ἐκεῖνο Vettori (ms. correction in the Munich copy of his  
 1st ed.) and an unknown hand in the margin of the Aldine at Munich, ἐκείνην P<sup>4</sup>  
 and, with an erasure over εἰ, P<sup>1</sup>: ἐκείνη Susem.<sup>1</sup> in text and perhaps M<sup>a</sup>, ἐκείνην  
 P<sup>2-6</sup> QM<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (corrector), probably also M<sup>a</sup>, accepted by Bender;  
 ἐκεῖνοι apparently P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand): Γ uncertain, *illi magis habent* William, whence  
 ἐκεῖνοι.....ἔχουσι the editors from Vettori and Morel to Bekker || 35 οἷον <ᾧ>  
 Chandler || 37 δούλους καὶ ξένους M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand) and Valckenaer (notes on Herod.  
 p. 404) || καὶ δούλους <καὶ> μετοίκους Ar. Bk.<sup>2</sup>, καὶ [δούλους] μετοίκους or καὶ πολλοὺς  
 μετοίκους? Göttling, μετοίκους καὶ δούλους Niebuhr (II. 305 n. 2, Eng. tr.), μετοίκους  
 ξένους Spengel. See however Meier *De gentil. Att.* p. 6, Bernays *Herakl. Briefe*  
 p. 155 f., and on the other side c. 5 § 2 with n. (503)

'burgomaster,' and as this was so in  
 parts of Thessaly (see Schömann *Antiq.*  
*iur. publ.* p. 84 n. 10, *Antiquities of*  
*Greece* p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been  
 also at Larisa: while (2) at the same time  
 in Attica, and the common language  
 generally, it was the term for workmen  
 or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The  
 jest, when cited in this context, raises a  
 presumption that the magistrates of Larisa  
 bore this same title at the foundation  
 of the city and had full powers to make  
 citizens of whom they pleased: yet who  
 in the world would spoil such a joke  
 or pun by inquiring whether this was  
 historically true? (But the jest would  
 lose all its point if *δημιουργοί* be taken,  
 as Oncken suggests, to mean the founders,  
 not the magistrates, of Larisa. For  
 every town has its founders, and not  
 merely Larisa and certain towns like it:  
 nor does the word bear this meaning  
 unless some more precise phrase be  
 added.) Further comp. VIII(v). 6 § 6 n.  
 (1573), 10 § 5 n. (1651): VI(IV). 4. 16 n.

(1188). SUSEM. (450) Cp. Thuc. I. 56  
*ἐπιδημιουργοί*.

30 εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς]  
 "For (he said) some [of them] are Larisa-  
 makers," i.e. hardware manufacturers.  
 Why should Gorgias interpret his own  
 joke? It is far more likely that this is a  
 gloss by some one who did not see that  
*ὄλμους* goes with *Λαρισαίους* above; or  
 perhaps believed that *λάρισα*, *λαρισις* meant  
 'a kettle' on the analogy of *τάναγρα*,  
*ταναγρίς*. In Anthol. Pal. VI. 305, τῷ  
*Λαρισαίῳ κυτογάστορα ἐψηγῆρας*, *Λαρι-*  
*σαῖος* is an adjective, and this makes  
 against its supposed use as a substantive,  
 and therefore against the emendation of  
 Camerarius (Ridgeway).

§ 3 30 ἀπλοῦν] a simple question,  
 οὐδὲν πακίλον.

37 πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ  
*δούλους μετοίκους*] "for he admitted  
 into the tribes many resident-aliens of  
 foreign and servile extraction" (*δούλους* =  
 freedmen). It is well known that Cleis-  
 thenes abolished the four ancient tribes



ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότε- (I)  
 ρον ἀδίκως ἢ δικάως. καίτοι κἂν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορή-  
 1276 a σειεν, ἄρ' εἰ μὴ δικάως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταῦτό δυνα-  
 § 5 μένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρώμεν καὶ ἄρ-  
 χοντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικάως,  
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν  
 5 τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν), δῆλον ὅτι πο-  
 3 λίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάως ἢ  
 μὴ δικάως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφι-  
 σβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πόθ' ἢ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε  
 9 οὐχ ἢ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται  
 § 2 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται  
 διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,

39 κἂν Bk.<sup>2</sup>, καὶ Γ II Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, προσαπορήσειεν <ἂν> Götting, τις <ἂν> Spengel  
 || τοῦτό W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. Bk., τοῦτο M<sup>a</sup> (1st hand), τούτω Γ P<sup>1-2,3,4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> M<sup>a</sup> (corr).

1276 a 5 τῆς omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τῆς] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || ἔφαμεν P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || 7  
 συνάπτειν? Korae || 9 γίνηται Γ Ar.

(see p. 340) and established in their place ten local divisions, for which he retained the name φυλαί: Curtius *Hist.* i pp. 382—387 Eng. tr., Schömann pp. 336, 365 Eng. tr. Comp. n. (588) on 9 § 13, VII (VI). 4. 19 n. (1427). SUSEM. (451)

Congreve supports the reading of Bekker<sup>2</sup> and Thirlwall (II. 74) by a comparison of IV (VII). 4 § 6 δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων, § 14 ξένους καὶ μετοίκους. But this is nullified by Aristoph. *Ach.* 503—8, *Eg.* 347 εἰ που δικίδιον εἶπας εὐ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου, Pax 297 μέτοικοι καὶ ξένοι. That δούλος may be used of freedmen is capable of abundant proof: Athenaeus VI. 93, 267 B, C διαφέρειν δὲ φησι Χρῆσιππος δούλον οἰκέτου γράφων ἐν β' Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀπελευθέρους μὲν δούλους εἶναι εἶναι, οἰκέτας δὲ τοὺς μὴ τῆς κτήσεως ἀφειμένους: Lysias c. *Agorat.* § 64 δούλος καὶ ἐκ δούλων ἐστίν (of a citizen): Isaeus VI § 49, οὕτως ὁμολογουμένη οὖσα δούλη (of a freedwoman): Harpocration s.v. μετοίκιον, cp. Boeckh *Publ. Economy* p. 48 Eng. tr. (the freedmen paid this tax). The proceeding of Cleisthenes was not more violent than that of Euphron at Sicyon: Xen. *Hell.* VII. 3. 8 ὅς δὲ δούλους μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίτας ἐποίησε: and the two commonest sources of an artisan population are cited side by side, *infra* c. 5 § 3 παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δούλον τὸ βάνανσον ἢ ξενικόν. There

is no authority for δούλους μετοίκους and if any change were needed Niebuhr's would be the simplest. See also Grote IV. 170 n. 1, Schömann *Constitutional History* p. 69 f. Eng. tr.

§ 5 1276 a 6 καὶ τούτους] Even those who have received the franchise in consequence of a revolution. SUSEM. (452)  
 7 πρότερον] 1 § 1 n. (432). SUSEM. (453)  
 c. 3 The identity of the state depends not upon its territory but upon its constitution.

§ 2 10 ἔνιοι] Possibly writers who advocated repudiation are meant: *Introd.* p. 20 n. 1. SUSEM. (454)

11 διαλύειν = discharge, pay in full.  
 ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως κτλ.] "on the ground that it was a loan to the tyrant and not to the state." This question was really raised in B.C. 403, when after the expulsion of the thirty, the Athenian state debated whether it was obliged to repay a loan of 100 talents borrowed by them from the Spartans, Demosth. xx. 11 f., Isocr. VII. 68 f. (Vettori). The converse case, viz. that the credit of a service rendered by the expelled tyrants was claimed by the state, arose, when the Corinthians after the expulsion of the Cypselidae demanded that the offerings dedicated by this family at Delphi and Pisa should be inscribed with the name of the town, and the acts of their tyrants be thus regarded as acts of the state.

οὐτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ (1)  
 κρατεῖν οὐσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. \* \*. εἴπερ οὖν 11  
 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες, κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁμοίως  
 15 <οὐ> τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύ-  
 της πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.  
 § 3 ἔοικε δ' ὁ λόγος οἰκείος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς  
 ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐ-  
 τὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιότατη τῆς ἀπορίας (p. 62)  
 20 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχε-  
 ται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι [τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους], καὶ  
 § 4 τοὺς μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δὲ ἕτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν

12 πολλά omitted by Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin) || <ἐπὶ> τῷ  
 Lindau || 13 συμφέρον. <ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία οὐ σκοπεῖ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον> or  
 something similar? Susem. || 14 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται] κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ἐντάσσοντο  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> following William's incorrect version in *democratiam versae fuerunt* || 15  
 <οὐ> Hayduck || "ταύτης is pleonastic" Eaton; [ταύτης] Thurot; τῆς αὐτῆς  
 Koraeas (with mark of interrogation after 16 τυραννίδος and a comma after 14 τοῦτον  
 instead of before κατὰ) || 17 ὁ λόγος after οἰκείος P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || [πῶς] πότε Spengel  
 Susem.<sup>1</sup>, see § 5 || 21 [τὸν.....ἀνθρώπους] Susem., dittography from 20, [τὸν τόπον  
 καὶ] Bücheler

The Delphians admitted the claim, the  
 Eleans rejected it: see Plut. *De Pyth.*  
*orac.* 13. 400 E (Schlosser). Comp.  
 further n. (432) on I § 1. SUSEM. (455)

Broughton (p. 171) cites the case of  
 the United States and the bonds issued  
 by the abortive Confederate government.

λαβόντος] Comp. Thuc. III. 81 ἀπέ-  
 θανον... ἄλλοι (ἐνεκα) χρημάτων σφίσι  
 ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων (τῶν  
 δανεισαμένων Schol.).

12 ὡς ἐνίας κτλ] "for some forms of  
 the state rest upon superior force and are  
 not due to public expediency." This is  
 the second time that Aristotle refers be-  
 forehand to his doctrine of 'degenerate'  
 forms of government, more precisely laid  
 down in c. 6: see above nn. (439 b, 440).  
 SUSEM. (456)

13 συμφέρον. \* \*] The lacuna may  
 perhaps be thus supplied: <But de-  
 mocracy also is a government of this  
 sort.> SUSEM. (457)

14 δημοκρατοῦνται] Ridgeway sug-  
 gests that William of Moerbeke took this  
 word to come from δημοκρατώ, and  
 hence his rendering: in *democratiam*  
*versae fuerunt*.

§ 3 17 ἔοικε δ' κτλ] But the true  
 grounds of this controversy lie deeper in  
 another question which now needs to be  
 investigated. SUSEM. (458)

20 ζήτησις] The most obvious mode  
 of investigation is concerned with the  
 place and the inhabitants.

21 διαζευχθῆναι] "disjoined," "sepa-  
 rated." Aristotle has in view the mea-  
 sure which the Greeks called διοικίζειν, cp.  
 VIII(V). 10. 11 n. (1668), when a town  
 was destroyed by its conquerors and the  
 inhabitants were driven to seek new  
 homes in the neighbourhood in a number  
 of unwall'd villages and hamlets, as was  
 done to Mantinea by the Spartans in  
 385 B.C. This was an oligarchical mea-  
 sure: for the custom of living together  
 in a walled town was usually favourable  
 to democracy. The opposite and de-  
 mocratical procedure, the union of several  
 country places, hitherto unwall'd, in a  
 single town was συνοικίζειν: and directly  
 after the battle of Leuctra this was done  
 by the Mantineans who rebuilt their city  
 B.C. 370 and moreover gave the impulse  
 to the foundation of a common capital  
 of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See  
 Curtius *Hist.* IV. pp. 305, 417 ff. Eng. tr.,  
 Schömann *Antiq.* p. 171 Eng. tr. Cp.  
 also I. 2. 8 n. (20 b). SUSEM. (459)

§ 4 22 ταύτην μὲν οὖν πρᾶστέραν]  
 In this form the problem must be re-  
 garded as easier to solve, for the variety  
 of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates  
 a solution.



πραoτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως (I) λεγομένης, ἐστὶ πῶς εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως). ὁμοί- 12  
 25 ὡς δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε  
 § 5 δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τεύχε-  
 σιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τεύχεσ. τοιαύτη  
 δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἣτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν  
 29 μᾶλλον ἔθνοους ἢ πόλεως· ἥς γέ φασιν ἐαλωκυίας τρίτην  
 § 6 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν  
 ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψις  
 (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον  
 ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολι-  
 τικόν). ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, 13  
 35 πότερον ἕως ἂν ἡ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν  
 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

23 πρῶτέραν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, Spengel thinks the word corrupt || 25 αὐτὸν τόπον P<sup>4-6</sup> W<sup>b</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>; perhaps also Γ, *eundem locum* William || 26 εἶναι μίαν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 26 δὴ] δεῖ P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> || 27 πελοποννήσῳ Γ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>3</sup> || 28 καὶ πᾶσα.....29 πό-  
 λεως transposed to follow 30 πόλεως Ramus || 32 ποσὸν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 33 ἔθνος omitted  
 by II<sup>2</sup> Ar. and in P<sup>1</sup> where a lacuna of twice its length is left

23 **πολλαχῶς λεγομένης**] As in Greek there is only the one word *πόλις* for 'city' and 'state,' in such a case as that just cited in *n.* (459) it might well be asked, whether the *state* of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the *city*. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word *πόλις*, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (*Introd.* p. 22), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 *n.* (554). SUSEM. (460)

Unquestionably it would be a great gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of *πόλις*, *πολιτικός*, by 'city' 'civic' rather than 'state' 'political' is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a 'municipal corporation' we cannot be always styling them the 'burgess-body.'

§ 5 26 **οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τεύχεσιν**] Editors compare Thucyd. vii. 77. 7 *ἀνδρες γὰρ πόλις καὶ οὐ τεῖχη οὐδὲ ναῦς*; Soph. *Oed. Rex* 56 *ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οὔτε πύργος οὔτε ναῦς ἔρμος ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐνοικούντων*

*ἔσω*; Tac. *Hist.* i. 84 *quid? vos pulcherrimam hanc urbem domibus et tectis et congestu lapidum stare creditis?* SUSEM. (461)

27 **Πελοποννήσῳ**] Cp. Pseudo-Lysias II (*ἐπιτάφιος*) § 45, *περὶ ἅπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τεῖχος περιβαλεῖν*, viz. the wall across the isthmus proposed in the Persian wars.

28 **ἔχει περιγραφὴν**] has a circumference of a nation; i.e. encircles a nation rather than a state.

29 **μᾶλλον ἔθνοους**] Comp. *n.* (11) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (463)

**ἥς γέ φασιν ἐαλωκυίας**] The capture by Cyrus is meant: Herod. i. 178, 191. Nothing is there said however of an interval of three days, but we are told that when the extremities of the town were captured the Babylonians who lived in the centre had not yet discovered that it was taken. See also II. 6. 6 *n.* (200). SUSEM. (462)

§ 6 31 **εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν**] The size is discussed in IV(VII). c. 4; the uniformity of race in VIII(V). 3. 11 f.: cp. *n.* (1531). See however *Introd.* p. 56. SUSEM. (464) Comp. for the phrase *solvere in alium diem*.

νων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν (I)  
 τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ αἰεὶ τοῦ μὲν  
 ἐπιγινόμενου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξiónτος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώ-  
 40 πους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν  
 § 7 δὲ πόλιν ἐτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἢ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ  
 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἐτέρας τῷ εἶδει καὶ  
 διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν καὶ  
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε  
 5 μὲν κωμικὸν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν αὖ-  
 § 8 τῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλ-  
 λην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον τῆς  
 συνθέσεως ᾗ, οἷον ἀρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἐτέραν εἰ-  
 § 9 ναι λέγομεν, ἂν ὅτε μὲν ᾗ Δῶριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὲ τοῦ-

1276 b 2 "πολιτείας is pleonastic or the text is corrupt" Eaton, *πολιτεία* Congreve, [*πολιτῶν*]? Susem. || 3 ἂν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, δόξειε M\* || 6 ἀνθρώπων omitted by P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || The punctuation (comma for full stop after ὄντων) Welldon || 7 ἢ τῆς συνθέσεως Π<sup>2</sup> Bk || 8 εἶναι omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 9 λέγομεν Albert Ar. Morel, λέγομεν Γ II

37 ποταμοὺς] The allusion is to the *dicta* of Heraclitus ποταμοῖσι δις τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, *Frag.* 41, 42, 81 ed. Bywater (Eaton, Ridgeway).

§ 7 1276 b 2 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας] Ridgeway rightly defends this, translating "For if the state is a kind of community, but it (ἡ πόλις) is in fact a community possessed by citizens in a constitution," and adducing the MS. text of 9 § 14 as another instance of the double genitive with κοινωνία. If any change is to be made at all, we should omit πολιτῶν, which, though grammatically unobjectionable, is superfluous and somewhat obscures the sense. Usually κοινωνία πολιτῶν or κοινωνία has been made the subject of the second sentence, and κοινωνία πολιτείας or πολιτεία its predicate, "and fellowship (of the citizens) is fellowship in a constitution" or "consists in a constitution." SUSEM.

§ 8 7 εἶδος ἕτερον τῆς συνθέσεως] "if the kind of combination be different," i.e. if the elements be differently combined.

8 ἀρμονίαν] See Exc. IV on B. v (VIII). SUSEM. (465)

In these two modes the notes (φθόγγοι) are the same: but the Dorian mode is from E to c, and b natural is μέση or key-note; while the Phrygian mode is from D to d and a is μέση. Comp. Dio Chrysost. II. p. 21 ἀρμονία Δῶριος καὶ

Φρύγιος ἄλλη καὶ Λύδιος.

§ 9 9 εἰ δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον] "On these principles then it is plain that we must affirm the identity of the city by a reference to its constitution." It would be unjust to Aristotle to apply to this conclusion\* in its literal sense his assertion 6 § 1 n. (523), 7 § 2 (535), 13 § 5 (592), that the constitution is nothing but the form of government, πολιτεῖα, κύριον. For the truth is that, like Plato, he includes under πολιτεία all which goes to condition the form of government as well as all that is directly conditioned by it. Thus, as Zeller II ii p. 551 rightly observes, he includes 'even the main features of the commonwealth which find expression in the spirit of the state administration and in the mode in which the end of the state is conceived': see IV (VII). 8 § 5 n. (800), 8 § 3 (806). Thus his notion of a polity or πολιτεία is not narrower but wider than our notion of a constitution. For when we speak with scientific precision the term 'constitution' usually denotes only the particular form which the political organism assumes, or the sum total of the rules regulating the distribution of political functions:—although no doubt, as a matter of fact, the text of a modern constitution does

\* Oncken (II. 121—130) ascribes to him, as his real view, almost the exact opposite of this conclusion.



10 τον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐ- (I)  
τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν (p. 63)  
ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν ἐξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν  
καὶ πάνπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ  
διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν πολιτείαν μεταβάλλῃ ἢ πόλιν, λό-  
15 γος ἕτερος.

4 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι II

14 μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν II<sup>2</sup> Bk, μεταβάλλῃ II<sup>3</sup> Bk.

not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see V(VIII). 1 § 1 f. n. (973), VIII(V). 9 § 11 (1641). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, VI(IV). 5 § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from IV(VII). c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (190).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see nn. 82, 296, 339) left too much out of sight, nay utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildenbrand p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people: and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous:—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isocr. VII § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. SUSEM.(466)

13 εἰ δὲ δίκαιον...λόγος ἕτερος] 'But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repudiate our obligations (§ 2) when

the state changes to another constitution is a different question.' The point is not resumed in the sequel.

"This shows at once the defectiveness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of repudiation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question." SUSEM. (467)

cc. 4, 5 *Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen?* See *Anal.* p. 109, and *Thurot Etudes* pp. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the *Republic*, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. VIII, IX. Aristotle admits it in some cases (4 § 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (6 § 1), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers which he enjoys. This is in accord with *N. E.* v. 2. 11: οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί, on which see Jackson's *note* which disposes of Grant's strange view that the author of the 'Eudemian' Book v used, with essential discrepancies, the present chapter and other sections of the *Politics*.

16 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων...18 μὴ τὴν αὐτήν] Schlosser's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to

πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπου- (11)  
δαίου θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε τοῦτο τυ-  
χεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον λη-  
20 πτέον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστίν,  
§ 2 οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτῆρων καίπερ ἀνο-  
μοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὃ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὃ δὲ  
κυβερνήτης, ὃ δὲ πρῶρεὺς, ὃ δ' ἄλλην τινὰ ἔχων τοιαύτην  
ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκάστου λόγος  
25 ἴδιος ἐσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμό-  
σει πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν  
§ 3 πάντων· τούτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτῆρων. ὁμοίως 2  
τοῖνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτη-  
ρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία.  
30 διόπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πο-  
λιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἶδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ  
ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τε-

17 ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and perhaps Γ || 19 πρῶτον omitted in P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin), πότερον? Spengel needlessly || 20 κοινωνῶν Π<sup>1</sup> || 23 τὴν τοιαύτην fr. || 25 ὁμῶς Vettori || 28 καὶ omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup> || 30 διὰ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

inquire how far, under any constitution, the state can reach this goal touches a fundamental point in constitutional theory of the utmost generality; and constitutions may be classified as (1) better or best, (2) worse or worst, according as they are more or less adapted to this end. The present inquiry accordingly serves as the basis of the classification of constitutions in order of merit which follows in c. 6, and of the entire theory of the separate constitutions. This then, and this alone, is precisely the right place for cc. 4, 5. That they have defects in the execution we are not prepared to deny, since Aristotle must have himself intended materially to recast them subsequently (see n. 471; compare nn. 473, 478): but this intention was never carried out. SUSEM. (468)

One glaring defect in the execution is the frequent violation of the rule forbidding the hiatus, which is fairly well observed in the rest of B. III. There are 40 bad cases in c. 4 alone out of a total of 90 odd for the whole of the book.

19 τύπῳ τινὶ] in outline. A frequent expression: IV(VII). 16. 12, V(VIII). 7. 2, VII(VI). 8. 24, VIII(V). 2. 1: Nic. Eth. 1. § 3, 3 § 4 παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ.

20 The simile of the crew is much

used by Plato: Rep. VI. 488 A ff., Politicus 297 B, E ff.; in the latter passage joined with that of the physician which is perpetually recurring in B. III.

§ 2 22 τὴν δύναμιν is an adverbial accus. See n. on φύσιν I. 12. 2.

23 κυβερνήτης] steersman, or pilot, answers in some respects more to the ship's captain, as he is skilled in navigation (Plato II. cc.) and responsible for the course of the vessel. Whereas the ναύκληρος or skipper, usually the owner of the ship, although nominally in command, need not be a practical seaman.

§ 3 27 ὁμοίως τοῖνυν κτλ.] Some of the citizens take part in the administration of the state merely as members of the popular assembly, others merely as judges in the law courts or members of the council; others again in a higher degree by filling various official posts. (Schlosser has strangely mistaken the sense: he thinks that the skill of the captain, helmsman, helmsman's assistant in the simile answers to the excellence of the man; and the performance of a successful voyage to civic excellence.) SUSEM. (469)

28 ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοιν.] the maintenance of the (political) union.

30 πρὸς] relative to. Congreve compares I. 13 § 15.



λείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι (II)  
 § 4 τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον  
 35 μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, φανερόν·  
 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαπορούντας ἐπελ- 3  
 § 5 θεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ

33 τὸν δ'.....34 τελείαν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>3-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. and P<sup>2-4</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>3</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, and there τὴν is also above the line) || μίαν omitted by Albert Ar. (?) Bk. (who writes κατ') || εἶναι κατὰ Γ Bk. || 34 τὴν omitted by Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup>), for P<sup>4</sup> see above || 36 ἀλλὰ omitted in fr. II<sup>1</sup> (added by p<sup>1</sup>) || 37 παρὰ? Susem., <κατὰ τὸν> περὶ Schmidt

33 τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα] Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtue and fitness of the man (ἀνὴρ) rather than of the human being, because he regards the ἀρετὴ of the woman as inferior and belonging to a separate species: see 4 §§ 15—18 nn. (491, 495): I. 13 §§ 9—11, nn. (114 b, 117, 119). SUSEM. (470)

§ 4 36 ἐπελθεῖν τι οἱ περὶ τινος are separately found: while VII(V). 10. 1 ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας ἐξ ὧν φθελ-  
 ρεται is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with διαπορούντας; "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state." "But the sense seems to require that ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον should mean here 'to arrive at the same result'; and if so, παρὰ might be necessary = 'starting from the best constitution' or 'from the point of view of the best constitution'." SUSEM.

§ 5 37 εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον] "For if it be impossible that a state should contain none but virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike." But how does this agree with the passages quoted in n. (133) on II. 2. 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurot p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18 § 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4—6 § 1: see n. (684) on 18 § 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this present stage of the discussion, 4 § 5, the arguments *pro* and *con* had not all been weighed dialectically and the final correction, to which c. 18 § 1 refers us back,

may have fallen out either at the end of c. 4\* or in the lacuna at c. 13 § 6 (see *Introd.* p. 43 ff. n. 599). But at c. 6† § 1 the statement here made is expressly set down as a part of the final result, while 13 § 6 is too near to 18 § 1 to be meant by the words ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. Should we then rather believe that Aristotle's genuine discussion is wholly or for the most part lost and that cc. 4, 5, which replace it, are wholly or in part a spurious interpolation? Sober inquiry will not easily be reconciled to such a desperate and violent step, although there is certainly much besides that points in this direction: see § 6 n. (473), § 8 (478), § 16 (491), § 17 (496); 5 § 1 (501). But then the only possible alternative is to assume that when Aristotle wrote this he was not yet clear about his model state, and that when making the reference in 18 § 1 he had in view not the part at present executed but a revised version which he intended to make subsequently but never actually completed. For 18 § 1 is in agreement with his repeated declaration subsequently IV(VII). 9 § 3, 13 §§ 9, 10, 14 § 8: VI(IV). 7. 2 (nn. 684, 808 and *Introd.* p. 51), that in fact the best polity is that in which the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man, and the citizens are not merely virtuous when judged by the standard of their polity, but absolutely virtuous and excellent men: and this alone is reasoned out logically (see n. 468). This of course does not at all affect the proposition that in the best state, as elsewhere, the citizens are not

\* Not directly after 4 § 5, as Thurot thinks, for the rest of chapter 4 from § 7 to the end would not agree with that supposition. Then it is presupposed that hitherto the two sorts of excellence have been declared to be not absolutely the same even in the ideal state.

† As suggested by Susemihl in *Compos. der arist. Pol.* p. 24 f. n. (24).

ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δ' ἕκα- (II)  
 39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, ἐπει-  
 40 δὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, <δεῖ δ' ἕκα-  
 39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς> οὐκ ἂν  
 1277 a εἴη ἀρετὴ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ  
 σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγα- (p. 64)  
 4 θοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς  
 § 6 ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. [ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἢ πό- 4  
 λης, ὥσπερ ζῶον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῇ ἐκ  
 λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ  
 κτήσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πό-  
 9 λης ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων

38 δυνατὸν Bernays || δεῖ δ'.....39 ἀρετῆς transposed to follow 40  
 πολίτας Thurot || 40 ἐπειδὴ δὲ P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπεὶ δὲ II<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar., ἐπεὶ δ' Bk. Bernays, ἐπεὶ  
 Spengel || ὁμοίως P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 39 αὐτὸν II<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτὸν Γ, αὐτον fr.

1277 a 1 μία ἀρετὴ II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || πολίτου <τε σπουδαίου> Schmidt || 3 πολιτείας  
 P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), perhaps right: γρ. πόλιν corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup> || 4 <ἀνδρας>  
 ἀγαθοὺς? Susem., ὁμοίους Bernays, perhaps right || 5 πολίται \* \* Thurot; but see  
 Comm. n. (471) and (471 \*) || [ἔτι ἐπεὶ..... 12 παραστάτων] Susem.; see Comm. n.  
 (473). Thurot suspected the § || 8 [κτῆσις] Bernays, [κτῆσις ἐκ] Welldon

all equally virtuous men, but it does affect the much more illogical inference that the inferior citizens of the best state have only civic virtue. On the contrary here the degree of civic excellence also must be regulated by that of individual excellence, and the special nature of the one by the special nature of the other: and one consequence of this is that which Aristotle in complete accordance with the facts lays down as a criterion of the best state, viz. that in its administration each is employed according to his special faculties and capacities and assigned to his right place. It may thence be inferred that Aristotle had no intention of permitting all the members of the governing civic body in the pattern state to fill all the various public offices in rotation, but that he assumed that this most virtuous civic body would always elect to particular state offices the fittest and most virtuous of its members. Cp. II § 8 n. (569). Consequently it must be allowed that the officers of state in the perfect city do not represent the union of the virtue of the citizen and of the man, as is here stated, but rather that they represent the highest and most perfect degree of this union: and so far from

being erroneous it is quite correct to say that Aristotle includes in this polity those who are not yet elected but are still eligible to such a position. Only they do not actually attain a complete confirmation of this highest individual virtue (which is at the same time the highest civic virtue) until they are elected to office: cp. further n. (521) on III. 5. 10. Nor should we forget that at IV(VII). 14. 8 n. (903) Aristotle makes only the virtue of the ruler (πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἀρχοντος) equivalent to the virtue of the man: in the best state the rulers are primarily the popular assembly composed of the elder citizens, but in a still higher degree the men selected out of it who are elected to offices of state. SUSEM. (471)

40 ὁμοίους] See n. on II. 2. 3, 1261 a 24.

§ 6 1277 a 6 εὐθὺς = for instance, like αὐτίκα. The first instance that comes to hand.

7 ὀρέξεως] Appetite, or impulse; here put for the irrational part of the soul in general (Eaton). See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (472)

9 ἐξ ἀπάντων τε...εἰδῶν] But these constituents are not all citizens in the sense of the definition given c. I § 2, and yet this alone is material here (Thurot).



10 συνέστηκεν εἰδὼν· ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν (II)  
 πάντων ἀρετὴν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ  
 § 7 παραστάτου.] διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ, φανερόν δ'  
 ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε  
 σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν  
 15 σπουδαῖον εἶναι \* \* ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν  
 § 8 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθύς ἐτέραν εἶ-  
 ναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων  
 υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ  
 μὴ μοι τὰ κομψά....,  
 ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει δεῖ,

§ 9 ὥς οὐσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρ-  
 21 χοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἔστι καὶ  
 ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη ἀπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός,  
 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου,

12 λαυστάτου? Schmidt || ἀπλῶς omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 15 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.  
 || <ἀνδρα> ἀγαθὸν Bücheler, which I accept || τὸν τε Susem. || πολιτικὸν  
 πολίτην οὐκ Congreve, followed by Bernays || 17 τοῦ added before ἄρχοντος by  
 Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 18 πολεμικὴν] πολιτικὴν Götting || 19 κομψά..... Spengel, κόμψ' Π<sup>2</sup> fr.  
 Bk. || 20 δὲ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., εἰ δε αὐτὴ fr. || ἀρετῇ omitted in Π<sup>1</sup> || 22 ἀπλῶς ἂν εἴη  
 Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 23 τοῦ δυναμένου ἄρχειν μόνου inserted after μέντοι by Γ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand, but μόνου is added by corr.<sup>1</sup>, and the whole erased by P<sup>1</sup> in the margin),  
 γρ. τοῦ δυναμένου ἄρχειν μόνου P<sup>4</sup> in the margin. Evidently a gloss

In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in *n.* (501) on III. 5. 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of II. 2. 3: comp. *n.* (133). SUSEM. (473)

§ 7 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς κτλ.] "Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?"

15 ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον] As distinguished from φρόνιμος, ἀγαθός refers to moral virtue (cp. *n.* 40). Just in the same way at II § 2 we have ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως in combination; where ἀρετὴ is 'virtue' simply, *i. e.* moral virtue. Cp. *n.* (565) and *n.* (703) on IV(VII). 1. 10. On the relation of φρόνησις (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see *nn.* (45, 112, 115). Further comp. III. 4 § 18 with *nn.* (493, 497, 498). SUSEM. (474)

16 φρόνιμον] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 5. 5, διὰ τοῦτο Περικλῆα καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν,

εἶναι δὲ τοιοῦτους ἡγοῦμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς: *ib.* VI. c. 8, which treats fully of φρόνησις or Practical Wisdom: Plato *Politic.* 292 D, 294 A ἀνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν (Eaton). SUSEM. (475)

§ 8 17 λέγουσί τινες] Whether these were authors, is doubtful. SUSEM. (476) Mr Wyse finds the reference in Ps.-Plato *First Alc.* 121 D ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.

18 Εὐριπίδης] In the *Aeolus*, *Frag.* 16 Nauck. Further comp. IV(VII). 14. 1, *n.* (891). SUSEM. (477)

19 τὰ κομψά sc. ποικίλοι γενότατο] let them not become versatile in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ κτλ.] Far more just is Aristotle's admission VIII(V). 9. 1 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned in such and such a way, ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (Thurot). Cp. *n.* (1630). SUSEM. (478)

23 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου] 'but in a

24 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὥς (11)  
 § 10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε τὸ  
 δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἢ ἀρετῇ  
 εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν  
 τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πο-  
 § 11 λίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν  
 30 ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε τὸν ἄρχοντα μαν-  
 θάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφοτέρω ἐπί-

24 ἴσως omitted in Π<sup>1</sup> (added by the corrector of P<sup>1</sup>), [ἴσως] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || τυραννεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 26 δοκίμου ἢ δοκεῖ ἢ Giphanius, δοκεῖ μὲν ἢ Zwinger, δοκεῖ που ἢ Welldon following Jackson, δοκεῖ αὕτη Rassow (cp. § 15, 1277 b 15), δοκεῖ δοκίμου ἢ Bernays. On this whole paragraph cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 387 f. || 27 οὖν] δέ? Susem. || 29 ἐπεὶ] ἔως Schlosser, ὅτι Koraes, εἰ μὲν Rassow, εἰ? Susem. Yet ἐπεὶ may be right, if the lacuna after 32 ἀμφοῖν is much larger than the mere loss of τοῦτο νῦν σκοπώμεν or something equivalent; or if Welldon's conjecture below is right || 30 ποτέ δοκεῖ κτλ] apparently corrupt, Bernays translates as if he read ποτέ μὲν δοκεῖ.....31 ποτέ δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ; ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ? Susem.<sup>2</sup> doubtfully; <ποτέ> οὐ ταῦτ' Welldon, much more probably, if 29 ἐπεὶ is right || ἀμφοτέρω] ἕτερα Koraes, ἄμφω ἕτερα Bernays, highly probable || καὶ] καὶ Schlosser || [οὐ] Rassow, [καὶ] Spengel: if so, τὸν τε in place of τὸν δέ || 31 ἀμφοτέρω P<sup>1</sup>.<sup>3,4</sup>, ἀμφοτέρον Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

specific citizen.' The gloss fairly gives the sense.

24 Ἰάσων] The famous tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, who attempted to carry out a policy in Greece similar to that afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon. He came to the throne before B.C. 378 and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius *Hist.* iv. pp. 443—451 E. tr., and Krafft's Art. 'Jason of Pherae' in Pauly's *Realencyclopädie*. Götting recalls another saying of his cited by Aristotle *Rhet.* i. 12. 31, 1373 a 25, that he must do some wrong in order to have the power to do much right. SUSEM. (479)

ἔφη] Not φησί, as it would be, if the quotation came from a tragedy.

πεινῆν...ἰδιώτης εἶναι] "he must starve if he were not on the throne, implying that he had never learnt the trade of being a subject." Eaton compares the saying of Astyages to Harpagos, and of Demaratos to Leotychides Herod. i. 129, vi. 67 and what is related of Theras *ib.* iv. 147: and Aeschyl. *Prom.* 926; but in all these cases the point is essentially different. SUSEM. (480) Even Grote is caught napping here, for he represents Jason as saying that he felt hunger until he became despot (III. p. 36 n.).

§ 10 25 ἀλλὰ μὴν...27 καλῶς] Eaton compares Pl. *Laus* i. 643 E: τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδεύαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. SUSEM. (481)

27 εἰ οὖν...29 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως] "If then we lay down that the excellence of a good man is that of rule, while the excellence of a citizen is that of both," ruling and being ruled, "they cannot both be equally praiseworthy." It is the virtue of the good man which alone is one and perfect, § 3 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα φασὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. Of civic virtue this is true *only in so far as* it denotes the excellence of rule (here declared to be the excellence of the citizen), but not in so far as it is the excellence displayed in due obedience. This latter then is a subordinate excellence. SUSEM. (482)

§ 11 Welldon, reading 29 ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ <ποτε> οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε κτλ., translates "Since then it seems that there are some cases where ruler and subject ought to learn both (rule and subjection) and other cases where they ought [each] to learn only one." But this strains οὐ ταῦτ' = *not* both the same.



στασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, \* \* κἀντεῦθεν ἂν κατῖδοι τίς. (II)  
 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα 8  
 34 λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, (p. 65)  
 § 12 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. λέγω  
 δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινικὰς  
 πράξεις. δούλου δὲ εἶδη πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι  
 πλείους. ὧν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνήτες· οὗτοι δ'  
 εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τὸννομα αὐτοῦς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ  
 1277 b τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναντος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ'  
 ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν  
 § 13 δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχο- 9  
 μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἀγαθόν] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ  
 5 τὸν πολίτην [τὸν ἀγαθόν] μαυθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε χρείας χάριν  
 αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοτὲ μὲν

32 κατένθεν M<sup>a</sup>, τοῖντεῦθεν II<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar. Bk. Bernays—evidently a mistaken conjecture for κἀντεῦθεν obliterating the clear traces left of a lacuna; ἐντεῦθεν Koraes Rassow || 33 [ἔστι..... 1277 b 8 ἐλευθέρων] Congreve || 34 λέγομεν d Lambin, λεγόμενα Γ II Ar. || 38 χερνήται p<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) || 39 αὐτὸς P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by a later hand), αὐτῶν or αὐτὸ Montecatino

1277 b 4 ἀγαθόν] ἄρχοντα Rassow, [τὸν ἀγαθόν] Susem.<sup>4</sup>, [ἀγαθόν οὐδὲ τὸν] Susem.<sup>3</sup>, οὔτε πολιτικὸν οὔτε πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθόν Spengel, [οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθόν] Thurot || 5 [τὸν ἀγαθόν] Welldon Susem.<sup>4</sup> || 6 γὰρ ἔτι] γὰρ τοι Riese || τοτὲ ..... 7 τοτὲ Riese, τὸν..... τὸν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>, cp. the variants IV(VII). 14 § 5 1332 b 37, τῶν..... τῶν Lindau, wrongly

32 \* \* κἀντεῦθεν κτλ] Quite apart from the distinct possibility of a longer omission, we may eke out the sense as follows: "but the citizen's knowledge and experience of both <is now the question before us, > and may be understood from what follows." SUSEM. (483)

33 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική] Not 'despotic' rule, which would mean in English rule over a state. "For there is a rule of master over slave and this we say is concerned with the drudgery which the ruler need not necessarily know how to perform, but rather to employ: the former would even be degrading. I mean by the former the ability actually (καὶ=even) to serve in domestic functions."

τὰ ἀναγκαῖα] More clearly expressed II. 6 § 5, τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα: cp. I. 7 § 3.

35 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον] Cp. I. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8 § 2 *nn.* (63, 68): also Xen. *Oecon.* c. 12. SUSEM. (484)

Plato *Politic.* 259 c ὡς βασιλεὺς ἅπας χερσὶ καὶ ξύμπαντι τῷ σώματι σμικρὰ ἅπτα

εἰς τὸ κατέχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ βώμην.

θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδ.] The other (the former) would inspire the servile spirit mentioned in *n.* (43) on I. 5. 8. See III. 5 §§ 2, 3. SUSEM. (485)

§ 12 38 ὧν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνήτες] Cp. I. 13 §§ 12, 13 with *nn.* (103, 122) and III. 5 § 4 with *n.* (507). SUSEM. (486)

1277 b 2 τὸ παλαιόν] An adverbial accus. of time, as τὸ ἀρχαῖον I. 2 § 7. This was the state of things at Athens under Solon's constitution.

3 δῆμον τὸν ἔσχατον] The most advanced democracy which by gradual development was usually the final outcome of the more moderate democracy: see II. 12. 3 *n.* (406) and the passages cited in *nn.* (400, 406). SUSEM. (487)

§ 13 5 εἰ μὴ ποτε χρείας κτλ] "except in certain cases for his private use." Comp. IV(VII). 14. 7 with *nn.* (900, 901) and V(VIII). 2. 6 with *n.* (983). SUSEM. (488)

6 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι] for (if he learns them

δεσπότην τοτὲ δὲ δοῦλον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει (II)  
 § 14 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέ-  
 γομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρ-  
 10 χόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἵππαρχεῖν ἵππαρχηθέντα, στρατη-  
 γεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα.  
 διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ  
 § 15 ἀρχθέντα. τοιούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην 10  
 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχε-  
 15 σθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρ-  
 § 16 χὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἀμφο.

7 <καί> τις? Susem. || 10 καὶ before στρατηγεῖν Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, misled by the ver-  
 sions of William and Ar. || 12 διὸ <καί> P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk.

for his private use) the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies.

8 ὁμοίων τῷ γένει = his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή is in accord with the soundest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 14 10 ἵππαρχεῖν κτλ] In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten τάξεις, one from each φυλή (see n. 451), and perhaps themselves called φυλαί. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a ταξιαρχος. Each such τάξις was divided into λόχοι or companies, as we should call them, and their commanders were called λοχαγοί. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἵππαρχοι, and under them were ten φύλαρχοι, one for each tribe. The generals, στρατηγοί, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten τάξεις; but between 460 and 455 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive politico-military officers. Evidently it was at the same time that the ταξιαρχοί were created, to assume what had been earlier the functions of the στρατηγοί: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them; or one might carry on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Schömann *Antiquities* p. 420 f., 422, 424 f.,

J. G. Droysen *Observations on the Athenian στρατηγοί* in *Hermes* ix. 1874. pp. 1—21, v. Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* pp. 57—67, and vii(vi). 8. 15 n. (1473). SUSEM. (489)

12 λέγεται κτλ] Comp. iv(vii). 14. 6 f. n. (898) ff. This saying is attributed to Solon by Apollodorus in Diog. Laert. i. 60, Stob. *Flor.* xlvii. 22 (Eaton), but hardly on good evidence. SUSEM. (490)

§ 16 16 καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ κτλ] Both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thurot objects, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end: only here, according to Aristotle's view, the virtue of the citizen who is governed is as such in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself in the course of his exposition: but the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own real opinion (see n. 120) represents the specific difference between the lower virtue of the woman and the higher virtue of the man, i. 13 §§ 7, 9, 10, *nn.* (114 b, 117, 119) so as to imply that the former is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. n. (470). SUSEM. (491)



καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς (II)  
καὶ [γὰρ] ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ, δηλον ὅτι οὐ μί-  
ᾶν εἴη τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῆ, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶδη  
20 ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυ-  
§ 17 ναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι  
δειλὸς ἀνὴρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρείος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία,  
καὶ γυνὴ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγα-  
θός, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς· τοῦ  
25 μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν). ἡ δὲ φρό- 11  
νησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετῆ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν

18 [γὰρ] Göttling, τῆς? Susem., γὰρ <ἄρχοντος καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Göttling, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἀμφω and a colon after 17 ἀρχικῆς || 19 τοῦ ἡθους Susem., τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Γ (before δηλον ὅτι) II Ar. Bk., καὶ ἄρχοντος Rassow || 20 ὡς γὰρ Π<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλως ὥσπερ P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 23 ἀκόλαστος Susem., Trieber independently, apparently also Ar. *inhonestia*: see Bonitz *Zeitsch. f. Gymnasialw.* XXVI. 1872. 893—895, Susem. and Bonitz *ib.* XXVII. 1873. 797; ἄλαλος P<sup>4</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> (in the text), ἄλαος Π<sup>1</sup> Bk., ἄλλος P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, ἄλλως Ald. Schmidt saw that the text was corrupt, and what sense the context required: see Comm. and Susemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 389

17 σωφροσύνης] See n. (206 b) on II. 6. 9. SUSEM. (492)

19 τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῆ] Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on I. 5 § 6 n. (40), § 9 (45<sup>1</sup>), 13 § 6 (112), § 18 (115): III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). SUSEM. (493)

εἶδη ἔχουσα κτλ.] "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). SUSEM. (494)

The adoption of Bernays' suggestions would slightly modify the translation of § 16: "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling <and in being ruled>. For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the free-man who is subject to rule (καὶ γὰρ <ἄρχοντος καὶ> ἀρχομένου), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antisthenes maintained the contrary: that the virtue of both is identical.

§ 17 21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφρόνως II. 6 §§ 8, 9. So also 23 κοσμία 'orderly' = parsimonious, frugal, and ἀκόλαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant.

23 οὕτω κοσμία] "only just as frugal." It follows that the difference of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on I. 13. 7 n. 114 b, III. 4. 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed, or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. SUSEM. (495)

24 οἰκονομία ἑτέρα] It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. I. cc. 8—10: see Exc. III. to B. I. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. *Mem.* II. 7. 12—14, *Oecon.* 7" (Eaton). SUSEM. (496)

25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις] By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing: that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See I. 5. 9 n. (45), I. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115): III. 4. 7 n. (474—5). Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 10. 2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον; also n. (498): VI. 4. 14 n. (1186), and *Rhet.* I. 11. 27, 1371 b 27, ἀρχικὸν τὸ φρονεῖν. Further references are § 8 of this chapter and IV (VII). 9. 5 n. (810). SUSEM. (497)

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν (11)  
 § 18 ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, (p. 6)  
 ἀλλὰ δοξα ἀληθὴς· ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ἀρχόμε-  
 30 νος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητής ὁ χρώμειος. πότερον μὲν οὖν  
 ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ  
 ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερόν ἐκ τού-  
 5 των· περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεται τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. III  
 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ὃ κοινωνεῖν ἔξ-  
 35 εστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν  
 οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆν, οὐχ οἷον  
 τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν (οὗτος γὰρ πο-  
 λίτης)· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θε-

29 αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 37 οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης  
 untranslated by Ar., suspected by Schneider; οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης· <ἀγαθὸς ὁ δυνάμε-  
 νος ἄρχειν> or something equivalent Thurot

§ 18 29 δόξα ἀληθής] 'Right opi-  
 nion' here denotes more precisely the  
 capacity of rightly apprehending the  
 order given in order to execute it aright,  
 for which the person who executes it is  
 often obliged to discover the ways and  
 means either wholly or in part for him-  
 self. 'Right opinion' of this sort does  
 not by any means correspond, as Eaton  
 thinks, with that to which Plato applies  
 the term, simply because the φρόνησις to  
 which Plato often opposes it (as in *Laws*  
 1. 632 c) coincides with philosophic know-  
 ledge. Hence Plato would not concede  
 to right opinion, as Aristotle does *Nic.*  
*Eth.* vi. 10. 3, that σύνεσις consists in the  
 right application of opinion so as to judge  
 upon the report of another a matter com-  
 ing within the sphere of prudence, ἐν τῷ  
 χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων  
 περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος.  
 Comp. the last note. See further 1. 13.  
 8 n. (115). SUSEM. (498)

αὐλοποιός] This comparison is taken  
 from Plato *Rep.* x. 651 D. Cp. 11 § 14 n.  
 (574). SUSEM. (499)

c. 5 § 1 33 περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην  
 κτλ.] 'It is an erroneous assumption to  
 think, as Thurot and others do, that this  
 is an altogether different question from  
 the one discussed in the last chapter.  
 These opening words at once prove that  
 Aristotle looks upon the discussion of  
 c. 5 as most closely connected with the  
 chapter preceding. There it was decided  
 that the virtue of the citizen in republican  
 states consists in his being qualified both

to rule and to be ruled: but in fact a re-  
 striction was needed in those cases where  
 full participation in civic rights is granted  
 to the lowest classes of the people, who  
 live by manual labour, the mechanics and  
 day-labourers. Aristotle's theory is that  
 owing partly to their want of leisure,  
 partly to their degrading occupation, they  
 cannot raise themselves to a higher life  
 of virtue: and that therefore they are just  
 as unqualified to rule as they are unable  
 to claim, in the full sense of the words  
 the title of ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, virtuous and  
 capable men. To append this restriction  
 is the main object of c. 5, and goes more  
 diffusely into details, §§ 4—7, respecting  
 the position of this class" (Rassow *Bemer-  
 kungen* p. 10 f.). SUSEM. (500)

34 ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ] 'whether he *only*  
 is really a citizen who has the right to  
 share in office or whether the working  
 men also ought to rank as citizens': as  
 was indeed the case at Athens.

πότερον πολίτης] It is true that Aristot-  
 le ought not to have raised the question  
 in this form after deducing the definition  
 of the citizen given in 1 § 2 ff.: comp. 4  
 § 6 n. (473). But in the following dis-  
 cussion he has taken care that no material  
 disadvantage results from this formal de-  
 fect. SUSEM. (501)

36 οἷον τε sc. ἐστίν.

37 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν] τὴν πολι-  
 τικὴν, including τὴν ἀρχικὴν, to command  
 as well as to obey.

οὗτος = ὁ βαναύσος: here would be an in-  
 stance of a citizen not qualified to govern.



§ 2 τέος ἕκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἡ διὰ γε τοῦτον (III)  
 1278a τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ  
 δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι. τοῦτο 2  
 γὰρ ἀληθές, ὥς οὐ πάντα θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη  
 πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ὡσανύτως πολῖται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ'  
 5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολῖται μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν,  
 § 3 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις  
 ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάνουσον ἢ ξενικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦ-  
 τοι καὶ νῦν ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάνουσον πολί-  
 την. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἦν εἵπομεν  
 10 λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδ' ἐλευθέρου μόνου, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔρ-  
 § 4 γων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν 3

39 οὔτε.....οὔτε Spengel

1278 a 5 ἐκ προσθέσεως Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, ἐκ προσθέσεως Casaubon || 9  
 πολίτην \* \* Oncken, wrongly || 11 δ' [ἀναγκαίων] Susem.<sup>3</sup>, δὲ μὴ ἀφειμένων?  
 Congreve, δ' αὐτουργῶν Schmidt, δὲ <μὴ ἀφειμένων τῶν> ἀναγκαίων or simply  
 δὲ <μὴ>? Susem., δ' ἄλλων Bernays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended  
 (τῶν ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate)

39 ἕκαστος] each native artizan.  
 "What are we to call him if we exclude him from the franchise? Even then he need not be classed as a resident-alien or a foreigner," in so far as he may still retain the right to speak and vote in the assembly, and to sit in the dicasteries, as under Solon's constitution: see II. 12 § 2, § 5; III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (502)  
 § 2 This question may however be said to involve no difficulty; for neither slaves nor freedmen come under the above mentioned classes (of aliens and foreigners). The indispensable elements of a state (ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) need not be all citizens.

1278 a 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ κτλ] This reason is not altogether satisfactory. The slaves cannot come into the question: while the freedmen were regarded (and with good reason) as a special class of the resident aliens: see Schömann p. 351 of Eng. tr. And so Aristotle himself considers them, if the reading is correct, c. 2 § 3. "But in the strict sense of the term, in accordance with its etymology μέτοικος denotes only a permanent resident in a town of which he is not a citizen, though he is a citizen somewhere else [cp. Eur. *Hel.* 891]: and this condition is not fulfilled in the case of the freedmen" (Dittenberger). SUSEM. (503)

2 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, κτλ] "For this is quite true that not all who are indis-

pensable to the city ought to be classed as citizens." A very important point for our view of Aristotle's ideal state: see IV (VII). 8 § 1 ff. n. (795). SUSEM. (504)

4 ὡσανύτως καὶ] equally with. See on II. 8. 21 ὁμοίως καὶ.

5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς] the one, viz. adults, are citizens in an unrestricted sense; the others, viz. children, only in a qualified sense; i.e. on the supposition that they grow up.

6 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς] "but under age." See c. 1 § 4 n. (437 b). SUSEM. (505)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some places were slaves or foreigners. But see Herod. II. 167, where contempt for handicrafts is said to be common to Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians, and to have been 'learnt' from them by the Greeks.

8 ἡ δὲ βελτίστη κτλ] Comp. IV (VII). 9 § 3, § 7, n. (809). SUSEM. (506)

9 εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης] "But if the artizan too is a citizen, then the virtue of the citizen, as defined by us, must not be affirmed to belong to every citizen, nor even to the free man as such, but to those only who are released from menial functions" [including free artizans].

§ 4 11 τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν κτλ] Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as neuter (in support of this use see II. 9 § 2 τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν, and I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5): 'in respect of compulsory work

ἐνὶ λειτουργούντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δούλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῇ βάνανσοι (III)  
καὶ θήτες. φανερόν δ' ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς  
14 ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθέν ποιεῖ δῆ-  
§ 5 λον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτεῖαι, καὶ εἶδη πολί-  
του ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου  
πολίτου, ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τινι πολιτεῖα τὸν βάνανσον ἀναγκαῖον  
εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ  
τίς ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ἣ κατ' ἀρετὴν  
20 αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ' ἐπιτηδεύ- (p. 67)  
§ 6 σαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάνανσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν δὲ  
ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ  
τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναν-  
24 σον δὲ ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ [οἱ] πολλοὶ τῶν

12 κοῖνοι II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 φανέν untranslated by Ar., suspected by the author of the erroneous conjecture <ὁ φανερόν> φανέν in the margin of Bas.<sup>3</sup>, and by Schneider. Bernays, "at the first glance": but can it mean this? ἐπάνω? Susem., <ὡς> φαμέν would be less alteration, but hardly right: <τὸ> φανέν or τὸ γὰρ φανέν Schmidt || 24 [οἱ] Schneider

those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers: 'οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζόμενοι of II. 7 § 23.

12 οἱ δὲ κοινῇ Comp. I. 13 § 13: ὁ μὲν δούλος κοινῶνός ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρωτέρων· ὁ γὰρ βάνανσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινα ἔχει δουλείαν, with n. (122); I. II § 6 n. (103), III. 4 § 12 n. (486). SUSEM. (507)

13 θήτες=ἐλεύθεροι διὰ περίαν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ δουλεύοντες Pollux III. 82.

φανερόν δ' ἐντεῦθεν] "In what position the artisans stand becomes clear upon slight reflexion from the following consideration"; viz. that a variety of 'citizens' is implied by c. I § 8.

14 αὐτὸ τὸ λεχθέν] Apparently this is the nom. Those who defend φανέν take it as=ἐὰν φανῇ; "if seen" (i.e. understood) "even our former statement makes (the matter) clear." δῆλον ποιεῖν absolute, as in c. 8 § 6, 1279 b 35; so φανερόν ποιεῖν c. 13 § 9, 1283 b 28. "Yet in both passages a clause with ὅτι follows equivalent to a substantive" (T. L. Heath).

§ 5 15 καὶ εἶδη πολίτου] "There must also be several species of citizens." See c. I §§ 8—II. SUSEM. (508)

18 οἷον εἴ τις ἐστὶν ἣν κτλ] Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate (see n. 440 on

c. I § 10), although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare 4 § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (536), § 4 n. (538): c. 13 § 8 n. (593). SUSEM. (509)

20 οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ'] See again n. (103). SUSEM. (510)

If we grant Aristotle's premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a body, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A. C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that "if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good" Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

§ 6 23 τιμημάτων μακρῶν=high property qualifications. Comp. VI (IV). 4 § 5 μακρὰν οὐσίαν.

§ 7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the government until he had retired ten years from the market-place.



§ 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἄπε- (III)  
 26 σχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ  
 πολιτείαις προσεφέλλεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ  
 ἐκ πολίτιδος ἔν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν, τὸν αὐτὸν 5

25 τὸν] τῶν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 26 ἀρετῆς Γ M\* ||  
 27 προσεφέλλεται καὶ] προσεφέλλει τινὰς? Riese. See my critical edition for other  
 emendations, of which τοὺς ξένους (for τῶν ξένων) P<sup>4</sup> is the oldest

25 ἐν Θήβαις δὲ] Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle commends this regulation VII(VI). 7 § 4, n. (1496), and justly too, as Schlosser long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy: on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would not be 'flooded' with alien or upstart elements. Further compare VIII(V). 3 § 5 n. (1512). But in Aristotle's own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights: nor indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. "In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, *Rhet.* I. 7. 32, 1365 a 19: but his *Politics* nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations *invariably* incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the 'rough labour' of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur)." Such people do not lack the indispensable "leisure" which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (*βαναυσοί*) "at whom the polite world looks askance" (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, *Hellen.* p. 216, very justly remarks that "no honest observer will deny that there is a moral *βαναυσία* which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Aris-

totle himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens" of the best state IV(VII). 14 § 7; cp. V(VIII). 2 § 6 *mm.* (982 a—3). "And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato's, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the *βαναυσος*. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What 'society' thinks of 'persons in trade,' not to speak of the 'lower orders,' no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle's. If he shares our prejudice, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of 'high life' with which *βαναυσία* is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable." SUSEM. (511)

26 τῆς ἀγορᾶς] Hence ἀγοραῖος βίος IV(VII). 9 § 3, δῆμος VI(IV). 3 § 2, ἀγοραῖον πλῆθος 4 §§ 10, 21 (Eaton).

27 προσεφέλλεται] drags in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antisthenes, Iphicrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demosthenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins.

ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος] Whoever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 n. SUSEM. (512)

§ 8 δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ (III)  
 30 μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν γησιῶν πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται  
 πολίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶν-  
 ται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δὲ ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦν-  
 ται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν,  
 § 9 τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν  
 35 οὖν εἶδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλι-  
 στα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν  
 ὥς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετάναστην  
 ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ' ὅπου  
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι-  
 40 κούντων ἐστίν.

31 τοιούτους [διὰ] πρ' Bernays (without parentheses) || 32 ἀποροῦντες Γ M\* ||  
 δὴ Susem.<sup>3</sup>, δ' II (including fr.) Bk., untranslated by William Ar., [δ'] Sylburg  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, γ' ? Susem. || 34 ἀστῶν fr. Perizonius (on Ael. V. H. vi. 10), αὐτῶν  
 Γ and all other mss. || 36—40 The right order given only by corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup>; 36  
 ὥσπερ.....38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν fr. P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and P<sup>4</sup> (corrector), 37 ὥς εἰ.....  
 38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν P<sup>2,3,6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), 38 ὥσπερ.....μετέ-  
 χων after 40 ἐστίν Γ M\* || 38 ἐστιν ὅπου Bernays, omitting ἐστίν before 39 ἀπάτης  
 and after συνοικούντων; not rightly

29 τοὺς νόθους] Under this name  
 were included not only those children  
 whose mother was not a citizen, but also  
 the children of a citizen mother if she  
 were not lawfully married to the father.  
 The latter were always accounted citizens  
 at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle  
 is only thinking of the former. See Schö-  
 mann pp. 356—8 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (513)

§ 8 "But as the admission of such  
 persons to the franchise is due to a dearth  
 of citizens of legitimate birth, as popu-  
 lation increases they gradually pare off  
 from the roll of citizens, first, the children  
 of slave fathers or slave mothers."

33 τοὺς ἐκ δούλου.....δούλης] See  
 preceding notes. SUSEM. (514)

εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] This remark  
 has been rightly adduced to show that at  
 Athens even in those times in which the  
 bastard children of citizen fathers became  
 citizens in their turn (n. 516) the chil-  
 dren of a citizen mother by a father who  
 was not a citizen were not reckoned  
 citizens. The child followed the status  
 of the father in both cases, although the  
 former case was restricted to the periods  
 in question. See Philippi *Contribution  
 to a history of Athenian citizenship* p. 64,  
 Schömann p. 358 Eng. tr. (where the  
 reference in n. 6, incorrectly given, is to  
 the present passage). Compare too 9

§ 13 n. (558) and VII(VI). 4 § 16 n. (1425).  
 SUSEM. (515)

34 τέλος δὲ κτλ] This was done at  
 Athens by a law of Pericles about 460  
 B.C., and by a law of Aristophanes in 403:  
 Schömann p. 357 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (516)

§ 9 36 Ὅμηρος] *Iliad* IX. 648, XVI.  
 59. SUSEM. (517)

37 "Like some *unprivileged* out-  
 lander," i.e. settler from abroad. But in  
 Homer the meaning of ἀτίμητος is probably  
 "without any τιμή" or blood price attached  
 to his life, i.e. one who may be killed with  
 impunity, rather than "without τιμή" in  
 the sense of civic privileges (Jackson).

38 ὥσπερ μέτοικος κτλ] "For he  
 who does not share in the privileges (of  
 citizenship) is no better than an alien  
 settled in the place. But where such a  
 principle is disguised, it is for the purpose  
 of deceiving the joint settlers."

ὅπου...ἐπικεκρυμμένον] i.e. where the  
 poorer citizens and the lower classes of  
 people are nominally eligible (i.e. have  
 not been formally deprived of the right of  
 being elected) to the special offices of  
 state; but precautions are taken by  
 various means to secure that such persons  
 are not easily elected to any of them: cp.  
 VI(IV). 13 §§ 1—4. SUSEM. (518)

39 τῶν συνοικούντων] Ridgeway pro-  
 poses to take this in a narrower sense as



§ 10  
1278 b

πότερον μὲν οὖν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν <ἀρετὴν> θετέον, καθ' ἣν (III)  
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν  
εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἕτερος,  
κάκεινός δ' οὐ πᾶς ἄλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνά-  
μενος εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν  
6 κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισταί, τὸ μετὰ IV  
ταῦτα σκεπτέον, πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους,  
καὶ εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐ-  
τῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων

1278 b 1 <ἀρετὴν> Schneider Susem. following Ar., ἑτέραν <ἀρετὴν> Spengel, less probably, θετέον <ἀρετὴν> an unknown scholar in the margin of the Munich Aldine || 2 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (added in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>). [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 3 <πῶς ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, καὶ> ὅτι <βάνανσος καὶ πολίτης>, or something similar, Thurot: see however Comm. n. (500) || 4 κάκεινός P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), κάκεινος Γ M<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> (κάκεινός changed to κάκεινός and ο again written over η) || 5 omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 7..... 5 κύριος omitted in Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>3-4</sup> (1st hand: added in the margin, but in P<sup>3</sup> again erased) || 8 καὶ εἰ Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk., probably right (καὶ εἰ πλείους omitted by M<sup>1</sup>)

'joint settlers of alien blood at the establishment of an ἀποικία': and he quotes in support of this view VIII(V). 3 §§ 11, 12, διὰ ὅσοι ἤδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστασίασαν οἶον... ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρίται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν. It may however be sarcastically used, as Wyse suggests: the σύνοικοι are really μέτοικοι.

§ 10 1278 b 3 ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτός] that is, primarily in the states which in some sort share in the best constitution: secondarily in those which approximate to it in some degree, and the more completely the more they approximate to it. See on c. 4 § 5 n. (471). SUSEM. (519)

τινὸς δ' ἕτερος] The two coincide the least, or not at all, in the worst of the depraved forms of government; viz. (1) the advanced democracy which elevates all mechanics and day-labourers to the citizenship, (2) the most extreme oligarchy which is an even closer approximation to tyranny (δυναστεία), and (3) tyranny itself. In these forms of government there is the slave-master's rule (ἀρχὴ δεσποτική) which in c. 4 § 11 was distinguished from the genuine political rule (Rassow). Compare also c. 6 § 11 below. SUSEM. (520)

4 κάκεινός δ' οὐ πᾶς] "And in the former state, not in every case, but only in the statesman who is supreme over, or qualified to be, either by himself or along with others, supreme over the public administration."

5 ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων] This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an "absolute monarchy" under the pre-eminently best citizen: see cc. 13, 17. SUSEM. (521)

c. 6. Is there one constitution or more than one? And in what do they differ? Compare A. C. Bradley *Hellenica*, pp. 222—230.

§ 1 9 πολιτεία=an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power. "Comp. c. 1 § 1 τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων τάξις τις; VI(IV). 1 § 10 τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενομίηται, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν: 3 § 5 with notes." SUSEM. (522)

Zeller has remarked (n. 466) that 'constitution' is not a term wide enough to express *πολιτεία*, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the 'form' of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3 s. fin.) its identity. "An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one

10 ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ (IV)  
 πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δὲ ἐστὶν  
 § 2 ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς  
 κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοῦναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις·  
 φαμέν δὴ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν  
 15 αὐτὸν δὲ τούτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.  
 ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ 2  
 τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τὴν κοινω-  
 νίαν τῆς ζωῆς.  
 § 3 εἴρηται δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ  
 20 οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν  
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πολιτικόν. διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς  
 παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ ἔλαττον] ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ 3  
 μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει  
 § 4 μέρος ἐκάστω τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ

12 δημοκρατίας P<sup>4</sup>, δημοκρατίας Sylburg, most likely right || 14 δὴ Spengel, δὲ Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 15 δὲ] δὴ? Casaubon wrongly || 16 δὲ Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, corrected by the same hand) Bk. || 17 κατὰ Bernays, καὶ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1-3</sup> in the text || 19 δὴ P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. Bk. || καὶ added after δὲ by P<sup>1</sup> Bk. P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) and, if this may be inferred from Bekker's silence, Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 20 καὶ before ὅτι omitted by Γ Bk. and all editors except Götting and Susem. || 21 ὁ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 22 παρ' περὶ M<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || πολιτείας Γ M<sup>2</sup> fr. || οὐκ ἔλαττον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> fr., in P<sup>1</sup> added by corr.<sup>1</sup> on the margin

constitution may be superior to another" (Bradley).

τῶν ἀρχῶν] This genitive may be paraphrased 'an order regulating the assignment of offices' as the parallel passages just cited sufficiently prove.

11 τὸ πολίτευμα] 'the ruling class' or 'government' of the city. "This Greek word cannot always be uniformly translated, as here and in c. 7 § 2 n. (534); but it denotes that individual man or that body of men, in whose name the state is governed, and hence the sovereign (κύριος). So far as we know Aristotle was the first to introduce the notion or, to be more precise, this correct notion of sovereignty. See also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9 and c. 13 § 5 n. (592)." SUSEM. (523)

πολίτευμα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία] 'the constitution is the ruling class': an emphatic way of stating, in Greek as in English, that the character of the constitution is determined by the holders of sovereign power, who make the form of government what it is. The 'constitution' varies with

the 'government' or governing class.

§ 2 14 φαμέν δὴ κτλ] 'Accordingly we say that in these cases' (a democracy and an oligarchy) 'the constitution is different. And we shall apply this same principle to all other cases.'

16 ὑποθετέον δὴ] We must therefore determine, as our fundamental principle in this investigation, the end for which the city is formed and the various ways of governing man in common life.

"See n. (530) on § 7." SUSEM. (524)

§ 3 19 κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους] In Book I. c. 2 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (525)

For the prepos. = 'in' cp. c. 18 § 1, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (Postgate).

23 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστω] 'to the extent to which each man is concerned in noble life.' μέρος nom. to ἐπιβάλλει, which is not used impersonally but as in Π. 6 § 22, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ ἡ σκέψις, and I. 13 § 13 (where however see note).

24 τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς] See n. (21) on I. 6 § 8. SUSEM. (526)



25 κοιῇ πᾶσι καὶ χωρὶς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ (IV)  
καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἴσως γὰρ ἕνεστί τι τοῦ  
καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς  
§ 5 κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολ-  
λὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν,  
30 ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥά- 4  
διον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διο-  
§ 6 ριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία,  
καίπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ  
35 φύσει δεσπότῃ ταυτοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει πρὸς  
τὸ τοῦ δεσπότη συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἥττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ  
δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου  
§ 7 τοῦ δούλου σφῆζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν)· ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ 5  
γυναικὸς [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης], ἣν δὲ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν,

25 *χωρὶς* <ἐκάστω> Spengel || 26 *καὶ συνέχουσι.....κοινωνίαν* follow 27 *μόριον* in P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Bernays and P<sup>1</sup> (corrector) the order of the text in P<sup>1</sup> fr. || 28 *ὑπερβάλλει* P<sup>1-4</sup>, *ὑπερβάλλῃ* P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. || δ' γὰρ or γ' or (with only a comma before *δῆλον*) θ'? Susem. || 31 *γε* is added after *ἀρχῆς* by P<sup>2-3</sup> fr., perhaps rightly || *λεγομένους* Susem. || 32 *διωριζόμεθα* Q<sup>b</sup> and perhaps Ar. || 39 [*καὶ...πάσης*] Susem., who also suspects *ἦν...οἰκονομικήν*; see Comm. n. (529)

§ 4 25 *χωρὶς*] to each separate individual.

26 *συνέχουσι τὴν π. κοινωνίαν*] Comp. Plato *Politicus* 301 E f.

*ἴσως γὰρ ἕνεστί τι κτλ*] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 9. 9, 1170 a 25, *εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὴ*; X. 4. 10 f. 1175 a 16, *ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὐ ἀρέγονται...πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω. συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται* (Eaton). SUSEM. (527)

27 *κατὰ τὸ ζῆν*] *in life*, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 28 *κατὰ τὸν βίον*.

ἀν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κτλ] The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man's true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

§ 5 31 *τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους*] Bonitz: the usual modes, *Ind. Ar.* 424 b 43: *i.e.* the modes (usually) stated [cp. *κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθῶτων λέγεσθαι*

*Meta.* I. 9 § 11]. But what we require is 'all the possible modes,' and so Bernays 'the modes in question.' This is supported by *τὸ λεγόμενον* I. I § 3, *τὰ λεγόμενα ὄργανα* 4 § 4. The modes of government in question = the modes of governing men. But even so we should rather expect *τῆς λεγομένης ἀρχῆς τοὺς τρόπους*: see *Critical Notes* and *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, p. 271 n. (23). SUSEM.

32 *διελεῖν*] distinguish. Comp. II. 2 § 1 n.

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς]. See Excursus I. to B. IV (VII). SUSEM. (527 b)

*διοριζόμεθα*] not necessarily of accurate distinction.

§ 6 33 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία*] See I. 2. 3 n. (7), I. 6 §§ 9, 10 n. (57) and on the other side I. 4. 5. SUSEM. (528)

35 *ὅμως ἄρχει*] Nevertheless the slave-owner's rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) 'to the interest of the slave.'

36 *οὐδὲν ἥττον* = μάλλον, predominantly.

37 *φθειρομένου* = while the slave is becoming useless, spoilt.

§ 7 39 *καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης*] This

40 ἦτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστὶν ἡ <εἰ> κοινῷ τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, (1V)  
 καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὡς ὀρώμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
 1279 a τέχνας, οἷον ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς  
 δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα  
 τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίος εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-  
 § 8 νῆτης εἰς ἐστὶν αἰὲ τῶν πλωτήρων· ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης (p. 69)  
 5 ἡ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὅταν δὲ  
 τούτων εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει  
 τῆς ὠφελείας, ὃ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὃ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-  
 § 9 νων εἰς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὢν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς  
 ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾗ κατ' ἰσότητά τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ

40 εἴτε for ἦτοι Lindau || <εἰ> Susem., fr. omits ἡ <εἰ> || 41 ὥσπερ II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

1279 a 1 ἰατρικὴν] ἐρετικὴν Lindau || 2 [ἕνα] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> mistaking William's version, εἶναι II<sup>1</sup> omitting 3 εἶναι || 6 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 7 ὠφελείας] ἀσφαλείας Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 8 διὸ.....το ὁμοιότητα probably quite sound: \* \* διὸ Conring, ὥσι.....συνεστηκυῖα Ar. Ramus, τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν Spengel, Schlosser thought πόλις had been dropped, ὁμοιότητα <ἡ πολιτεία> Schneider, but if the word has been lost it would be more likely to drop out after πολιτῶν

addition appears contradictory and un-Aristotelian: for it would include once more the rule of a master over his slaves to which the rule in question is held to be opposed. Nor are the words ἦν δὲ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικὴν free from suspicion, for the rule of the householder again includes a rule over slaves. We must therefore understand οἰκονομικὴν in a narrower and more special sense 'emphatically' (as Congreve says) to mean the rule of the householder over the *free* members of his family as contrasted with his rule over slaves I. 13 §§ 1, 2. But even then it is very doubtful whether οἰκονομικὴ and δεσποτικὴ can be so opposed in Greek; nor is this proved by I. 1. 2. SUSEM. (529)

40 ἦτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν] Comp. τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον N. E. V. 6. 9 and Jackson's n. But in the state this good of the subjects ruled, and common good of rulers and subjects, consists in the 'end' of the state mentioned, or rather recalled to our memory, in §§ 3—5 viz. the highest possible life, εὐ ζῆν. This is the reason why the recapitulation of the facts in §§ 3—5, οἱ πῶτοι λόγοι, had to be prefixed to this passage. SUSEM. (530)

41 καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν...κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δι] essentially...incidentally.

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας] Comp. Pl. *Politicus* 297 E: εἰς δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπαλίω-

μεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν αὐτοὺς βασιλικούς ἀρχοντας...τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν (Eaton): and earlier still, Socrates Xen. *Memorab.* III. 9. 11 (Henkel). See further below c. 15 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 §§ 6—8: IV(vii). 2 § 13 n. (726), 13 § 2 n. (870); and above II. 8. 18 n. (270). SUSEM. (531)

1279 a 2 αὐτῶν] i.e. αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχόντων, cp. n. on I. 6. 6 αὐτοῖς. With this summary justification of δεσποτεία (§§ 6, 7) compare Plato's in *Rep.* IX. 590 D: ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος (ὁ ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχων τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος) ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἀρχῆται οὐνοπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαιμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἀρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἀρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ψέτο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐξωθεν ἐφειστώτος.

§ 8 7 δ μὲν, sc. ὁ κυβερνήτης, πλωτήρ (γίνεται).

§ 9 8 διὸ κτλ] "Hence too with civic offices, when the city is framed upon the equality and similarity of the citizens, their claim is to hold office in turn."

9 ὅταν ᾗ κατ' ἰσότητά...καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα=ὅταν ᾗ ἐξ ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων sc. ἡ πόλις, supplied from πολιτικὰς.

"Although this is the case not only in



- 10 καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιούσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μὲν, (IV)  
 ἢ πέφυκεν, ἀξιούντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα  
 πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκό-  
 § 10 πει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς  
 ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς  
 15 ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνέβαινεν ὑγιαίνειν αἰεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι νοσα-  
 κεροῖς οὖσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς.  
 § 11 φανερόν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον  
 σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ  
 ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων,  
 20 ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ πᾶσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν·

12 τὸ τοῦ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || αὐτοῦ P<sup>1</sup> Ald., αὐτοῦ Γ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2-3-4</sup> || 13 κεινου fr., ἐκείνω  
 Schneider (not necessary), κοινῇ Sylburg, κοινὸν Bojesen (wrongly), [συμφέρ:ν] Bernays  
 || 18 αὗται P<sup>1</sup> apparently, αὗται Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 20 πᾶσαι καὶ Π<sup>3</sup> Bk.

Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Politics, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." SUSEM. (532)

10 πρότερον μὲν κτλ.] "in early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after your interest as you formerly when in office looked after *his*: but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desire to hold it uninterruptedly; one might suppose that though of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would no doubt hunt as eagerly after places."

11 λειτουργεῖν] of the onerous task of the magistrate *e.g.* in old Athens: munus publicum dum gerit, commodum civium inservit cum damno etiam rei familiaris.

τινα and 12 αὐτοῦ] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. 11. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας reechoes the ἢ πέφυκε of the text here) and I. 1 § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of πολιτικός, even if his essential identity with βασιλικός be assumed.

§ 10 15 οἷον εἰ... 16 ἀρχάς] Comp. Isocr. VII. (*Panegyricus*) 24, 25: αἰτιον δ' ἦν τοῦ μὴ περιμαχῆτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅτι μεμαθηκότες ἦσαν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μὴ... ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερόν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστοις ὑπαρχόντων,

εἰ ποτε δεήσειε, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν. οὕτω δ' ἀπέλχοντο σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε χαλεπώτερον ἦν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὐρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἄρχειν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. SUSEM. (532 b)

§ 11 obviously goes with c. 7.

17 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον] This is τὸ δίκαιον and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society: c. 12 § 1.

18 ὀρθαί] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the *Politics* Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks 302 B τίς οὖν δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἡκιστα χαλεπὴ σύζη, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη; Comp. τὴν ὀρθὴν (*i.e.* the ideal state) χωρὶς ἀποκρίναντες τοῦτων ἐβδόμη, *ib.* 302 C. What Aristotle calls ὀρθαί, are the κόσμοι καὶ ἐννομοί of the *Politics*, just as his παρεκβάσεις are the παράνομοι and ἀκόλαστοι of Plato.

κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον] As opposed to τί καὶ τίσι δίκαιον.

19 τὸ σφέτερον explained by τῶν ἀρχόντων = τὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν: a usage common in Thucydides, *e.g.* IV. 114, VIII. 46.

20 παρεκβάσεις] 'perversions'; departures from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb παρεκβαλεῖν is both intrans. and trans. = to violate, *e.g.* VIII(V). 10. 5. The noun = error in *Metaph.* XIV(N). 2 § 13, 1089 b 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, Isaeus p. 62. 13, and so *Nic. Eth.* I. 5. 1.

δεσποτικάι γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν. (IV)  
 7 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπι- V  
 σκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσί, καὶ πρῶ-  
 24 τον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται  
 § 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ  
 πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον  
 τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς  
 πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοι-  
 νὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλί-  
 γων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον  
 εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.  
 § 3 καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν 2  
 ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν  
 35 πλειόνων δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἡ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρ-

25 δέ] δ' ἡ Welldon || τὸ II<sup>1</sup> fr. (omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk.) || 27 ὀλίγων Γ M<sup>+</sup> || 32 <μῆ>  
 μετέχοντας Bernays || 34 τῶν omitted by M<sup>+</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τῶν] Susenl.<sup>1-2</sup> || ὀλίγων] οὐτων fr.

21 δεσποτικάι] like the sway of a master over slaves.

cc. 7, 8 (with c. 6 § 11) *Threefold classification of normal and degenerate constitutions according as (α) one man, (β) a few, or (γ) the many, are supreme.*

§ 1 23 πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ] See Excursus I. to B. III. p. 447 ff. SUSEM. (533)

§ 2 25 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ.] See c. 6 § 1 n. (523); also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9. SUSEM. (534)

26 σημαίνει ταυτόν] For constitution we may substitute 'ruling body.'

πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων] Cities contain a variety of parts or elements. Each class contributes something to the city, and so has a certain claim to political rights. The relative strength of these elements determines the question where the supreme power or 'sovereignty' lies, and settles what the constitution of the city shall be. In England to-day the πολίτευμα includes the sovereign, the lords, and the electoral body among the commons.

27 ἀνάγκη δ'...ἡ τοὺς πολλούς] But as early as § 4 ff. it is seen that this merely numerical standpoint is only preliminary and by no means exhaustive: see nn. (538, 540, 543). SUSEM. (535)

Eaton compares Cic. *De Rep.* I. § 42, Tac. *Ann.* IV. 33, and for the dependence of the constitution upon the magistrates Cic. *De Legg.* III § 12.

H.

28 ὅταν...πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι] But how, a Platonist might ask, can they so govern, unless they have absolute knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?

32 τοὺς μετέχοντας] sc. τῆς πόλεως. They may still be indispensable elements, c. 5 § 2 ὡς ἀνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις.

ἡ δεῖ κτλ.] If they are to be called citizens, the inhabitants must share in the 'weal' which is the end of the city: *N. E.* VIII. 9 § 4 ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ εἰς ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμενεῖν.

§ 3 33 μοναρχιῶν] A neutral word, convenient as including the two species βασιλεία and τυραννίς, Plato *Politic.* 302 D, E. In no single case of all the six is the use of the corresponding designation applied to modern states (monarchy, aristocracy, &c.) other than misleading, even when the qualifications are supplied. The most democratic of Greek democracies we should call an oligarchy.

35 ἡ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀρίστον] Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term: but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, n. (386) on II. II. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy; and he uses the word widely in this sense alone: II. 6 § 16 n. (218), 9 § 20 (320), II § 5 ff. (386); III. 5 § 5 (509), 13 § 8 (593), 15 § 10

25



χειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦ-<sup>(V)</sup>  
 σιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύη-  
 38 ται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολι-  
 § 4 τειῶν, πολιτεία. <καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι  
 <τὰ ὅπλα.> συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἓνα μὲν γὰρ δια- 3  
 40 φέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλε-  
 1279 b πὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολε-  
 μικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην  
 τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν. καὶ μετέχουσιν

37 <πολεμικὸν> πλῆθος Zeller (*Griech. Phil.* II. ii. 714 n. 1) || The trans-  
 position of b 3 καὶ μετέχουσιν..... 4 ὅπλα to follow a 39 πολιτεία by Schmidt  
 (see *Introd.* 82) || 39 <ὅκ> εὐλόγως? Spengel who first saw that the text was  
 unsound; \* \* συμβαίνει Thurot, afterwards accepted by Spengel || μὲν omitted by fr.

(655), 17 § 6 (680), VI(IV). 2 § 1 (1133),  
 2 § 5 (1142), 7 § 2 (1233 ff.), 8 §§ 4—  
 10 (1245), 15 § 10 (1356); VII(VI). 2 § 7  
 (1402). Other references in n. (471) on  
 III. 4. 5. SUSEM. (536) In *Rhet.*  
 I. c. 8 he adopts the former derivation.

39 πολιτεία] a constitutional govern-  
 ment, a polity: a republic of the middle  
 classes (so far as any Greek city can be  
 so called). In this work without any  
 other distinctive name, like the English  
 Commonwealth; but in *N. E.* VIII. 10  
 called τιμοκρατία: see Exc. I.

§ 4 1279 b 4 οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα]  
 "Here it is the possessors of arms that  
 share in the government": more pre-  
 cisely, the heavy-armed; i.e. those who  
 are in a position to equip themselves at  
 their own cost with heavy armour and (as  
 Zeller remarks II ii 748 n. 7) to undergo  
 the gymnastic training requisite for this  
 species of military service, to which time  
 and leisure and also a certain material pros-  
 perity were essential. Accordingly this in-  
 volves a moderate property qualification.  
 Comp. Exc. I. to B. III.; II. 6. 16 with  
 n. (216), VI(IV). 13 § 4 (1259), § 7 (1268);  
 VII(VI). 7 § 1 n. (1452). From this point  
 of view the Four Hundred at Athens  
 restricted the franchise to 5000 citizens,  
 Thuc. VIII. 97. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (537)  
 From 411 to about 409 (or 408) Athens  
 was a Polity in this sense, and again  
 from 321 to 317 B.C.

1279 a 39 εὐλόγως] (παράλογως, al-  
 most=εἰκότως, with good reason. See  
 p. 82.

40 πλείους δ' ἤδη...πολεμικήν] But  
 when we come to the case of a larger  
 number, it is hard for them to be per-  
 fectly trained in all excellence: (ἀλλά

but on the contrary) at the most they can  
 be trained in military excellence alone.

1279 b 2 διόπερ... 3 τὸ προπολεμοῦν]  
 The military character of Polity is also  
 emphasized by the author of the interpo-  
 lated passage, c. 17 § 4. Yet in the na-  
 ture of this form of government itself, as  
 Aristotle elsewhere describes it, scarcely  
 any cogent reason can be found for  
 making this such an inseparable and  
 essential feature. He may have dimly  
 perceived that the description of Polity  
 as a mere blending of democracy and  
 oligarchy without the addition of aristo-  
 cratical elements,—as distinguished from  
 those spurious aristocracies which, like  
 Carthage, combine in themselves these  
 three elements, VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9  
 (cp. II. II. 5 n. 386)—by no means  
 agrees with the recognition of Polity as  
 one of the three normal constitutions, as  
 defined by him; but that on the contrary  
 (as was remarked *Introd.* p. 62) if this  
 recognition is to remain valid, some ac-  
 count must be taken of merit also even in  
 a Polity, and it must be presumed that a  
 certain amount of excellence is spread  
 generally amongst the citizens. And in  
 accordance with the view here expressed  
 about military excellence this may have  
 induced him to transfer the warlike spirit  
 of the Spartan system not so much to the  
 other mixed aristocracies as to the re-  
 maining constitutions, which are most  
 akin to it, viz. the Polities, in order in some  
 measure to bridge over the chasm; for  
 indeed he cites Sparta VI(IV). 9 § 6 f. n.  
 (1262), as an example of a successful  
 blending of democracy and oligarchy in  
 Polity, though this involves him in in-  
 consistency. At the same time by this

§ 5 αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὄπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-  
 5 μένων τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας,  
 δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μονα-  
 ρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλι-  
 γαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-  
 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐ-  
 10 δεμία αὐτῶν.

8 δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἐκάστη τού-  
 των τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ  
 δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφούντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀπο-  
 βλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκείον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ  
 15 τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν.  
 § 2 ἐστὶ δὲ τυραννὶς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσπο-  
 τικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὥσι κύ-

1279 b 6 οὖν possibly Γ, igitur William || 13 ἕκαστον (or ἐκάστου) μεθόδῳ?  
 Koraes || μὴ] μηδέν? Schneider, perhaps rightly if 15 τι, which is not in Π<sup>1</sup> Ar.,  
 should be omitted || 16 δὲ] δὴ or γὰρ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || δεσποτική?  
 Sylburg

immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already unobserved found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For then in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely politics but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding τιμοκρατία in Plato's *Republic* (Excursus 1.), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristotle himself later on, VI(IV). 8 §§ 1, 2, n. (1239). Comp. Zeller II ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 §§ 2, 3. Cp. n. (535). SUSEM. (538)

§ 5 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς] Earlier still Thucydides, 1. 17, accuses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. SUSEM. (539)

7 ἡ δ' ὀλιγ.... γ ἀπόρων] Here then

the numerical standard completely disappears, see *nn.* (535, 538): as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See n. (544). SUSEM. (540)

c. 8 § 1 11 δεῖ δὲ... 12 ἐστίν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the *Politics*, except Bk. VIII(V), has no other object. SUSEM. (541)

12 τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφούντι] Comp. c. 13 § 14 n. (601), VI(IV). 15 § 4 n. (1350): also *Introd.* p. 70 f. SUSEM. (542)

Further see VI(IV). 10. 1, V(VIII). 3. 12. Here μέθοδος=branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in II. 1 § 2 (a nearer parallel is *Nic. Eth.* I. 1 § 1, 3 § 1, 1094 b 11).

14 ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν] But in *Nic. Ethics* this is the supreme end of theory: οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις, οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ἐδώμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ γινώμεθα.

μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν] "not to overlook or omit anything." Cf. *De Part. Animal.* I. 5 § 4, 645 a 5, μηδὲν παραλείποντας εἰς δύναμιν μῆτε ἀτιμώτερον μῆτε τιμώτερον.

§ 2 16 δεσποτικὴ κτλ] ruling civil society like a slaveholder.



ριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ (V)  
 19 τούναντιον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι.  
 § 3 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἴεν οἱ  
 πλείους ὄντες εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δὲ ἐστίν  
 ὅταν ἢ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ πον συμ-  
 βαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείτ-  
 25 τους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύ-  
 ριον πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν· οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν  
 § 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν <εἴ> τις συν- 6  
 θείῃ τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος (p. 7.)  
 οὕτω προσαγορεύει τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ἣ τὰς  
 ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐποροὶ ὀλίγοι τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, δημο-  
 30 κρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἣ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες· ἄλλην  
 § 5 ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολι-  
 τείας, τὴν ἐν ἣ πλείους εὐποροὶ καὶ ἐν ἣ ἐλάττους οἱ  
 ἄποροι, κύριοι δ' ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία  
 § 6 ἄλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστίν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ 7  
 35 λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι  
 κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστίν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς  
 δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς  
 δ' εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς

19 [πλῆθος] Spengel, perhaps rightly || 20 <τούτων> τὸν? Susem. || 21 πο-  
 λιτείας Schneider, perhaps rightly || 22 ἢ] εἴη M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || συμβαίνει Γ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>  
 T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, συμβαίνει Schneider, συμβαίνει Sylburg || 25 δόξειε Π<sup>1</sup> || 26 κἂν  
 <εἴ> Susem., κἂν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk., ἐὰν (?) Γ M<sup>1</sup> (?) Ar., si quis William || 28 προσ-  
 αγορεύει Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald., προσαγορεύει Morel Bk. || 32 <οἱ> εὐποροὶ Sylburg Bk. || 34  
 παρὰ] περὶ P<sup>3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 38 <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας Susem., if 39 διαφορὰς is right

18 οὐσίας] property (in plural).

§ 3 20 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία] "The first difficulty affects the definition," i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἀπορία affects τὸ δίκαιον (Wyse).

§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of vi(iv). 4 § 6 οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες, οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?

§ 6 34 ἔοικε τοίνυν κτλ] "Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an

accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy." Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end; essential qualities [cp. c. 9 § 1 n. on ὅρος] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὠρισμένων. So in i. 1. 2, iv(vii). 4. 4 ff. he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential.

38 διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορὰς] A διαφορὰ or 'specific difference' is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, heretwo constitutions, differ (ᾧ διαφέρουσι) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether

§ 7 ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς), ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε (V)  
 40 δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πεινία καὶ πλοῦτος  
 1280 a ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἂν  
 τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου  
 § 8 δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἶπο-  
 μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς. εὐποροῦσι  
 5 μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δι' αὖ  
 αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφοτέρω τῆς πολιτείας.  
 9 ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας  
 καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ

39 διαφορὰς Γ, accepted by Koraes Bk. Bernays etc. Then *aiτίας* is predicate and *πολιτείας* must be understood with *ῥηθείσας* or else inserted; thus *ῥηθείσας* <πολιτείας> Bernays: *ῥηθείσας* <ἀπορίας> Koraes wrongly, see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 391 f.

1280 a 6 πολιτείας \* \* Conring, perhaps rightly; a transitional clause is needed

*aiτίας* goes with *τὰς ῥηθείσας*, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we expect <διὰ> *τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας*, as § 8, δι' αὖ *αἰτίας*. "And for this reason too it follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the reasons mentioned"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise Bernays (without inserting *διὰ*, but making *aiτίας* *διαφορὰς* the predicate): "it follows that the constitutions mentioned, *τὰς ῥηθείσας* sc. *πολιτείας*, are not causes of specific difference."

Although from distinct points of view various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain state of equilibrium or relative preponderance amongst the competing social elements. See *Introd.* pp. 60 f., 63; c. 7 § 1 n., c. 15 §§ 10—13, VI(IV). 9 § 10, 11 §§ 9—11, §§ 16—18, 13 §§ 10, 11, VIII(V). 9 §§ 8, 9. Also Bradley *Hellenica* p. 225 ff.

§ 7 1280 a 1 ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους] Here is a plain statement that any government whatever by the rich majority would be an oligarchy, any whatever by the needy minority a democracy. Yet the writer of the interpolated passage VI(IV). cc. 3, 4 has failed to understand this: see n. (1164) and VI(IV). 4 §§ 5, 6. SUSEM. (543)

§ 8 5 δι' αὖ *αἰτίας*] 'on which

grounds both parties claim to be citizens,' viz. in an oligarchy because they are wealthy, in a democracy because they are free-born.

c. 9 *Right, or justice, in an oligarchy and in a democracy: their conflicting claims judged by the standard of perfect justice.*

Oncken I. pp. 30—33 has treated this chapter as a typical example of Aristotle's analytical method.

§ 1 7 Properly ὅρους = definitions, like ὁρισμούς. Better, standards or determining principles; that which gives its special character to Oligarchy or Democracy; id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur (*Ind. Ar.*), οἷς δοκεῖ ὡρίσθαι [ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία] VII(V). 9 § 14. The word was so used by Plato *Rep.* VIII 551 c (comp. 562 b ὁ προὔθετο ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο = ὑπέρπλονος, ... ὁ δημοκρατία ὀρίζεται ἀγαθόν = ἐλευθερία). We have had it before II. 6 § 9, 9 § 32 and it occurs about sixteen times in the sequel. Grant's argument *Ethics* I. p. 61 f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the interval between writing the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, is disproved by its occurrence in the *Republic*.

All the various elements of the city contribute something in virtue of which they claim a share of political privilege. The predominant element (7 § 2) or class fixes its own contribution as the qualification for citizenship, or standard. This again may be viewed as the end which the citizens pursue.

8 τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ] The state is a realisation of *distributive*



δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ (V)  
 10 μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως  
 δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ'  
 § 2 οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ <γὰρ> τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον  
 εἶναι, καὶ [γὰρ] ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις·  
 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ'  
 15 αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κριταὶ  
 § 3 φαῦλοι περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ  
 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς,  
 καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ  
 πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, (p. 72)

11 τὸ ἴσον δίκαιον? Vettori || 12 καὶ <γὰρ> Bas.<sup>2</sup> || 12 καὶ...13 ἀνίστοις omitted by Γ M\* || 13 καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., γὰρ transposed to come before 12 τὸ ἄνισον Bojesen, [γὰρ] Schneider || 15 κριταὶ after 16 φαῦλοι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, κατ' ἀξίαν: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as *wealth* or *free birth* in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9 πάντες] Here again ἀμφοτέροι might be expected. Comp. II. 11 § 5 n. (387) and *Rhet.* II. 9 § 3 ἀπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν = all who are envious or righteously indignant, 'both classes' (Shilleto).

ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός] The partial truth in these one-sided conceptions is fully recognized. The ἀξία which oligarchy or democracy take as the qualification for political privileges, although not the true one, still has a subordinate importance for the state. It is justice in some measure. See § 3, § 15; VIII(v). 1 § 5.

10 καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν κτλ] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οἷον δοκεῖ κτλ] 'Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.' They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial

equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights; i.e. they give equals to unequals.

§ 2 14 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι... κακῶς] But they omit the qualification for whom equality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment.

15 σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κτλ] Comp. c. 16 § 8, n. (642). SUSEM. (544)

§ 3 16 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ κτλ] "Hence since right means 'right for given persons,' and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to."

18 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς] *N. E. B. v. c. 3* (Bekker's c. 6) esp. §§ 4—6, § 10 διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἄ. Comp. n. (584), also VIII(v). 1. 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (545)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Grant *Ethics* I. p. 53, but see Jackson's commentary on B. v. p. 77—81.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος κτλ] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

"This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats admit it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth: the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. VIII(v). 1. 2 f. n. (1493)." SUSEM. (546)

20 μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ (V)  
αὐτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἑκατέ-  
§ 4 ρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ  
ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἀνισοὶ ᾧσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἀνι-  
24 σοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως  
§ 5 ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη- 10  
μάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι  
τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλι-  
γαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον  
μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν ταλάντων τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μῶν τῇ  
30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγίνο-  
§ 6 μένων). εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν μόνον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ  
εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν ἦν πό-  
λις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ  
τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν, ὅπως  
35 ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν

22 νομίζουσι <τὸ> δίκαιον Spengel, perhaps rightly || 24 ἐλευθερίᾳ Vettori, ἐλευθερί-α (or -η) Γ Ar., ἐλευθερίῃ M\*, ἐλευθέρῃσι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. (the first iota above the line), ἐλευθέρῃσι P<sup>1</sup> || 27 ὀλιγαρχικῶν P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 29 ταλάντων Γ μῶν Π (including fr.) Ar. Bk. (in P<sup>3</sup> μν over an erasure) || εἰσενέγκαντα Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 30 δ' ὄντι M\* P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 31 μόνον ἔνεκεν Π<sup>2</sup> fr., omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 34 ἔνεκα M\* P<sup>1</sup>

21 μέχρι τινός] See on § 1 above.  
\*Because each side contends for a partial justice, but thinks it is contending for an absolute justice.

§ 4 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Comp. c. 12 § 2, and VIII(V). 1 § 2 f. *nn.* (584 b, 1493). SUSEM. (546 b)

25 κυριώτατον] what is most important; viz. the grand aim and object of a city.

§ 5 26 τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι κτλ] 'they have a stake in the city proportionate to their share of the property.'

29 ταλάντων] A talent=47½ German marks=£231 2s. 6d., a mina=78½ German marks=£3 17s. approximately: Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 172 f. SUSEM. (547)

30 οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς...ἐπιγινόμενων] 'ought not to have an equal share of the principal nor of the profits accruing.' Congreve however suggests that the participles may be masculine, and so Bernays, with a different sense: 'either of those who originally contributed or of a subsequent generation of shareholders.' This can hardly be right. SUSEM.

§ 6 33 νῦν δ' οὐκ κτλ] Comp. 1.

2. 8 and the further passages cited in *n.* (21). Also *Nic. Eth.* x. 6. 8, 1177 a 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραποδῶν μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον, and x. 7. 6, 1177 b 4, where happiness is made to consist in leisure, ἐν τῇ σχολῇ. But that slaves have no leisure, is stated *Pol.* IV(VII). 15. 2 (Eaton). Cp. too *nn.* (925, 926) at that passage. SUSEM. (548)

35 διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν κτλ] "for commerce and mutual intercourse." Here the sentence breaks off, the parenthetical example being elaborated and supported by other subordinate illustrations until the end of the chapter. Moreover the manner in which the true end of the state comes to light is not stated in antithesis to the false ends rejected, but is an incident of this elaborate treatment of the one false view, that the end is commercial intercourse: viz. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας διασκοποῦσιν, § 8. Thereupon the mention of the true end leads to its severance from some unessential though indispensable conditions (κοινωνία τόπου, περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, §§ 9—12); and this is followed by the formal definition of the true end of the state, § 13, from which



χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους—καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρ- (V)  
 χηδόνοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥς  
 § 7 μῖα ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι 11  
 περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν  
 40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ  
 1280 b τούτοις κοινὰ καθεστᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕτεροι παρ' ἑκατέρους, οὔτε  
 τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους,  
 οὐδ' ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀδικὸς ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ  
 μοχθηρίαν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδική-  
 5 σουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας [πολιτικῆς] δια-  
 § 8 σκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἥ καὶ φανερόν ὅτι

36 ἀλλήλους—] Thurot and Bonitz, to mark the anacoluthon. As far as the sense goes, the apodosis is at 1281 a 4 ff. διόπερ κτλ. || τυρρηνοὶ P<sup>4</sup> fr., τύραννοι P<sup>2-3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) || 33 συνθήκαι σωθήναι P<sup>2-6</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand), apparently P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), as συνθήκαι is written over an erasure || 39 καὶ omitted by P<sup>6</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and the 1st hand in P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> (added by a later hand in Q<sup>b</sup>) || 40 ἐπὶ πᾶσι Schneider transposing

1280 b 1 ἑκατέρους] ἑτέροις Ar. Koraes, perhaps rightly || 2 τοῦ omitted by II<sup>1</sup> fr., hence [τοῦ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || ἕτεροι M<sup>6</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ || 4 ἔξει P<sup>2-3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand) || ἀδικήσουσιν Morel, ἀδικήσωσιν Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. || 5 [δὲ] Koraes, as if the apodosis began here || πολιτικῆς omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (added after ἀρετῆς by P<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || διασκοποῦσιν P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by P<sup>1</sup>), διακοποῦσιν Γ M<sup>6</sup> fr. || 6 εὐνομίας <πόλεως μίας> Bernays

the real measure of political rights is a deduction made in § 15. Were the digressions dismissed, and the anacoluthic period rewritten, it would perhaps run as follows: εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν (κοινωνοῦσι) ἀλλὰ μάλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν, μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ ζωῆς ἔνεκα τέλει καὶ αὐτάρκει καὶ τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν θεῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτους προσήκει πλείστον μετέχειν πόλεως. Bonitz *Studien* III. pp. 139—141 (105—107).

36 Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχ.] This maritime alliance between Carthage and the Etruscans, which was formed soon after the beginning of the sixth century, B. C., to drive out the Greeks and keep them away from the western half of the Mediterranean, is noticed by Herodotus I. 166, Mommsen I. p. 153 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (549)

37 οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα] Comp. c. I § 4, n. (435). SUSEM. (550)  
 ὥς] as it were, like ὥσπερ.

§ 7 38 συνθήκαι...σύμβολα...γραφαί] Usually συνθήκαι=a general term for

a treaty or convention, usually of a public nature between two states, but also all private covenants: σύμβολα=a special kind of contract, viz. international commercial treaties (so § 6): see Meier u. Schömann *Attisch. Process* p. 494 n. 49. Here συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων are commercial treaties in general: σύμβ. περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν=special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

40 ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοινὰ] magistrates common to them all appointed to secure these ends.

1280 b 2 τοῦ ποίους τινὰς κτλ.] nor does the one state care what the character of the citizens of the other state should be.

3 τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας] those who come under the treaty.

4 ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως κτλ.] The modest aim to which the modern state is restricted.

§ 8 6 εὐνομίας] "good government," the goal and end of all political science; *Nic. Eth.* III. 3. 11, 1112 b 14 (Eaton): οὔτε πολιτικὸς (βουλευέται) εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους. SUSEM. (551)

δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζο- (V)  
 μένη πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμ-  
 μαχία τῶν ἄλλων τέτρω διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀπωθεν  
 10 συμμαχιῶν, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυ-  
 κόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητής ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' (p. 73)  
 § 9 οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ 12  
 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι  
 τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἓν, ὥστε ἄπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ  
 15 Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς  
 ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ιδίων ταῖς

7 ἐπιμελὲς] ἐπιμέλειαν P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπιμε<sup>λ</sup> M<sup>a</sup> || 9 ἀπωθε fr., ἀποθεν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1-3-4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald, Bk.<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 10 συμμαχιῶν Conting, συμμάχων Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Bk. || 13 συνάγοι Π<sup>3</sup> Bk.

7 ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι κτλ] "the city which truly and not in mere pretence deserves the name must give its attention to virtue." See A. C. Bradley *Hellenica* pp. 193 f., 210 f.

8 γίνεται κτλ] For else the society is transformed into an alliance differing from all other leagues, whose members dwell apart, in locality alone: the law too is transformed into a compact and 'a guarantee of mutual rights' in the words of Lycophron, not calculated to make the citizens virtuous and just.

10 Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής] See Exc. II. to B. II. p. 333 and *Introd.* p. 35. To all appearance Lycophron belonged to the school of Gorgias (*n.* 448): perhaps, as v. Wilamowitz conjectures *Hermes* XIV. p. 173, he was the same as the erotic poet Lycophronides (*Bergk Poet. lyr.* III.<sup>4</sup> p. 633 f.). He is specially known to us elsewhere only as the composer of an eulogy on the lyre, and as maintaining that one thing cannot at the same time be many and that therefore every combination of a predicate with the subject by means of the copula is inadmissible: also that nobility is only an imaginary good. Comp. Vahlen *The Sophist Lycophron* in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1865, p. 143 ff., Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II. pp. 425, 477 Eng. tr. A sophist was originally any man of intellectual importance, who also made it his profession to acquire education and knowledge and impart them to others: hence the seven sages are also called the seven sophists. At a later time, after the age of Pericles, the name was given in a narrower sense to paid professional teachers of rhetoric and other

departments of an encyclopaedic education. They delivered single lectures and discourses of an instructive or amusing kind (*ἐπιδείξεις*), charging a fee for admission, or perhaps published them in writing; in some cases they appeared as experts in argument. In this sense the word occurs here. At the same time it received the odious connotation in which we exclusively use it at the present day, in consequence of the many subtleties, the pettifogging quibbles, and paradoxes in which this class of people was often involved; although the movement towards freethinking\* and critical scepticism, which they originated, and their bold innovations had much to justify them, and were in part of epoch-making importance. Cp. *n.* (31) on I. 3 § 4. SUSEM. (552)

See Cope in the *Journal of Sacred and Classical Philology* vol. II. pp. 140—143: also his note on *Rhet.* III. 3. 1.

§ 9 It will be remembered that Corinth and Argos were for a short time, 393—387 B.C., united ostensibly as one state, to the intense indignation of the philo-Laconian party. See Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 4 § 6 αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ ἀφανισμένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὅροις ἀνασπᾶσθαι καὶ Ἄργος ἀντὶ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζεσθαι: V. 1 § 34, § 36.

16 ἐπιγαμίας] Usually a lawful marriage could only be contracted between two citizens of the same Greek state: but the privilege was occasionally granted to individual strangers or to an alien community as a whole; and special treaties

\* [A negative 'enlightenment' or 'illumination,' Aufklärung.]



- § 10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν (V)  
χωρὶς μὲν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν,  
ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ  
20 τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς  
ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν  
μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων,  
§ 11 οἷον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω πῶ πόλεις. διὰ 13  
τίνα δὴ ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς  
25 κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος  
μέντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς  
ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικούντας μόνον,  
οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειε πόλεις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴ-  
§ 12 περ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς. φανερόν τοίνυν  
30 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς  
αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγ-  
καίον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων

18 ἄπωθεν fr. Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ἄποθεν II Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 19 εἴησαν P<sup>1</sup> Ar., εἰ ἦσαν Γ M<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> || 20 εἰ  
omitted by II<sup>3</sup> || 22 μυριοί Ald. Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 23 πῶ Ar. (apparently) and Bk., πῶς possibly  
Γ (*quidem* William), πῶ II (including fr.) Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 30 ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schömann pp. 101, 306, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bacchiadae of Corinth (II. 12. 8 n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. VIII. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. SUSEM. (553) τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς π. κοινωνημάτων] 'one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.'

§ 10 17 οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς] Aristotle does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö-

mann p. 123, p. 207 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (554) "Is not Aristotle taking an imaginary case: the elements of society (such as γεωργοί) which are necessary πρὸς τὸ ζῆν μόνον i. living apart but exchanging products (μεταδόσεις) ii. living together and connected by a defensive league, § 11?" (Wyse).

20 οἷον εἰ κτλ] That is, supposing they belonged to these different crafts without which the state could not exist at all: see IV (VII). c. 8. SUSEM. (555)

21 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι] i.e. not at all too many even for a 'city' according to Greek ideas, as distinguished from a race or tribe: cp. IV (VII). c. 4, also n. (11); and II. 6 §§ 4-6, 9 §§ 15-17, n. 198-201, 306, 307, 309, 311. SUSEM. (556)

§ 11 24 διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας] because they did not live near enough to each other.

25 ἕκαστος μέντοι κτλ] Each making his own house his 'castle.'

29 συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς] after their union and when they lived apart.

§ 12 φανερόν τοίνυν κτλ] Comp. c. I § 3 n. (434 b). SUSEM. (557)

32 οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων κτλ] "yet not even if all these conditions are present is it then actually (ἤδη) a city, but (a city is) the union of families and clans

τούτων ἀπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ (V)  
 34 ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρ-  
 § 13 κους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἓνα κατοικοῦν- 14  
 των τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαι τ' ἐγέ-  
 νοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ δια-  
 γωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ  
 39 συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν,  
 § 14 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν  
 1281 a κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν,  
 ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πρῶ- (p. 74)  
 ξεων [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ  
 § 15 τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύ- 15  
 5 τὴν κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλείον ἢ τοῖς  
 κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζουσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν  
 πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίστοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι  
 κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦν-

34 τελείας Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 35 καὶ] η fr. || 38 τῷ συζῆν Koraes || 40 δὲ ἢ οὐ δὴ  
 Susem., δὲ ἢ Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Bk.

1281 a 1 <χάριν> Scaliger, ἔνεκεν Koraes, see next note || 3 χάριν omitted by  
 Π<sup>1</sup> (added in P<sup>1</sup> by corr.), [χάριν] Scaliger. This justifies the insertion of χάριν in  
 line 1, rather than ἔνεκεν || 5 τούτοις omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand)

in noble living, to the end that they may  
 attain a perfect and independent life.  
 This however will not be secured unless  
 they dwell in the same place and have  
 the right of intermarriage."

§ 13 36 κηδεῖαι = ties of affinity.  
 37 φρατρίαι] See II. 3 § 5, 5 § 17,  
 VII (VI). 4 § 19 *nn.* (141, 169, 1427 b).  
 Amongst the Greeks these "brother-  
 hoods" were [or appeared to be] the next  
 subdivision of the old tribal stocks (φυλαί)  
 having a number of clans (γένη) included  
 under them. SUSEM. (558)

θυσίαι] Clubs which met to sacrifice.  
 διαγωγαί] Cp. IV (VII). 15. 2. n. (921).  
 SUSEM. (558 b) 'The recreations of a  
 life in common which depend on φιλία'  
 would include much, e.g. the commerce  
 of disciple and friend as well as the plea-  
 sures of social reunions (Wyse).

38 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον κτλ] Comp. *Nic.*  
*Eth.* VIII. 3 § 5 1150 b 4, οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως  
 ἐστὶν φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν 5 § 3, 1157 b 19,  
 6 § 4, 1158 a 23, IX. 9 § 10 1170 b 10, 10  
 § 4 1171 a 2, 12 § 1 1179 b 20 (Eaton).  
 SUSEM. (559)

40 ταῦτα] all these minor associations,  
 κηδεῖαι, φρατρίαι, &c., are necessary means

to the end, and that is why they came into  
 existence (36 διὸ). "This certainly looks  
 as if to Aristotle the φρατρίαι were some-  
 thing posterior to the origin of a πόλις by  
 συνοίκισις of κῶμαι" (Wyse).

§ 14 πόλις δὲ κτλ] "Therefore a  
 city is the union of clans and villages (to  
 attain) a perfect and independent life."  
 Ridgeway defends the double genitive:  
 "the fellowship of clans and villages in a  
 perfect and independent life."

1281 a 1 τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους] Cp.  
 I. 2 § 8 *nn.* (20 b, 21): further *nn.* (459,  
 460) on III. 3 § 3: also III. 1 § 12 n.  
 (447): IV (VII). 4 § 11 n. (579), 5 § 1 n.  
 (764), 8 § 8 n. (804) and n. (136). SUSEM.  
 (560)

2 τῶν καλῶν...πράξεων] With re-  
 gard to this conclusion, see n. (708) on  
 IV (VII). 1 § 11. SUSEM. (560 b)

§ 15 The citizens have a stake in the  
 city in proportion to their contributions  
 towards civic fellowship, in the sense just  
 given to the term. Superior contribu-  
 tions to other objects (wealth, birth) are  
 of no avail to confer a greater share of  
 civic rights.

c. 10 Where ought sovereignty to reside?



10 τες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- (V)  
νων ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. VI  
ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ  
τὸν βέλτιστον ἓνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα  
ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ  
15 πλείους εἶναι διανεμῶνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικον  
§ 2 ἐστίν, ἔδοξε γὰρ [ἂν] νῆ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως τὴν οὖν ἀδι-  
κίαν τί δεῖ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων,  
οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανεμῶνται, φανερόν ὅτι  
φθεῖρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ φθεῖρει τὸ  
20 ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον  
§ 3 ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ 2  
τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας  
δικαίας· βιάζεται γὰρ ὧν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆ-  
θος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους ἄρχειν δίκαιον  
25 καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν οὖν κακέينوι ταῦτά ποιῶσι καὶ διαρ-  
πάξωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλῆθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ  
§ 4 δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι φαῦλα πάντα  
καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ 3

13 [ἢ τύραννον] or change to ἢ τὸν νόμον Spengel (not bad) || 16 ἂν omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Ar. Bk. || 17 δεῖ] χρῆ Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || πάλιν.....ληφθέντων corrupt according to Oncken: see Comm. n. (561) || 19 φθερεῖ Γ || 24 ἄρα Π<sup>2</sup> and M\* (1st hand) || δίκαιον ἄρχειν Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 25 ταῦτα Vettori and Lambin in their translations, ταῦτα Γ Π Ar. || 27 πάντα φαῦλα Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 28 δίκαια] σπουδαία Π<sup>1</sup>

In particular, (c. 11) *Should it rest with the Many or the Few?*

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austin *Jurisprudence* Lect. vi. pp. 226—255, ed. 3.

§ 1 12 ἢ γάρ τοι κτλ] It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminently good man, or (5) a despot.

16 ἔδοξε γὰρ κτλ] Ironical. "It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?"

§ 2 17 πάλιν τε κτλ] And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city. SUSEM. (561) The principle is self-destructive.

19 οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετῇ] Cp. II. 2 § 7 n. (135 b). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which

qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: *Nic. Eth.* II. 6. 1, 1106 a 15 (Congreve): whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴς *N. E.* VI. 5. 6, 1140 b 19 (Eaton). SUSEM. (561 b) Cp. *Pl. Rep.* X. 608 E: if moral evil, which is the evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.

20 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον...φθαρτικόν] Comp. I. 2. 16 n. (28 c), II. 2. 4 n. (133), III. 12 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590). SUSEM. (562)

§ 3 24 ἀλλ' ἄρα κτλ] Passing to (2), the claims of the wealthy few.

27 καὶ θάτερον ἄρα] (If so,) then so also is the conduct of the majority justified.

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (ἐπιεικεῖς) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν.

καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους (VI)  
 30 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρ-  
 χαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ'  
 § 5 αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ'  
 εἶνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλι- (p. 75)  
 γαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν  
 35 τὸ κύριον ὅλος ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα  
 πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον. ἂν οὖν ἡ νό-  
 μος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικός δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν  
 ἡπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.  
 11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος· ὅτι  
 40 δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν  
 ὀλίγους δὲ, δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν,  
 § 2 τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν  
 1281 b οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ-  
 τίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ  
 συμφορητὰ δειπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων·  
 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόνον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-

35 ἔχοντα.....36 ψυχὴν after 36 φαῦλον P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 37 διοίση P<sup>1</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> ||  
 41 λύεσθαι.....42 ἀλήθειαν. That the text is unsound was seen by Camerarius,  
 λύεσθαι <δεῖν>? Schneider, [λύεσθαι] Götting, [λύεσθαι καὶ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> (λύεσθαι a  
 variant on ἀλήθειαν), τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ καὶ λύεσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν Thurot,  
 <οὐχ ἱκανῶς> λύεσθαι Shute || τινος Γ Μ\* || ἔχει Μ\* (1st hand) || εὐπο-  
 ρίαν Koraes, accepted by Bernays and by Susem.<sup>2</sup> as less violent than the other  
 proposals, cp. *De caelo* II. 12 § 1, 291 b 27, εἰ τις διὰ τὸ φιλοσοφίας διψῇ καὶ μικρὰς  
 εὐπορίας ἀγαπᾷ περὶ ὧν τὰς μεγίστας ἔχομεν ἀπορίας.

1281 b 1 οὐ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup> Ar., δ P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

31 ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ.] This is the reason why the same feature in Plato's government is called dangerous (ἐπισφαλές), though unavoidable, II. 5 § 25 n. (181).

§ 5 Similarly the claim of the one pre-eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle's 'best state') is reduced to a case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

34 ἀλλ' ἴσως κτλ.] Cp. c. 15 § 4, c. 16 § 5 ff. n. (641). SUSEM. (562 b)

36 φαῦλον] sc. εἶναι predicate, "that a human being, whoever he may be, with human passions in his soul should be supreme instead of the law, is a mistake."

ἂν οὖν κτλ.] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy; and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 1 39 ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος] cc. 12—17 and B. VI(IV), B. VII(VI);

comp. *Introd.* p. 43. SUSEM. (563)

40 μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ κτλ.] This is a defence of the claims of (1) as against (3). In c. 15 the claims of πλῆθος and βασιλεὺς are compared.

§ 2 42 τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς κτλ.] Comp. c. 15 § 7 n. (646); also c. 11 § 9 below, Thuc. VI. 18. 6 ὁμοῦ δὲ (νομίσατε) τὸ τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκρίβες ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστα ἂν ἰσχύειν, with Herod. III. 80 s. fin. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἐνὶ τὰ πάντα (Eaton), SUSEM. (564)

This is the one distinctively original thought of Aristotle, foreshadowed in his definition of citizen, c. 1 § 8.

1281 b 2 οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς σύμπαντας] See II. 3 § 2 and notes.

3 συμφορητὰ δειπνα] 'public dinners' to which many contribute.

4 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κτλ.] Cp. c. 4



5 νήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὥσπερ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον (VI)  
 τὸ πλήθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ'  
 § 3 αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ  
 καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα  
 9 καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μῦθον, πάντα δὲ

5 καὶ <ὥς> or καὶ <ὥσπερ>? Susem., following Thurot hesitatingly || συνελ-  
 θόντας P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2-3</sup> || [ὥσπερ] ἓνα Thurot || 7 τῇν  
 περὶ τὴν M<sup>a</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and perhaps Γ || 8 κρίης Γ M<sup>a</sup> (et *kries melius* William)

§ 7 n. (474): also IV(VII). I §§ 10, 11 n. (703). SUSEM. (565)

Hobbes' *Leviathan*, the body politic, is similarly an artificial body.

5 καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων...7 διάνοιαν] Trendelenburg in his "Law of Nature" (*Naturrecht* p. 463) rightly objects that 'in works of art man is essentially a free, unprejudiced spectator: in politics he is a partizan fellow-actor. There is a fallacy in an argument from analogy which draws an inference from the *universal* common to all the cases compared, when in fact it is the *difference* between them which is decisive.' But he proceeds to argue, that the comparison leaves out of account the desires and passions which in the case of the multitude dull the intelligence and pervert the will; that the truth brought together by their collective wisdom is materially prejudiced and hampered by the falsehood collected along with it; that the supplementing of the truth from various sides is hindered or frustrated by the resistance of errors and self-seeking. In reply to this we must inquire, whether when the public at large judges and enjoys works of art, only healthy popular inclinations and instincts are brought together: whether they are not blended with others which are unhealthy and misleading. Aristotle at least is of this latter opinion V(VIII). 6 § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n. (1097), and certainly he is right. Further is there no fallacy in the criticism which overlooks the true analogy in the difference?

On the other side it is not to be forgotten, that where our own interest is concerned, although passion no doubt is inflamed and the critic is converted into a judge in his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9), yet at the same time the intellect is sharpened: thus in accordance with the analogies applied in § 14, (whose correctness even Trendelenburg has not questioned,) in practical questions, where his own weal and woe are at stake, the

uneducated man approximates to an expert still more closely than in art criticism. If it were not so, art critics might be appointed by the popular vote, but not even the most indirect choice of its representatives should be left to the people, although our procedure is now universally the reverse and we believe it to be justified. Trendelenburg's objections (p. 147) to too numerous executive or decreeing assemblies are quite in point. But he forgets that in §§ 8, 9 Aristotle, if we take him literally, only allows the popular assembly to elect the officials: and that in any case (see Exc. IV. to B. II. n. 388) he restricts the decision of the people to a few definite questions. Had he been acquainted with the representative system, he would have judged more correctly: he would then most likely have referred to the council all matters which call for a full deliberation and responsible decision rather than a vote. That not merely capacity but prejudice also and ignorance are collected in the popular assembly is moreover expressly laid down by Aristotle in §§ 6, 7 (though Trendelenburg has altogether overlooked this); but he holds that the danger arising from the passions of individual sovereigns is the greater of the two (15 § 8 n. 647), whereas in a capable nation he maintains that the force of truth will finally triumph over falsehood. This is the thought upon which, as we know, his conception of rhetoric is based: see Zeller II. ii. 755. It may be that this is not capable of strict demonstration, but to a large extent remains merely a matter of belief. Yet this much is certain, that whoever does not cherish this belief has lost faith in humanity generally. See also n. (577) on II § 19. SUSEM. (565 b)

§ 3 8 κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοί] Both music and poetry are well able to illustrate this maxim. The present century is rich in good work which has won its way in spite of the critics.

§ 4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 ἕκαστοι τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς  
 φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνή-  
 χθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε  
 14 κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὲ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐτέ-  
 ρου δὲ τινος ἑτερου μῦθον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον  
 καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφο-  
 ρὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἀδελφον,  
 ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς  
 20 κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσειε λόγος· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν  
 οἱ ἐνίοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;)· ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν πλῆθος  
 26 οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότε-  
 ρον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν  
 ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους (p. 76)  
 24 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι μῆτε  
 § 7 πλούσιοι μῆτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διὰ  
 τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀν<ἀγκη> τὰ δ'

11 ἕκαστοι Thurot, ἐκάστου Γ II Ar. Bk. || ὥσπερ] ὥπερ Vettori in the margin of his Munich copy || [καὶ τῶν μὴ.....12 φασί] Oncken || 13 κεχωρισμένων Γ Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, καὶ χωρισμένων M<sup>a</sup> || γε<οὐδὲν κωλύει>? Spengel || 14 ἔχει P<sup>4</sup> and perhaps Ar. <ἔστιν ἔχειν>? Susem., but no change is needed || 18 περὶ] ἐπὶ Sylburg, perhaps rightly || ἐνίον Spengel, which would also do, ἐνίους Schneider (bad) || 24 μῆτε πλούσιοι omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 25 μηδὲ ἐν? Susem., μηδὲ ἐν P<sup>1</sup>, μὴ δὲ ἐν M<sup>a</sup>, μηδέεν P<sup>2-3</sup>, μηδ' ἐν P<sup>4</sup>, μηδεῖν Ald. || 27 ἀνάγκη Rassow, ἀν Γ II Bk. Schneider first saw the text to be unsound and violently changed ἀδικεῖν into ἀδικεῖεν and ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς into ἀμαρτάνοιεν

§ 4 12 τὰ γεγραμμένα κτλ] Comp. what Socrates says, Xen. *Memor.* III. 10. 2 καὶ μὴν τὰ γε καλὰ εἶδη ἀφομοιοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ οὐ βῆδιον ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἀμεμπτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες, τὰ ἐξ ἐκάστου κάλλιστα, οὕτως ὅλα τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι. Zeuxis adopted this procedure, when he painted his Helen. To make it a masterpiece of female beauty, he took as models the five most beautiful maidens in the city in order that he might unite in the picture the special excellences of each: see Brunn *History of the Greek artists* II. pp. 80, 88 (Vahlen). Comp. n. (64) in Susemihl's edition of the *Poetics*, c. 6 § 11. SUSEM. (566)

13 κεχωρισμένων γε] With the brief gen. abs. comp. *N. E.* VIII. 13 § 2 ἀμυλλωμένων, 15 § 4 ὑπερβάλλοντος.

§ 5 16 τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν π. πρὸς

τοὺς ὀλ.] the difference between the many and the few. So διάστασις, Nic. *Eth.* IX. 3. 4.

18 ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς...ἀρμόσειε λόγος] For the same argument would apply to the animals.

19 τί διαφέρουσιν] Comp. I. 5 § 8 n. (43), and n. (54) on I. 6 § 8. SUSEM. (567)

20 περὶ τὴν πλῆθος] in a certain (given) population.

§ 6 21 τὴν πρότερον εἰρημ. ἀπ.] Namely: who is to possess the sovereign power? Comp. also § 19 n. (578). SUSEM. (568)

23 τίνων δεῖ κυρίους κτλ] This next problem (§§ 6—14) is: how far does the sovereignty of the freemen, the mass of the citizens, extend? This was provisionally decided c. 1 § 8.

§ 7 27 ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη] There should be an independent causal sentence here,



ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς)· τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν (VI)  
 29 φοβερὸν (ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι,  
 § 8 πολέμιων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λεί-  
 πεται δὴ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς.  
 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττου-  
 31 σιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνas τῶν ἀρχόν-  
 § 9 των, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῷσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ  
 35 ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς  
 βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἢ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ  
 μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλί-  
 § 10 γης· χωρὶς δ' ἕκαστος περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἀτελὴς ἐστίν. ἔχει

28 μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν Böcker, μηδὲ μετέχειν Γ II Bk. || 38 ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν  
 II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

something standing to τὸ μὲν μετέχειν  
 ... οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς as the clause ὅταν γὰρ  
 ... ὑπάρχωσι, πολέμιων ... ταύτην below  
 stands to τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι... φοβερὸν.  
 With Rassow's conjecture, ἀνάγκη (ἐστίν),  
 there is such a verb; without it there is  
 no verb on which the infinitives ἀδικεῖν  
 εἶναι and ἀμαρτάνειν can depend.

29 ὅταν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. VII(VI). 5  
 § 4 n. (1434). SUSEM. (568 b)

This is presumably the sequel of the  
 objections raised in c. 10 §§ 4, 5. The  
 further development would be in the  
 form of Plato's well-known simile of  
 the drones in his criticism of oligarchy  
*Rep.* VIII. 551 D, 552 A—E, 555 D.

§ 8 It remains for them to take part  
 in deliberation and in trials.

32 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων ... 34 ἐῷσιν]  
 Comp. II. 12 § 3 (Exc. v. p. 350 f.), § 5 nn.  
 (412, 413): VI(IV) 11 § 19 n. (1303), VII  
 (VI). 4 § 4 n. (1415). Such a constitu-  
 tional restriction is not admissible, cer-  
 tainly, for the citizens of the ideal state  
 who have the best nature and education  
 and are in the possession of a fixed amount  
 of land. There suitable elections of offi-  
 cials must be assumed without such a  
 restriction; there all the citizens have  
 equal rights (cp. nn. 440, 885). But  
 nevertheless, as was inferred in the *Introd.*  
 p. 54 from II. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there  
 can be hardly any doubt that even in the  
 ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict  
 the activity of the whole body of full citi-  
 zens to the election of the officials, to-  
 gether with the final decision upon legisla-  
 tion as well as upon questions of war and  
 peace and treaties with foreign states.  
 Comp. III. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). SUSEM.  
 (569)

33, 'set them over,' i.e. 'assign to  
 them' the election of the magistrates and  
 the scrutiny of their conduct (when they  
 retire from office).

ἐπὶ after τάττουσιν. Other construc-  
 tions are *eis*, *κατά* and *ἐπὶ* with *dat.*

§ 9 35 ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν] 'sufficiently  
 clear sight' or 'enough discrimination.'  
 The terms *αἴσθησις* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι* in  
 Aristotle often go beyond the notion of  
 mere sensation and sense perception to  
 which Plato in the *Theaetetus* restricts  
 them. Thus *αἰσθάνεσθαι* = to understand  
 another's command in I 5 § 9 (cp. n. 45  
 b). Like Plato himself at an earlier time,  
*Phaedr.* 271 E, even where the terms ex-  
 press that notion, Aristotle always has  
 in view the discrimination of the sensible  
 individual by sense, the *judgment* of  
 perception, so that he calls it a discrimi-  
 nating and judging faculty (*δύναμις κριτική*,  
 cp. n. 497): *Anal. Post.* II. 15 § 5, 99  
 b 35, *De Anima* III. 9. 1, 432 a 15.  
 Thence by a very natural transition he  
 applies these terms to denote the dis-  
 crimination of the individual and par-  
 ticular generally, and the decision as to  
 what is right and wrong in relation there-  
 to in practical life:—an instinctive pro-  
 cess, so to speak, or at all events one  
 which rests merely upon observation and  
 experience, *Nic. Eth.* II. 9. 8, 1109 b 20,  
 IV. 5, 13, 1126 b 3 ff. SUSEM. (570)

36 καθάπερ ἢ μὴ κ.] "as innutritious  
 food when mixed with the nutritious  
 makes the whole a better diet than the  
 scanty supply" (of nourishment alone),  
 § 2 n. (564). SUSEM. (571)

38 χωρὶς] alone, by himself.  
 ἀτελὴς] Properly 'immature' or 'un-  
 developed' or 'incomplete': thence 'un-

δ' ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι (VI)  
 40 δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰατρευκεν,  
 οὐπὲρ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς  
 νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἰατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ  
 1282 a τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν  
 ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνas ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλ-  
 § 11 λους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρός δὲ ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχι-  
 τεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ  
 5 γὰρ τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀπο-  
 δίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἥττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς  
 § 12 εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν δό-  
 ξειεν ἔχειν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδό-  
 των ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ  
 10 κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων  
 καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὐ τι τῶν  
 § 13 εἰδόντων γε μᾶλλον. ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ

42 ὁ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || καὶ added after ὁμοίως δὲ by Γ M\*

1282 a 5 τοιοῦτοι καὶ Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., καὶ untranslated by William, Ar. || 7 καὶ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, hence [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 9 τε omitted by P<sup>1-4</sup> || 10 [περὶ] or [περὶ ἐνίων] Spengel (the former perhaps right) || 11 καὶ before τῶν ἰδιωτῶν omitted by P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || οὐ τοι Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>

qualified to judge.' The word was used in I. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize the boy's powers of reflection and 'virtue' (Congreve). Cp. also *n.* (875) on IV(VII). 13. 5. SUSEM. (572)

§ 10 A difficulty: only the physician can properly judge a course of treatment and pronounce with authority that it has been successful.

39 ἀπορίαν πρώτην] 'Certainly this mode of ordering the constitution involves a difficulty—in the first place that &c.': followed § 15 by ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης: cp. *Analysis* p. 111. SUSEM. (573)

1282 a 1 ὥσπερ οὖν κτλ] Compare Plato's illustration of the physician tried by boys at the accusation of the cook, *Gorg.* 521 E.

§ 11 3 ἰατρός δὲ κτλ] 'Physician' may mean (1) the practitioner in ordinary cases, (2) the scientific student who has mastered the whole field of medicine, (3) the educated layman who has acquired his knowledge of medicine only out of scientific interests generally.

5 τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι κτλ] 'For there are even some such' viz. amateurs 'in nearly all the arts, and we assign the

right to judge to the educated layman as much as to the profession.' With the order of Π<sup>2</sup>, τοιοῦτοι καὶ, Bernays and others must translate 'in almost all other arts as well,' which is a misplaced emphasis. Camerarius compares the first words of the treatise *De partibus animal.* περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον... δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἐξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδεῖαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. SUSEM. (573 b)

§ 12 7 ἔπειτα=further, not answering πρώτην; but rather completing so much of the problem as is expressed in §§ 10, 11 viz. περὶ τὴν κρίσιν.

περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν] in the election of magistrates, § 13 ἀρχαιρεσιῶν.

8 τῶν εἰδόντων] experts in statecraft, answering to the geometers and pilots, Plato *Politicus* 301 A, B, ὁ ἐπιστήμων.

11 If περὶ is retained, μετέχουσι=μετέχουσι τῆς αἰρέσεως virtually; 'have a voice in the election.'

§ 13 12 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Cf. II. 3 § 1 n.



- ἀν εἴη τὸ πλήθος ποιητέον κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε (p. 77)
- § 14 τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 10
- 15 διὰ τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἀν ἢ τὸ πλήθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδρα-  
ποδῶδες (ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτῆς τῶν εἰδόντων,  
ἅπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι  
περὶ ἐνίων οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτ' ἄριστ' ἀν κρίνειεν,  
ὅσων τᾶργα γινώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἷον  
20 οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γινῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλ-  
τιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ  
πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοῖνῃν ὁ δαιτυμῶν ἀλλ'  
§ 15 οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειεν  
τις ἀν οὕτω λύειν ἱκανῶς. ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης.
- 25 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύ- 11  
λους τῶν ἐπικεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὐθυναὶ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέ-  
σεις εἰς μέγιστα ἄς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,  
τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόασιν· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων
- § 16 τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσιν καὶ  
30 βουλευέουσιν καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς  
τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσιν δὲ καὶ στρατηγούσι καὶ τὰς  
μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχοῦσιν ἀπὸ μειζόνων. ὁμοίως δὲ τις ἀν 12

17 ἢ before βελτίους omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [ἦ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 18 μόνος Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (*solus* William, Ar.) || 21 αὐτῇ αὐτοῦ P<sup>2,3</sup> Ald. || κρίνει Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. || 26 εὐθύναι M<sup>a</sup> Ald.  
|| 27 μέγιστα Γ, μέγιστοι M<sup>a</sup>, μέγιστον P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. || ἐν  
omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 30 διδάσκουσι P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), γρ. δικάζουσι in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> ||  
32 ἀρχῶσιν M<sup>a</sup>, ἐχουσιν Π<sup>2</sup> || μεγάλων Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ Γ II Bk.

13 κύριον οὔτε... οὔτε] The two *minima* without which it is reduced to virtual dependence on its rulers (δούλος ἀν εἴη καὶ πολέμος II. 12. 5).

§ 14 The reply to the objection of § 10: (a) the collective judgment of a free people may be even superior to that of the experts: (b) the users of the laws may be better practical judges of them than their makers: the expert's knowledge is not always an advantage.

15 διὰ τὸν πάλαι λόγον] for the reason stated above, §§ 2—4. πάλαι as in § 20; so II. 4 § 10.

μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες] answering to περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον of § 5.

17 καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων κτλ] The user may be in a higher position than the maker: c. 4 § 18 ὁ αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος (ὁ αὐλοποιός. η. (499). SUSEM. (574)

19 ὅσων τᾶργα κτλ] viz. all those subjects in which the products (?) are

understood, even by such as are unacquainted with the art.

§ 15 Second objection (see § 10). The least capable citizens have the most authority: sovereignty resides with them.

27 ὥσπερ εἴρηται] § 8. 'Solon and some other legislators.' SUSEM. (575)

§ 16 31 ταμιεύουσι... 32 μειζόνων] "But for the treasurership and the ministry of war and the highest offices men of higher property qualification are required." Even at Athens the "Treasurers of the Goddess" as they were called, and the treasurers of the other temples, though appointed by lot, were always taken from the highest class only: Schömann p. 418 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (576)

The reply. Strictly speaking no single ecclesiast or dicast is a magistrate: he is only a fraction or element of the composite magistrate or public official, the assembly and the law court.

λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταύτ' (VI)  
 § 17 ὀρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλη-  
 35 σιαστὴς ἀρχῶν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ  
 δῆμος· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μῦθόν ἐστι τούτων (λέγω  
 δὲ μῦθον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστήν καὶ τὸν δικα-  
 § 18 στήν). ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολ-  
 λῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα  
 40 δὲ πλείον τὸ τούτων πάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἓνα καὶ κατ'  
 § 19 ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω 13  
 1282b τούτων τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανε-  
 ρὸν οὐδέν οὕτως ἕτερον ὥς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυ-  
 ρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἀρχοντα δέ, ἂν τε εἰς ἂν τε  
 πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνα- (p. 78)  
 5 τοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθό-  
 § 20 λου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς δεῖ εἶναι  
 τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει  
 τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις

40 τὸ before τούτων omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, hence [τὸ] Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || πάντων τούτων Π<sup>2</sup>  
 Bk. || 41 ἔχόντων Π<sup>2</sup>

1282 b 1 τὸν τρόπον τούτων M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 6 διορίσαι] δηλώσαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || εἶναι δεῖ P<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
 || 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ.....10 ἀδίκους transposed to follow 11 νόμους by Congreve; to follow

33 καὶ ταῦτα] ἡ τάξις αὐτῇ τῆς πολι-  
 τείας, § 10.

§ 18 39 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δέ κτλ.] More-  
 over the amount of property at which all  
 these are rated is far greater collectively  
 than the property of individuals in high  
 offices and of the members of small  
 boards.

§ 19 41 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Tren-  
 delenburg thinks that we do not quite  
 clearly see whether Aristotle is only  
 setting up his analogies dialectically or de-  
 fending them as his own opinion. There  
 can be no doubt, however, especially after  
 such an explicit explanation as is here  
 given, that the latter is the case: nor  
 can any reason be discovered, even on  
 other grounds, for a doubt of this kind.  
 SUSEM. (577)

1282 b 1 ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία]  
 This is the question treated in c. 10, and  
 then partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1—5, viz.  
 who is to possess supreme authority?  
 (Comp. § 6 n. 568.) The answer was  
 "the whole of the bourgeois body in every  
 state which has any degree of excellence":  
 and on the basis of this decision, the  
 point which came up at c. 10 § 5 is now

settled by the addition of the qualifying  
 clause "but in accordance with the laws,"  
 and in such a way that the greater or less  
 degree of excellence and correctness of  
 the laws is determined by that of the  
 constitution to which they correspond.  
 This raises the question of the relative  
 merit of the normal constitutions which  
 we proceed to answer in cc. 12, 13: see  
 however *Introd.* p. 41 f. SUSEM. (578)  
 3 κειμένους ὀρθῶς] if they are good  
 laws.

τὸν ἀρχοντα δέ κτλ.] "and the ruler,  
 be he one or many, must only be sove-  
 reign in such cases as the laws are quite  
 unable to lay down precisely, because  
 of the inherent difficulty of framing  
 general rules applicable to all cases."  
 Comp. c. 15 § 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with  
 nn. (637, 652, 653): *Nic. Eth.* v. 10. 4,  
 1147 b 13. Here again Aristotle is  
 following Plato, *Politicus* 294 A—303:  
 see n. (637) on c. 15 § 4. SUSEM. (579)

To these references *Laws* ix 875 c  
 may be added (Jackson *ad loc.* *Nic. Eth.*)  
 also *Pol.* II. 8 § 22.

§ 20 8 πάλαι] At c. 10 § 5: comp. n.  
 (578). SUSEM. (580)



- 9 ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους † σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δι- (VI)  
 § 21 καλοὺς † ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν  
 πολιτείαν κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. <ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως ταῖς  
 9 <πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι  
 <καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους.> ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι  
 12 τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους.  
 τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.  
 12 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VII  
 15 ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριω-  
 τάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις. ἔστι δὲ  
 πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμ-

13 δικαίους by Schneider (who however brackets the sentence), and Schmidt (who then emends <τι> γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο <ἢ> ὁμοίως.....ἀδίκους;), while Thurot omits ἀλλὰ γὰρ and transposes 8 καὶ ὁμοίως..... 10 ἀδίκους to follow 11 δῆλον ὅτι. A double recension, 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ..... 10 ἀδίκους = 10 πλὴν τοῦτο..... 11 τοῦτο, wrongly assumed by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || καὶ before ὁμοίως II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Schneider Rasso Thurot Bernays, <εἰ> καὶ Koraes, ὦν Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (si similiter William) || On cc. 12, 13 see *Introd.* 41 ff. || 15 δὲ II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Scaliger Bonitz Spengel || 16 ἔστι δὲ Scaliger || 17 <τὸ> Susem.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως] 'for relatively to the constitutions the laws, too, must necessarily be bad or good, just or unjust.' Comp. VI(IV). I § 9 n. (1128), Isocr. VII. 14. SUSEM. (581)

In cc. 12, 13 true constitutional principles take a more definite shape. In a note to his Translation, p. 172, Bernays remarks that these two chapters "contain a separate sketch for the discussion of the same questions which are partly treated in cc. 9—11, partly in cc. 16, 17. As the sketch presents some peculiarities, e.g. the mention of ostracism, c. 13 § 15 ff., those who arranged Aristotle's papers thought it ought to be preserved; and the place they assigned to it seemed recommended by the close connexion of its contents with the neighbouring chapters. Where the tautologies thus arising appeared too obvious, the attempt was made to lessen them by formulae like εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον 13 § 1, § 2. According to Aristotle's intention, the beginning of c. 14 should join on directly to the close of c. 11": the reason assigned being that the words φάμεν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην, 14 § 1, find no connexion at the close of c. 13, but refer back to the words κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας of 11 § 22. This view has been already examined, *Introd.* pp. 42, 43.

c 12 § 1 14 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις] Comp. I.

§ 1 n. (1), *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 § 4, 1094 a 26. SUSEM. (582)

The structure of this sentence is disputed. Scaliger, Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period from 14 ἐπεὶ to 22 λαμβάνειν. But this requires δὲ in line 15, whereas δὴ is the reading of II<sup>1</sup>.

16 δύναμις] Joined with αὐτὰς τέχναις, II. 8 § 18; so *Rhet.* I. 2 § 1, ἔστω δὲ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἑκαστον τοῦ θεωρησῆαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐτέρας ἐστὶ τέχνης ἔργον.

ἔστι δὲ... 17 δίκαιον] 'The good for the state, i.e. the interest of the commonwealth, can only be justice.' πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν is the subject and τοῦτο refers to this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the next sentence, is predicate. See c. 10 § 2 and the references given in n. (562). SUSEM. (583)

It is convenient at this place to reproduce, from *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, the fuller account of πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, the embodiment of 'right' or 'justice' in civil society: τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἰσῶν ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, the justice of free and (proportionately or actually) equal citizens living together with a view to the satisfaction of wants. When this is not the case there is only an analogical sort of justice, τι δίκαιον καὶ κατ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρός

φέρουν. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι (VII)  
 γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς  
 20 διώριστα περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν (τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ  
 § 2 δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι φασίν). ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ  
 ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν  
 καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ §  
 παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρ-  
 25 χάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι  
 τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες. τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκ-  
 § 3 καιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται  
 καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὅτι οὖν τῶν  
 29 ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπέρ-  
 § 4 χουσιν. ἡ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν

19 [ἐν οἷς.....ἠθικῶν] Stahr || 21 δ' omitted by P<sup>4</sup> C<sup>o</sup>, [δ'] or else τ' Spengel, δὴ Bonitz || 23 ἴσως.....1283 b 32 δίκαιον noticed by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 8, p. 937 A ff. || 27 [καὶ] Schneider, [τὸ] Ramus || 30 δ' γὰρ Spengel

αὐτοὺς νόμος δ' ἐν οἷς ἀδικία ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου...τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἐλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. See further Jackson's admirable comments, pp. 101—103 of his edition.

18 [ἴσον τι] 'All hold that justice is a species of equality.' So also in *Nic. Eth.*, see n. on 9 § 1.

19 τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις] Strictly scientific or philosophical discussions as contrasted with such as are merely dialectical, *Thoric.* i. 14 § 6, 105 b 30, and with the exoteric discussions carried on from the standpoint of the ordinary or 'envisaging' consciousness, *Eud. Eth.* i. 8 § 4, 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεπται δὲ...καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. Comp. c. 6 § 2; IV(VII). 1 §§ 2, 3 and Excursus to B. IV(VII). τῶν ἠθικῶν] *Nic. Eth.* v. c. 3 which is similarly cited c. 9 § 3; see n. (545). Cp. VIII(V). 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584)

20 τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ] 'For justice is held to be something assigned to certain persons, and must be equal for equals.' One's rights, one's just share, is the nearest English for the concrete δίκαιον. Or, as Mr A. C. Bradley puts it, here is the nearest approach to our modern notion of a 'right.'

§ 2 21 ποίων δ' ἰσότης] Comp. c. 9 § 4, κατὰ τὶ ὅσον χρήμασιν, ὅσον ἐλευ-

θερία, n. (546 b): VIII(V). 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584 b)

22 ἔχει...23 φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν] 'Here lies a difficulty, and a stimulus to research in political science.' SUSEM.

23 κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ] on the ground of superiority in any advantage. This is one of the phrases used in I. 6 § 3. Here certainly *external* goods: see line 28.

26 τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν] 'For (he would say) people who differ have different rights and their relative merits are different.' The correction of Ramus, καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν, changes the sense, 'and their different rights go according to merit.' See n. (1493). SUSEM.

§ 3 On this view superiority in colour (white and dark races?) or size (cp. IV [VII]. 14 § 3) or in any other external good would confer a larger share of political rights. The falsity of this is seen from the other arts.

Eaton compares Nic. Damasc. (s. voc.) 'Ἀλιτέρνηιοι λίβες τοὺς ταχυτάτους αὐτῶν αἰροῦνται βασιλεῖς.

§ 4 31 αὐλητῶν] A partitive genitive with εὐγενεστέροις. The comparison between αὐλητικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ is best known from the discourse of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue 327 A (cp. 323 B). It is doubtless Socratic. Cp. c. 4 § 18.



τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέ- (VII)  
 ροις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔρ-  
 γον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. (p. 79)  
 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγα- 3  
 § 5 γούσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ  
 τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολλὸν δ' ἐλλείπων κατ' εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλ-  
 λος, εἰ καὶ μείζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐλη-  
 τικῆς (λέγω δὲ τὴν τ' εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ  
 40 τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλεον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκείνος  
 κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν· ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας  
 1283 a τῶν αὐλῶν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπερ-  
 οχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ'  
 § 6 οὐδέν. ἔτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν 4  
 ἂν εἴη συμβλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως

33 οὐδὲ Γ Μ\* || 35 εἰ δὲ.....1283 a 3 οὐδέν is regarded as an interpolation by Riese, who wrongly thinks the inferiority of αὐλητικὴ to nobility and beauty to have been previously stated

1283 a 4 [μᾶλλον] Ridgeway, ἐνάμειλλον? Ingram

32 τὴν τέχνην] Adverbial accus. after ὁμοίων, as after ἴσος II. 2 § 6, ἐξ ἴσου I. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ in line 25.

33 δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον κτλ.] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.

34 καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν = the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν = advantage in respect of flutes.

35 προαγαγούσιν] "if we advance a little further." Intrans. as in *Phys.* I. 1 § 2, 184 a 19, προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφέστερων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα, *Poet.* 4 § 7, 1448 b 23, κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες. It appears then that αὐτὸ is a nom., as 5 § 4: 'of itself.'

§ 5 38 εἰ καὶ...41 αὐλητικήν] "even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes." I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Bernays, we understand ἐκεῖνα from what precedes as the subject of ὑπερέχουσι. Riese treats the

entire passage 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον...1283 a 3 οὐδέν as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assertion that the remark 'although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty' has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen *Beiträge zu Arist. Poet.* II. p. 71 (159)f. SUSEM.

Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle's constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. II § 17 λέγω δὲ...δικαστήν, *Rhet.* I. 11 § 26, 1371 b 20, *ib.* III. 2 § 6, 1404 b 32. Vahlen also urges this in defence of καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει in c. I § 4 of the present book of the *Politics*.

1283 a 1 δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.

4 συμβλητόν = commensurable. See *De gen. et corr.* II. 6 §§ 1, 2 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβλητά), ἀνάγκη ταῦτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἅπασιν τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ὥς μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἰεν ἀέρος δέκα.

§ 6 εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος] 'For if a given bodily stature (confers political privileges) more than' i.e. in preference to—here we must supply 'a certain amount of wealth or good birth.'

5 ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς (VII)  
ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλείον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ  
ὁδὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλείον ἀρετῆς μέγεθος ὅλως ὑπερ-  
έχειν \* \*, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσόνδε γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ  
§ 7 κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύ-  
10 νατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ  
πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ' ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν  
βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλείον  
τοὺς δ' ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἢ τού-  
§ 8 των διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν). ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συν-  
15 ἔστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν.  
διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ ἐπικεῖς καὶ πλού-  
σιοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα  
φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ

6 ἢ.....ὑπερέχειν omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> || 7 <εἰ> καὶ πλείον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῇ  
μεγέθους Bernays || ὑπερέχειν ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος P<sup>2.3.4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Plutarch Bk. ||  
ὑπερέχειν <ἐνδέχεται>? Susem., ὑπερέχει Ar. Plutarch Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (corrector)  
and perhaps Γ || 8 [πάντα] Bernays || [μέγεθος] Susem. || 10 καὶ omitted by  
Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> || 11 ἀνισότητα P<sup>4</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and Plutarch, ἰσότητ' Γ M<sup>a</sup>, ἰσότητα  
P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 16 περὶ τῆς P<sup>4.6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || ἐπικεῖς Susem., εὐγενεῖς Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2.3.4</sup> Ar.  
Ald. Plutarch Susem.<sup>1</sup> (in the text), συγγενεῖς Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>. Cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 393  
|| καὶ πλούσιοι after 17 καὶ ἐλεύθεροι Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Plutarch Bk. || 17 τ' omitted by M<sup>a</sup>  
P<sup>1</sup>, hence [τ'] Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>

5 ἐνάμιλλον εἴη = would enter the lists  
with, be comparable to.

6 ὥστ' εἰ πλείον κτλ] 'Hence if  
A's superiority in stature exceeds B's  
superiority in merit, and (if) in general  
stature *can* exceed merit, evidently every-  
thing is comparable with everything else'  
—*can* represents the ἐνδέχεται conjectured  
to stand after ὑπερέχειν. Bernays  
takes <εἰ> καὶ πλείον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῇ  
μεγέθους, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ as all belonging  
to the apodosis: "then, although virtue  
in itself is more excellent than bodily size,  
yet a common measure can be found."

8 τοσόνδε γὰρ εἰ κρεῖττον κτλ] If a  
cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic  
inch of silver, then clearly a certain  
amount of gold is *equal* to a cubic inch of  
silver. But this being impossible in the  
case where wealth, or bodily strength,  
competes with virtue, it follows that "in  
politics as well as (καὶ) the other sciences  
or faculties (§ 3) it is not every kind of  
inequality on which men ground their  
claims to public office, and this for good  
reason." μέγεθος, except in line 8, =  
stature, not 'amount.'

§ 8 14 ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνέστηκεν]  
But it is on the ground of the elements  
of which a city is composed that they  
necessarily contend for state offices, ὡς  
κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντας § 4. Of these  
'elements' of the city, the various factors  
or sections of society whose preponderance  
fixes the constitution and the nature of  
the qualification for political power, he  
enumerates three; merit, wealth, and free  
birth. Comp. *nn.* on 7 § 2, 9 § 1; also  
VI(IV). 8 §§ 7—9.

17 τίμημα is the rated valuation of  
taxable property, upon which taxes were  
levied. Generally speaking, it was greatly  
below the true, or selling, value. Thus  
τίμημα φέρειν or ἔχειν = to have property  
so estimated, to be a taxpayer, *because*  
returning a rateable value of property.  
So in VI(IV). 13 § 2, τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι  
τίμημα and τοῖς ἀπόροις are found opposed,  
and *ib.* 6 § 2, κτᾶσθαι τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρι-  
μένον. But in itself τίμημα does not mean  
taxes.

18 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπόρων... 19 δούλων] A  
body of needy paupers would not have  
the necessary leisure, II. 9 § 2. A body



§ 9 οὐδ' ἐκ δούλων). ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δηλον ὅτι καὶ  
 20 δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τού-  
 των οἰκείσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προ-  
 13 τέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκείσθαι κα-  
 ἐνὶ γὰρ τούτων ὁρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγα-  
 25 θὴν ἢ παιδεία καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβη- (p. 80)  
 τοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε  
 πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἔν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε  
 ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἑν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς  
 § 2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό-  
 30 τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες,  
 ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλείον  
 μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἢ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ  
 συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν· οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι

20 πολιτικῆς P<sup>4</sup> and Plutarch || 25 δικαίως] ἀναγκαίως P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 27 ἴσων  
 P<sup>2</sup> (apparently), P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand)  
 and P<sup>1</sup>, ἴσων ἴσον Ar. and corrector of P<sup>1-4</sup> in the margin:—in P<sup>1</sup> another ἴσον is added  
 in the margin after the ἴσον altered by P<sup>1</sup> into ἴσων || 32 τὰ omitted by M<sup>6</sup> P<sup>1</sup>,  
 hence [τὰ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

of slaves would be without natural rulers,  
 1. 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle  
 could not consistently allow that any  
 barbarian *ἔθνος* constituted a 'city.' The  
 monarchy which is one of his normal  
 governments is not monarchy over bar-  
 barians.

§ 9 21 ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων] These  
 indispensable factors or elements, *ἃν ἄνευ*  
*οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις*, c. 5 § 2, IV (VII). 8 § 1.  
 But justice and virtue are equally indis-  
 pensable if the city is to live properly.

c. 13 § 1 These claimants for power  
 (*ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν*, 12 § 7) stand on  
 a different footing according as we look (1)  
 to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the  
 highest life, which is nowhere realized  
 save in the ideal state.

23 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι] 'In  
 view of the bare existence of a city,' as  
 contrasted with *εἶναι ζῆν*, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. *τὸ*  
*πόλιν εἶναι* = *τὸ συζῆν* of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14.

24 πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν κτλ.]  
 Comp. I. 2 § 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (585)

25 ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ] καὶ explica-  
 tive. Education (culture) and virtue are  
 words which Aristotle uses interchange-  
 ably in this connexion. We may add  
 merit, *κατ' ἀξίαν* = *κατ' ἀρετὴν*, 5 § 5  
 (Bradley). See also *Rhet.* I. 8 § 4 with

Cope's note p. 156 f.

26 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 9. Compare  
*Introd.* p. 42. SUSEM. (586)

27 πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν κτλ.] 'that those  
 who are equal in some one thing only  
 (cp. 9 § 4 *κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι*) should have an  
 equal share of everything.'

29 τοιαύτας] All states based on  
 such equality and inequality (Congreve).

§ 2 καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 1. It was  
 said, *Introd.* p. 42, that this reference  
 cannot be dislodged from its place so  
 easily as the preceding one, as Bernays'  
 suggestion (*n.* on c. 12 § 1) requires.  
 SUSEM. (587)

31 ὅτι πλείον...32 κοινόν] "that they  
 are larger landowners and that the land is  
 a public concern." A national interest;  
 one to which we can widely or generally  
 appeal: *quod ad communem salutem et*  
*utilitatem pertinet*, Bonitz s.v. See also  
 Cope on *κοινότερον*, *Rhet.* I. 1 § 10. But  
 Bernays renders 'is a common foundation  
 of the state'—which can hardly be right.

32 ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια κτλ.] "Further  
 (that) for the most part they are  
 more trustworthy for the transactions of  
 life," as they have not the temptations of  
 the poor.

33 "The claims of the free born and

καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων (πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ (VII)  
 35 γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἢ δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις  
 § 3 οἴκοι τίμιος· ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων,  
 εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ γένους)· ὁμοίως δὲ φήσομεν δι- 8  
 καίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν \* \*, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ  
 39 ἀρετὴν εἶναι φάμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἣ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον  
 § 4 ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς  
 ἐλάττους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους  
 εἰσὶν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους.  
 1283 b ἀρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶον οἷ τ'  
 ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλήθος ἄλλο τι  
 πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ, ἢ

35 δ'] τ' Zwinger, τ' or γὰρ Susem. || 37 δὲ Plutarch Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> and apparently  
 Γ (autem William):—perhaps right. But see Vahlen *Poetic* p. 191 ed. 3 (p. 161 ed. 2)  
 || 38 ἀμφισβητεῖν <καὶ μάλιστα τὴν δικαιοσύνην> or something similar Susem. || 42  
 συλλαμβανομένων? Stahr, συμβαλλομένων Korais

1283 b 2 τι omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (ἀλλ' ὅτι P<sup>4</sup>), hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

of the nobles are closely related." Supply  
 διαμφοσβητοῦσιν. ἐγγὺς is nearly equiva-  
 lent to an adjective, see n. on II. 9 § 5.

34 ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων] From time im-  
 memorial, as noble birth stands to merely  
 free birth so free birth and descent from  
 citizens have been opposed to the status  
 of slaves and freedmen: see I. 6 §§ 7, 8,  
 a passage which should be compared with  
 the following words also. SUSEM. (588)

34 ff. This is confirmed on two grounds:  
 (1) the nobles are the truest citizens, and  
 (2) the cream of the citizens. Properly  
 speaking, it is only in a republic that a  
 real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Free-  
 man, *Comparative Politics*, Lect. VI. pp.  
 246—270.

35 The use of γενναιότεροι and ἀγεν-  
 νῶν does not bear out the distinction  
 made in *Rhet.* II. 15 § 3, εὐγενὲς κατὰ  
 τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ  
 τὸ μὴ ἐξιστασθαι τῆς φύσεως.

36 οἴκοι τίμιος] Cp. I. 6 § 7, τοὺς δὲ  
 βαρβάρους νομίζουσιν οἴκοι μόνον εὐγενεῖς,  
 n. (52). SUSEM. (588 b)

βελτίους εἰκὸς] Ambition to win fresh  
 honour is a trait of good birth, τὸ φιλοτι-  
 μότερον εἶναι τὸν κερκτημένον, *Rhet.* II. 15 § 2.

§ 3 37 ἀρετὴ γένους] Comp. *nn.*  
 (54, 55) on I. 6 § 7, VI(IV). 8 § 9 n.  
 (1248), VIII(V). 1 § 7 προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ  
 πλοῦτος, n. (1496). SUSEM. (589)

ὁμοίως δὲ...δικαίως...ἀμφισβητεῖν] As  
 the claim of (a) the wealthy line 31, (b)  
 the free born and the nobles, so now that

of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a  
 partial justification.

With δὲ in enumerations Vahlen, com-  
 menting on *Poet.* 18 § 3, 1455 b 31, com-  
 pares II. 3 § 2, VIII(V). 3 § 16, 4 § 10:  
 often strengthened at the close of a list,  
 as καὶ ὅλως δὲ, καὶ καθόλου δὲ.

38 κοινωνικὴν] 'justice especially; for  
 justice is, as we affirm, a virtue essential  
 to civil society (κοινωνία), on which all the  
 others must necessarily attend': i.e. jus-  
 tice in the sense of obedience to the laws  
 as is more fully explained in *Nic. Eth.* v.  
 1. 12—20, 1129 b 11, ff. [where see  
 Jackson's notes]. Compare too *N. E.*  
 VIII. 1 § 4, 1155 a 22, 9 § 1 ff. 1159 b 25  
 (Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2  
 and the references cited in n. (562).  
 SUSEM. (590) A remarkable reason for  
 the claim of ἀρετῇ, after all we have been  
 told (Wyse).

§ 4 40 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους] sc.  
 δικαίως ἀμφισβητοῦσι. The justice of this  
 claim has been argued in c. 11.

41 καὶ γὰρ κρείττους κτλ] Comp.  
 Plato *Gorgias* 488 D οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ  
 ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; (Eaton).  
 SUSEM. (591)

42 ὡς λαμβανομένων] Comp. c. 10  
 § 2, πάντων ληφθέντων: "if the many  
 are taken in a body and compared with  
 the few in a body" (Congreve).

1283 b 1 λέγω δ' οἶον] I mean, namely.

3 πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις κτλ] The  
 question raised in c. 10.



§ 5 οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων<sup>9</sup>  
 5 ἀναμφισβήτητος ἢ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις  
 διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἢ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ  
 διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη  
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον). ἀλλ' ὁμῶς σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν  
 § 6 αὐτὸν ταύτῃ ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. \* \* εἰ δὴ τὸν 10  
 10 ἀριθμὸν εἰεν ὀλίγοι πάνπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα  
 δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκο-  
 πεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλήθος  
 ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαν-  
 § 7 τας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δό-

8 σκοποῦσι μὲν Ald., σκοπήσομεν? Sylburg, σκοπῶμεν Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, *considerandum est* Ar. || 9 ὑπαρ<sup>χ</sup> Μ<sup>α</sup>, ὑπάρχει P<sup>1</sup> || εἰ δὴ.....13 αὐτῶν; transposed by Thurot to precede 1284 a 4 εἰ δὲ τις; see *Introd.* p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν κτλ]  
 "Under each one of the constitutions mentioned there will be no dispute as to the proper holders of office: for (these constitutions) differ in their sovereigns, e.g. the one by being in the hands of the wealthy, another by being in the hands of the good, and similarly with each of the others." τὰ κύρια is the plural of τὸ κύριον the 'sovereign,' a supreme authority: also found in *Rhet.* I. 8. 2, 1365 b 27 τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύρια ἔστιν, and *Demosth. Falsa Leg.* § 259 p. 424, 11 οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ καὶ τὰ κύρι' ἅττα ποτ' ἔστιν ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων. Cope compares *N. E.* III. 8 § 15, 1116 b 18, τὰ πολιτικά=the citizen levies, as a similar plural.

5 τοῖς κυρίοις] Comp. c. 6 § 1 n. (523), c. 7 § 2 n. (537): also n. (466). SUSEM. (592)

8 περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον] So § 4, ἐν μιᾷ πόλει.

On the following sentence, 9 εἰ δὴ... 13 ἐξ αὐτῶν, see *Introd.* p. 43. Thurot *Études* p. 49 gives a brief analysis of §§ 6—14. Aristotle proposed to investigate what class ought to have power in a state where all sorts of superiority (riches, nobility, virtue, numbers) are represented: and this is his answer: (1) *If the virtuous are few, we must inquire whether they are numerous enough to govern the state or to make a state by themselves*, § 6. (2) *No superiority gives an exclusive right to the exercise of power*, §§ 7—10. (3) *The best laws are relative to the interest*

*of the whole state and to the great body of the citizens. The citizen is not the same under all governments; under the best government he is the good man*, §§ 11, 12. (4) *If a single individual, or a handful of men not numerous enough to form a state by themselves, be preeminent for virtue, they cannot be reduced to the level of equality*, §§ 13, 14. On this answer Thurot remarks; "the first proposition (1) has nothing to do with the question Aristotle has just raised: it is clear that before he discusses what is to be done with the virtuous few he should prove the right of the virtuous to command. The second, (2), has a direct bearing on the question, of which it is the negative solution. The germ of a positive solution is found in (3), but this solution is not given directly; for Aristotle is handling a difficulty as to the end of the best legislation. In (4) he discusses a particular case analogous to that which is the subject of (1). This analogy and the impossibility of understanding (1) in its present place lead me to suppose that the words εἰ δὴ...ἐξ αὐτῶν should be transposed to come after κατ' ἀρετὴν and before εἰ δὲ τις (1284 a 3). Then there will be a good sequence of ideas."

§ 6 13 ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία] So 10 § 1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκόλιν.

§§ 7, 8 The refutation of the several claims is not the same as in c. 10, but is a species of *reductio ad absurdum* by the enforcement on the same ground of the right of the one richest, or noblest, or most virtuous man, or of the strongest group.

- 15 *ῥεῖαν γὰρ <ἀν> οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες* (VII)  
*ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἴ* (p. 31)  
*τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων ἐστί, [δῆλον] ὅτι κατὰ*  
*τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων δεήσει,*  
*ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούν-*  
 § 8 *των δι' ἐλευθερίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν τοῖς συμβήσεται καὶ* 11  
 21 *περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις εἰς ἀμεί-*  
*νων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων*  
*ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταῦτ' δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν*  
*εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν*  
 25 *ὀλίγων, κἂν εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν*  
*πόλλων κρείττους ὥσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δέοι κυρίους*  
 § 9 *εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὲ ταῦτ' ἔοικε ποιεῖν φανε-* 12

15 δόξαιε M<sup>a</sup>, δόξαιεν P<sup>4</sup> (corrector), δόξαιε Ald., δόξαιεν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Plutarch Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || γὰρ <ἀν> Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, <ἀν> γὰρ Götting || 17 [δῆλον ὅτι] Camerarius Bk.<sup>2</sup>, Vahlen (*Beiträge zu Ar. Poetik* IV. 432) tries to save *στι* at least. Comp. also Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* I. p. 58 n. (1) || 20 τοῖς τοῦτο ἴσως P<sup>2-3,4</sup> Plutarch Ar., τοῦτ' ἴσως Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || 27 φανερόν ποιεῖν II<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Bk.

16 δῆλον γὰρ ὡς κτλ] Comp. VII(VI). 3 § 3 n. (1407 b) ἐὰν εἰς ἐχθρὴν πλείων τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος. SUSEM. (592 b)

17 πάλιν=αδ, in this case as in the former.

18 τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων] This is called *τυραννίς* in VII(VI). 3 § 3.

§ 8 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρ. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp. c. 5 § 5 n. (508), c. 7 §§ 3, 4 with nn. (536, 8). SUSEM. (593)

There provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, cc. 16, 17; viz. εἰς τις ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων. All the governing class are good, but he is pre-eminent in goodness.

24 εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος κτλ] Comp. Pl. *Gorg.* 489 E ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (594)

§§ 9, 10 πάντα δὲ ταῦτα κτλ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. L. Stein (*Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissenschaft* IX. p. 157) and Hildenbrand (p. 422) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects as incorrect all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true concep-

tion of a state, as elevated above all particular opposing interests, although he could not quite attain to it, "since the autocratic conception of authority had not been able anywhere in Greece to rise above the conflict of parties to the development of its own activity, and even Aristotle was unacquainted with the only means of elevating it above this conflict, namely, true constitutional monarchy," cp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. Hildenbrand rightly remarks in answer to Stein, that it is just this negative result which leads to the positive construction of an ideal state, built upon this foundation. Hildenbrand however has also failed to see that even at this point something more than the mere negative result has been attained, and that one claim at any rate, viz. that of superior merit, is only provisionally rejected,—whether it be the case that the excellence of remarkable individuals is *superior* or *inferior* to that of the general mass of citizens. Comp. Aristotle's own express statements 17 §§ 5, 6 nn. (680, 681), VIII (V). I § 6 n. (1495): which contain by implication the positive result, that only two forms of government can be the best, viz. those which rest upon the one or the other of the above opposite conditions, an ideal monarchy and an aristocracy. The immediate context §§ 11, 12 shows that Aristotle desires



- ρὸν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὄρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθὸς ἐστὶ, καθ' ὃν ἀξι- (VII)  
 οὔσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι  
 § 10 πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιούοντας  
 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ  
 πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον·  
 οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων  
 καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὥς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς ἀθρόους.  
 § 11 διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσιν  
 36 τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν (ἀποροῦσι γὰρ 13  
 τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθε-  
 σθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμ-  
 39 φέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων), ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν.  
 § 12 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς

28 ὀρθῶς Q<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (ἀποροῦσι...  
 39 πλειόνων) Bernays: earlier editions have a full stop at ἀπαντᾶν and no parenthesis  
 || 37 βουλομένῳ <γε> Schneider || 40 γὰρ Susem., δ' Γ Π Plutarch Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

distinctly to express this here. See *nn.*  
 (597, 599). SUSEM. (595)

28 τῶν ὄρων οὐδεὶς κτλ.] Cp. § 1 n.  
 None of the 'standards,' i.e. the defining  
 principles upon which they claim to  
 govern.

§ 10 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύ-  
 ματος] to control the governing body.

33 τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν  
 ὀλίγων] This is the thesis which Grote  
 is striving to prove throughout his history,  
 taking the Athenian Demos as his great  
 example. He dwells upon the sacrifices  
 of which it was capable at Salamis and  
 Argennusae, upon its financial honesty,  
 as attested by an undebased coinage, and  
 its wise moderation in the hour of triumph,  
 when after the unparalleled provocations  
 of the Thirty it consented to a general  
 amnesty, B.C. 403. The appeals made  
 to the humanity and enthusiasm of the  
 multitude had most chance of success, as  
 the cases of Paches and Diagoras prove.  
 Against all this must be set the panic  
 and terror at the time of the mutilation of  
 the Hermæ and the hasty condemnation  
 of the generals at Athens, the troubles of  
 Corcyra and Samos, and other occasional  
 outbursts of popular fury like the Scytal-  
 ism at Argos.

34 οὐχ ὥς καθ' ἕκαστον] See the  
 parallel expression in c. 11 § 2 and the  
 note on II. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 ζητοῦσι...τινες] Was this  
 also in writing? SUSEM. (596)

προβάλλουσιν] "bring forward as a

problem"; whence πρόβλημα.

36 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν...39  
 ὅταν συμβαίῃ κτλ.] May be met as  
 follows (in § 12) in the case supposed.

37 τίθεσθαι] Properly, to enact.  
 But Herod. I. 29, II. 177 of Solon.

39 τὸ λεχθέν] That is, the case  
 when the aggregate merit of the great  
 majority surpasses that of prominently  
 able individual men. SUSEM. (597)

§ 12 40 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως]  
 The problem is to find the standard to  
 which the most upright laws (τοὺς  
 ὀρθοτάτους νόμους) must conform. Here  
 the right must be taken to mean the  
 equably right, and the equably right  
 regards the interest of the whole city  
 and the welfare of the citizens. For  
 ἴσως=aequaliter Shilleto quotes Plato  
*Laus* VII. 805 A Σαυρομάτιδας αἰς τῶν  
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπλων κοινωνία καὶ τοῖς  
 ἀνδράσιν ἴση προστεταγμένη ἴσως ἀσκέται:  
*Epin.* 991 A ἴσως δὲ τοῦ ἐλάττονος πλεον  
 ἐλαττόν τε τοῦ μείζονος: Dem. *De Pace*  
 59, 18 ἡμεῖς οὐτε συμφόρους οὐτ' ἴσως οὐτε  
 καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας; Isocr. *Panegy.*  
 77 συνθήκαι...αἵτινες ἂν ἴσως καὶ κοινῶς  
 ἀμφοτέροις ἔχωσι, and probably Soph.  
*Philoct.* 758. Though restored in *Pol.*  
 II. 6 § 20, it is not elsewhere certain in  
 Aristotle. It is however a v. l. VI (IV).  
 14 § 12, *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 § 6. Also found  
 in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 9 § 10, 1430 a 1, ἂν  
 ἴσως καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς προσφερόμεθα  
 (? a citation).

41 πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· (VII)  
 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι  
 1284 a ἐστί, καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρί-  
 στην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν  
 a 3 πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

§ 6  
 1283 b 9

<\* \* εἰ δὲ τὸν

10 <ἀριθμὸν εἶναι ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα  
 11 <δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν,  
 12 <εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλήθος  
 13 <ὅστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; >

1284 a 1 πρὸς] κατὰ Schneider, perhaps rightly || 3 τὸν after βίον omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand)

1283 b 9 \* \* Conring Thurot (by Susem.<sup>1</sup> placed after 13 αὐτῶν), see Comm. n. (599). Spengel assumes either a lacuna before this passage, or that it should be transposed to follow either (1) 1283 a 40 τὰς ἄλλας or (2) 1283 b 8 τρόπον || δὲ Susem.<sup>2</sup>, δὴ Γ II Plutarch Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> in the text || 11 διελεῖν τὸν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Plutarch Bk. || 12 [ἢ] Schneider, probably right

42 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν κτλ] A neat formula summing up the results of cc. 1-9.

1284 a 1 καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος] See c. 1 § 10 n. (440). SUSEM. (598)

1284 a 1 πρὸς δὲ...3 ἀρετὴν] In the best constitution, the better class (βελτίους) coincides not merely with the majority but even with the whole mass of citizens: cp IV(VII). 9 § 3; 13 §§ 9, 10; VI(IV). 7 §§ 2-4. Thurot rightly remarks that after the negative answer §§ 5-10 n. (595) to the question first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11, 12 also contains the germs of a positive answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed to follow directly upon it, the answer is continued in the context without interruption of the connexion. Thurot is no less right when he observes that this solution is no direct answer to the former questions, but as regards its form is only an answer to the subordinate question of § 11 itself. There is therefore a considerable hiatus after § 12. But Thurot is scarcely correct and clear when he assumes that it can be supplied from §§ 11, 12 if we draw the conclusion that "in a state where there are virtuous men, rich men, nobles, and a mass of citizens, power belongs to all those who have true civic virtue, this being something different from moral virtue not only under an ideal government but everywhere else." In my opinion, we should rather expect the

conclusion that in the best constitution, all citizens ought to have equal rights, and that the true aristocracy is one in which all citizens are provided with sufficient property. But where the excellence (ἀρετή) of the few is equal to that of the many, especially if neither exceed a certain amount, in default of other means of satisfying the claims of both parties, either the exercise of full citizenship, or else the merely passive right of being elected to office (11 § 8 n. 569), must depend on a moderate property qualification, and wealth be introduced as a supplementary consideration. Thus, although inferior to aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity, would still be included among the normal forms, and would in such a case be better than democratic equality. SUSEM. (599)

2 ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος] Comp. Top. IV. 5 § 11, 126 b 9; οὐτὲ γὰρ ὁ προαιρούμενος ἀδυνατῶν δέ, οὐθ' ὁ δυνάμενος μὴ προαιρούμενος δὲ διάβολος ἢ φέναξ.

§ 6 1283 b 9 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...13 πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] "But if the possessors of virtue are altogether few in number, how should we decide (Bernays: set the limits)? Or must their fewness be considered relatively to the task; are they competent to administer the city or, in other words, numerous enough to form a city themselves?" Schneider rightly saw that the last sentence contained a single supposition: able to manage the city, because strong enough to form a city by themselves.



§ 13 εἰ δέ τις ἐστὶν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερ- VIII  
 1284 a 4 5 βολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἐνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα πα-  
 ρέχσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων  
 ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς (p. 82)  
 τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θε-  
 τέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων,  
 10 ἄνιστοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν·  
 § 14 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν  
 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους 2  
 καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος.  
 αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις

1284 a 4 εἷς] εἷς Γ M\* P<sup>4</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 5 δυνατὸν Γ M\* || παρα-  
 σχέσθαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

§ 13 1284 a 4 τοσοῦτον διαφέρων...  
 6 ὥστε μὴ...] So preeminent...that the  
 merit of the rest is not commensurable.

4 κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν] 'in excess  
 of merit'=by reason of his exalted  
 merit. So *N. Eth.* IX. 4 § 6, 10 § 5 ἢ  
 ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας=friendship in the  
 extreme, or exalted friendship.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one  
 such prince of men, (2) a number of them  
 too small to form the 'complement' of a  
 city. Comp. for πλήρωμα VI(IV). 4 § 12  
 and *Pl. Rep.* II. 371 E (where the sense  
 is slightly different).

5 ἢ πλείους...6 πόλεως] The second  
 case hardly belongs, strictly speaking, to  
 this place, since it requires that one kind  
 of collective virtue be added to another;  
 and in this kind of calculation it is  
 impossible to decide where to stop  
 adding particular men to the virtuous  
 minority, while the result of the calcula-  
 tion varies according to our decision.  
 Therefore Aristotle in what follows  
 neglects this case entirely and does not  
 construct from it a 'truest' form of  
 aristocracy beyond and above the true  
 one. Comp. c. 17 § 5, 18 § 1 with *nn.*  
 (678, 682). SUSEM. (600)

7 τὴν πολιτικὴν] In other words,  
 τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δύναμιν (Congreve).

9 μέρος] The phrase μέρος εἶναι = με-  
 τέχειν or κοινωνεῖν τῆς πόλεως: see IV(VII).  
 4 § 6; 8 § 1, § 6; 9 § 4. It is opposed  
 to the indispensable adjuncts (ὧν ἄνευ  
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) which are excluded from  
 the franchise. 'The conditions of com-  
 mon political life cease to be applicable;  
 the great man is not an equal amongst  
 equals to be bound by equal rules'

(Bradley). Trans.: "these men must cease  
 to be accounted members of the city.  
 For they will be wronged if they are  
 deemed worthy of mere equality when  
 they are so far superior (*δυνατοὶ*) in merit  
 and civil capacity." See II. 7 § 18 *n.*,  
 VIII(V). 1 § 3.

11 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν] Comp. § 25 and  
*n.* (615). Aristotle could hardly express  
 more strongly how improbable he himself  
 considers this case. His reasons for  
 considering it notwithstanding are no  
 doubt those mentioned in 8 § 1 for  
 the consideration of other no less im-  
 probable cases. Cp. *n.* (542) and *Introd.*  
 p. 70 f. See also *n.* (678) on III. 17. 5.  
 Bradley *Hellenica* p. 239 rightly traces  
 this thought to its origin in Plato's  
*Politicus*. SUSEM. (601)

Plato's words are πασῶν γὰρ ἐκείνην γε,  
 sc. τὴν ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν, ἐκκριτέον, οἷον  
 θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν,  
 303 B.

§ 14 13 κατὰ=anent, applicable to,  
 binding upon; and not necessarily  
 'against'. Even the rule of law does  
 not bind such men.

"This sentence κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ  
 ἔστι νόμος occurs word for word in St  
 Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, c. 5 v. 23,  
 suggesting, at all events, a direct adapta-  
 tion from Aristotle." (T. L. Heath.)

14 αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος] Comp. 17  
 § 2 *n.* (675). SUSEM. (601 b)

"Comp. the identical sentiment in St  
 Paul *Romans* c. 2 v. 14, where ἐαυτοῖς  
 εἰσι νόμος is applied to ἔθνη τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα  
 νόμον, further described (v. 15) as men  
 who do by nature (φύσει) the same things  
 as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have

15 πειρώμενος κατ' αὐτῶν. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἅπερ Ἀντισθέ- (VIII)  
νης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ  
§ 15 ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρακι-

16 δημηγορούντων P<sup>4</sup> and M<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), δημουργούντων Γ || 17 διὸ καὶ.....  
1284 b 34 πολέσω Krohn regards as a spurious addition: against this view see Comm.  
n. (602 b)

moral virtue" (T. L. Heath). Comp. *Nic. Eth.* iv. 8 § 10, 1128 a 32, *ὅσον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ*.

15 Ἀντισθένης] The celebrated pupil of Socrates who founded the Cynic school. The quotation is probably from his work *Πολιτικός*, 'The Statesman': cp. A. Müller *De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis* p. 64 (Marburg 1860): Zeller *Socrates and Socratics* p. 323 n. (41) and c. 13 generally, p. 284 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (602)

*Treatment of disproportionate eminence in the imperfect constitutions: §§ 15—23.*

Motives of self-preservation lead democracies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15, 16. This has a counterpart in the execution by violence of eminent citizens which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in the policy pursued by sovereign states (Persia, Athens) in humbling their subjects, § 19.

Compare Grote's masterly defence of Ostracism: c. 31, iv. pp. 200—212.

§ 15 17 διὸ... ὀστρακισμὸν] It is improbable that this conception of Ostracism is the correct one. It was resorted to rather when two party leaders had each about the same number of followers and thus the machinery of the state was likely to be brought to a dead lock. In such cases, the removal of one converted the other into the leading statesman. This at any rate was the significance of this institution at the best period of the Athenian democracy, although according to Philochoros, *Fr.* 79 b, it was at Athens originally directed against the followers of the Peisistratidae (*μόνος δὲ Τπέρβολος ἐκ τῶν ἀδόξων... ἐξοστρακισθῆναι διὰ μοχθηρίαν τρόπων, οὐ δὲ ὑποψίαν τυραννίδος*: μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ κατελύθη τὸ ἔθος, ἀρξάμενον νομοθετήσαντος Κλεισθέ- νους, ὅτε τοὺς τυράννους κατέλυσε, ὅπως συνεβάλῃ καὶ τοὺς φίλους αὐτ... Müller *Frag. hist. gr.* i. p. 397, 3 ff.); and else- where too it may have had a similar origin. Thus it is possible that here Aristotle really adheres to the original intention of Ostracism (so Seeliger in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxv. 1877 742, n. 8) though on the other hand in his remarks

further on, § 23, there can be no doubt that he refers to its later degeneracy (n. 613). This institution prevailed at Athens from the time of Cleisthenes until the latter half of the Peloponnesian War or even later (n. 613), at Argos, viii(v). 3 § 3 n. (1509 b), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, and Ephesus. At Athens the question whether there should be an Ostracism in any particular year was regularly debated and voted on in the popular assembly. If the result was affirmative, a day was fixed for another meeting of the Assembly, at which at least 6000 citizens had to be present: so Fränkel and before him Lugebil *On the nature and historical significance of Ostracism at Athens* in the *Suppl. to the Jahrb. f. Philol.* N. S. iv. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherd the name of the person whom he wished to banish, and the man who was thus designated by the majority had to leave Athens within 10 days for a term of ten years, subsequently diminished to five; he might however be recalled before that time by a vote of the Assembly. See Schömann pp. 182, 338, 395 Eng. tr. with Fränkel's corrections *op. cit.* p. 92 f. n. 1: cp. pp. 14 ff. 52, 80 ff. SUSEM. (603)

One part of the Berlin papyrus, on which hardly decipherable fragments of Aristotle's *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* have been discovered, relates to the establishment of ostracism. 'Aristotle distinguishes two phases in the development of this institution. At first the dread of a restoration of the Peisistratidae prevailed, and (a) relatives or friends of Hippias and Hipparchus were banished. Later on, as a settled institution, it fell upon (b) any who by preponderant influence threatened to become dangerous to democratic equality, such as Aristides and Xanthippos.' Diels restores ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν Ἐξηκ- [εστίδου τοὺς τῶν τυράννων] φίλους ὀστρά- κισον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἀντιπολιτευο- μένων (?) θταν] τις δὲ σχῆ μείζω [δύναμιν]. The name of Aristides is recovered from a brief excerpt in pseudo-Heracleides Müller *Frag. Hist. Gr.* ii. p. 209, 7 of the very passage which is but half recovered



σμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· (VIII)  
 αὐταὶ γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,  
 20 ὥστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυ-  
 § 16 φίλιαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστράκιζον καὶ με-  
 θίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὀρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται<sup>3</sup>  
 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ  
 τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὴν  
 25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων.  
 διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου  
 Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν  
 § 17 (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρου εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ-  
 φθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς  
 30 ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν  
 ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγ-

19 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ P<sup>1</sup> || δοκοῦσι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || διώκειν] *persecuntur* William ||  
 20 πολυφύλιαν P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), γρ. πολυφίλιαν corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>

to us: Κλεισθένης τὸν περὶ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμον εἰσηγήσατο, ὃς ἐτέθη διὰ τοὺς τυραννιῶντας (a)· καὶ ἄλλοι τε ὥστρακίσθησαν καὶ Ξάνθιππος καὶ Ἀριστείδης (b). Diels *Ueber die Berliner Fragmente* p. 30.

18 διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν] For this reason, that laws are only destined for those who are more or less on an equality, while an individual grows disinclined to be bound by law in proportion as he rises above this general equality. If this very simple connexion be borne in mind, there is no reason to suspect an interpolation. SUSEM. (602 b)

21 ὥστράκιζον] Note the imperfect; here certainly because Ostracism was obsolete in Aristotle's time. See *n.* on II. 9 § 19.

§ 16 22 μυθολογεῖται κτλ] "Even in the story there is a naive hint that Herakles was out of place in the Argo. When he went on board the ship, it threatened to sink, and when he took hold of an oar, it broke at once in his grasp." (Preller *Gk. Mythol.* II. p. 324.) Pherekydes of Leros (*Fr.* 67), Antimachos, and Poseidippos also state that Herakles was set on shore because the Argo complained that his weight was too great for her (Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. I. 1290), but this was not the only form of the legend. See Apollod. *Bibl.* I. 19. 9, Herod. VII. 193. SUSEM. (604)

24 οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν] "For the Argo refused to carry (ἀγειν) him with the rest

as far outweighing her crew": φθεγξαμένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῦτου βάρος. Apollodorus. I. 9. 19.

27 οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν] 'must not be thought to blame it with absolute justice.'

§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρου] In the account given by Herodotus v. 92, the parts of Periander and Thrasybulos are reversed (Vettori). Aristotle refers to the story again VIII(v). 10 § 13, *n.* (1669). For the tyrant Thrasybulos of Miletus see E. Curtius II. p. 108 f. Eng. tr., and for the tyrants of Miletus in general VIII(v). 5. 8, *n.* 1557. Periander, ruler of Corinth probably from 626 to 585, one of the most brilliant and at the same time most tragical figures among the earlier Greek tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded as one of the first to introduce all those measures which appeared, not without reason, to the Greeks who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as inseparable from the tyrannis. See VIII(v). 11. 4 *n.* (1711); also VIII(v). 12. 3 *nn.* (1751, 1754), VIII(v). 4 § 9, 10 § 16 *nn.* (1525, 1672): E. Curtius I. p. 250 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (605)

Livy (I. 54) borrows the story for Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.

32 συννοήσαι] Comp. σύννου γερόμενον, II. 7. 17.

§ 18 33 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] Oncken (II. 173) says that Aristotle approves of Ostracism. It would be as correct (or

γείλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι (VIII)  
 § 18 δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον 4  
 συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν,  
 35 ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημο-  
 κρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὁστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρό-  
 πον τινὰ τῷ κολοῦειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. (p. 83)  
 § 19 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ  
 κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ  
 40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θάττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν  
 ἀρχήν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περ-  
 1284 b σῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς  
 πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέ-  
 § 20 κοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας ἐστὶ 5

· 37 τῷ τὸ Γ Μ<sup>8</sup> Ρ<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || κωλύειν Γ Μ<sup>8</sup> Ρ<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2-3</sup> (1st hand), γρ.  
 κολοῦειν P<sup>2</sup> (corr. in the margin), reviser of P<sup>3</sup> in the margin, afterwards erased || [καὶ  
 φυγαδεύειν] Valckenaer (on Her. v. 6), perhaps rightly || 41 παρὰ] περὶ P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald.  
 1284 b 2 ἐπέσκοπτε T<sup>b</sup>, ἐπέσχωπτε P<sup>2</sup>

rather incorrect) to deduce from this exposition his approval of the violent measures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he approves of both, but only from the standpoint of Democracy and Tyrannis respectively, two forms of government which he condemns and pronounces to be degenerate types. See however *n.* (614). SUSEM. (606)

35 ὁμοίως ἔχει] i.e. συμφέρει, it is the interest of oligarchies and democracies and accordingly they take such measures.

§ 19 38 περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη] 'in the case of cities and nations' (und. subject to them). See *n.* (11) and the references there given. SUSEM. (607)

39 Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους] Aristotle is thinking of the famous Samian revolt, 441—440 B.C., see E. Curtius II. p. 471 ff. Eng. tr.; Von Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 11 f. SUSEM. (608)

40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους] Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were the only independent states amongst the allies of Athens. In the year 424 however, the Chians were compelled by the Athenians, who had suspicions of their intentions, to pull down their new walls: Thuc. IV. 51. The revolt of Mitylene (428) and almost all the other cities of Lesbos, and their punishment (427) are noticed VIII(V). 4. 6 *n.* (1548): see E. Curtius III. pp. 100 ff. 118 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (609)

ἐπεὶ γὰρ...41 παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας]

'For as soon as they had firmly grasped empire they humbled these states in violation of the compacts made with them.' It is clear from *n.* (609) that this is not true of the Lesbians: even in regard to the Chians and the Samians it scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSEM. (610)

For ἐπεὶ θάττον—as soon as, Shilleto compares Demosth. *Pantaen.* § 41 p. 978, 18, *Conon* § 5 p. 1257, 28: Plato *Protag.* 325 c ἐπειδὴν θάττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, *Alc.* I. 105 A ἐὰν θάττον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παρέλθῃ.

1284 b 1 τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους κτλ.] 'Who had become haughty from having once held empire.' The meaning of ἐπὶ, 'to have been in authority' or 'to have reached empire,' is worth noting. It seems a metaphorical parallel to ἐπ' ἀκρου εἶναι, or ἐπ' εὐθείας κινεῖσθαι. Compare perhaps Dem. *Philipp.* I § 7 p. 42, 4 ἂν ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθέλῃσθε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν.

2 ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις] 'used often to reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Herod. I. 156: externally regarded, his conduct was certainly unusually mild. In regard to the Babylonians see Herod. III. 159 (Eaton). Comp. Duncker's *History of Antiquity* (ed. 4) IV. pp. 334 ff., 464 ff., 477 ff. (vol. VI. cc. 6, 7, 14 Eng. tr.). SUSEM. (611)



τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι (VIII)  
 5 πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ  
 περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει  
 § 21 τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ  
 ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλ-  
 λοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῶον, οὐδ' εἰ δια-  
 10 φέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε πρύμναν ναυπηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων  
 τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μεί-  
 ζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγ-  
 § 22 χορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχας 6

5 ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 8 ἐάσει ἐάν M<sup>a</sup>, ἐάσει ἂν P<sup>4</sup> || 10 ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 11 τι omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, hence [τι] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 13 ὥστε ..... 15 δρῶσιν transposed to follow 20 διορθοῦν Thurot (see *Introd.* 83), by Bernays to precede 7 δῆλον. See *Comm. n.* (612). Or is the sentence an interpolation, and no change required?

The problem (what to do with men of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the normal state, § 20. *Principles of symmetry require that, as in the arts, there should be no disproportionate influence or merit, § 21.* This is a frequent cause of revolutions (δι' ὑπεροχὴν), as is explained VIII(v). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eaton).

§ 20 4 καὶ = even the normal forms.

§ 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας] 'a foot that violates symmetry in its size' (the gen. as in § 16, πλωτήρων), 'even if it were of surpassing beauty.' κάλλος adverbial acc., cp. λοιπὰ c. 12 § 2. For the order of the words (hyperbaton) see Vahlen's *Arist. Aufsätze* II. pp. 41—44. On symmetry, see *Metaph.* M. 3 § 11, 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξεις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον: this is illustrated in *Pol.* IV(vii). 4 § 7, *Poet.* 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these words was proposed by Thurot and Bernays (see *Introd.* p. 83). Bernays renders "Hence this point need not stand in the way of a good understanding between single rulers and the city communities; so far, that is, as their personal rule is useful (also) for the cities and they adopt this procedure." Thus he understands ταῖς πόλεσι to be those which are ruled by μονάρχας. So Postgate (*Notes* p. 7):—"ταῖς πόλεσιν in both sentences are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,' but the states governed by the μονάρχαι (notice not τύραννοι)." See *note* (612).

15 κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς] Hence in regard to admitted instances of superiority the case for Ostracism possesses a certain political justification, a ground of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the constitution so as not to require anything of the sort; failing that, the next best course is to adopt it as a corrective measure. Unfortunately it was used in the cities for factious purposes.

17 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κτλ] *Comp.* VIII(v). 3 § 3 n. (1510) where the same recommendation is given, καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρῳ ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰσθαι ὕστερον, and c. 8 § 12 n. (1619). SUSEM. (611 b)

13 ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] It is only with the gravest misgivings that I have followed Thurot in the transposition of § 22, b 13—15, to this place and in his other by no means simple changes. But I see no other means of obtaining any really consistent connexion, corresponding to the one idea prevalent throughout the whole chapter, namely that the measures taken by Monarchs and Republics rest in this respect on the same principle, and that the same problem must be considered by the true forms of Monarchy and Republic, and not merely by the degenerate ones. Thus in these matters a republic has no advantage over a monarchy; on the contrary the corresponding measures of violence are generally calculated with a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,

14 συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφελίμου (VIII)  
 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογου-  
 μένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ  
 § 23 τὸν ὀστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς  
 οὕτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης  
 ἱατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειράσθαι τοιοῦτο  
 20 τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. <ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς  
 14 <μονάρχας συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφε-  
 15 <λίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.> ὕπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο περὶ  
 21 τὰς πόλεις· οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας

14 μονάρχους II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ Thurot, τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ <ὥς>? Susem.  
 <ἐνεκεν> ἀρχῆς Schneider, <χάριν> ἀρχῆς Schmidt || ὠφελίμου [ταῖς πόλεσιν  
 οὐσης] Thurot (the best suggestion as yet), ὠφελίμου.....οὐσης transposed to follow 19  
 ἱατρείας Schmidt || 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν] τοῖς πολλοῖς Lindau

while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connexion is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Bernays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects; of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as *αἰσυνήτης* that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs; on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected *αἰσυνήτης* by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. He at length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition, viz. that, as Bernays proposed, § 22, ὥστε...δρῶσιν, be inserted between *τρόπον* and *δῆλον* at the end of § 20: these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (ὥστε...διό) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here

shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristotle nowhere else designates a monarch's subjects as *πόλεις*; we should rather expect *τοῖς ἀρχομένοις* or at any rate *τοῖς πολίταις* in both places instead of *ταῖς πόλεσιν*: and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate *ταῖς ἐαυτῶν πόλεσιν*. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of *καὶ* "also" before *ταῖς πόλεσιν* would be indispensable for the sense, as Bernays' own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. SUSEM. (612)

20 ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο] If Thurot's transposition be approved, this means: "but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government." Without any such change Bernays and others make it refer to the words *τοιοῦτο τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν*:—it was not used as a corrective.

21 οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον κτλ] It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy. It is said that when it was enforced for the last time at Athens, Alcibiades and Nicias diverted it, contrary to the original intention, to a third person Hyperbolos, and that this led to its disuse. Even if the story in this form is not to be relied on, still it may have become apparent on that oc-



- § 24 συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν (VIII) μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυλαῖς πολιτεῖαις ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι, φανερόν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς  
 25 δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ (p. 84)  
 § 25 ἂν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετὴν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου (παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν), μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους αἰδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὐχ] Bernays || 25 ἐπεὶ P<sup>2.3</sup> || 31 ἀξιοῦμεν Γ Susem.<sup>1.2</sup>, ἀξιοῖ μὲν M<sup>a</sup>. The parentheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the principal clause: μερίζοντας? Susem. || 32 ὅπερ <καὶ> Susem.<sup>1.2</sup> and possibly Γ (*quod et videtur* William); perhaps rightly || 33 ἀσμένως] ἀναγκάως P<sup>4.6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || βασιλείας P<sup>2.3</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

casion how easily a combination of two parties could defeat the true aim of this institution, and turn it against the most zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no evidence that it was ever actually resorted to again at Athens. Cp. Schömann pp. 182, 395 Eng. tr. When the healthy life of parties ceased there, and especially when its surplus strength began to fail the state, and every man of talent was needed at his post, Ostracism proved to be superfluous. When it had been more than once employed in order to remove some person displeasing to the dominant party (Damon Plut. *Per.* 4., *Aristid.* 7., Callias Pseudo-Andoc. iv. 32) it disappeared from the frame-work of the Constitution (See-liger). SUSEM. (613)

Summary of results: *the removal of eminent men is (a) expedient and just in the interests of perverted constitutions, but (β) not absolutely just. The best state can neither expel such a man of preeminent merit, nor treat him as an ordinary subject. It only remains to make him sovereign*, §§ 24, 25.

§ 24 23 [ἰδίᾳ] expedient and just in the private interest of the government. Not 'in particular cases.' This is a restatement of §§ 18, 20.

24 οὐχ ἀπλῶς sc. ἐστὶ δίκαιον. The mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας] Aristotle does not say what should be done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy, which are also to be reckoned among right forms of government. Is it possible that he regarded Ostracism as still admissible? Further comp. *nn.* on II. 9 § 30 (339); III. 6 § 1 (521); III. 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601); 17 §§ 4, 5 (677-8); VI (IV). 2 §§ 1, 2 (1133-6-7), 10 § 3 (1280) and *Introd.* p. 43 ff. SUSEM. (614)

26 οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν] κατὰ governs ὑπεροχὴν. Note that the cases chiefly alleged for Ostracism before, § 15, are now excluded.

§ 25 31 τοῦ Διὸς] Used proverbially, as in Herod. v. 49 ἥδη τῷ Διὶ πλοῦτον πέρι ἐρίζετε, 'ye vie with Zeus in wealth.' Comp. *Nic. Eth.* vi. 13 § 8, 1145 a 10 ἐτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἰ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φάλη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν (Eaton).

μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς] 'Nor to rule such an one, in a distribution of offices': i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better taken with ἄρχειν γε than, as Bernays and others, with ἀξιοῖεν, in which case it must be strained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχόμενος as in c. 17 § 7, οὐτ' ἀξιοῖεν ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος.

33 βασιλέας αἰδίους] Kings for life. The form of the phrase, and the words ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν certainly do not favour the reference to Alexander which it was once

14 ἴσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μετα- IX  
 36 βῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν  
 πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκέπτεον δὲ πότερον συμφέρεi  
 τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκῆσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασι-  
 λεύεσθαι, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν  
 § 2 συμφέρεi τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρεi. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον διελέσθαι  
 41 πότερον ἔν τι γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς.

1285 a ῥάδιον δὴ τοῦτό γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένη περι- 2  
 § 3 ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἰς πασῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν  
 τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτεία δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν  
 κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ

35 ὀρισμένους ΓΜ\* || 37 εἶναι <καὶ> Koraes || δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. ||  
 40 δὴ ΓΜ\* P<sup>1</sup>.2.3 || 41 ἔν τι ἐν τῷ Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || αὐτῶν Π<sup>2</sup> Ar.

1285 a 1 ῥᾶον Μ\* P<sup>1</sup> || δὲ Susem.<sup>2</sup> (perhaps rightly) || 4 δὲ] δ' ἢ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup>  
 L<sup>r</sup>, γὰρ Ar.

the fashion to discover in the treatise. From VIII(v). 10 § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian monarchy was widely different from this exaltation of one eminent citizen of extraordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

c. 14. Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the first of which is **Monarchy**. *There are five actual and historical types of single rule: (a) the Spartan king, (β) the oriental sovereign, (γ) the αὐστηρῆς or dictator, (δ) the king in the heroic age; §§ 2—14. To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (ε) that of the absolute sovereign with full powers, § 15.*

The last type is alone of value for our inquiry, because, as shown 14 § 25, 17 §§ 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate, form of the best constitution. See *Introd.* pp. 44—47. *Analys.* p. 112 f., and VI(iv). c. 10.

§ 1 36 φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολι-  
 τειῶν] Bernays, *Trans.* p. 173 n., arguing in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out that there is no link to connect these words with the foregoing, as the normal constitutions are not mentioned. He therefore prefers to take the clause in direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which closes with the words, 'the laws in the normal forms of the state must necessarily be just, but those in the perverted forms not just.' To this it may be replied that there is a mention of the 'normal forms' in c. 13 § 20 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply the same antithesis). But it is more im-

portant to insist that a merely verbal allusion of the kind, is, after all, indecisive, whereas the discussion of monarchy forms a natural sequel to the result enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25: which, be it observed, answers the question of § 13 and § 6. Indeed Bernays' view would have been more tenable if he had shortened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13 §§ 1—12, and had allowed the main thread of the discussion to be resumed at c. 12 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. *Comp. Introd.* p. 42 n. (3).

38 οἰκῆσεσθαι] middle, II. 1 § 3.  
 πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ] *Comp.* IV(vii). 6 § 5  
 χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν. This admits the case of the ἔθνος or nation, and helps us to see that Aristotle would not have allowed Persia or Macedon to rank as a πόλις, although he would have admitted their claim to possess a πολιτεία, and although he calls the subjects πολίτας, § 7. *Comp.* n. on 12 § 8.

§ 2 1285 a 1 γένῃ] Used indifferently with εἶδος (§§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for 'species' or 'variety': so I. 11 § 5 n., VI(iv). 4 § 8.

§ 3 'The kingly office in the Spartan constitution is held to be the truest type of monarchy according to law,' i.e. constitutional or limited monarchies (tyrannies).

4 ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ κτλ.] "He is merely commander in war when he has quitted the country." See Schömann p. 228 Eng. tr. It is remarkable that Aristotle does not notice the judicial power of the Spartan kings and their



5 τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμόν ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ (IX)  
 § 4 πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ  
 βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρίτωρ καὶ αἰδῖος ἐστίν· κτεῖ-  
 ναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινί [βασιλείᾳ], καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν  
 ἀρχαίων, ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νομῶ. δηλοῖ  
 10 δ' Ὁμηρος· Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν  
 § 5 ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γὰρ

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης...

οὐ οἶ...

ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς·

παρὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

15 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τούτων 3

6 τοὺς omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [τοὺς] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 7 αὐτοκράτορων II Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 8 [βασι-  
 λεῖα] Susem. and Bernays independently, [ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ] Giph. (untranslated by  
 Ar.) Jackson (who would transpose 9 ἐν ταῖς.....ἐξόδοις before καθάπερ). Other  
 suggestions in my critical edition: add *ἐνεκα δειλίας* Bywater || 9 νομῶ Fäsi (see  
 Passow's lexicon) νόμῳ all mss. edd. || 10 ὁ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 11 γὰρ II<sup>1</sup>  
 Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, γοῦν P<sup>2,3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>3</sup>, οὖν P<sup>4</sup> || 12 μάχης] νοήσω P<sup>1</sup> (1st  
 hand, μάχης is added in the margin by corr.<sup>1</sup>); φεύγοντα νοήσω added by Γ (*videro*  
*fugientem e proelio* William) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (comp. Römer *Sitzungsber. der Münchn. Ak.*  
*phil. Cl.* 1884. II. pp. 270—276, Busse *op. c.* p. 34), φεύγοντα κτεῖναι by Camot, φεύγοντα  
*κυρέω* an unknown hand on the margin of the Munich Aldine; ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσ-  
 σοντα νοήσω *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 4. See Comm. n. (619) || 13 ἐσεῖται M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>3</sup>, ἐσεῖται P<sup>4</sup>

presidency in the Senate and the Popular Assembly, especially as in treating afterwards of monarchy in the heroic age (§ 12 n. 628) he rightly emphasizes the former. SUSEM. (616)

§ 4 8 εἰ μὴ ἐν τινί] "except in a specified case." To the other remedies suggested for this passage Jackson adds the omission of the words 8 ἐν τινὶ βασι-  
 λεῖα and the transposition of 9 ἐν ταῖς πο-  
 λεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις to take their place.

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων] In general we can observe in the office of the Spartan kings many traces of its descent from the old Greek monarchy of the heroic age. See Schömann p. 227 Eng. tr., Trieber p. 114. SUSEM. (617) So as representing the state in relation to the gods, Her. VI. 57, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 13 § 2, 8, 15 § 1. The Spartan state was the early Greek state of the heroic age, barbarically, not scientifically, martial, and from its simple martial organization free. Elsewhere such a state did historically pass into an oligarchy, as the nobles profited by the decline in the power both of the king and of the assembly of warriors. But the peculiar circumstances of Sparta crystallized

(or shall we say fossilized?) this early form, with just so much of modification (Ephors, Helots &c) as sufficed to secure its maintenance.

9 ἐν χειρὸς νομῶ] in hand to hand encounters.

10 Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κτλ] 'For Agamemnon was content to listen to chiding in their debates': e.g. *Iliad* I. 225. SUSEM. (618)

The Homeric 'ecclesia,' or ἀγορά, is not the βουλή of chiefs (as Congreve supposed) but a counterpart of the assembly of citizens in time of peace. See Gladstone *Homeric Studies* II. p. 114 ff., Freeman *Comp. Politics*, pp. 201—207. Grote has unduly depreciated it.

§ 5 11 λέγει γὰρ] *Iliad* II. 391 ff. But in our texts the wording is slightly different, and the last words παρὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος are wanting. The same lines are also quoted, with a slightly different reading ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσ-  
 σοντα νοήσω | οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυ-  
 γέειν κύνας, in *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 4 from *Il.* XV. 349 ff., where the variation from our present reading is still greater. SUSEM. (619)

§ 6 δ' αὖ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δ' αἵρεται· παρὰ ταύτην δ' (IX)  
 ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρ' ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλείαι τῶν  
 βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὖται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν  
 τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί· διὰ γὰρ (p. 85)  
 20 τὸ δουλικώτεροι τὰ ἦθη εἶναι φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν  
 Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,  
 ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.  
 § 7 τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσὶν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ  
 τὸ πάτριον καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασι-  
 25 λικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οἱ γὰρ πολὶ-  
 ται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους  
 ξενικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων οἱ δ' ἀκόν-  
 των ἀρχοῦσιν. ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ  
 § 8 τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα  
 30 μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλησιν,

18 παραπλησίαν P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by the same hand), παραπλησίως P<sup>4-6</sup> C<sup>4</sup>  
 Q M<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 19 τυραννίσιν,  
 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Susem., τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ Γ M<sup>a</sup>, τυραννίσι κατὰ P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>3</sup>),  
 τυραννὶ κατὰ P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), τυραννικὴ κατὰ C<sup>4</sup>, τυραννικαὶ κατὰ Q<sup>b</sup> R<sup>b</sup>  
 S<sup>b</sup>, τυραννικὴν εἰσὶ δ' ὁμῶς κατὰ P<sup>4-6</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, τυραννίδι εἰσὶ δ' ὁμῶς κατὰ Ar.,  
 τυραννικῇ εἰσὶ δ' ὁμῶς κατὰ W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk. || πατρικὰς Γ M<sup>a</sup>, πατρικά R<sup>b</sup>, πάτριον?  
 Spengel || 20 δουλικώτεροι P<sup>4</sup> Q U<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. δουλικώτερας M<sup>b</sup> || εἶναι τὰ ἦθη Bk.,  
 εἶναι τὰ ἔθη Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. || 24 πάτριαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., πατρικαὶ Schneider || 25 αὐτὴν τοιαύτην?  
 Γ (talem William) Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, perhaps right || 27 <τὸ> ξενικόν? Sylburg (wrongly)

16 αἱ δ' αἵρεται] Possibly the *ταγὸς*  
 of Thessaly, called *βασιλεὺς* Her. v. 63,  
 Thuc. i. 111; compared with the Roman  
 dictator by Dion. Hal. Greece retained  
 few traces of that older institution com-  
 mon to many Aryan races, an *elective*  
 monarchy or chieftainship but with pre-  
 sumption greatly in favour of a few noble  
 families (*βασιλεὺς*=duke, while *ἀναξ*=  
 noble). See Gladstone *Hom. Stud.* iii. 51,  
 Freeman *Comp. Politics*, Lect. iv pp.  
 114—159.

§ 6 The oriental monarchy is a rule  
 over unfree subjects (*δεσποτικὴ*) with their  
 consent and in virtue of traditional forms.

18 παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν] In Eur.  
*Herac.* 423, οὐ γὰρ τυραννίδ' ὥστε βαρ-  
 βάρων ἔχω, the rule of non-Greek kings  
 is called a tyranny (Eaton). SUSEM. (670)

19 διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι κτλ.] Comp.  
 i. 2 §§ 2—4 n. (11), iv (vii). 2 § 15, 14 § 21;  
 and notes (54, 780, 781). SUSEM. (621)

20 τὰ ἦθη] This accus. 'of respect'  
 depends on *δουλικώτεροι*. Comp. 9 § 10  
*πλήθος εἶεν μύριοι*, 12 § 2, 13 § 6.

§ 7 23 ἀσφαλεῖς] firmly established,  
 not to be overthrown (like tyranny).  
 "Yet in 16 § 9, 1287 b 7, as in 11 § 7,  
 1281 b 26, and in 11. 8 § 16 'safe,' 'trust-  
 worthy' is the meaning." (T. L. Heath.)

24 ἡ φυλακὴ] From meaning 'self-  
 defence'—see viii (v). 11 § 27—the word  
 came to be used in the concrete sense of  
 a protecting force, or body-guard. So also  
*ὅπως μήτε φυλακὴ τρέφεται*, viii (v). 11 § 8.

26 ξενικόν] Foreigners, a force of  
 foreign mercenaries. Comp. c. 15 § 10 n.  
 (656), § 14 (666), and especially viii (v).  
 10 § 10, *φυλακὴ τυραννικὴ διὰ ξένων*, n.  
 (1666), *Rhet.* i. 2 § 19, 1357 b 30 ff.,  
 Herod. i. 59 (Eaton). SUSEM. (622)

§ 8 State officers called *αἰσυνήται*  
 were appointed anciently in troublous  
 times, some for life, others with a com-  
 mission to accomplish a definite political  
 task (*πράξεις*). Hence their analogy to  
 the Roman dictators.

30 ἕτερον δ'...αἵρετὴ τυραννίς] Comp.  
 15 § 14 n. 667, vi (iv). 10 § 2 n. (1277—9).  
 In the *Polity of Cyme* (Fr. 481, 1557 a



οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυνμήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν (IX)  
 αἵρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ  
 § 9 νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἤρχον δ' οὐ μὲν  
 διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὀρισμένων  
 35 χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἰλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττα-  
 κὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ  
 § 10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἶλοντο αὐ-  
 τὸν Πιττακὸν ἐν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι  
 τὸν κακοπάτριδα

40  
 1285 b

Πιττακὸν πόλιος τὰς διχόλω καὶ βαρυνδαίμονος  
 ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀολλίεες.

35 οἶαν M<sup>a</sup>, οἶαν P<sup>1</sup>, οἶαν P<sup>4</sup> || φιττακὸν Π<sup>1</sup> and so subsequently || 38 σκολίων  
 Götting || 40 πόλιος Schneidewin, πόλιος all mss. edd. || διχόλω Schmidt  
 Bergk, ἐχόλω or ἀχόλω M<sup>a</sup>, ἀχόλω Π<sup>1</sup>P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Susem. <sup>1-2-3</sup>, ἀσχόλω Camerarius  
 1285 b 1 μέγ' μὲν Γ M<sup>a</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || παίνεντες? H.  
 L. Ahrens

5 ff. = 476 Rose *Ar. pseudop.* = 192 Müller)  
 Aristotle stated that in olden times the  
 tyrants were called αἰσυνμήται (ὁ δὲ Ἀρισ-  
 τοτέλης ἐν Κυμαίων πολιτείᾳ τοὺς τυράν-  
 νους φησὶ τὸ πρότερον αἰσυνμήτας προσ-  
 αγορεύεσθαι. εὐφημώτερον γὰρ ἐκείνο τοῦ-  
 νομα). SUSEM. (623)

32 οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον] For he  
 was constitutionally appointed, although  
 to powers beyond the constitution.

§ 9 35 οἷον εἶλοντο κτλ] The  
 similar fragment of Theophrastos in  
 Dionys. R. A. v. 73, already mentioned  
 in the *Introduction* p. 18, n. 7, runs as  
 follows: οἱ γὰρ αἰσυνμήται καλούμενοι  
 παρ' Ἑλλήσι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ  
 βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἵρετοί τινες  
 ἦσαν τύραννοι· ἤρουντο δ' αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις  
 οὐτ' εἰς ἀόριστον χρόνον, οὔτε συνεχῶς,  
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, ὅποτε δόξειε συμ-  
 φέρειν, καὶ εἰς πόσον χρόνον: 'Those whom  
 the Greeks in older times called αἰσυνμή-  
 ται were, as Theophrastos states in his  
 books on Monarchy, elected tyrants.  
 But the states did not elect them for an  
 indefinite period, nor yet regularly, but  
 only during the pressure of misfortunes,  
 as often and for as long a period of time  
 as seemed expedient, as e.g. the Mityle-  
 nians once elected Pittacus to ward off  
 the attack of the exiles, who followed the  
 poet Alcaeus.' The single expression  
 "during the pressure of misfortunes"  
 (πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς) is, as Krohn shows,  
 thoroughly in the manner of Theophrastos  
 and "so too is the further treatment which  
 undertakes to assign to αἰσυνμητεία its

historical position in political develop-  
 ment. Originally, he says, there pre-  
 vailed everywhere in Greece a law-  
 abiding monarchy based on law; but  
 gradually this degenerated into arbitrary  
 rule, and the next step was to a republic.  
 But neither did this prove strong enough  
 to uphold law and right, and thus,  
 through the pressure of circumstances,  
 (καιροὶ πολλὰ νεοχμούντες) they reverted  
 in reality, though not in name, to the  
 establishment of monarchical powers.  
 Compare the words, v. c. 74, ἡναγκάζοντο  
 παράγειν πάλιν τὰς βασιλικὰς καὶ τυραννι-  
 κάς ἐξουσίας εἰς μέσον, ὀνόμασι περικαλύπ-  
 τοντες αὐτὰς εὐπρεπεστέρας, Θετταλοὶ μὲν  
 ἀρχοῖς, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀρμοστὰς καλοῦν-  
 τες, φοβούμενοι τυράννους ἢ βασιλεῖς αὐτοὺς  
 καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophras-  
 tos Πολιτικά πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς β. 1 (in  
 Harpocr. s. v. ἐπίσκοπος) πολλῶ γὰρ κάλ-  
 λιον κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσιν, ὡς οἱ  
 Λάκωνες ἀρμοστὰς φάσκοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις  
 πέμπειν, οὐκ ἐπισκόπους οὐδὲ φύλακας, ὡς  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, as a proof that the account  
 moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to  
 Theophrastos." (Henkel *Zur Arist.*  
*Pol.* p. 3, n. 1.) SUSEM. (624)

§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skolion  
 was a particular kind of drinking song,  
 sung by the guests at a party singly in  
 a certain order. Fragments of them may  
 be found in Bergk *Poet. lyr.* III<sup>4</sup>, p. 643  
 ff. SUSEM. (625)

39 κακοπάτριδα] Does this mean  
 base-born) (εὐπατρίδαι? 'They set up the  
 base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the

- § 11 αὐται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικά (IX)  
 εἶναι τυραννικά, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἵρεται καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικά·  
 τέταρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωι-  
 5 κούς χρόνους ἐκούσιοί τε καὶ πατριοὶ γινόμεναι κατὰ νόμον.  
 § 12 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας  
 κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι  
 χώραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι  
 πατριοὶ. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας  
 10 καὶ τῶν θυσίων, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικά, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς  
 δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποιοῦν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες  
 οἱ δ' ὀμνύοντες· ὁ δ' ὄρκος ἦν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις. (p. 86)

2 δεσποτικά.....3 τυραννικά Sepulveda, 2 τυραννικά.....3 δεσποτικά Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 5 ἐκούσιοι M\*, ἐκούσια.....πατριοὶ Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 8 βασιλείαι Casaubon, perhaps right || 10 οὐσιῶν Π<sup>1</sup>, γρ. οὐσιῶν P<sup>4</sup> in the margin || 12 ἐπανάστασις M\* P<sup>1-4</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, emended by the same hand), ἀνάστασις Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, γρ. ἀνάστασις corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> and under the text of P<sup>3</sup>

wrathful ill-fated town with loud cries assenting in full assembly' (Wyse). Or is it 'bane to his country'?

40 Πιπτακόν] See Exc. II. on this book, p. 451 ff. SUSEM. (626)

§ 11 1285 b 2 διὰ τὸ δεσποτικά εἶναι τυραννικά κτλ.] These two species of monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude the citizens from the government as completely as if they were slaves: hence they come under coercive or arbitrary rule (δεσποτεία, c. 6 § 6 f. with notes). Xerxes is οὗχ ὑπεύθυνος πόλει, Aesch. Persae 213: Pittacus is ἀπερὸς τύραννος. So far they are akin to the rule of an usurper who must rest upon force because he has no legal title to his position. On the other hand they are definitely separated from such rule by having a very good and legitimate title. As Aristotle says they are 'elective and over willing subjects'; or as we should put it, they rest upon the consent of the governed. See n. (634).

4 αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους] The monarchies of the heroic age are described by Grote, Part I c. 20; Gladstone *Studies on Homer* II. pp. 1—69. See also Freeman *Comp. Politics* Lect. IV. and Lect. II. p. 64 ff.

§ 12 6 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους...εὐεργέτας] Comp. c. 15 § 11 (ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας) n. (659) and VIII(v). 10 § 3 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, n. (1649). SUSEM. (627)

7 κατὰ τέχνας] In the arts (of peace).

He is probably thinking of the mythical inventors.

8 τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πατριοὶ] 'hereditary kings for their successors.' Yet we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing that the Hellenic chieftains had once been, like the Teutonic, elected. Comp. Ridgeway *The Land Tenure in Homer* in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* VI. 1885, p. 337: the τέμενος of Odysseus is by no means secure to Telemachos, *Odys.* XI. 184 f.

10 καὶ τῶν θυσίων κτλ.] "Such as did not require a priest acquainted with special rites," e.g. like the Eumolpids (Jebb). So Saul, the Israelitish king, is described as offering sacrifice.

11 τοῦτο=the judicial functions. It is not the 'coronation oath' that is in question, as Mr Lang assumed, *Essays* p. 23.

12 τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις] 'The form of oath consisted in the act of uplifting the sceptre.' Comp. *Iliad* I. 233 f. ἐπὶ μέγαν ὄρκον ὁμοῦμαι· ναὶ μὰ τὸδε σκῆπτρον, VII. 412 τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνέσχεθε πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, X. 321 τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνάσχει καὶ μοι δημοσίων: also n. (616) generally. SUSEM. (628)

The sceptre as an instrument of the oath is always a symbol of office, whether kingly or judicial. Note that while Homer calls the thing sworn by (σκῆπτρον, Ζεύς VII. 411 &c.) ὄρκος, Aristotle gives the name to the solemn accompanying act.



§ 13 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πόλιν 8  
καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἤρχον· ὕστερον  
15 δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν  
ὄχλων παραινουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριαι  
θυσῖαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον  
εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν  
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.

§ 14 βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, 8  
21 μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἦν ἐκόντων  
μὲν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὠρισμένοις· στρατηγός τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικα-  
στής ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα  
δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτική  
25 κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσυνμητεία προσαγορεύουσιν  
(αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν αἵρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δὲ ἡ Λακωνικὴ  
τούτων (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ  
§ 15 γένος αἰδίου)· αὗται μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν  
ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δ' εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ἢ πάντων 2  
30 κύριος εἷς ὢν ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν

13 [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αἱ πάτριαι M<sup>a</sup>, omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. || οὐσίαι Π<sup>1</sup> ||  
|| 18 εἶναι] καὶ Koræes || 22 ὠρισμένων M<sup>a</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. (?) || τε omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.  
|| 27 εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 30 εἷς omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || ὥν περ Bücheler,  
probably right, [ὥσπερ.....ἐκάστη] Conring

§ 13 14 τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια] domestic and foreign affairs.

15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κτλ.] 'As the kings themselves resigned some of their functions, while others were taken from them by the populace.' παραινουμένων=shredding or paring off, as in c. 5 § 8.

16 ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις κτλ.] Thus at Athens the second of the nine Archons specially superintended religious worship and bore the title of King Archon, as the successor in this respect of the ancient kings. Comp. further Herod. III. 142, IV. 161 (kings at Cyrene), VII. 149 (kings at Argos), 153; also VII(VI). 8 § 10 n. (1482) below and n. (1653) on VIII(V). 10 § 6. SUSEM. (629)

For the functions of the King Archon (whose wife was βασίλισσα, as the wife of the Roman 'rex sacrorum' was called 'regina') see also Lysias c. *Andocidem*, Or. 6 §§ 4, 5: on the Argive kings Pausanias II. 10 § 1 and Plutarch *De fort. Alex.* II § 8, p. 340 D: and in general on these shadowy survivals of a former real kingship, including the interrex and rex sacrorum or sacrificulus, Dion. Hal. IV. 74, Plutarch *Quaest. Rom.* 63, p. 279 C, and Freeman

op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these references are taken.

17 ὅπου δ' ἄξιον sc. ἦν; where it deserved to be called a kingdom.

19 τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον] This is decidedly too strong an assertion, see n. (616). In § 14 where the Spartan kings are mentioned, it is more correctly limited by the qualifying phrase ὡς εἰπεῖν, for the most part. SUSEM. (630)

The Argive kings belonged to this class of commanders in war: Herod. VII. 149.

§ 14 22 ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὠρισμένοις] On certain fixed conditions: ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέραςι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι, Thuc. I. 13.

24 ἐκ γένους=κατὰ γένος, hereditary.

27 ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] See n. (630)

and II. 9 § 33, ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις, n. (343). SUSEM. (631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all the foregoing, so far as they are limited or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a monarchy answering to the art of household management, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν: cp. I. 1 § 2.

30 ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη] Like each separate barbarian

κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ (X) οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ <παμ>βασιλεία πόλεως [καὶ ἔθνοὺς ἑνὸς ἢ πλείονων] οἰκονομία.

- 15 σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκε-  
 35 πτέον, αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μετα-  
 ξὺ τούτων εἰσὶν. ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασι-

31 τεταγμένων Montecatino: Bücheler rightly thinks no change needed; if any, he prefers τεταγμένης || 32 παμβασιλεία Susem., βασιλεῖα Γ Ar. Bk. See VI(IV). 10 § 3, 1295 a 19 || 33 [καὶ.....πλείονων] Susem.<sup>2</sup>, see Comm. n. (633) || καὶ ἡ M<sup>a</sup> || πλείονος M<sup>a</sup> II<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>2</sup>.<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup>). Postgate explains this as the gen. of πλείων used as a subst. || οἰκονομίας P<sup>3</sup> II<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, altered by corr.<sup>1</sup> or corr.<sup>2</sup>) || 36 βασιλείας Π<sup>1</sup>

tribe or Hellenic city. Comp. nn. (11. 633). SUSEM. (632)

33 πόλεως...οἰκονομία] It is difficult to see what could have induced Aristotle to describe absolute monarchy not only as dominion over a state, but also to add "and over a nation," where we should at any rate have expected "or" (as M<sup>a</sup> gives); and not content with this, even to add "or several nations." Throughout his work he is dealing with the forms of government of a state, not of a nation: (see I. 2. 4 n. 11) and there is nothing in the nature of absolute monarchy, which would justify such an exceptional extension. On the contrary, it appears further on in the work (17 § 1, § 5 n. 677), as has been stated several times already, that the only admissible and possible non-despotic absolute monarchy is that which can be conceived in the ideal state in the exceptional case described in c. 13. The interpolator has been misled by the preceding words ἐκάστου ἔθνοῦς καὶ πόλεως, and has made the mistake into which since his time many modern critics have fallen (see *Introd.* p. 26 and c. 13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615, 17 § 5 n. 678), of supposing that this Aristotelian absolute monarchy referred to the Macedonian Empire. Cf. also VI(IV). 10 § 3 and n. (1280). SUSEM. (633)

Doubtless there are some slight indications in the work itself that Monarchy was actually exercised over a wider area than the territory of a single city. But in such cases it seems to be assumed that the rule must be *δεσποτική*, and the population not yet fully organized for civil society.

c. 15 From this survey it appears that Monarchy is either (1) a special state office, as at Sparta, or (2) Absolute Monarchy, or something intermediate to these two.

Whether it is expedient to have an hereditary or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question: §§ 1—3. Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle's classification, *Esprit des Lois* B. XI cc. 8, 9.

§ 1 35 αἱ πολλαὶ] The oriental monarchy may be as absolute as the παμβασιλεία; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as *δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ* from *οἰκονομική* in c. 6 §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perversion of true monarchy: but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (*δουλικώτεροι τὰ ἥθη*) they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler's advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) heredity, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard.

36 ἐλαττόνων μὲν...παμβασιλείας] Of the 'despotic' kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schwarz right charges him, in *Die Staatsformenlehre des Aris.* p. 32 f. (Aristotle's Theory of the forms of government, Leipzig 1884): he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. [To the former is opposed any arbitrary or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyrant, or the great king, or the citizen of transcendent virtue and merit, who rules all things at his own good pleasure (*ἀρχεῖ πάντων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν*): to the latter is opposed only the *usurped* rule of the τύραννος.]

To what extent may this also be assert-



§ 2 λείας, πλείονων δ' εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν (X) περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν αἰδίου εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ αἵρεσιν, 1286 a ἢ οὐ συμφέρει, ἐν δὲ πότερόν ποτε ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρα- 3 τηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), (p. 87) § 3 ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι- 6 λείας πολιτείας εἶδος ἐστίν, ὥστε περὶ τοῦτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.

ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον

39 αἵρεσιν P<sup>4.6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Ar., μέρος Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2.3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk., ἀρετὴν Bas.<sup>9</sup> in the margin 1286 a 1 ποτε omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., perhaps rightly || 3 ἔχει] ἔχεται omitting εἶδος ? Bernays

ed of the αἰσυνμητεία? Aristotle does not seem to give a sufficient answer to this question. Both, it is true, are founded on law; but though the elevation of the ideal king in a genuine aristocracy is a suspension of the laws, the αἰσυνμητης too, as long as he rules, causes a suspension of the old constitution, and has power to remodel both constitution and laws according to his pleasure. Still the αἰσυνμητης himself governs according to his own laws, while the ideal king may, in each single case, disregard them if he pleases. SUSEM. (634)

§ 2 1286 a 3 νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος=presents a branch of legislation rather than of constitution. ἔχειν as in ἔχειν λόγον I. 6 § 9, or ἀπορίαν, III. 10 § 1, II § 1, § 10, 12 § 1: and so ἔχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν, *De Part. anim.* I. 5 § 2, 644 b 31. The genitive with εἶδος is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν ὄργανον εἰδεῖ, I. 4 § 2. A better example is *Rhet.* II. 22 § 1, 1395 b 21, ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον (Bekker ἑκατέρου) τοῦτων ἐστίν. Trans. 'a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.' The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1.

4 ἐν ἀπάσαις] Comp. 16 § 1 n. (669). SUSEM. (635)

5 ἀφείσθω] 'We may dismiss it for the present.' One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his *Politics*. See *Introd.* p. 32 n. 1. SUSEM. (636)

τὴν πρώτην=at the first, as in *Meta.* Z (VII). 12 § 12, 1038 a 35, τῶσαυτα

εἰρήσθω τὴν πρώτην. In Herod. I. 153 τὴν πρώτην εἶναι: cf. III. 134. In *Probl.* II. 32 § 2, 869 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης=ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

§ 3 5 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κτλ] "But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution; hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed." Without doubt then, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i.e. παμβασιλεία. See nn. on c. 17 § 1. For ἐπιδραμεῖν 'run over,' like ἐπελθεῖν, comp. *Rhet.* I. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16; a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from *Introd.* pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from *Philologus* xxv. 1867. pp. 386—392. Its rationale is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which he could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (εἰσι δὲ)...§ 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—13 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See *Anal.* p. 112 f.

First ἀπορία: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth ἀπορία stated in 16 §§ 2—4.

§ 4 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δο-  
 10 κεί δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον ὁ  
 νόμος λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν. ὥστε  
 ἐν ὁποιοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἄρχειν ἡλίθιον· καὶ πῶς  
 ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς,  
 εἰὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερόν τοίνυν ὥς  
 15 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία  
 § 5 διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κακείνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν  
 τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· κρεῖττον δὲ ὅ μὴ  
 πρόσσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ὅ συμφυές. τῷ μὲν οὖν  
 νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ'  
 20 ἔχειν πᾶσαν.

9 δοκοῦσι Bas.<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 10 ο νόμος Götting, ol νόμοι Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 12 <ὥσπερ>  
 καὶ Conring, <καθὰ> καὶ Koraes || πῶς M<sup>a</sup>, omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and  
 P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), <ὥσπερ> πῶς <καὶ> ? Susem. || 13 τριήμερον Γ M<sup>a</sup> Ar., τετρήμερον  
 P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 αὐτοῦ P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., αὐτῷ M<sup>a</sup>, αὐτῶν perhaps Ar., αὐτῶν an unknown  
 scholar in the margin of Stahr's copy of Morel's edition, also Schneider following  
 Vettori's translation || 17 δέ] γὰρ Koraes, wrongly || 19 τοῦτ' Ald., τοῦτω P<sup>3</sup>  
 and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand)

§ 4 Argument in favour of monarchy.

9 δοκεῖ δὴ κτλ] Now those who maintain kingly rule to be expedient hold that the law lays down general statements (only) and gives no instructions for treating the (various) cases which arise.

"This side is defended in Plato's *Politicus* 294—303. Cp. c. 11 § 19 n. (579), c. 16 § 11 nn. (652—3), II. 8 §§ 18—22 n. (275), VI(IV). 4 § 31 (1210)." SUSEM. (637)

12 ἐν ὁποιοῦν τέχνῃ... ἡλίθιον] Plato brings out the absurdity in navigation and medicine, *Polit.* 298—9.

καὶ πῶς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ] Undoubtedly this is not found in Plato, yet he employs the analogy of the physician, 295 c. See II. 8 § 18 n. (270), III. 16 § 6 (726), IV(VII). 2 § 13 (870). SUSEM. (638)

13 μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον... κινδύνῳ] "After the treatment has lasted three days the physician may change it; but if sooner, he does it at his own risk." Herodotus (II. 84) does not mention this, but Diodoros I. 82 § 3 states, without any such limitation, that in Egypt the physicians were paid by the state, and were obliged in their treatment of patients to adhere to a written code, compiled by many of the most celebrated physicians of ancient times. If they acted contrary to prescription, they might be accused of a capital crime (Camerarius). It is not

easy to determine which of the readings, *τριήμερον* or *τετρήμερον*, is correct. That *μελέτην* must be understood with *τὴν τριήμερον* or *τὴν τετρήμερον*, is proved by Postgate from Pseudo-Hippocrates 817 F *τεσσαρακονθήμερον τὴν μελέτην καὶ τὴν ἐπίδεσιν χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι*. Herodotus II. 77 relates that the Egyptians who lived in the corn country purged the body for three successive days in each month by means of emetics and clysters. Diodoros § 1 says that the Egyptians sometimes made daily use of these precautionary means of fasting, vomiting and clysters, but sometimes omitted them for three or four days. Neither does this then supply a safe analogy, if indeed there is an analogy at all. SUSEM. (639)

14 φανερόν τοίνυν κτλ] An easy victory for one side of the discussion.

§ 5 Reply to this argument.

16 ἀλλὰ μὴν κακείνον κτλ] "But again rulers are obliged to have the general principle, too, before-mentioned; yet that which has no emotional nature" viz. the law "is in general superior to that in which it is innate."

18 τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ κτλ] A similar statement in c. 10 § 5 n. (562 b); *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 5, 1134 a 35; X. 9 § 12, 1180 a 21 (Eaton). SUSEM. (640)

19 τοῦτ' ἔχειν] sc. τὸ παθητικόν, or (10 § 5) τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν.



c. 16 § 5  
1287 a 28

<ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον >

- 29 <κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μό-  
30 <νους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ  
<ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους

20 ἀλλ'..... 1287 b 34 ὁμοίως. That the right order has been disturbed was seen by Giphanius, Zwinger, Schneider, Spengel. See *Introd.* 83—86 on the arrangement here followed; also for Cook Wilson's resolution of cc. 15, 16 into two parallel versions 15 §§ 2—10=16 §§ 1—9, §§ 11—13, and for Spengel's proposals.

1287 a 28—b 8. a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν.....32 ἐστὶν cited by Julian ad Themistium p. 261 B || νόμον] Π Ar. and the Codex Vossianus of Julian, νοῦν Γ Julian and Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 29 δοκεῖ.....ἄρχειν omitted by the Cod. Voss. of Julian || θεὸν] γρ. νοῦν corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> and corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> (both in the margin), ἄλλως νοῦν corr. of P<sup>4</sup> in the margin || τὸν νοῦν μόνους Cod. Voss. of Julian, τοὺς νόμους Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. Julian and Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 30 θηρία Cod. Voss. of Julian perhaps rightly || ἥ τε] ὅ τε M<sup>2</sup>, ὅτε Γ || 31 τοῦτον Cod. Voss. of Julian || ἄρχοντας omitted by Julian, ἄρχων τέλος Γ? (*et furor principatum habuerit, tandem et optimos viros interimet* William), ἄρχων τέλος or ἄρχων <κατὰ> στάς τέλος? Schmidt

Four objections to the human ruler.

c. 16 §§ 5—9; 1287 a 28—b 8. (1) *Law is passionless and therefore its rule is the better*; § 5.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] Whether οὖν marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place. The section might follow 1287 a 23, but there too οὖν would have no force.

νόμον...νοῦν μόνους] The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words ad Themist. 261 C D ὁρᾷς, ὁ φιλόσοφος...τέλος ἐπιθεῖς τὸν κολοφῶνα τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναι φησι τὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὁρέξεως) not the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρία· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν. Yet Codex Vossianus of Julian restores to us the valuable reading τὸν νοῦν μόνους, the corruption of which into τοὺς νόμους is the key to the whole confusion. In the existing manuscripts the two recensions are variously blended and confused. See *Julian and Aristotle in the Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXVII. 1878 p. 389 f. SUSEM.

Trans. 'he therefore who appoints the Law to rule makes none but God and Reason rulers, it would seem; he who

appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutes, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unfettered by passion.'

30 προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον] Best explained by the Platonic simile in *Rep.* IX. 588 a c: the tripartite figure, man, lion, and many-headed appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

ἥ τε ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς] While Plato makes θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller *Plato* p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (I. 5 § 6 n. 40). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Häcker seems to assume in his treatise *On the division and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics* (Berlin 1863. 4) p. 6 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, βούλησις. At any rate Häcker's careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, θυμὸς on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; θυμὸς then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unim-

16 § 6 <ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ 5  
 <δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδους, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ  
 <γράμματα ἰατρνεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετώτερον χρῆ-  
 16 § 7 <σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν  
 36 <παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνηνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς  
 <κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἳ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς  
 <πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασιν πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 <τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-  
 40 <φθεῖρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν

32 ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας II<sup>2</sup> fr. Julian Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin), φθείρει P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, marked by dots for erasure), *interim* et William || ὁ νοῦς νόμος M<sup>2</sup> fr. Julian and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand): no doubt Γ also. The full text of this older recension was ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων.....τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' .....διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους.....διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν, which gives a sense, though less appropriate than the other || νόμος] μόνος Cod. Voss. of Julian || 34 γράμμα M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> fr. || καὶ omitted by fr. [καὶ] Susem.<sup>3-4</sup>, ἀλλὰ untranslated by Ar., [ἀλλὰ] Schneider || 35 φιλίαν <ἢ ἐχθραν> Spengel (hardly needful) || 36 ἀρνοῦνται M<sup>2</sup> Ar. and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 39 πιστευθέντας] πεισθέντας Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, probably right

ped activity of our natural individuality. But Aristotle does not limit θυμός to external reaction, nor indeed to mere reaction at all. For, in the first place, even if the passage in *Nic. Eth.* VII. 6. 1 ff. 1149 a 24 ff. was not written by Aristotle himself, but only by some one who (whether directly or indirectly) was his pupil, we may still infer the master's opinion from the pupil's, and assume that in θυμός the idea of displeasure at oneself was not foreign to him. For Anger, Displeasure, Indignation, and on the other hand Courage and Love of Freedom, IV(VII). 7. 2 n. (781), are the principal manifestations of θυμός, indeed θυμός is sometimes actually used for "Anger," sometimes for "Courage." As regards Häcker's second statement, the conception of θυμός in Aristotle is by no means always confined within the limits of mere warding off and rejecting; on the contrary Aristotle thinks IV(VII). 7. 5, n. (786), that the part of the soul whence hatred proceeds may also produce love. Thus it embraces, at any rate in part, what we call "the affections." On this analogy however, Fear should belong to it as well as Courage (*Top.* IV. 5. 4 126 a 8 f.) but scarcely, as Eaton supposes, all the passions in contrast to Desire. Plato also ascribes to it ambition and love of honour. And it is by no means as certain, as Häcker and Brandis (*Gr.*-

*Röm. Phil.* III i p. 140) suppose, that Aristotle was of an entirely different opinion. In a pamphlet entitled ὁ θυμός *apud Aristotelem Platonemque* P. Meyer has not been more fortunate than Häcker in his account of the Aristotelian distinction between θυμός and ἐπιθυμία and Aristotle's conception of both; and the matter is no clearer than before. Compare Susemihl in *Bursian's Jahresber.* 1876, v. p. 264 ff.; also III. 10. 5 with n. (562 b) and notes 182, 790, 839, 935, 1704, 1741. SUSEM. (641)

(2) *The analogy of the 'arts' is misleading; for there (e.g. in medicine) personal motives do not come in:* §§ 6, 7. In *Nic. Eth.* II. 4 §§ 2, 3 he points out that the [Socratic] analogy of the arts and moral conduct is seriously defective.

§ 7 35 οἳ μὲν κτλ.] 'the physicians do not act unreasonably out of personal liking; on the contrary they earn their fee by healing patients,' so that their interest lies in effecting cures and this coincides with their 'art.'

38 πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν] "to spite (men) and to win favour; since when people once suspect their doctors are pledged to their enemies for gain" i.e. have been bribed "to make away with them, they will in that case more urgently require to be treated according to written rules."



c. 16 § 8 <ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς >

1287 b <οἱ ἱατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἱατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-  
<μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὥς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνουν τὸ ἀληθές  
<διὰ τὸ κρίνουν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον  
4 <ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ  
<μέσον.

c. 16 § 9  
5 <ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα  
<νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη εἰσὶν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα  
<ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ  
8 <τὸ ἔθος.>

1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὥς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-

1286 a 21 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον.

1287 b 2 τὸ ἀληθές..... 3 κρίνουν omitted by P<sup>4-6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 4 δὲ Thurot, γὰρ Γ  
Π (including fr.) Ar. Bk. || 6 ὥστ' (ὥστε M<sup>a</sup>) ei Π<sup>1</sup> Ar., ὥστε Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk., ὥστ' ei  
<καὶ> Schneider

§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the human ruler. "But again physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to treat them, and trainers in their practice (call in) other trainers, which implies that they cannot here judge aright, because they are judges in their own case and under the influence of feeling."

1287 b 3 διὰ τὸ κρίνουν κτλ.] Comp. c. 9 § 2 n. (544). SUSEM. (642)  
ὥστε δῆλον κτλ.] "Hence it is clear that whoso seeks what is just and right seeks an impartial middleman: now the law is such a middleman."

4 μέσον] The arbitrator or 'middleman' stands between the two contending sides and is therefore of neither side, i. e. is impartial. Comp. VI (IV). 12 § 5; πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ὁ μέσος, n. (1314), and Nic. Eth. v. 4 § 7, 1132 a 22, καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐνιοὶ μεσιδίου. SUSEM. (643)  
Add Thuc. IV. 63, ἐτοίμος ὢν Βρασιδᾷ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπει.

§ 9 (4) In any case the authority of unwritten and social law is supreme.

5 κυριώτεροι] more authoritative. Comp. n. (48), on I. 6 § 1, and VII (VI). 5 § 2 n. (1430). Broughton adds Soph. Antig. 580 ff. SUSEM. (644)

See Cope *Introd. to the Rhetoric* pp. 239—244. He shows that τὸ ἐπιεικές, Equity, is a special application of κοινὸς νόμος, which as universal law, or the law of nature, is opposed to positive, conventional and written laws; that both κοινὸς νόμος and τὸ ἐπιεικές are designated unwritten law, ἀγραφα νόμματα, Rhet. I. 13 § 2, § 12, 15 §§ 3—6, and correspond

to the ἔθνη and ἐπιτηδεύματα of Plato *Laos* 793 D. Comp. *Politic.* 295 A, *Laos* 680 A; Demosth. *De Cor.* p. 317, 20 ff.: Thuc. II. 37 s. fin.

6 εἰ... 7 ἀλλὰ] Even granting a human ruler is more trustworthy than written statute-law, still he is not so safe as the law of social custom.

c. 15 § 5 1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις... κάλλιον] "But perhaps some one will say that to compensate for this [a human ruler] will be better able to advise on particular cases." This sentence evidently belongs to the first ἀπορία, advocating like c. 15 § 4 the claims of the human ruler, though in a modified manner. But the words following in the mss, c. 15 § 6, are in no definite logical connexion; so that translators are at a loss to make any intelligible sequence, Jowett for instance inserting [to whom we in turn make reply:] after this sentence, though he does not propose to insert ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιθετόν before the ὅτι or to omit the τοίνυν after it: while Bernays translates "to this objection one might perhaps reply &c.," and separates off the next sentence by a break.

c. 16 §§ 4, 5 1287 a 23—28 This is at any rate a valid objection to the modified view just proposed, and is clearly still concerned with the first ἀπορία. "But yet in any cases where the law seems unable to decide, a man would equally be unable. Whereas the law gives a suitable training and then sets the magistrates to decide and manage all other matters 'to the best of their judgment.'"

c. 16 § 4  
1287 a 23<ἀλλὰ μὴν<sup>(XI)</sup>

24 <ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος  
6 § 5 25 <ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος  
26 <ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν  
27 <τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ  
28 <πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.>

c. 15 § 6  
1286 a 21ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν<sup>(X)</sup>

22 ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους,  
ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων  
εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ  
25 ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἓνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας;  
§ 7 || καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλευόμενοι καὶ κρί-  
νουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκα-  
στον. καθ' ἓνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὅστις οὖν ἴσως χείρων·

1287 a 23—28 24 οὐδ' ὁ δ' Ar. (accepted by Vettori and Schneider) || 25 <τὸ  
καθόλου> ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly (and similarly Schneider and Koraes),  
universale William (from a gloss in Γ on ἐπίτηδες): παιδεύσας omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 27  
ἔτι δὲ <πάντα> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly, following William's version (*adhuc autem omnia  
dirigere dant*)

1286 a 21—25 25 δεῖ ἄρχειν] δεῖ διαρρεῖν or διαρεῖν? Koraes || πάντας] πάνυ  
P<sup>2</sup>-a.<sup>6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., γρ. πάνυ p<sup>1</sup> in the margin, πολλούς Ar.

1286 a 26—b 3=1287 b 15—35. See *Introd.* p. 84 f., the parallel columns.

1286 a 27 αἱ κρίσεις εἰσι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.

1287 a 26 τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρί-  
νειν] The standing expression apparently  
used of the judge: the heliastae took  
this oath, says Demosthenes, xxiii. c.  
*Aristocr.* § 96 p. 652 s. fin. γνώμῃ τῇ δι-  
καιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὁμωμόκασιν, cp. *adv.*  
*Lept.* § 180, p. 493, 1 καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν νόμοι  
μὴ ὡς γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ κρινεῖν [ὁμω-  
μοκότες ἦκετε], Pollux viii. 10 § 122, ὁ δ'  
ὄρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι  
εἰσί, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ  
ὧν μὴ εἰσί, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ. (Eaton).  
SUSEM. (645)

Aristotle remarks in *Rhet.* i. 15 § 5,  
1375 a 29 f. that the oath may be ex-  
plained to mean τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι  
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.

27 ἐπανορθοῦσθαι] “and allows them  
to adopt any correction which appears  
upon trial to be an improvement upon the  
established laws.” The play upon words  
ἐπανορθοῦσθαι... κειμένων is quite accidental.

On behalf of the place here assigned  
to c. 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28 it may be  
urged (1) that the plurals (τοὺς ἄρχοντας,  
πειρωμένοις) are not appropriate to the  
transition from the first to the second  
ἀπορία, and (2) that only in this way do

the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαί-  
νουσι become intelligible.

c. 15 § 6 Transition to the second  
ἀπορία. *If it be allowed that there is  
a province (viz. that of particular cases)  
in which the decision of the law is in-  
sufficient, should it be supplemented by  
the one best citizen as ruler, or by the  
entire community?*

1286 a 22 αὐτὸν] that he (viz. the  
ruler). Otherwise Eaton, “that there be  
some one to make laws.”

23 ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν] “but should  
not be unalterably binding where they are  
wrong.” This refers to the gradual  
correction of the established laws just men-  
tioned, c. 16 § 5.

§ 7 With §§ 7—9 compare the parallel  
version c. 16 §§ 10—13, printed in parallel  
columns, p. 84 f.

26 συνιόντες] The subject is πάντες  
sc. οἱ πολῖται, the entire body of citizens.

27 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον] Cp. *Rhet.*  
i. 1 § 8 περὶ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι,  
ἢ εἶσθαι ἢ μὴ εἶσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,  
§ 7 περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων.

28 καθ' ἓνα] Taken individually  
χείρων inferior [to the one best citizen].



ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς (X)  
 30 καλλίων μίας καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον  
 § 8 ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὅστισιν. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ  
 πολὺ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν  
 ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἐνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος  
 ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρί-  
 35 σιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν.  
 § 9 ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον (p. 89)  
 πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.  
 εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο ῥάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν  
 ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώ-  
 40 τερὸς ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ

29 [ὥσπερ.....30 ἀπλῆς] Oncken || 30 κρίνειν M<sup>s</sup> II<sup>a</sup> || 32 καθάπερ <γὰρ>  
 Bk.<sup>2</sup>, rashly. Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristote-  
 lian. Cp. Vahlen *Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gymn.* XVIII. p. 721 ff. || 33 γὰρ Susem., δ' Γ  
 II Ar. Bk. || 37 ὃν P<sup>2,3,4</sup>, ὃν Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> || 38 τοῦτο μὴ II<sup>2</sup> Bk.

29 ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς] "a feast to  
 which many contribute." Cp. II § 2, n.  
 (564). SUSEM. (646)

§ 8 31 ἔτι μᾶλλον...33 ἀδιαφθορώ-  
 τερον] Vahlen has illustrated this con-  
 struction, viz. a simile breaking the prin-  
 cipal sentence (often worked out into  
 elaborate detail) and a resumption of the  
 main thought with οὕτω asyndeton, from  
 VI (IV). 3 § 6, 1290 a 11—15; *Nic. Eth.*  
 VII. 6 § 1, 1149 a 25—31, εἰκε γὰρ ὁ θυ-  
 μὸς ἀκούει μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούει  
 δέ, καθάπερ...ὕλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς  
 κτλ.; *De Soph. El.* 16 § 5, 175 a 26—30,  
 συμβαίνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δια-  
 γράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνιοτε  
 συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν  
 τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ' ὃ ὁ λόγος συμ-  
 βαίνει συνεῖραι διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦ-  
 μεν; *Poet.* 15 § 11, 454 b 8—13, ἐπεὶ δὲ  
 μῦθοις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγωδία βελτιόνων, ἡμᾶς  
 δεῖ μμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἰκονογράφους·  
 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα...γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν  
 ποιητὴν κτλ.; *De Anima* II. 8 § 10, 420 b  
 17 ff., 9 § 7, 421 b 26 ff. (οὕτως οἶν the  
 text, οὕτω καὶ the other recension or para-  
 phrase of E), III. 7 § 7, 431 b 12 ff.  
 Comp. I. 3 § 9, 406 b 15—20 (ὁμοίως δὲ  
 καί...), *Rhet.* III. 9 § 6, 1409 b 22—25, τὰ  
 δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ ὥσπερ...ὁμοίως  
 δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι κτλ., where the resump-  
 tion is not asyndeton. "Add *Poet.* I. 4 § 3,  
 1253 b 33—39, II. 6 § 14, 1265 b 20 f.,  
 III. 7 § 6, 1277 a 5 ff., V (VIII). 7 § 7,  
 1342 a 22 ff." SUSEM.

ἀδιάφθορον] "incorruptible," not merely  
 by bribes, but by any passion.

32 τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθ.]  
 Yet when, *Rhet.* I. 1 § 7, he is com-  
 paring the functions of the dicast and  
 of the laws he expresses an opinion which  
 it is difficult to reconcile with this, ὅτι  
 ἔνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾶον ἢ πολλοὺς  
 ἐν φρονούντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν  
 καὶ δικάζειν.

35 ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον] "But in the other  
 case it is improbable" lit. difficult, see  
 II. 7 § 3 n., "that all should err at  
 once."

ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον...ἁμαρτεῖν] This is hard-  
 ly correct. A large assembly is more  
 likely to be led into over-hasty con-  
 clusions than a single capable man and  
 ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a  
 large assembly, the passion does not  
 generally last so long; and they more  
 easily regain composure; while a single  
 ruler, if once misled by inclination or  
 hatred, may easily confound obstinacy  
 and stubbornness with energy, so that  
 there is greater danger that he will mis-  
 use his unlimited power. SUSEM. (647)

§ 9 36 μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον κτλ.]  
 "not acting against the law except," i. e.  
 only acting against the law in cases where  
 it [i. e. the law] must necessarily be de-  
 fective.

38 ἐν πολλοῖς = ἐν τῷ πλῆθει line 36.  
 ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους] "at least suppose a  
 majority to be good men and good citi-  
 zens." A majority, though not the whole  
 body of citizens.

40 οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν] Nume-  
 rous enough, indeed, in the best state, to

- <sup>1286 b</sup>  
<sup>§ 10</sup> δὲ πάντες; ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν στασιάζουσιν (X)  
ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετόν ἴσως ὅτι  
σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ κακείνους ὁ εἰς ||.  
c. 16 § 9  
<sup>1287 b 8</sup> <ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει<sup>(XI)</sup>  
9 <ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,  
10 <ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθύς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα  
11 <καταστήσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἴπερ, ὁ καὶ πρότερον  
12 <εἰρημένον ἐστίν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν  
13 <δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ  
14 <σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ  
καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος  
15 <τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.>

1286 b 1 δὲ πάντες] δ' ἀνδρες Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> || στασιάζουσιν Ar. Morel Bk.

1287 b 8–15 § πολλά omitted by P<sup>6</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>3,4</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, and by a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>, but afterwards erased) || 9 ὑφ' αὐτοῦ fr. 11 δ.....12 ἐστίν before εἰ περ Γ Π Ar. Bk., transposed by Susem.<sup>3</sup> See Comm. n. (649) || 13 δὴ Camerarius, γε Böcker; but see Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* 167 a 19 ff. || 14 ἐρχομένων Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> fr. || 15 δέκα] δὲ M<sup>s</sup>, untranslated by William || ὡς οὐχ ἕνα· λοιπὸν (iam William) ἄρχειν δίκαιον added by Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> after συμφράδμονες; a gloss which has found its way into the text, given by p<sup>2</sup>, and in red ink on the margin of P<sup>1</sup>, in the more correct and fuller form ἀπὸ κοινοῦ τὸ ὡς οὐχ ἕνα λοιπὸν ἄρχειν δίκαιον

form the popular assembly and to appoint the council, the magistrates and the courts of justice from themselves alone—or, more precisely, from the older members amongst them, provided they are not too old: see IV (VII). 14 § 5, n. (817). SUSEM. (648)

§ 10 1286 b 1 ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν κτλ] Objection. "A larger body will split up into parties; with the one ruler this is impossible. To which we must, I take it, reply that they are (*ex hypothesi*) as virtuous in soul as that one ruler."

c. 16 §§ 9, 10 1287 b 8–15. The place of this fragment is vindicated by the congruence between its subject-matter and the foregoing. The contrast is still between ὁ εἰς and πλείους.

*The one ruler cannot overlook all things himself: he must appoint a number of officials; so that the state of things is virtually the same as if there were a number [i.e. a large body of the citizens] ruling.*

1287 b 10 ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθύς ὑπάρχειν] 'Whether this was the original state of things' as it would be if the great body of citizens were rulers.

§ 10 11 δ καὶ πρότερον κτλ] In c.

13 § 8, §§ 13–25. See also c. 15 § 3 s. fin. If we followed the manuscript order we should have to translate: "Lastly, as was remarked before, if the virtuous man deserves to rule because he is superior": but then it would follow that the apodosis (τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς...βελτίους) also occurred in the preceding chapters. But in the two passages which alone are conceivable and to which Bernays refers us c. 11 §§ 1–3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not find this, but something really quite different and only comparatively similar. Or could it have occurred in the lacuna which we assume after 13 § 5? This is hardly likely. We must therefore transpose thus: "if, as was previously remarked, the virtuous man &c." SUSEM. (649)

13. τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς] For δὲ in apodosis after εἰ cp. *Phys.* IV. 8 § 11, 215 b 15, εἰ γὰρ τὰ τέτταρα τῶν τριῶν ὑπερέχει ἐνί, πλείονι δὲ τοῦν δυοῖν...τοῦ δὲ μηδενὸς οὐκέτι ἔχει λόγον ὃ ὑπερέχει. With ἀλλὰ this is frequent: see e.g. c. 5 § 3 of this book.

14 σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ] Homer *Iliad* X. 224. SUSEM. (650)  
ἡ εὐχὴ] Agamemnon says this of Nestor, *Iliad* II. 372 f. SUSEM. (651)



1286 b 3

εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν 7

- 4 τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρα-  
 5 τίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἰρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς  
 πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ  
 χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ᾗ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους.  
 § 11 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ᾗν εὐρεῖν  
 ἀνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε  
 10 μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεις, ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν  
 τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ  
 δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι  
 ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.  
 § 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ χεῖρους γενόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 8

1286 b 3—1287 a 23 1286 b 7 ὁμοίως Γ Π<sup>3</sup> Ar. || 9 πολλὴ] *plures* Ar., πολλοὺς  
 ? Sylburg || 10 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἐπεὶ Jackson, ἐτι δ' Susem.<sup>1-2-3</sup> with all earlier autho-  
 rities || ἐτι δ'.....11 ἀνδρῶν Krohn rejects as spurious, but the change to ἐπειδὴ  
 disposes of his doubts. See Comm. n. (659) || 13 καὶ <ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ> πολι-  
 τείαν? Susem. || 14 γιγνόμενοι Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, γινόμενοι Bk.<sup>2</sup>

c. 15 § 10 1286 b 3 εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν...  
 5 θετέον] Compare n. (536) on 7 § 3.  
 SUSEM. (655)

6 καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνά-  
 μews] "whether the king has an armed  
 force granted to him or not." Cp.  
 § 14—c. 16 § 2 n. (666), as well as 14 § 7  
 n. (612). SUSEM. (656)

7 ἂν ᾗ λαβεῖν κτλ] "provided al-  
 ways a majority can be found of uniform  
 excellence." In fact an 'assembly of  
 kings' as Kineas said of the Roman  
 senate. ὁμοίους as in 4 § 5, and as in 15  
 § 11 ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

In §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατίαν), we have  
 a sort of historical appendix to the first  
 two ἀπορίαι.

§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] The im-  
 mediate reason is rather to be sought—as  
 Aristotle himself explains I. 2 § 6, n.  
 (19 b)—in the development of the state  
 from the family through the intermediate  
 link of the village-community. It would  
 have been better therefore to repeat that  
 fact and then to add that on account  
 of the further reason which is here ad-  
 duced kingly rule was maintained for  
 some time longer. Cp. n. (659). SUSEM.  
 (657)

9 τότε μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεις] "con-  
 sidering too the small size of the cities in  
 which they lived then." Comp. § 13  
 n. (663), and the passages there collected.  
 SUSEM. (658)

10 ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας κτλ] It

would have been highly desirable  
 to adjust this second reason to the first.  
 For if monarchy is traced back on the  
 one hand to the government of a com-  
 munity by its elders, and on the other to  
 personal merit, the two causes cannot  
 simply be at once combined, though a  
 partial combination is not only conceiv-  
 able, but even right. Aristotle however  
 has neglected to make it, and has thus  
 left a difficulty unsolved. For when  
 Henkel writes *Stud.* p. 95, 'but even in  
 places where the original connexion be-  
 tween the state and the organization of  
 the family no longer exercised a deter-  
 mining influence, it was only monarchy  
 that grew up in the beginnings of civi-  
 lization,' adducing the second reason to  
 explain this, he is quite right, but un-  
 fortunately there is nothing of the kind  
 in Aristotle. See also VIII(v). 10. 3 n.  
 (1649). SUSEM. (659)

12 συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς κτλ]  
 Comp. VIII(v). 10 § 37 n. (1708). "They  
 would no longer submit to the rule of a  
 king, but strove after a commonwealth  
 (κοινὸν τι) and tried to set up a free  
 government" (πολιτείαν): i.e. a republican  
 constitution, or more accurately, first an  
 aristocracy or a 'polity' of horse soldiers,  
 next a 'polity' properly so called, of  
 heavy-armed foot: VI(IV). 13 § 10, cp.  
 n. (1273). SUSEM. (660)

§ 12 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ χεῖρους... 15 ὀλι-  
 γαρχίας] And yet Aristotle (?) VIII(v).

- 15 ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εὖλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἐντιμον (X)  
 γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλούτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραν-  
 νίδας μετέβαλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν·  
 αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότε-  
 ρον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δη-  
 § 13 μοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πό-  
 21 λεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥᾶδιον ἔτι γίνεσθαι πολιτεῖαν ἑτέραν παρὰ  
 δημοκρατίαν.  
 εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἄριστον θεῖη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι 9  
 23 ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ  
 τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γινομένων ὁποιοὶ τινες

17 μετέβαλλον M<sup>a</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 18 ἄγοντες <τοὺς ὀλίγους> or ἄγοντες <τοὺς πλουσίους> or something similar Henkel (*Studien*, p. 96 n. 24); see Comm. n. (662)  
 || 22 εἰ.....27 φύσιν cited by Julian ad Themist. p. 260 D f. || 23 περὶ παρὰ the mss. of Julian except the Cod. Voss. || 24 ὁποιοὶ (ὁποῖοι M<sup>a</sup>) Π<sup>1</sup> fr. Julian and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.), ὁποῖον P<sup>3</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), ὁποῖων P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> C<sup>c</sup>

12 § 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Timocracy to Oligarchy in precisely the same way (Schlosser). See nn. (1767, 1777). SUSEM. (661)

18 εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες] Here τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας or τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however would insert τοὺς ὀλίγους or τοὺς πλουσίους in the text and translate: "while the powerful" (viz. the tyrants) "from disgraceful avarice continued more and more to thin the ranks of the rich." But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is somewhat obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchies were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (II. 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strengthen the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the δῆμος in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did "dispersed over its farms and isolated," VIII(v). 5 § 8 n. (1558), stood in need of leaders. But for this very reason there was first a transitional state of things, viz. the tyranny of these same leaders; and

afterwards when the people grew stronger the tyrants were banished, and a democracy arose. SUSEM. (662)

§ 13 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους κτλ] Comp. § 11, VI(IV). 6 § 5 n. (1225), 13 § 10 (1272), § 11; VII(VI). 5 § 5 (1435), 6 § 5 (1448—9), also VI(IV). 12. 3 n. (1310). Beside this increase in the population Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, VIII(v). 5 §§ 8, 9, comp. nn. (1558—9), and VIII(v). 10 § 5 n. (1650): the military organization of the people, which if trained to serve as light infantry would easily hold its own against cavalry and heavy infantry, VII(VI). 7. 2, and the development of the navy, *ib.* nn. (1453—5) (Henkel). SUSEM. (663)

21 ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥᾶδιον κτλ] "Nowadays hardly any form of government, except democracy, can easily arise." Kingly rule in particular is not to be expected; if a monarchical constitution arises at all, it is in the form of τυραννίς, VIII(v). 10 § 37; cp. VIII(v). 5 §§ 6—8 (Henkel) with n. (1708). SUSEM. (664)

22 εἰ δὲ δὴ τις... 23 πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων:] This is the third ἀπορία: a standing difficulty of all monarchy. In order to meet it heredity has been modified at different periods (1) by election from a royal line, as amongst the early Teutonic tribes, cp. n. on 1285 a 16; (2) by adoption, as in the best times of the Roman empire.

24 ἀλλὰ γινομένων ὁποιοὶ τινες ἔν-  
 χον] "But that will be mischievous if



§ 14 ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὧν τοῖς (X)  
 26 τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔτι ῥάδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γάρ,  
 καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.  
 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ<sup>10</sup>  
 τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ἢ δυνήσεται (p. 89)  
 30 βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται  
 § 15 τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ [καὶ] κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μη-  
 δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως  
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.  
 § 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν  
 35 διορίσαι (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην  
 τὴν ἰσχύν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω  
 τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἦττω, καθάπερ οἱ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς  
 ἐδίδουσιν, ὅτε καθισταῖεν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνή-  
 την ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ἦται τοὺς φύλακας, συν-  
 40 εβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσοῦτους τοὺς φύλακας·  
 16 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα XI  
 1287 a

25 ἀλλ'.....26 τέκνοις omitted by Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>, given in P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> Q M<sup>b</sup> U<sup>b</sup> C<sup>c</sup> in the form  
 ἀλλ' οὐ καταλείψει τοὺς υἱεὶς διαδόχους ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔχων τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ||  
 τοῖς] τοιούτοις Ar. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> (perhaps rightly), omitted by Julian || 26 οὐκ ἔτι ῥάδιον  
 τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι Julian, οὐ ῥάδιον ἔστι τοῦτο Γ(?), οὐκέτι (οὐκ ἔστι M<sup>a</sup>, οὐκ ἔστι P<sup>a</sup>) τοῦτο  
 ῥάδιον Π (including fr.) Bk., perhaps rightly || 29 αὐτόν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, αὐτόν Γ Π || ἡ M<sup>a</sup>  
 P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. || δυνήσεται M<sup>a</sup>, possit William || 31 καὶ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> fr., un-  
 translated by Ar. || 32 αὐτοῦ Γ, αὐτοῦ Π || 33 φυλάξει P<sup>4</sup> Ald., φυλάξει P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup>  
 T<sup>b</sup> fr., φυλάσσεται M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 36 ἐκάστων Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> (singulorum William) || 39 [ἡ  
 τύραννον] ? Susem., <αἰρετόν> ἡ τύραννον? Schmidt || 40 συρακουσίους fr.

the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random" or "just as it happens," a euphemism for "if they are very inferior." So Pl. *Gorg.* 514 E πρὶν πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτόχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι: Eur. *Hipp.* 929 τὴν μὲν δικάσαν τὴν δ' ὅπως ἐτύχανε.

"This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important" (Congreve). SUSEM. (665)

28 ἀπορίαν] The fourth difficulty started is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch's disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means not only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even a standing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (656), 14 § 7 n. (622). SUSEM. (666)

§ 15 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύ-

ριος] "For even if he be lawfully sovereign...still he must have a force to guard the laws."

§ 16 38 αἰσυμνήτην] Cp. c. 14 § 8 n. (623). SUSEM. (667)

39 ὅτ' ἦται τοὺς φύλακας] This is what Dionysios the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ Diod. XIII. 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodoros XIII. 85—94 (cp. nn. 1562, 1576) B.C. 406 or 405. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm *Geschichte Siciliens* II. pp. 94—96, p. 128. Cp. VIII(v). 5 § 10, n. (1562), 6 § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1604), 10 § 6 (1660), 11 § 10 (1723); also I. 11. 12 n. (106), *Rhet.* I. 2. 19, 1357 b 30, Plato *Rep.* VIII 566 B, Polyaen. V. 2. 2. SUSEM. (668)

c. 16 § 1 1287 a 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως κτλ] This clause with δὲ answers

πράττοντος ὃ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέ- (XI)  
ψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν  
εἶδος, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-  
5 χειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν αἰδίου, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ  
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως·  
τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ  
Ἵποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἔλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα- 2  
§ 2 σιλίας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἀρχεὶ πάντων κατὰ  
10 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς, \* \*.

δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ  
11 φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἓνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου  
συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλιν· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ  
αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν

1287 a 4 πολιτείας Camerarius and Vettori (also by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine), βασιλείας Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 8 ἐλάττων Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahr's copy of Morel (probably right) || 8 περὶ... 13 ἀναγκαῖον quoted by Julian ad Themist. p. 631 A f. || 9 δὲ ἐστὶ Codex Vossianus of Julian || ἀρχεῖ... 10 βούλησιν perhaps transposed by Γ to follow 10 βασιλεὺς || πάντων Julian, πάντα II (including fr.), πᾶν Codex Vossianus || 10 αὐτοῦ Cod. Voss. (accent by a second hand), αὐτοῦ Hertlein || λεπτέον inserted after βασιλεὺς by Γ; a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller form by P<sup>1</sup>: κατὰ κοινὸν τὸ λεπτέον. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δέ, which is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Sylburg and Scaliger, to δῆ. || τὸ κατὰ Julian || 11 εἶναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἓνα Γ M<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || ὅπου..... 12 πόλιν and 13 καὶ..... φύσιν omitted by Julian

to the preceding one beginning τάχα μὲν οὖν 15 § 16; and it is an objection to Mr J. Cook Wilson's analysis of cc. 15, 16 that it ignores this correspondence.

2 ἐφέστηκε] the question is now at hand, impends.

4 καθάπερ εἵπομεν] c. 15 § 2, n. (635). SUSEM. (669)

5 αἰδίου = held for life.

6 τῆς διοικήσεως] 'of the administration.' Not in the technical sense in which ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως meant the Minister of Finance at Athens.

7 περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον] Comp. VIII(V). 1 § 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1550); also II. 7 § 23 n. (249). SUSEM. (670)

8 At Opus the holder of this office bore the title of Cosmopolis Polyb. XII. 16. Comp. Schömann p. 142 Eng. tr.

§ 2 There is a manifest lacuna after line 10 ὁ βασιλεὺς; the omission of δὲ in the citation by Julian is one attempt to conceal it, as the change to δῆ is another.

For instead of extending to παμβασιλεία the fourth ἀπορία (which in 15 §§ 15, 16, 1286 b 34—40, received an easy solution in respect of limited monarchy) the text goes on to raise an entirely new problem, ἀπορία (5); viz. *Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly when all are peers (δμοιοί)? Is it not natural that power should pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέρος) and be vested in officials, whose functions are arranged by law?* Thus by the mention of law the fifth difficulty brings us round again to the first,—a circumstance in itself quite unexceptionable, though it is no doubt responsible for the collection here of the various fragments §§ 4—13 which bear more or less closely upon the first and second ἀπορίαι.

10 δοκεῖ δέ τισιν] Comp. II. 2 § 4 n. (133), § 6 (134 b); IV(VII). 3 § 6 n. (740); further I. 7 § 1 n. (58 b); IV(VII). 8 § 2 (797), VI(IV). 11 § 8 (1293). SUSEM. (672)



εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφήν ἢ (XI)  
 15 ἐσθήτα βλαβερόν τοῖς σώμασιν, <καὶ> οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ  
 § 3 τὰς τιμὰς, ὁμοίως [τοῖνυν] καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον τοὺς ἴσους· διόπερ οὐδένα 3  
 μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοί-  
 νυν ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἤδη νόμος· ἢ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν (p. 90)  
 19 ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα  
 § 4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄρχειν  
 βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς  
 νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕνα τοῦ-  
 23 τον εἶναι φασι δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν 4  
 ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίξειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπος  
 § 5 ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος  
 26 ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν  
 τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὃ τι ἂν δόξῃ  
 28 πειρωμένοις ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον

14 εἴπερ] ὥσπερ an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine || ὥστ'  
 εἴπερ καὶ] ὥσπερ γὰρ? Schneider || 15 <καὶ> Götting || ἔχει] ἔχειν Schneider  
 || τὸ P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>8</sup> Bk. || 16 τοῖνυν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || οὐδένα Bernays, οὐδὲν Γ Π (in-  
 cluding fr.) Ar. Bk. || 23 ὁμοίως Π<sup>2</sup>

1287 a 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα..... 28 κειμένων transposed to follow 1286 a  
 21 κάλλιον: see p. 433

1287 a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν..... b 8 τὸ ἔθος transposed to follow 1286 a  
 20 πᾶσαν: see pp. 430—432

14 τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους] Comp.  
*Nic. Eth.* II. 6 § 7, 1106 a 36 ff. (Broughton). SUSEM. (673)

§ 3 16 ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον κτλ.]  
 "So too it is quite as harmful if unequal shares are assigned to those who are equal. Hence it is right that in ruling and being ruled all should be alike, and consequently should interchange with one another in both. But here we come to law, for the system" on which they interchange "is a law."

17 τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος rotation in ruling and being ruled.

18 ὡσαύτως sc. δίκαιον ἐστὶ.

§ 4 21 νομοφύλακας=guardians of the laws: the expression used by Plato *Laws* IV 715 c (Eaton). SUSEM. (673 b)

23 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ.] "In order to bring this passage 1287 a 23—28, as it stands, into logical connexion with the preceding fifth ἀπορία, it will be necessary to regard it not as an objection to the view therein expressed, but as introducing a new objection to a ruler who goes beyond the letter of the law: ἀλλὰ μὴν=but again, as in 1262

b 24, 1287 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25—27, allows that within certain limits the one ruler is really in a position to make such decisions, and speaks of rulers in the plural. Hence there can be no question here of attacking or defending monarchy, and besides all the ἀπορίαι are alike in treating *absolute* monarchy unfavourably. It would still be open to us to read ὁ δ' with Aretinus instead of οὐδ', a 24; but if that were done ἀλλὰ in the next line would not be in place: Ar. omits it and we should rather expect ὡδὲ or ὥστε or something of that sort." SUSEM.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] "It is not to be denied that, if the preceding passage 1287 a 23—28 be transposed, this passage 1287 a 28—b 8 might quite well follow the fifth ἀπορία, so far as the connexion of thought goes. But the form renders this impossible. The fact that law is passionless is not an inference that can be drawn from the natural injustice of a permanent ruling body: so that οὖν will not stand as 'therefore.' Nor will it suit as a transitional particle, without something else, καὶ or ἐτι δε." SUSEM.

κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν (XI)  
 30 μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ  
 ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους  
 § 6 ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ 5  
 δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ  
 34 γράμματα λατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετώτερον χρη-  
 § 7 σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν  
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς  
 κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς  
 πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασιν πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 τοὺς λατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-  
 40 φθεῖρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν  
 § 8 ζητήσαιν· ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς 6  
 1287 b οἱ λατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους λατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-  
 μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὥς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ  
 τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ  
 § 9 δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ μέσον.  
 5 ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα  
 νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ-  
 ματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ (p. 91)  
 8 ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει 7  
 ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,  
 10 ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα  
 § 10 καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἴπερ, δ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον  
 12 ἐστίν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δι-  
 13 καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ  
 14 σὺν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένῳ

καὶ ἡ εὐχή τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος

15 τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.

|| εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ

16 ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνουν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος  
 ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-

1287 b 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ..... 15 συμφράδμονες transposed to follow  
 1286 b 3 ὁ εἶς: see p. 435

1287 b 15 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ..... 35 δεῖν ὁμοίως is another recension of 1286 a 26  
 —b 3. See *Introd.* p. 84 f. || δὲ] γὰρ? Susem. || 17 γε omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> Bk.

c. 16 §§ 10—13 1287 b 15—35. In  
*Introd.* pp. 84—5, the reader will find this  
 passage printed in parallel columns side by  
 side with c. 15 §§ 7—10, 1286 a 26—b 3,

an arrangement which cannot be adopted  
 here, simply because it is then no longer  
 possible to preserve the lines of Bekker's  
 quarto edition, as is done elsewhere.



τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. (XI)  
 § 11 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ 8  
 20 δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον  
 τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄρι-  
 στον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευίνονται νομοτεθῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων  
 ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄν-  
 24 θρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινούντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι  
 § 12 οὐχ ἓνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαι-  
 δευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπόν τ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δό- 9  
 ξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὄμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς  
 κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολ-  
 30 λοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχαι ποιοῦσιν  
 αὐτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοῖς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ  
 § 13 καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες  
 οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι  
 κάκεῖνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὃ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὁμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ  
 τούτους οἶεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἶεται  
 35 δεῖν ὁμοίως. ||

17 ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγου-

18 ὡς.....κρίνειεν transposed to precede 17 ἐπεὶ by Π<sup>2</sup>, untranslated by Ar. || 19  
 καὶ omitted by Γ and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, added by p<sup>1</sup>) || ἐπειδὴ Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 22 νενομο-  
 θετῆσθαι Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> *lege statuta esse* William || 25 κρινεῖ Spengel, κρίνει Γ Π Ar. Bk.  
 || 26 ἄτοπον...31 συνάρχους cited in Scholia on Aristoph. *Birds* 92 || τ' Π<sup>1</sup> fr.,  
 δ' Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. || 27 ἔχοι Susem., ἴδοι Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. Schol.  
 on Aristoph. Bk. || δυοῖν] δυοὶ Sylburg || 28 πράττοι Conring wrongly, but recog-  
 nizing that the text was unsound || 29 μονάρχαι Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || 30  
 αὐτῶν Morel, αὐτῶν Π Schol. Aristoph., αὐτοῖς Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (*sibi* William), possibly right  
 || τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon || 31 αὐτοῦ Susem.<sup>3</sup>, αὐτοῦ Γ Π Susem.<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, αὐτοῖς Schol.  
 Aristoph. Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps right, αὐτοῖς Bk.<sup>2</sup>, but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 125 a 18 f. || 32  
 δὲ omitted by fr. || 33 ὅ τε Γ, ὅτε P<sup>4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald., ὅτε Q<sup>b</sup>, ὁ δὲ Ar. || φίλους ἴσως Γ M<sup>2</sup>

c. 16 § 11 19 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν κτλ] It is on this account that 'equity' is necessary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decrees. See *Nic. Eth.* v. 8. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. 13 § 12 ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Cope's comments and his *Introd.* pp. 190—193], Plato *Polit.* 294 b ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 579, 637 and VI(IV). 4. 31 n. (1212). SUSEM. (652)

22 περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευίνονται] This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of *Nic. Eth.* III. c. 3. SUSEM. (653)

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν] Here, it may be remarked, Mr J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα...τῶν κειμένων.

§ 12 29 ὀφθαλμοῖς] An allusion to the title of the king's eye, given by the Medes and Persians to a counsellor of the king: Herod. i. 114 (cp. c. 100), Aesch. *Persae* 973, Aristoph. *Ach.* 94 with scholiast, Xenoph. *Cyropaed.* VIII. 2 §§ 10—12. Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. *De Mundo* c. 6, 398 a 21 ff., Poll. II. 4 (Eaton) and n. (1715) upon VIII(V). 11 § 7. SUSEM. (654)

c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3

36 *σι, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει* 10  
*τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει*  
*δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ*  
*δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν,* (p. 92)  
 40 οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶν ταῦτα  
 § 2 γὰρ γίνεται [τά] παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φα-  
 1288a νερόν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον  
*ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἓνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ ὄντων νό-*  
*μων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγα-*  
 4 θὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν  
 § 3 ἀμείνων ἦ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον  
*εἴρηται δὲ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. [πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ 11*

38 δεσποτικὸν] δεσποτὸν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald., probably also P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), δεσπο-  
 στὸν Sylburg Bk., ἀριστοκρατικὸν in place of either δεσποτικὸν οἱ βασιλικὸν Schlosser.  
 See Comm. || καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (in P<sup>1</sup> added in the margin) ||  
 βασιλευτὸν P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. Bk., probably also P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), βασιλευτικὸν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.)  
 || 41 τὰ rightly omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk., retained by fr.

1288a 2 νόμων ὄντων M<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 3 ἀλλ'.....νόμον omitted by II<sup>3</sup> || 5 εἰ  
 omitted by fr. || 6 ἤδη omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [ἤδη] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || [πρῶτον.....15 ἀρχάς]  
 Susem. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 398 f.

will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας, or absolute monarchy. Comp. Susemihl *Quaest. coll. crit.* p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to that commonwealth of virtuous men in which alone absolute monarchy will arise. Comp. c. 15 § 9.

§ 1 36 ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν] i.e. in certain circumstances: not, as Bernays and others translate, "in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies)." See n. (677) and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 397 ff. SUSEM. (674)

38 δεσποτικὸν...βασιλικὸν] "Bekker writes δεσποστὸν after Sylburg and βασιλευτὸν as in II<sup>2</sup>. But we find τυραννικὸν standing side by side with these; and as this can hardly be used, like ἀριστοκρατικὸν and πολιτικὸν, in a passive sense it proves that we should rather read δεσποτικὸν with Götting, as in II<sup>1</sup>, and adopt βασιλικὸν from the corr. of P<sup>1</sup>. Further, how else are we to construe καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον and τῶν ἄλλων...παρεκβάσεις, to which Lambin raised an objection? But with the text before us ἔστι φύσει is the predicate of the first clause, ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν the predicate of the second clause: all the rest is subject." SUSEM.

40 ταῦτα γὰρ...παρὰ φύσιν] Com-

pare the apparently inconsistent passage VII(IV). 12 § 3 n. (1310). SUSEM. (674 b)

§ 2 1288a 3 ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον] Cp. 13 § 14 n. 601 b. SUSEM. (675)

This is the thorough-going Absolutism of the scientific expert in government, as advanced by Plato.

§ 3 6 καὶ πρότερον] viz. c. 13 §§ 13—25. SUSEM. (676)

6 πρῶτον δὲ...15 ἀρχάς] Krohn is right in objecting to the meaningless tautology in the definition of the peoples suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is even worse that aristocracy is here described in a manner which, although it does not directly contradict Aristotle's conception, still by no means exhausts it, and therefore does not render it faithfully. It is indeed essential that a true aristocracy should possess citizens who are capable enough always to elect the most capable persons to office. But it is as essential to this ideal aristocracy, that these persons should only hold their offices for a certain time, and then be replaced by persons not inferior in capacity, so that there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and ruled. And it is yet worse to find the people suited for a monarchy represented as different from that suited for



βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. (XI)  
 § 4 βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν  
 γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀρι-  
 10 στοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν [[πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι  
 δυνάμενον]] τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν  
 ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ἐν  
 ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρ-  
 χεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα  
 § 5 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.] ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν 12

10 [πλῆθος...φέρειν] Vettori Bk. || [πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον] Susem. following Ar. and Schneider. Perhaps another recension of the preceding || 11 ἀρχὴν omitted by M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 12 πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ.....13 ἐγγίνεσθαι Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup>, [ἐν ᾧ.....13 πολεμικόν] Hercher (*Hermes* VII. 467) || 13 πέφυκε καὶ ἐν Π<sup>2</sup> (only P<sup>4</sup> has ἐν for ἐν, written over an erasure), [καὶ ἐν] Bk.<sup>1</sup>, omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> fr. Ar. || ἡθος Hayduck (probably right) || πολιτικὸν fr. Π<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr. of P<sup>1</sup>) || καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι M<sup>o</sup>, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk. || 15 ἀπόροις P<sup>3</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> fr. Ar. γρ. ἀπόροις P<sup>1</sup> in the margin. P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand) also had ἀπόροις: εὐπόροις was written over by corr.<sup>3</sup> and γρ. καὶ ἀπόροις inserted in the margin; <εὐπόροις καὶ> ἀπόροις? Stahr (not bad). See Comm. n. (677): πολίταις Koraes || ἡ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Bernays Susem.<sup>1</sup> || [τῶν ἄλλων] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, *aliorum id est aliorum* Albert; if ἡ is right either τῶν ἄλλων is a dittographia from 17, or must be transposed to follow 16 ἕνα τινὰ, or, as Schmidt proposes, to follow 19 βασιλεύα

aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz. that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see *Introd.* p. 44). For this very reason, we would not translate above at 17 § 1 "for some people monarchical government is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government"—but rather: "under some circumstances the one, and under others the other." But the interpolator, like many modern critics, misunderstanding the passage adopted the former meaning, and so it seemed to him necessary to interpolate here an exact account of each kind of people. When the passage is rightly interpreted, the incorrectness of this interpolation at once becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is closely connected with καὶ πρότερον... (§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this connexion entirely. In its present form the definition of the people suited to a Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether we adopt the reading εὐπόροις or ἀπόροις; the former gives a mixture of aristocracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous combination of aristocracy and democracy, while the Aristotelian Polity is a compromise between oligarchy and demo-

cracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad even for this interpolator, and we ought perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture τοῖς εὐπόροις <καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις> which would remove the difficulty. SUSEM. (677)

§ 4 12 πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος κτλ.] If we adopt the very probable change of the second πλῆθος into ἡθος, the sense is: "And the population suited for a Polity is that in which there is naturally a warlike character (ἡθος), qualified to be rulers as well as subjects in accordance with a law which assigns the offices of state in accordance with their merits to the rich (? and the poor)." If this change be not made, the sentence will be differently rendered according as the second πλῆθος is regarded (1) as mere redundancy (*Postgate Notes* p. 25), or (2) as used in a different sense from the first: i.e. as meaning 'body,' 'class' within the entire civic population. Bernays, while adopting this latter view, makes δυνάμενον...ἀρχάς refer to the first πολιτικὸν πλῆθος: which seems inconsistent. If 'the population suited to Polity' were 'one in which a warlike class naturally arises,' it should merely be *this class* and not the population generally 'in which an interchange of ruling and being ruled can be carried into effect.' SUSEM.

16 ἄλλων ἓνα τινὰ συμβῆ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν (XI)  
 τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων,  
 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάν-  
 § 6 των καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρό-  
 20 τερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προσφέρειν εἰώ-  
 θασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες οἳ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς  
 καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς  
 (πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν  
 § 7 αὐτήν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ 13  
 25 φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δὴ που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν,  
 οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος  
 ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι  
 § 8 τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ  
 τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος [τοῦτον] ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. (p. 93)  
 30 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον XII

16 τινὰ omitted by II<sup>1</sup>, [τινὰ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 20 [οὐ μόνον] Bojesen || 21 ἀριστο-  
 κρατίας and 22 ὀλιγαρχίας Γ M<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 22 δημοκρατίας Γ Susem.<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>s</sup> (1st  
 hand) || 23 παντὶ fr. πάντες II<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), perhaps right; yet altered to  
 πάντῃ by the corr. of P<sup>4</sup> || ἀξιοῦσιν... ὑπεροχὴν omitted by T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> (1st hand,  
 ἀξιοῦσιν added in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>, and ἀξιοῦσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν by a later hand in the  
 margin of Q<sup>b</sup>) || 24 <καὶ> Schneider, which supersedes Bojesen's violent change  
 (line 20) and Spengel's suspicion of 20 οὐ μόνον οὕτως || 27 τὴν omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>4</sup>  
 Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk. || 29 τοῦτον omitted by II<sup>1</sup> || κατὰ μέρος εἶναι τοῦτον ἀλλὰ ἀπλῶς fr.

§ 5 18 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος κτλ] Ari-  
 stotle speaks with far more correctness  
 here than in 13 § 13 when he is dealing  
 with a whole stock of individuals or even  
 a single man. But this gives a fresh proof  
 (cp. *Introd.* p. 46) that in describing his  
 ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of  
 Macedonia; for not even Oncken would  
 attribute to him the absurdity of regarding  
 the whole royal family of Macedon as  
 gods dwelling among men (13 § 13 n.  
 601, § 25 n. 615). SUSEM. (678)

§ 6 19 εἴρηται πρότερον] viz. c. 13  
 §§ 23—25 and §§ 1—12. SUSEM. (679)

21 τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς] Instead of  
 aristocracy, we should at first sight  
 rather expect polity: for aristocracy is  
 founded on the right of fitness or merit,  
 the only ultimate right (7 § 3 n. 536).  
 But Aristotle is here pointing to the ex-  
 planations in 13 §§ 1—12, in which it is  
 aristocracy and not polity that is dis-  
 cussed; and even this is hypothetically  
 designated as faulty, in cases, that is,  
 where the excellence of the community is  
 not weighed against that of individuals

to see which excels the other. SUSEM.  
 (680)

24 κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] sc.  
 δίκαιον 'but also according to the right  
 previously expounded': viz. the right  
 of merit, when the estimate just men-  
 tioned (in n. 680) has been correctly  
 made. Accordingly we are referred back  
 to c. 9 as well as to c. 13. Further comp.  
 n. (595) and VIII(v). 1 § 6 n. (1495).  
 SUSEM. (681)

§ 7 26 οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε... 28 συμβέβη-  
 κεν] 'For it is not natural that the part  
 should outweigh the whole, and the pos-  
 sessor of such extraordinary eminence has  
 happened to be in this case' viz. that all  
 the others together stand to him as part to  
 whole. The ordinary interpretation is,  
 'For it is not the course of nature that  
 the part should surpass the whole, whereas  
 this happens when a man is very superior  
 to the rest.' But see c. 13 § 13. Su-  
 SEM. (681 b)

§ 8 29 μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς]  
 'not merely in rotation' with others,  
 'but absolutely sovereign.'



31 οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, (XII)  
 18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φάμεν εἶναι τὰς  
 ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ  
 τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ συμβέβη-  
 35 κεν ἢ ἓνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον  
 εἶναι κατ' ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ'  
 ἄρχειν πρὸς τὴν αἰρετωτάτην ζωὴν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδεί-  
 χθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ  
 πολίτου τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεως· φανερόν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον  
 40 καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συ-  
 στήσειεν ἂν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευμένην, ὥστε ἔσται 2  
 1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθνη ταῦτά σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον  
 § 2 ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν [καὶ βασιλικόν]. διωρισμέ-  
 νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς  
 4 ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.

36 ἄρχεσθαι <καὶ ἄρχειν> Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 39 τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης II<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.  
 || 41 <ἀριστ' ἢ> ἀριστοκρατουμένην Bücheler, probably right. Schmidt  
 thinks ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευμένην a gloss which has taken the place of the  
 true reading ἀρίστα πολιτευομένην or εὖ τεταγμένην; [ἢ βασιλευμένην] Spengel who  
 first saw the text to be unsound

1288 b 2 πολιτικόν] πόλιν ἀγαθὴν (or σπουδαῖον)? Spengel || [καὶ βασιλικόν]  
 Spengel, καὶ βασιλικόν <καὶ ἀριστοκρατικόν> Conring wrongly: καὶ βασιλευτὸν  
 Nickes, accepted by Bernays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good  
 sense || 4 καθίστασθαι πῶς M<sup>a</sup>, καθίστασθαι πῶς P<sup>3</sup> T<sup>b</sup> W<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand,  
 the second acute has been erased).

c. 18 *Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the narrower sense, i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristocracy.*

This chapter is of first-rate importance for the question of the order of Books IV (VII), V(VIII), because it enables us to decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal) state in its normal form is or is not identical with the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία Aristocracy: a point which Forchhammer (*Philol.* xv. p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (*Philol.* xiv. p. 293 ff. *Der alte Staat des Aris.* p. 66 ff.), defending the traditional order of the books, denied. Their objections are examined by Spengel *Arist. Studien* II. p. 60 (652) f.

§ 1 34 οἰκονομουμένην] administered, managed. No stress can be laid upon this word: see VIII(V). § 15 τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομία.

35 ἢ ἓνα τινὰ... ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος] The first two cases give the ideal king-  
 dom; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678): the third

gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n. (600). SUSEM. (682)

37 πρὸς τὴν...ζωὴν] Comp. II. 1 § 1 n. (128): also n. (21) on I. 2 § 8, n. (284) on II. 9 § 5 and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (683)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] c. 5 § 10; see n. (471). SUSEM. (684)

At the end of this chapter in the manuscripts and in the editions (down to and including Bekker's quarto) is appended the unfinished sentence ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν. It was Spengel's great merit, *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* p. 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognize in this imperfect sentence a transition to the discussion of the ideal state, dating back from the time when that discussion immediately followed the present chapter, and consequently evidence of an older order of the books than that adopted by the compilers of our present text (? Andronicus). See *Introd.* p. 17, p. 47 f.

## EXCURSUS I.

### ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. III. 7. I.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel *Studien* p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff. From Herodotos III. 80—82 we learn that the Athenians of the Periclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotos nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that 'during the Peloponnesian war,' as Henkel says, 'men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names (Thuc. III. 82): afterwards the Socratics used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, τὴν εὐώνυμον ἀριστοκρατίαν, Plato *Politic.* 302 D.' Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyrannis, are found in Herodotos as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the masterly descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people: for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding<sup>1</sup> as at Sparta (Xen. *Mem.* III. 5. 14—16: IV. 4. 15, cp. *De Rep. Lac.* 10. 7, Plato *Crito* 92 E); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. *Mem.* IV. 6. 12, cp. I. 2. 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

<sup>1</sup> And not, as Oncken II. 152 misinforms us only 'after performance of definite statutory injunctions.'



the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in the one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind<sup>1</sup>. In democracy he made no such distinction at all: he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (Xen. *Mem.* III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master's footsteps most closely in his *Politicus*, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard<sup>2</sup> which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyrannis, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates' Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the *Republic* so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the *Politicus* arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy, in the *Republic* on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the *Politicus* to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy: cp. Zeller *Plato* p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the *Republic* and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

<sup>1</sup> Hence Oncken's criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account,

and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which bases a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

<sup>2</sup> That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude: Plato *Polit.* 219 D f., 302 C.

the fashion of Sparta and Crete, for which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (II. 6. 17 with *n.* 219, cp. also *Introd.* p. 20): for Plato in the *Republic* does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad: IX 544 f., 547 D ff.

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II. 6 §§ 17, 18 that he shews himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the *Laws*, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also *n.* 191 on II. 6. 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited; the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the *Politicus*, except that it is not stated in the *Laws* whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyrannis, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the *Politicus*, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy: nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the *Republic*. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order: at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the *Laws*, since he uses the term Aristocracy III 701 A in the sense of a 'government by the best,' although in III 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage IV 712 CD it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by "Aristocracy." We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7. 3, VI(IV). 7. 1, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—cp. *n.* 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato's time gave it the common name Πολιτεία, Constitution or Commonwealth in general: evidently (a) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution *par excellence*; or else (b) because as in their opinion the best constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (c) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the *Ethics* I. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato coined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifica-



tion, i.e. the rule of a moderate property-qualification. Comp. III. 7. 4 *n.* (537), VI(IV). 9. 3 *n.* (1254), VI(IV). 13. 7 *n.* (1269).

Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself remarks VI(IV). 2. 3 (cp. *nn.* 1139, 1140), the view presented by Plato in the *Politicus*, except that he replaces law-abiding Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in the form of the antithesis between the 'old fashioned' and the 'modern' Democracy—II. 12 §§ 2, 4, cp. VI(IV). 6 § 5, 14 § 7, §§ 11, 12: VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 §§ 3, 4, VIII(V). §§ 10 and *n.* (406)—which Isocrates, in particular, is fond of using<sup>1</sup>. Hence follows the essentially original addition made by Aristotle to the Greek classification of forms of government, which he expressly claims as original VI(IV). 1 §§ 8—11 (cp. *n.* 1126, also VI[IV]. 2 § 4 *n.* 1140 b, VII[VI]. 1 § 7 *n.* 1383 b, VIII[V]. 12 § 18 *n.* 1787), namely the accurate analysis of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in particular, into their sub-species, and the estimate of the comparative merit of the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbridled and corrupt, which resemble Tyrannis, VI(IV). c. 4 f, VII(VI). cc. 4—7. Thus in contrast to Plato's procedure in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* he certainly regards even the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration, though it stands still very near to Polity. But even amongst the mixed forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Polities, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the absolute sense: VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9, cp. 2 § 1 *n.* (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 (218), IV(VII). 11. 5 (849), also *n.* (536) on III. 7. 3: for which an ideal Monarchy as the best form of all is at least conceivable: III. c. 13 *nn.* (595, 597, 601), c. 17 *nn.* (677, 678); VI(IV). 2 § 1 f *nn.* (1133, 1136—7), 10 § 4 *n.* comparing *nn.* (521) on III. 6. 1, (614) on III. 14. 24, (633) on III. 14. 2. But this, the only Monarchy which has any justification in the developed state, is not tied down to laws but is absolutely unqualified. Comp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. The same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by Aristotle, without specifying the sub-species, in the *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—3:<sup>2</sup> indeed he had probably expounded it still earlier in one of his dialogues. For it is assuredly probable, if not certain, that when Isocrates, who is trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy, as found in Herodotos<sup>3</sup>, makes a hit at those who, caring little for essential points, regard Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy

<sup>1</sup> Comp. e.g. Isocr. VII. 15 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The divergences which Oncken, p. 158 ff. believes he has discovered rest upon misapprehensions.

<sup>3</sup> But in such a way as to give Oligarchy the meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle.

in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms (*Panath.* §§ 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring, as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the *Ethics*, which at that time unquestionably was not yet published<sup>1</sup>; nor is there anything said in the *Ethics* about a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f, criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from Socrates and Plato, says not without some reason: la science ne peut admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s'appuie, non pas sur le principe même ou l'organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs différences intrinsèques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, c'est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference; that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence, sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction between a despotism and a really free government be maintained? And is there not a difference in the 'principle of the constitution itself' between a constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which distributes power wisely? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it. SUSEM. (533)

## EXCURSUS II.

## PITTACUS: III. 14. 10.

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Töpffer more particularly has recently shown in his *Quaestiones Pisistrateae* pp. 81—107

<sup>1</sup> Heitz in his continuation of K. O. Müller's History of Greek Literature, *Geschichte der griech. Litt.* II ii p. 281 f. (cp. p. 245) is certainly of opinion that the *Nicomachean Ethics* owes its origin, in part at least, to pupils' notes of lectures delivered by Aristotle during Plato's lifetime in the Academy: but see, as against this, Susemihl in *Philologischer Jahresbericht* XLII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another possibility, which occurred to Oncken II p. 160 f., is however by no means excluded: —if, that is, on other grounds we really must assume with Teichmüller and Bergk that the polemic of Isocrates in the *Panathenaicus* §§ 16—34 is directed against

Aristotle and his friends, and that consequently after Plato's death Aristotle paid a second visit to Athens from 344 to 342 B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on rhetoric and poetry (see Susemihl *Jahresber.* XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would make it at least possible that his lectures extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was informed of the subject-matter of these ethical lectures, and thus came to attack the part of them treating of politics in §§ 131—133 of the same pamphlet (the *Panathenaicus*). But we do not require such an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and therefore it would be better, I take it, to abstain from it.



(Dorpat, 1886). He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Penthilidae, VIII(v). 10. 19 *n.* (1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duris *Frag.* 53 in Diog. Laert. I. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least that party of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mitylenaeans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Troad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenaeon colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mitylenaeans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippos (*Fr.* 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo XIII. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strab. XIII. 600, Plut. *De Herod. malign.* c. 15, Diog. Laert. *l.c.*, Suidas) is very suspicious, as Töpffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo *ll. cc.*, Apollodoros *Fr.* 78 in Diog. Laert. *l.c.*, Töpffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," *στρασιωτικά*, as they are called (Strab. XIV. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, *Frag.* 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. I. 76, Diod. IX. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 *n.* 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. I. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (viz. according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record

in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 50 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger: hence the *floruit* (*ἀκμή*) of the latter, *i.e.* his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2=611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2=651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, *i.e.* as Eusebius in the Armenian translation attests, Ol. 43, 3=606<sup>1</sup>. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, *viz.* the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus' appointment to be Aesymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the Parian Marble, *Ep.* 36 as restored by A. Schöne 'Researches into the life of Sappho' in *Symb. phil. Bonn.* p. 755 ff.), and a year later, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus' tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (Diog. Laert. i. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3=570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (Laert. Diog. i. 79, where *ἐβδομήκοντα* must obviously be altered to *ὀγδοήκοντα*). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, *e.g.* to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 636. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenides we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (*Fr.* 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfried Müller that he took part in the battle of Carchemish, B.C. 605; see his essay, 'A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,' in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1827, pp. 287—296. Müller's only reason on the other side, *viz.* that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Duncker is nearer the truth when he remarks *op. cit.* vi. p. 281; "Antimenides may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar's Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

<sup>1</sup> The text of Suidas (*s. v.* Πιττακός) καὶ τῇ μὲν ὀλυμπιάδι Μέλαιχρον τὸν τύραννον Μιτυλήνης ἀνείλε. καὶ Φρύωνα στρατηγὸν Ἀθηναίων πολεμοῦντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ Σιγείου μονομαχῶν ἀπέκτεινε δικτῶν περιβαλὼν αὐτόν should be thus punctuated,

with a full stop, in place of a comma, after ἀνείλε. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Eusebius. This too has been correctly remarked by Töpffer p. 55 f.



Hophra, or in the taking of Jerusalem." Moreover, as Alcaeus himself tells us that he reached Egypt (*Fr.* 106 in Strabo I. p. 37), which was no doubt during his exile, it would appear that he at any rate was exiled for several years. SUSEM. (626) Cp. now *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887, p. 140 ff

## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Ol. 32, 2	Pittacus born	B.C. 651
Ol. 36	Phrynon aetat. 25 victor	636
Ol. 42	Downfall of the tyrant Melanchros	
Ol. 42, 2	Pittacus floruit, aetat. 40	611
	Phrynon aetat. 50 conquers Sigeion	
Ol. 43, 3	Phrynon slain in single combat by Pittacus	606
Ol. 47	Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles	592
Ol. 47, 2	Pittacus aetat. 60	591
Ol. 47, 3	Pittacus made Aesymnetes	590
Ol. 50	Pittacus resigns his office	580
Ol. 52, 3	Pittacus dies, aetat. 81	570

## EXCURSUS III.

## FRAGMENTA VATICANA RESCRIPTA.

The printing of B. III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887, vol. XLII p. 102 ff. G. Heylbut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the *Politics*: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age<sup>1</sup> the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blunders of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes<sup>2</sup>. The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius' conjecture ἀστῶν, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of καί, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks P<sup>2</sup>, the principal codex of the family II<sup>2</sup>, although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent<sup>3</sup>. For the definite separation between the two recensions II<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Heylbut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accents are very rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

<sup>2</sup> It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heylbut 59 record the

partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of ν ἐφελευστικόν; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of ditto-graphy, 11 of omission through homoeoteleuton and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

<sup>3</sup> Namely, of XIV century, four centuries later than fr.

$\Pi^2$  was brought about, as I have shown<sup>1</sup>, in the sixth or seventh century while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian's MS apparently more nearly resembled  $\Pi^1$  than  $\Pi^2$ , while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of  $\Pi^1$  and of  $\Pi^2$ . Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heylbut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in  $\Pi^1$  or  $\Pi^2$ . On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that  $\Pi^1$  has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases<sup>2</sup> than  $\Pi^2$ , and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heylbut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with  $\Pi^1$ , or with  $\Pi^2$ : sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, "1276 b 30 διο with  $\Pi^2$ , 1281 a 35 f *εχοντα...ψυχην* placed after *φ αυλον* with  $\Pi^2$ , 1287 a 11 "ενα παντων ειναι with  $\Pi^2$ , a 32 ο νους νομος as Julian reads, 1288 a 2 νομων "οντων as  $\Pi^2$ ": whereas in the fourth of these passages  $\Pi^1$  also agrees with Julian, and in the other four it is not  $\Pi^1$ , but only  $\Gamma M^s$  (or in the last passage  $\Gamma P^1$ ), from which fr. diverge. If Heylbut chose to adopt this procedure (viz. to make divergence from  $\Gamma M^s$  equivalent to divergence from  $\Pi^1$ ), he should in all fairness have set down to the credit of  $\Pi^1$  the readings in which the fragments agree with  $\Gamma M^s$  only; namely, 1278 b 22 πολιτειας, 1280 b 5 διακονουσιν, 1287 b 13 ερχομενων. The second of these erroneous readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as  $P^1$  has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, *διακοπούσιν* for *διασκοπούσιν*, the fragment as well as  $\Gamma M^s$  had already converted this into *διακονούσιν*<sup>3</sup>. Still more interesting is 1292 a 3, where  $M^s$  has the true reading with  $\Pi^2$ , while the frightfully corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in  $\Gamma$ , and originally also in  $P^1$ . At 1287 a 33  $\Gamma \Pi^2$  rightly have *γράμματα*, fr. has *γράμμα* with  $M^s P^1$ . The statement "1286 b 17 μετέβαλλον with  $\Pi^2$ " is quite misleading: for here it is only  $P^1$  that has *μετέβαλλον* at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of  $\Gamma$ . At 1278 a 36 the order of the words in fr. is the same as in  $P^1$  and corr.  $P^1$ , i.e. a branch of  $\Pi^1$ .

<sup>1</sup> In my critical edition p. xiv. Cp. above, p. 2, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to a single passage may suffice. II. 2 § 6, 1261 a 39 ff, where  $\Pi^2$  affords an especially deterrent example: cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a

series of similar passages.

<sup>3</sup> See above p. 76 n. (1). We know that  $P^1$  was copied quite at the end of the fifteenth century: for on the last page but one the scribe, Demetrios Chalkondylas, records the births of his children from the year 1484 to the year 1501.



Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have *βουλευόμενον* with  $\Pi^2$  and *κρινούν* with  $\Pi^1$ . Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with  $\Pi^1$  or  $\Pi^2$ , as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with  $\Pi^2$ " in the following cases; 1276 b 33<sup>1</sup>, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (*εἴπαμεν*); and "with  $\Pi^1$ " in the following; 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (*το πολιτεύμα*), 1280 b 4 (*εἴξει*), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write *οὐθείς* and *γίγνεσθαι* with  $\Pi^2$ , on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with  $\Pi^2$  against  $\Pi^1$  62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with  $\Pi^1$  27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided<sup>2</sup>. The correctness of the calculation that  $\Pi^1$  has retained the true text oftener than  $\Pi^2$  cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 *αὐ φαιη* is undoubtedly derived from  $\Pi^1$ . And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family  $\Pi^1$ , even this makes but very little change in favour of  $\Pi^2$ .

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. *φύσει μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πολιτικόν*: on the contrary there can be no doubt that  $\Pi^2$  fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 *διότι πολιτικὸν ζῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 11 *φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος*<sup>3</sup>, 1169 b 18 *πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος*. [Moreover *ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ* may be for *ἄνθρωπος*, as Stöhr suggests.<sup>4</sup>]

On the other hand in the above calculation *καὶ εἰ* or *κἄν εἰ*, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote *κἄν εἰ*. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in *τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης*: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

<sup>1</sup> It is a mere accident that M<sup>s</sup> here agrees with  $\Pi^2$ . With the copyist of M<sup>s</sup> no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homoeoteleuton: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

<sup>2</sup> Besides the 51 passages noted below in which  $\Pi^2$  fr. agree against  $\Pi^1$  there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated fr., viz. Susem.<sup>3</sup>, agrees with  $\Pi^2$  against  $\Pi^1$ , viz. 1275 a 28 f., 1277 a 12, a 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases  $\Pi^1$  omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292

b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Susem.<sup>3</sup>, i. e. with  $\Pi^1$  as against  $\Pi^2$ ; adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which  $\Pi^1$  fr. are agreed as against  $\Pi^2$ .

<sup>3</sup> See Rassow *Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik.* (Weimar, 1874) p. 54.

<sup>4</sup> See *Commentationes Philologicae* (Monachii, 1891) p. 98.

feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension  $\Pi^1$  (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1280 a 15 f.,<sup>1</sup> and 1288 a 13 f.<sup>2</sup> Those which he adduces in favour of *μία ἀρετή* 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight<sup>3</sup>. However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms *μόναρχος* and *μονάρχης*: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words *οὐκ ἔλαττον*, my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by  $\Pi^1$  than added by  $\Pi^2$  without justification. But now it appears that fr. agree with  $\Pi^1$  in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has proved that they are untenable<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the *γε* inserted after *ἀρετῆς* by P<sup>2-3</sup> fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace *τοὺς* in the text with P<sup>2-3</sup> fr. Ald. Bk., as here the sense favours the article. SUSEM.

Heylbut's collation with the text of Susem.<sup>3</sup> is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 *εἰς γεγραμμένους* | 19 *γὰρ* | *ἀπλως*: λ is added above the line | 21 *ἐστίν* | 22 *μᾶλλον* | 24 *εἰσιν* | 26 *αοριστος*: ο added above the line | 33 (*ο μὲν*) | 34 (*λε*)*γομένους* | 39 (*pas...ουσας*); there is only room for about 10 letters; probably the copyist omitted *τὰς δὲ προτέρας*

1275 b 4 (*ναί...εκαστην*) *πολιτεῖαν* *διο* *περὶ* *ολεχθεῖς* | 5 *ἐστίν* | 7 *εν* omitted | 8 *δικάζουσιν* | 10 *ἀλλοις* *ἀλλας* | 11 *της* *ετερας* | 12 *κρινουσιν* | 13 (*του*) | 15 *ἐστίν* | *ἀλλα* | 16 *βουλευσθαι* with  $\Pi^2$  | 19 *βουλευτικῆς* *η* *κριτικῆς* | 20 (*προς*)...21 (*ορι-*

<sup>1</sup> In favour of *φαῦλοι κριταί*, the order of  $\Pi^3$  fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, *Τὸρ*. VIII. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 *ἐπεὶ δὲ φαῦλος κοινωνὸς ὁ ἐμποδίζων κτλ*, *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 § 5, 1094 b 28 *ἀγαθὸς κριτής*.

<sup>2</sup> For the less usual order of  $\Pi^3$  fr., *ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν*, Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Comp. 1255 b 8 with *Crit. note*.

<sup>3</sup> They are 1276 b 32, 1277 a 10, b 18, 1322 a 8, a 26.

<sup>4</sup> Heylbut points out that *ἐλαττον* denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g. *πλείους—*

*ἐλάττους* VII(VI). 3 § 3, 1318 a 26: *ἐξ ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν*, VIII(V). 6 § 3, 1305 b 12: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ δι' ἐλάττονος* (sc. χρόνου) *ποιούσι τὰς ἀρχάς* VI(IV). 15 § 1, 1299 a 6: *οὐ γὰρ ἐλαττον διέστηκεν* IV(VII). 3 § 2, 1325 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by *οὐχ ἥττον*, *οὐδὲν ἥττον*, the opposite of which is *πολὺ ἥττον* = much less easily, e.g. VI(IV). 11 § 11, 1296 a 5. At VIII(V). 8 § 7, 1308 a 18, *ἥττον* is parallel to *οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥᾶδιον*.



Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have βουλευόμενον with Π<sup>2</sup> and κρυσίν with Π<sup>1</sup>. Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with Π<sup>2</sup> or Π<sup>1</sup>, as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with Π<sup>2</sup>" in the following cases; 1276 b 33<sup>1</sup>, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (εἰπαμεν); and "with Π<sup>1</sup>" in the following; 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (τὸ πολιτευμα), 1280 b 4 εἴη, 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write οὐδείς and γίγνεται with Π<sup>2</sup>, on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with Π<sup>2</sup> against Π<sup>1</sup> 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with Π<sup>1</sup> 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided<sup>2</sup>. The correctness of the calculation that Π<sup>1</sup> has retained the true text oftener than Π<sup>2</sup> cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 *ων* *φωρ* is undoubtedly derived from Π<sup>1</sup>. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Π<sup>1</sup>, even this makes but very little change in favour of Π<sup>2</sup>.

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. *φῶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἀνθρώπος ζῶν πολιτικὸν*: on the contrary there can be no doubt that Π<sup>2</sup> fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 *δοῦναι πολιτικὸν ζῶν ὁ ἀνθρώπος*, *Eth.* *Nich.* 1007 b 11 *φῶναι πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρώπος*<sup>3</sup>, 1169 b 18 *πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος*. [Moreover *ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ* may be for *ἀνθρώπος*, as Stöhr suggests.<sup>4</sup>]

On the other hand in the above calculation *καὶ εἰ* or *ἐάν εἰ*, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote *εἰ* or *ἐάν*. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in *τῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀρετῆς*: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

It is a mere accident that M<sup>2</sup> here agrees with Π<sup>1</sup>. With the exception of M<sup>1</sup> no other text is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an *ἐκπαρασκευασμένη*: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

<sup>2</sup> Besides the 31 passages noted below in which Π<sup>2</sup> fr. agree against Π<sup>1</sup> there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated fr. viz. Susem.<sup>3</sup> agrees with Π<sup>2</sup> against Π<sup>1</sup>, viz. 1275 a 28 f., 1277 a 12, a 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1281 a 10 in which cases Π<sup>2</sup> omits words, also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292

b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Susem.<sup>3</sup>, i. e. with Π<sup>1</sup> as against Π<sup>2</sup>: adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Π<sup>1</sup> fr. are agreed as against Π<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> See Rassow *Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik.* (Weimar, 1874) p. 54.

<sup>4</sup> See *Commentationes Philologicae* (Monachii, 1891) p. 98.

feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension  $\Pi^1$  (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1280 a 15 f.,<sup>1</sup> and 1288 a 13 f.<sup>2</sup> Those which he adduces in favour of *μία ἀρετή* 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight<sup>3</sup>. However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms *μόναρχος* and *μονάρχης*: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words *οὐκ ἔλαττον*, my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by  $\Pi^1$  than added by  $\Pi^2$  without justification. But now it appears that fr. agree with  $\Pi^1$  in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has proved that they are untenable<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the *γε* inserted after *ἀρετῆς* by  $P^{2,3}$  fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace *τοὺς* in the text with  $P^{2,3}$  fr. *Ald.* Bk., as here the sense favours the article. SUSEM.

Heylbut's collation with the text of Susem.<sup>3</sup> is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 *εὐγεγραμμενους* | 19 *γὰρ* | *ἀπλως*: λ is added above the line | 21 *εστιν* | 22 *μαλον* | 24 *εστιν* | 26 *αοριστος*: ο added above the line | 33 (ο μὲν) | 34 (λε)γομενους | 39 (*pas...ουσας*); there is only room for about 10 letters; probably the copyist omitted *τὰς δὲ προτέρας*

1275 b 4 (*ναί...εκαστην*) *πολιτεῖ(αν διο) περ(ολεχθεῖς)* | 5 *εστιν* | 7 *εν* omitted | 8 *δικαζουσιν* | 10 *ἀλλοις ἀλλας* | 11 *της ετερας* | 12 *κρινουσιν* | 13 (του) | 15 *εστιν* | *αλλα* | 16 *βουλευσθαι* with  $\Pi^2$  | 19 *βουλευτικῆς η κριτικῆς* | 20 (*προς*)...21 (*ορι*-

<sup>1</sup> In favour of *φᾶνλοι κριταί*, the order of  $\Pi^2$  fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, *Τορ.* VIII. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 *ἐπεὶ δὲ φᾶνλος κοινωρὸς ὁ ἐμποδίζων κτλ.* *Nic. Eth.* 1. 3 § 5, 1094 b 28 *ἀγαθὸς κριτής*.

<sup>2</sup> For the less usual order of  $\Pi^2$  fr., *ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν*, Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. *Comp.* 1255 b 8 with *Crit. note*.

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ζονται) δη | 23 επι...οιον twice over | 24 παμππους | 25 απορουσιν | 27 ειρωνευ-  
ομονος | 29 υπο των twice over | λαρισσοποιους, but just before λαρισσαιους | 30  
εστιν | 31 διορισμος | 32 και γαρ ουδε

1276 b 18 ημη corrected from ημιν | 21 τωδε | 23 τινεχωτην τοιαντην |  
24 δη(λον) | 25 (αρετη)ς | 26 (εργον εστ)ιν | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κοινωνία  
δ' εστιν is omitted | 30 διο with P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> | πολι(του προς) | 31 εστιν | 32 α(ρετην) |  
33 τὸν δ'...τελειαν is omitted with M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> | 34 ενδεχετ(αι) | πολι(την) | 35 (καθην) |  
36 ἀλλὰ is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | εστιν | 39 αυτον | π(οιει)ν | 40 επειδε as Π<sup>2</sup> |  
(παν)τας

1277 a 1 ει(η)μ(ια)αρετη as Π<sup>2</sup> | (κα)ι | 2 (σπουδαιου πολ)ιτ(ουδ)ει | 3 (αναγ-  
καιον ειναι τ)η(ν) | πόλιν τήν] πολιτην | αγαθ(ου αδυνατον ει μη) | 5 (τησπου)δαια |  
6 (πολις ωσπερ ζων) | ψυχ(η εκ) | 8 κτησεις | 9 ανοποιων | 15 αγαθονειναι  
as Π<sup>2</sup> | 16 φρονημον | 17 λεγουσιν | 18 ευρηπιδης φησιν | 19 κομψ as Π<sup>2</sup> | 20 ειδε-  
αυτη as Π<sup>2</sup> | 21 εστιν | 22 απλως αν ειη as Π<sup>2</sup> | 24 πινην | 29 αμφω επαιουν  
ποτε | 32 τουντευθεν as Π<sup>2</sup> | 33 εστιν | 39 τουνομαυτους as Π<sup>2</sup>

1278 a 29 τουνοθους | οis in πολλοis over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ολιγ(αν..)   
θρωπιαν, between γ and θ room for four letters | 32 δοχλ(ου κα)τα | 34 αστων |  
36 ωσπερ...38 μετεχων comes after 40 συνοικουντων εστιν as in P<sup>1</sup> corr. P<sup>4</sup>

1278 b 1 εστιν | εκ των ειρημενων with Π<sup>2</sup> | 3 κακεινος ου with Π<sup>2</sup> | 8 κανει with  
Π<sup>2</sup> | after τινες an erasure of half a line | 9 εστιν | 10 κυριος | 11 δεστω |  
12 διοιον | 14 δεκαι | 16 συνεστηκεν | 19 δη with Π<sup>2</sup> | 21 ο is omitted with  
Π<sup>2</sup> | 22 περι αλληλων πολιτειας ορεγονται\* | 24 εστιν τερος | 25 πασιν | 26 και...  
κοινωνιαν between αυτου and ισως as Π<sup>1</sup> | 28 υπερβαλη | 29 κακοπαθιαν | 31 γε  
after αρχης | 40 η <ει> omitted | 41 ωσπερ with Π<sup>2</sup>

1279 a 2 παιδοτρειβην | 13 το κεινου | 15 αρχ(ουσινοςακ)αιροις | 16 αρχας :  
χ above the line | 19 σφετερον] σ above the line | 22 εστιν | επι(σκεψασθαι) |  
23 εισιν | 25 διωρισθεισων | το πολιτευμα with Π<sup>1</sup> | 26 σημανει...πολιτευμα is  
omitted | (δ)εστιν | 28 (ο)ταν | (π)ολλοι | 31 (η)του | 32 (δει) | 33 (την) | 34 (απο-  
βλεπουσαν...την) δε των οντων μεν | 35 δ(ε ενος αρισ)τοκρατιαν | 37 οτανδετο |  
38 (κ)αλει(ται το) | (πασων...δενλο)γως | 39 μεν is omitted

1279 b 2 πληθ(ει) γιγνεται | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν | (μη δε τι) |  
15 καταληπει | 16 εστιν | 20 ει(νοι) | 23 συμβαινη | 26 καντις | 28 προσ-  
αγορευει | 34 the line ends with πο, the next begins τεια : either λι is omitted,  
or it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 δια is omitted | 39 γιγ-  
νεσθαι | 40 δημοκρατεια

1280 a 1 αρχωσιν | 10 πᾶν τὸ: παντα | 14 αφερουσιν | 15 φανλοι κριται with  
Π<sup>2</sup> | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαλεχθεν omitting το | κρινουσιν | 22 νομιζουσιν]  
ομιζουσι over an erasure | 24 ελευθεριοι: the first ι above the line | 26 μετε-  
χουσιν | 29 εκατον μνων | εισενεγκαντα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 31 μονον ενεκεν with Π<sup>2</sup> |  
33 εστιν | 36 τυρηννοι | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 του is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | αδικος: κ above the line | 4 εξει with  
Π<sup>1</sup> | αδικησωσιν | 5 δαρετης | διακονουσιν with ΓΜ<sup>s</sup> | 8 γιγνεται | 9 απωθε |  
10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφρον | 17 πολεσιν | δουνδει | 23 που | 26 οικειαι | σφι(σι)ν |  
28 δοξειεν | 30 η πολις ουκ εστιν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 34 γενεσιν | 35 και] η | 40 δεη

1281 a 1 χάριν is omitted | 3 χαριν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 5 μετεστιν | τ(οι)ς | 6 μειζουσιν |

\* περι with M<sup>s</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>, πολιτειας with ΓΜ<sup>s</sup>, οὐκ ἔλαττον omitted with Π<sup>1</sup>.

7 (παλακορυνην | επερχουσιν | 10 λεγουσιν | 16 αν is omitted with P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 17 χρη with Π<sup>2</sup> | παλι | λειφθεντων | 21 τουτων | 23 κριττι.ω'ν | 24 δικαιοσυνην with Π<sup>2</sup>; ν in αρχην above the line | 26 εστιν | 27 παταφανα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 28 δικα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 35 εχοντα... 36 ψυχην after φανων with P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup>

1286 b 17 μετεβαλλον with M<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 18 αισχροκερδων | 21 γιγνεσθαι | 24 γιγνομενων | 26 τουτο ραδιον | 31 και is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | 33 φυλαξει | 34 δυναλεια των τωτων is omitted with Π<sup>1</sup> | 40 συρακοσιος

1287 a 2 εφεστηκεν | 4 βασιλειαις | 5 οτων | 7 εστιν | 9 εστιν | πατω | 11 ενα πατων εικαι with P<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 16 ομοιος τωτων και as Π<sup>2</sup> | ουδεν | 25 παιδεντας with Π<sup>2</sup> | 26 εφωτησιν | 29 των των μονους | τους νομους | 31 αρχοντας διαστρεφει as Π<sup>2</sup> | 32 διαφθειρει is omitted as in Π<sup>2</sup> | ο ρους νομος with Π<sup>1</sup> Julian | 33 γραμμα with M<sup>1</sup>P<sup>1</sup> | 34 και is omitted | 37 καμνοντας is corrected from σκαμνοντας | 38 επηριον | 40 θεραπειαν

1287 b 4 ο γαρ νομος | 5 τω κατα | 6 (κατα) | τω κατα | 8 υφαντον | 10 καταστησει | 11 ποτερον : (αν)ηρ | 13 εστιν | ερχομενων with Γ M<sup>1</sup> | 16 εισιν | 17 αρξειν | 19 επειδη with Π<sup>2</sup> | περιλιθηναι | 24 α(λλο)τι | 26 τισως with Π<sup>1</sup> | 27 (ζε)λτιον υδοι τις (δυου) ορμασ(ε και δυσι)ν | 28 ποσιν | 29 μοναρχοι with Π<sup>2</sup> | 32 ποιησουσιν | δε is omitted | 37 εστιν | δεσποτον with Π<sup>2</sup> | βασιλευτων with Π<sup>2</sup> | 41 γιγνεται τα παρα φουσιν with Π<sup>1</sup>

1288 a 2 νομων οτων with M<sup>1</sup>Π<sup>2</sup> | 5 ει is omitted | 6 ποτερον | 8 εστιν | πεφυκεν | 13 πεφυκεν ενεργεσθαι as Π<sup>1</sup>, omitting και εν | πολιτικον with Π<sup>1</sup> | 14 αρχεσθαι και αρχειν with Π<sup>2</sup> | after καταξίαν dittography; διαμενοντων καταξίαν, then διανεμοστα | 15 αποροις with Π<sup>2</sup> | 17 (τωσυν)τον ω(σ)θ | 18 βασιλειων | 21 εστε σοι οστε | 23 πατη with Π<sup>1</sup> | 24 και is omitted | 26 πεφυκεν | 29 κατα μερος εικαι τουτον αλλα απλως with Π<sup>2</sup> | 30 προτερον | 31 after η συμφερει dittography; ταις πολεισιν η συμφερει | τισιν | 33 δαναγκαιον | 34 apparently οικονομητης | 35 τινσυμπατων | 39 της πολεως της αμιστης with Π<sup>2</sup> | 41 ωστεστα

1288 b 1 παιδια | 3 δητουων | πο(λι)τειαις | τι(ν)α πεφυ(κε γεγν)εσ(θαι) ροπον | 5 δη | 9 αριστοτελους πολιτικων : γ : in the margin by the same hand . Δ . [fol. 302<sup>r</sup> begins with this heading] | 11 γεγρομενας : the second γ scratched

out | 14 καλιστα | κεχορημεναι | 16 εργον with Π<sup>1</sup> | δεαν | 18 μηθεν | 19 εστιν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 23 εστιν | 24 αρμοττουσα with Π<sup>2</sup> | 26 τε απλως και την is omitted | 31 συμβεβηκεν | 35 ως | 36 λεγουσιν

1290 a 36 ομοιους : the second ι above the line | ουθεις

1290 b 2 δοταν | πολλους with Π<sup>2</sup> | 5 φασιν | 8 ετι instead of επει | πλειονα μορια with Π<sup>2</sup> | 11 δημοσι | 12 τουτωι | τημαις | 15 δημοι | οιοραν as Π<sup>2</sup> | 17 εστιν | 19 δοταν | 21 πολιτειαις οτ πολιτειαν | πλειους... αιτιαν is omitted | 24 πασαν εχειν with Π<sup>2</sup> | 25 μεν is omitted as Π<sup>2</sup> | 29 δη | ειδημονον | 33 πλει, no trace of ω | ταυτον | 35 ληφθωσιν | 37 δε | 39 συγκητε | μερων with Π<sup>2</sup> | 40 εστιν | καλλουμενοι

1291 a 4 δαγοραιον | 5 και τας ωναις is omitted | 6 καπηλιας | 7 ουθεν | εστιν αναγκαιον as Π<sup>2</sup> | 11 φησιν | 13 τουτου τους | 18 μαλον | 20 αποδιδωσιν | 21 απομενων as Π<sup>2</sup> | 22 τετταρσιν | 27 δικαστικης corrected from δικαστηκης | 29 ουθεν | γαρ before διαφερει with Π<sup>1</sup> | 33 αναγκαιων μοριον της πολεως



with  $\Pi^2$  | 34 ο with  $\Pi^2$ , not ὅπερ | οἶδον | 39 βουλευομενον with  $\Pi^{2*}$  | 41 πο-  
λεσιν | γινεσθαι | δικaios

1291 b 3 αυτους: s above the line | 4 και τεχνιτας twice | 12 καθιστασιν | και  
δοκουσιν twice | 14 εισιν | 15 εστιν | δημοκρατειας | 17 λεγωμενων | 21 χρημα-  
τιστικον | 22 αλιευτικον: the first ι above the line | εκαστα: τα above the line |  
27 αμφοτερον | ετερον | 30 δημοκρατεια | εστιν | 32 υπαρχειν | 34 μαλισταεστιν

1292 a 3 τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι] ταλλαμεν ειναι with  $\Gamma^1$  | 17 τοιουτος | δημοσ as  
 $\Pi^2$  | 22 παρ' is omitted | 23 δειμαγωγοι | 24 εισιν | 29 προσκλησιν with  $\Pi^1$  |  
30 αρχε | 32 εστιν | 33 εκαστα or εκαστον | 34 εστιν | 36 ουθεν

1292 b 1 μακρων with  $\Pi^1$  | 3 ποιωσιν | 5 οταν παις | 9 τελευτεας | ειπαμεν  
with  $\Pi^2$  | δημοκραταις εν ταις is omitted | 10 καλουνσιν | 13 between κατα and  
τους room for 3 letters | δε after δια is omitted | 14 πολιτενεσθαι δε δημοτικως | †  
15 κατα τους νομους | 17 τουτο δε | 19 αλλα αγαπωσιν ‡

\* Apparently κρινουν with  $\Pi^1$ ; this at least is the inference to be drawn from  
Heylbut's silence.

† Apparently εθος with  $\Pi^1$ ; Heylbut is silent.

‡ [It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut's  
annotation of the readings (see p. 456): also that 1280 a 29 εισενεγκαντα is given as  
the reading at any rate of  $\Pi^2$  and presumably of fr. (εισεναγκαντα Heylbut).]

#### NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

In Mr Newman's edition I. p. VIII. f. II. p. LIV. there recurs, although in a  
much milder form, Heylbut's assertion already refuted by me in *Jahrb. f.*  
*Philol.* CXXV. p. 801 ff., and in Excursus III. above, that I seek to base  
the text of Aristotle's *Politics* primarily on  $\Pi^1$ , and especially on  $\Gamma$ . Mr  
Newman writes:

"Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially  
on  $\Gamma$ , but he frequently adopts readings from the second."

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too  
often followed  $\Pi^1$ , I have nevertheless already said at p. XXXII.:

"quanquam ex eo, quod dixi, satis apparet ita nobis traditum esse hoc  
Aristotelis opus similiter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtam ex utraque  
codicum familia recensionem perficere hodie queamus, tamen in hac mixtura  
artis criticae regulas diligentius, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas  
periti omnes concedent. Quod ut fiat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba...  
cum libris affinis Graecis (sunt) conferenda, deinde quaerendum, ubi  
huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent: ubicumque autem aequae  
bonam sententiam utraque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est  
posthabenda."

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished *a priori*  
to make the recension  $\Pi^1$  the basis of the text would proceed just as  
perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with  
 $\Pi^2$ ; that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its  
merits: *quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent*; and

only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added "and on linguistic grounds") a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family  $\Pi^1$ . The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heylbut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest: but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from  $\Pi^1$ . In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of  $\Pi^2$ , as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the *Politics* has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly deterrent example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1272 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in  $\Pi^1$ , however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel's dictum, that the *Politics* has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown *a priori* by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in  $\Pi^1$  are corrected by means of  $\Pi^2$  and those in  $\Pi^2$  by means of  $\Pi^1$ ; whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity. Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger's, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the "Vetusta translatio," or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of  $P^1$  and Ar., for the rest is certainly true only of the "deteriores" of the family  $\Pi^2$  (=  $\Pi^3$ ). I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from  $\Gamma$  or from  $P^1$  and  $P^4$  (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, common to all our sources of the text? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-



strated, unless it be one so preeminently excellent as e.g. A<sup>o</sup> of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetic*, or Σ in Demosthenes, or Γ in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K<sup>b</sup> alone presents right readings in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension Π<sup>1</sup>, or of the better class of Π<sup>2</sup>, present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of Π<sup>1</sup>, that while these cases are not quite rare in Π<sup>1</sup>, in Π<sup>2</sup> they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. XII. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. *notes*] on this matter:

"solis Γ libro debemus praeter 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Χαρητίδῃ, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δ' ἦδη, 1271 a 20 κἂν (μὴν Π; partem veri vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἔθνος ἐν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1331 a 42 ἐνια δέ, 1336 a 34 σπουδασομένων (aut σπουδασθησομένων, quod praebet P<sup>6</sup>), 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστάσεις (ut videtur), b 38 πλήθει, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταραντίνων ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ὀπλιτικὴν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγυς ὃν (an ἐγγίζον?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων (ut videtur),

solis Γ P<sup>6</sup> has: 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 16 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ, 1321 b 29 τὰ om., 1322 b 36 προσευθύνas (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:

solis Γ et pr. P<sup>2</sup> 1259 b 28 δέ:

solis Γ P<sup>1</sup> 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτὸ:

solis Γ et corr. P<sup>1</sup> 1278 b 22 παρ':

solis Γ Ar. 1289 b 38 πολέμους:

solis Γ P<sup>6</sup> Ar. 1336 a 5 δέ:

solis Γ R<sup>b</sup> 1303 b 31 τὰ:

solis Γ Ald. corr.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 1332 a 33 τῷ:

solis Γ Ar. corr.<sup>3</sup> P<sup>2</sup> 1335 a 26 σώματος:

solis Γ P<sup>2</sup> 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ὅλως M<sup>o</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ὅλως cet.).

Neque fas esse censeo in tali rerum condicione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum servatorum lectionibus οἱ κοινωνοὶ et μὲν multo illas exquisitiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppeditat translatio, οἰκονόμοι et ταλάντων...

E solo P<sup>1</sup> has...depromere licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπιβαλόντων (nisi idem habuit Γ), 1259 a 13 ἐλαιουργείων, 1278 a 36 sqq. rectum ordinem (corr.<sup>1</sup>), b 4 κακείνης corr.<sup>1</sup> (nisi potius retinendum est κακείνος), 1286 b 17 μετέβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam Γ), 1287 b 38 βασιλικόν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχει, 1335 b 20 γενομένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον corr.<sup>1</sup>, 1340 b 30 παιδίων, 1299 b 24 ἐτέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?):

e solis P<sup>1</sup> et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τὸ, 1280 b 19 εἴησαν:

e solis Ar. et corr. P<sup>1</sup> has: 1255 a 37 ἔγονον, 1299 a 14 πολιτείας:

e solis P<sup>1</sup> mg. P<sup>2</sup> rc. P<sup>3</sup> 1284 a 37 κολούειν, quarum nonnullae...ita sunt comparatae, ut currente calamo a Demetrio Chalcondyla demum et Leonardo Aretino e suis ingeniis facile potuerint restitui, velut ἐλαιουργείων, πρότερον, παιδίων, τὸ ποιεῖν, εἴησαν, ἔγονον...Solo autem M<sup>o</sup> codice paene nusquam

nititur textus, item nusquam paene solo P<sup>3</sup>, solo P<sup>2</sup> 1253 a 25 (καὶ post φύσει om.), 1270 b 38 (εἴποιο), 1325 a 29 (αὐτὸ τὸ corr.<sup>1</sup>), 1339 a 14 (εἴπειεν), quibus locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 ἀπαιδαγωγήτους.<sup>1</sup>

This is exclusive of the cases, in which ΓM<sup>a</sup> alone or M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup> alone or ΓP<sup>1</sup> alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (*l.c.* p. XI.)

1253 b 33 ὁ om. M<sup>a</sup>, erased by P<sup>4</sup> (whether they are to be followed, is certainly a matter for dispute):

1279 b 22 συμβαίνει P<sup>14</sup>:

1336 a 17 ψυχρὸν P<sup>1</sup>P<sup>4</sup> (corr.):

1342 b 33 ἦ added by P<sup>1</sup> and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>2</sup> (here conjecture is really out of the question):

1290 a 1 δὴ P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>24</sup> (corr.):

1290 a 2 διειλόμεν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), διειλόμεθα P<sup>1</sup>, διειλόμην ceteri:

1291 b 32 ὑπερέχειν P<sup>14</sup> Ar.:

1295 a 39 δ' erased by corr. of P<sup>4</sup>, γρ. καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ δέ corr.<sup>3</sup> in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> (this may be a conjecture):

1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ P<sup>14</sup> and γρ. in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>:

1309 a 40 αἴρεσιν P<sup>4</sup> (corrector):

1316 a 38 ἀναξιλάου P<sup>14</sup>.

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am entitled to assert, that the Vetusta translatio is "instar optimi codicis." That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything, I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first edition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this source of the text.

In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of Π<sup>1</sup> only at

1252 b 28 (ἦδη ΓP<sup>1</sup>),

1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 3,

1258 b 40 (Χαρητίδη Γ),

1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt),

1259 b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand of P<sup>1</sup>),

1260 a 37 (ἀρα):

and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: ὑποδέσθαι ΓM<sup>a</sup> possibly rightly.

But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 ὁ is only added before ἀνθρωπος in M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup>, yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at line 7. The two similar passages in the *Ethics* (as I have remarked on p. 456) also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup>; and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly in B. II. 1270 b 19 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of διὰ τύχην against M<sup>a</sup>P<sup>1</sup>; but at 1323 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have διὰ τὴν τύχην. Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the καὶ between εὐγενὲς and ἐλεύθερον with Π<sup>2</sup>; and at 1260 a 26 ἦ before τὸ with P<sup>24</sup>S<sup>1</sup>T<sup>1</sup>. In the latter case he is right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted to enumerations (after οἶον, ὥσπερ especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15



unless *καὶ* be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before *κατατοκιζόμενοι*) the explanation must be quite different, viz. *ἀσσωτενόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι* must mean "accumulating debts in consequence of their profligacy." At 1252 a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting *εἶναι* or leaving it out: as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in  $\Pi^2$ . And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (*Qu. crit. coll.* p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although  $\Pi^1$  is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in  $\Pi^2$ , yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle's mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19 f he wrote *ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ* without *συνῆλθον*. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted *ὁμοκάπους*, but it still remains doubtful whether *ὁμοκάπρους* be not right after all (see Addenda *ad loc.*). At 1253 b 27 *τῶν οικονομικῶν* ( $\Pi^2$ ) is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 *δὲ* is omitted by P<sup>66</sup>O<sup>1</sup>U<sup>1</sup>L<sup>1</sup> Ald., but one which is justified by the facts; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write *δὴ*): that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow's emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of  $\Pi^1$  *τῷ οικονομικῷ*. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that *ὅλως* was explained by *ἀπλῶς* or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable: still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, *λόγῳ* ( $\Pi^1$ ) to correspond better to the sense and grammar than *λόγου* ( $\Pi^2$ ), I have laid down *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 343, and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 *ὀψοποιητική* and 1256 a 6 *κερκιδποιητική* are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakeably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present *διδομένη* to the perfect *δεδομένη* and conversely 1260 a 4 the perfect *ὑφήγηται* to the present *ὑφηγείται*, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 *<ἀρχόντων καὶ>* *ἀρχομένων*, see Addenda *ad loc.*

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 (*ὁμοκάπρους* or *ὁμοκάπρους*), the following quite uncertain cases: 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 *κομίζονται* and 1258 b 1 *μεταβολικῆς* ( $\Pi^1$ ) may be corruptions of *πορίζονται* and *μεταβλητικῆς*; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere.  $\Pi^1$  is certainly wrong 15 times: 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 (*ταῖς*), 1257 b 24.  $\Pi^1$  is right 24 times: 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 (*ἥδη*  $\Gamma P^1$ ), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 (*Χαρηγίδης*  $\Gamma$ ), 1259 a 37, b 28 (*δὲ*  $\Gamma$  1st hand  $P^2$ ), 1260 a 4 twice (*ἀρχόντων καὶ*  $\Gamma$  and

ὑφ' ἡγεῖται), 1260 a 37 (ἄρα), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 32, 1254 a 10, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 20 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to M\* as well as ΓP<sup>1</sup>. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension Π<sup>1</sup>, either here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of Π<sup>1</sup> in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple *errata*, as e.g. φιλίτια, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Susem.<sup>1</sup> p. xiv.), and the repeated φαλλέας. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading ἀνδρεία (ἀντρεία). Apart from the order of the words 1265 a 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 31, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 b 8, 14: one feels inclined to decide in favour of Π<sup>2</sup> at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of Π<sup>1</sup> at 1263 a 23 (καὶ omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11. Mr Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly" the reading of Π<sup>1</sup>. In the remaining 109 cases Π<sup>1</sup> has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 69 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (εἰς ὃ τῆς Γ), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (ἐλκίσει ΓP<sup>1</sup>), 1261 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 13 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's crit. n.), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (ἔθεισι), b 7 (see *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 366 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 33 f. four times, b 11 (ἄλλαις ΓM\*), 30, 1266 b 2 (Γ), 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 23, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (αὐτῆς ΓP<sup>1</sup>), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 32 (αὐτῇ affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 15, 17, 20 (κἂν Γ), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 25, 39, b 13. Π<sup>1</sup> has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times: 1261 a 18 (ῆ omitted by M\*P<sup>1</sup>, probably wrongly, whether by Γ also, cannot be known), 35 (at least M\*P<sup>1</sup>), b 7 (οὐ, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 39 (at least M\*P<sup>1</sup>), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (φαλλέας), b 6, 1267 b 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least M\*P<sup>1</sup>), 25, 27 (at least M\*P<sup>1</sup>), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (φιλίτια, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1272 a 1 (at least M\*P<sup>1</sup>), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless θατέραν is here nearer to the true reading than θάτερον, θάτερα being the original). To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 b 6 (but Περαιβοῖς is the right orthography), 1270 b 19, 32, 1271 a 20 (but μὴν gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change τὸ δικαστήριον into the more natural and simple τὰ δικαστήρια?), 1274 a 21: yet not without himself giving expression to his



doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 39 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here  $\Pi^2$  presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way  $\epsilon\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\circ\iota\varsigma$  has arisen from  $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\circ$ , yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then  $\tau\acute{o}$  before  $\epsilon\nu\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota$  need not be changed into  $\tau\acute{\omega}$ ; but there is no need of this with the reading  $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\circ$ : see Susem.<sup>4</sup> *crit. n.* and *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 361.

1262 b 32. The omission of  $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\alpha\kappa\alpha\varsigma$  in  $M^*P^1$  is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex  $\Gamma$  at that place.

1263 a 23. For  $\epsilon\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$  Mr Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263 a 28 ff. see the Addenda *ad loc.* If  $\epsilon\acute{\kappa}\alpha\sigma\tau\omega\ \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\epsilon\delta\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  ( $\Gamma M^*$ ) is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 70th case in favour of  $\Pi^1$ .

1265 a 33 f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true.  $\Pi^1$  has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koraes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as Mr Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma$ , not  $\delta\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota\varsigma$  into the text.

1265 b 30. In case the reading  $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$  were right,  $\tau\eta\nu$  could scarcely be omitted before this word or before  $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\sigma\acute{o}\tau\alpha\tau\eta\nu$ .

1267 b 25 f. With the reading  $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omega\ \pi\omicron\lambda\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  arises the absurdity, that  $\epsilon\sigma\theta\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  would depend not simply on  $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\epsilon\iota$ , but on  $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omega\ \pi\omicron\lambda\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ . Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\delta\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\nu\ \tau\eta\nu\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta\nu$  in the sense of "to decide the case against the accused" Greek at all, except in the formula  $\epsilon\rho\eta\mu\eta\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\delta\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\nu$ ?

1268 b 21. Mr Newman's statement in the critical note, that  $\eta\delta\eta$  is left out by  $\Pi^1$  here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by  $\Gamma$  and  $P^1$  (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken  $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omega$  ( $\Pi^1$ ) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it,  $\tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$  is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman's intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose

τῶν δυνατῶν, with Π<sup>1</sup>, to follow δοῦναι (line 9): but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture—an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Koraes, οἱ ἄν (line 8) for ὅταν. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π<sup>2</sup>, as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that δυναστῶν (Π<sup>1</sup>) instead of δυνατῶν (Π<sup>2</sup>) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτεία. Not so. Once for all, Π<sup>2</sup> is made out to be the better recension!

1272 b 39. Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that καθ' αὐτό is not found in any manuscript: it is in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>, quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in Γ. He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading καθ' αὐτό, a second καθ' αὐτό (P<sup>1</sup> and somewhat corrupted M<sup>1</sup>), and a third κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (Π<sup>2</sup>), the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π<sup>2</sup> is made out to be the better recension!

1273 b 6. Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text εὐπορίαν from Π<sup>2</sup> and O<sup>1</sup>, in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly described the state of the case in relation to the recensions Π<sup>1</sup> and Π<sup>2</sup> when in my third edition p. v. I wrote: "haud raro hanc, saepius illam meliorem." Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heylbut's account, which I have not correctly reported in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. p. 804 f., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undoubtedly the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π<sup>2</sup>, but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π<sup>1</sup>. If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π<sup>2</sup> any more than in favour of Π<sup>1</sup>: on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, ἀστῶν 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 καὶ omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated conjectural emendations would have been confirmed: as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Moerbeke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the care bestowed by the worthy monk; indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π<sup>1</sup>. However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the *Vetusta translatio* is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-



ments and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to I. c. 11 I agree with him: I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so-called second book of the *Oeconomics*, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. SUSEM.

## H.

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσή-  
 1323 a 14 κουσιν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσα- I  
 § 1

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη...6 σκέψιν joined by all previous authorities to B. III, omitted by Bk.<sup>2</sup> See Comm. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> fr. Ald. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γὰρ (with the omission of the following τὸν μέλλοντα) P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ar.

1323 a 14 [περὶ...15 ἀνάγκη] Spengel || δὲ added after περὶ by P<sup>2</sup> and corrector of P<sup>5</sup>; perhaps rightly, yet see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || τῆς inserted before ἀρίστης in P<sup>1</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>; cp. p. 456 f.

B. IV(VII), i.e. the fourth book of the new order, but in the traditional order of the manuscripts the seventh, commences a sketch of the best polity which is continued through the next book, B. V(VIII), there being no break between them, and finally left unfinished at its close. Preliminary questions are discussed in cc. 1—3, the external conditions (the land, the people, the agricultural class, the public buildings) in cc. 4—12; c. 13 treats of the end of the constitution and the means at the legislator's command for realizing it; the most important of which, viz. a system of state education (in the widest sense), receives a detailed exposition, beginning with c. 14 of this book and not completed at the abrupt close of the next. The two books are written in a finished style, carefully elaborated, with minute attention to the rule of the hiatus, which is seldom violated in B. IV(VII) and not at all in B. V(VIII).

1288 b 5, ἀνάγκη δὲ...6 σκέψιν] That this conclusion of B. III, breaking off in the middle of a sentence, is only a parallel version of the beginning of the (old) seventh book, is acknowledged by all who recognize that the proper place for the (old) seventh book is immediately after the third. Beyond all doubt, of the two parallel versions, that at the end of B. III is the original one, as Spengel rightly decides, and it ought not to have been omitted from the text of Bekker's

octavo edition\*. When the rest of this book had been torn away from its connexion and transformed into the seventh book, some transition was needed; hence the clause περὶ πολιτείας...ζητησιν ἀνάγκη was added by the redactor. SUSEM.

The grounds for making the transposition of the books have been already noticed: *Introd.* p. 16 n. (4), p. 17, p. 47 f. The main point to decide is, where in the treatise ought the description of the best polity (in the form of pure aristocracy) to come, whether before the description of the existing faulty polities or after them. The indications of B. III are unmistakeable, especially cc. 13 and 18: and upon them Spengel has rightly insisted (*Ueber die Politik* p. 16 f., *Arist. Studien* II. pp. 46 ff., 60 ff., 71). Not less convincing is the assertion in VI(IV). c. 2 that aristocracy, as well as monarchy, has been already discussed. But when the question has been decided upon these grounds, the unfinished sentence at the end of B. III certainly affords striking corroborative evidence.

c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2). *The connexion of the best constitution with the highest life.*

Few chapters in the work have been subjected to more minute examination than this. See Bernays *Dialoge des Arist.* pp. 69—84 and Vahlen *Aristote-*

\* Not that of Oxford, 1837, but *Iterum editum* I. Bekker, Berolini 1855; *nunc iteratum* 1878.



1323 a 15 σθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη] διορίσασθαι πρότερον τίς (1) αἰρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀδήλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων § 2 αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ τι γίνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον 20 ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. (P. 94)

νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξω- 2 τερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. § 3 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητή-

15 πρότερον] πρῶτον P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly || 19 παρὰ λόγον Γ Ar. || 20 ὁμολογεῖσθαι Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *confessum esse* William || 22 [καὶ] Schneider, [καὶ τῶν] Oncken wrongly

*ische Aufsätze* 11 'On a chapter of the Politics' (Vienna 1872; 52 pp.).

§ 1 1323 a 16 αἰρετώτατος βίος] See n. (683) with the passages there quoted. SUSEM. (688)

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν] i.e. the absolutely best constitution: see VI(IV). 1 § 3 πολλοῖς γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθεῖναι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν, and n. (1116). SUSEM. (686)

18 προσήκει] 'We should expect the citizens who live under the best constitution possible to them (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς) to be taken closely with ἄριστα) to fare best,' i.e. to lead the most desirable life.

§ 2 21 κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι, χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ.

22 τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] See Ex-cursus I. to this book. SUSEM. (687)

23 καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς] 'It is clear from passages such as *De Caelo* 11. 13 § 18, 295 a 2 f. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων διώρισται πρότερον ὅσα κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν δύναμιν εἰχόμεν, χρηστέον ὡς ὑπάρχουσιν and *Meteor.* 111. 2 § 12, 372 b 10 f. ἐστὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἡμῶν τε θεωρημένων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεικνυμένοις· διὸ τὰ μὲν λέγωμεν, τοῖς δ' ὡς ὑπάρχουσι χρῆσόμεθα αὐτῶν, that this expression does not imply that an exposition given elsewhere is to be borrowed or reproduced, but that the results of some other discussion will be employed and utilized. Those who remember the tolerably frequent use of the verb χρῆσθαι by Herodotus e.g. in 11. 120 εἰ χρή τι τοῖσι ἐποποιούσι χρεώμενον λέγειν, corresponding to Thucydides 1. 10 § 3 τῇ Ὀμήρῳ αὐ ποιήσει εἰ τι χρῆ

κάνταῦθα πιστεύειν, will hardly raise any objection to our taking the word, used here and in *Nic. Eth.* 1. 13 § 9, 1102 a 27 in connexion with the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι, but not as confined to them, in the sense of the phrase in *Nic. Eth.* VI. 4 § 2, 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. It is plain that this expression does not in any way show whether the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own or belongs to some one else, nor to what degree or extent it is utilized' (Vahlen). SUSEM. (688)

§ 3 24 πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἂν] The appeal to the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι in this passage and in § 5 (see n. 694) thus amounts (in effect at any rate) to an appeal to public opinion, to what was at the time conceded by all, or at least by all cultivated and intelligent men. We should also notice how, as 111. 12 § 1, the strictly scientific (philosophical) distinctions and discussions are opposed (1) to opinion universally current, and on the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle himself at least by his pupil Eudemos (see n. 584), to the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι; and it is hardly possible to regard the latter as anything else but the expression of that universal opinion. Bernays sees in these words an ironical excuse on Aristotle's part in reply to the charge which was no doubt often levelled at him, of useless logical hair-splitting, when he thus expresses the hope that he may be allowed to make *one* division at least without opposition. But Vahlen rightly urges against this view that, in spite of the announcement of at least this *one* division, the emphasis is not

25 σιειν ἂν ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν (I)  
 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν  
 § 4 τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηδὲν  
 μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης  
 μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας  
 30 μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ  
 πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἔνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς  
 φιλτάτους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν

25 [οὐ] Oncken wrongly || 26 τῷ omitted by P<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) ||  
 27 χρή omitted by P<sup>3</sup> II<sup>2</sup> (added in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>): δεῖ Vettori Bk. || 29 [μηδὲ  
 φρονήσεως] Susem.<sup>1</sup>; see on a 32 || 30 του Koraes, [τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ πιεῖν] Bernays,  
 perhaps rightly. Yet see Vahlen *Arist. Aufsätze* II. p. 11 (9) ff. || τοῦ before πιεῖν  
 omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 31 ποιεῖν P<sup>1</sup> and M<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 32 [φίλους] Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup> ||  
 τὴν διάνοιαν is omitted by M<sup>1</sup> (which has a lacuna of 4 or 5 letters) and apparently by  
 Γ; *quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant* William, doubtless from  
 a gloss. Hence ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ γὰρ μακαρίζουσιν Su-  
 sem.<sup>1,2</sup> wrongly

laid on the division, but on the inference drawn from it; that just because there are three kinds of goods, he who is to be happy cannot entirely dispense with any of the three. But I do not perceive why this thought ought properly to have been elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as Vahlen supposes; at any rate with the form of 'argumentum ad hominem' here chosen, proceeding from premisses universally conceded, where all that was required was to prove the superior claim of intellectual goods, which was alone in dispute. Besides the request that 'he might be allowed just this one division' would appear very strange in connexion with this division of goods. For, except perhaps the comprehensive term "external goods," it is not at all peculiar to Aristotle; and he repeats it elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* I. 8 § 2, 1098 b 12 ff., *Rhet.* I. 5 § 4, 1360 b 25 ff., and often mentions it in passing as something well known and perfectly certain, without a word of justification or approval. SUSEM. (689)

25 μερίδων] Even though it is plain to everybody that the subject is "goods," yet it is strange that no express mention of the term occurs either here (where it would be very appropriate instead of the word chosen, μερίδων) or in what precedes. SUSEM. (690)

§ 4 28 σωφροσύνης] Comp. n. (206 b). SUSEM. (691)

These are the four Platonic virtues,

which Aristotle substantially retained as the basis of his more extended list.

29 δεδιότα...30 μυίας] This hyperbolic description, according to Bernays, also points to the passage having been transferred from some dialogue. But an extravagant and drastic picture of the kind is by no means rare in Aristotle. See *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 16, 1098 a 18 *μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα οὐτῷ δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ'* ὀλίγος χρόνος: 10 § 14, 1101 a 8 *ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ*: VII. 5 § 6, 1149 a 8 *δεδιέναι πάντα κἂν φοβήσῃ μῦς*: X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 10 *πράξεις δὲ πῶς ἀπονεύμαι χρεῶν αὐτοῖς* (sc. τοῖς θεοῖς) *κτλ...* b 19 *οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῶνα*: 8 § 10, 1179 a 4 *δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ*: *Poet.* 7 § 4, 1451 a 2 *εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῶον, α 7 ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι*: *Rhet.* II. 12 § 8, 1389 a 23 f. *τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρελθὺς βραχύ. τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμῆσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἶόν τε, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα* (Vahlen). SUSEM. (692)

30 For τοῦ with the infinitive after ἐπιθυμεῖν see Xenophon *Memor.* I. 7 § 3, III. 6 § 16; *Oecon.* 14 § 9. For τὸ πιεῖν as a substantive Plato *Rep.* IV. 439 b *τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἀγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν*, and Xenophon *Hiero* I § 30 (Vahlen).

32 τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν] Here too φρόνησις, the virtue of the practical intellect, stands in contrast to the moral vir-



οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό- (I)  
 § 5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγ- 3  
 35 χωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.  
 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὅποσονοῦν,  
 πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν-  
 § 6 των τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμεῖς  
 δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥάδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν  
 40 ἔργων [δια]λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ  
 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις,  
 1323 b καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ

34 ὥσπερ] οὕτω before λεγόμενα P<sup>b</sup>, [ὥσπερ] Scaliger who is followed by Spengel, ἀπλῶς Bernays, <ἀπλῶς> ὥσπερ ? Susem., a conjecture which I hold to be probable even after Vahlen's defence of the text p. 14 (16). Nevertheless I concede to Vahlen that the transposition ὥσπερ λέγοντες ἅπαντες would also make good sense. Other suggestions in my critical edition: ὥσπερ \* \* \* Schneider, ὡς εἰπεῖν Koraes || 36 εἶναι omitted by P<sup>b</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 37 [καὶ] χρημάτων Bernays, wrongly || 40 λαμβάνειν Lambin, διαλαμβάνειν P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, διαβαίνειν P<sup>1</sup>

tues; cp. 1. 13 § 8, III. 4 §§ 7, 8, 18, I 1 § 2, § 6 and §§ 10, 11 below with *nn.* (40, 45, 112, 115, 474—476, 498, 565, 703). SUSEM. (693)

§ 5 34 ὥσπερ πάντες] "Almost all would allow, when stated." Comp. *n.* (689). SUSEM. (694) ὥσπερ πάντες: ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντες = ὥσπερ οὐδέν: ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐδέν. Vahlen compares *Rhet.* 1. 6 § 24, 1363 a 11, ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope); and with the idiomatic use of the participle Plato *Sympos.* 199 b τῶν τῶν λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, *Protag.* 311 E, τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; and the Herodotean ταῦθ' ὡς ἀπερὶ χθόντα ἤκουσαν.

35 διαφέρονται] Men differ as to how much of each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three the superiority is due. The view of the multitude is that ever so small a measure of goods intellectual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased without end.

37 Cp. 1. 9, 10, 1257 b 7 πλούτου καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen).

38 εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν] Cp. 1. 8 § 14 f., 9 § 13 ff. with *nn.* (76 b, 90). SUSEM. (695)

§ 6 ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν] Here again Bernays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 3 § 1 n. (733), VI(IV). 2. 3, 1289 b 9 [add 11. 9, 12, 1270 a 10], *De Anima* 1. 3

§ 10, 406 b 22 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν; *Meta.* III. 5 § 19, 1010 a 15 f. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), *Post. Anal.* 1. 3 § 2 s. f., 72 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν (Vahlen). SUSEM. (696)

39 διὰ τῶν ἔργων] To convince oneself by means of the facts. Like γινόμενα, φαινόμενα, συμβεβηκότα we find ἔργα and πράγματα used for 'facts' as distinguished from λόγοι, 'theories.' See c. 4 § 7, 1326 a 25, § 12, 1326 b 12: B. 11. c. 8 § 19, 1268 b 39, c. 9 § 16; also c. 3 § 8, 1262 a 17 (λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις).

40 ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται κτλ.] Cp. 11. 9 § 35 with *n.* (346 b) and c. 15 § 6 n. (928) below. SUSEM. (697)

1323 b 1 εἴτ' ἐν τῷ... εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν] Bernays argues that to leave several possibilities open in this way is another indication that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle's own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. "Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opinions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own assumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alternatives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. [yet it is doubtful if this part of the *Ethics* is Aristotelian]; cp. 13

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ (I)  
 ἦθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολὴν,  
 περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάξουσιν, ἢ τοῖς  
 5 ἐκέῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις  
 ἐλλείπουσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις  
 § 7 εὐσύνοπτον ἐστίν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρασ, ὥσπερ ὄρ-  
 γανόν τι (πάν γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν, ὃν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ  
 βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς  
 10 ἔχουσιν)· τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν  
 ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον [εἶναι], εἰ δεῖ καὶ τού- (p. 95)  
 τοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.  
 § 8 ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρί-

1323 b 6 ἀλλὰ omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), and possibly by Γ || 8 γὰρ  
 Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and Bernays, who alters πάν into πέρασ,  
 wrongly || χρήσιμον ἐστι τι Vahlen, perhaps rightly; <χρήσιμον τοῦτ' ἔχει πέρασ εἰς ὃ>  
 χρήσιμόν ἐστιν (or something similar) Susem. Both probable corrections, the one is  
 no easier than the other || ὦν ὥστε Bernays, and so (or perhaps ὥστε αὐτοῦ) Ar.,  
 corium William, αὐτῶν perhaps Γ; ὥστε αὐτῶν Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Vahlen p. 21 (23) ||  
 9 αὐτῶν omitted by III<sup>1</sup> Ar., [αὐτῶν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> with Koraes, αὐτῆς Oncken, quite need-  
 lessly, but not (as Vahlen thinks) less correctly || 11 χρήσιμον μᾶλλον P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> || [εἶναι]  
 Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ἐστίν ? Spengel, <χρή> χρήσιμον Bernays. I am not convinced by  
 Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)

§ 2, 1153 b 15 ff., and 1. 8 § 6 ff. 1098 b  
 25 ff., and also cp. *Rhet.* 1. 5 § 3 ff." (Vahlen). Cp. also below v(VIII). 5 § 10  
 (Eaton) with n. (1033). SUSEM. (698)

2 ὅτι μᾶλλον...6 ἐλλείπουσιν] Cp.  
*Nic. Eth.* ix. 8 § 9 f., 1179 a 3 ff. οὐ  
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκὲς οὐδ' ἢ  
 πρᾶξις...καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν  
 τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (Eaton).  
 SUSEM. (699)

§ 7 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ...ὄργανόν τι] Cp.  
 1. 8 § 15, 9 § 13 with nn. (76 b, 90), also  
*De Anima* 1. 3 § 15, 407 a 23 ff., τῶν μὲν  
 γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἐστὶ πέρατα, πᾶ-  
 σαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν, *Metaph.* 11 (a). 2 § 12,  
 994 b 13 ff. [yet this is a spurious book],  
*Nic. Eth.* vii. 13 § 4, 1153 b 24 ff. πρὸς  
 μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὁρὸς αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς  
 εὐτυχίας] (Vahlen). SUSEM. (700)

8 πάν γὰρ κτλ] The sense required  
 is 'whatever is useful is useful up to a  
 certain point [or, has a limit to its utility],  
 to exceed which must necessarily either  
 do harm or confer no benefit upon its  
 possessor.' Vahlen supposes a participial  
 clause to have been replaced by the words  
 ὃν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. The simplest draft of  
 the sentence would be τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρασ

...ἂ ὑπερβάλλοντα (i.e. ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ) ἢ  
 βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν τοὺς  
 ἔχοντας. Then by a familiar idiom the  
 second alternative is replaced by ἢ μηδὲν  
 ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐκτὸς). The  
 sentence thus becomes somewhat un-  
 symmetrical in form, because τὴν ὑπερ-  
 βολὴν, though it goes well enough with  
 βλάπτειν, is less suitable as the subject  
 of μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν.

11 καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν] 'to predi-  
 cate of these also,' viz. of mental goods.  
 So *Nic. Eth.* 11. 6 § 9, 1106 b 10 ὅθεν  
 εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις  
 ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀφελεῖν ἐστὶν οὐδὲ προσθεῖναι.  
 With the use of the prep. cp. the phrase  
 ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν.

§ 8 13 ὅλως τε δῆλον...15 διαθέσεις]  
 "Further, as a general rule it is clear  
 that the relative superiority of the *best*  
*condition* of one thing [as compared with  
 that of another] will be said to be  
 measured by the difference existing be-  
 tween the things of which these are said  
 to be in themselves the best conditions."  
 Comp. *Rhet.* 1. 7 § 4, 1363 b 21 ff.  
 (Congreve), § 18, 1364 a 37 ff. καὶ ὦν ἢ  
 ὑπεροχὴ ἀρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων...καὶ ἀν-



στην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, (1)  
 15 ἤνπερ εἶληχε διάστασιν ὧν φαμεν εἶναι αὐτὰς ταύτας δια-  
 θέσεις. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τιμιώτερον καὶ τῆς κτήσεως  
 καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διά-

15 εἶληψε Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>2</sup> of P<sup>2</sup>) || διάστασις Ar. (apparently) and Γ, but before ἤνπερ: [διάστασιν] Bojesen, ἤπερ διέστασιν ὧν Bernays, wrongly, ἤπερ... δια-  
 στάσει? Vahlen needlessly: see Comm. || αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.  
 avoiding hiatus || ταύταις τοιαύταις Bernays, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see  
 Comm. || 16 τιμιώτερον transposed to come after 17 σώματος in Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., τιμιωτέ-  
 ραν M<sup>4</sup>, pretiosior William

τικεμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ  
 βελτίους καὶ καλλίωνων καλλίους. So I. c. § 4,  
 καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπέρῃ, καὶ  
 αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ θα[?]δ[?] αὐτῶν, καὶ  
 τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου: *Top.* 111. 3 § 4, 118  
 b 4 ff. ἐτι οὐ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἰρε-  
 τώτερα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον (Vahlen): 2  
 § 9, 117 b 33 ff. εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτου  
 βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τοῦτω βέλ-  
 τιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ βελτίστον (Bernays).  
 Even in this unmistakable and express  
 'development of the logical formula'  
 Bernays discovers a proof of quotation  
 from a dialogue. See n. (702). SUSEM.  
 (701)

14 A parallel to πρὸς ἄλληλα after  
 ἐκάστου is *Pol.* 23 § 2, ὧν ἐκαστὸν ὡς  
 ἑνυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. Comp. ἀλλήλων  
 after ἐκάτερον Pl. *Phaedo* 97 A, Aeschines 1.  
 137, after μηδὲνα Ar. *Lysistr.* 49. Take  
 κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν with what immediately  
 precedes: the best condition of two things  
 'compared in point of superiority,' i.e. as  
 judged by the superiority of the one  
 relatively to the other. All this forms  
 the subject of ἀκολουθεῖν. What is the  
 object? Either τῇ διαστάσει, or κατὰ τὴν  
 διάστασιν (for which cp. c. 14 § 1, 1332 b  
 15), ἤνπερ κτλ. Normally one would ex-  
 pect this to be changed by attraction of  
 the relative into ἤνπερ εἶληχε διαστάσει (or  
 καθ' ἣνπερ εἶλ. διάστασιν). Instead of  
 this, the antecedent is absorbed into the  
 relative sentence and assimilated to its  
 construction ἤνπερ εἶληχε διάστασιν. Such  
 absorption and assimilation may be seen  
 in VI(IV). 4. 8, 1290 b 28, 5. 2, 1292 b 8,  
 12. 2, 1296 b 20, possibly (see n. ad loc.)  
 1. 8. 13, 1256 b 29. A good example is  
 Pl. *Rip.* 400 D εὐθιγὰ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἣν  
 ἀνοίαν οὖσαν ὑποκομιζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς  
 εὐθιγὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς... διάνοιαν:  
 where the construction of the relative  
 sentence invades the resumed principal  
 sentence. See 1323 b 34, 1324 b 13. The  
 periphrasis of ἔχειν c. accus. for a verb is

sometimes varied. Here εἶληχε διά-  
 στασιν = διεστάναι as Pl. *Tim.* 38 D, *Pol.*  
 288 E δύναμιν εἶληχέναι = δύνασθαι, *Phil.*  
 49 C γελοίων εἶληχε τάξιν = γελοῖα ἐστίν.  
 In its simplest form the proposition states  
 that the ὑπεροχὴ of the best condition of  
 two things compared corresponds to the  
 διάστασις between the things. The best  
 state of A: the best state of B :: A : B.  
 Allow the soul's superiority, and you  
 must allow the superiority of ἀρετῇ and  
 φρόνησις its best states. (Vahlen.)

15 διάστασιν] The order of the words  
 in Γ (*distantia quam quidem sortita est  
 quarum dicimus esse ipsas has Will.*) may  
 suggest that διάστασιν was originally a  
 variant of ὑπεροχὴν, and to be bracketed  
 (Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Madvig  
 who also proposed <καὶ> διάστασιν).  
 But Vahlen pp. 28—34 (30—36) has  
 shown that διάστασιν is all but indispens-  
 able for the sense, and himself admits  
 that it is not necessary to alter to ἤπερ...  
 διαστάσει. Schneider, who first felt a  
 difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ.  
 πράγματος κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν ἤνπερ  
 εἶληχε πρὸς ἄλληλα τῇ ὑπεροχῇ ὧν  
 φαμεν κτλ. SUSEM.

αὐτὰς ταύτας] Vahlen shows that this  
 is an instance of the idiomatic attraction  
 of a pronominal subject (here a demon-  
 strative, often a relative) into the number  
 and gender of the predicate. In Plato  
*Phil.* 57 E ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας  
 ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστα' εἶναι = this is what we  
 especially mean by the exact sciences. So  
 here: 'the things whereof we say that  
 just this and that are the attributes'  
 becomes, not ὧν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, but ὧν αὐτὰς  
 ταύτας φαμεν εἶναι διαθέσεις.

17 καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν] Both ab-  
 solutely and relatively to us. See *N. Eth.*  
 I. 4. 5, 1059 b 2: Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 77 a  
 21 ff. where τινί, ἐκάστω, πρὸς τινα, πρὸς τι  
 are cited as similarly contrasted with  
 ἀπλῶς. So III. 9. 3, 1280 a 21, μέχρι τινός.

- § 9 *θεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ (1)*  
*τῆς ψυχῆς ἔνεκεν αἰρετὰ πέφυκε ταῦτα καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἰρεῖ-*  
 20 *σθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἔνεκεν τὴν ψυχὴν.*  
 § 10 *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον 5*  
*ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύ-*  
*τας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμέ-*

18 καὶ omitted by P<sup>1-3</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 19 ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἰρετὰ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 20 καὶ added before τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας by Γ M<sup>a</sup>

18 Take *τούτων* after *ἐκάστου*. For the use of *ἀνάλογον ἔχειν* absolutely cp. II. 10 § 4, 1271 b 41, II § 3, 1272 b 37.

§ 9 18 *ἔτι δὲ... τὴν ψυχὴν*] Cp. *Top.* III. 1 § 4, 116a 29 f. *τὸ δι' αὐτὸ ἀρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον ἀρετοῦ ἀρετώτερον*. "What is desirable on its own account is more desirable than that which is desirable for the sake of something else" (Bernays). Although this point of view (*τύπος*) is closely related to the one adopted here, yet it is not identical with it. A more important point is that as the precise argument of the *Topics* is employed e.g. in the *Ethics* also, 1. 7 § 4, 1097a 30, we have no right to follow Bernays in ascribing to this chapter of the *Politics* a scientific character materially distinct from the method of the *Ethics* and only suited for popular writings (Vahlen). Moreover there is no development of the 'logical formula' for this proof, as in the former case (see n. 701); while in the passage of the *Ethics* this is done. SUSEM. (702)

The last remark because Bernays argues (p. 80) that in the dialogues the treatment must necessarily have been somewhat abstract and dialectical; and this side of the dialogue he thinks is reflected in the present chapter. The author wrote, he says, for the public at large, who, if impatient of technical terms, are nevertheless especially qualified to appreciate the tact which adapts to each branch of science its appropriate logic.

§ 10 22 *ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως*] Cp. III. 4 § 7, II § 2, with *nn.* (474, 565). SUSEM. (703)

*καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας*] Why Aristotle was obliged to add 'activity in accordance with the virtues' we learn from *N. Eth.* I. 8 § 9, 1098b 31 ff. *διαφέρει δ' ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν πράξει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἑξεί ἢ ἐν ἐργείῃ: τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθέδοντι..., τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον τε: πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει.* We must agree

with Bernays that it is owing to the manifestly popular character of the style of description here followed that Aristotle now avoids the technical term *ἐνέργεια* used in that passage. Cf. also § 13 with n. (710), and n. (736). SUSEM. (704)

23 *μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένους*] Bernays wrongly endeavours to discover a solemn religious tone in this expression. It denotes no more than 'taking the happiness of God as evidence' or 'appealing to the happiness of God,' cp. *Thuc.* I. 73. 2, just as in a similar phrase the Cyrenaics and Epicureans are reproached with appealing to the lower animals, *Plat. Philob.* 67 B *τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἰονταὶ κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας*, *Cic. De Fin.* II. 33 § 109 *bestiis... quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis*. It is nothing unusual for Aristotle in his strictly scientific writings to introduce God into the inquiry. Not only is there really not the slightest difference in this respect between c. 3 § 10 (cp. n. 746) and the passage before us, but further the very same thought is worked out rather more fully in *Nic. Eth.* X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 7 ff., and similar references to the deity occur e.g. *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 7 § 4, 1158 b 35, cp. VII. 14 § 8, 1154 b 26 ff. Lastly, the comparison here between human and divine happiness is not in the slightest degree carried beyond the proper point. According to Aristotle the activity of God is only speculative thought, and indeed even this thought is nothing but his absolutely perfect thinking upon his own nature, and it is in this that his perfect happiness consists, see *Zeller op. c.* II. ii. p. 365 ff. Aristotle's aim is to prove, as against the opposite view generally current, the greater necessity for goods of the mind, in order to happiness. A reference to the happiness of God was not unsuitable for his purpose; the inference from this is that happiness in general does not depend upon external goods, but is founded on mental qualities;



νοις, ὅς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἔστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (1)  
 25 ἑξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις  
 εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ  
 ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν  
 τῆς ψυχῆς αἷτιον ταῦτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δὲ οὐδεὶς  
 § 11 οὐδὲ σῶφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἔστιν)· || ἐχόμενον  
 30 δ' ἔστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα

25 αὐτὸν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>3</sup> || τῷ τὸ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (perhaps rightly) || 27 [ἀγαθῶν] Bernays, [τῆς  
 ψυχῆς] Spengel Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Vahlen p. 40 (42) ff. || 29 ἐχόμενον... 36 σῶφρων a  
 duplicate of 1324 a 4 πότερον... 13 σπουδαιοτέραν first recognized by Susemihl, Spengel  
 (following Schlosser) having previously remarked that the two passages do not go well  
 together. See p. 86 f. where they are printed in parallel columns

and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see n. 689) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen). SUSEM. (705)

For this *N. E.* x. 8. 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι: cp. I. 10. 16, 1101 a 19.

26 καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἑτέραν εἶναι] Many see no difference between the two: *Nic. Eth.* I. 8 § 17, 1099 b 7 f. ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτ' ἀπαιτοῦσιν ἐνιοὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Cp. Socrates apud Xen. *Memor.* III. 9 § 14 (Eaton). SUSEM. (706)

Add *Phys.* II. 6 § 1, 197 b 3 σημείον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτ' εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἑγγύς, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις εὐπραγία γάρ.

29 ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην] Cp. *Phys.* II. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἐνεκά του γνωμένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐνεκα γένηται οὐ ἔξω τὸ αἷτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταῦτοματον λέγομεν ἀπὸ τύχης δὲ τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταῦτοματον γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσιν προαίρεσιν: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to beings possessed of

purpose are said to be by chance" (Eaton). SUSEM. (707)

Comp. the lucid comments of D. D. Heath *Misconceptions of Aristotle* in *Journal of Philology* VII. p. 111 ff.

§ 11 ἐχόμενον δ' ἔστι κτλ] Next there follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 εὐδαίμονα and 31 πράττουσαν καλῶς are predicates of which τὴν ἀρίστην πόλιν is the subject.

30 τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already adduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 12) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πράττειν has (1) the transitive meaning 'to do=to perform certain acts,' line 32 τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν, (2) the intransitive meaning 'to do=to be (in a certain state),' as e.g. in this present connexion καλῶς πράττειν = to be doing (or faring) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Bernays' conclusion that Aristotle would

- τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς (I)  
 πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν· οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον  
 § 12 οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ὀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρία  
 δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύ-  
 35 ναμιν καὶ μορφὴν, ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
 λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.||  
 § 13 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφρομισμένα τῷ  
 λόγῳ (οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς  
 οἰκείους ἐπεξελεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἑτέρας γὰρ ἔστιν ἔργον σχο-

31 γὰρ Bernays, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text (defended by Vahlen p. 45 [47] f.) || 32 τὴν Spengel, τοῖς Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) || πράττουσαν M<sup>1</sup>, πράττουσιν with all other authorities Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) || 33 [καὶ φρονήσεως] Schneider || 34 Κο-  
 raes and Bk.<sup>2</sup> insert καὶ σωφροσύνη after φρόνησις, and l. 36 ἀνδρείος καὶ before δίκαιος;  
 but see Vahlen p. 48 (50) ff.

not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked upon it as a mere play upon words, he certainly would not have admitted it into a dialogue either; most certainly he would not have transcribed it from a dialogue into the present work. As a matter of fact not only has Plato committed the same mistake in all scientific seriousness, *Gorg.* 507 c [*Rep.* 353 E], but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8 (cp. *nm.* 732, 744) and III. 9 § 14 (cp. *n.* 560 b), and similarly in *Nic. Eth.* I. 8 § 4, 1098 b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly attempts to disprove the last case (Vahlen). But Spengel is right in thinking it strange that the question disposed of in § 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still requiring to be settled and is accordingly there settled. This difficulty disappears so soon as we set the two paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of the same subject, and with it another difficulty raised by Hildenbrand p. 368 ff., on which Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 73 (565) ff. has laid far more stress than it deserves. Hildenbrand's view is that in III. 18 the question, whether the virtue or the happiness of the individual and of the state is identical or not, is brought forward as having already been settled by III. cc. 5, 6 (cp. *nm.* 471, 684), whereas in IV(VII). 1 § 11, 2 § 1, the question is first submitted to investigation, and that therefore III. c. 18 is a draft from Aristotle's pen which he afterwards discarded. The error in this conclusion lurks (as Böcker observes) in the words

'virtue or happiness'; for the latter term as used by Aristotle is not coincident with the former, but requires in addition a certain measure of external goods. The proof that the *virtue* of the state is identical with that of the individual does not therefore by itself in any way demonstrate the identity of their happiness [or wellbeing]. In any case, if we take the one version, that contained in c. I. § 11, there is no escape from the difficulty that the previous inquiry as to the identity of the *virtue* of both is also ignored. But if we replace it by the second version, c. 2 §§ 1, 2, there would be nothing to prevent Aristotle expressing himself as he does, even with the distinct presupposition of the earlier inquiry (cc. III. 5, 6) and the reference to it in III. c. 18 § 2. As to the identity of the 'virtue or excellence' manifested by the state and by the individual cp. also c. 13 §§ 9, 10 and VIII(v). 9 § 12 with *n.* (1642). SUSEM. (708)

§ 12 33 Observe that this is the postulate of Plato in the *Republic*, made implicitly II. 368 E and reasserted expressly IV 435 b, 442 d ff. On δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν, terms cognate to εἶδος, λόγος, φύσις, cp. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 206 b 12, and *n.* on I. 4. 6, 1254 a 14. Apparently the antecedent of ὧν, if expressed, would be τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ φρονήσει: see on 1323 b 15.

§ 13 39 ἑτέρας...σχολῆς] For this forms the task of another study, a lecture of another kind. Here only in this sense,



40 λῆς ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ (I)  
χωρὶς ἐκάστου καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχο- (p. 96)  
1324 a ρηγμένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρά-  
§ 14 ξων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν  
μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχά-  
2 νει μὴ πειθόμενος· || πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν II  
5 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν. φα-  
νερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶ-  
§ 2 ναι τὴν αὐτὴν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθεν-  
ται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, εἰ μὴ πλουσία,  
10 μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τι-  
μῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσιν εὐδαιμονεστά-  
την εἶναι φαῖεν ἂν· εἴ τε τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται,  
§ 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. || [ἀλλὰ 2

40 καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου omitted by P<sup>4</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and the first hand of P<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> (added in the margin of S<sup>b</sup> by the same hand, in the margin of P<sup>3</sup> by a later hand and again expunged) || 41 ἐκάστῳ P<sup>2</sup> Ar. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of P<sup>3</sup> || κεχορηγμένος P<sup>4</sup>-6 L<sup>1</sup> Ald.

1324 a 4 πότερον...13 σπουδαιοτέραν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86  
10 μακαρίζουσιν or μακαριοῦσιν Ar. Spengel || 12 ἂν before εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> Bk. and P<sup>5</sup> (in the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [ἀλλὰ...1325 b 34 πότερον] Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>

Lat. disciplina, course of study or instruction: in all other passages of Aristotle σχολή=leisure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφέσται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα, Nic. Eth. I. 2 § 9, 1094 b 11; see *Introduct.* pp. 67, 70 f. As there was a work of Theophrastus called ἠθικαὶ σχολαί (Diog. Laert. v. 47) Krohn *op. c.* p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle's. But his view requires some stronger proofs. SUSEM. (709) "That σχολή was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἐλεγε σχολήν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατατριβήν, Diog. Laert. vi. 42: cf. also Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* I. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus..., itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli" (Ridgeway). But the witticisms attributed to Diogenes need very careful sifting be-

fore they can pass as historical (Susemihl).

41 ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς...1324 a 1 πράξεων] Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in n. (704) is applicable. Cp. also n. (736). SUSEM. (710)

1324 a 3 διασκεπτέον ὕστερον] Spengel rightly observes, *Ueber die Pol.* p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cp. Excursus I. SUSEM. (711)

c. 2 § 2 9 ἐφ' ἐνός] Cp. Plato *Theaet.* 157 A ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι.

c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τεθεωρηται πρότερον).

A subsidiary question: is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophic retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceable rule over freemen and of internal activity?

§ 3 13 ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη δέοι The close

ταῦτ' ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἶρε- (II)  
 15 πώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πό-  
 λεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπο-  
 λελυμένος, ἐτι δὲ τίνα πολιτεῖαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν διάθεσιν  
 πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἵρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως  
 § 4 εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς  
 20 διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον  
 αἵρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην νῦν προηγήμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκείνῳ  
 μὲν [[γὰρ]] πάρεργον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.  
 § 5 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτεῖαν ἀρίστην ταύτην 3

See Comm. *nn.* 712—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—9 || 14 πότερον

Γ Μ\* (?) Ρ<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> Ar. (M\* has <sup>7p</sup> πό) || 18 αἵρετοῦ <τοῦ> Koraes || 19 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπεὶ διὰ  
 Μ\*, τὸ δὲ περισσόν is a gloss of p<sup>2</sup> in the margin; γὰρ Spengel, quite wrongly ||  
 21 νῦν after προηγήμεθα Π<sup>2</sup> Ρ<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 22 γὰρ omitted by Γ Ρ<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Bk., rightly

sequence of cc. 2, 3 upon c. 1 leaves us only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3 have exactly the same origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by the same excellences of style, or else the editor who inserted c. 1 has further added to it from his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of course c. 2 §§ 1, 2 (see *n.* 708). Even setting aside the difference of style, the second alternative is forced upon us by the numerous difficulties, some slight, others very considerable, which present themselves in this section, see *nn.* (713—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—749), with which the few points in c. 1 and c. 2 §§ 1, 2 that might raise doubts as to the genuineness of that portion (see *nn.* 690, 709, 711) should be more closely compared. Read Ed. Müller's exhaustive examination in his *History of the theory of art among the ancients* II. pp. 366—373, Breslau, 1837, a work universally neglected, which ought to have led subsequent inquirers to a renewed consideration of these chapters. What a deal of pains he takes to remove the difficulties in them, and all in vain. Although my view differs considerably from his, in many respects it is most intimately connected with his exposition. This is not the place to enter into a more detailed examination of his argument, but see *n.* (743). Only one difficulty is common to the two portions c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2) and c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1: viz. that later on in c. 3 §§ 3, 4 the inquiry of c. 1, and so too a little further on in c. 13 § 8 ff. the inquiry pursued in cc. 2,

3, though in a slightly altered form, is commenced over again, in each case without the slightest sign that they have been already adequately discussed, whereas the interpolator does not fail to refer by anticipation to this later section, c. 3 § 1 (cp. *n.* 731). SUSEM. (712)

14 ἐν μὲν—22 μεθόδου ταύτης] The transition to the best constitution took place as far back as III. c. 18, and in IV (VII). 1 it was stated that we must first examine the best life; now after having concluded this examination and after having stated that the result holds good for the state as well as for the individual, it seems very awkward to say that there are two questions requiring to be investigated, (1) whether the best life for the individual is one of scientific leisure or of political activity, and (2) which is the best constitution. The first question is violently thrust in, and, as it stands, cannot properly be allowed to take even a secondary rank as a question of politics, which the author at once declares is all that he himself claims for it; it has nothing whatever to do with the science of politics, as Schlosser long since observed. It would be a different thing if it were preceded by, and then taken up and treated as co-ordinate to, the inquiry whether the end of the state is peaceful activity or war, which in § 5 is treated as a co-ordinate question. SUSEM. (713)

§ 5 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν φανερόν ἐστιν]  
 4 It is plain then that the [absolutely] best polity is that system under which any one of the citizens whatever would fare



καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῇ μα- (II)  
 25 καρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν  
 ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἰρετώτατον, πότε-  
 ρον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ  
 πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις, ὃν  
 § 6 μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς  
 30 δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμώτατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαί-  
 νονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν· λέγω  
 δὲ δύο τὸν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ  
 μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὖ (p. 97)  
 34 φρονούντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν  
 § 7 ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ  
 μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μετ'  
 ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον

24 ἦς Ar. apparently, [τάξις] Spengel. The former probably right: yet see Vahlen p. 35 (37) || ζῇ M<sup>a</sup>, ζῆ P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 28 τις <ὧν>? Koraeas, [tis] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed || 29 φιλόσοφοι [sc. αἰρετόν] Jackson || 30 τούτους after τοὺς δύο M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || φιλοτιμώτατοι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>a</sup> Ald. || 31 πρότερον Koraeas (needlessly) and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || 33 γε Spengel, τε M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, omitted by P<sup>3</sup>, perhaps rightly, [τε] Congreve || 35 ἕκαστον P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. Spengel, γρ. ἕκαστον P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin), perhaps rightly || τῇ πολι M<sup>a</sup>, τὴν πολιτείαν (πολιτείαν 1st hand of P<sup>2</sup>) P<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (γρ. τὴν πολιτείαν corr. in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>), perhaps rightly; τὴν πόλιν Spengel, needlessly || 37 τινὸς omitted by P<sup>1</sup>

best and live in the enjoyment of happiness' Cp. c. i § 1 and n. (685). SUSEM. (714)

29 τινές] 'Some' only? We should expect 'all.' But this may be explained as due to Aristotle's minimizing style of expression. Cp. n. (401). SUSEM. (715)

§ 6 σχεδὸν γὰρ ... 32 φιλόσοφον] The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually diffuse. SUSEM. (716)

No account is here taken of the view that honour is the aim of the political life, *N.E.* i. v. 4, 1095 b 23. Whereas in *N.E.* x. 7. 7, 1177 b 19 ff. αἱ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ἀρεταὶ are sharply distinguished from ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (θεωρητικῇ), here the object seems to be to represent the political and contemplative life as akin, though the latter is in both discussions regarded as αὐτοτελής (Newman).

34 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ] But granting that the speculative (i.e. studious) life is the better end for the individual, the state is in no

way concerned in this, beyond rendering such a life possible to the few fitted for it, provided that the rest consent to take active part in the administration: for otherwise the state would itself come to an end. The author is in error (cp. n. 736\*) in supposing that the question, whether scientific or political activity ranks highest for the individual, corresponds exactly to the question which arises with regard to the state, whether it should pursue a policy of peace or of war. Cp. *iii.* (743, 745). SUSEM. (717)

§ 7 35 οἱ μὲν] The advocates of a peace policy think that while despotic rule over others is never without a certain injustice of the deepest dye, even rule as exercised under a free government, though devoid of injustice, yet tends to disturb our own easy prosperity. The conjunction of τὸ ἄρχειν and γινόμενον = ἡ ἀρχὴ γινόμενη is harsh, but can be paralleled. On δεσποτικῶς (properly as slaves) see 1277 a 33 n.

οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ· τούτων (II)  
 δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες. μόνον  
 40 γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν· ἐφ'  
 ἐκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις  
 § 8 ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτενομένοις. \* \* οἱ μὲν οὖν 5  
 1324 b οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν  
 τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονα φασίν. παρ'  
 4 ἐνίοις δ' οὗτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος, ὅπως δε-  
 § 9 σπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην  
 ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ ποῦ τι πρὸς  
 ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὥσπερ  
 ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται  
 § 10 σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλήθος· ἔτι δ' ἐν  
 10 τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ τοιαύτη τε-  
 τίμηται δύναμις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θραξί  
 καὶ Κελτοῖς. ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι παροξύνον- 6  
 τες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ  
 14 τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσας ἂν στρατεύων-  
 § 11 ται στρατείας· ἣν δέ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν

38 αὐτὸν Γ, perhaps rightly, αὐτῶν Vettori<sup>2</sup>, αὐτοὺς Schneider.

1324 b 1 \* \* of Susem. and Böcker, <ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀμφισβητεῖται.  
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ \* \* > οἱ or something similar? Susem. || 4 δ'...ὅρος] δ' οὗτος καὶ τῆς  
 πολιτείας ὅρος τῶν νόμων P<sup>1</sup>, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος τῶν νόμων P<sup>4,6</sup>, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολι-  
 τείας οὗτος ὅρος (καὶ added by Congreve) τῶν νόμων all other codices and editors ex-  
 cept Susem. || 8 πολεμίους Π<sup>1</sup> || 14 τῶν] τοσούτων? Koraes, but see Vahlen  
 p. 34 (36) on 1323 b 15

41 οὐ μᾶλλον] not so much.

§ 8 Secuta est uberior expositio senten-  
 tia eorum qui vitam optimam esse con-  
 tendunt civitatibus quae καθ' αὐτὰς ἰδρυ-  
 μέναι sint, cf. 1325 b 23—27. SUSEM.

1324 b 1 πολιτενομένοις \* \* ] To  
 complete the connexion we require words  
 to the following effect:—"and there is  
 the same difference of opinion with re-  
 gard to states. For some think that  
 those states lead the best and happiest  
 existence which devote themselves purely  
 to domestic politics and have nothing  
 to do with any policy of war. For, they  
 say, etc." "This then is one view, but  
 others (οἱ δὲ) etc." SUSEM. (718)

§ 9 7 ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι—πλη-  
 θος] Cp. II. 9 § 34, IV(VII). 14 § 15 ff.,  
 V(VIII). 4 §§ 1—6, with *nn.* (344, 910,  
 1005). SUSEM. (719)

§ 10 9 ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι] cp. I. 2 § 6,  
 and *n.* (19 b). SUSEM. (720)

11 καὶ Πέρσαις] cp. Hdt. VII. 2, IX.  
 122 (Eaton). SUSEM. (721)

12 καὶ Κελτοῖς] cp. II. 9 § 7, and *n.*  
 (287) p. 334 f. and below c. 17 § 3 and  
*n.* (953). SUSEM. (722)

14 τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον] Does  
 this throw any light on the real signifi-  
 cance of Hannibal's sending by Mago the  
 rings of the Roman equites, as told by  
 Livy XXIII. 12? (Ridgeway).

§ 11 15 καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν] Here  
 we see the Macedonians expressly reckon-  
 ed among barbarian peoples. And even  
 if this is pronounced the interpolation of  
 a pupil, yet the more closely the earlier  
 Peripatetics were attached to the Mace-  
 donian cause, the more probable it be-  
 comes that the pupil is here reproducing



μηδένα ἀπεκταγkότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζώσθαι τὴν φορ- (11)  
 βειάν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τιμὴ σκύφον  
 περιφερόμενον τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγkότι πολέμιον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς  
 Ἰβηρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῶ, τοσούτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους  
 20 καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν  
 § 12 πολέμιων· καὶ ἕτερα δὴ παρ' ἑτέροις ἔστι τοιαῦτα πολλά,  
 τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατελημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθουσιν.

καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις τ  
 ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι (p. 98)  
 25 θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχη καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ  
 § 13 μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴῃ τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν,  
 ὃ γε μηδὲ νόμιμον ἐστίν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

16 ἀπεκτονότα P<sup>1-5</sup>, ἀπεκτανkότα P<sup>8</sup> (1st hand, corrected in the margin by a later hand, but the correction was afterwards expunged), ἀπεκταkότα P<sup>4-6</sup> Ald., ἐπταικότα M<sup>5</sup> || 17 σκύφον περιφερομένου? Schneider || 18 ἀπεκταkότι M<sup>5</sup> P<sup>1-4-6</sup>, ἀπεκτανkότι P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), ἀπεκτονότι P<sup>5</sup> || 19 ἀριθμοῦντες or ἀριθμοῦντας, apparently, Γ (numerantes William) || οὐ βελίσκους M<sup>5</sup> || 21 δὲ? Koræes wrongly || 24 δύνασθαι transposed by Lindau to follow 28 ἄρχειν, wrongly || 27 μόνον after δικαίως P<sup>5</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and apparently Γ

unaltered his master's view. SUSEM. (723). Cp. *Introd.* p. 46 n. (3)

17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις] Comp. Herod. iv. 66. SUSEM. (724)

18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρσιν] The only mention of the Iberians, or Spaniards, in the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious *De Mirabilibus* 46, 85, 87, 88, 833 b 15, 837 a 8, 24 ff. SUSEM. (725)

19 ὀβελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual translation 'obelisks' or 'stone pillars' is quite reconcileable with the practice of savage tribes. Thus "in New Caledonia rows of stones are found commemorating the number of enemies killed and eaten in former wars." Mr Ridgeway writing to the *Academy* of Aug. 29, 1885, suggests that this Iberian practice accounts for the stone pillars actually placed around tombs in Western Europe. On the other hand Dr Jackson communicates the following note.

"ὀβελίσκος means, not 'obelisks' as the commentators suppose, but literally 'spits.' Originally the spits carried the heads of the slain: when the custom of affixing the heads fell into disuse, the

spits, which should have borne the actual trophies, continued to be planted ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολέμιων; i.e. the trophy was converted into a badge. On trophy-taking, and its connexion with 'militancy', of which Aristotle is quite aware, see Spencer's *Ceremonial Institutions* ch. ii, p. 48 with p. 186."

§ 12 22 κατελημμένα] established, confirmed, secured: Cope *Rhet.* II. 2 § 20 compares Thuc. v. 21 σπονδὰς εὖρον κατελημμένας; Plato *Lysis* VII. 823 A τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατελημμένα; *Nic. Eth.* X. 9 § 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατελημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι: also the active use in Thuc. VIII. 63 § 3 τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐτι βεβαιώτερον κατέλαβον.

25 τῶν πλησίον] but § 8, a 5 τῶν πέλας.

§ 13 Hampke compares with this the discussion upon slavery I. 6 §§ 1-5: one phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν, is certainly echoed by the protest 27 f. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ κτλ "to rule at all hazards, whether justly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a victory may be won even by unjust means."

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμας τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὐτε<sup>8</sup>  
 30 γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὐτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ [[ἦ]] πείσαι ἢ  
 τὸ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆ-  
 § 14 ρας. ἀλλ' εἰκάσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἶεσθαι  
 εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ  
 συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες.  
 35 αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικάως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς  
 § 15 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ<sup>9</sup>  
 φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστὸν, ὥστε εἴπερ  
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειράσθαι δεσπόζειν,  
 ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυ-  
 40 σίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν· ἐστὶ δὲ θηρευ-  
 § 16 τὸν ὃ ἂν ἀγριον ἢ ἐδεστὸν ζῷον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἂν καὶ  
 1325 a καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, ἣ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι  
 καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι που καθ' ἑαυτὴν νό-

29 ἀλλὰ...ὁρῶμεν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>) || 30 ἦ before πείσαι inserted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 31 τὸ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || λάσασθαι Π<sup>1</sup> (but βιάσασθαι a correction in P<sup>1</sup>) || 33 ὅπερ <παρ' > or ὁ παρ' ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || 36 μὴ φύσει κτλ can hardly be right: [μὴ] Thurot, perhaps rightly. Schneider suspected a lacuna: if so, it may conceivably be filled up thus; μὴ <φύσει πειθόμεθα, καὶ > φύσει || 37 δεσποστὸν—δεσποστὸν Stahr, δεσποτὸν—δεσποτὸν Giphanius, δεσπόζον—δεσπόζον Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 39 δεσποστῶν a later hand in P<sup>5</sup> and Lambin, δεσποτῶν Γ M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1-2-3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand), δεσποτικῶν P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>2</sup> || 40 ἐστὶ δὲ <πρὸς τοῦτο > θηρευτὸν Oncken rightly, though perhaps this need only be understood

29 The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is by no means superfluous. See Xen. *Mem.* III. 9 § 11, *Pl. Rep.* 488 D δε ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεῖνός ἦ, ὅπως ἀρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιάζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, *Politicus* 296 B ἂν τις ἀρα μὴ πείθων τὸν λατρευόμενον, ἔχων δὲ ὁρθῶς τὴν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα βέλτιον ἀναγκάζῃ δρᾶν τινα, τί τοῦνομα τῆς βίας ἐστὶ ταύτης; Yet the repeated collision of vowels, 30 ἱατροῦ οὐτε, κυβερνήτου ἔργον, πείσαι ἢ, 32 οἶεσθαι εἶναι, 33 ἕκαστοι οὐ, is in striking contrast to the book as a whole, and in two cases is not removable by transposition.

οὐτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὐτε κτλ] Comp. *Plat. Gorg.* 456 B (Eaton): also c. 13 § 2 n. (870), and above III. 6 § 7 n. (531). 15 § 4 n. (638), 16 §§ 6—8: 11. 8 § 18 n. (270). SUSEM. (726)

§ 14 35 αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς] at home, in their own political affairs.

§ 15 37 φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστὸν] See B. I. c. 4 § 6, cc. 5, 6. SUSEM. (727)

39 θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν] *Plutarch Alexand.* 72 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κορσικῶν ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο, πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων. τοῦτο δὲ Ἡφαιστίνους ἐναγισμὸς ἐκαλεῖτο. This was B.C. 324—3 quite at the close of Alexander's career.

40 τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν] Implying that wild animals which are not fit for food may be hunted for other purposes, and to supply other necessities of life. It is not quite clear whether the writer thinks that for such other purposes it is also under certain circumstances permissible to hunt men, and whether therefore he would allow of war for the capture of slaves, which Aristotle disallows (I. 8 § 12 *nn.* 65, 75) as a branch of θηρευτική. SUSEM. (728)



μοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἥς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ (II)  
πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων·  
5 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιούτων.

§ 17 δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς 10  
μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὥς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνου  
χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι

9 πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγα-

§ 18 θῆς πῶς μεθέξουσιν καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. δι-  
οίσει μέντοι τῶν ταπτομένων ἔνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο-  
θετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, εἰάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειννιώντες, ποῖα πρὸς (p. 99)  
ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τίχοι τῆς προσηκούσης  
15 σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν·

3 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον III  
αἰρετώτατον, διαφορομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε-  
κτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμά-  
ζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου

1325 a 6 ἄρα after ὅτι M\* P1.2.3 S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 8 τοῦ before σπουδαίου omitted by M\* P1  
|| 18 of...23 ταύτων] This whole parenthesis is transposed in P<sup>2.3</sup> to follow 24 ὁρθῶς,  
by means of the letters αβγ written above the line || 19 [τε] Spengel

§ 16 1325 a 3 ἥς τῆς πολιτείας] We may well believe that such conceptions, though foreign to Pericles, and new even to Isocrates, had become familiar enough in the Athens of Phocion, especially amongst those who lived to compare the brilliant peace administration of Demetrios of Phaleron with the disastrous results of the active policy which had led to Chae-  
ronea and Crannon. Comp. Bernays *Phokion* pp. 31 ff., 55 ff. and Newman 1. p. 311.

5 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιούτων] But this is only true with the proviso that such a state is not attacked by offensive wars, for which it must by its constitution be prepared, as indeed the writer himself explains, § 18. SUSEM. (729)

§ 17 6 δῆλον ἄρα...10 εὐδαιμονίας] Precisely the same statement as in these two sentences is made by Plato *Lysis* 1. 628 D: ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοοῦμενος οὕτω τις οὐτ' ἂν ποτε πολιτικός γένοιτο ὁρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἐξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὐτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβῆς, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (730)

§ 18 12 εἰάν τινες...γειννιώντες] So already 11. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a foreign policy, if it be only a policy of non-intervention and self-defence.

14 κἂν ὕστερον] c. 14 §§ 7—11. See *nn.* (712)—this reference may of course be interpolated—and (906). SUSEM. (731)

c. 3 *The best life for the individual is practical activity in the service of a free city. Yet intellectual activity is also practical and is a higher life still.*

§ 1 17 περὶ τῆς χρήσεως] How it is to be enjoyed.

λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους] Comp. *n.* (696) on c. 1 § 6. SUSEM. (733)

19 'τε interdum ei vocabulo additur, quod utrique membro commune est: φύσει τε <γὰρ> ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων (i.e. φύσει γὰρ ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ τε υἱῶν καὶ...) *N. E.* VIII. 13 [c. xi. § 2], 1161 a 18<sup>7</sup> Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 749 b 44 ff. τοῦ ἐλευθέρου] τοῦ ἀπολελυμένου, untrammelled by office and by civic obligations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were metoecus, as Anaxagoras had been before them.

20 βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἰρετώτατον, (III)  
οἷ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πράττοντα  
πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι  
ταῦτόν), ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ  
24 ὀρθῶς, οἷ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων.  
§ 2 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ, ἢ δούλῳ, χρῆσθαι  
σεμνόν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς με-  
τέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δε-  
σποτεῖαν οὐκ ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων  
ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δού-  
30 λου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.  
§ 3 τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀλη-  
θές· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξις ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ κα-

22 εἶναι before καὶ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 25 τὸ] τῷ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1-2-4</sup>, τῷ Ald. || 27 δεσποτεῖαν P<sup>3</sup>  
(1st hand, corrected by a later hand), δεσποτικὴν P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ, so that this may  
be right || 29 αὐτὸ τὸ P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), αὐτὸ τὸ Γ P<sup>1-4-5</sup>, αὐτὸ M<sup>a</sup> Ald., αὐτῷ P<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup>  
(1st hand)

21 ἀδύνατον γὰρ... 23 ταῦτόν] Comp.  
n. (708). SUSEM. (732)

§ 2 25 οὐδὲν γὰρ... σεμνόν] Comp.  
1. 7 § 5 n. (64) and below c. 14 § 19 n.  
(913). SUSEM. (734)

26 ἐπίταξις] See note (124) on ἐπι-  
τάξει χρῆσθαι 1. 13 § 14.

27 νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν δεσποτεῖαν]  
See n. (58). Yet Plato was free from  
this error when he classified the forms of  
rule, *Laws* III. 690 A ff. On the other  
hand he makes πολιτικὴ= βασιλική, *Euthy-*  
*demus* 292 c, a passage which should be  
added to *Polit.* 258 E, as quoted on 1.  
1 § 2.

29 ἢ αὐτὸ... δούλου] How great that  
difference may be, we learn from 1. 5  
§ 8 n. (47).

30 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] B. 1. cc.  
4—7. SUSEM. (735)

§ 3 31 οὐκ ἀληθές] is not right, *haud*  
*verum* est.

32 ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξις] This is  
certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine.  
See c. 1 §§ 10—13, *nn.* (704, 710); *Nic.*  
*Eth.* 1. cc. 7—9: VI. 2 § 5, 1139 a 3, VI.  
5 § 4, 1140 b 7, X. 6 § 2, 1176 a 33;  
*Phys.* II. 6 § 1, 197 b 5; *Poet.* 6 § 12,  
1450 a 17; *Rhet.* 1. 5 § 3, 1360 b 14;  
comp. Zeller II. ii p. 612. But still it is so  
provided only that under πράξις is includ-  
ed not merely practical, but also theoretical  
or mental activity, and that consequently  
the term is understood in the wider sense:  
for otherwise this doctrine would not be

true of the highest felicity of pure thought,  
as it pertains to God alone (n. 705), to  
which however the author himself appeals  
§ 10, n. (746). And of human well-being,  
too, scientific perfection in active opera-  
tion is the higher element, moral perfec-  
tion only the lower element, according to  
the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. "It  
must be granted, that then it would be hard  
to say how the happiness of the individ-  
ual and of the whole state can be one and  
the same" (Schlosser). Here Schlosser en-  
deavours to explain the mistake pointed  
out in *nn.* (717, 745) by assuming that  
'Aristotle subordinated the idea of in-  
ternal activity to that of contemplation.'  
This thought is quite just; but does this  
unhappy attempt to mend matters by such  
a confusion look more like the master or  
a pupil? Granted that this subordina-  
tion is intended here (and from § 8 this  
cannot be doubtful—see n. 743), still of  
those who prefer the *scientific* life to the  
practical life it cannot possibly be main-  
tained with truth that they prefer in-  
activity to activity, nor can Aristotle him-  
self have written anything so inconsistent.  
SUSEM. (736)

ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν κτλ] "The actions  
done by the just and temperate contain  
a realization of many noble ends." This  
is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle him-  
self. Further comp. for σωφρόνων n.  
(206 b), II. 6 § 9. SUSEM. (737)



λῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. (III)  
καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων 3  
35 ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλεί-  
§ 4 στων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖν τὸν  
δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον  
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πα-  
τρὸς μήθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς  
40 τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράτ-  
τειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρ- 4  
1325 b ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώ-  
§ 5 τατον· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται (p. 100)  
τοῦτο ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι  
τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ  
5 τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων· ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐδὲν ἂν τη-  
λικούτον κατορθώσειεν ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς  
ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ  
§ 6 <ἐν> μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις

36 δεῖν Susem., δεῖ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 39 ὑπολογίζειν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, ὑπολογεῖν  
S<sup>b</sup> Bk., ὑπολογεῖν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>-2-3-4-5 V<sup>b</sup> Ald. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ὑπόλογ<ον> ἔχ<ειν> οἱ ὑπό-  
λογον ποιῆσαι Madvig || Koraes proposed either (1) to bracket μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο  
φροντίζειν, or to alter to (2) μηθὲν, or (3) μηδὲν πρὸς τοῦτον φροντίζειν ||

1325 b 3 ψεῦδος untranslated by William, [ψεῦδος] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, ψευδῶς? Casaubon ||  
8 <ἐν> Thurot

34 τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις] 'Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are laid down, universal sovereignty is the highest good.' This further inference is not at all easy to justify: it is fairly dragged in by force. SUSEM. (738)

§ 4 Development of this extreme view, that, as the practical life implies the possession of power, the more power the better.

37 παριέναι = to surrender, sc. τὸ ἄρχειν, III. 14 § 13. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι = to deprive another (state or ruler) of empire, Dem. VIII. *De Chers.* § 42, p. 100, 7, ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι.

38 πατέρα παίδων κτλ] Plutarch, *Demetrius* c. 3, p. 890 b, complains that the Diadochi sacrificed every natural tie to their lust for empire.

39 ὑπολογίζειν] This verb, if indeed it be right, is ἀπαξ εἰρημένον in Aristotle, though found in Plato and Demosthenes.

41 ἴσως] 'perhaps,' conforming to Aristotle's own dictum *Rhet.* II. 13 § 2, 1389 b 18 ἀμφισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν αἰετὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα. But in b 2 it con-

ceals a very positive opinion under a cautious formula.

§ 5 1325 b 3 τὰς πράξεις] The actions of one who has obtained power by violence (ἀποστερῶν καὶ βιαζόμενος).

4 ὅσον ἀνὴρ... 5 δούλων] These three species of domestic relations, and of household rule based upon them, are taken as the prototypes of all rule, except where it is government of equals by equals and so alternates with obedience. See I. 12 § 1 f. and *Nic. Eth.* VIII. c. 11 (Eaton). SUSEM. (739)

5 ὁ παραβαίνων] An Archelaos or a Napoleon.

6 κατορθώσειεν] would perform a right action: rectum faciat. This use of the verb, as opposed to παρεκβαίνειν, may be easily understood from *Nic. Eth.* II. 5 § 12, 1106 b 26, ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαίνεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται, and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of κατόρθωμα as a technical term.

§ 6 8 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον...παρὰ φύσιν] Cp. III. 16 §§ 2-4 n. (672), II. 2 § 6 n. (134 b). SUSEM. (740)

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (III)  
 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ἢ κρείττων κατ'  
 ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ  
 7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον  
 ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρα-  
 κτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν 5  
 15 εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ'  
 8 ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς  
 διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαι-  
 νόντων χάριν γινομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλ-  
 20 λον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ δια-

18 εἶναι after μόνας P<sup>1</sup>, after ταύτας Γ || 20 αὐτῶν Vettori, αὐτῶν Γ II || διανοή-  
 σεis...21 μάλιστα] Should this be διανοήσεις' ἢ...πράξις τίς. μάλιστα?

10 διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις] To the genuine Aristotle this proposition holds provided only that the one great citizen is superior in virtue to all combined, not (as is here expressed) to each individual: see III. 13 §§ 13—25, c. 17. SUSEM. (741)

§ 7 12 δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον κτλ] "He must have not only the virtue but the force to develop his activity fully" (without transgressing virtue). This is only possible in the best state: see III. 13 §§ 24, 25; also *n.* (677) and *Introd.* p. 44. SUSEM. (742)

14 ταῦτα] That while the life of freedom is preferable to that of rule over unwilling subjects, βίος δεσποτικός, § 1, yet the life of action is preferable to that of inaction § 3 (which however does not imply that conquest or grasping at sovereignty is unconditionally desirable §§ 4—6).

16 ὁ πρακτικός] So far as the individual is concerned, comp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 8 §§ 8, 1178 b 32, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρεῖται, 7 § 9, 1178 a 7, οὗτος ἄρα (sc. ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος) καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος· δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. But the qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously impair the comparison.

§ 8 "But the practical life need not mean a life in relation to others, as some suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone be practical which are done for the sake of certain external results of the action: on the contrary the self-contained speculations and processes of the intellect are far more truly practical." By *τινες* we should naturally understand Plato: but the cap better fits Aristotle himself, *Nic.*

*Eth.* X. 7 § 4, 1177 a 30, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, § 7, αὐταί, sc. αἱ πολιτικαὶ πράξεις, ἀσχοιοὶ καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφλένται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν. Eaton compares *Rep.* IV 443 D where justice is expounded to be harmonious activity of all the parts of man, and therefore internal, *περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ [πράξιν]*.

20 τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς...διανοήσεις] This can only mean theoretical or purely scientific thinking; Ed. Müller's uncertainty on this point is the chief defect in his whole exposition, which hinders him from arriving at any really tenable result and is the cause of many errors. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 7 § 5, 1177 b 1 οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς θεωρητικῆς, γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἡ πλεῖον ἢ ἐλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξιν. Upon Aristotle's view two things must be distinguished in every activity, the end and the means; theoretical activity differs from practical and creative activity (see *n.* 34) in this respect, that in the former internal activity is a self-contained end, while in practical activity the end lies in the act produced by it, which affects some external person, and in the creative activity of art the end is the work or result produced. <sup>1</sup> See *De Caelo* II. 12 § 9, 292 b 6, ἡ πράξις ἐστὶν αἰ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, ὅταν καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ἡ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα, *Nic. Eth.* VI. cc. 2—5, *De Anima* III. c. 9<sup>1</sup> (Eaton): Zeller *op. c.* II. ii. p. 177 f. If αἱ αὐτοτελεῖς θεωρεῖται καὶ διανοήσεις are the most truly practical, the supporters of the view that the intellectual life is to be



νοήσεις. ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξις τις· μάλιστα δὲ πρᾶττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν  
 § 9 πρᾶξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοαῖς ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδρυμένας καὶ  
 25 ζῆν οὕτω προηρημένας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο 6 συμβαίνειν· πολλὰ γὰρ κοινωναίαι πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι  
 § 10 τῆς πόλεως εἰσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσιν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ  
 30 τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

21 μάλιστα...23 ἀρχιτέκτονας cited by Julian ep. ad Themist. p. 263 D || 22 καὶ inserted after δὲ by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || τῶν] τὸ Julian || 23 τῆς διανοίας Julian

preferred to that of the statesman are unconditionally right, nor can we see how far the writer thinks he is mediating between them and their opponents. He would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that man must exercise not only his intellectual, but also his moral, powers: that he is an integral part of the whole formed by the state, and not a god, i. 2 §§ 11, 12. That consequently, although it is life in the state which alone renders possible an assured scientific activity itself, yet it may well be permitted to individual men to be active for science primarily, and for the state only secondarily and in the fulfilment of the most general duties of a citizen. That at the same time there must be others who find their real satisfaction in the activity of the statesman and consequently adopt the opposite procedure: while a symmetrical combination of excellence in both will be the highest, and for that reason certainly the least common. See c. 14 §§ 7—11, n. (906), also nn. (717, 1024) and *Introd.* p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (743)

21 ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος] Comp. c. i. § 11 n. (708). SUSEM. (744)

§ 9 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν...28 ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'However even for states placed by themselves and determined upon an isolated life there is no necessity for inaction: activity is still possible to them in sections, for the various sections of the city have many ways of associating. And in the same way this is true of each individual man.' What was recalled to mind in n. (717) is true here also. The comparison is not suitable; for neither is the internal administration of the state a theoretical activity, but rather it is practical or partly

practical, partly creative (see nn. 34, 743); while in the case of the individual man every activity (except the theoretical) is always finally directed to others. Even on the doctrine of Plato (Zeller *Plato* p. 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of Aristotle, the individual's moral virtue is primarily a mutual relation of the parts of his soul, the rational soul and that which has to be subjected to the guidance of reason (see nn. 41, 112). Yet its active exercise is for the most part possible only in intercourse with others. SUSEM. (745)

28 ὁ θεός] See n. (705) on c. i § 10, n. (736). SUSEM. (746)

29 πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] An activity and happiness of the universe cannot, strictly speaking, be in question on the orthodox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats the Platonic assumption of a World-soul. The world as a whole is only passively affected, i.e. God causes it to revolve round the earth, which is at rest, in 24 hours: or precisely stated, this passive affection belongs to the rest of the universe, the earth alone being exempt. All other motions and activities, affections and changes, belong to the several beings inside the universe. See Zeller II. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though comprehending all this in its harmonious arrangement we may call it, in a metaphorical sense, the activity of the universe, or even say that the world has its wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered activity, yet considered as an analogy to the internal administration of the state this is more halting than the last (n. 745). For it is intended to prove that the highest happiness of the individual man lies in purely internal or theoretical

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον (III)  
 32 ἐκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-  
 4 ποις, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροιάσται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ IV  
 αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρό- (p. 101)

32 [καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Koraes followed by Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup>, but see Comm.  
 n. (739) || 33 [περὶ αὐτῶν] Schneider, περὶ τούτων ? Nickes, perhaps rightly ||  
 34 [καὶ...πρότερον] Spengel Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> See on 1324 a 13

activity: hence the whole analogy has no meaning unless the wellbeing of the universe (εἶχευ καλῶς) is exactly identical with its happiness (εὐδαιμονεῖν). Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. SUSEM. (747)

32 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, cc. 2, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. SUSEM. (748)

c. 4 § 1 34 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας] By "other forms of government" were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of the latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν onwards, the "other forms of government" can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the "state to be constituted according to an ideal," τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως (cp. Diebitsch's excellent remarks, p. 8 f., in opposition to Teichmüller). But then these words would prove that the traditional order of the books is the correct one. Yet the whole of §§ 1, 2 is merely a recapitulation of the contents of the first three chapters, and it is only as such that it has any meaning and connexion, as Spengel, *Ueber die Politik* p. 26 f., has incontrovertibly proved. The only sensible explanation is this: "After disposing of the necessary introductory questions regarding the best state, we must discuss this best state itself, and must treat first of its external and then

of its internal requirements." Thus the intermediate reference to other forms of government (whether the discussion of them has preceded or not) is out of place here and breaks the connexion. Therefore Spengel pronounced the words in question καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας...πρότερον to be an interpolation, and he was followed among others by Susemihl.\* But when Hildenbrand p. 363 f. and Teichmüller (*Philologus* XVI. p. 164 ff.) pronounced "the other forms of government" to refer rather to the other model polities or at least those which are claimed as such, which have been already criticised in the Second Book, as distinguished from the true Aristotelian model state, Spengel gave his adhesion to this view. Yet even if the reference back to these is less injurious to the proposed connexion, still it is an inadmissible interruption, and would have to be set aside as an interpolation by another hand, besides that for the reasons previously stated it is only the former explanation of them, as referring to all other states except the perfect state, which appears possible. But the case is entirely different, if cc. 2, 3 are the work of an interpolator, who must then also be the author of c. 4 § 1 as far as πρότερον. We need then only add this new piece of awkwardness to the rest of his sins, and we shall have after all to decide in favour of the latter interpretation, that the words do refer to B. II., since the interpolator has tacked his composition on to the first chapter, the first sentence of which is immediately connected with the end of Book III., so that, as we have already stated, *Introd.* p. 48, he either found or made a redaction, which contained the books in the right order. At any rate this is the simplest explanation; we should otherwise have to assume that these words had been afterwards interpolated into his interpolation by a third person, who must already have been acquainted with the order of the

\* In *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CI. 1870, p. 350.



35 τερον.] ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑπο- (IV)  
 θέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως.  
 § 2 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμ-  
 μέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ  
 39 εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ  
 § 3 οἷον περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ 2  
 1326 a τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντῃ καὶ ναυπηγῷ, δεῖ τὴν  
 ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδεῖαν οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν  
 αὕτη τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμε-  
 νον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ  
 5 τῷ νομοθέτῃ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδεύειν ἔχουσαν.  
 § 4 ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλήθος τῶν ἀν-  
 θρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ πόλους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ  
 τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, πόσῃν τε εἶναι καὶ πόλιν τινὰ ταύτην.  
 οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλείστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν 3  
 10 εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (749). If these words take up the sentence 1323 b 37 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν... 1324 a 4 παθόμενος, we should expect ἀρχὴ <δὲ> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 περὶ omitted by M<sup>s</sup>, [περὶ] Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 37 γενέσθαι Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *fore* William, γίνεσθαι? Susem. || 38 προϋποτεθεῖσθαι Sylburg Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *praesupponi* William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εὐχομένους, as Sylburg suggested

1326 a 3 αὐτῇ IP<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 4 κάλλιον] βέλτιον M<sup>s</sup> || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ> κατὰ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσῃν Sylburg, ὅσῃν II Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4 § 1, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention (see *nn.* 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ, a place immediately after the end of Book III. without the slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last unfinished sentence of B. III. to B. IV(VII).—as has been done—and then get rid of it with the rest of c. 1. of B. IV(VII). and at the same time treat the words τῶν λοιπῶν in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here: "Our beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c." SUSEM. (749) Cp. II. 1 § 2, 1260 b 36, ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἣ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως.

c. 4 §§ 2—14, cc. 5—7: περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. With this compare generally Plato *Latous* IV.

§ 2 38 χορηγίας] See *n.* on I. 6 § 3, 1255 a 14.

διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ κτλ] Cp. II. 6 § 7 *n.* (202): also II. 1 § 1, *n.* (128) and the references there collected. SUSEM. (750)

§ 3 40 ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ] The analogy was used I. 10 §§ 1, 2.

§ 4 Under the external means required for a city comes first the mass of the population: how many ought they to be? and of what natural character? So likewise in regard to the territory: how large and of what nature ought this to be?

The proper number of the inhabitants is discussed in §§ 4—14: their race and mental characteristics in c. 7.

The size of the ideal city: c. 4 §§ 4—14. 1326 a 10 ποία μεγάλη] With §§ 4—6 compare Pl. *Rep.* IV. 423 B: ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῇ σωφρόνως ὥς ἀρτι ἐτάχθη,

§ 5 ποία μικρὰ πόλις. κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρι- (IV)  
 νουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύνα-  
 μιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δύνα-  
 μένην τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην,  
 15 οἷον Ἴπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἱατρὸν εἶναι μεῖζω φήσει-  
 § 6 ἐν ἅν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ 4  
 μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας,  
 οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο οἰητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἴσως  
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν  
 20 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως καὶ  
 ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μερῶν· ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπε-  
 ροχὴ τοῦ πλῆθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημείον, ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάναν-  
 σοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, (p. 102)  
 ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν μεγάλην τε  
 § 7 πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν 5  
 26 ἔργων φανερόν ὅτι χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον εὐνομεῖσθαι

11 ποία added by Γ M<sup>a</sup> Ar., omitted by all other authorities and Bk. || 12 εἰς δὲ] ἀλλ' εἰς preferred by Thurot, but such variations should be noted without correction. The passage supports R. Schöll's conjecture at 1253 a 22, <οὐκ> ἔσται || 14 οἰητέον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [οἰητέον] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 18 ποιητέον Camerarius Bk<sup>2</sup>, ὀριστέον? Schmidt || ἴσως after 19 πόλεσιν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 20 εἰσὶ μέρος πόλεως apparently Γ, πόλεως εἰσὶ μέρος Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 21 μορίων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 25 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Π<sup>1</sup>, ἀλλὰ μὴν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε καὶ? Koraes

μεγάλη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκίμειν λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἡ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων (Eaton). Plato also criticizes the widespread belief that a state to be happy must be large and wealthy *Laos* 742 D ff., cp. 738 D, E. 11—13 Comp. *Isocr.* VII. 13. SUSEM. (751). Add VI. 81, XV. 171 f. (Newman).

§ 5 12 μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν] We should regard not so much their numbers as their efficiency: explained, in the next line, as power to execute the proper task, or function, of a city. (In § 10, a 38 it is rather "essence," cp. c. 1 § 12, 1323 b 33.) For the use of δὲ instead of the more usual ἀλλὰ, as in a 15 οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἱατρὸν, cp. Thuc. IV. 86. 1 οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει δέ.

15 Ἴπποκράτην] We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which

constitute the first and third books of the 'Epidemics,' the no less excellent little work 'On the influence of air, water and locality,' and perhaps 'On the origin and cure of diseases,' and the fragment 'On wounds in the head.' Still these are enough to prove the ability of the man, who is rightly called the Father of Medicine. SUSEM. (752)

§ 6 18 κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος] 'We must not estimate it by the mass of any and every sort of people.' Comp. c. 8 § 8 n. (804) and VIII(v). 3 § 11 ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλῆθους πόλις γίνεταί οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ n. (1531 b). SUSEM. (753)

20 ὅσοι μέρος... 21 μερῶν] 'but only count those who form an integral part of a city or the parts of which it properly consists': see cc. 8, 9. SUSEM. (754)

21 τούτων depends on πλῆθος.

23 ὀπλῖται] Of course the soldiers are here mentioned only to exemplify the organic members of the city generally. SUSEM. (755)

§ 7 26 χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον]



τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι (IV)  
καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὔσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλήθος.  
§ 8 τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὁ τε γὰρ  
30 νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν  
εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλον ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν  
τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε  
συνέχει τὸ πᾶν. ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει  
§ 9 εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς  
35 ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον, <ἐπεὶ τό γε  
<καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.> ἀλλ' ἐστὶ 6  
36 τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάν-  
§ 10 των, ζώων φυτῶν ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν  
μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύνα-  
μιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως ὅτε

29 τε omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, very likely by Γ, perhaps rightly, [τε] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 33 ἐπεὶ  
...34 γίνεσθαι transposed by Böcker to follow 35 ἀναγκαῖον. See p. 87. Schneider,  
who first saw the difficulty, proposed to transpose the whole clause or to bracket ἐν  
πλήθει καὶ || τό γε] δὲ τὸ and 34 [διὸ] Koraes || 34 πόλιν] πόλιν P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st  
hand) || ἥ Koraes, most likely right || 36 πόλεσι P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk., civitati Ar. || 38  
αὐτοῦ Γ P<sup>1-5</sup>, αὐτοῦ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2</sup>

Sparta and the small Cretan cities were the typical instances of εὐνομία: Syracuse, and to a less degree Athens, of the opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for its comparatively good government II. 11 §§ 1, 2. The most populous cities of the Hellenic world in the fourth century were the two already named. Syracuse may have had in its territory 800,000, the numbers given for Acragas Diog. Laert. VIII. 63, Holm *Gesch. des Siciliens* II. 402 (Diod. XIII. 84 makes the free population, exclusive of slaves, 200,000 at Acragas). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Tarentum came next. The glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybaris, Croton, and Acragas had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξις τις] And πολιτεία = τάξις τις ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, so that this vague notion of system or arrangement does not tell us much. Editors compare Pl. *Gorg.* 503 E ff. esp. 504 D ταῖς δὲ δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσι (δύναμις) νόμον τε καὶ νόμος.

32 θείας γὰρ...33 τὸ πᾶν] "for this is a task for divine power, such as holds this whole world together." And this although Aristotle makes the whole activity of the deity consist in pure thought, νοήσεως νόησις, thought thinking upon itself. For God is not only the highest and ultimate

formal and final cause, but also the highest and ultimate moving cause: see esp. *Meta.* XII. (A) 7 § 6, 1072 b 13 ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρα φύσεως ἡρτῆται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις; 8 § 19, 1074 b 3 παραδέδοται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅτι...περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ἄλην φύσιν. SUSEM. (756)

§ 9 34 ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ.] 'which has the definition here given,' i.e. εὐταξία, 'combined with a certain size,' ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν κτλ 'since beauty is usually found to depend on number and magnitude.'

Comp. *Poet.* 7 §§ 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὁ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ οὔτε ἀμικρον ἂν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῶον...οὔτε παμμέγεθες: *Meta.* XIII. (M) 3 § 11, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον: *Probl.* XIX. 38; XVII. 1; *Nic. Eth.* IV. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δὲ ἀστέιοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ: Ed. Müller *op. c.* II. pp. 84—107; Zeller II. ii. p. 765 f. SUSEM. (757)

Plato *Phileb.* 64 D, μετρίότης γὰρ καὶ ἐνυμετρία κάλλος δῆποτε.

§ 10 39 ἐστερημένον κτλ.] 'robbed of its true nature,' i.e. depraved, like the

40 δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἶον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται (IV)  
 πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίων, εἰς δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐλθὼν ὅτε  
 1326 b μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσῃ τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ  
 § 11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων  
 λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐταρκες), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν  
 ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ'  
 5 οὐ πόλις· πολιτεία γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γὰρ στρατη-  
 γὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, ἢ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ  
 Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ  
 τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλήθος αὐταρκες πρὸς τὸ ζῆν  
 εὖ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν  
 10 ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλήθος εἶναι [μεῖζω] πόλιν,  
 § 12 ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ  
 τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥάδιον. εἰς γὰρ αἱ  
 πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,  
 § 13 ἀρχοντος δ' ἐπιτάξεις καὶ κρίσεις ἔργον πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν (p. 103)  
 15 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ'

1326 b 3 ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐταρκες omitted by P<sup>1-5</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. || 4 μὲν after τοῖς P<sup>2-3-4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Bk. || αὐτάρκης, <αὐτάρκης δὲ> ὥσπερ ἔθνος or αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ <δὲ> ἔθνος Jackson, perhaps rightly || 5 πολιτεία] πολι P<sup>2-3</sup>, πολιτην S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 8 ζῆν after 9 εὖ P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 10 [μεῖζω] Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> Schmidt would transpose thus: μεῖζω ταύτης <καὶ>. Presumably μεῖζω is a variant or gloss upon ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλήθος

διεφθαρμένα of I. 5 § 5 (cp. I. 2 § 13 n. 28), 'or stunted,' in poor condition.

40 πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον] A boat a span long.

41 οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίων] nor yet a boat two furlongs long: comp. *Poet.* 7 § 9, 1451 a 2, οἶον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ἕξων.

§ 11 1326 b 2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* ix. 10 § 3, 1170 b 31: ἢ ἔστιν τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικὸν πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν (Eaton). SUSEM. (758)

3 αὐταρκες] See I. 2 § 12 n. (21), also n. (136), III. 1 § 12 (447), 9 § 14 (560), IV(VII). 5 § 1 (764), 8 § 8 (804). SUSEM. (759)

4 αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις] See n. (11) and II. 2 § 3 n. (132). SUSEM. (760)

5 οὐ ῥάδιον] The larger the city or canton-state becomes, the more difficult is the working of the constitution. Babylon, like all Peloponnesus (II. 6 § 6, III.

3 § 5), has passed the limits within which civic unity is possible. Such an overgrown city or canton-state must be treated as an ἔθνος: or possibly that is what he contemplates in III. 14 § 1 (πόλις καὶ χώρα). The problem which to Aristotle seemed almost insoluble was solved by events, as the federal system became developed; the Achaean league, an ἔθνος, included for a while all Peloponnesus in political unity, Polyb. II. 37. 11.

7 πρῶτην] primitive, earliest as b 8 πρῶτον. The term is applied to οἰκία, κώμη I. 2 § 5. So in the definition *De Anima* II. 1 § 6, 412 b 5, πρῶτη ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὁργανικοῦ.

§ 12 14 ἐπιτάξεις καὶ κρίσεις] Cp. VI(IV). 15 § 4, μάλιστα δ' ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας ὅσας ἀποδέδοται βουλευσασθαι τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτατον ἐστίν, n. (1349 b). SUSEM. (761) Similarly Pl. *Politicus* 260 n, συμπασης τῆς γνωστικῆς τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικόν.



ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποιοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς (IV)  
πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, φαύλως  
ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις.  
19 περὶ ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν  
§ 14 τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερώς. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις s  
καὶ μετοίκους ῥάδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας· οὐ γὰρ  
χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆ-  
λον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἢ μεγίστη τοῦ  
πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος.  
5 περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-  
26 τον· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ V  
μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινὰ, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς  
τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν· (τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παν-  
τοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς  
30 αὐταρκες)· πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι  
τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σω-

20 πολυανθρωπία τῇ] πολυανθρώπων Susem.<sup>1</sup>, quae valde multorum hominum William  
|| 23 [πόλεως] Spengel, ὅρος <τῆς μεγίστης> Schneider, both unnecessarily || 24 ἦτοι  
εὐβοήθητος P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>4</sup>) and P<sup>3</sup> (a later hand), a gloss from 1327 a 3 || 26 τὰ omitted  
by P<sup>4.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 27 τινὰ <δεῖ> Spengel, τινὰ <δεῖ εἶναι τὴν χώραν> Scaliger, but  
πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν should be understood from what follows || πᾶς] πᾶν Bk.<sup>2</sup> by  
a misprint

§ 13 17 ὡς ὅπου... 18 κρίσεις] τοῦτο =  
τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους. A genuine Athenian  
sentiment; not only does Plato's judg-  
ment agree with this (*Latus* v. 738 E, ὅπως  
ἂν φιλοφρονῶνται ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ  
γνωρίζουσιν, οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθόν, ἢ  
γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ  
φύσιν ἀλλήλους ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις  
ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὐτ' ἂν τιμῆς τῆς ἀξίας οὐτ'  
ἀρχῶν οὐτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσήκουσας  
ὁρθῶς τυγχάνοι), but Thucydides also re-  
marks, VIII. 66 § 3, that during the reign  
of terror under the Four Hundred people  
were afraid to communicate their sus-  
picions to one another διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς  
πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν (Eaton).  
SUSEM. (762)

19 οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν] "it is  
not fair to pronounce off-hand." Know-  
ing the ground of his objection to over-  
populous cities, we can argue (as in a  
similar case previously, see on III. 5 § 5)  
that his own principles require him to  
withdraw it where increased facilities of  
communication have enabled men to sur-  
mount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἢ μεγίστη... 24 εὐσύνοπτος]

"the largest excess of population which  
will promote independence of life and  
yet can be taken in at one view." This  
closely corresponds with the decision pro-  
nounced by Aristotle as to the proper  
length of a poem, and the size of a work  
of art generally, *Poet.* c. 7 § 10, 1451 a  
3 ff. 23 § 5, 1459 a 30 ff. 24 § 5, 1459 b  
18. *Comp. Rhet.* III. 9 § 6, 1409 b  
17 ff. (Eaton). Also c. 5 § 3 below with  
n. (768). SUSEM. (763)

c. 5 deals with the territory. *It should  
be sufficient for the support of the inhabit-  
ants without external supplies*, §§ 1, 2;  
*compact and easily defensible*, § 3; and  
*with direct access to the sea*, § 4.

§ 1 30 αὐταρκες] 'Independence'  
implies that the soil produces all the  
necessaries of life. See 1. 2 § 12 n. (21),  
and the references in n. (759). SUSEM.  
(764)

πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει] 'in extent and  
magnitude'; muchness and greatness are  
here nearly synonymous.

31 ζῆν σχολάζοντας] Cp. χώρας δεήσει  
τοῖς τοσοῦτοις ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ θρέψονται, II.  
6 § 6 n. (201): δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ

- § 2 φρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγο- (V)  
 μεν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτή-  
 σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνει ποιεῖσθαι  
 35 μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν  
 αὐτήν· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφι-  
 σβητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἔλκοντας ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-  
 βολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν.  
 § 3 τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δ' ἔνια 2  
 40 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρῆ  
 μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον.  
 1327 a ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔφαμεν εὐσύνο-  
 πτον εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον  
 τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν.  
 τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρῆ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν, πρὸς τε  
 5 τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. (p. 104)  
 § 4 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοι-  
 νὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἀπάντων) ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν

32 τοῦτο L<sup>3</sup> Ar. Ald. || τὸν ὅρον omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. (supplied by corr.<sup>3</sup> in P<sup>2</sup>) ||  
 38 τὴν before γλισχρότητα omitted by P<sup>1,3</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> || 41 μὲν τοῖς τοῖς μὲν ? Susem. (cp.  
 v. l. 1326 b 4)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν after εὐσύνοπτον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. || 6 μὲν <οδ> Schneider

σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολά-  
 ζωμεν, Nic. Eth. X. 7. 6.

Ἀλευθέρως ἄμα καὶ σωφρόνως] "at  
 once with liberality and temperance":  
 cp. II. 6 § 8 n. (206), § 9 n. (206 b, 207);  
 also II. 7 § 7 n. (237 b), and VI(IV). 11  
 §§ 3, 4 n. (1290 b). SUSEM. (765)

§ 2 33 ὕστερον] An unfulfilled pro-  
 mise; there is no such treatment o  
 political economy. See *Introd.* p. 49  
 n. (4), 53 n. (6). SUSEM. (766)

36 ἀμφισβητήσεις] 'For there are  
 many controversies on this subject; be-  
 cause of those who urge us to one or the  
 other extreme in life, to parsimony on the  
 one hand and to luxury on the other.'  
 Presumably written works are intended.

37 ὑπερβολήν] excess, extreme, as in  
 c. I § 5, 1323 a 38, VI(IV). 11 § 10 τὰς  
 ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς. Cp. c. I § 7, 1323 b  
 11, II. 9 § 24 (ἡ δόξα ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ  
 σκληρόν) and N. E. IV. I § 39, 1121 b 27  
 (ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ  
 μηδὲν ἀνδοῦναι).

§ 3 41 τοῖς πολεμίοις...εὐέξοδον] 'a  
 difficult country for the enemy to invade,  
 but easy for the citizens to quit.' Comp.  
 c. II § 3 n. (848). SUSEM. (767)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι]  
 See c. 4 § 14 n. (763). SUSEM. (768)

"We say of the territory, as we said of  
 the population, that it should be such as  
 can be taken in at one view; meaning  
 thereby that reinforcements can easily be  
 marched for the defence of every part  
 of it."

4 κατ' εὐχὴν] 'If we are to fix upon  
 an ideal site': comp. n. (128): 'a position  
 favourable for access to the sea and for  
 communications by land is imperative.'  
 SUSEM. (769)

§ 4 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος] "One  
 defining principle," see n. on III. 9 § 1  
 "is that just mentioned": τὸ εὐβοήθητον  
 εἶναι: "the city must be equally in com-  
 munication with all parts of the country  
 for defensive purposes." This is ex-  
 panded c. 6 § 3, a 21—23. κοινὴν εἶναι =  
 facilem aditum habere ad omnes locos  
 Bonitz *Ind. Ar. s. v.*

7 ὁ δὲ λοιπός] "And the other is that  
 it should be easy of access (τὸ εὐπαρα-  
 κόμιστον εἶναι τὴν χώραν) for the convey-  
 ance of the produce of the soil as well as  
 of material like timber, or any other  
 similar material in which the country may



γινομένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα (V)  
 ὕλης, καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνοι  
 6 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην εὐπαρακόμιστον. περὶ δὲ τῆς  
 11 πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ὠφέλιμος ταῖς 3  
 εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν  
 ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενουῖσθαί τινας ἐν ἄλ-  
 λοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορόν φασιν εἶναι πρὸς  
 15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ  
 ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους  
 ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεῦσθαι  
 § 2 καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ 4  
 πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν  
 20 τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας <καὶ> τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδελον.  
 § 3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾶον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους  
 εἶναι δεῖ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν

8 The punctuation (a comma after παραπομπάς instead of a period, and no comma after 10 τοιαύτην) Jackson followed by Welldon || 9 τυγχάνει P<sup>1</sup>, τυγχάνει P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> || 10 τοιαύτην before κεκτημένη M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, before ἢ χώρα Γ || [περὶ...1327 b 18 τοῦτον] Broughton: see Comm. || 12 πολλοὶ Camerarius and possibly M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand): for

M<sup>a</sup> has πο<sup>λλ</sup>, i.e. πολλὰ or πολλοί, and P<sup>1</sup> has πο<sup>λλ</sup> (with a written very small and apparently an erasure after it), πολλὰ Γ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (corr.) and perhaps M<sup>a</sup> || 14 εἶναι φασι Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 17 ὑπ' ἐναντίαν M<sup>a</sup>, ὑπεναντίον P<sup>2</sup> C<sup>o</sup> || 20 τὴν πόλιν omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> || τῆς χώρας <καὶ> Bojesen (see c. 5 § 3, c. 11 § 1), τὴν χώραν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 21 πολέμους Sylburg, πολεμούς Γ Π Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

trade" (Welldon). κεκτηῖσθαι ἐργασίαν τι-  
 νος = to have acquired a trade in any  
 staple commodity.

c. 6 *The advantage and disadvantage  
 of proximity to the sea.*

Comp. A. Lang *Introductory Essays*  
 p. 71. Broughton maintains that c. 6 is  
 not by Aristotle, but is wholly the work  
 of some Peripatetic, which Apellikon or  
 Andronikos first inserted in this place.  
 Comp. n. (790), and on the other side  
 nn. (881, 932). SUSEM.

§ 1 12 πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισ-  
 βητοῦντες] See Plato *Laus* iv. 705 A,  
 706 ff.; cp. XII. 950. But in Aristotle's  
 account of the opinions held by represen-  
 tatives of this view there are some things  
 not to be found in Plato: accordingly it  
 would seem that he has other writers also  
 in view. At a later time Cicero 'is  
 wholly in agreement' with such opinions,  
*De Repub.* II. c. 3 f. 'Aristotle looks at  
 the question more impartially' (Oncken)

and really goes as far as it was possible  
 for him to go with his narrow theories  
 upon Political Economy. But of course  
 even he was greatly hampered by them.  
 See nn. (772, 774). SUSEM. (770)

13-18. Objections: (1) the con-  
 tinued residence of aliens brought up  
 under alien laws, and (2) the populousness  
 of seaport-towns, are prejudicial to good  
 government. See *Laus* iv. 704 D.

15 καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν sc. ἀσύμ-  
 φορόν εἶναι. γίνεσθαι] sc. τὴν πολυαν-  
 θρωπίαν. A large population is the result  
 of their traffic by sea. The participles  
 are accus. as subjects of χρῆσθαι.

§ 2 18 εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει] apart  
 from these results.

20 "that the city should communi-  
 cate both with the land and the sea."  
 This sense seems certain from 25 ἀμφο-  
 τέρων μετέχουσιν.

§ 3 21 φέρειν] To resist, bear the  
 brunt of an attack.

καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμέ- (V)  
 24 νους, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄμφω δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρ-  
 § 4 ξει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ  
 παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα  
 τῶν γινομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. αὐτῇ  
 γὰρ ἐμπορικῇν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.  
 οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου  
 30 χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης  
 μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ' ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοιοῦτον.  
 § 5 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρώμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχον<τα> καὶ χώραις καὶ  
 πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυνῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν  
 πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστὶ μήτε πόρρω λίαν,  
 35 ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,  
 φανερόν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς  
 κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ (p. 105)

24 ἀλλ' εἰ Π<sup>3</sup>, ἀλλά γε Schneider || 30 ἦν P<sup>2-3-4</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. and apparently Ar. ||  
 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar., ἐπεὶ δὲ Götting || ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Welldon, ὑπάρχοντα  
 Congreve Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, ὑπάρχον καὶ Γ Π Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ὑπάρχειν καὶ Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 34 νέμειν  
 αὐτὸ τὸ Γ Ar. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, αὐτὸ τὸ after a lacuna P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand), τὸ αὐτὸ (αὐτὸν P<sup>4</sup>)  
 νέμειν other authorities and P<sup>5</sup> (later hand). Either may be correct. Cp. Busse  
 p. 38.

23 καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι] Cp. c. 11  
 § 11 n. (855). SUSEM. (771) Also II. 6  
 § 8.

24 κατὰ θάτερον] 'in one of the two  
 ways, if both are at their command.'  
 (μετέχουσιν dative plur. of the participle.)

§ 4 27 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν] Partitive  
 genitive: 'is one amongst necessary  
 conditions': so II. 11 § 10, 1273 a 33.  
 This periphrasis enables Aristotle to avoid  
 the hiatus of ἐκπέμψασθαι ἀναγκαῖον.

αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικῇν κτλ] 'For it  
 ought to carry on trade in its own interests  
 exclusively and not for the advantage of  
 others.' This dictum strikes at the root  
 of free-trade legislation (Eaton). SUSEM.  
 (772)

Thirty years ago our other English  
 commentator Congreve uncompromisingly  
 denounced this dictum: "Any theory  
 like this of Aristotle's—such as the mer-  
 cantile and protective system of later  
 times,—which aims at exclusiveness, is to  
 be condemned as a direct attack on the  
 real interests of mankind." Even now  
 how large a part of civilized mankind is  
 in Aristotle's position and fails to discern  
 its real interests in this matter.

H.

29 πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν] 'a universal mart.'  
 This exactly describes the situation of  
 Athens as the sole mart e.g. of corn from  
 the Black Sea. Cp. Xen. *De Vect.* 3.

31 οὐδ' ἐμπόριον] The ideal city is not  
 itself to be such a place of trade, nor is  
 it to have a commercial seaport of this  
 kind.

§ 5 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ... 33 ἐπίνεια] "This was  
 the situation of Peiraeus, Cenchreae,  
 Lechaion, Notion (cp. VIII(v). 3 § 15 n.  
 1541), Nisaea, Pegae, Patrae, Argos"  
 (Eaton). SUSEM. (773)

35 τείχεσι] As the long walls con-  
 necting Peiraeus with Athens, Lechaion  
 with Corinth, and Nisaea with Megara.

37 εἰ δέ τι βλαβερὸν] "while any  
 harm they may cause it is easy to guard  
 against by prescribing and defining in the  
 laws who are, and who are not, to enjoy  
 mutual intercourse." Here then even  
 Aristotle adopts the principles of Plato's  
 policy in regard to the treatment of  
 foreigners, *Latos* XII 950 ff., esp. 952 D-  
 953 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (774) Plato  
 would exercise a strict surveillance on all  
 who enter or leave the country: comp. n.  
 (373) on the Spartan *ξενηλασίαι*.



τι βλαβερόν, φυλάσασθαι ῥάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας (V)  
 39 καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς  
 § 6 ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν  
 βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ  
 1327 b μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίων τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροῦς  
 εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ  
 § 7 θάλατταν)· περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως  
 ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ  
 5 ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύ-  
 τὴν τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον.  
 τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γινομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν  
 ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ  
 § 8 αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατι-  
 10 κὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζεούντων ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ  
 κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας· πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων  
 καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν,  
 οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι  
 15 τριῆρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

1327 b 1 αὐτοῖς M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2-2-4</sup> Ald. || πλησίων P<sup>2-4</sup> || καὶ φοβεροῦς εἶναι transposed to follow 2 βοηθεῖν by Camerarius and Lambin, perhaps rightly || 5 πολεμικὸν Schneider (in the translation) Bk.<sup>2</sup>, <μὴ μόνον> πολιτικὸν ? Schneider, which may also be right. His proposal to bracket καὶ πολιτικὸν is not commendable || 8 ἄρχειν ? Schlosser (wrongly) || οὐθὲν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., οὐδὲ Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 9 μέρος omitted by L<sup>a</sup> C<sup>a</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> || 13 καὶ added after δὲ by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 14 ἡρακλεωτῶν P<sup>4-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 15 ἐνδεεστέραν Sepulveda, and Γ apparently had κεκτισμένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει ἑτέρων ἐνδεεστέρας (*aedificata civitate magnitudine aliis contractiore*)

§ 6 A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote c. 79.

§ 7 1327 b 4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ...βίον] "For if the city is to have a career of supremacy." One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: 14 § 21. Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state: a warlike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however *n.* (917) and *Introd.* p. 55. SUSEM. (775)

5 πολιτικόν] Schneider well remarks:

quasi reliquae civitates πολιτικὸν βίον non colant. Conservative critics defend the word as meaning "a true political life" by reference to II. 6 § 7, IV(VII). 2 § 3.

§ 8 9 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν κτλ] "For only the marines are free men and form part of the land army; and it is they who are supreme (on board ship) and control the crew."

10 καὶ τῶν πεζεούντων] At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. *n.* 1519). Thuc. III. 98 § 4, VIII. 24 § 2; but generally (*n.* 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. VI. 43 (Eaton). Cp. Boeckh *Staatsk.* I<sup>2</sup>. 583 f., I<sup>2</sup> 649 f. p. 500 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (776)

14 τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν] Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the

§ 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων καὶ (V)  
θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διωρισμένα  
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν VI  
7 ὄρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δὲ τινὰ τὴν  
20 φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὲ κατανοήσειεν ἂν  
τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπὶ τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας  
τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διεῖλη-

16 καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων Susem., καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων Γ II Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>  
Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> in the text, καὶ πόλεως λιμένων Welldon wrongly, καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεως  
Congreve. In place of πόλεων Koraes conjectured ἐπιτελών, Schmidt ἐμπορίων,  
Broughton περιπολίων, Jowett πλοίων. Conring followed by Bk.<sup>2</sup> bracketed καὶ πόλεων  
|| 17 διωρισμένον L<sup>a</sup> P<sup>5-6</sup> Ald. Bk.<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), διορισμένον P<sup>4</sup>, διωρισμένους S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> ||  
21 τὰς πόλεις omitted by P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup>

Herakleiot, *Anab.* v. 6 § 10 (Giphanius). He also calls Herakleia in Pontus a colony from Megara, settled in the land of the Mariandynians (*Anab.* v. 10 § 1). We know from other sources that there were also Boeotians (from Tanagra) along with the Megarian colonists, and that the colony was founded about 550. Strabo xii. 549 is wrong in designating it a Milesian settlement. The colonists had converted the Mariandynians whom they had conquered into subjects or vassals, in virtue of a compact similar to that made by the Thessalians with the Penestae (cp. n. 280) and by the Spartans with the Helots, containing a special proviso that they should not be sold out of the country. Indeed the Herakleiot did not call them their property or their slaves, but their spear-bearers (δορυφόροι). See Posidonius *Frag.* 16 in Ath. vi. 263 c, Strab. xii. 542, Plato *Laus* vi 776 D (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. *Oecon.* ii. 9 § 1, 1347 b 3 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (777)

15 τῷ μεγέθει ... ἐμμελεστέραν] "A city of but moderate size, as compared with others." We do not anywhere else find an accurate statement as to the probable size of Herakleia; but extracts from the work of its native historian Memnon in Photius give us information as to its power and history (J. G. Schneider). See Müller's edition, *Fragm. hist. Gr.* iii. p. 525 ff. There are notices of the early internal history of Herakleia viii (v). 5 § 3 n. (1555); 6 § 3 (1569), § 7 (1575), § 15 (1582). SUSEM. (778)  
Comp. also Grote, c. 98, vol. xii. p. 622 ff.

18 περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους...

19 πρότερον] "As to the strength of the citizen body, and what limit should be set to it, we spoke above (c. 4 §§ 4—14)."

c. 7 The natural characteristics of the citizens: they should be of Greek race, uniting intelligence with a spirited temper, §§ 1—4. Criticism of Plato: §§ 5—8.

§ 1 22 διεῖληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν] divided amongst different races. So διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας vi (iv). 11 § 13, 1296 a 11; εἰς διαφορὰς *De Part. Animal.* i. 3 § 3, 642 b 30; διαριθμῆσθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἶδη *Rhet.* i. 4 § 4, 1359 b 3.

§§ 2, 3 Compare the remark made by Plato *Rep.* iv. 435 E, that among the Thracians, Scythians and other northern nations courage predominates; among the Phoenicians and Egyptians love of gain; among the Greeks reason. Hippocrates in his work *de aëre, aquis, locis* alluded to above in n. (752), p. 547 ff. Kühn, compares in detail the natural differences between Europeans and Asiatics, and describes the happy mean of the Greeks. Herod. ix. 122 makes Cyrus say that fertile countries make effeminate people, since the same soil is not capable of producing rare fruits and warlike men; and in iii. 106, he says that Hellas enjoys by far the best climate. Plato *Tim.* 24 c commends in particular the happy blending of the seasons in Attica, and the combination of warlike excellence and love of knowledge resulting from this influence. In the Aristotelian *Problems* xiv. 8, 16, there is a discussion of the question why the inhabitants of warm countries are as a rule cowardly, and those of cold countries brave (Eaton). Cp. also n. (641). SUSEM. (781)



§ 2 πται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη (VI)  
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοίας  
25 δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ  
μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνά-  
μενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ  
τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα (p. 206)  
§ 3 διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ  
30 τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμον καὶ  
διανοητικὸν ἐστίν· διόπερ ἐλευθέρων τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλ-  
τιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς  
§ 4 τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ 2

24 [καὶ] τὰ Spengel Susem.<sup>2</sup> Or better καὶ [τὰ] with explicative sense? Cp. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 357 b 13 ff., Vahlen *Zeit. zu Poet.* II. p. 88. || 28 μὲν inserted after ἀρχόμενα by II<sup>1</sup> || 31 μάλιστα Γ (apparently) Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] "The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe." J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnesus and Thrace (Hom. *Hymn to Apollo* 251). Not only is this interpretation in itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. 10 § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be epexegetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe." SUSEM. (779)

26 ἀπολίτευτα] Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φύσει ἄρχων Aristotle considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φύσει ἀρχόμενος.

28 διόπερ ἀρχόμενα... 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). SUSEM. (780)

§ 3 30 ἐνθυμον] spirited, courageous.

31 διόπερ ἐλευθέρων... 33 πολιτείας] "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been" [lit. continues to be] "free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government." Herod. IX. 2 makes the Thebans say to Mardonios that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the

whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρόν Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, ὅπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτά ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις (Eaton). See further *Introd.* p. 46. SUSEM. (782)

This is the passage on which Oncken I. 18 ff. II. p. 273 relies for his interpretation of Aristotle's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish ὁμόνοια (*Panegyric, De Pace, Philippus*, cp. *Ep.* 3). According to Oncken the μία πολιτεία was already realized *de facto* in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demosthenes) περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν. But that the arrangement of 336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (συνμαχία βοηθείας χάριν) and not a πολιτεία (II. 2 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedon having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms συνθήκαι and κοινὴ εἰρήνη themselves (cp. *Rhet.* II. 23 § 18, 1399 b 12 ὅτι τὸ δίδοναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν [ἐστίν], καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotus, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotle had in mind,

τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει (VI)  
 35 τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκρται πρὸς ἀμφο-  
 τέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ δια-  
 νοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδείς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας  
 § 5 εὐαγῶγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ  
 φασὶ τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικούς μὲν  
 40 εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός  
 ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

34 καὶ inserted by M<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 35 τε omitted by II<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> Spengel approves the omission unless καὶ be inserted after τε || 38 τῶν νομοθέτην P<sup>4</sup>, τῶν νομοθετῶν I<sup>1</sup> apparently

under which he thought united Hellas could rule the world? The answer expected is either (1) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (Bundesstaat). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by 'constitution' Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchically and 'despotically' governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of βασιλεία they may be said to have a constitution. But the very words in which this variety is described (see *n.* on III. 12 § 8) exclude its application to the Greeks: it is *because* Asiatics are of more servile temper than Europeans, and barbarians generally than Greeks, that they quietly endure the yoke, III. 14 §§ 6, 7. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theoretically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (III. 13 §§ 13, 14, 24, 25; 14 § 1, § 15; 17 §§ 5—8) has a counterpart in an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedon (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the Congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes: see VI(IV). 11 § 18 f., and *Frag.* 81, 1489 b 26, Plutarch *De Alexandri virtute* 1 c. 6 ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμονικῶς τοῖς δὲ βαρβάρους δεσποτικῶς χρώμενος. To us Chaeronea, or Crannon, may mark the

end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks—whether they sided with Demosthenes or with Phocion.

§ 4 34 The Dorian, Ionian, Thesalian, Arcadian, Acarnanian, Aetolian ἔθνη, occur as examples of Greek tribal populations.

35 μονόκωλον] one-sided. The Aetolians approximated to the hardy peoples of the north: the Asiatic Ionians to the softer Asiatics.

§ 5 38 ὅπερ γὰρ φασὶ τινες] Plato in *Repub.* II. 375 c ff. *Comp. n.* (1006) on V(VIII). 4 § 2. SUSEM. (783)

39 τοῖς φύλαξι] See *n.* (140) on II. 3 § 5. SUSEM. (784)

φιλητικούς] The word itself is not used by Plato, but in substance his meaning is not essentially different (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκέλους πράους αὐτοὺς εἶναι), so that it is difficult to see why Schneider should believe that Aristotle does him injustice. See however *n.* (789). SUSEM. (786)

40 ὁ θυμός ἐστιν... φιλοῦμεν] 'It is passion or temper which makes us friendly; for that is the faculty of soul with which we love.' The logic reads faulty in the translation because we can scarcely render by the same word θυμός=courage, θυμός=affection, although we too speak of the heart as the seat of both. See *n.* (641) on III. 16 § 5. *Comp. Topics* II. 7 § 6, 113 a 35 ff., οὐκ εἰ τὸ μῖσος ἐπισθαι ὀργὴν ἐφήσεν, εἴη ἂν τὸ μῖσος ἐν τῷ θυμο-εἰδεῖ· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, and *Top.* IV. 5 §§ 5, 6, 126 a 8 ff.: ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμο-εἰδεῖ, καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, where fear and anger are hypothetically assigned to 'spirit', but love (φίλια) to the ἐπιθυμητικόν or impulsive principle of the soul (J. G.



1328 a δύναμις ἣ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις 3  
καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἵρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας,  
§ 6 ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσσηκόντως τοῖς  
φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·

5 σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχει.

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης  
§ 7 ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμὸς. οὐ  
καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας·  
πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρή τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι

1328 a 5 σὺ Bergk, following Schneider, οὐ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || δεῖ  
M\*, untranslated by William || παρὰ Γ P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bergk, περὶ with all other authorities  
Bk. || ἀπάγχει P<sup>1</sup>, ἀπέγχει M\* and apparently Γ (a lanceis perforationes William),  
ἀπάγχεο P<sup>2,3,6</sup> L\* Ald. Bk. Bergk, ἀπάγχετο P<sup>4</sup>, ἀπήγχεο P<sup>5</sup>, ἀτέγχεο S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and  
perhaps Ar. (lanceis transfixus es)

Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. "Theognis, too, 109 ff., ascribes love and hatred to 'spirit' or θυμός" (Camerarius). Further comp. *nn.* (790, 182, 839, 935). SUSEM. (786)

41 αὐτῇ] Not τοῦτο, see c. 1 § 8 n.

1328 a 1 πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις]  
Eaton compares *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379  
b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις [ὀργίζονται] μᾶλλον ἢ  
τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· ὁνοῦνται γὰρ προσήκειν μάλ-  
λον πάσχειν εὐ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ. SUSEM.  
(787)

2 αἵρεται] rises viz. in indignation.

§ 6 3 Ἀρχίλοχος] *Frag.* 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the νόμος belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see n. 17 to my edition of the *Poetics*). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choruses; there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the ἰὼ Βάκχε attributed to him (*Frag.* 120), but none as to the hymn to Herakles (*Frag.* 119). Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paeans cannot be certainly inferred from *Frag.* 76, 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre into poetry and into vocal music con-

structed according to the rules of art, and he supplied it with a series of strophes composed of short dactylic iambic and trochaic verses, and of verses in which dactyls or anapaests and trochees or iambs were combined. See Westphal *Greek Metric* II. p. 350 ff., 443, 450, 457, 479 f., 498, 563 ff. The fragment of verse here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter without the opening dipody, and it belonged to a poem composed throughout of such tetrameters, as we see from another longer fragment (*Frag.* 66). On Archilochus, see Bernhardt *History of Greek literature* II. p. 486. SUSEM. (788)

§ 7 7 οὐ καλῶς κτλ] Here clearly Aristotle is taking Plato's statements much too literally, and in a much cruder and stricter sense than they are meant. SUSEM. (789)

9 οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι κτλ] Plato also *Rep.* IV. 440 c designates indignation at injuries received as a main element of θυμός, and indeed, as already noticed in n. (641), he refers ambition to θυμός. But Aristotle also mentions *Poet. Anal.* II. 12 § 22, 97 b 15 ff. as one of the chief characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχοι, that they will not brook insult. On the other hand *Nic. Eth.* IV. 3 § 30, 1125 a 31 ff. that they are not revengeful, but know how to forgive and forget (Eaton). It is not easy however to reconcile what is here stated with the description given there § 24, 1124 b 9 ff., according to which the high-minded man is ready to confer benefits, but is ashamed of receiving them, and always requites services done

- 10 τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλ- (VI)  
 λον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πᾶσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,  
 § 8 ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ' ὅ-  
 οἷς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς  
 τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται  
 15 καὶ χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν  
 16 οἱ τοι πέραν στέρξαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ πέραν  
 μισοῦσιν.  
 § 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν  
 18 δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσῃν  
 τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισταί· σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν (p. 107)  
 20 αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γνω-  
 8 μένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως)· ἐπεὶ δὲ ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν VII

13 δεῖν] δεῖ M<sup>1</sup>, δὲ apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup>), δὴ? Koraes, William leaves it untranslated, [δεῖν] Schneider Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || τιν' ? Koraes || ὑπολαμβάνουσι] νομίζουσι M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and very likely Γ || 14 τῇ βλάβει P<sup>4</sup>, τι βλάβει P<sup>6</sup>, τῇ βλάβει P<sup>6</sup> || 15 πόλεμοι (πολέμοι Γ) γὰρ II<sup>1</sup> Plutarch *de frat. am.* p. 480 D, γὰρ πόλεμοι II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. || 16 πέραν—πέρα II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 18 ὁπόσῃν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 21 τῶν ἄλλων omitted by P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, supplied in the margin)

him by greater services in return, so that he may not be under obligation to others, but rather others to him (Broughton). Cp. also *n.* (878). SUSEM. (790)

§ 8 'And this is a result to be expected; for they imagine themselves to be robbed as well as slighted by those from whom they believe a kindness ought to be due to them.' ἀποστερεῖσθαι (ὑπ' ἐκείνων) παρ' οἷς—by those *in whose case* there ought to be an obligation to a service to themselves.

"Cp. *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2 ff. (Eaton, Congreve)." SUSEM. (791)

14 ὅθεν εἴρηται] This is a line of Euripides, from what play is not known, *Frag.* 965 (Nauck). SUSEM. (792)

16 οἱ τοι πέραν κτλ] We know neither the author nor the play from which this is quoted (*Frag. adesp.* 53 Nauck) SUSEM. (793)

§ 9 19 οὐ γὰρ... 21 αἰσθήσεως] Comp. c. 12 § 9 *n.* (868). SUSEM. (794)

Also *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 §§ 18, 19, 1098 a 26 ff. and *De Anima* I. 1 ad init. 422 a 2, with Wallace's note on ἀκρίβεια. Also I. 5 § 1, 1254 a 20, IV(VII). I § 6, 1323 a 39 with *nn.*

cc. 8—12 contain the social conditions of the best city, which differ but slightly from those laid down by Plato (more

especially in the *Laws* B. v., vi.) and would command the assent of most reflecting Greeks as at least theoretically desirable.

c. 8. *Distinction of the citizens proper, who are an essential part of the city, from the rest of the population, which is but an indispensable adjunct.*

This idea is already familiar to the reader of B. III. c. 5, c. 13 § 13: see *n.* on 1284 a 9.

§ 1 21 ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων] Thus for instance the things without which happiness cannot exist are not all parts of happiness, *Eudem. Eth.* I. 2 §§ 2—5, 1214 b 11—27 (Eaton). Some of these (ὧν ἀνευ οὐκ) are only secondary causes, as Plato already called them (*Ast. Lex. Plat.* s. v. συναίτιος), or necessary conditions (Camerarius). Cp. *Metaph.* v. (Δ) § 1, 1015 a 20: "necessary (or indispensable) is that without which as secondary cause life is impossible" (Eaton). See Zeller II. ii, p. 331 *n.* (1). Cp. *n.* (907) and *n.* (504) on III. 5 § 2. SUSEM. (795)

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων] Natural wholes made up of organic parts, as in I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29, with which πόλις was ranked III. I. 2, 1274 b 39 *n.* (434). They are frequently mentioned in the zoological treatises.



κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μέρη τῆς ὅλης συ- (VII)  
στάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πό-  
24 λεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν  
— <οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος  
<εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν> — οὐδ'  
§ 2 ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι τὸ γένος. ἐν γάρ

22 ταυτὰ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτά Bk.<sup>1</sup>, ταῦτ' P<sup>4</sup>, πάντα ? Wyse || 25 ἐξ ἧς P<sup>2</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps  
P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), since in that ms. ἐξ ἧς is over an erasure, [ἐξ] ἧς and τέλος for γένος  
? Postgate || [τὸ] γένος ? Koraes

22 μέρη.] Also μέρη (μάλιστα ὄντα  
1329 a 4 f., cp. 1291 b 8): the technical  
terms for 'full members,' constituent  
parts and not mere adjuncts of the or-  
ganic whole. See the good instances  
c. 4 § 6, 1326 a 20 f.; VI(IV). 4. 14,  
1291 a 24. In contrast to them the ad-  
juncts are (1) necessary appendages, ὅσα  
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, (2) *sine*  
*quibus non*, ὧν ἄνευ πόλεις οὐ συνίσταται,  
(3) requirements, ὧν δεῖ, or even (4) τὰ  
ἐνπάρχοντα e.g. τροφή, χώρα. Note that  
both μέρος and μέρος are also used as  
non-technical terms, for the adjuncts.  
So μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as  
here) of full membership, 1329 a 35:  
sometimes again of the entire population,  
1279 a 32. The relation between consti-  
tuent parts and necessary conditions is  
explained III. 12. 8 f., 1283 a 15—22 and  
IV(VII). 6. 7, 1327 b 9: the ναυτικός  
ὄχλος is no part of Aristotle's city. There  
can be no city of brutes or of slaves.

συστάσεως.] A term with various  
meanings: (1) the putting together =  
construction, (2) the thing so constructed  
δ συνίσταται, thus duplicating τὰ κατὰ  
φύσιν συνεστ., cp. 1329 a 35. It is  
largely used in the biological works for  
'structure' or 'organism': so also VI(IV).  
11. 8, 1295 b 28. On the latent analogy  
between organism and state, implied in  
this term and in ἐργα = functions, but  
drawn out at length VI(IV). c. 4 §§ 8, 9,  
see A. C. Bradley *op. cit.* p. 203 ff.

The view of *De Partibus Animal.* 1. 5  
§§ 12—16, 645 b 14—20, is that every  
part (μέριον) of the body, like an instru-  
ment (ὄργανον), is for an end: this end is  
a function (πρᾶξις τις). The parts are  
nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, more  
or less specific, γένεσις, ἀφῆσις, ὕπνος,  
πορεία, κτλ.

The transposition of the clause 27 οἷον  
εἴτε τροφή... 28 ἐστίν appears inevitable,  
because 'food' and a 'quantum of terri-  
tory' would otherwise be adduced as

instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, for  
which purpose they are clearly inappro-  
priate. The common object of the society,  
which gives the city its unity, is its ethical  
end, the conviction of the members that  
they must endeavour to realize a noble  
life, § 4, a 36—38 (cp. III. c. 9). On the  
other hand a supply of food and so much  
territory are indispensable requisites, and  
would seem to be included under κτήσις  
a 33.

24 οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας.. ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι  
τὸ γένος] "Nor is this true of any other  
association which is to form a unity of  
kind" (and not merely of mass, γένος is  
adverbial accus.): i.e. which is to have a  
true organic unity, not merely the collec-  
tive unity of an aggregate or heap. After  
25 ἐν τι there is no need to insert ἐσται,  
for γενήσεται (or ἐσται) can easily be un-  
derstood. SUSEM. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the so-  
ciety must have some one identical com-  
mon interest, though they need not all  
share in it equally. Haec mihi videtur  
esse sententia: unum aliquid idemque  
sociis commune necesse est (Susemihl).

25 A generic unity, or natural compo-  
site whole, I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29 n., but not  
a κράσις, μίξις, or σύμφυσις in which the  
mingled elements vanish and give birth  
to a new product: for the citizens con-  
tinue to exist as parts of the whole I. 2.  
14, 1253 a 26. The difference between  
the mere heap and the organic whole is  
explained *Meta. Z.* 17. 8, 1041 b 18 ff. (ex-  
amples: a syllable, flesh; each something  
apart from its constituents). See also  
*Meta. H.* 6. 1, 1045 a 8, ὅσα πλεῖω μέρη  
ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἐστὶν ὅλον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν,  
ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μέρη. For a  
parallel to the language see *Phys. v.* 3.  
7, 227 a 14, ἐν τοῦτοις ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές, ἐξ  
ὧν ἐν τι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν.

The notion of Unity is analysed *Meta.*  
Δ. 6, I. 1: τὰ πρῶτως λεγόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ  
οὐσία μία ἢ συνεχέα (sometimes τὸ ὅλον is

τι [καὶ] κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἂν τε ἴσον (VII)  
 ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν (οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν  
 § 3 εἴτε χώρας πλήθος εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν). ὅταν 2  
 δ' ἢ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δὲ οὐ ἔνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἔν γε τούτοις  
 30 κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον ὀρ-  
 γάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς·  
 οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὃ γίνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ'  
 § 4 ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως  
 μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς  
 35 πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ

26 τι] τοι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2-3</sup>, [τι] Koraes || [καὶ] Susem. || δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup> Ar., δὴ P<sup>2-3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>  
 Ald. || ταὐτὸ] τοῦτο Π<sup>1</sup> || 27 οἷον...28 ἐστὶν transposed by Bojesen to follow 24  
 ὑπάρχειν, cp. *Introd.* p. 87 || 27 ἐστὶν erased by a later hand in P<sup>3</sup>, perhaps  
 rightly || 28 ὅταν...35 ἐστὶν transposed to follow 1328 b 1 πολέτας Susem. See  
 Comm. and cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 401 f. || 29 δ' ἢ] δὴ Π<sup>2</sup>, δὲ Ar. || οὐδὲν] οὐδὲ  
 Γ M<sup>a</sup> || ἔν M<sup>a</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> || 30 λαβεῖν] παθεῖν Postgate, perhaps rightly  
 || 32 [ὃ γίνεται] Schneider || 33 δεῖ μὲν κτήσεως Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, δεῖ κτήσεως (without  
 μὲν) Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 34 οὐδὲν δ' ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶ (ἐστὶ P<sup>1</sup>) M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ἢ δὲ κτήσις  
 οὐδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς πόλεως Γ apparently || 35 κτίσεως P<sup>3</sup> V<sup>b</sup>

added to τὸ συνεχές] ἢ εἶδει ἢ λόγῳ, 1016  
 b 8. The last two together = ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος  
 εἰς ἢ, 1052 a 29.

§ 3 There is no such 'common interest' in the case of the means to an end and the end itself, the tools and the craftsman, architecture (the builder's art) and the house. § 4 Hence property may be necessary to cities, but nevertheless does not form part of a city.

28 ὅταν δ' ἢ.....35 ἐστίν] This passage is closely connected with § 6 b 2 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ κτλ. No one would suspect any loss if the intervening passage §§ 4, 5, 1328 a 35—b 2 were removed. In fact this intervening passage must be regarded as a parenthesis, suggested by a 26 ἂν τε ἴσον ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, apparently inserted in the wrong place: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 401. In confirmation of this view may be cited Dr Postgate's remark (*Notes* p. 9): "the same sense can be got out of the text by making ἐν γὰρ τι...μεταλαμβάνωσι, § 2, parenthetical, and ἢ δὲ πόλεις κτλ, § 4, a resumption of it: thus οἷον...ἐστὶν will refer to ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν." That is, though his own remedies are different (see *Crit. n.*), he agrees as to the end in view; viz. the reference of 27 οἷον κτλ to 24 ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and the resumption of 15 ἐν γὰρ τι...27 μεταλαμβά-

νωσιν at 35 ἢ δὲ πόλεις κτλ.

28 ὅταν δ' ἢ] 'When one thing is the means and another the end, in this case at least there is nothing in common, except that the latter receives the activity of the former.' A very doubtful use of λαβεῖν instead of λαβεῖν τι, said of the thing acted upon: by no means established, as Prof. Ridgeway thinks, by Pl. *Apol.* 25 E, where τινὰ μοχθηρὸν ποιῆσθαι τῶν ξυμμόνων is followed by κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Dr Postgate's παθεῖν brings out the exact shade of meaning: "the one acts and the other is acted upon; the builder makes and the house is made."

30 οἷον ὀργάνῳ] *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 11. 6, 1161 a 32 ff. The same incompatibility exists between the tyrant and his subjects as between soul and body, workman and tool, master and slave. Cp. *E. E.* VIII. 9. 2, 1241 b 17—19. (Could λαβεῖν = be the recipient of services, ποιῆσαι = to render them?)

§ 4 33 That property is no 'part' of the state, but merely an indispensable condition, must weigh with us in deciding whether κτητική is a branch of οἰκονομική, 1. 4. 1, n. (32), from the constant parallel of household and state 1. 8 § 13, § 15, 1256 b 30, 37 f.; 11 § 13, 1259 a 33 ff.  
 35 πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα κτλ] Under



πόλις κοινωνία τις ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδε- (VII)  
 35 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ 3  
 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως  
 ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχασθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδέν,  
 40 δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ  
 πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο  
 1328 b θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.  
 36 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ  
 ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις  
 4 ἂν εἴη. διὸ \* \* ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν 4  
 37 ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμὸν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον

39 αὐτῆς <πάντως> ? Spengel, needlessly || 40 τῷ τοῦ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk.

1328 b 2 ταῦτ' Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, ταῦτα Bas.<sup>3</sup> || 4 διὸ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. and Vettori, who detected the lacuna. But Bk. ignored it, and Welldon is content to punctuate 3 εἴη (καὶ γὰρ...4 εἴη)· διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν

the head of 'animate property' are included slaves as well as domestic animals: see I c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp. also n. (37). SUSEM. (801)

ἢ δὲ πόλις κτλ.] "Now the city is a society of like members": comp. I. 7 § 1, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἰσῶν, VI(IV). II § 8 ἰσῶν καὶ ὁμοίων, with notes (58 b, 1293). See also n. (133) and the passages there cited. On the other hand ἀδόνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, III. I § 5, see n. (471). SUSEM. (797)

36 ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς κτλ.] It is therefore this 'best life realizable' which is the 'one identical common interest' in question, ἐν τι κοινὸν (Congreve). Compare further n. (21) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (798)

§ 5 37 αὕτη δὲ κτλ.] No reference is made to a previous discussion or to the *Ethics*. Comp. the Excursus I. SUSEM. (799)

38 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος] A fair paraphrase of the definition of *Nic. Eth.*, as may be seen from *E. E.* II. I, 1219 a 16, τῶν δ' ἢ χρήσις ἔργον, 1219 b 2, ὧν ἕκαστον χρήσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.

39 ὥστε] Apparently redundant, as in II. 2 § 5 n.

40 τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους] This supplements the statement of III. I §§ 8, 9. An imperfect constitution exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Either the subordinate ends, which fall short of man's true develop-

ment, are raised into ultimate ends: or the true end is sought, but not for all' (A. C. Bradley). Cp. c. 9 § 2, 1328 b 31.

41 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κτλ.] Cp. n. (466) on III. 3. 9. SUSEM. (800)

1328 b 1 Cp. I. 8. 4 ff.

§ 6 2 The recognition of the 'parts' or Members proper will be facilitated by an enumeration of social functions (ἔργα), i.e. 'occupations' (b 20 ἐργασίας) requisite to the independent existence of the community, which serves roughly to classify the inhabitants working at these occupations: food implies farmers, handicrafts workmen, etc. New terms are introduced in the parallel lists VII(VI). 7. I, 1321 a 4 ff. (βανανισκόν, ἀγοραῖον) and VI(IV). 4. 9, 1290 b 40 ff. (βάνανσον, ἀγοραῖον, δικαστικόν, δημοιουργικόν, βουλευσόμενον): but here τεχνῖται must include βάνανσοι, while τὸ εὐπορον or 'capital' probably furnishes the wealthier merchants (ἀγοραῖον), so far as these are citizens, and the comprehensive κριταὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων corresponds in the main to three classes (judicial, official, deliberative) of VI(IV). c. 4. "Both lists reflect the imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society" (Newman).

3 All the real members, or parts (μέρη), of a city will be indispensable, though not all things indispensable will be members.

4 διὸ \* \*] There are so many conceivable possibilities for filling up this lacuna that any definite attempt of this kind becomes idle. SUSEM. (802)

μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ (VII) ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινω-  
νοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρὸς τε τὴν  
ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδι- (p. 108)  
10 κεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι  
καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς χρεῖας καὶ πρὸς <τὰς> πολεμικάς,  
πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν  
καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγ-  
καϊότατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων  
15 τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

§ 8 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς 5  
εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πληθὸς ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ πρὸς  
ζῶν αὐταρκες, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δέ τι τούτων τυγχάνη  
19 ἐκλείπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι  
§ 9 ταύτην· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι  
πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος, οἱ παρασκευάζουσι  
τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὐπορον,  
καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων).  
9 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοι- VIII

8 [καὶ] Koraes, for which [τε] Welldon, wrongly || αὐτοῖς P<sup>3</sup> (?), αὐτοῖς Γ and the rest of our authorities || 11 <τὰς> Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 12 [καὶ πρῶτον] Spengel || 16 ὧν] ἁ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 18 τούτων after τυγχάνη (τυγχάνει P<sup>4</sup>) II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 20 συνεστάναι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 21 παρασκευάζουσι P<sup>3</sup>.<sup>3-5</sup> Bk. || 23 δικαίων Lambin, ἀναγκαῖον Γ II Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

§ 7 An enumeration of functions necessary in a city, to some extent parallel, is attempted in Plato *Rep.* II. 381, cp. *Phaedr.* 248 D, E.

§ 7 8 πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν κτλ] To these two legitimate ends of warfare is added a third c. 14 § 21, 1334 a 2 n. (918).

12 πρῶτον] First in importance.

14 κρίσιν] Under κρίσις τῶν συμφερόντων is here included everything besides the administration of justice which belongs to the government of a state. Thus it includes the making of laws and the common action of the consultative and executive councils as well as of the officers of state. SUSEM. (803)

§ 8 18 ὡς φαμέν] III. 1 § 12, cp. n. (447); IV(VII). 4 § 11 n. (759); also n. (21) with the passages there quoted. The present φαμέν is equivalent to a reference to what has preceded, not only here but c. 10 § 9, n. (831), c. 13 § 4 n. (872), 14 § 8 n. (902). Any multitude of men taken at

random does not constitute a state; a remark which was made c. 4 § 6 n. (753) and repeated VII(V). 3. 11 n. (1531 b). SUSEM. (804)

§ 9 20 κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας] must be organized in accordance with these occupations.

21 Cp. II. 8. 10, 1268 a 32 f.

23 κριτὰς] So above, § 7, b 14, κρίων. c. 9 Exclusion from the franchise of the producing classes: artisans, traders, husbandmen. Those who remain will have different functions, according to age, military, governmental, and judicial duties. This close body of citizens will own the land: when superannuated, to become priests.

This exclusion of the 'necessary appendages' from full civic rights was foreshadowed in the criticism of Plato's Republic, II. c. 5 §§ 18—28, and of Hippodamus, c. 8 §§ 8—12: it was laid down distinctly III. c. 5: see n. (504).



25 νωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαν- (VIII)  
 τας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους  
 καὶ δικάζοντας), ἥ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους  
 ὑποθετέον, ἥ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
 § 2 ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν,  
 30 ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας  
 πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολι-  
 τείας ἐτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι  
 § 3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τούναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ 2  
 τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη  
 35 δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστα εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ'  
 εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἰρηται  
 πρότερον, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτενο-  
 μένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ  
 μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάνανσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον  
 40 δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννῆς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς (p. 109)  
 § 4 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δεῖ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλ-

29 ταὐτὸ Susem., τοῦτο Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 32 μὲν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 37 κάλλιστα P<sup>4</sup>, καλλίστη Π<sup>1</sup> || 40 [ζῆν] ζῆ-  
 τεῖν Γ P<sup>5</sup> || 41 τὴν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || δεῖ] δὴ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk.

§ 1 25 τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας] This would be the case in democracies.

§ 2 29 καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν] Just before, § 1, b 25 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ. SUSEM. (805)

33 πάντων sc. ἔργων.

§ 3 34 αὕτη... 35 εὐδαίμων] Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (686), c. 13 § 4 n. (872): also II. 9. 5 n. (284) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία, see n. (466). SUSEM. (806)

36 εἴρηται πρότερον] It was observed in Excursus I., n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that cc. 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more: had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀποδέδεικται, 'proved,' rather than εἴρηται 'stated.' Comp. further n. (872). SUSEM. (807)

38 ἀπλῶς] In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy: III. 9.

39 πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] Relatively to the constitution of the time being: under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (ὅρος) for the standard. See III. 4. 3, 1276 b 30, VI(IV). 7. 2, 1293 b 3 ff.

τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τίνα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, with n. (1233). Comp. also II. 9. 1 n. SUSEM. (808) Add VI(IV). c. 11 s. fin. 1296 b 9 ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις, but c. 16 § 1, 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and *Meta*. XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 1082 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁρθῶς λέγουσιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐκ ὁρθῶς. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from τέλος or ὅρος. Apparently the meaning is the same here as a 22 ὑποθέσεως or II. 2. 1, 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν.

40 ἀγεννῆς] See III. c. 5, esp. notes (506, 509, 511). Cp. also n. (103) SUSEM. (809)

On the construction ὑπεναντίος πρὸς cp. II. 9. 1, 1269 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 40. For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. *Olynth.* III § 32, p. 37, 10: ἐστὶ δ' οὐδέποτε, οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας· ὅποι' ἄττα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἦ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρόνημ' ἔχειν. Cp. Burke: Great empires and little minds go ill together.

§ 4 1329 a 1 δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς] 'Lei-

1329 a λοντας ἔσσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς (VIII) ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ 3 πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς 5 πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα <ἐτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θε- § 5 τέον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδυ- 10 νάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους αἰεὶ, ταύτῃ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς. οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. § 6 λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν 4

1329 a 1 πολίτας added after ἔσσεσθαι by P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>3</sup> Ar. Ald. W<sup>b</sup>, [πολίτας] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 5 <ἐτέροις> Koras Bk.<sup>2</sup>; previously Schneider wrote ἐτέροις for ἕτερα || 6 δε] δὴ Π<sup>1</sup> || 11 δὲ untranslated by William, δεῖ? Göttling || τοῖς αὐτοῖς Camerarius Bk.<sup>2</sup> perhaps even Ar., τοὺς αὐτοὺς Γ II Bk.<sup>3</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 12 ἢ] καὶ Γ Ald. W<sup>b</sup> || 13 ἀμφοτέρα? Susem. followed by Welldon, who nevertheless retains 14 ταύτην

sure is needed if virtue is to be forthcoming, as well as for the conduct of state affairs. Contempt for labour goes side by side with exaltation of leisure: *n.* (93). The artizan, the farmer even, is too busy to cultivate virtue. Cp. Aelian *V. H.* x. 16, ἡ ἀργία ἀδελφὴ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστὶ. From the Greeks this estimate passed to the Jews: see Ecclesiasticus c. 38, 24—34 (Newman).

3 βουλευόμενον...καὶ κρίνον] From ἀμφω, a 6, it is clear that a single class is meant: a body which deliberates on questions of policy and decides questions of justice. Cp. § 9, a 31, τό τε ὀπλικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν.

4 ἐνυπάρχει] 'are contained in the city as members in the fullest sense' not merely indispensable adjuncts.

6 ἄμφω = the functions (1) of the military class, (2) of the deliberative and judicial class.

§ 5 7 διότι = that (after φανερόν): as 1253 a 7 and often.

8 ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς] sc. ἐστὶ: belongs to a different time of life.

9 φρονήσεως] Cp. III. 4. 17 n. (497): also *nn.* (45, 112, 115, 474—476). SUSEM. (810)

ἢ δὲ κτλ] This is said to be στάσεως αἴτιον, II. 5. 25, 1264 b 8. With the partitive genitive τῶν ἀδυνάτων cp. c. 6 § 4, 1327 a 27: in full *ἐν* τῶν ἀδυνάτων c. 14

§ 4, 1332 b 32.

11 ταύτῃ δὲ] Resumptive of the δὲ in a 9: 'in as far as it is impossible...in so far they must be the same.' When δὲ has preceded with the relative, it may for emphasis be repeated with the demonstrative. The idiom is found in Herod. (e.g. II. 50), Thuc. (II. 46), Xenophon, Isocrates (*Panegy.* § 98, § 176), Plato (*Lach.* 194 D ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός) and Demosthenes (c. *Mid.* § 100, see Buttman's Exc. XII.). Bonitz, *Ind. Ar.* 166 b 58—167 a 12, and *Studien* II. III. pp. 124—129, has disposed of the view formerly held (by Zell, Göttling, etc.) that Aristotle in some cases used δὲ where other Greek prose writers introduce the apodosis without any particle. The only valid instances are (1) after a conditional particle (1287 b 12 n.), (2) as ἀλλὰ occasionally far on in the sentence.

οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κτλ] Hence one of the favourite measures of tyrants was to forbid the use of arms VIII(V). 10 § 11, and 11 § 22 *nn.* (1667, 1742 b). See moreover Xen. *Cyr.* VII. 5. 79, Thuc. III. 27, the Demos in Mytilene obtained arms: ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὅπλα οὐτε ἡκροῶντο ἐν τῶν ἀρχόντων (Eaton). SUSEM. (811)

§ 6 13 τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην] 'hanc partem rei publicae administrandae' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. 'It only remains to



πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν (VIII)  
 15 δυνάμεις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις  
 ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον  
 § 7 [εἶναι]· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ  
 μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ <εἶναι> περὶ τούτους. ἀναγκαῖον  
 γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὔτοι. τὸ  
 20 γὰρ βάνανσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν μέρος  
 ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς  
 ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ  
 τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαν-  
 § 8 τας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φα-  
 25 νερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγ-  
 καῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιόικους.  
 λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος.  
 § 9 φανερά δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε  
 βάνανσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει

14 [ταύτην] Thurot (unless the word be transposed to follow 16 ἀμφοῖν), τὴν αὐτὴν Ueberweg, ταῦτα Susem. Cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 402 f. || μὲν <γὰρ> Vettori in his translation || 16 ἐστίν] εἶναι (from l. 17) Lambin || 17 εἶναι was transposed to follow 18 τούτους by Camerarius, to follow 18 δεῖ by Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>; εἶναι δοκεῖ Γ P<sup>6</sup> Ar., εἶναι [δοκεῖ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ἐστίν Lambin followed by Welldon || 18 <εἶναι> added by P<sup>5</sup> Bk., and so William Ar. translate || 20 μέρος] γένος Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. which is just as good || 25 ὅτι—εἴπερ] εἴπερ—ὅτι Hayduck || 26 [ἢ] Susem., cp. 1330 a 29 and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 403 || 27 ἱερέων Γ P<sup>5</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald., ἱερῶν the other authorities || 29 ἱερέα omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), πολίτην supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin

entrust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons" (a lame conclusion): as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc. 8, 9. If however we adopt ἀμφοτέρα and ταῦτα (see *Crit. notes*), then τὴν πολιτείαν becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb ἀποδιδόναί. SUSEM.

17 ἔχει...ἀξίαν] "This division recognizes desert." See c. 14 § 4. 1332 b 35, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (896). SUSEM. (812)

§ 7 18 <εἶναι> περὶ τούτους] Cp. § 8, a 25, εἶναι τούτων, § 9, a 33, τὴν ἀνάπαισιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦς. 'περὶ c. acc. rem significat ad quam aliqua actio referatur' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.*, who cites *Topics* II. 7. 5, 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως=the sensation of sight. "The landed property must be in their hands."

19 Civic rights are not for the artizans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the 'manufacture' of virtue.

21 ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (813)

23 εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν] "When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class." Cp. II. 5. 27 n. (184). SUSEM. (814)

§ 8 φανερόν δι' κτλ] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions: (1) Aristotle's decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as serfs or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, II. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 36 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of serfs of Greek descent, Penestae, Helots, etc. *nn.* (280, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (839) and Exc. 'On the Cretan περιόικοι' p. 336 SUSEM. (815)

§ 9 33 περὶ αὐτοὺς must be περὶ τοὺς

30 τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο (VIII)  
 μέρος, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει (p. 110)  
 δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαν-  
 σιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τού-  
 τοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

§ 10 ὦν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλιν οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη  
 36 πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ  
 θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς  
 πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώ-  
 39 ρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος)·  
 10 [ἔοικε δὲ οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γινώριμον τοῖς περὶ IX

33 αὐτοὺς? Susem. || τούτους Γ P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand, for οὖς is written over an era-  
 sure) and Bk. || 34 τὰς ἱερωσύνας Ar. and Bas.<sup>3</sup>, τὰς ἱερωσύνας Γ II Bk. || 36  
 γεωργούς—τεχνίτας? Scaliger || 37 [ὑπάρχειν] Spengel: the text can hardly be sound  
 || 39 δὲ Schneider, δὴ Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 40 [ἔοικε... 1329 b 39 χώραν]  
 Susem., [b 3 τὰ τε... 25 Σεωστριος] Chandler, [b 5 ἀρχαία... 25 Σεωστριος] Bojesen:  
 see Comm. and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404 ff.

θεοῖς; in their service (Welldon). But  
 see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404.

τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας]  
 Those who are superannuated: upon the  
 principle stated II. 9. 25, see n. (330).  
 This is the solution of an apparent incon-  
 sistency; that in this, the only genuine  
 aristocracy, n. (530), all citizens have equal  
 rights, see n. (930), and yet aristocracy is  
 the rule of a minority: III. 7 §§ 1—3, 15  
 §§ 8—10 n. (648), cf. III. 18. 1. For if the  
 citizens of the ideal state must complete  
 military service before admission, at the  
 age of 35, into the popular assembly (c.  
 16 § 9 1335 a 30 ff., Exc. II.), and are not  
 eligible to the Council or the offices of  
 state (military commands excepted) till  
 they are about fifty, while later on they  
 are again released from all civic duties  
 and lose all civic rights by becoming  
 priests, it follows that it is only from his  
 fiftieth to about his seventieth year that  
 each citizen can have a share in the  
 entire government and administration,  
 as indeed was remarked *Introd.* p. 51,  
 p. 54. For these twenty years only is he  
 actually a full citizen, in the active exer-  
 cise of his rights. This being so, the  
 ruling body of full citizens will always  
 remain, beyond all doubt, a minority of  
 the civic body in the wider sense, in-  
 cluding the soldiers and superannuated  
 old men, even if the boys and youths are  
 excluded. Comp. c. 13 § 9, 1332 a 34  
 n. (885), c. 14 §§ 4, 5. On the position

which the priests hold in relation to the  
 magistrates proper see VI(IV). 15. 2 n.  
 (1344), VII(VI). 8. 21 n. (1478). SUSEM.  
 (816, 817)

35 ff. 'Thus we have given (1) the  
 indispensable adjuncts and (2) the integral  
 parts of a city: i.e. cultivators, artisans,  
 and the whole class of labourers are ad-  
 juncts indispensable to cities, while the  
 integral parts are the defensive force and  
 the deliberative body. These elements  
 are severally distinct, the distinction be-  
 tween integral parts and adjuncts being  
 permanent, that between the army and  
 the deliberative body only temporary.'  
 A valuable summary of results.

c. 10 [*Historical digression: §§ 1—9.*]  
*Particulars respecting the division and  
 cultivation of the land: §§ 9—14.*

The historical digression is apparently  
 an interpolation by a well-informed Peri-  
 patetic. At all events the suspicion under  
 which it labours (see *Crit. notes*) has not  
 been dispelled by Spengel's fond admira-  
 tion of this "beautiful passage" (*Arist.*  
*Stud.* III. p. 3 n.), or by Newman's dis-  
 passionate survey, Vol. I. p. 573 f.

§ 1 40 οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ] Possibly  
 this is directed against Plato, and in-  
 tended to prove that he was by no means  
 the inventor of the particular classifica-  
 tion wherein Aristotle here follows him.  
 E. Curtius *History of Greece* I.<sup>6</sup> p. 162  
 (I. p. 181 Eng. tr.) even goes so far as to  
 suppose that all the three 'orders' of the



πολιτείας φιλοσοφούσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρησθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη (IX)  
 1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωρ-  
 γοῦν. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔτι  
 καὶ νῦν, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον  
 4 Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ

1329 b 2 τε omitted by P<sup>2.5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>, perhaps by Γ || τοῦτον after τὸν τρόπον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup>  
 Bk. and γρ. P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin) || δὲ added after ἐτι by Π<sup>1</sup> (but corr. in the  
 margin of P<sup>1</sup> marks it for omission γρ.) || 4 μένω Γ M<sup>a</sup>

Platonic state had actually existed in Crete:—an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16 n. (167). SUSEM. (818) Hippodamos (see II. 8. 2) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 5. 17, 1264 a 10 note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato's republic in the Indian state: Holm *Griech. Gesch.* III. p. 185.

41 γένη] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164: *ιερείς* (*ib.* cc. 37, 143), *μάχιμοι* (c. 165), *βουκόλοι* (c. 65), *συνῳταί* (c. 47), *κάπηλοι*, *κυβερνήται*, *ἐρμηνεῖς* c. 154). See however E. Meyer *Gesch. des Alterthums* I. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 565.

1329 b 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause: "μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronuntiata amplius explicatur" Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. The stock instance is *Poet.* c. 22 § 4, 1458 a 23: ἀλλὰ ἂν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιῇ, ἢ αἰνιγμα ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισμός, ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἰνιγμα, ἂν δ' ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. Vahlen *Beiträge* III. 317 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαρισμός. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ἂν μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιαῦτα by ἐκ μεταφορῶν and ἐκ γλωττῶν. Consequently οὖν is not illative: a simple μὲν and δὲ would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ...). Vahlen classifies the present passage and *Soph. El.* 6. 15, 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits *Categ.* 2 § 1, 1 a 17, *Top.* 105 b 21, 108 b 9, b 38 to be not very different: while *Pol.* I. 2. 8, 1252 b 29 (see *Crit. note*), IV(VII). 17. 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (ὅλως μὲν οὖν...μάλιστα μὲν οὖν), and VIII(V). 12. 8, 1316 a 8 are

somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps *De Rep. Athen.* c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K.<sup>1</sup>, but Harpocration omits οὖν.

4 Σεσώστριος] The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker *History of Antiquity*, I.<sup>5</sup> 134—158, Eng. tr. 1877, pp. 142—159) two real kings, Sethos I. (1439—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—circa 1350), just as all Spartan institutions were attributed to Lycurgus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker I.<sup>5</sup> 191 f., Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. SUSEM. (819)

"The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father's calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste": A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, *Herodots zweites Buch* p. 573, who quotes Plato *Tim.* 23, 24, Isocr. *Busiris* 6—8, Diod. I. 73 f., I. 28, Strabo XVII. p. 787. Cp. *Les castes en Egypte* in *Le Muséon*, 1886. Also E. Meyer *Gesch. des alten Aegyptens* (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (*ib.* p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesostrius, any more than User-tesen II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (*Aegyptische Geschichte* p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke *Weltgesch.* I. p. 26, Maspero *Genre ép.* p. 83: 'Setsû, var. Setsû-râ, le nom populaire de Rhamsès II.' Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (*Gesch.* p. 117): "the three notices dealing with

§ 2 *περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ*  
*τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βα-*  
*σιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῶ παλαιότερα τού-*  
 § 3 *των. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλὸν*  
*τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τό τε ὄνομα*  
 10 *μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλούς ἀντ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν*  
*ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοῦνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση*  
*τετύχθηκεν ἐντὸς οὕσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ*  
*Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει δὲ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὁδὸν ἡμι-*  
 § 4 *σείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς*  
 15 *Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους τε αὐτοῖς ἄλ-*  
*λους θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστήσαι πρῶτον· διὸ*  
*καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις*  
 § 5 *καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ὥκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-*

8 λόγοι Γ<sup>S</sup>, λογιῶι P<sup>1</sup> || 13 *Ναπετίνου* ? Sylburg (from Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.*  
 I. 35) || δὲ γὰρ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 15 *τε αὐτοῖς ἄλλοις* M<sup>a</sup>, τ' ἄλλους αὐτοῖς P<sup>3</sup>, ἄλλους *τε*  
 αὐτοῖς P<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 18 *τυρρηλίαν* M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2-3-4-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps Γ

the country leave a good impression: yet the statement that the division into castes originated with Sesostris does not diverge from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotle can hardly have made independent researches on Egypt in detail."

*Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην*] The division of the Cretan population is mentioned II. 5. 19, 1264 a 21, n. (171), c. 10 §§ 1—8 with Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (820)

§ 2 5 *τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις*] The system of public meals, as *ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας*, II. 11. 2, 1272 b 30: cp. also II. 5. 5, 1263 a 23.

6 *περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν*] Compare again II. 10 § 3, § 5, § 7, § 9. SUSEM. (821)

§ 3 8 *οἱ λόγοι*] II. 8. 1, 1267 b 28. Comp. Antiochus *Frag.* 3, 4, 6, Müller *F. H. G.* I. p. 181 f. SUSEM. (822)

*Ἰταλὸν τινα... 15 γεωργούς*] Antiochus (*Fr.* 6 apud Strab. VI. 254 f.) however calls the Lametic gulf the Napetine: the name common in later times is ὁ Ἰππωνιατικός. This gulf is in the south-west of Italy, in Bruttium, and is now Golfo di S. Eufemia: just opposite to it, on the east coast, is the Scylletic Gulf or Golfo di Squillaci. Strabo describes them as 160 stadia [i.e. 18 miles 660 yds] apart, rather more than half a day's journey. The name [Italy] was then

originally confined to the south-west promontory of the peninsula, between the strait of Messina on the one side and these two gulfs on the other. Oenotria means Wine-land, Italus the Ox, or calf: Italy, the land of Oxen. The ox used for ploughing must be meant, a symbol of the transition of the Graeco-Italians from a pastoral to an agricultural life; and this, one of the oldest legends of the Italian race, shrewdly connects the original Italian legislation with the transition. Another version of the same belief makes the ox the leader of the primitive Samnite colonies; while the oldest national names in Latin distinguish the people as reapers (Siculi perhaps also Sicani) or field-labourers (Opisci). See Mommsen, *History of Rome* I. p. 21 f. Eng. tr. Thucydides VI. 2. 4 calls this king Italos not an Oenotrian but a Sicel. For the name Europe, see c. 7 § 2, n. (779). SUSEM. (823)

§ 4 16 *καὶ τὰ συσσίτια*] There is no other authority for this statement of common meals in Italy. SUSEM. (824)

*διὸ καὶ νῦν... 17 χρῶνται*] The language is undoubtedly the echo of II. 10. 3, 1271 b 30 *διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς*. But we hesitate to draw the inference that here, as there, an extract from Ephorus follows (Newman: I. p. 575 n. 2).

§ 5 18 *ὥκουν δὲ κτλ*] Here the in-



- 19 νίαν Ὀπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἑπώνυ- (IX)  
 20 μίαν Αὔσωνες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἴόνιον  
 Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην Σιρίτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες  
 § 6 Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν  
 γέγονε πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (p. 111)  
 24 πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν

20 αὐσωνες M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>4-5</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 21 χάωνες (χάωνες S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>) II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. || Σιρίτιν Göt-  
 tling Bk.<sup>2</sup>, Syrtem William, σύρτην P<sup>3</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), σύρτιν the other authorities  
 Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand), Σίριν Heyne (Orisc. II. 211, 235)  
 from Arist. Frag. 542, 1568 b 11 ff. (Σίριν is the correct accentuation.) || χάωνες  
 II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar.

terpolator has taken the opportunity to air his historic knowledge, for this whole passage has nothing whatever to do with the point he wants to prove. The nearest neighbours of the Oenotrians or Itali on the north-west and north-east only, are mentioned here. At any rate this must be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these places has any meaning at all. The name of the one, Opici, is the same as the Opisci or Oscans, explained in n. (823). Why the Greeks called them Ausonians we cannot tell. Iapygia denotes what was afterwards called Apulia and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the south east of Lucania. His inclusion of the Chonians among the Oenotrians is another proof of the author's agreement with Antiochus (Frag. 6, n. 823). But the Oscans were not near neighbours of that oldest Italy; even according to the account given by the interpolator they lived south of Tyrrhenia (Etruria) in Latium, and more especially in Campania, north of the Gulf of Paestum. Cp. Arist. Frag. 567 [558 Arist. pseudop.=609 ed. Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. I. 72 where Latium is described as a region in Opice, τὸν τόπον τοῦτον τῆς Ὀπικῆς, ὅς καλεῖται Λάτιον (Eaton). But Antiochus goes on to say that the name Italy, and probably also the earlier name Oenotria, had first been extended further north as far to the north-west as the river Laos which flows through the south-west of Lucania and to the north-east as far as the plain of the Siris and Metapontum, situated to the north of this plain in the north-east part of Lucania; so that Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum, was still included in Iapygia; for he tells us, the country round the plain of the Siris had been inhabited by a great

Oenotrian tribe, the Chonians, who gave it the name Chonē. Thus the whole of the west coast of this region newly added to the old designation Italy is washed by the Terinaic Gulf, of which the Hipponia-tic in the extreme south is only a particular bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy quite accords with this, for he includes Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the boundary towards Iapygia (VII. 33 § 3), while he appears to include Tarentum in Iapygia (VI. 44 § 2) and places Campanian Cuma in Opicia (VI. 4 § 5). Herodotos (I. 167) even extends the designation Oenotria beyond the Laos and the Terinaic Gulf, so that Elea also is included in it. The country of the Opici would then touch this enlarged Italy on the north-west, but unfortunately in our present passage there is no mention of this extension of the name; and, besides, the Chonian territory is not said to border on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is itself included in it. The whole passage is therefore doubtless a wretched interpolation, and as such would have to be removed from the rest, if that really belonged to Aristotle. But it will be shown in notes (829, 830) that the whole passage §§ 1—9 has been added by another hand, and that its author, one of the oldest Peripatetics, though he has drawn from good historical sources, may yet have written this sentence, in which he has certainly made very bad use of them. SUSEM. (825)

§ 6 24 πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κτλ.]  
 As shown in n. (819). SUSEM. (826)  
 τοῖς χρόνοις] The plural as in VI(IV).  
 6 § 5, 1293 a 1, and in the suspected  
 chapter II. 12 § 7, 1274 a 30: more usually  
 as in VI(IV). 3 § 3, VIII(V). 4 § 1.  
 Another instance is Nic. Eth. VIII. 12 § 2,  
 1161 b 25, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις.



Walker & Bostall sc.



- § 7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἢ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ (IX)  
 26 ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρήσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,  
 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρεῖαν  
 εἰκὸς διδάσκειν αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιου-  
 σίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὐλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξη-  
 30 σιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἰεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν  
 § 8 ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ 5  
 Αἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιοτάτοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,  
 νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν <ἀεὶ> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς  
 μὲν εἰρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα  
 35 πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.  
 § 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὄπλα κεκτη-  
 μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότε-  
 ρον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ  
 πόσῃν τινὰ χρή καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν·] περὶ δὲ τῆς 6  
 40 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρή,  
 λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινὴν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὴν

28 εἰκὸς after διδάσκειν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 30 τὰ omitted by Γ and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 31 δὲ] γὰρ ? Susem. || 33 <ἀεὶ> Bernays and Susem. independently, <πρῶτοι> ? Schneider || 34 εὐρημένους Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, apparently right || 36 τῶν <τὰ> Spengel || 41 δεῖν after εἶναι II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

27 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις] Cp. the well known passage *Meteorol.* 1. 3 § 8, 339 a 29, οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσομεν ἀπαξ οὐδὲ δις οὐδ' ὀλιγάκις τὰς αὐτὰς δόξας ἀνακυκλεῖν γινομένας ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις.

§ 7 27 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα] Comp. n. (795) on c. 8 § 1. SUSEM. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην κτλ] All these ideas are certainly genuinely Aristotelian: see II. 5 § 16, 1264 a 3 with n. (167) and *Meta.* I. 1. § 15, 981 b 17 ff.: esp. b 20 ὅθεν ἥδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν. But see n. (829). SUSEM. (828)

§ 8 34 τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι [ζητεῖν] How can that be done, if everything has been already discovered? It is hardly possible to attribute this paradox to Aristotle. The intermediate link is wanting, which explains that what has been already discovered may be lost in oblivion and therefore require to be rediscovered. SUSEM. (829) Cp. Plato *Laiois* 630 E of legislators: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐν χρεῖα γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖν νῦν παραθέμενος. But Waitz compares the end of the *Torics*, 184 b 6—8.

§ 9 36 ὅτι μὲν οὖν... 39 χώραν] If we compare this new recapitulation with the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is clear that it passes over everything intermediate, as not containing anything peculiar or important for the course of the inquiry, but as seeking historic confirmation partly for what is affirmed in c. 9 and partly, with an eye to what is coming, for the *syssitia*, which do not come up for discussion until 10 § 10; like the former recapitulation, it summarizes everything discussed before c. 10. But while the former is rightly confined to the contents of the two preceding chapters, with which alone what follows (6—9) is connected, the latter wrongly passes over the passage c. 5 § 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it were there at all, and goes back to the subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although this has no immediate connexion with what follows. We can clearly detect the interpolator, who has framed this second recapitulation, so entirely out of place here, with the sole object of fastening his own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on Aristotle's treatise. SUSEM. (830)

41 φαμεν] II. 5 §§ 4—9 *nn.* (156, 156 b,

- 1330 a κτήσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς (IX)  
 γινομένη κοινήν, οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς.  
 § 10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ  
 κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συν-  
 5 δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν  
 πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ ῥάδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν  
 ἰδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλ-  
 λην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ 7  
 § 11 πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο μέρη  
 10 διηρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινήν τὴν δὲ τῶν  
 ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διηρῆσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς  
 μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς  
 λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, (p. 112)  
 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχα-  
 15 τιάς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἐκάστω  
 νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν. τό 8  
 τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς

1330 a 2 γινομένη Congreve, γινομένη <γίνεσθαι> Susem.<sup>2</sup>, γινομένη Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 4 δοκεῖ? Susem. || 14 τὸ μὲν ἕτερον Stob. p. 332 and Paris. 2042 || τὸ after μέρος omitted by Stob. || ταῖς ἐσχατίαις Stob., *proprias necessitates* William Ar. Suid. and Phot. notice this passage s. v. ἐσχατίαν || 15 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ δὲ ἕτερον Stob. || τῇ πόλει Stob. || ἐκάστων P<sup>4</sup>, ἑκαστον L<sup>a</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup>

158), 9 §§ 2—4 n. (279), 11 § 10 n. (393). Compare also II. 6 §§ 10—14 n. (211); IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 7, 8. The same use of the present, φαμέν, as in c. 8 § 8 n. (804), and below c. 13 § 5 n. (872), c. 14 § 8 n. (902). SUSEM. (831)

1330 a 1 τινὲς] Plato alone is meant by this. SUSEM. (832) See n. on 1261 a 6.

2 οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα] A condition upon which special stress is laid in the criticism of Carthage cited n. (831): ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὁρᾶν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μὴδὲν ἀσχομενεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἀρχόντες ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἰδιωτεύοντες, 1273 a 32 ff.

§ 10 3 συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι] As e.g. Plato *Lysis* 780 B, ἔδοξε μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς σωτηρίαν τὸ νόμιμον, Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 5.

5 ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν] An unfulfilled promise: *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4) and p. 53. SUSEM. (833)

δεῖ δὲ τούτων... 8 οἰκίαν] "Now all the citizens must take part in these (syssitia), but it is not easy to arrange that poor men should contribute their quota from their own means and at the

same time pay all that is needed for their own housekeeping as well." See II. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 § 8 n. (365). Compare also n. (153) on II. 5. 2. SUSEM. (834) For τὸ τεταγμένον cp. II. 10 § 7, 1272 a 15.

8 κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως] "The *Politics* takes for granted the maintenance, even in the best state, of the popular faith and the traditional worship" (Newman). Comp. n. (859).

§ 11 13 εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην] This is precisely the solution which the criticism in Book II. indicated: see n. on 8 § 3 (254), 9 § 31 (341), 10 § 8 (365).

14 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν... 16 μετέχωσιν] See II. 6 § 15 n. (215). SUSEM. (835) The lands nearer to the city would possess many advantages over those more remote.

16 τό τε γὰρ ἴσον... 20 καλόν] Comp. Thuc. I. 120 § 2 (the various members of the Peloponnesian confederacy), II. 21 § 3 (the Achaeans): the Book of Numbers c. 32 (the tribes beyond Jordan), as



- § 13 ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον (IX)  
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλυγοῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους  
 10 ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ  
 παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμ-  
 μετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὥς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον  
 οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλευσασθαι καλῶς.
- § 13 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρησθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον  
 15 διὰ τὰς προειρημένους αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μὲν,<sup>9</sup>  
 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε  
 θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἰεν χρήσιμοι  
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ  
 20 βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύ-  
 § 14 σιν, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ιδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους  
 τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς.  
 τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς  
 δούλοις ἄθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
- 11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε X  
 35 καὶ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν  
 ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι

19 τῆς] τὴν Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 20 ἔχθραν Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || διὸ παρ'] διόπερ Π<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly ||  
 22 βουλῆς] τιμῆς Γ M<sup>1</sup> || 26 εἰ δεῖ] εἴδει Sylburg, δεῖ Schneider, εἰ <εἶναι> δεῖ  
 Spengel, possibly rightly || ὁμοφύλους πάντας—27 θυμοειδεῖς Schneider, hardly  
 right || 29 <ῆ> περιοίκους Schneider, cp. 1329 a 26 || 30 ἰδίοις before ἐν  
 omitted by P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar., the second ἰδίοις omitted by Γ P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 34 τὲ Ald., τὰς P<sup>3</sup>  
 T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 35 θαλάττης M<sup>1</sup>, θαλάσσης the other authorities Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 36 αὐτὴν]  
 αὐτὴν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || εἶναι... 37 δὴ] εἰ κατ' εὐχὴν δεῖ κατατιγχνάειν,  
 τὴν θέσιν πρὸς τέτταρα \* δὴ (δεῖ Schneider Susem.<sup>2</sup>) Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, wrongly, *si ad totum*

cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12  
 generally see II. 6 § 14 n. (211). SUSEM.  
 (836)

§ 13 26 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν] Compare  
 the passages collected in n. (128) on II. 1  
 § 1. SUSEM. (837)

μήτε ὁμοφύλων] So Plato *Leges* VI. 777 D  
 cp. μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοῖς μέλ-  
 λοντας ῥῶον δουλεύσειν ἀσμφώνους τε εἰς  
 δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα. Comp. Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.*  
 I. 5 §§ 5, 6, 1344 b 11 ff., esp. b 18 καὶ  
 μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλοὺς (Schneider).  
 SUSEM. (838)

μήτε θυμοειδῶν] The same expression  
 II. 5. § 25, 1264 b 9, see n. (182); there  
 "men of spirit," here "passionate."  
 Compare what is said of θυμός in notes  
 on III. 16 § 1 (64), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786),  
 § 7 (790). SUSEM. (839)

28 δεύτερον δὲ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n.

(815), also notes on II. 9. 4 (282) and  
 Exc. III. on the Cretan περιοίκου p. 338.  
 SUSEM. (840)

32 διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι... ἐλευθερίαν] A  
 new contradiction in Aristotle's theory of  
 slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the  
 best state actual slaves or serfs can only  
 be, must logically remain slaves for ever.  
 However comp. Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.* I. 5 § 5 f.,  
 1344 b 14 ff. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡρίσθαι  
 πᾶσιν· δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευ-  
 θερίαν κείσθαι ἄθλον. SUSEM. (841)

33 ὕστερον] an unfulfilled promise:  
*Introd.* pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (842)

cc. 11, 12. *The city: regulations in  
 detail for the site, the water-supply, the  
 plan of the streets, the fortifications, and  
 the two Agorai.* Cp. *Analysis* p. 115.

§ 1 36 εἴρηται πρότερον] In c. 5 §§ 3,  
 4. SUSEM. (843)

37 τὴν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέ- (X)  
 § 2 ποντας. πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἶ τε  
 γὰρ πρὸς ἑὼ τὴν ἐγκλισιν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα  
 40 τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγεινότεραι, δεύτερον δὲ  
 κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχίμεροι γὰρ αὗται μᾶλλον)· τῶν δὲ λοι- 2

*oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique respicientes* William, who doubtless translates a gloss || εἶναι omitted by P<sup>5</sup>, [εἶναι] Bk.<sup>2</sup> (perhaps rightly), εἰ δεῖ Welldon, who transposes 37 εὔχεσθαι δεῖ to follow κατατυγχάνειν (wrongly). Bonitz *Ind. Ar. s. v.* suspects that κατατυγχάνειν is corrupt || 37 εὔχεσθαι ἀρχεσθαι M<sup>8</sup> || πρὸς omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (supplied by P<sup>1</sup>) || δὴ omitted by II<sup>2</sup> Bk., δεῖ? Schneider, \* \* δεῖ Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || 38 αἶ τε] αἶτε P<sup>2,3</sup> S<sup>b</sup>, αἶ II<sup>1</sup>, αἶ [τε] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, αἶ μὲν Koraes (needlessly) || 40 δὲ <αἶ> Koraes, certainly necessary; perhaps δ' αἶ is better || 41 καταβόρειον Lindau; but Schneider shows that κατὰ βορέαν has the same sense || εὐχίμεροι] νεαροὶ Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, *recentiores* William, εὐδίοι Muretus, εὐάεροι Böcker, approved by Susem.<sup>1</sup>, —all resting upon misapprehension of κατὰ βορέαν

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι...κατατυ-  
 χάνειν...37 βλέποντας] The construction of the infinitives εἶναι, κατατυγχάνειν is disputed, and Bonitz *Ind. Ar. s. v.* suspects the latter word. Busse (*op. c. p.* 17) compares (as Götting had done) phrases like ἐκὼν εἶναι and the like: he thinks an object of the verb κατατυγχάνειν can be supplied without trouble from what follows. On the contrary, if κατατυγχάνειν is sound, it is on this verb that the accus. with infinitive τὴν θέσιν εἶναι must depend: this construction already given in Passow's lexicon has lately been proposed anew by Dr Jowett (=τοῦ θέσιν εἶναι). To this Susemihl objects: "at non hoc optandum est ut τὴν θέσιν accipiat urbs, sed τὴν ἐπιτηδεῖαν θέσιν vel τὴν θέσιν ὡς δεῖ, quod ut subaudiri posset e verbis πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας, scribendum potius erat fere sic: αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς θέσεως κατατυγχάνειν. Aut igitur lacuna deformatus esse videtur locus aut, quae est Bonitzii suspicio, κατατυγχάνειν corruptum. Omnia bene se haberent, si <τοῦ ἐπιτηδεῖαν> vel <τοῦ ὅταν δεῖ> εἶναι legeretur, sed in re tam incerta praestat a coniecturis abstinere." Mr Welldon's proposal is met by the inquiry, Can κατατυγχάνειν govern an accusative? and if it can, would it not be easier to omit εἶναι with P<sup>5</sup>? (See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 407, of which the foregoing is an abstract.) SUSEM.

37 εὔχεσθαι] Another of the passages collected in n. (128) on II. 1. 1. SUSEM. (844)

§ 2 38 αἶ τε γὰρ...40 ὑγεινότεραι] Similarly Hippocrates *De aere* 1. p. 525 ff.

Kühn. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air: cp. *Meteor.* 11. 6. 20, 364 b 19 f., *Problem.* xxvi. 56. *Oecon.* 1. 6. 9, 1345 a 31 ff., Thuc. 111. 23. 5. Aristophanes *Wasps* 265 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Theophrastus *De ventis* § 4: like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-east and sometimes as north-west winds. Socrates in Xen. *Memor.* 111. 9. 9 and Xenophon himself *Oecon.* c. 9 § 4 (a passage almost literally copied Pseudo-Arist. *Oecon.* 1. c. as Schlosser remarked) prefer a house with a south aspect (Eaton). SUSEM. (845)

Add Plutarch *De curiositate* c. 1, 515 c: ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ζέφυρον ἀνεμὸν κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐρείδοντα δειλὴς ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρνασοῦ δεχομένην, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαίρωνος. The east wind is spoken of as warm *Probl.* xxvi. 31, 943 b 24 (Newman).

41 κατὰ βορέαν] Under the north wind, and so protected from it: i.e. with south aspect. Cp. *Oecon.* 1. 6. 8, 1345 a 33, κατὰβόρρος οὔσα, Plato *Critias* 118 A, B: πρὸς νότον ἐτέτραπτο ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτων κατὰβόρρος (J. G. Schneider). Hippocrates however preferred a north aspect as next best to an east aspect. SUSEM. (846)

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν] What are the four points to be observed, a 36? Health first, a 38; two more are accounted for by the words πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν; the one which still remains is, in all probability, beauty



- 1330 b πῶν \* \* πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς (X)  
 § 3 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον  
 εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον,  
 ὑδάτων δὲ καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλήθος (p. 113)  
 5 οἰκείον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε εὖρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν  
 ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνοους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε  
 μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον.  
 § 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγιείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τοῦτο 3  
 δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἐν τε τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πρὸς  
 10 τοιοῦτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, καὶ  
 τούτου τὴν ἐμπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις  
 χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον  
 συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ  
 § 5 πνεύματος δύναμις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν  
 15 ταῖς εὐ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ'

1330 b 1 <πρὸς μὲν τὸν κόσμον \* \*, τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν ἐστι τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως> πρὸς, or something similar, ? Susem. || 2 μὲν after αὐτοῖς is omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> and not translated by Ar.; hence [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 4 δὲ Γ P<sup>5</sup> Ar., τε M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 5 εὖρηται] εὐρῆσθαι Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, but Schneider thought another verb required: τηρῆσαι for γε εὖρηται ? Susem.<sup>2</sup>, needlessly; cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 408 || 6 ὀμβρίους ὕδασιν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1-3-4</sup> V<sup>5</sup> Ald., ὀμβρίους ὕδατος P<sup>2</sup>, *aquarium imbrium* William, ὀμβρίου ὕδατος or ὀμβρίων ὑδάτων ? Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 7 ἐπιλείπειν Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, needlessly || εἰργομένοις Madvig || 8 ἐπεὶ] εἴπερ Böcker, transposing εἴπερ...17 χρεῖαν to precede τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν 1330 a 41 || 9 δεῖ <καὶ> ? Susem. || 10 καὶ τούτου <δεῖ> Schneider, <δεῖ> καὶ τούτου Welldon, 11 ἔχειν <δεῖ> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>. But if a verb is required (instead of understanding δεῖ in the apodosis from b 9 the protasis) χρῆσθαι, <χρή> καὶ is more obvious || 11 τούτου] τούτων Welldon, wrongly || πλείστους P<sup>3-4</sup> || 14 ταύτην Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk.

of situation. See ἡδίων 1330 b 22, κόσμον b 31, εὐχαρις 1331 a 36, καὶ τούτων τὸν κόσμον a 38. If the mention of this has been lost after λοιπῶν we may perhaps supply it, as suggested in the *Critical notes*, and render the whole: "of the remaining points, <regard for the beauty of the town is indeed important, but far more important> that it should be well situated for the needs of civil administration and for military purposes." See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 408. SUSEM. (847)  
 § 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Again from the same point of view as c. 5 § 3, 1326 b 41: see n. (767). SUSEM. (848)

4 ὑδάτων] The water supply of Greek towns was often scanty enough (Mahaffy): that of Antioch was wonderfully good: Liban. I. 354 R. Strabo, too (p. 235),

commends the Romans for their attention to this requirement (Newman). Cp. Pl. *Laus* 779 c.

5 τούτο γε εὖρηται] See *Occom.* 11. 2. 22, 1350 a 17, εὐρέειν = assequi; though τοῦτο is a little strange, the sense must be "thus what is required has been attained." Cp. c. 13 § 2, 1331 b 29. SUSEM.

7 'Recte Ridgewayus ὕδατα subiectum esse monet et εἰργομένους obiectum verbi ὑπολείπειν' *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 408 SUSEM. That this is Aristotle's regular use of the verb is plain from *Rhet.* I. 13. 20, 1374 a 33, ὑπολείπει γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα, and III. 17. 21, 1418 a 35, οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος (Ridgeway).

§§ 4, 5. These suggestions are eminently sound and practical.

ὅμοια μὴτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ἢ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τὰ τε εἰς (X)  
 τροφήν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ  
 τόπων [τῶν] ἐρυμνῶν οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον  
 ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλυγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχι-  
 20 κόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ οὐδέτερον,  
 § 6 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκή-  
 σεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς  
 τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἂν εὐτομος ἢ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον  
 καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς  
 25 ἀσφαλείας τούναντίον ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον·  
 δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς  
 § 7 ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχε-  
 ται γάρ, ἂν τις οὕτως κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωρ-  
 γίοις ἃς καλοῦσιν τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν  
 30 ὅλην πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν εὐτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους·

16 μὴτ' μηδὲ Koraes, rightly || τοιούτων Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>5</sup> (corr.), τούτων  
 the other authorities Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 18 τῶν omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, <τῶν> τόπων τῶν  
 P<sup>5</sup> V<sup>b</sup>, τόπων τῶν Bk. with the other authorities || 21 ἰδίων] οἰκείων M<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>1</sup>  
 (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 22 μὲν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, untranslated by  
 Ar., hence [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 23 καὶ inserted before κατὰ by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 24 [καὶ]  
 Schneider Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, possibly right || Ἱπποδάμιον Π<sup>2</sup> (in P<sup>3</sup> ἄ written faintly) P<sup>5</sup> ||  
 25 χρόνον] τρόπον Γ M<sup>1</sup> || 26 δυσέξοδος—δυσεξερεύνητος] δυσεξερεύνητος—δυσέξοδος  
 Jackson || 27 ἀμφοτέρων after τούτων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 28 γεωρ-  
 γίοις Scaliger, γεωργοῖς Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γεωργικοῖς Camerarius || 30  
 ὅλην] ἄλλην Ar. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || πόλιν after μὴ ποιεῖν  
 Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., omitted by P<sup>1</sup>

§ 5 20 ἀριστοκρατικόν] This holds good of the best constitution also, since this is at once the true and the best form of aristocracy: VI(IV). 7. 2 n. (1232), cp. c. 2 § 1 (1133), § 4 (1141): II. 6. 17 n. (218): III. 7. 3 n. (536) and Exc. 1. on B. III. For it is only in an aristocracy that fortified places are used solely as a protection against external foes: and the latter will plainly find the conquest of the city more difficult if they have to capture many such. Under a monarchy or an oligarchy the Acropolis, or single citadel, was also used for defence against popular insurrections; for this reason it is against the interests of democracy, because liable to become the rallying place of movements in favour of the tyrant or the oligarchs; in short usurpers may establish themselves there. These remarks are not disproved by the fact that democratic states like Athens itself retained their old Acropolis. SUSEM. (849)

§ 6 23 κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον...τρόπον] See Exc. II. to Book II.: p. 331. SUSEM. (850)

24 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς...τούναν-  
 τίων] Eaton remarks that the surprise of Plataea (Thuc. II. c. 4) in ancient, and the second siege of Saragossa in modern, times, will illustrate the author's meaning. But "Aristotle probably has in view the experience of Perinthus, when besieged by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall only to find himself in face of a close array of houses rising tier over tier up the slope of the hill, and parted by narrow lanes across which the besieged carried walls; Diod. XVI. 76" (Newman). SUSEM. (851)

§ 7 29 τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας] Unquestionably, vines planted in the fashion of a quincunx. SUSEM. (852)

30 εὐτομον] Cut up, i.e. laid out, in straight streets: as Strabo says of Alex-



οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς. (X)  
 § 8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρε-  
 τῆς ἀντιποιούμενας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,  
 34 καὶ ταῦθ' ὀρώντες ἐλεγχόμενας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλω-  
 § 9 πισαμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ<sup>8</sup>  
 πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σφῆζεσθαι διὰ (P.<sup>114</sup>)  
 τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ  
 ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων [καὶ]  
 τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ σφ-  
 40 ζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πύσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν  
 ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολε-  
 1331 a μικωτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ  
 βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας.  
 § 10 ὁμοιον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν γ

31 πρὸς before κόσμον omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 37 καὶ before  
 συμβαίνει omitted by M<sup>1</sup>, [καὶ] Koraes; καὶ συμβαίνει transposed to follow 38 ἐνδέχε-  
 ται Stahr || 38 καὶ untranslated by William, [καὶ] Spengel || 39 [καὶ] Spengel,  
 wrongly || [καὶ τῆς] ἀρετῆς ἀνθρωπίνης <τε> καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις Schmidt  
 1331 a 3 τὸ τῷ S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand)

andria (p. 793) ἀπασα μὲν οὖν ὁδοῖς κατα-  
 τέμνεται.

§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν κτλ.]  
 Plato *Laus* VI. 778 D ff.: περὶ δὲ τειχῶν  
 ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἐυμερομένην τὸ καθεύ-  
 δεῖν ἔαν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τεῖχη καὶ  
 μὴ ἐπανίστανται. SUSEM. (853)

34 ἐλεγχόμενας ἔργῳ] Here no doubt  
 he is thinking more especially of Sparta:  
 see n. (554) on III. 9. 10. SUSEM. (854)

Grote asked how, if Sparta had had  
 walls like those of Babylon, they could  
 have procured for her any greater protec-  
 tion than her strong position afforded in  
 the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But  
 in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas,  
 though he did not succeed in surprising  
 it unawares, actually penetrated into the  
 city, Xen. *Hellen.* VII. 5. 11, Polyb. IX.  
 8. 5. Very obstinate resistance had been  
 offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perin-  
 thus (340), although Thebes, in spite of  
 its walls, was carried by assault (335).

§ 9 36 οὐ καλὸν] To skulk behind  
 fortifications has been in all ages con-  
 trasted with courage in the open field.  
 So of the remark of Archidamus, which  
 Camerarius quotes from Plutarch, that at  
 the sight of a catapult he exclaimed:  
 ἀπώλετο ἀνὴρ ἀρετά.

37 καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται] An

inversion which Mr Newman compares  
 with II. 5. 27, 1264 b 18, μὴ τῶν πλείσ-  
 των ἢ μὴ πάντων. Translate: "but as it  
 not only may but does happen that the  
 superiority of the enemy is too much for  
 the brave but not superhuman resistance  
 of the smaller number, in such cases, if  
 the defenders are to preserve themselves  
 and be free from indignity and injury, we  
 must hold that walls of impregnable  
 strength are a soldierly precaution, es-  
 pecially when we consider the precision  
 that has been attained in the manufacture  
 of missiles and siege-engines."

1331 a 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ ταῖς  
 μηχανὰς] Possibly this indicates the two  
 main divisions of Greek artillery ὀξυβελεῖς  
 sc. καταπάλται for discharging arrows  
 chiefly, with a range of 400 yards, and the  
 heavier engines πετροβόλοι; see A. Bauer  
*Griech. Kriegsalterthümer* in Iwan Mül-  
 ler's *Handbuch d. Kl. Alt.* IV. 1, p.  
 310 ff. H. Droysen *Kriegsalterthümer*  
 p. 190—204.

§ 10 3 ὁμοιον γὰρ τὸ...ἀξιοῦν καὶ]  
 "To insist on not building walls round  
 cities is the same thing as to seek for a  
 country easily invaded:" for καὶ 'as' after  
 ὁμοιον see II. 8. 21, 1269 a 6. With  
 ἀξιοῦν cp. II. 8. 13, 1268 b 5, τὸ κρίνει  
 ἀξιοῦν.

καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν ἐνέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς (X)  
 5 ὄρεινους τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκήσεσι μὴ  
 περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούν-  
 § 11 των. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν  
 περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως  
 χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ  
 10 ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὲ τούτων  
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχη τῇ  
 πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τὰς τε  
 § 12 ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπι-  
 15 τιθεμένοις ἐπιμελὲς ἐστὶ δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν,  
 οὕτω τὰ μὲν εὔρηται τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ  
 12 τοὺς φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθε-  
 σθαι τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλη-  
 θος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσιτίοις κατανεμεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ  
 20 τείχη διειληφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους  
 ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευ-

5 ὁρινοὺς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 10 τοῖς—κεκτημένοις Ar.,  
 ταῖς—κεκτημέναις Γ II Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 11 [μόνον] ? Koraes, wrongly (cp. Pl. *Symp.* 179 B  
 with Hug's note) || 12 τούτων] τῶν ὄντων ? Koraes || 13 χρείας <αὐταρκούντως>  
 ? Schneider, not badly || 16 δεῖ before ζητεῖν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand,  
 supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || καὶ after φιλοσοφεῖν untranslated by William and Ar. (perhaps  
 rightly) || 17 ἐπιχειροῦσιν ? Schmidt || 21 δῆλον... 22 φυλακτηρίοις omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>  
 (supplied in the margin by p<sup>1</sup>) || αὐτὰ Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 125 a 35 f.), certainly right

5 The construction must be ὁμοίως δὲ  
 <ὁμοίον ἐστι>...μὴ περιβάλλειν, this in-  
 finitive being parallel to ζητεῖν.

§ 11 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ] We had a  
 similar mode of argument in c. 6 § 3 n.  
 (771) with respect to a maritime site for  
 the city. SUSEM. (855)

11 οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον] μόνον is  
 pleonastic.

14 τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας] Dionysius  
 the Elder invented machines of this kind;  
 Diod. xiv. 42. 1, 50. 4 (Camerarius).  
 Cp. Rüstow and Köchly *Gesch. des griech.*  
*Kriegswesens* p. 207 f. Afterwards the  
 campaigns of Philip and Alexander of  
 Macedon led to many fresh improve-  
 ments in the siege-engines and heavy  
 artillery: see Rüstow and Köchly p. 264,  
 307 ff. "It is possible" (see n. 1589 on  
 viii(v). 6. 13) "that Aristotle was ac-  
 quainted with the work of Aeneas Tacti-  
 cus. (See c. 32.)" (Eaton.) SUSEM. (856)

See also H. Droysen *Kriegsalterthümer*

c. 9 p. 187 ff. The first casual mention  
 of καταπάλται at Athens circa Ol. 105 or  
 106, 356—348: they were of course used  
 by Philip in the sieges of Byzantium and  
 Perinthus, 340, 339; and by Alexander  
 against Halicarnassus 334.

§ 12 17 ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν]  
 This is equivalent to the Latin maxim:  
 si bellum vitare vis, bellum para (Con-  
 greve). SUSEM. (857)

c. 12 § 1 19 τὰ δὲ τείχη... 21 ἐπι-  
 καίρους] So Xenoph. *Cyrop.* vii. 5 § 12,  
 towers for guard-rooms ἀνίστη δὲ πολλοὺς  
 πύργους, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστα φυλακτήρια εἴη  
 and Polyb. viii. 17. 5 of Cretan merce-  
 naries at Sardis συνέβαινε δὲ τοὺς Κρητὰς  
 πεπιστευθῆναι τι τῶν φυλακτηρίων τῶν κατὰ  
 τοὺς ὀπισθεν τόποις τῆς ἀκρας (J. G.  
 Schneider). SUSEM. (858)

20 διειληφθαι] c. 7 § 1, 1327 b 22,  
 διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσι.

21 αὐτὰ] Vahlen on *Poet.* c. 15 § 12,  
 1454 b 17 out of several instances has



άζειν ἕνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς φυλακτηρί- (X)  
 § 2 οἷς. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἂν τις διακοσμήσειε  
 τὸν τρόπον· τὰς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδομένας οἰκήσεις XI  
 25 καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει τό-  
 πον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν  
 ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθό- (p. 115)  
 § 3 χρηστον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει  
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιώντα  
 30 μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμυνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον  
 τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἷαν καὶ περὶ  
 § 4 Θετταλίαν νομίζουσιν, ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ'  
 ἐστὶν ἣν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὠνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε  
 βάναισον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν τοιούτων παρα-

24 θεοῖς P<sup>4</sup> Ar., θεοῖς the other authorities and Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 25 τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων  
 ? Susem., τὰ κυριώτατα <τὰ> τῶν Ridgeway (but see § 7, 1331 b 6 ff.) || ἀρχείων  
 P<sup>4</sup>, ἀρχῶν P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald., ἀρχαίων the other authorities || [συσσίτια] Spengel ||  
 28 ἐπιφάνειαν—θέσιν] θέσιν—ἐπιφάνειαν Thomas Aquinas, approved by Chandler and  
 Spengel, perhaps rightly. If so, τε must be bracketed or transposed to follow ἔχει  
 πρὸς || 29 ἀρετῆς] ἱερατείας ? Jackson || ἀρετῆς θέσιν] θέσεως ἀρετῆν Lambin ||  
 θέσιν] ξεν Götting, ἔφεσιν Eaton, θεῶν Schneider. If this latter be accepted, either  
 with Susem.<sup>1</sup> read [ἐπιφάνειαν τε] as a gloss, or with Bücheler transpose ἐπιφάνειαν  
 τε to follow θεῶν || 32 νομίζουσιν Lambin, ὀνομάζουσιν Γ II Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in  
 the text || 34 τῶν τοιούτων] τοιούτων M<sup>1</sup> II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., also P<sup>1</sup> (corr.) and apparently  
 Ar. (perhaps rightly)

one similar: *De anima* II. 4 § 12, 416 a  
 10 αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τρεφόμενον. Add  
*Pol.* III. 5. 4, 1278 a 14.

Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly:  
 "Aristotle's idea is that the messes of the  
 several divisions of the citizens shall be  
 held at the immediate sphere of their  
 employment: those of the φύλακες in the  
 φυλακτήρια and πύργοι where they are on  
 duty. Similarly the common meal of the  
 ἄρχοντες is in the town hall." Hence he  
 proposes to read τὰ κυριώτατα τὰ τῶν  
 ἀρχείων, which is open to the objection:  
 non omnium magistratuum sed superiorum  
 tantum praetoria circa forum superius  
 iacent. SUSEM.

§ 2 27 μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον]  
 Thus Aristotle places all the regulations  
 for religion and 'cultus' in his ideal state  
 under the Delphic oracle precisely as  
 Plato does *Rcp.* IV. 427 B (Congreve).  
 SUSEM. (859).

§ 3 28 ἐπιφάνειαν τε κτλ] C.p. Vitruv.  
 I. 7: aedibus vero sacris, quorum deorum  
 maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, in  
 excelssissimo loco, unde moenium maxima

pars conspicitur, areae distribuantur  
 (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly Plato  
*Latus* VI. 778 c, the temples to be built  
 all round the Agora and the city around  
 them πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων εὐερκίας  
 τε καὶ καθαρότητος χάριν: VIII. 848 D  
 (similarly in the twelve κῶμαι). SUSEM.  
 (860)

Add Pausan. IX. 22 εὐ δέ μοι Τανα-  
 γραῖοι νομίσαι τὰ ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα  
 δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γὰρ αἱ οἰκίαι  
 σφίσι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἱερά ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν  
 καθαρῷ τε ἐστί καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπων. Xeno-  
 phon gives as Socrates' opinion: ναοὶς γε  
 μὴ καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπω-  
 δεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὐσα ἀστι-  
 βεστάτη εἴη, *Mcm.* III. 8. 10.

31 περὶ Θετταλίαν] Also, according  
 to Xenophon's romance, amongst the  
 Persians also: *Cyrus*. I. 2. 3, ἔστιν αὐτοῖς  
 ἐλευθέρα ἀγορὰ καλουμένη, ἐνθα τὰ τε  
 βασίλεια καὶ τὰλλα ἀρχαία πεποιήται.  
 SUSEM. (861)

See Blümner *Privatalte*.<sup>3</sup> § 18 p. 134 n.  
 (2). ἀγορὰ was also used as a term for  
 'harbour' in Thessaly (Hesychius).

35 βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἴη δ' ἂν (XI)  
 εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων  
 § 5 ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρησθαι κατὰ τὰς  
 ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέ-  
 39 ροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ  
 § 6 τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρου-  
 σία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευ-  
 1331 b θέρων φόβον)· τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύ-  
 της εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς, ἔχουσιν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε  
 ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας  
 πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται εἰς ἱερεῖς 3  
 5 εἰς ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν  
 § 7 τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχείων

39 τὰς—πρεσβύτερας Γ, τὰ—πρεσβύτερα apparently M<sup>s</sup>

1331 b 4 τῆς πόλεως after διαιρεῖται II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., thus avoiding hiatus, “there must be some mistake” Congreve, ? πολιτεύματος Susem. || 5 <καὶ> eis Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, [eis] <καὶ> ? Susem. But if 4 τῆς πόλεως is right, ὀπλίτας or στρατιώτας must have been dropped and eis may be a trace of this, [eis] <καὶ> ἄρχοντας <καὶ ὀπλίτας> Weldon, combining these suggestions || τὴν omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (supplied in P<sup>1</sup> by corr.), untranslated by Ar. Perhaps rightly, if there is really a lacuna after οἰκοδομημάτων || τὴν—6 οἰκοδομημάτων] τὰ—οἰκοδομήματα Ridgeway || 6 χώραν inserted after οἰκοδομημάτων by Bas.<sup>3</sup> It should be ἀγορὰν which may just as well be understood; οἰκοδομημάτων <χώραν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐν τοῖς ἀρχείοις τὴν αὐτὴν> Spengel

§ 4 34 παραβάλλειν] Intrude upon, approach: *N.É.* VII. 13 § 6, 1153 b 34 παραβάλλειν εἰς ἡδονὰς καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν: *Hist. anim.* VIII. 12 § 11, 597 b 15: ὅταν ἐκείθεν παραβάλλωσιν sc. ὄρνυγες. *De gen. anim.* III. 11 § 31, 763 a 31, περὶ ῥόδον παραβαλόντος ναυτικοῦ στρατοῦ.

§ 5 39 ἄρχοντάς τινας] Either special magistrates: cp. VII(VI). 8 § 22 γυμνασιάρχια, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοῦς καὶ Διονυσιακοῦς with *n.* (1484)—or the παιδονόμοι, for whom see c. 16 § 12 *n.* (943), c. 17 § 5 (958), § 7 (960), § 10 (963), § 12 (969): VI(IV). 15 § 3 (1345), § 9 (1355), § 13: VII(VI). 8 § 22 *n.* (1483) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUSEM. (862)

τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους] In order that they may be kept in check by the presence of the magistrates: *Introd.* p. 52. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 *f. n.* (962). SUSEM. (863)

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ] See c. 9 above. SUSEM. (864)

5 The repetition of eis before ἄρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the

soldiers form an important element of τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, it is probable either that they were mentioned here (possibly the double eis conceals some corruption), or that πόλεως is itself a corruption of πολιτεύματος, the governing body. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 409—411. It is apparent from a comparison of II. 6. 2, 1264 b 32, eis δύο μέρη, τὸ μὲν eis γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ eis τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος, and *infra* c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 30 ff. διηρηται...τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν eis τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ eis τὰ καλὰ, how much harsher the text is than would be the following e.g. τὸ μὲν eis ἱερεῖς τὸ δὲ eis ἄρχοντας.

With τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων understand, from b 1, ἀγορὰν as in b 11. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 410. This removes one of Prof. Ridgeway's objections (*Transactions* II. p. 143), but it is still strange that ἱερῶν should be an adjective here when it is a substantive § 2, § 8.

6 ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν=τετάχθαι, as § 4, 1331 a 37. So ἔχειν τιμὴν=τιμᾶσθαι,



ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γρα- (XI)  
φὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην  
διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην  
10 ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κα-  
τεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι  
τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ  
πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις.

§ 8 νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρή τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν 4  
15 χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὕλωρους  
οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν  
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμη-  
μένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν.

§ 9 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους καὶ λέγον- (p. 116)  
20 τας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἄργον ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ  
τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ

8 τὴν after ἄλλην omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly, [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 10 καὶ  
κάν ? Susem. || κατεσκευάσθαι P<sup>1</sup>, κατασκευάσθαι S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>, κατασκευάσθαι M<sup>a</sup> ||  
14 μεμνησθαι P<sup>3-5-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>2-4</sup> (1st hand, νενε in P<sup>2</sup> is written over  
an erasure), νενεμνησθαι P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 16 ἀγορανόμους P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, cor-  
rected by a later hand)

1333 b 35; *Ex.* τὴν φύσιν = πεφυκέναι,  
1330 b 14; ἐπιμέλειαν = ἐπιμελείσθαι,  
1330 b 11; αἰσθῆσιν = αἰσθάνεσθαι, 1340 a  
3 (cp. 1253 a 17); not to mention various  
phrases: ἔχειν δυσχέρειαν, μοχθήριαν, δυσμέ-  
νειαν, διαφορὰν, δυσκολίαν, which are equi-  
valent to εἶναι δυσχερές, μοχθηρόν, δυσ-  
μενές, διάφορον, δύσκολον. Comp. Vahlen  
*Arist. Anfs.* II. p. 30 f.

§ 7 9 ἀγορανομίαν... 10 ἀστυνομίαν]  
Comp. II. 5. 21 n. (176 b), VI(IV). 15. 9  
n. (1354), § 22 n. (1373); VII(VI). 8 §§ 3—5  
nn. (1461, 1463, 1468). SUSEM. (866)

10 συνόδῳ] As in II. 9. 31, 1271 a 28  
n. meeting, gathering. Cp. 1319 a 32.

11 περὶ has almost the meaning of a  
possessive gen., cp. c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 18.

§ 8 14 τάξιν is the so-called cognate  
accus. after νενεμῆσθαι.

15 οὓς καλοῦσιν. κτλ.] Comp. VII(VI).  
8. 6 n. (1465) for these wood-rangers or  
foresters. Plato has the term ἀγρονόμοι  
*Laus* VI. 760 ff. SUSEM. (866)

16 φυλακτήρια κτλ.] Comp. Plato  
*Laus* VIII. 848 D: for the twelve κῶμαι,  
exactly as VI. 778 C for the Agora (Eaton).  
See the citation n. (860). SUSEM. (867)

§ 9 19 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν κτλ.] Cp. 1.

11. 5, 1258 b 34 f. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος  
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρησίμων, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ  
ἐνδιατρίβειν.

20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν] Comp. c. 7 § 9,  
1328 a 19 ff., n. (794). SUSEM. (868).

22 εὐχῆς ἔργον] Another of the pas-  
sages cited in n. (128) on II. I. I. SUSEM.  
(869)

This next chapter, c. 13, is preliminary  
to that detailed account of Education in  
the best state which forms the subject of  
the treatise from c. 14 to the (incomplete)  
termination of B. v(VIII). We have here  
a string of remarks on the end of the  
state, and the best means to secure it by  
a given character in the citizens: remarks  
not very dissimilar to parts of cc. 1—3,  
or again to c. 14. For this reason the  
chapter has been bracketed by Congreve  
and Broughton, either wholly or in part.  
See *Anal.* p. 115 f., *Introd.* p. 88 f.  
Prof. J. Cook Wilson's view, as there  
stated, is that c. 13 seems like a shorter  
duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "The chief  
difference is that c. 13, 1332 a 7—9,  
takes the definition of the Good in the  
general form given in *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 7  
(or *Eud. Eth.* II. 1), while cc. 14—15,

μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλείον ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν,  
 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποίων δεῖ XII  
 25 συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ  
 § 2 πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο ἐστὶν ἐκ οἷς γί-  
 νεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοις δ' ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκο-  
 πὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς  
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ  
 30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ  
 ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυ-  
 χεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος  
 πάντων ἐπιτυχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαῦλον,  
 ὅτε δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἱατρικὴν οὔτε [γὰρ]  
 35 ποῖόν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς,  
 οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιη-  
 τικῶν· δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμασι ταῦτα ἀμ-  
 φότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις).  
 § 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται 2  
 40 πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν,  
 τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τινὰ φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-

23 ἐπιπλεῖον P<sup>2-3-4</sup> Ald., ἐπὶ πλεῖν P<sup>1</sup> (perhaps rightly) || 24 ἐκ inserted before ποίων by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, [ἐκ] Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 25 συνεστάναι M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 26 πολιτεύεσθαι Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, πολιτεύεσθαι II Bk.<sup>1</sup> || [ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο... 1332 a 27 τέχνη] Congreve, who calls it an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning, [ἐπεὶ... 1332 b 11 ἀκούοντες] Broughton and Wilson, the latter considering c. 13 a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15: see *Introd.* p. 88 f. and *Comm. nn.* (876, 879, 881, 948, 949) || 28 τῶν <ὀρθῶν> P<sup>4-5-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || 31 καλὸς Γ P<sup>1</sup> || 32 ὅτε P<sup>4</sup>, ἐνίοτε P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 34 γὰρ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, inserted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 41 τύχην ἢ φύσιν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. and perhaps M<sup>1</sup>

like *Nic. Eth.* x., distinguish between the life of moral virtue and the higher life of philosophic contemplation. In c. 13 there is no consciousness of what seems implied in c. 15, that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the καλὸν as θεωρεῖν. In the version of c. 13 the language which follows the words φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, 1332 a 7, has more affinity for the Eudemean than the Nicomachean Ethics" (*Journal of Phil.* x. 84 ff.).

§ 1 26—38 Eudemos reproduces this *E. E.* II. II. 3, 1227 b 19—22. The whole period b 26—1332 a 3 is excellently discussed by Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* II. III. p. 94 sq. SUSEM.

§ 2 29 εὐρίσκειν = assequi. See 1330 b 5 n. So λαβεῖν = ascertain. Yet below b 38 κρατεῖσθαι = to be won, secured.

30 ταῦτα are (1) τὸ τέλος and (2) αἱ πρὸς τὸ τέλος φέρουσαι πράξεις. See b 38.

34 οἷον περὶ ἱατρικὴν] References to Medicine have occurred II. 8. 18 n. (270), III. c. 6 § 7 n. (531), c. 11 §§ 10, 11, c. 15 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 § 6 ff. Also IV (VII). c. 2 § 13 n. (726). SUSEM. (870)

35 τὸ ὑγιαίνειν εἶναι σῶμα] Note that εἶναι is transposed. The order is ποῖόν τι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν σῶμα δεῖ εἶναι, in what condition the patient should be left, in order to be well.

§ 3 41 χορηγίας τινός] Certain resources, means, prerequisites, auxiliaries. For this meaning cp. *N. Eth.* I. 8. 15, 1099 a 31—33, καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀρχορήγητον ὄντα, I. 10. 15, 1101 a 14 f. τὸν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, X. 8. 4, 1178 a 23 ff., § 9,



<sup>1332</sup> α ρηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς (XII)

§ 4 ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον), οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκειμένον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἀριστ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἀριστα δ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν· δηλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστὶ, μὴ λαυθάνειν.

§ 5 φαμὲν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων s

<sup>1332</sup> α 1 τοῦτου] ταύτης Schneider needlessly || 2 εὐθὺς] αἰθῖς Madvig, wrongly (αἰθῖς is not found in Arist.) || 4 ἐστὶν ἀρίστην M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> omitting τὴν, hence [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 6 ἐνδέχοιτο M<sup>a</sup> and perhaps Γ || 8 διωρίσμεθα omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || τι] τε M<sup>a</sup>, τι γε P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>): the word is untranslated by William

1178 b 33 (Eaton). These are the auxiliary causes or indispensable conditions (see n. 795) of Wellbeing. SUSEM. (871)

§ 4 <sup>1332</sup> α 2 οἱ δ' εὐθὺς] The δὲ answers μὲν of 1331 b 40: 'whereas others, with the means at their command, from the outset miss the right way to attain happiness.' For this sense of εὐθὺς comp. I. 5. 2, 1254 a 23 εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. Bonitz *Ind.* s. v. distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16. 9, 1287 b 10, I. 8. 9, 1256 b 9, κατὰ τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς; so VI(IV). II. 6, 1295 b 16, εὐθὺς οἰκοθεν, and VIII(V). c. 4 § 9, 1304 a 30, § 12, 1304 b 9, c. 5 § 3, 1304 b 32, c. 11 § 23, 1314 b 29: (2) a quasi-causal sense, suapte natura, = φύσει εὐθὺς (ὑπάρχει), as in V(VIII). 5. 23, 1340 a 40: (3) introducing, in a series of reasons, one which is at once perfectly obvious, as I. 13. 6, 1260 a 4, III. 4. 6, 1277 a b, IV(VII). 14. 2, 1332 b 18, V(VIII). 2. 2, 1337 b 2.

3 ἐπεὶ... 7 λαυθάνειν] It is pointed out in Exc. I. (p. 559) that the same expression has already been employed twice before, (i) in c. 1 § 1 ff. and, (ii) in cc. 8 and 9 (c. 8 § 4 f. 1328 a 35—39, with which must go c. 9 § 3, 1328 b 34—39, § 7, 1329 a 22). The first time this resulted in an independent investigation of the nature of Happiness, εὐδαιμονία, while on the second occasion Happiness was merely defined (as ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τέλειος 1328 a 38), without further explanation and without reference either to the previous discussion of c. 1, or to the *Ethics*. Hence—assuming the genuineness of c. 13 and especially observing that in this present passage, too, the discussion of c. 1 is ignored—we inferred that the first chapter of our present book was

not intended, in Aristotle's final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the *Ethics* there (i.e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 f., c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 1, φαμὲν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα, where the present φαμὲν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 n. (804), 1329 b 41 n. (831), 1331 a 19 n. (902)—in the sense of ἐφαμεν, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp. also n. (807) and I. 2. 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (872)

§ 5 8 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* I. 7. 9 ff., esp. § 15, 1098 a 15 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8. SUSEM. (873) εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων δφέλος] It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle's love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see n. 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [*Dialoge*, p. 72], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men like Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. SUSEM. (874)

With far less probability Grote in an essay on the *Ethics* (in *Fragments* p. 133 f.) connects this passage with *Nic. Eth.* I. 3. 2 f., 1094 b 14 ff. and II. 2. 3—5, 1104 a 1—11 (πειρατέον βοηθεῖν) as an indication of Aristotle's despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): "that Aristotle regarded

9 ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ (XII)  
 § 6 ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (p. 117)  
 τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς. οἶον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-  
 12 καίας πράξεις αἱ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-  
 τῆς μὲν εἰσιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως  
 ἔχουσιν (αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων  
 15 μῆτε τὸν ἄνδρα μῆτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ  
 § 7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος ἀναίρεσις ἐστίν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις  
 τούναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις.

10 ταύτης ? Stahr, not badly || 12 αἱ <γὰρ> Reiz || διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας Jackson, δίκαιαι (δίκαιαι αἱ Γ Μ\* and apparently Ar.) τιμωρία Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || καὶ (before κολάσεις) omitted by Γ Ar. || 13 καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι omitted by P<sup>1-5</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 14 [μὲν] Koraes, perhaps rightly || 15 δ' ἐπὶ δὲ περὶ ? Schneider || 16 εὐδοξίας ? Spengel, προεδρίας ? Jackson || κάλλισται καλαὶ ? Spengel || 17 ἀναίρεσις Schneider, αἵρεσις Γ Π Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text. Cp. 1332 b 36.

the successful prosecution of ethical inquiries as all but desperate."

9 The grammatical subject of εἶναι is εὐδαιμονίαν. The definition in full is ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks I. p. 575 f., II. 385—401.

τελείαν] We may paraphrase: "matured and relatively permanent." See Rassow *Forschungen* p. 116 ff. Happiness of too short duration is not true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age: for a child has not yet attained to Well-being, because its virtue is not yet developed: *Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, 1100 a 1 ff., cp. *Pol.* I. 13. 11, n. (120). The corresponding negative term, too, ἀτελής, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development: I. 13. 7 f. (cp. § 11), III. 11. 9 n. (572), V(VII). 5. 10 n. (1033). SUSEM. (876)

10—21] Respexit haec Eudemus VII. 2. 43 (56), 1238 b 5 sqq. SUSEM.

10 ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] This is not to be found in *Nic. Ethics*, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (881), he is the author of this chapter. SUSEM. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'absolute' are attributes not very suitable to moral or virtuous activity, or goods in general.

§ 6 11 τἀναγκαῖα] On this passage see Dr Jackson's article, *Journal of Phil.* X. 311, to which should be added that he justifies "the rather abrupt use of the word τἀναγκαῖα for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato *Rep.* VI. 493 C: ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλὰ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μῆτε ἑωρακῶς εἶη κτλ." Cp. c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 32: πρακτά=(1) ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα, (2) καλὰ; and *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 5, 1116 b 2 f. δεῖ δ' οὐ δεῖ ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.

τὸ καλῶς] sc. πραχθέν. But below, a 13, τὸ καλῶς, sc. ἔχειν = nobleness or beauty as a quality of actions.

13 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν] 'They are of the character of a necessary evil' (Congreve). SUSEM. (877)

14 τῶν τοιούτων, sc. τιμωριῶν καὶ κολάσεων.

15 ἐπὶ = to secure; the final sense of ἐπὶ c. acc. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 268 b 59 ff., Eucken II. p. 58.

§ 7 17 ἀναίρεσις] Postgate defends the vulgate αἵρεσις = choice, in the sense that of two evils we choose the less. For me this is too subtle. SUSEM. (877 b)

αἱ τοιαῦται] sc. αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς.



χρήσαιοτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσφ καὶ  
 20 ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακά-  
 ριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώριται κατὰ  
 τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ὃ διὰ τὴν  
 § 8 ἀρετὴν [τὰ] ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ  
 τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας  
 25 ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἷτια  
 τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμ-  
 πρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

22 δι' ἀρετὴν, omitting τὴν, M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: hence [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 23 [τὰ]  
 before ἀγαθὰ Reiz Bk.<sup>2</sup> || δὲ Sepulveda, δ' Γ Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || δὲ  
 καὶ ὅτι apparently Γ (palam autem et quod William) || 27 αἰτιῶτο <τις> P<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> ||  
 ἢ λύρα Γ, perhaps rightly

19 χρήσαιοτο δ' ἂν Comp. Nic. Eth.  
 I. 10. 11 f., 1100 b 18 ff., where this  
 is presented as a special feature of Mag-  
 nanimity (cp. c. 7 § 7, n. 790). Again in  
 Post. Analytics II. 13. 18, 97 b 15 ff., this,  
 τὸ ἀδιάφορο εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦν-  
 τες, is mentioned as a second mark of the  
 high-souled character (μεγαλόψυχος) along  
 with that adduced in n. (790), τὸ μὴ ἀνέ-  
 χεσθαι ὑβριζόμενοι (Eaton). SUSEM. (878)  
 Cp. χρήσις in N. E. I. 10. 12, 1100 b 27,  
 χρήσθαι § 13, 1101 a 4.

20 τὸ μακάριον The decision in N. E.  
 I. 10. 14, 1101 a 6, is ἀθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε  
 γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε,  
 ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. Cp. ib. I.  
 10. 3, 1100 a 16 f., and the absurd deriva-  
 tion from χαίρειν, VII. 11. 2, 1152 b 7.

21 κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους Nic.  
 Eth. III. c. 4 [c. 6, Bk.], esp. § 4, 1113  
 a 25, τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν  
 (sc. βουλευτὸν) εἶναι sc. φατέον βουλευτὸν, a 32  
 διαφέρει πλείστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθὲς ἐν  
 ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν. It is quite true the statement  
 is not made there in so many words: this  
 is much more nearly the case in the two  
 spurious treatises, Eud. Eth. VII. 15. 5,  
 1248 b 26 ff., Magna Moralia II. 9. 14,  
 1207 b 31 ff. SUSEM. (879) Comp.  
 also Rhét. I. 6. 2, 1362 a 24 ff.

§ 8 24 τὰς χρήσεις The plural as  
 ἐνέργειαι. In fact χρήσις and ἐνέργεια are  
 both opposed to ἔξις. The use which  
 from time to time he makes of these  
 goods (not of their opposites) attests  
 his absolute virtuousness and goodness.  
 Hence to consider external goods the  
 cause of Wellbeing is the same thing as  
 to attribute to the instrument what is  
 really the result of the player's skill.

25 διὸ... 26 ἀγαθῶν] Because external

goods are just those which while abso-  
 lutely good (ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ) are not good  
 for every one, but only good at all times  
 to the good man: Nic. Eth. v. 1. 9, 1129  
 b 1 ff., ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἀδικος, περὶ  
 τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα  
 εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ  
 ἀγαθὰ, τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ, Meta. Z (VII). 4. 2,  
 1029 b 5, καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν  
 ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγα-  
 θῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστω ἀγαθὰ. SUSEM.  
 (880) The distinction is drawn N. E.  
 VII. 12. 1, 1152 b 26 f. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς  
 τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί. See N. E. I. 3.  
 3, 1094 b 17 ff.: wealth and strength are  
 instances, since they have proved in some  
 cases fatal (τινὲ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ).

c. 13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see Crit.  
 note on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets  
 the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26  
 ἐπεὶ δὲ... to 1332 a 27 τῆς τέχνης, as an  
 unnecessary interruption of the reasoning.  
 "What was said" (a 28, τῶν εἰρημένων)  
 would then mean what was said cc. 4—  
 12; and that would undoubtedly serve  
 to explain what according to §§ 9, 10  
 requires explanation ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. But  
 then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ  
 σπουδαῖον κτλ lacks all proper connexion  
 unless it has been directly preceded by  
 the statement that Wellbeing consists in  
 the practice of virtue assisted by the re-  
 quisite external conditions. This alone  
 makes all follow in regular order: these  
 conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend  
 on Fortune, but if the external condi-  
 tions are present it is the governing intel-  
 ligence that produces virtue. Hence the  
 fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispen-  
 sable for the context, and the athetesis of  
 that passage is not the right way to re-

ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, §  
 § 9 τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχό-  
 30 μεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὣν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαν  
 γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν). τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν  
 οὐκέτι τῆς τύχης ἔργον ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ  
 μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοῦς πολίτας τοῦς μετέχοντας  
 34 τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους. ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται  
 § 10 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γί-

29 κατατυχεῖν Koraes, κατ' εὐχὴν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, καὶ τυχεῖν  
 Madvig, κατέχειν Schmidt, καὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν ? Jackson || 31 αὐτὴν inserted after γὰρ  
 by P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>5</sup> Ar. Ald. W<sup>b</sup> Bk., perhaps also by S<sup>b</sup> || 32 τῆς omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. ||  
 33 γε omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || τῷ Γ Ald. W<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), τὸ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> 3-4-5 S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar.  
 and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand)

move the objection noticed in *nn.* (687, 872), although we do not deny, and in *n.* (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inserted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. For, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton's objections to the genuineness of c. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in *nn.* (876, 879), which taken by itself is far from decisive; while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embedded in the context of c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f.; cp. *n.* (931). SUSEM. (881)

28 ἐκ] It follows from what has been said: cp. *n.* on 1254 a 31.

τὰ μὲν = ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποῶν δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν = χρήσις ἀρετῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ τάγαθὰ ἀπλῶς. To this is opposed the work of the legislator as in I. 10. 1, 1258 a 21 ff., II. 5. 8, 1263 a 39, II § 15, 1273 b 21. The drift of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two requisites, the one, *χορηγία*, is due to Fortune: the other, *ἀρετή*, is the legislator's task (*σκεπτέον*). Cp. 1333 a 14 *πραγματευτέον*, viz. by education. 'Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance.'

§ 9 29 εὐχόμεθα] Another of the passages cited *n.* (128). SUSEM. (883)

30 τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν] The

structure of the state = the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune's disposal. The relative clause is the object of *κατατυχεῖν*.

κυρίαν γὰρ] For here we acknowledge that Fortune is supreme. Comp. c. 1 § 10, 1323 b 27 f., *nn.* (707, 795, 871); Zeller<sup>3</sup> *op. c.* II. ii. p. 333. SUSEM. (882)

32 ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως] 'The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (will), the two conditions of all right action, the *εἰδὼς* and *προαιρούμενος* of *N. Eth.* II. 4. 3, 1105 a 30 f. (Congreve). On them depend virtue or vice, goodness or badness of character. See further *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 1—5, dealing with the intellect and moral action; also *n.* (121) on I. 13. 12. SUSEM. (884)

34 ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες] Here still more clearly than at c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 19, it is laid down that all the citizens of the best state have perfectly equal rights. Cp. *nn.* (816, 817); III. c. 1 §§ 9, 10, c. 13 § 12, *nn.* (440, 599). SUSEM. (885)

§ 10 35 πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεταί σπουδαῖος] By this term Aristotle denotes only the man of developed and matured virtue and excellence. See III. 3. 3, *n.* (470), and *n.* (112) on I. 13. 6: further *Nic. Eth.* VI. 1. 7, 1139 a 15, 2 § 6, 1139 b 12 f. Comp. Walter *op. c.* p. 283 ff. In what sense the words *εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπ. εἶναι μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον* δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν are to be taken is clear from III. c. 11 §§ 2—4, 1281 a 42 ff., esp. b 4 f. πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μῦθον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ γίνεσθαι συνεκδόντων ὥσπερ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον, *n.* (565 b): c. 13 §§ 3, 4, 1283 a 37 ff. See further IV(VII). c. 1



- 36 νεται σπουδαίος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους (XII)  
εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον·  
ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.
- § 11 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ 6  
40 τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶ-  
τον οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶων, εἴτα καὶ (p. 113)  
ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὄφελος  
1332 b φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ  
τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον  
§ 12 καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶων μάλιστα μὲν 7  
τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ  
5 καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφω-

41 εἴτα P<sup>5</sup> (later hand) and Lambin, οὕτω Π<sup>1-2</sup> Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand) || 42 δὲ Γ, τε II Ar. Bk.

1332 b 1 μεταβαλεῖν II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || ἔνια...3 βέλτιον observed to be defective by Conring || γάρ] δέ? Schneider || ἐστὶ διὰ] ἐστὶν ἰδία Koraes || [διὰ] Götting, βίβη Lindau, against the sense || 2 φύσεως <καὶ> in the margin || <ἀ> διάγεται> διὰ? Susem., <ἀ> διὰ and <ῥέπει> ἐπὶ Schmidt, ἐθῶν <δὲ μεταβαλλόμενα>? Conring, ἐθῶν \* \* or else [διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν] Thurot || δὲ is added after διὰ by Alb. and Thomas || 3 βέλτιον <ἀγόνται> Schneider (who also brackets b 1 ἐστὶ), βέλτιον <ἀγόμενα> Welldon who also reads 2 διὰ <δὲ> τῶν ἐθῶν || 5 ὥστε...6 ἀλλήλοις transposed by Böcker to precede 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν: see *Introd.* p. 89. Susem. had observed that in its traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 πολλὰ γὰρ...7 βέλτιον || 5 μόνος Spengel (*solus* Ar.), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII(v). 9. 12, 1310 a 18 f. n. (1642). SUSEM. (886) As here the virtue of the whole state is unequally diffused through the citizens (as was doubtless the case in the existing democracies), so (II. 5. 27) we find unequal distribution of happiness discussed. For the antithesis πάντες )( ὡς ἕκαστος, see II. 3. 2, 1261 b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII(v). 8. 3, 1307 b 35 ff.

39 ἀλλὰ μὴν...40 λόγος] This is repeated c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f., n. (931). Comp. *N. Eth.* x. 9. 6, 1179 b 20 f., γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθὸν οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει οἱ δ' ἐθει οἱ δὲ διδασκῇ. As in that passage λόγος, reason, is replaced by διδασκῇ, instruction, so in B. II. 5. 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by φιλοσοφία, culture. Comp. also II. 8. 24, 1269 a 20: the coercive force of law is due to custom and involves time. SUSEM. (887)

41 εἴτα καὶ...42 ψυχὴν] For slaves by birth are still men, though incapable of real human excellence I. 5. 8, 1254 b 16 ff., I. 13. 2 f., 1259 b 22—28. In *Nic. Eth.* vi. 13, 1144 b 1 ff., Aristotle treats

of these good or bad natural dispositions, or qualities (αἱ φυσικαὶ ἕξεις), as the necessary conditions for the future growth of the real moral and intellectual qualities or aptitudes (ἐξεις), which correspond to them. Comp. n. (1043), i.e. Exc. III. on B. v(VIII). SUSEM. (888)

42 ἔνια is subject to φῦναι, but in the next line it must be the object governed by μεταβάλλειν.

§ 11 1332 b 1 ἔνια γὰρ...3 βέλτιον] That there is some flaw in this sentence will hardly be disputed. Aretinus translates well enough to show the meaning, 'nam aliqua per naturam ad utrumque apta per mores ad peius vel melius convertuntur'; but in this he can scarcely have followed any manuscript. SUSEM.

§ 12 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κτλ.] In form this sentence recalls *Meta.* I. 1. 3, 980 b 25—28, *N. E.* VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 19—22.

4 μικρὰ is accus., ἔνια nominative. The gender of μόνον is a parallel to τελεωθέν and χωρισθέν, I. 2. 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν] Habit should cooperate with natural endowment. This

- νεῖν ἀλλήλοις. <τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζώων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει> (XII)  
 4 <ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον>  
 <γὰρ ἔχει λόγον> πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμους καὶ τὴν φύσιν  
 7 πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.  
 § 13 τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλον-  
 τας εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον·  
 10 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι  
 μαθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.  
 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόν- XIII  
 των καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτέον, εἰ ἐτέρους εἶναι  
 δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ  
 15 βίου· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν

\* 8 τοίνυν omitted and δὴ inserted after φύσιν by M<sup>4</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin): presumably τοίνυν and δὴ (*before* φύσιν) were variants. In Bk.<sup>2</sup> φύσιν is omitted by mistake || 10 ἐθιζόμενα II<sup>2</sup> || 13 ἤδη] εἶναι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), δὴ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.), possibly right || ἐτέρους—14 τοὺς αὐτοὺς I II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, τοὺς αὐτοὺς—14 ἐτέρους Susem.<sup>2-3</sup> Madvig first suspected corruption, but proposed ἀρχομένους, [ἢ] || 15 τὴν omitted by P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup>

is a satisfactory sense; see however p. 89 for Prof. Wilson's view (ταῦτα=reason, habit, natural endowment: all three).

§ 13 9 πρότερον] In c. 7. SUSEM. (889) 10 τὰ μὲν γὰρ] By habituation (ἐθιζόμενοι) arises moral virtue, by instruction (ἀκούοντες) intellectual virtue, *Nic. Eth.* II. I. 1, 1103 a 14 ff. These are the two sides of Education: *N. E.* II. I. 8, 1103 b 22 ff., x. 9, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (890)

11 ἀκούοντες] Cp. *N. E.* x. 9. 7, 1179 b 27 οὗ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγον. Apparently ἐθιζόμενοι...ἀκούοντες corresponds to τῷ λόγῳ...τοῖς ἔθεσιν c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 18.

c. 14 *The distinction between rulers and ruled; whether absolute and life-long, or relative and temporary:* §§ 1—5.

§ 1 12—16] Comp. III. 4. 8 n. (477) for the distinction in education. SUSEM. (891)

13 f. Against the proposed transposition (see *Crit. n.*) Dr Jackson argues in the following note: 'Aristotle here contrasts (a) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (b) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. it might

be said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, "the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled"; or again it might be said that, when the functions alternate, "the same persons rule and are ruled." But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used simultaneously in both senses. Susemihl however, though he has altered the text in 1332 b 13, 14, so that the phrase τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι bears the latter of the two meanings above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the former of those meanings in 1332 b 22. Thus the alteration creates an inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in both places in the former of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intelligible.'

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Susemihl assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: "vitium inde ortum esse videtur, quod deinde pro τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἐτέρους εἶναι διὰ βίου potius dicitur αἰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχειν τοὺς δ' ἀρχεσθαι καθάπαξ (v. 22 sq.) et pro τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι accuratius πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι (v. 26 sq.)" *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 412. Where the reasons on each side are so equally balanced, the traditional order in the text indicates no more than *non liquet*.



§ 2 κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἶψαν τοσοῦτον (XIII)  
 διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς  
 ἥρωας ἡγοῦμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθύς πρῶτον  
 κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας ὑπερβολήν, εἴτα κατὰ  
 20 τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν  
 ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι  
 βέλτιον αἰεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι  
 § 3 καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ράδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν 2  
 Ἰνδοῖς φησι Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέ-  
 25 ροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας  
 ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν  
 καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον \* \* ταῦτόν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, καὶ  
 χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ  
 § 4 δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν  
 30 βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν· τοσοῦτους τε εἶναι

23 ὥσπερ] ὅπερ Reiz || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἄρχεσθαι  
 ? Schneider, [κατὰ μέρος] or 27 [καὶ ἄρχεσθαι], or else ἄρχεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μέρος  
 ἄρχειν Spengel (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἴσον <τῷ δικαίῳ> Thurot, ἴσον  
 <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον> Susem. from Dübner's translation || 29 νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι  
 transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Thurot || 30 βουλόμενων Vettori (in  
 his translation), Reiz, rightly || τε] δὲ ? Spengel

16 κατὰ = in virtue of. Cp. κατὰ ταῦτα  
 λέγεσθαι *Meta.* i. 6. 3, 987 b 9, Bonitz *ad loc.*  
 Eucken p. 43. This construction with ἀκο-  
 λουθεῖν is less frequent than the dative.  
 But cp. *N. E.* II. i. 8, 1103 b 23, κατὰ  
 γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ  
 ἔξεις, VII. 9. 6, 1151 b 34, καθ' ὁμοιότητα  
 ἡκολούθηκεν, *Hist. Animal.* VIII. 2. 13,  
 590 a 16, ἀκολουθοῦσιν οἱ βλοῖ κατὰ ταύτας  
 τὰς διαιρέσεις, a 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13  
 (*Ind. Ar.* 26 a 36 has, what is rare, a  
 double misprint, I' 2. 517 a 3).

§ 2 εἰ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ] Comp. i. 5. 10,  
 1284 b 34—36 with n. (47). SUSEM. (892)  
 Strikingly similar to Pl. *Politicus* 301 D, E:  
 νῦν δὲ γε ὅποτε οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενος, ὥς δὴ  
 φαμεν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν συμ-  
 νεσιν ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν  
 διαφέρων εἰς, δεῖ δὴ συνελθόντας ξυγγράμ-  
 ματα γράφειν.

22 βέλτιον αἰεὶ κτλ] This has been  
 affirmed II. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the  
 basis of the argument for Absolute Mon-  
 archy III. 13. 13. See *nn.* (601, 678).

§ 3 Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was  
 sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the  
 mouth of the Indus, Herod. IV. 44. We  
 may conclude with certainty from this  
 passage that he published an account of his

expedition in a book of travels. But the  
 geographical work, which has come down  
 to us bearing the name of Scylax, *Περὶ  
 πλοῦς τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν Ἡρακλέους στηλῶν*, is  
 of much later date. SUSEM. (893)

Comp. Niebuhr in *Phil. Museum* 1.  
 245.

24 τοὺς βασιλέας κτλ] Cp. VI(IV). 4.  
 4, n. (1165). In Ethiopia the kings were  
 chosen for their stature. SUSEM. (894)

27 τό τε γὰρ ἴσον <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον>  
 ταῦτόν] Where all the citizens are peers,  
 equality is the same thing as justice.  
 See III. 9 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (895)

Equality = τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρ-  
 χεσθαι, cp. 1261 a 30. From VIII(V). I.  
 11—13, 1301 b 26 ff., it is τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν  
 ἴσον which is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, while it is  
 τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἴσον which is ταῦτό.

28 χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν.....  
 32 ἔστιν] This passage condenses the  
 results of the inquiry into the stability and  
 instability of governments in B. VIII(V)  
 and VI(IV), especially recognising the  
 criterion of VIII(V). 9. 6, 1309 b 16 ff.,  
 and VI(IV). 12. 1, 1296 b 14 ff. ὅπως  
 κρείττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν.  
 See n. (1307).

τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι κρείττους τού-  
των πάντων, ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι 3  
γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβή-  
34 τητον. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσιν, δεῖ σκέψα-  
§ 5 σθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ  
φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα [αὐτῷ] τῷ γένει  
37 ταῦτ' ὅ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρ-  
χεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν. ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδεὶς καθ'  
ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἄλλως τε  
40 καὶ μέλλον ἀντιλαμβάνειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχη  
§ 6 τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἡλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν 4  
καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ὥστε καὶ τὴν  
1333 a παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἐτέραν  
εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασιν  
δεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἴρη-  
4 ται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.  
§ 7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν

31 τούτων after 32 πάντων P<sup>1-5</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 36 διαίρεσιν Ar., αἵρεσιν Γ II Bk., cp.  
1333 a 33 || αὐτῷ inserted by Ald. W<sup>b</sup> Bk., αὐτῶ M<sup>a</sup> and Γ after τῷ, αὐτὸ P<sup>2-3-4-5</sup>  
S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, τῶν αὐτῶν Bas.<sup>3</sup>, τὸ Spengel, omitted by P<sup>1</sup> Ar. || τῶν Ald. W<sup>b</sup> ||  
37 ταῦτον Bk., ταῦτῶ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>), *cosdem* Ar., un-  
translated by William, omitted by Bas.<sup>3</sup> || τὸ—τὸ] τοτέ—τοτέ M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 39 οὐδ'  
εἰ νομίζει Sepulveda, οὐδ' εἰ νομίζοι Koraes, not badly || 40 τὸν τοιοῦτον] τοῦτον  
τὸν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., perhaps right, *eundem* Ar.

1333 a 1 ἔστω] ἔστι μὲν Bk.<sup>2</sup>

§ 5 35 εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον] c. 9 §§  
4—6: see n. (812). SUSEM. (896)

41 ἱκνουμένης=προσηκούσης Bon. *Ind.*  
Ar. s. v. Found with ὥρα *Probl.* XX. 14,  
924 b 14; with ἔξις, ἐπιστήμη *Pol.* VI (IV).  
I. 2, 1288 b 16.

*Education to be in one sense the same  
for all; in another sense a different edu-  
cation for rulers and ruled: §§ 6—8.*

§ 6 1333 a 1 ἔστιν ὡς κτλ] The  
education is the same and yet different  
in so far as it has two different sides; it  
trains the governed to obey well, but only  
in so far as this would seem to teach  
them how to govern well in the future:  
thus so far it really teaches the future  
governors. Comp. Bonitz in *Zeitsch. f.*  
*d. östr. Gymn.* XVIII. 1867, p. 680 f.  
SUSEM. (897)

2 τὸν τε γάρ] With this whole pas-  
sage comp. III. 4. 10—14, 1277 a 25 n.

(490). This is one of the few instances  
in which τε γάρ=etenim, as is allowed  
by Bonitz, who discusses the Aristotelian  
usage of τε γάρ generally in the paper  
just cited p. 672 ff., esp. p. 680. SUSEM.  
(898)

English readers may consult Shilleto's  
critical note to Dem. *De Falsa Leg.* § 176.  
He cites Herod. IV. 167, Aristoph. *Pax*  
402, Ar. *Rhet.* III. 7. 11, 1408 b 17, and  
III. 11. 7, 1412 b 9, and further illustrates  
the similar usage of οὐτε γάρ.

3 ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἴρηται λόγοις] I.e.  
III. 6 §§ 6—10, 1278 b 30 ff. It is note-  
worthy that reference is only made to this  
passage, and not to the much more  
similar one quoted in n. (898). However,  
some such reference may have been lost,  
where the following context is defective.  
See n. (900); also n. (902). SUSEM.  
(899)



ἐλευθέρων. \* \* διαφέρει δ' ἔνια τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔρ-  
 γοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἔνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων δια-  
 κονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακο-  
 νεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτως δια-  
 10 φέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὥς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ  
 § 8 τίνος ἔνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν  
 ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν  
 ἀρχόμενον τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον,  
 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγα-  
 15 θοὶ γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ  
 τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς.  
 § 9 διήρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' 6  
 αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνά-

6 \* \* διαφέρει Conring, cp. B. III. c. 4 1277 a 29—b 30, and see Comm. n. (900) ||  
 11 πολιτικοῦ Rassow, πολιτεία M<sup>2</sup>, πολίτου Γ<sup>1</sup>·<sup>5</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text,  
 πολίτου <ἀρίστου> Spengel || αὐτὴν omitted by P<sup>4</sup>·<sup>6</sup> C<sup>2</sup> (?) || 13 δεῖν over an  
 erasure P<sup>4</sup>, δεῖ P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 14 πῶς Schneider, πῶς <ἀν> ? Koraes || 15 γίνονται  
 P<sup>2</sup>·<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk.<sup>1</sup>, γίνονται P<sup>2</sup>, γίνονται ? Koraes

§ 7 6 ἐλευθέρων \* \*] The passage which is wanting here, must have stated that in the government of the best state only the latter kind of rule can be in question, and that the power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 13, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause:—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use," 1277 b 5 ff. SUSEM. (900)

6 διαφέρει δ' ..... 11 τίνος ἔνεκεν] See V(VIII). 2. 6, 1337 b 17 ff. with n. (983). SUSEM. (901) The end redeems and ennobles apparently menial offices, as for a soldier to groom his own horse.

§ 8 If the good officer, who has learnt to command by obeying, is also the good man, how are we to train up good men? By this section we are brought back to 1332 a 36. But the last clause τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς carries us back further, to 1332 a 7 or the beginning of c. 13, 1331 b 24 ff. How tortuous the course of the discussion is, may be seen from the fact that after the Unity of Education we take its two main branches, moral and intellectual Educa-

tion; next criticise Sparta; then after much repetition arrive at a similar halting place to the present, 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐστὶ, τοῦτο δὲ θεωρητέον.

12 φαμεν] The present may well stand here also (see nn. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense: if so there is certainly a reference to III. 4 § 5. Comp. n. (471). SUSEM. (902)

14 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ..... 16 ζωῆς] The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φρόνησις has been clearly proved in III. 4. 17. The question now to be considered is which of the two rank the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also V(VIII), 2. 1 n. (977), also n. (1024) and Exc. I. to B. V(VIII). Also *Introd.* p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (903)

*Principle regulating the subordination of the semi-rational soul, the seat of moral virtue, to the properly rational soul, the seat of intellectual excellence: §§ 9—14. Application of this to the criticism of states (like Sparta) which make success in war the goal of education: §§ 15—22.*

§ 9 17 διήρηται δὲ κτλ.] See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (904)

μενον. ὧν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγε- (XIII)  
 20 ται πῶς. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτως  
 § 10 διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ  
 χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιονός ἐστιν ἔνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν ὁμοίως ἐν (p. 120)  
 τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν· βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον  
 ἔχον. [διήρηται τε διχῇ, καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαι- 7  
 25 ρεῖν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἐστι λόγος ὃ δὲ θεωρητικός.  
 § 11 ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διηρηθῆναι δηλον-  
 ὅτι.] καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς  
 τοῦ φύσει βελτιονοῦς αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ-  
 29 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἰρε-  
 § 12 τώτατον οὐ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ 8  
 31 βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολήν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρή-  
 νην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρή-  
 § 13 σιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλὰ. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν  
 αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξε-

20 πότερα M<sup>a</sup>, qua William || 24 [διήρηται...27 δηλονότι] Susem. || τε] δὲ Γ' ||  
 διχῇ <ὁ λόγος> Reiz, following Lambin's translation || 26 οὐ] δ' P<sup>1</sup> || καὶ τοῦτο  
 τὸ μέρος after διηρηθῆναι P<sup>1-5</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || δῆλον ὅτι Bk., omitted by Ald. W<sup>b</sup>, while Ar.  
 translates it after πράξεις: δῆλον <δ'> ὅτι Sylburg, <καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι Spengel. Both  
 Sylburg and Spengel omit 27 δέ, which neither William nor Ar. translates || 29 ἢ  
 πασῶν ἢ <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Ed. Müller (*Gesch. der Kunsttheorie* II. p. 370), ἢ πασῶν ἢ  
 τῶν δυοῖν Lindau, [ἢ] πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν Ridgeway, [ἢ] πασῶν [ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν] or else  
 [ἢ πασῶν ἢ] <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Susem.: Schmidt however conjectures that ὡν ἂν  
 βούλωνται has been dropped after δυοῖν || 31 [καὶ] πόλεμον Reiz || 32 [εἰς τὰ] and  
 33 [εἰς τὰ] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 42 b 26 ff., 632 a 29 f.: see however Vahlen *Ztschr. f. d.*  
*östr. Gym.* 1872 p. 540 || 33 [περὶ] and 34 αἵρεσιν Schneider, wrongly

§ 10 24 διήρηται] Sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχον.  
 The passage in brackets as far as 26 δηλον-  
 ὅτι is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, see  
 n. (40); and it would be quite appropriate  
 to raise here the further questions: In regard  
 to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or  
 the practical side that occupies the higher  
 place? Is it the intellectual develop-  
 ment of the former, or rather the culti-  
 vation of practical and political insight,  
 which is the chief and final aim of Edu-  
 cation? Yet these questions are not raised  
 anywhere in the context and so the pas-  
 sage serves no useful purpose. What is  
 worse, it interrupts the connexion in the  
 most confusing manner: it must therefore  
 be pronounced an interpolation by an  
 alien hand. SUSEM. (905)

§ 11 27 καὶ τὰς πράξεις] Cp. nn.  
 (712, 717, 731, 736, 743) on c. 2 § 1, § 6,  
 c. 3 § 1, § 3, § 8. SUSEM. (906)

29 τοῖν δυοῖν] The relation is ex-  
 pressed 1331 b 29, τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φε-  
 ρούσας πράξεις.

30 οὐ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου] The  
 highest within his reach, how determined  
 is not explained. Cp. 1. 1. 1.

§ 12 30 διήρηται δὲ] As e.g. 1. 5.  
 10, 1254 b 31. There is an echo of this  
 division in Plut. *De lib. educand.* c. 13,  
 96 C πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν  
 διήρηται (Newman).

32 τῶν πρακτῶν] Cp. 1332 a 10.  
 With χρήσιμα comp. the utilitarian  
 conception of a civic virtue as in Plato's  
*Phaedo*, *Protag.*, *Republic* and Mr Archer  
 Hind's *Phaedo*, Appendix 1.

§ 13 34 αἵρεσιν] The correlation of  
 αἰρετώτατον a 28; so a 41, τὰς τῶν πραγ-  
 μάτων αἵρέσεις = the choice of one action  
 in preference to another. The estimate  
 of value is the ground of preference. At



- 35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχο- (XIII)  
λῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἔνεκεν.  
πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοίνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον,<sup>9</sup>  
καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις  
§ 14 αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν  
40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-  
των αἱρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-  
1333<sup>b</sup> λεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τὰ  
ναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα [δὲ] πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ  
μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἔτι  
4 ὄντας παιδεύετον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παι-  
§ 15 δείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλ- 10  
6 λήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς  
πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαν-  
τες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς  
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν  
10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας.  
§ 16 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων

40 πρακτῶν ? Susem. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense || 41 αἱ-  
ρέσεις Koraes (cp. a 34), διαιρέσεις (δι' αἱρέσεις P<sup>4</sup>) Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text ||  
μὲν omitted by Γ P<sup>5</sup>, hence [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup>

1333 b 2 δὲ before πράττειν added by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., before καὶ P<sup>5</sup>, δεῖ ? Stahr || 7 βέλ-  
τιον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., possibly right, βέλτιον <καὶ τὸ> ? Schneider || 8 πάσας omitted  
by Π<sup>1</sup>

a later time αἰρεῖσθαι, φεύγειν are technical  
Stoic terms, e.g. D. L. VII. 105.

35 πόλεμον] sc. αἰρετὸν εἶναι or αἱ-  
ρεῖσθαι δεῖ.

ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς] Comp. *N. E.*  
x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4 ff., Plato *Latw* i. 628 D  
(Eaton), and with the former passage n.  
(921) below. SUSEM. (907)

37 βλέποντι] Goes with πρὸς πάντα:  
an instance of hyperbaton.

39 τέλη] Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοποὺς.

§ 14 1333 b 1 μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην  
ἄγειν] Cp. again Plato *Latw* i. 628 D,  
ὡσαύτως τις οὐτ' ἂν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτ'  
ὀρθῶς πρὸς τὰ ἐξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων  
μόνον ἢ πρῶτον, οὐτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβῆς,  
εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ  
μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰ-  
ρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (908)

4 τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας] What these  
are, is plain from 1260 b 15 f., 1277 a 16  
—20. See further n. (1024) on V(VIII).

5. 4, 1339 a 29 f.

§ 15 5 οἱ δὲ νῦν] Cp. II. i. 1, n.

(128 b). SUSEM. (909) The plural  
notwithstanding, it would seem as if  
Sparta and Lycurgus alone were meant.

7 οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον] A familiar  
criticism. Cp. II. 9. 34 n. (344 ff.), IV  
(VII). 2. 9 n. (719), V(VIII). 4 §§ 1—7, n.  
(1005). SUSEM. (910) Add Isocr.  
IV. (*Panegyric*) 187, 188, 228 (Newman).  
With συντάξαντες comp. 1324 b 8, and  
1271 b 2 (σύνταξις).

9 φορτικῶς] In a purely utilitarian,  
almost mercenary spirit.

§ 16 11 καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γρ.]  
Comp. VI(IV). 1 § 3 with n. (1123) and  
*Introd.* p. 20 n. 1. Here we again clearly  
perceive how slight is our knowledge of  
such political literature before Aristotle.  
It is highly probable that among the  
writers here alluded to were those too  
who were the first to set up the theory of  
a mixed constitution, see II. 6. 17, n.  
(219—221) and B. III. Exc. I. p. 449,  
since it was in the Spartan and Cretan  
constitutions that they found the realiza-

ἀπεφάναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακε- (XIII)  
 δαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι (p. 121)  
 πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. ἂ 11  
 15 καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξε-  
 § 17 λήλεγκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζη-  
 λούσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίνεται

14 ἐνόμοθέτησαν ΓΜ<sup>a</sup> || 16 νῦν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [νῦν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || ζητοῦσι  
 Camot Bk.<sup>2</sup>, certainly right || 17 τὸ τῶν Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || πολλῇ ΓΜ<sup>a</sup> || γίνονται  
 ΓΜ<sup>a</sup>, γίνεται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>

tion of their ideal, 1265 b 33 with *n.* (219). Thimbron, or Thibron, according to another reading, is quite unknown to us. There can scarcely be a doubt that Aristotle was also thinking of the work on the Lacedaemonian constitution which bears the name of Xenophon. At any rate its author, i. e. f., makes the happiness which the Lacedaemonian citizens attained by obeying the Laws of Lycurgus consist chiefly in the fact that, in spite of their small number, they had proved themselves the most powerful and celebrated state in Greece; and Aristotle's next remarks sound exactly like a polemic against the opening words of this little work: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐννοήσας ποτὲ ὡς ἡ Σπάρτη τῶν ἀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων οὕσα δυνατωτάτη τε καὶ ὀνομαστοτάτη ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐφάνη, ἐθαύμασα ὅπως ποτὲ τρόπῳ τοῦτ' ἐγένετο· ἐπεὶ μέντοι κατενόησα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐκέτι ἐθαύμαζον. The suggestion would therefore be natural enough that Thimbron, and not Xenophon, was the real author; but the true authorship of Xenophon has been lately demonstrated with such certainty by Naumann *De Xenophontis libro qui Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία inscribitur* (Berlin 1876) that it is scarcely possible to adduce any tenable argument against it. Oncken's suggestion, too, *op. c.* II. p. 179, that Xenophon wrote it under the assumed name of Thimbron, is just as unsatisfactory as that of v. Leutsch (*Philologus* XXXIII. p. 97) that he wrote the first part of the *Hellenica* under the name of Cratippus. Both these hypotheses themselves depend on an hypothesis, the falsity of which has been demonstrated by Nitsche (after Morus) in a dissertation *Ueber die Abfassung von X. Hellenika* (Berlin 1871) p. 42 ff. This is the hypothesis, unquestionably dating from ancient times, that, according to his own statement, *Hell.* III. 1, 2, Xenophon published his *Anabasis* under the name of Themisto-

genes of Syracuse. But the right interpretation of the passage in question is that Themistogenes also wrote an *Anabasis*, to which Xenophon refers because his own was not written at the time. Moreover there is no ground for the supposition that Xenophon ever published any of his works under an assumed name. Thimbron or Thibron is a well-known Laconian name, and the one alluded to here by Aristotle was doubtless a Laconian by birth, and this may have been the reason why Aristotle cites him by name, without mentioning Xenophon. SUSEM. (911)

v. Wilamowitz identifies the author Thimbron with the Spartan who commanded in Asia Minor 399 B.C. (*Xen. Anab.* VII. 6. 1, 8. 24, *Hell.* III. 1. 4, IV. 8. 17). His words are: "Next there appeared on the scene a champion of Oligarchy, Thibron, an ambiguous character and incompetent official, but one of the ruling caste: he wrote in glorification of Lycurgus. Well might Agesilaos request his literary agent, Xenophon, to draw up a new version of the story" of Sparta, "just as he had entrusted him with the task of justifying before public opinion the period from 404 to 388.... The foundation for the common traditional view of Sparta was laid in the half century 403—350: its author was probably Dieuchidas of Megara" (*Homeric Untersuchungen* p. 273 f.). He conjectures in a note that possibly Plato's strange authority for Sparta in the *Laws* [B. III. esp. 683—693] was Thibron.

14 τὸ κρατεῖν] Conquest, 'to win victory,' as § 19, b 30, 1271 b 3. We find ourselves in the midst of a discussion similar to that of c. 2 § 8 ff.

15 καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελέγκται νῦν] Comp. II. 9 § 16 n. (308), § 34 n. (345); and n. (919). SUSEM. (912)

§ 17 17 πολλὴ χορηγία] As in II. 9 § 35, γίνεσθαι τὰγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχῃ δι' ἀρετῆς.



τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίμβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται (XIII)  
 τὸν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν  
 20 γραφόντων περὶ <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι  
 § 18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἤρχον· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ 12  
 νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαί-  
 μονες, οὐδ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ  
 μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντες  
 25 πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα-  
 § 19 λῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦν  
 δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς  
 ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ'  
 ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομί- 13  
 30 ζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἡσκησεν ἐπὶ  
 τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν. ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.  
 § 20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πει-  
 ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν·  
 ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Πανσανία τῷ βασιλεῖ, καί-  
 35 περ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμὴν. οὕτε δὲ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού-  
 των νόμων καὶ λόγων οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὠφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθὴς ἐστίν.

18 θίμβρων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || 20 <τῆς> Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup> || γεγυμνάσθαι M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> ||  
 21 ἐπειδὴ γε νῦν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23 ἔστι δὲ Congreve, ἔστι γὰρ Susem. || 26 δὲ M<sup>a</sup>,  
 omitted by P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> || 30 [κρατεῖν] Reiz, καρτερεῖν ? Congreve, perhaps rightly  
 || ἴσχυσεν Γ P<sup>2</sup>, ἡσχυσεν M<sup>a</sup> || 31 τῷ Scaliger Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 36 λόγων (omitted by  
 P<sup>4</sup>) καὶ νόμων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. (?) and Bk.

18 Θίμβρων] See n. (911).

19 τῶν ἄλλων] To Thimbron and Xenophon we saw cause to add Ephoros n. (219): and perhaps Critias.

20 γεγυμνάσθαι] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen: see Schömann *op. c. E.* tr. p. 255 ff.

§ 18 21 δῆλον] That is, on their own premisses such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of *post hoc propter hoc*.

23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g. Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 14, [Plut.] *Inst. Lac.* c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1270 a 19. Possibly Plutarch's authority for the 'Life of Agis' adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the

credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle's criticism in B. 11. and in the *Politics*. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (a) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epitadeus and degenerate Spartans: (β) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Crypteia, or the treatment of the Helots: and (γ) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.

§ 19 27 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς κτλ.] Comp. 1. 5 § 2, n. (38 b); IV(VII). c. 3 § 2 n. (734). SUSEM. (913)

§ 20 32 δῆλον γὰρ] 'For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.' Certainly a very appropriate remark. SUSEM. (914)

34 On Pausanias see VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 nn. (1498, 1596). SUSEM. (915)

35 πολιτικός] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a 'noun' πολιτικός, exactly as in 1324 b 26 νομοθετικός stands to νομοθέτης.

§ 21 ταῦτα γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην (XIII)  
 ἐμποιοῦν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὴν τε τῶν 14  
 πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα κατα-  
 40 δουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ  
 δουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς  
 1334 a ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-  
 τείας, τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ 15  
 § 22 δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ  
 τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν (p. 122)  
 5 ἕνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς  
 λόγοις. αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι  
 μὲν σφύζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται.  
 τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀνιάσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγουν-  
 τεσ. αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι scho-  
 10 λάζειν.

15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ 16  
 ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι  
 τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερόν ὅτι  
 δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπερέχειν· τέλος γάρ,

37 ταῦτα P<sup>2-3-5</sup> L<sup>5</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar., ταῦτα the other authorities, τὰ Spengel || ἰδία P<sup>2</sup>  
 Ald. || τὸν <τε> Thurot Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, <καὶ> τὸν Congreve || 38 ταῦτα omitted  
 by P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>4</sup>, [ταῦτα] Bk.<sup>2</sup> || ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν twice over in Π<sup>1</sup> || 39 πολεμίων  
 Γ M<sup>4</sup> || 41 δουλεύωσιν P<sup>4-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || ζηλώσι Γ

1334 a 1 πάντως ? Oncken || 2 τρίτον] τοῦτο Joh. Brandis (*Rhein. Mus.* xi.  
 p. 596), not rightly || τῷ Vettori, τοῦ Koraes || 3 ὅπως...4 σχολάζειν omitted  
 by Γ M<sup>4</sup> || 5 τάξει P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) and probably Γ (*ordinis* William), τέξῃ M<sup>4</sup> || 8  
 ἀφίπασιν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly || 11 ὅθ' ? Susem., yet δὲ is also tenable || 14  
 ὑπερέχειν Susem., ὑπάρχειν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

§ 21 37 τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην] Cp.  
 n. (296) on II. 9. 12. SUSEM. (916)

40 ἵνα followed by ὅπως. See P.  
 Weber *Absichtssätze* p. 20, who quotes  
 1267 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1320 b 11.

41 ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγ.] This  
 is a curious admission, which proves that  
 Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his  
 ideal state without external dominion, but  
 rather as at the head of a group of allies,  
 whom it has conquered in war, and pro-  
 tects, but also to some extent rules; like  
 Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this  
 dominion ought to be generously exercised,  
 so that it may be of even greater service  
 to the governed than to the governing  
 states. Cp. also *Introd.* p. 55. SUSEM.  
 (917)

1334 a 2 τρίτον δὲ κτλ] Comp. I. 8.

12, 1256 b 23, with notes; also *nn.* (54,  
 75, 728) and I. 7. 5, 1255 b 37, n. (65).  
 SUSEM. (918)

§ 22 5 τὰ γινόμενα] So I. 5. 1,  
 1254 a 21 ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν.  
 A fuller phrase 1328 a 20, see n.

6 Ephorus apud Strabonem ix. p.  
 614: καθάπερ Ἑπαμεινώνδας ἔδειξε τε-  
 λευτήσαντος γὰρ ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν  
 ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς τοὺς Θεβαίους, γενοσαμέ-  
 νους αὐτῆς μόνον· αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγων  
 καὶ ὁμιλίας ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνῃ δ' ἐπιμελη-  
 θῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς, *F. H. G.*  
 I. 254 (Newman).

9 αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης] Cp. again  
 II. 9. 34, with n. (345). SUSEM. (919)

c. 15 *Preceminence of the virtues of  
 peace, though all virtues are alike indis-  
 pensable: §§ 1—6.*



15 ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολή δ' (XIII)  
 § 2 ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 17  
 καὶ διαγωγὴν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ  
 ἀσχολίᾳ. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως  
 ἐξῆ ἰσχολάζειν· διὸ [σώφρονα] τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει  
 20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικὴν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ  
 σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως  
 § 3 δούλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 18  
 δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν,  
 σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρό-  
 25 νοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν

19 ἐξῆ: Γ M', perhaps Γ had σχολάζης || [σώφρονα] Susem.

§ 1 15 εἴρηται πολλάκις] c. 14 §§ 12, 13, 22. SUSEM. (920)

§ 2 16 πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν] Besides its general meaning 'mode, or condition, of life' and the more special sense, extending beyond the necessities of existence, 'refinement of life' (*Meta.* I. 1. 15. 981 b 18, I. 2. 11, 982 b 23), the word *διαγωγή* in Aristotle, with or without the attribute *ελευθέριος* (cp. v[VIII] 5. 8 with n. 1027) or some similar expression, or ἐν τῇ σχολῇ "in a condition of leisure" (v[VIII] 3 § 3, § 8, cp. n. 993), means the occupation of leisure worthy of a really free man, such as he attains when his political duties have been performed, or such as he always possesses, provided he is pecuniarily independent, and leads a life of true study or contemplation. The occupation of such leisure, i.e. in other words (see *Nic. Eth.* x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. nn. 907, 548, and 922) the highest degree of human happiness and satisfaction, is however activity: according to Aristotle, the highest activity there is. It consists in the study of all branches of knowledge and the contemplation of all works of art: it confers the highest intellectual enjoyment and most nearly approaches to the divine blessedness, *Metaph.* XII (A). 7 § 7, 1072 b 14 f. and above nn. (702, 728). From this meaning of 'the highest intellectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes descends to the more commonplace one of mere occupation and especially 'social occupation or intercourse': *N. E.* ix. 11. 5, 1171 b 13, *Fragm.* 90, 1492 a 28; cp. also e.g. *Pol.* v[VIII]. 2 § 9 with n. (995). Then it is used in the plural for societies whose object is such intercourse, especi-

ally refined intellectual culture (III. 9. 13, 1280 b 37, where it might be translated "social clubs," cp. n. 558 and v[VIII]. 5. 11 with n. 1035) and even for regular feasts, gambling and drinking parties: *Nic. Eth.* x. 6 § 3, § 8, 1176 b 12 ff., 1177 a 9. In such cases the word becomes identified with the amusement, sport, or pastime, undertaken for recreation (cp. *Nic. Eth.* iv. 8 § 1, 1127 b 33 f.); though in the former and stricter interpretation, the two are sharply distinguished: v[VIII]. c. 3 §§ 3—8, c. 5 § 1 ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. nn. (993, 995, 1023, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1041) and especially Exc. v. on B. v[VIII]. See also Schwegler ad Arist. *Meta.* Vol. III. p. 19 f., Bonitz, Arist. *Meta.* II. p. 45, *Ind. Ar.* 178 a 26 ff., and especially Zeller<sup>4</sup> II. ii. p. 734 f. n. (5). SUSEM. (921) In short, a term which may stand for any employment of leisure, even on vulgar amusements, receives a special application to (1) elevated intellectual enjoyments (1339 a 25); in particular (2) those of philosophy and art, including music.

20 οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις] Comp. n. (548) on III. 9. 6. Slaves do certainly need recreation, but leisure in Aristotle's sense of the word, as explained n. (921), is something quite different from recreation. SUSEM. (922)

§ 3 23 φιλοσοφίας] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investigatio,' as in III. 12. 2, 1282 b 23, or *Phys.* I. 2. 5, 185 a 20; and hence explains it as 'virtus intellectualis.'

25 ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] Comp. Thuc. III. 82. 2: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ

γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ (XIII)  
 τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπολαύσεις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης  
 § 4 ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ 19  
 πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ  
 30 πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές  
 εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιεῖται φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα  
 γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δι-  
 καιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιού-  
 § 5 των ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσειν  
 35 καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέ-  
 χειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι (p. 123)  
 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆ-  
 38 σθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς,  
 § 6 εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις. διὸ δεῖ 20

28 δεῖ] δέονται (δέ over an erasure), 29 δοκοῦντες, and 30 ἀπολαύοντες P<sup>2</sup>, *indigent*  
*—qui videntur—frui* William || 29 σωφροσύνης <μετέχειν> Koraes, more satis-  
 factory, if any change is needed || 37 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς omitted by P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, supplied  
 by a later hand), τοῖς...χρῆσθαι omitted by M<sup>2</sup>, ἐτι...χρῆσθαι omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Ar. ||  
 τὸ τῷ P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), omitted by P<sup>2</sup> Bk., <αίσχρον> τὸ Koraes, perhaps rightly

πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν  
 ὁμοιοί (Eaton). SUSEM. (923)

26 ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας] Comp. Thuc.  
 III. 29. 4, VIII. 24. 4, Plato *Latius* VII  
 814 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (924)

§ 4 29 δοκοῦντας] Porson discusses  
 this idiom, accus. not dat., in a note on  
*Orestes* 659. It is not confined to Euripides  
 amongst Attic writers (Valckenauer  
 on *Hippol.* 23): see Aesch. *P. V.* 86, and  
 the comic fragment apud Herodianum  
 Pierson, p. 450, *εὐρυχωρίας σε δεῖ*, as cited  
 by Porson.

31 οἱ ποιεῖται] First in the *Odyssey*  
 IV. 561 ff., next the author of the episode  
 on the ages of the world in Hesiod's  
*Works and Days* 167 ff., then Pindar  
*Olymp.* II. 60 ff., and others. The Isles  
 of the Blest, or Elysium, are placed at  
 the remotest ends of the earth: it is the  
 land of privileged heroes who do not die  
 but are taken alive from the earth: here,  
 'where falls not hail or rain or any snow,'  
 where gentle breezes are ever blowing,  
 they spend a most blessed life in undis-  
 turbed enjoyment of all good under the  
 sway of Kronos or Rhadamanthus. See  
 Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. p. 635 ff.; cp.  
 pp. 53, 69. SUSEM. (925)

μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι κτλ.] This is the  
 moral of Plato's fine myth respecting the

children of Kronos, *Politicus* 272 A—D.  
 Though it is not there stated that the  
 advantages of the golden age failed to  
 confer greater happiness, there can be  
 little doubt that this is Plato's meaning.  
 Several expressions of the *Politicus*, *πατε-  
 ρόσης αὐτοῖς ὄντω πολλῆς σχολῆς...κατε-  
 χρώντο τούτοις ξύμπασιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν...  
 ἐμπιμπλάμενοι σίτων ἄδην καὶ ποτῶν* 272  
 B, C, seem to find an echo here.

32 φιλοσοφίας] Culture, cp. II. 5. 15,  
 1264 a 40. Intellectual aptitude, a habit  
 of intellectual inquiry, to give occupation  
 in leisure and save the citizens from rust-  
 ing. Liberal and refined pursuits such  
 as music, literature, philosophy in the  
 restricted sense, must in leisure hours  
 replace the active business of life, τὰ ἀναγ-  
 καῖα καὶ χρήσιμα.

33 σχολάζουσιν] This conception of  
 a life of cultivated leisure, distinct from  
 work and recreation, as the ideal life (cp.  
 1337 b 30), which only 'philosophy' can  
 train us rightly to enjoy (cp. 1267 a 11),  
 is of primary importance for the discus-  
 sions in Book V(VIII). See esp. V(VIII).  
 c. 3 §§ 4—8 with notes.

§ 5 39 ἀνδραποδώδεις] This term  
 'slavish' means to Aristotle 'sunk like  
 beasts in low sensual enjoyments.' Plato  
 traces out exactly the same line of thought,



40 μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖ- (XIII)  
νοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν  
1334 b ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι  
ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ  
ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν \* \*.

<ὅτι μὲν οὖν \* \* τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν, φανε-  
5 ρὸν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.  
§ 7 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους 21  
καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τὴν

1334 b 1 γίνεσθαι Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, γένεσθαι P<sup>4</sup>, γενέσθαι the other authorities Bk.<sup>1</sup>  
Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 2 ἐπεὶ ἐτι Welldon, who punctuates with a full stop at 3 ἀρε-  
τῶν, ignoring the lacuna || τε] τὰ P<sup>1.5</sup> || 3 ἢ (omitted by M<sup>1</sup>) || τὰ τοῦ (τοῦ  
omitted by M<sup>1</sup>) πολέμου added by I M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>5</sup> before ταῦτα contrary to the sense, τὰ πολε-  
μικά, a similar addition, is presented as a gloss by p<sup>2</sup> || τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ὅτι] Camera-  
rius first saw that the text was defective. Thurot placed the lacuna after, and Spen-  
gel before, the words τῶν ἀρετῶν, supplying it conjecturally as follows: τῶν ἀρετῶν  
<ὁπολαμβάνουσιν, ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἀρξάντες. ὅτι μὲν  
οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν κτλ Thurot (cp. II. 9 § 34,  
1271 b 3 ff.): τῶν <πολεμικῶν μείζω εἶναι ἀνάγκη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην  
χρὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν εἰς τὴν σχολὴν> ἀρετῶν καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτῶν, κτλ Spengel; mistak-  
ing the sense. Thurot's supplement requires a slight alteration to account for the  
loss: hence 4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα δεῖ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι  
κτλ Susem. Welldon supplies <ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἀρετὴν δεῖ ἀσκεῖν> ||  
αὐτὴν αὐτὴν? Congreve || 6 [τυγχάνομεν...12 ἡχθαι] Broughton, thinking it to be  
an interpolation by the author of the present redaction || δὴ] δὲ? Susem.

though in a different manner, in the first  
two books of the *Laus*. See n. (43) on  
I. 5. 8. SUSEM. (926)

§ 6 1334 b 1 ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέ-  
γιστα] Namely the external goods. Com-  
pare for the Spartan convictions II. 9. § 24,  
1270 b 34; ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ  
λάβρα....ἀπολαβεῖν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν,  
n. (328), and § 35, 1271 b 7 ff., νομίζουσι  
μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι'  
ἀρετῆς κτλ with nn. (346, 346 b, 347).  
SUSEM. (927)

2 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς] That is, by means  
of valour or courage, which is a particular  
virtue: see II. 9 §§ 34, 35 nn. (344, 347),  
esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ  
πᾶσα σὺνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολε-  
μικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρῆσιμίη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν.  
Comp. also IV(VII). I § 6, κτῶνται καὶ  
φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ'  
ἐκείνα ταῦτα, n. (697). SUSEM. (928)

Mr Newman well observes that this  
correction of the one-sidedness of Laca-  
daemonian training tells just as much

against all systems which, like Stoicism  
and Puritanism, tend to develope some-  
thing less than the whole man.

ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω...3 ἀρετῶν] The passage  
is defective: we may supplement it from  
II. 9 § 34, 1271 b 4, thus: 'But as they  
esteemed these goods higher than the  
virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher  
than that of the virtues, <they maintained  
their state only while at war, and fell  
after they had acquired empire.> (Thu-  
rot.) SUSEM. (929)

4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Thurot further  
suggests as the sense of this opening para-  
graph: <That virtue must be practised  
in leisure also,> and for its own sake, is  
clear from this. SUSEM. (930)

§ 7 6 διηρημένοι πρότερον] The re-  
sult of our previous analysis: 13 § 10,  
1332 a 39 f., see n. (887) and n. (881) on  
c. 13 § 8. SUSEM. (931)

7 τούτων] The citizens of the best  
state (Susemihl): cp. b 8 παιδευμένοι, § 5,  
a 34, § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.

φύσιν, διώρισταί πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παι- (XIII)  
 δευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ  
 10 πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχε-  
 ται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-  
 § 8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἤχθαι. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτό  
 γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’  
 ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ  
 15 δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς  
 τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν  
 § 9 μελέτην· ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δὴ ἐστίν, οὕτω 23  
 καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ  
 λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἑξεῖς τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν,  
 20 ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα

8 παιδευταῖοι M<sup>1</sup>, παιδευτέον P<sup>2</sup> || 9 πρότερον omitted by P<sup>3</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 10 ἀρίστην.  
 <ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν>? Jackson || 11 καὶ omitted by P<sup>2</sup>, [καὶ] Koraes Bk.2; Koraes also  
 suggested its transposition to follow τὸν λόγον || 12 ἐθῶν omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (supplied  
 in the margin of P<sup>1</sup> with γρ. prefixed) || ὁμοίως P<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>  
 with γρ. prefixed, ὁμοίους Ar., ὁμοίων P<sup>1-2</sup> || διὰ...ἤχθαι] τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως  
 ἀγωγὴν? Schneider || 14 ἀρχῆς <ἀρχῇ> François Thurot, perhaps rightly, but (as  
 Postgate observes) even this slight change is hardly needed || [τέλος] and ἀλλ’ οὐ  
 C. Thurot, ἄλλο τελοῦς <ης> Spengel

8 διώρισταί πρότερον] In c. 7. SUSEM.  
 (932)

9 τῷ λόγῳ κτλ] Parallel to c. 13  
 §§ 12, 13, and to the more general dis-  
 cussion of *Nic. Eth.* x. 9 §§ 1—12 (c. 10  
 Bk., 1179 a 33 ff.).

11 διημαρτηκέναι τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-  
 θέσεως] To miss the truest (highest) con-  
 ception or ideal: as is explained in c. 13  
 § 2. See c. 4 § 1, 1325 b 35. Men may  
 be led astray by habit as well as by rea-  
 son. With ἤχθαι = drawn cp. *N. E.* i. 4.  
 6, 1095 b 4. The sense of ὁμοίως is vir-  
 tually, ‘amiss.’ Göttling is quite wrong  
 in rendering “eodem perducī moribus  
 quo perduxisset ἡ βελτίστη ὑπόθεσις.”

§ 8 12—15] Mr Newman thinks much  
 light is thrown on this difficult passage by  
*De Part. Animal.* II. i. 6, 646 a 30 ff.  
 πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι  
 ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐπ’  
 ἀρχήν, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κινήσεως καὶ ἐχού-  
 σης ἥδη τινὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τινὰ μορφήν ἢ τοι-  
 οῦτον ἄλλο τέλος.

13 ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς] The sense  
 of ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς is clear from c. 16 § 1, see n.  
 (937): ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ  
 ὁπως κτλ. “Obviously birth is the first  
 or earliest thing which demands our care,”

i.e. we begin with birth. The next words  
 mean ‘the nearest or proximate end from  
 any starting-point’—understanding ἐστί  
 with the gen. ἄλλου τέλους, ‘belongs to  
 [is referred to] another, or new, end.’  
 The proximate end is but a means, sub-  
 ordinate to a higher end: *Nic. Eth.* i.  
 1. 4, 1094 a 14 ff. In our human nature  
 this higher end is intellect and reason.  
 SUSEM. (933)

16 τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν μελέτην] Somewhat  
 stronger than ἐπιμέλεια, for which cp.  
*N. E.* x. 9 §§ 9, 13—15, 17 (e.g. 1180  
 b 23 δι’ ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν).

§ 9 18 δύο μέρη κτλ] See c. 14  
 § 9, 1333 a 17, n. (904), and esp. n. (40)  
 on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (934)

20 τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς] In  
 English, as in German, it is not easy to  
 find two terms, mutually related as ὄρεξις  
 and ἐπιθυμία. Striving, or effort in ge-  
 neral, is the meaning of ὄρεξις [Hamilton’s  
 conation]; ἐπιθυμία denotes sense-desire,  
 or appetite, in particular. This explains  
 why ὄρεξις alone denotes ‘the motive force  
 of the irrational soul’ (as I should trans-  
 late ἐξῆς; characteristic possession, or at-  
 tribute, is not strong enough), while  
 within the soul θυμός, passion—see nn.



- πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ (XII)  
 § 10 λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βού-  
 λησις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς  
 παιδίοις, ὃ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προοῦσιν πέφυκεν ἐγ-  
 25 γίνεσθαι. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν  
 τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἔνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ (p. 124)  
 τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.  
 16 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως XIV  
 30 τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν

23 καὶ after δὲ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. || 24 πέφυκεν after ἐγγίνεσθαι (ἐγγίνε-  
 σθαι P<sup>2-3</sup> 4) P<sup>1-5</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 26 τὴν after ἢ omitted by P<sup>4-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>3</sup> || 27 τὴν δὲ τοῦ τοῦ  
 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> || 28 τοῦ σώματος] τοῦ τρίτου M<sup>a</sup> (*huius autem eorum quae animae* William) ||  
 30 τὰ σώματα after βέλτιστα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk. || γίνηται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk.

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις, will, are distinguished: and further, why in I. 5. 6 the term *ὀρεξις* is first used, 1254 b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος 'the emotional part,' see note (40). The same trichotomy of the irrational soul is also found in *De Anima* II. 3. 1, 414 b 1, III. 10. 3, 433 a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with *De Anima* III. 9. 3, 432 b 4 ff. and *Topica* IV. 5. 6, 126 a 12 f., if the statement ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἡ βούλησις is rightly interpreted, is shown by Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious treatise *De Motu Animal.* c. 6 § 4, 700 b 22, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὀρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and *Eud. Eth.* II. 7. 2, 1223 a 26 f. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὀρεξις... ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, need not be taken into account. The Will appears, as the passage from *Eud. Eth.* more particularly proves, as ὀρεξις = impulse, whether rightly or wrongly guided by reason, directed to real or apparent good, see *N. Eth.* II. 4 (II. c. 6 Bk.), while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is pleasant, and Anger (θυμὸς) at revenge. See Walter *Die praktische Vernunft* pp. 194—212. Yet all this does not suffice to explain the present passage, which rightly denies to the child (at all events to the infant just after birth) the possession of any rational impulses. The difference between our passage and the two cited from *De Anima* is that here θυμὸς and βούλησις are again drawn closer together and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean 'aversion and liking'? In any case at b 22 βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (*op. c.* II. ii. p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more precisely a weakened sense, denoting something more analogous to θυμὸς than to ἐπιθυμία. SUSEM. (936)

§ 10 We must then train the body first; next the impulses, the motive forces of the irrational soul; and lastly the reason.

25 πρῶτον μὲν... 27 ὀρέξεως] Here again Aristotle follows closely in the track of Plato, *Latius* II. 652 E—653 C. SUSEM. (936)

Add *Republic* 410 B, 563 A, 591 C ff.

c. 16 *Precautions necessary on the part of the parents to secure healthy progeny.*

§ 1 29 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτλ] The expression is chosen with reference to the words at the beginning of c. 13 § 8, 1334 b 13, and as regards the facts also Aristotle takes up the same thread. Cp. n. (933). But in the further and decisive step, of making education begin not merely before birth but even before conception, Aristotle quite follows Plato's procedure *Latius* IV 721, VI 774—776, 783 D ff., 788 ff. (comp. *Rep.* V 458 E, *Politicus* 310). It is in imitation of the Spartan model: see Xen. *De Rep. Lacadaem.* I. 3 ff., Plut. *Lyc.* 14 (Eaton). SUSEM. (937) Add Critias, *Fr.* 1, *F. H. G.* II. 68 (Newman).

δεῖ ὅπως] The remedy for a rather violent hiatus may be easily discovered by comparing 1320 a 33, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἀλθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως κτλ.

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας (XIV)  
 χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν.

- § 2 δεῖ γὰρ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς  
 αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς  
 35 ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνά-  
 μεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,  
 ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μὴ (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στά-  
 σεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς). ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν 2  
 § 3 τῶν τέκνων διαδοχὴν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι τὰ  
 40 τέκνα ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν  
 πρεσβυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν  
 1335 a πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι  
 (πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδῶς ἦττον ὑπάρ-  
 χει τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν  
 § 4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς)· ἔτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο  
 5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχη  
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα 3  
 § 5 συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὥριστα τέλος  
 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ  
 τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ  
 10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν

32 πρὸς ἀλλήλους omitted by Γ M<sup>s</sup>, hence [πρὸς ἀλλήλους] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 33 γὰρ  
 Susem., δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || <περὶ> ταύτην Vettori, perhaps rightly || 34  
 συζῆν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 37 γὰρ omitted by S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar. || 39 τῶν omitted by P<sup>2-3</sup> ||  
 λίαν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || τὰ τέκνα after 40 ταῖς ἡλικίαις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

1335 a 2 γὰρ after τε omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 5 ὑπάρχει M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 6 σχεδὸν...11 τού-  
 τους transposed to follow a 27 ἐτι <ἢ μικρόν> Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>. See *Introd.* p. 89

32 γαμικὴν] 'Nuptial,' not 'con-  
 jugal'; cp. I. 3. 1, 1253 b 9 n. Or, as  
 Prof. Gildersleeve puts it, γάμος = wed-  
 ding, not wedlock.

§ 2 33 κοινωνίαν] Comp. Eur. *Bacchae*  
 1277 ἐγένετο | Πένθευς ἐμῇ τε καὶ πατρὸς  
 κοινωνίᾳ.

34 συγκαταβαίνωσι] For the vb. κατα-  
 βαίνειν, § 5, 1335 a 11, see Schw. *Lex.*  
*Herod.* It is used, like ἔκνεισθαι (cp. 1332  
 b 41), for 'to suit': properly 'to meet in.'  
 The compound with σύν = to come simulta-  
 neously to an end, so producing a con-  
 vergence or correspondence.

§ 3 Johnson *Rasselas* c. 29 affords  
 a parallel. "From these early marriages  
 proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents  
 and children: the son is eager to enjoy  
 the world before the father is willing to

forsake it, and there is hardly room at  
 once for two generations... Those who  
 marry at an advanced age will probably  
 escape the encroachments of their chil-  
 dren; but, in diminution of this advan-  
 tage, they will be likely to leave them,  
 ignorant and helpless, to a guardian's  
 mercy. From their children if they have  
 less to fear they have less also to hope."

41 ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων] The  
 gratitude due from their children. Cp.  
 Plato *Lysis* IV. 717 B, C.

1335 a 1 βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις] Plato  
*Lysis* 717 C εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνοις with  
 Stallbaum's note: βοήθεια τῷ λόγῳ *Parm.*  
 128 C, *Alc.* I. 116 A, τοῖς φίλοις.

4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς] Near-  
 ness, i.e. equality in age, produces bick-  
 erings, misunderstandings (II. 5. 4).



§ 6 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν-  
 12 δασμός φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζώοις  
 ἀτελῇ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ  
 μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν  
 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν  
 πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε-  
 § 7 λείς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματα εἰσίν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις  
 αἱ νέαι πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ  
 καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τινὲς φασὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν  
 20 τοῖς Τροϊζηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμί-  
 σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-  
 § 8 μιδὴν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδό-  
 σεις ποιέσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ δοκοῦσι  
 νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων  
 25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ

11 ἔστι] ἔτι Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the notes, wrongly || 12 τὴν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. ||  
 13 ἔκγονα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || θηλυτόκα Camerarius (wrongly), θηλυτέρα Koras || 14 ταὐτὸ  
 τοῦτο Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk., hoc ipsum William || 16 ἐπιχωριάζει M<sup>a</sup> and (after a lacuna)  
 P<sup>1</sup>, ἐπιχωριάζεται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin) and apparently I' || τὸ] τοὺς M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>5</sup> ||  
 18 αἱ νέαι] ἐναι Π<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλως αἱ νέαι P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || πονοῦσι after τε M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23  
 εἶναι inserted after γὰρ by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 25 δὲ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, untranslated  
 by Ar., [δὲ] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, wrongly

§ 6 13 θηλυτόκα] This point is not mentioned *Hist. Animal.* v. 12. 1 (v. 14 Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. SUSEM. (938)

We find it however, with the presumed physical cause, *De Gen. Animal.* iv. 2. 1, 766 b 29 ff., τὰ τε γὰρ νέα θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀμαζόντων, καὶ γηράσκοντα μᾶλλον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὕτω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοῖς δ' ἀπολείπει. Falstaff, *Henry IV.* Part II, Act 4 sc. 3, humourously calls this one of the ill effects of water-drinking.

15 τεκμήριον δέ·...γάρ] If the *Index Ar.* s. v. may be trusted, this is the only instance of this usage in its normal form, the pronoun being omitted. We had σημείον δέ·...γάρ c. 7 § 6, 1328 a 1, and Bonitz *ib.* 677 b 9 ff. cites ten other instances, including 1312 b 21, 1318 b 17.

16 ἐπιχωριάζει] Comp. v(viii). 6. 12, 1341 a 34. The verb appears in another sense in Pl. *Phaedo* 57 A. The supposed passive of the Lexx. (see *Crit. n.*) receives its *coup de grâce* from Kaibel, the last editor of Athenaeus, who at xiv. 619 f. reads κατὰ τινα ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ' αὐτοῖς....ἔδοντες, with the critical note

"παρ' αὐτοῖς < ἐορτὴν > Wilamowitz, recte defendens ἐπιχωριάζεσθαι verbum medium."

συζευγνύναι] To pair, join in marriage: § 9, a 29.

§ 7 18 πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον] This statement reappears in the spurious B. vii. of *Hist. An.* c. 1 § 16, 582 a 20.

19 τὸν χρησμὸν] A gloss cites the oracle in the form μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἀλοκα, 'till not the fresh furrow.' Götting proposed to alter νέαν to νέας, thinking there was a play upon νεᾶς which he took to be gen. of a supposed νεά = novale, fallow land [for which νεῖός, Attic νεός, is the received form]. SUSEM. (939) Comp. Eur. *Phoen.* 18 σπεῖρειν τέκνων ἀλοκα, Soph. *Oed. T.* 1210 (Ridgeway); also *Antig.* 569 ἀρώσμοι γὰρ χιτῆρων εἰσὶν γόαι.

20 διαφθειρομένων] Comp. *Frag. Λόγου γαμικοῦ* of Clemens Alexandrinus p. 1022 P., III. 501 Dind. παρθένων φθορὰ λέγεται οὐ μόνον πορνεία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρὸ καιροῦ ἐκδοσις, ὅταν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἄωρος ἐκδοθῇ τῷ ἀνδρὶ.

§ 8 24 Comp. Aristoxenus Tarent. *Fr.* 20, *F. H. G.* II. 278.

σώματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου (XIV)  
 27 τις χρόνος ὥρισμένος, ὃν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύνον ἔτι <ἢ μι-  
 κρόν.> § 4 a 6 <σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα γ συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν  
 <ἐπιμέλειαν. § 5 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὥρισταί τέλος 8 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ  
 <πλείστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ 9 τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς  
 <ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύ-  
 <ξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν 11 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους.>  
 28 § 9 διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν 6  
 ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ† καὶ τριάκοντα[ ἢ μικρόν].  
 30 ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσιν τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται,  
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν παύλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται  
 § 10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς  
 33 μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, εἰ γίνηται κατὰ λό-

26 σώματος Γ Ar. and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>3</sup>), ἄλλως σώματος P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin), σπέρματος  
 the other authorities || 27 χρόνος after ὥρισμένος P<sup>1-3</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || πληθύνον Bk.<sup>2</sup>, πλη-  
 M<sup>2</sup>, multum William Ar.

6 δὲ Susem., δὴ Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> || ταῦτα before πάντα M<sup>2</sup>, untranslated by  
 William

29 συζευγνύναι P<sup>1</sup>, συζευχθῆναι M<sup>2</sup> || ἐξ Ar., ἐπὶ all other authorities: πέντε ?  
 Susem. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel's, see Comm. n. (940) || [ἢ μικρόν] Sepul-  
 veda, transposed by Götting Susem.<sup>2-3</sup> to follow 27 ἔτι || 30 τοσούτῳ] τούτῳ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup>  
 Ar. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || ἀκμάζουσιν M<sup>2</sup>, ἀκμάζουσά P<sup>4-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || 31  
 <συγ> καταβήσονται Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> wrongly following William (*convenient*) || 32 ταῖς  
 μὲν ἀρχομένοις Ridgeway wrongly: see Exc. II. p. 567 || 33 ἀρχομένης Γ apparently  
 (*inchoante akmes* William) Bk. Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> and P<sup>5</sup> (corr.), perhaps rightly || γίνηται  
 Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, γένηται P<sup>1</sup>

26 καὶ γὰρ τούτου κτλ] Sc. τοῦ σώ-  
 ματος: bodily growth has fixed limits of  
 time which it does not exceed (or only to  
 a small extent). Comp. note on V(VIII).  
 I. 1, 1337 a 13.

§ 9 28 διὸ τὰς μὲν κτλ] In *Rep.* v.  
 460 E Plato fixes the period for procrea-  
 tion amongst his guardians from twenty  
 to forty in the woman, and from twenty-  
 five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case  
 in the man. His regulations in the *Laws*  
 are not consistent. The marriage of the  
 sons is at one time enjoined when they  
 are between thirty and fifty-five (IV. 721 A,  
 VI. 785 B), at another time when they are  
 between twenty-five and thirty-five at  
 latest (VI. 772 D). Similarly the daughters  
 are to marry before the age of twenty,  
 but while the earlier limit is once fixed  
 at sixteen (VI. 785 B), it is elsewhere  
 raised to eighteen (VIII. 833 D).

In the spurious B. VII. of Aristotle's  
*Historia Animal.* cc. 5, 6 there are state-  
 ments about the limits of age for getting  
 offspring in tolerable agreement with the  
 present passage. The limit is said to be,  
 as a rule, sixty in the man, forty in the  
 woman, with occasional prolongation to  
 seventy and fifty respectively. Xenophon  
 (*Oecon.* 7 § 5, cp. 3 § 13) fixes the earlier  
 limit in the wife's case at fifteen. SUSEM.  
 (940)

§§ 9, 10 are treated by Prof. Ridgeway,  
*Transactions* p. 145 f., Dr Jackson *ib.* pp.  
 116—118.

\*Vide quae disserui in Herm. XIX.  
 p. 592 sqq.; ubi etiam exposui, cur prorsus  
 recte olim Spengelium v. 29 πέντε pro  
 ἑπτὰ postulasse nunc censeam' *Quaest.*  
*crit. coll.* p. 414. The substance of the  
 paper in *Hermes* is given in Exc. II. p.  
 566. SUSEM.



γον εὐθὺς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλι- (XIV)  
 35 κίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. περὶ μὲν  
 οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται· τοῖς δὲ  
 περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χρώνται καλῶς  
 καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσαντες χειμῶνος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην.  
 § 11 δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τὰ τε  
 40 παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν·  
 οἳ τε γὰρ ἱατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσιν ἱκανῶς,  
 1335<sup>b</sup> καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νο-  
 § 12 τίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δὲ τινῶν τῶν σωμάτων  
 ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστα <ἀν> ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστή-  
 σαι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,  
 5 τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν <δεῖ> εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν  
 χρήσιμος ἔξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν

34 γέννησις Reiz Susem.<sup>2</sup> || [τῆς ἡλικίας] Spengel || 37 δεῖ χρῆσθαι omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. thus avoiding hiatus || χρᾶσθαι M<sup>3</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || οἷς] ὡς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || ὡς—καὶ νῦν καλῶς Schmidt || [δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὡς] Madvig || 38 ποιεῖσθαι after τὴν συναυλίαν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || συνουσίαν Zwinger Bk.<sup>2</sup> || 39 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar., δι' P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), δὴ other authorities Bk. and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand) || 41 λέγουσι after ἱκανῶς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

1335 b 3 μάλιστα <ἀν> Koraes Bk.<sup>2</sup>, μάλιστα ἀν M<sup>3</sup> (?), μάλιστα the other authorities and Bk. || 4 μᾶλλον...τοῖς omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by P<sup>1</sup>) || παιδείας Π<sup>1</sup> (corrected by P<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 5 <δεῖ> Susem., possibly however it can be understood from 4 λεκτέον || οὔτε γὰρ ἡ omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by P<sup>1</sup>) || 6 ἔξις omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by P<sup>1</sup>) || οὔτε πρὸς εὐεξίαν inserted after εὐεξίαν by Γ M<sup>3</sup> || οὐδὲ Koraes, οὔτε II || πρὸς omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied

§ 10 34 καταλελυμένης] On the analogy of καταλεῖν πόλεμον, εἰρήνην, βλοσυρὸν, κατάλυσις συμποσίου, στρατιάς, τριήρους (a crew), δῆμον, πολιτείας, where 'breaking up,' 'dissolution' are the main ideas, we must render 'in the decline of their powers, or vigour.' So *fracta aetate* Vict., *aetate iam decrepita* Lambin.

38 χειμῶνος] more exactly, in the month Gamelion (January and February), which derived its name of wedding-month from the custom: Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* VII. 1 § 2. Pseudo-Hippoc. *περὶ ἀφρόρων* (III. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, maintains "that the spring is the most suitable time." SUSEM. (941)

§ 11 41 καιροῖς] Favourable conditions.

1335 b 1 τὰ βόρεια] That the north wind is particularly favourable to male offspring is more precisely stated by Aristotle in different passages of his *Historia Animalium* and *De generatione*

*Animalium*: e. g. *H. A.* VI. 19 § 4, 574 a 1 καὶ βορείοις μὲν ὀχευόμενα ἀρρενοτοκεῖ μᾶλλον, νοτίοις δὲ θηλυτοκεῖ. SUSEM. (942)

3 ἐπιστήσασιν] Intransitive, as if τὴν γνώμην had to be supplied: attentively. Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. *Ant.* 227.

§ 12 4 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας] Another reference to a discussion to follow, which is not to be found in the extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (958), § 7 n. (960), § 10 n. (963), § 12 n. (969), 12 § 5 n. (862); VI(IV). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355), § 13, VII(VI). 8 § 22 n. (1483). Also *introd.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (943)

5 Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 168 a 54 ff. is in doubt whether δεῖ might be mentally supplied from λεκτέον, or must be added. The sense is: id iam nunc dicendum est, quod est τύπῳ ἱκανόν. SUSEM.

5 οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν κτλ] Comp. Plato *Rep.* III. 404 A (Eaton) and below V(VIII). 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7—9 n. (1015). SUSEM. (944)

- καὶ τεκνοποιῖαν, οὔτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοποιητικὴ λίαν, (XIV)  
 § 13 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν (p. 126)  
 ἔξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίους, μηδὲ πρὸς ἓνα  
 10 μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν  
 ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀν-  
 § 14 δράσι καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 9  
 τῶν σωματῶν, μὴ ῥαθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιὰ τροφῇ χρωμέ-  
 νας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥάδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ'  
 15 ἡμέραν τινα ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν  
 τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν. τὴν μέντοι διά-  
 νοιαν τοῦναντίον τῶν σωματῶν ῥαθυμοτέρως ἀρμόττει διά-  
 γειν· ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης  
 § 15 ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ 10  
 20 τροφῆς τῶν γενομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον  
 τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλήθος τέκνων ἢ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν  
 κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γενομένων· ὥρισθαι γὰρ

by p<sup>1</sup>) || ὑγίαν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>.<sup>5</sup> || 7 θεραπευτικὴ M<sup>a</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup>), *curis indigens* William || κακοποιητικὴ M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup>), *male habens* William || 8 ἔχειν omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 9 ἓνα \* \* Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, ἐν as a gloss by corr.<sup>3</sup> in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> and Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>; but πόνον should be understood || 11 ἐλευθέρων Γ P<sup>1</sup>, ἐλευθερίων the other authorities Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> || ταῦτα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || καὶ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 12 ἐγκύους P<sup>1</sup> Ald. || 16 ταῖς ἐληχίαις Γ Ar. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 18 ἀπολάβοντα M<sup>a</sup>, ἀπολαβόντα Γ and perhaps Ar. || γενόμενα Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 19 καὶ added before τὰ by Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 20 γενομένων P<sup>1</sup>, γεννωμένων P<sup>5</sup>, γινομένων M<sup>a</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup>, γιγνομένων Π<sup>2</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 21 ἐὰν added after τέκνων by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (margin), ἐὰν μὴ ? Scaliger. Schömann *Gr. Alt.* II. p. 517 n. (1) restores the passage thus: τέκνων (ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύῃ μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γενομένων) ὥρισθαι γε δεῖ || ἐθῶν Γ P<sup>4,5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> C<sup>a</sup> Ar. || 22 κωλύει P<sup>2,4,5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk. and P<sup>3</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), κωλύει apparently P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), perhaps rightly, κωλύσει Susem., καλὴ ἡ (with preceding ἐὰν) Schlosser || γενομένων Koraes (who does not reject γεννωμένων), γεννωμένων Scaliger, γινομένων M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γιγνομένων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || ὥρισθαι Γ Ar. P<sup>1</sup> (margin) and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), ὥρισθαι M<sup>a</sup>, ὀρισθῆναι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), ὥρισται P<sup>3,5</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin) and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>), ὥρισθω Spengel || γὰρ] γοῦν Koraes, γε Schömann

§ 13 10 "If any word is needed, read πόνον, but ἓνα refers to πόνοις with quite sufficient clearness. Similarly v(VIII). 4. 2, 1338 b 15" (Ridgeway). Comp. however *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 415.

§ 14 14 προστάξαντι καθ' ἡμέραν τινά... 16 τιμὴν] Plato, too, *Laws* VII 789 E, prescribes in spite of ridicule, ἅμα γέλῳ φράζωμεν, that when enceinte the wife should take walks assiduously (Eaton). SUSEM. (945)

15 ἀποθεραπείαν] The force of the prefix is similar in ἀφοσιῶσθαι, to discharge one's conscience. Here, 'to discharge her service.'

18 ἀπολαύοντα] Prof. Ridgeway takes this to mean that the foetus is a drain on the woman's strength, just as plants draw the good out of the ground: τῆς sc. ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσης.

§ 15 22 ὥρισθαι... 23 πλήθος] How this is to be brought about was stated II.



δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλήθος, εἰ δέ τισι γίνηται παρὰ (XIV)  
ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶν,  
25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ  
§ 16 διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 11  
ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισταί, πότε ἀρχε-  
σθαι δεῖ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρ-  
μόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὀρίσθω. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων  
30 ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς  
σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῇ.

23 δεῖ Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. and P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), δὴ P<sup>2-3</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr. in the margin) P<sup>3</sup>  
(a later hand): so Spengel || 24 συνδυασθεῖσιν Spengel Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> from a misuse  
of William's translation *aliquibus...combinatis*, <τῶν> συνδυασθέντων? Koraes ||  
25 μὴ omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 28 δεῖ] χρῆ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. || ζεύξεως M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st  
hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 30 καὶ inserted after καθάπερ by Γ, if *sicut et iuniorum*  
(William) is an accurate translation || τὰ omitted by M<sup>a</sup>, possibly by Γ || τῶν  
omitted by P<sup>1</sup> || 31 γηρασκόντων M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected in the margin  
with γρ. prefixed)

6 § 12: see *nn.* (209, 211), also II. 7 § 5  
*n.* (236). Plato, too, *Rep.* v 460 D, 461 C,  
orders exposure in the case of weakly or  
deformed infants of the guardian class (as  
was remarked *n.* 140), and in the case of  
conception occurring where the law or  
the magistrates' orders have been in-  
fringed, abortion, or (presumably if this  
has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he  
goes further than this by condemning  
the offspring of inferior guardians: τὰ δὲ  
τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ εἰάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνά-  
πνηρον γίνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ  
κατακρύψουσιν, 460 C. But even in the  
*Timaeus* 19 A his words convey the im-  
pression that he had not given any in-  
structions for exposing the children of  
less qualified parents, but meant simply  
a secret transference of them to the third  
class of the population. Under the guise,  
that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies  
his former regulation in this sense (see  
Zeller *Griech. Phil.* ed. 4 II. i. 909 *n.* 2,  
ed. 3 pp. 771 *n.* 3, Eng. tr. p. 478 *n.*  
55, Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. p. 171). In  
the *Laws* (see *nn.* 192, 208) he drops  
the preventive means of abortion alto-  
gether, nor does he say anything about  
exposing illegitimate and deformed in-  
fants. Thus in the course of his own life-  
time Plato gradually attained to a more  
humane view. In this respect Aristotle's  
ideal state goes far beyond that of the  
*Laws* in the stringency and callousness,  
or rather, to give it its true name, the

abominable cruelty of its regulations. As  
to exposure, the example of Sparta has  
again had a determining influence on both  
thinkers. In all other Greek states it was  
left to the father's decision whether he  
would expose his child or not: but at  
Sparta a committee of the eldest members  
of the Phyle decided, and in accordance  
with their decision the deformed or weakly  
infant had to be despatched to the place  
of exposure (Ἀποθέται) on Taygetos.  
See Schömann p. 270 f. (Eng. tr. 256).  
Comp. also *Introd.* p. 52 f. SUSEM.  
(946)

Note that ὀρίσθαι...πλήθος is a virtual  
repetition of II. 6. 12, 1265 b 6 ff., just as  
c. 4 § 2, 1325 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17,  
in both cases without the conventional ὡς  
εἴρηται πρότερον (Newman).

23—25] Here the indignation of some  
honest reader found vent in the remark-  
able gloss on the margin of P<sup>3</sup>, τί λέγει ὁ  
δαιμόνιος τοῖς τοῖς; Doubtless the same  
hand which scribbled φλυαρεῖ, φλυαρία,  
against 1269 b 26, 1272 a 23. Whether  
from this "thin end of the wedge" came  
the gradual depopulation of Greece, which  
Polybius (xxxvii. 9) deplores, is another  
matter. Cp. Thirlwall *Hist.* VIII.  
463 ff.

§ 16 28 Meisterhans ed.<sup>2</sup> p. 28 ff.  
shows that λειτουργεῖν is the true Attic  
form. The usurping λειτουργεῖν does not  
appear before the third century B.C.  
When this εἰ was pronounced as ε, λι-

- § 17 διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμῇ. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς (XIV)  
 πλείστοις ἢνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες  
 ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεν-  
 35 τήκοντα ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα 12  
 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφείσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γεν-  
 νήσεως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγείας χάριν ἢ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύ-  
 § 18 τῆς αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμίλιαν. περὶ δὲ  
 τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν  
 40 ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσ- (p. 127)  
 αγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας  
 1336 a ἐάν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμία ζημιούσθω πρε-  
 πούση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.  
 17 γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι <δεῖ> μεγάλην εἶναι δια- XV  
 φορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὅποια  
 5 τις ἂν ᾖ. φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπισκο-  
 ποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τὴν

35 ὡς Π<sup>1</sup>, but ὥστε P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 36 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 37 ὑγείας M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>2</sup>, ὑγείας χάριν omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 38 τὴν omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by p<sup>1</sup>) || 39 καὶ ἢ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly

1336 a 3 <δεῖ> Susem. Should it come before διαφορὰν? || 5 δὲ Γ P<sup>3</sup> Ar., τὲ M<sup>a</sup>, τε P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> || 6 εἰσάγειν Γ P<sup>3</sup>, ἀγειν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, ἀεὶ Π<sup>2</sup> Ar., ἀσκεῖν Koraes, ἐπάγειν ? Susem.

τούργια was written in inscriptions of the Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν τινες] Solon *Frag.* 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this theory of successive stages in human life at c. 17 § 15 (cp. n. 971), and similarly in *Hist. Animal.* v. 12 § 2 (v. 14 § 3, 544 b 25 ff.), 17 § 16 (v. 20 § 3, 553 a 2 ff.), vi. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 f.); comp. vii. 1 § 1, 581 a 12 ff., vii. 13 (vii. 12 § 2, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the *Schol.* to Aristoph. *Birds* 494). Compare Hippocr. quoted in Philo *περὶ κοσμοποιίας* p. 71 Pfeif. and Censorin. *De die natali* 14 (J. G. Schneider). Congreve remarks that in *Rhet.* ii. 14 § 4, 1390 b 11 f. the forty-ninth year is more precisely given, not the fiftieth as here. SUSEM. (947)

36 τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γεννήσεως] This means that if any license is taken, there must be recourse to abortion, so that no child is born. The key is furnished by *Rep.* v. 461 c, μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέν, 'to prevent any embryo which may come into being from

seeing the light' (J. G. Schneider). *Comp. n.* (946) and *Introd.* p. 63. SUSEM. (948)

§ 18 40 προσαγορευθῇ πόσις] "In the sense of *call* προσαγορεύω sometimes employed προσηγόρευσα and προσηγόρευθην, though in the sense of ἀσπάζομαι it had προσερώ, προσεῖπον, and προσεῤῥήθην" (Rutherford). See *New Phrygicus* p. 333 ff. with citation of [Dem.] *Adv. Boeotum de dote* xl. § 1, ὅταν τις ἀδελφὸς προσαγορευθῇ. *Comp.* i. 12. 3, 1259 b 13 (προσηγόρευσε), and for the use of πόσις, *Soph. Trach.* 550 f. μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἑρακλῆς ἐμὸς καλῆται τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἀνὴρ (paramour).

c. 17 *Treatment and food of children during infancy.*

§ 1 1336 a 3 οἴεσθαι... 5 ἂν ᾖ] "Our next care must be for the proper quality of the nourishment, since much depends upon this, as we are bound to believe, for the thriving of the body." *Comp.* Plato *Rep.* iii. 404 b ff., Xenophon *De Rep. Lac.* 2 § 5 (Eaton). SUSEM. (949)



πολεμικὴν ἔξιν, ἢ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφή μάλιστα (XV)  
 § 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, αἰνοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι 2  
 δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμ-  
 10 φέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλό-  
 τητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἕνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μη-  
 χανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμ-  
 φέρει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν  
 14 παίδων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς  
 § 3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-  
 βάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γενό-  
 μενα [ψυχρόν], τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχρὸν ἀμπύσχειν, οἷον  
 Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατόν ἐθίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχο- 3  
 μένων βέλτιον μὲν ἐθίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν.  
 20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ἢ τῶν παίδων ἔξιν διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν

7 πληθούσα Vettori Bk., probably right || 8 νοσήματα] σώματα P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> ||  
 9 τηλικούτους Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, *tantillos* William, τηλικούτον ? Susem., τηλικούτῃ P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>s</sup> ||  
 10 διαστρέφεσθαι M<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), διαφέρθαι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), *desfluer* William, δια-  
 στρέφεσθαι other authorities and P<sup>1</sup> (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed) || ἀπαλό-  
 τητα M<sup>s</sup>, ἀπλότητα Π<sup>2</sup> || 14 πρὸς before πολεμικὰς omitted by M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 16 τοῖς  
 τῶν M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || γενόμενα Susem., γεννώμενα Scaliger, γυνόμενα M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Bk.<sup>2</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 in the text, γιγνόμενα Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 17 [ψυχρόν] Susem. || ψυχρὸν after σκέπασμα  
 P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), μικρὸν the other authorities and Ar. Bk. || ἀμπύσχειν Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 and P<sup>2-3</sup> (?), ἀπίσχειν P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand), ἀμπύχειν P<sup>6</sup> || 18 εὐθὺς...19 ἐθίζειν omitted by  
 P<sup>4-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || ἀρχομένῳ P<sup>2-3</sup> Ald. Bk., ἀρχομένους ? Sylburg, ἀρχόμενον ? Spengel ||  
 19 ἐκ...ἐθίζειν omitted by Ar. || 20 διὰ <τὴν> Jackson

8 δαινοτέρα] Plato *Laws* II. 666 A forbids indulgence in wine before the eighteenth year (Göttling). Comp. *Hist. Anim.* VII. 12 § 2, 588 a 5 ff. (Eaton); *De Somno* c. 3 § 9, 457 a 4 ff., § 14, 14 ff. SUSEM. (950) Comp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 25 (Ridgeway).

§ 2 9 κινήσεις...τηλικούτων] "All the exercise possible at that early age." So also Plato *Laws* VII. 789 e ff. SUSEM. (951)

10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι] This passage, says St Hilaire, is the first germ of orthopedy. Camerarius understood it of cradles and swaddling clothes (cp. Plato *i. c.*): Vettori of irons to straighten the crooked knees of children, *serperastra* as Varro calls them *L. L.* IX. 5. 11. SUSEM. (952)

§ 3 15 διὸ...18 Κελτοῖς] The same thing is said in an epigram first published by Brunck *Anal. vet. poet.* III. p. 150 XXXII, *θαρσαλέοι Κελτοὶ ποταμῷ ζηλήμονι ῥήνῃ | τέκνα ταλαντεύουσι, καὶ οὐ πάρος εἰσι*

*τοκῆς | πρὶν πᾶν ἀθήρῳσι λελουμένον ὕδατι σεμνῷ...* | οὕτω γὰρ γενέταο φέρονόν, πρὶν γ' ἐσαθρήσῃ | κεκρμένον λουτροῖσιν ἐλεγε- γάμου ποταμοῖο: and by Nonnos *Dionys.* XXIII. 95, XXXVI. 5 (Göttling). Further compare Strabo III. 165, Galen *περὶ ὑγιεινῶν* I. T. VI. p. 51 Kühn, and Kapp *Aristot. Staatspädagog.* p. 123 (Eaton). Galen however calls the people, of whom this is told, not Kelts but Germans. See on this point II. 9 § 7 with *Note*, p. 334 and IV(VII). 2 § 10 n. Comp. further Verg. *Aen.* IX. 603 f. There is a similar habit amongst the Beloochees (Ridgeway). SUSEM. (953)

§ 5 20 διὰ θερμότητα] Aristotle thus assumes that the vital heat, which by its gradual but serious decline causes old age, and by its extinction death, gradually becomes weaker and weaker from the moment of birth, so that it is most largely found in the embryo and the new-born infant, and in animals generally so long as they are growing, because growth is

ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν. § 6 a 34 <τὰς δὲ διατάσεις 35 τῶν παίδων κατὰ τοὺς (XV)  
 <κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς  
 <νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν. 37 γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον  
 <τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ 38 τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις  
 <ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ' 39 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παι-  
 <δίοις διατεινομένοις.> § 4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεῖ-  
 22 σθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτη παραπλη-  
 σίαν· τὴν δ' ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν, 4  
 ἣν οὔτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν  
 25 οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόρους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐμποδί-  
 ζωσιν, δεῖ [δὲ] τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν  
 τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, ἣν χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι'  
 § 5 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδείας. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς  
 παιδείας εἶναι μῆτε ἀνελευθέρους μῆτε ἐπιπόνους μῆτε ἀνει-  
 30 μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν 5  
 δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι (p. 128)  
 παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσδοποιεῖν πρὸς  
 33 τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδείας εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-  
 § 6 λὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδασομένων. τὰς δὲ διατά- 6

1336 a 34—39 34 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...39 διατεινομένοις transposed by Susem. to follow 21 ἄσκησιν, see *Introd.* p. 89 || 35 κατὰ Γ, καὶ II Ar. Bk. || τοὺς omitted by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 38 πονοῦσιν] πνεύμοσι Ridgeway

21 πρώτην <ἡλικίαν> ? Spengel, Schmidt would transpose 23 ἡλικίαν to this place; but it can just as well be understood || 22 τὴν ταύτη] τοὺς ταύτη V<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.), ταύτη P<sup>5.6</sup> L<sup>3</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand) || 23 ἐχομένην P<sup>6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 24 ἦν] in qua William || 26 δὲ omitted by II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4.5</sup> Bk., but it should perhaps be retained || 29 ἄγαν inserted before ἀνελευθέρους by P<sup>1</sup> || 31 τοὺς omitted by P<sup>4.5.6</sup> V<sup>b</sup> and perhaps by S<sup>b</sup> || 33 διὸ <καὶ> ? Susem. || 34 σπουδασομένων Koraes,

conditioned by vital heat. *Comp. Probl.* III. 7, XI. 14, *De Inventute etc.* cc. 3, 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (954)

§ 6 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις] Plato *Latus* VII. 791 E ff. (Camerarius). SUSEM. (955)

38 Dr Jackson defends τοῖς πονοῦσι by an appeal to Darwin *On the Expression of the Emotions* pp. 148, 236, 284.

§ 4 23 μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν] Plato however in the *Latus* VII. 793 E ff. makes this second stage of education extend from the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still this deviation is not material, since Aristotle makes education proper begin with the seventh year, §§ 7—15. SUSEM. (956)

28 καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδείας] Plato *l. c.* proposes for this age a kind of Kinder-

garten under the inspection of the nurses (αἱ τροφαί) who for the most part leave the children to invent their own games (παιδαὶ αὐτοφνεῖς), but prevent them from growing too angry over them, the nurses themselves being under the control of a female Board of Inspection. SUSEM. (957)

§ 5 30 καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων] *Comp. n.* (970), and §§ 7—12 in regard to the παιδονόμοι: above c. 16 § 12 n. (943), c. 12 § 5 n. (862) with notes (960, 963, 969), and *Introd.* p. 52 f., also VI(IV). 15 § 9 n. (1355), § 13, VII(VI). 8 § 22 n. (1483). SUSEM. (958)

33 διὸ τὰς παιδείας.. 34 σπουδασομένων] *Comp.* Plato *Latus* I. 643 B ff. SUSEM. (959)



35 σεις τῶν παίδων κατὰ τοὺς κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν· γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάβεις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ § 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὴ 40 τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλι- 1336 b κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων τ § 8 καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὕλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο, δεῖ 5 τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσchrῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεργος), μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μη- § 9 δὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δέ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων ἀπηγορευμένον, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως

σπουδασομένων οἱ σπουδασθησόμενων Γ apparently (*studendorum* William) and perhaps Ar. (*quae postea serio sunt facienda*), σπουδασθησόμενων P<sup>5</sup>, σπουδαζομένων M<sup>4</sup> P<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., σπουδασμάτων Ridgeway

39 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

1336 b <τὴν> μέχρι ? Susem., but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 109 b 44 ff. || 2 ἀπολαβεῖν Γ (*absumere* William) Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, ἀπελαύνειν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 3 ἀνελευθερίαν] τῶν ἀνελευθέρων P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>4</sup> Ar. Ald. Bk.<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand), τῶν ἀνελευθερίαν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.) || 4 ὥσπερ] εἴπερ Lambin Bk.<sup>2</sup>, wrongly || τι after ἄλλο (so avoiding hiatus) Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 7 μὲν οὖν] δὲ Susem., approved by Schmidt || 8 δέ] δὴ Susem., μὲν οὖν Schmidt (with colon after 12 χάρις) 9 ἀπηγορευμένον] τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. || ἐλεύθερον <μὲν> Koraes

§ 7 41 ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται] Comp. § 9 n. (962). Here then Aristotle refuses to adopt the idea of common games for children, in which the children of aliens and slaves of this age also take part, as was proposed by Plato, here again the more humane of the two, and briefly mentioned in n. (957). His refusal is on the ground that by means of these infant schools Plato begins the public education as soon as the third year has been reached, while he follows the Spartans in postponing it to the seventh year: see Schömann p. 271 (Eng. tr. p. 206). Further see § 5, n. (958). SUSEM. (960)

1336 b 2 εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν κτλ.] This and the two following sentences with the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen *Poetics*<sup>2</sup> p.

190 f., Busse *op. c. p.* 28, Susemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπολαύειν, which William of Moerbeke mistook, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and 1303 b 31, for ἀπολαβεῖν (in pronunciation ν=φ, β=ν), is correct and means to derive influence of any kind, good or bad: Busse cites δέδοικα μὴ ἀπολαύσω τι φλαύρον Isocr. 8. 81.

§ 8 4 ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο] With the utmost vigilance. A variation upon the more usual εἴπερ τι ἄλλο which recurs VIII(V). 8. 2, 1307 b 31 in the same order, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, which Π<sup>2</sup> gives here.

7 ἀκούωσι] Plut. *De recta ratione audiendi* c. 2, 38 B, διὸ καὶ Ξενοκράτης τοῖς παισὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἐκέλευε περιάπτειν ἀμφωτίδας ὥς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὤτα ταῖς πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἦθη διαστρεφόμενων.

10 ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολάζειν καὶ πλη- (XV)  
γαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις  
ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι<sup>8</sup>  
τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἡ  
§ 10 γραφὰς ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς  
15 ἄρχουσι μηδὲν μῆτε ἄγαλμα μῆτε γραφήν εἶναι τοιούτων  
πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ  
τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀφίη-

10 [ἀτιμίαις] Bücheler Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, rightly if ἀτιμίαις is not corrupt: ἐπιτιμίαις or ἐπιτιμήσεσι? Susem. formerly, αἰκίας? Schmidt who further approves [καὶ πληγαῖς] Schneider || 14 ἔστω P<sup>1-5</sup> Ar., ἐστὶ ΓΜ<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> || 17 πρὸς... νόμος omitted in P<sup>4-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> || τούτους Reiz Bk.<sup>2</sup> || παρήσιν P<sup>5</sup> over an erasure, ἐφίσιν Koraes

§ 9 11 ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις] Meier, *De bonis damn.* p. 103, understands by this their exclusion from sacrificial festivals in which slaves could not take part, that is, from the state sacrifices (*λερὰ δημοτελῆ*) proper: for which cp. Böckh *Staatsk.* 1<sup>3</sup>, p. 269 (ed. 2, p. 298). SUSEM. (961)

12 ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν] "To punish him for his degrading conduct." Comp. c. 15 § 5 n. (926) and especially n. (43) on 1. 5 § 8: and in regard to this whole section c. 12 § 5 n. (863), and more particularly *Introd.* p. 52 n. (3). SUSEM. (962)

§ 10 14 ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν... 16 μίμησιν] See V(VIII). 15 § 21 n. (1053), V(VIII). 7 § 3 n. (1084). The magistrates here mentioned are of course the Παιδονόμοι, as before; see n. (958). SUSEM. (963)

16 πράξεων = scenes, n. (1084).  
εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς... 17 ὁ νόμος] As, for instance, Dionysos, Aphrodite, Priapos, Eileithyia (Kapp). Aristotle himself, it is well known, traces the origin of Comedy to the worship of Dionysos, namely, to the improvised speeches added to the choral ode by the chief singer or leader of the chorus in the phallic songs; such phallic songs, he says, were still customary in many places (*γενομένη ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά ἐξαρχόντων*), *Poet.* 4 § 14, 1449 a 11 ff. These improvised speeches certainly contained improprieties of the sort here mentioned. But that even in the phallic songs properly so called there was often much that was positively indecent might hardly be doubted, even apart from the specimen we have in Aristoph. *Ach.* 263 ff., where

Dikaiopolis sings a burlesque of one, as he himself says (261). Other facts relative to this matter are mentioned by Athenaeus XIV. 621 d—622 d, on the authority of Sosibios and Semos. Both writers mentioned certain reciters, called αὐτοκάβαλοι, who delivered monologues or even dialogues (*ρήσεις*) from the stage crowned with ivy according to Semos, and were at a later date called ἱαμβοί, like their poems. It is beyond all doubt that Archilochos, n. (788), found similar iambic lampoons in current use at the merry festivals of harvest and vintage, and therefore in the worship of Dionysos and Demeter, which was especially cultivated in his home of Paros and her colony Thasos, where Archilochos settled. Comp. Homer *Hymn to Demeter* 496, Paus. x. 28. 1, Steph. Byzant. s. v. Πάρος, Hesych. s. v. Κάβαροι; Welcker *Kl. Schrift.* 1. p. 87 ff. It was out of this natural popular poetry that he fashioned his own artistic iambic poetry. Aristotle himself mentions directly afterwards (§ 11) the recital of such artistic compositions (*ἱαμβοί*), which certainly took place at such religious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at the proper season, probably in contests between rhapsodes. For it would appear from the pseudo-Platonic *Ion* 531 A that a contemporary rhapsode might include Archilochos in his repertoire; in any case his iambic poetry, on the analogy of the present passage: whether also his elegies, is doubtful. About that time also the burlesque epos and its recitation by rhapsodes were brought into vogue by Hegemon of Thasos, in contests at festivals of this kind. SUSEM. (964)



- σιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἰκνουμένην καὶ (XV)  
 19 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς.  
 § 11 τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὐτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας θεατὰς θετέον, ὃ  
 πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρ- (p. 129)  
 ξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων  
 γινομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἢ παιδεία ποιήσῃ πάντας.  
 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον·  
 25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ  
 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ κατὰ δὲ τὸν  
 § 13 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ 10  
 κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ὑπο-

18 τοὺς...ἰκνουμένην M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν Γ P<sup>5</sup> Bk. (πλέον P<sup>5</sup> over an erasure), iam homines factos Ar., τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> Bas.<sup>1,2</sup> and the text of Bas.<sup>3</sup> || ἐτι ἥδη ? Susem., iam Ar., [ἐτι] Welldon || 19 αὐτῶν P<sup>1,5</sup>, αὐτῶν Γ M<sup>a</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> || καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> in the margin of P<sup>1</sup>), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || τιμαλφῶν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || [τοὺς θεοὺς] ? Susem. || 20 θετέον] θετητέον M<sup>a</sup>, νομοθετητέον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., <εἶναι> ἐατέον Jackson, probably right || 23 ἀπαθῆς M<sup>a</sup> and apparently P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || πάντας suspected by Jackson, πάντως ? Susem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν...27 ἀναγκαῖον transposed by Susem. to follow 35 δυσμένειαν || 27 [ἴσως ...37 αὐτοὺς] Böcker || 28 κακῶς] καλῶς Γ M<sup>3</sup> || ἔλεγε suspected by Camerarius, ἔψγε or ἤλεγε ? Schmidt

18 ἐτι] The word cannot have arisen from ἥδη, nor is it likely to have crept into the text. However dissimilar, this must apparently be added to the passages in which ἐτι means iam. SUSEM.

§ 11 20 οὐτ' ἰάμβων] See n. (964) and n. (788) IV(VII). 7 § 6. SUSEM. (965)

21 κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κτλ] The term μέθη which recurs V(VIII). 5 § 2, n. (1019) denotes the advanced stage of the banquet, at which men's spirits were more elevated and they began to drink wine undiluted (ἄκρατον): cp. Plato *Laius* II. 271 E, Ath. II. 40 a (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also V(VIII). 5 § 8, n. (1028), 7 § 13 f. n. (1067), also n. (113). But, as was remarked in *Introd.* p. 55, κατάκλισις, or admission into συσσίτια, in all probability commenced with initiation into military service from the seventeenth year onwards: see V(VIII). 4 § 9 Exc. I. to B. V(VIII) but when recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed for them (Exc. to B. V(VIII)) they certainly have συσσίτια of their own, and only when their education has been completed, from their twenty-first year onwards, are they admitted to the συσσίτια proper, at first those of the soldiers, and allowed the

other liberties here mentioned. SUSEM. (966)

22 καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κτλ] Plato on the contrary even in the *Laius* VII. 816 D, E, XI. 935 E wholly banishes comedy and Iambos, and only permits comic dances by foreigners or slaves. SUSEM. (967)

§ 12 25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας] Another point the discussion of which is missing: see *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 53 n. (1). SUSEM. (969)

§ 13 28 Θεόδωρος] It is beyond all doubt that Theodoros is here treated as one deceased: but I fail to see that he is spoken of *Rhet.* III. 2 § 4, 1404 b 22 ff. as if he were still living and on the stage, as Zeller II. ii. p. 131 n. (1) maintains. From the latter passage it is very clear that he was the greatest tragic actor of recent times. Aelian, *V. H.* XIV. 40, relates a story of the powerful impression which his acting made on the tyrant Alexander of Phærae. Plutarch mentions him along with Polos as a famous protagonist actor in leading parts in *De regim.* 21, 816 F, and with Nikostratos, Kallipides, Mymniskos, Polos in *De Gloria*

κριτής· οὐδενὶ γὰρ πώποτε παρήκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ (XV)  
 30 τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκείουμένων τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς  
 πρώταις ἀκοαῖς· συμβαίνει δὲ ταῦτό τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων.  
 § 14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρώτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς  
 νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν  
 35 ἔχει ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν.

§ 12 b 24 <νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον·  
 <25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ  
 <26 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν  
 <27 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον.> 35 διελθόντων δὲ τῶν  
 36 πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ. δεῖ θεωροῦς ἤδη γίνεσθαι  
 37 τῶν μαθήσεων ἃς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς.  
 § 15 δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παι- 11  
 39 δείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μέχρις ἡβῆς καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προεῖναι P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> and probably P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand) || <οὐδεν>, οὐδὲ Bothe (on Terent. p. 619) || 30 θεατῶν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. and (with γρ. prefixed) corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 34 ὅσα after αὐτῶν P<sup>1-3</sup> II<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 35 δυσμένειαν II Bk. Susem.<sup>1-3</sup> in the text, *inhæasionem* William, *improbilatem* Ar., *δυσγένειαν* Schmidt, Susem.<sup>2</sup>, *δυσχέριαν* Koraes.

1336 b 24—27 24 τούτων P<sup>1</sup> and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) P<sup>4</sup> Ald., τούτων Γ M<sup>a</sup> Ar. and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) all other authorities Bk. || 25 διορίσαι P<sup>4-6</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup> || 26 πρῶτον πρότερον? Koraes, needlessly

36 ἤδη omitted by II<sup>2</sup> wrongly, [ἤδη] Susem.<sup>1</sup> Cp. 1268 b 21, 1280 a 6 || 38 τὴν omitted by M<sup>a</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>1</sup>), [τὴν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 39 μέχρι II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>

Athen. vi. 835 f (cp. also *De Audiendis Poetis* 18 c). Demosthenes *De Falsa Leg.* § 246 f, p. 418, 4, mentions him along with another great protagonist of the time, Aristodemos, with the remark that both shone in the rôle of Sophocles' Antigone, but did not appear in the *Phoenix* of Euripides; that Aeschines acted under them as tritagonist and had represented Creon in the *Antigone*. In his private life Theodorus appears to have been very wild, to judge by the nickname given him no doubt by the comic poets (see Hesych. s. v. πελεθόβαξ or πελεθοβάψ). An idea of his habits may also be gathered from Hesych. s. v. Θεοδώρου ἔλεγον οἱ κωμικοὶ τοὺς πρωκτοὺς, ἀπὸ Θεοδώρου τινὸς οὐκ εὖ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὥρας χρησαμένου. See also Hesych. s. v. Ἀριστοδόμου οἱ κωμικοὶ τὸν πρωκτὸν, καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Τιμησιάνακτα ἔλεγον. Diog. Laert. II. 104 calls him a tragic poet: but this must rest either on a

false reading or an error—more probably the latter, as Aelian also calls him ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητής. Comp. also Athen. xi. 482 d and Meineke *Frags. Com. Gr.* I. p. 523 f. SUSEM. (968)

§ 15 39 μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἡβῆς... 40 ἐτῶν] The first period is to be wholly taken up with gymnastic, three years of the second with the remaining subjects of youthful training, the following years again with severer bodily exercises; see V(VIII). 3 § 13, n. (1003), 4 § 9 n. (1015) Exc. Here Aristotle only partially follows Plato [see nn. (1015, 1016)]. In the *Republic* the latter divides the educational course into three parts. The first begins with gymnastic, preceded by the narration of myths, legends and tales, much as Aristotle also prescribes (see § 20, n. 958): gymnastic is followed by music and poetry together with reading, writing and arithmetic, and certain elements of



40 ἀφ' ἧβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάσι (XV)  
 διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς,  
 1337<sup>a</sup> δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη  
 καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον τῆς φύσεως βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν.

40 ἐν P<sup>4-5-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup> || 41 κακῶς Muret, καλῶς Γ II Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text  
 1337 a 2 τῆς φύσεως after βούλεται Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk.

mathematics generally: this lasts until the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The next two or three years, until the twentieth, are to be spent in military exercises. The second course of ten years for the more highly qualified students is in the higher mathematics, pure and applied; the third or philosophical course, which is only for the most richly endowed natures, lasts five years longer, as we had occasion to mention in *n.* (182) on II. 5 § 25. See *Rep.* II. 376 E f., III. 403 C, VII. 534 C—535 A, 536—537 D, 539 D ff. In the *Latus* (see VII. 794 C—795 D, 809 E—813 C, 817 C—822 D, cp. 813 C ff.). Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. *n.* 956); reading and writing from ten to thirteen; music, singing, and at the same time the really severer instruction in dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17; lastly, the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy—no doubt from seventeen to eighteen. It has been explained in *n.* (193) on II. 6. 5 that even in the *Latus* the better endowed natures were afforded opportunity, after the age of thirty, for the same higher education as that furnished in the *Republic* by the second and third courses, or at least for something similar to it. SUSEM. (970)

40 οἱ γάρ... 41 οὐ κακῶς] Cp. c. 16 § 8 *n.* (947). SUSEM. (971)

1337 a 1 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη... 2 ἀνα-

πληροῦν] Eaton compares *Phys.* II. 8 § 8, 199 a 15 f. ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μμεῖται: "and in general it is art which either brings to completion what nature is unable to effect or else imitates nature": on which passage see Döring *op. c.* p. 81 ff. Further comp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 15 (i.e. I. c. 4 Bk., 1097 a 5) where we are told of all arts and sciences that each seeks to meet a definite want, τὸ ἐνδεές ἐπιζητοῦσαι. SUSEM. (972)

"The context here, in its reference to education, limits the scope of τέχνη to useful art. Useful art supplements nature and at the same time follows her guidance. He who would be a master in any art must first discern the true end by a study of nature's principles, and then employ the method which she suggests for the attainment of that end" (S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects*, p. 241). He adds: "in the passage from the *Physics* also it is probable that the distinction is not, as would at first sight seem, between useful and fine art, but between two aspects of useful art. The sentence is not quite logical in form, but the meaning is that useful art on the one hand satisfies those needs of man for which nature has not fully provided, on the other hand its processes are those of nature."

## EXCURSUS I.

### Οἱ ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

NOTE ON IV(VII). I. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in III. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages<sup>1</sup>. Inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, III. 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see n. 584). But whether they are (1) *discussions by others*, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, the reference is to (2) Aristotle's *dialogues and popular works*, or to (3) *dialectical discussions*, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems<sup>2</sup>, in *his scientific writings*, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work<sup>3</sup>: whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) *oral controversies and expressions of opinion* are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all<sup>4</sup>.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, n. (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see n. 689) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and

<sup>1</sup> *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 9, 1102 a 26, VI. 4. 2, 1140 a 3; *Metaphysics* XIII(M). I. 4, 1076 a 28; *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31; *Eud. Eth.* I. 8. 4, 1217 b 22, II. 1. 1, 1218 b 34.

<sup>2</sup> See Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II ii p. 242 ff., Thurot *Études* p. 118 ff., Teggé *De vi ac notione dialecticae Aristoteleae* (Trepow 1877).

<sup>3</sup> See Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 105 b 16 ff.

<sup>4</sup> This is a point quite rightly emphasized by Vahlen. But how is it consistent to say e.g. that 'the division of

'goods which follows has furthermore been laid down and explained in the 'outside discussions and does not require 'to be repeated in detail here' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the supposition of a previous explanation be got out of the words? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. n. (688).



has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and discussions on such subjects in educated circles<sup>1</sup>. In other words he calls in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, *Dialoge des Arist.* p. 69 ff., 158 ff., finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen<sup>2</sup>, *Aristotelische Aufsätze* II. (*Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXXII. p. 5 ff.) has conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp. also the review by Susemihl *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873, p. 673 ff.). He has not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel<sup>3</sup> that for a question discussed in the *Ethics* Aristotle should quote his popular writings in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the *Ethics* the whole investigation turns on the inquiry, "What is the best life, or human happiness?" and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in point. In the *Politics* Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what he has done on several other occasions (II. I. 5, III. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI(IV). 9 § 2, cp. IV(VII). 12 §§ 3, 4: see *nn.* 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might simply have referred to the results of the *Ethics*. But if he had intended to begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the requirements of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impossible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether non-existent, as is actually the case.

<sup>1</sup> For Bernays' proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though advanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller *op. cit.* II ii p. 119 n. (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it says:—"as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation respecting the constituents of the best life

to be perfectly correct, we should in the present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally conceded, that there are three kinds of goods, and that all three are necessary to the best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary opinion (*ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*) goes no farther: for the ordinary view regards mental goods, i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing."

<sup>2</sup> And more recently Diels: see below.

<sup>3</sup> See Krohn *op. cit.* p. 37.

Now already at c. 8 § 4, cp. *n.* (799), and at c. 9 § 3, § 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. *n.* 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as "according to our previous inquiry," and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the *Ethics*. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see *nn.* (807, 813). There is this further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. *n.* 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, but of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the *Ethics*—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see *nn.* 876, 879, 881<sup>1</sup>), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it<sup>2</sup>, and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the *Introd.* pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on Politics Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer's notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also *n.* (711). SUSEM. (687)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a twofold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression *Aristotle* I. pp. 63—75, not content to understand by it 'discourses outside the subject,' thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to *Phys.* iv. c. 10 where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, *Études* p. 213, he can cite Alexander in *Topica* διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ (the *Topics*) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς, 260 a 24 ed. Brandis. So too Simplicius, τὰ ἐξωτερικά = τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δι' ἐνδόξων περανόμενα.

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded: see *n.* (881).

<sup>2</sup> For the inconsistencies which Krohn

thinks he has discovered are too deep for me to detect.



Grote then understands the term "extraneous to philosophy" (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in *ἐξωτερικός* more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to *σκέψις Pol.* I. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase *οἱ ἔξωθεν λόγοι*, II. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own *ἀπορίαν... ἄλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον Phys.* I. 2. 9, 185 b 11, by *ἀπορίαν ἐξωτερικὴν Simpl. in Physica* 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit *Phys.* c. IV. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with *Nic. Eth.* I. 8, 1098 b 10 καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the *Politics*, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 104 b 44 ff.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled *Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles* reported in *Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.* 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' τὰ ἔξωθεν λεγόμενα, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote (and Thurot) that the imperfect form or the dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit *a priori* than to *ἔνδοξα* generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to *λόγοι διαλεκτικοί*? (cp. *λόγοι ἐπιχειρηματικοί*, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι* all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwearied in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistic declamations: but in such *ἔνδοξα* we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 8, where a similar in-

tention is announced, 1098 b 9 *σκεπτόν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές.* The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition. Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our *Politics* passage. Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (*Latw* III. 697 A, B), adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly to the words 1098 b 16 ff. *ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων.* "Thus he has found support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the γέ: 'at least this *διαίρεσις* is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in *Pol.* IV(VII). 1. 3, 1323 a 24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 5, 1323 a 34, *ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥστερ πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν.* That he had the *Ethics* in mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 *ἐτέρας σχολῆς*, and by the citation c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on *ικανῶς*:—believing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of what is found in Outside Discourses, we must now also make use of it: *καὶ νῦν*, here in the *Politics* as before in the *Ethics*<sup>1</sup>."

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or *οἱ ἔξωθεν λόγοι* and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmaeon (? Epicharmus) is suggested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in *N. E.* I. 13, 1102 a 26; Plato *Charmides* 163 A for *N. E.* VI. 4, 1140 a 3; Hesiod, Homer, or the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he is bound to infer that the *ἀπορίαι* concerning Time in *Phys.* IV. c. 10 have come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connexions: not only is it *external* and *referring to what is external*, but in contradistinction to *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*, it would naturally be used for *non-philosophical discussions*<sup>2</sup>." What all men say may be a part of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in *Eud. Eth.* II. 1 it is just='what all the world says.' And this meaning makes both *Politics* passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But on the other hand with regard to *Meta.* 1076 a 22—28, *Eud. Eth.* 1217 b 22, and *Physics* IV. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is not so much to *λεγόμενα* as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by reason not of its origin, but of its method<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 480 f.

<sup>2</sup> Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 1884, p. 267.

<sup>3</sup> Torstrick's rendering of another dis-

puted phrase *οἱ ἐν κοινῷ γινόμενοι λόγοι* *De Anima* I. 4. 1, 407 b 29, is *eae disputationes quales homines elegantiores instituere solent.* This at least does justice to the present participle.]



## NOTE ON IV(VII). II. 6, 1330 b 26.

δυσείσοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.

Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endeavouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. II. 4. It seems strange however that, whereas the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both precedence and prominence. Should we not expect *δυσείσοδος*? and if so, would it not seem that *δυσεξερεύνητος* should correlate with *ξενικοῖς*, *δυσείσοδος* with *ἐπιτιθεμένοις*, rather than *δυσείσοδος* with *ξενικοῖς*, *δυσεξερεύνητος* with *ἐπιτιθεμένοις*? I conjecture therefore *δυσεξερεύνητος* γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ *δυσείσοδος* τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. H. JACKSON.

## EXCURSUS II.

## THE AGE OF SUPERANNUATION.

ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, εἴαν γίνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν. IV(VII). 16. 10, 1335 a 32—35.

The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man's age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father's civic rights (so I take *διαδοχή*) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, n. 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the

father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, 70½ years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated, c. 9 § 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years: if a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a mere approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (§§ 16, 17, 1335 b 26—38). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (§ 15, 1335 b 21—26, II. 6. 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, cp. II. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff.). Further, the remark in *Introd.* p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified: even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistracies (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civic rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that their possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, *u.* (817).

The above explanation premised, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (*Transactions of Cambridge Philological Society* II. p. 146) would read *ταῖς μὲν ἀρχομέναις*, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 49). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (*ib.* p. 118), who in his turn retains *ἀρχομένης* (Γ and corr. P<sup>b</sup>), but, while rightly referring *ἀρχομένης τῆς ἀκμῆς* as well as *καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας* to the father, takes *τοῖς μὲν* to be the older, *τοῖς δὲ* the younger children by the same marriage, and explains *ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων* as the children's attainment of the age of puberty. Had this been the sense we should have expected *τῶν μὲν...τῶν δὲ* instead of the datives, and perhaps the addition of *τῶν πατέρων* after *τῆς ἀκμῆς* and of *ἐκείνων* after *ἡλικίας* would then have conduced to clearness. This however is a small



matter. The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων; as if it meant that the children succeed (*not their father but*) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary. SUSEM.

# Θ.

- § 16 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινα  
περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῇ ποιεῖ-  
5 σθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον (ὃ γίνεται  
καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποίαν  
7 τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.
- 1 11 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον ἰ  
περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσκειν, καὶ  
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο- (p. 130)  
§ 2 λιτείας (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἦθος

1337 a 3 πρῶτον...7 ταύτην first separated from B. IV(VII) and rightly prefixed to B. V(VIII) by Spengel || 7 δεῖται M\*, δεῖ εἶναι Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> following William's translation (*oportet esse*) || 14 παιδεύεσθαι Ar., πολιτεύεσθαι Γ II Bk., πολιτ<εἶαν παι-  
δ>εῦεσθαι Jackson, yet at c. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1 Γ M\* have πολιτενομένοις for παιδενομέ-  
ροις (cp. 1260 b 15, 1310 a 14)

B. V(VIII). The same subject continued: the true system of state education.

This book joins on so closely with the preceding that it is not easy to make a parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengel's proposal to begin at πρῶτον μὲν is in full accordance with the usage of Aristotle. The same thing frequently happens at the commencement of a chapter. Aristotle recapitulates before starting a fresh subject. The worthy people who divided his books into chapters ignore this: see e.g. cc. 3, 5, and 7 of this book, which more properly should begin at 1337 b 22, 1338 b 39, and at 1341 b 9 respectively. The alternative commencement has actually been marked in this edition at II. c. 12, p. 314, III. c. 2, p. 359.

c. 1. *Three points to decide:* (1) *Should there be a systematic education?* (2) *Should it be a public system?* (3) *What subjects should it include?* While (1) and (2) are soon settled in the affirmative, B. V(VIII)

leaves off before we are far advanced with (3). Cp. *Anal.* p. 118.

§ 1 12 καὶ γὰρ] *Si nam et significat, pro altero καὶ a 18 post longam parenthesis adhibitum est ἔτι δὲ, sed facilius fortasse καὶ γὰρ etenim esse sumemus: certe altera earum inducta est his, altera ἔτι δὲ particulis, et μὲν οὖν a 11 excipitur δ' conjunctione quae legitur a 21.* SUSEM.

13 οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο] The neglect of this: in Latin, *hoc non servatum*. Cp. 1324 a 36 n., VIII(V). 8. 2, 1307 b 33 f.

§ 2 14 δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι] What this means is explained VIII(V). 9 §§ 11, 12, 1310 a 12 ff. Cp. n. (1641). *Rhet.* I. 8. 6, 1366 a 12 f. (Eaton): *δέοι ἂν τὰ ἦθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ἦθος πιθανώτατον πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι.* SUSEM. (973)

τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας] As Plato in *Rep.* VIII. 544 D explains, any constitution (e.g. a timocracy) is due to the prevalence of a certain (e.g. timocratic) temper amongst the citizens: *ιδ.* 549 A, *ἡ οὖν ἐκ*



15 τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν (1)  
 πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρα-  
 τικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· αἰεὶ δὲ  
 τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας), ἔτι δὲ πρὸς 2  
 πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι  
 20 καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον  
 § 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τὸ τέλος  
 τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ  
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-  
 λειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον ἕκα-  
 25 στος νῦν ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν  
 ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν  
 § 4 ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν  
 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τίνα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς  
 πόλεως, μόνιον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἢ δ' ἐπιμέλεια

18 βέλτιον M<sup>5</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar., βελτιστον the other authorities (viz. Γ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>) and Bk.<sup>1</sup> ||  
 24 [κατ'] Spengel, needlessly || ἕκαστος after 25 νῦν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 26 γὰρ Susem.,  
 καὶ M<sup>2</sup>, δὲ the other authorities Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 28 αὐτῶν Γ, αὐ M<sup>2</sup>  
 || αὐτοῦ P<sup>5</sup>, αὐτοῦ or αὐτοῦ P<sup>2</sup>, αὐτοῦ P<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>, αὐτῶ Γ P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτῶ M<sup>2</sup> || 29 μόνιον... πόλεως  
 omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

δρῦος ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γί-  
 νεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς  
 πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα, τὰλλα ἐφελ-  
 κύσῃται; Comp. also *Rep.* 541 A, *Laws*  
 IV. 711 B. It is not the 'spirit of the  
 constitution,' but the temper or character  
 which originates and keeps up the consti-  
 tution. Comp. the application of the term  
 ἦθος to ἀρμονίαι and ῥυθμοί c. 5 §§ 22, 23,  
 1340 a 40, b 7.

18 τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος] The nobler temper.  
 In other words, where the constitution is  
 such as to permit the excellence of the  
 individual considered as a citizen to coin-  
 cide with his excellence considered as a  
 man: cp. III. cc. 4—6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8:  
 IV(VII). 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10:  
 VI(IV). 7 § 2 with notes (468, 471, 684,  
 808, 1233). Also Plato *Laws* I. 641 B,  
 εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐρωτᾷς παιδεῖαν τῶν παιδευ-  
 θέντων, τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνύησιν, οὐ  
 χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ  
 γίγνουσι' ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί. SUSEM. (974)  
 As to the argument, it is much the same  
 as in I. 5. 2 f. 1254 a 25. It is perplexing  
 to determine whether it merely guarantees  
 consistency in the use of the term βέλτιον,  
 or is intended for a material inference.

ἔτι δὲ] answers a 12 καὶ γάρ, alleging  
 another reason.

19 δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας] An Aristo-  
 telian periphrasis for the special sciences  
 which has already occurred II. 8. 18, 1268  
 b 36. Comp. III. 12 § 1, 1282 b 16, where  
 ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις is one, the highest of  
 ἐπιστήμαι καὶ τέχναι, b 14, which phrase  
 is replaced in § 3, 1282 b 31, by ἐπιστήμαι  
 καὶ δυνάμεις; also VI(IV). 1 §§ 1, 2, with  
 notes.

21 καὶ πρὸς τ. τ. δ. π.] Therefore  
 there should be τάξεις τις περὶ τοὺς παῖδας:  
 the first of the three questions is settled.

§ 3 21 ἐπεὶ δὲ] This corresponds to  
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν of a 11.

25 τε καὶ] join ἰδίᾳ τε διδάσκων.

26 δεῖ γάρ] This sentence gives one  
 reason why the education is to be public.  
 The second point is quickly dismissed, but  
 the third takes up the whole of this book.

§ 4 27 ἅμα δὲ κτλ] The sacrifice of  
 the individual to the state was carried out  
 most completely at Sparta, but Periclean  
 Athens did not fall far short in this re-  
 spect. Aristotle accepts the principle along  
 with the other fundamental postulates of  
 the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly  
 in I. 13. 15 as here. Comp. I. 1 § 12 ff.,  
 4 § 5, and Eucken *Methode* p. 80 f. Also  
 the conception of rearing a family as  
 λητουργία, IV(VII). 16. 16.

30 πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν. (I)  
ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ 3  
πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.  
2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετήτεον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην  
κοινῇ ποιητέον, φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν παιδεία καὶ πῶς  
35 χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβη-  
τεῖται διὰ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι  
δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν  
βίον τὸν ἀριστον, οὐδὲ φανερόν· πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν  
§ 2 πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος· ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμ- 4  
40 ποδῶν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἢ σκέψις, καὶ δῆλον οὐδενὶ πό-  
τερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα  
πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-

31 κατὰ Sylburg, καὶ Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 32 κοινῇ or κοινῶς Γ Ar. (communiter), κοινῶς M<sup>2</sup>, κοινῶν II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., perhaps rightly || 36 διὰ] περὶ II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 40 οὐδενὶ II<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>, οὐδὲν the other authorities and Bk. (this may of course be right) || 42 εἴληχε Reiz, needlessly

30 The order πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βλέπειν ἐπιμέλειαν would avoid the hiatus and conform to I. 13. 15, 1260 b 14, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν. Cp. Plato *Laus* 903 B, C.

31 ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις] Comp. *N. Eth.* X. 9. 13, 1180 a 24 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (975)

32 καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην] On the ἀγωγή or public training of Spartan citizens see Schömann Eng. tr. I p. 255 ff.

It was the same for all VI(IV). 9. 7, 1294 b 22 ff. (except the kings' eldest sons or next heirs, Ps-Pl. *Alc.* I. 122 B, Plut. *V. Agesilai* c. 1), and without it mere birth from Spartan parents did not constitute any one a citizen: cp. the wellknown story of the hostages; 'Ἐρεοκλῆς ἐφορεύων εἶπε 'παῖδας μὲν οὐ δώσω, ἵνα μὴ ἀπαίδευτοι γένωνται, τῆς πατρὸς ἀγωγῆς ἀνεκτῆσαι· οὐδὲ πολῖται γὰρ ἂν εἴησαν.' Plutarch *Arophth.* Lac. 54, 235 B. Cp. *Inst. Lac.* 21.

c. 2. Conflict of views as to what should be taught: divergent theories of the end of education: § 1, 2.

The knowledge needed for affairs of life must be imparted, but only within certain limits. Even in scientific studies there is much which a gentleman would not pursue, or only as means to a given end: §§ 3—6.

37 οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν—ἀριστον] But Aristotle would not recognise any such dilemma as 'virtue or happiness,' unless

we here limit virtue to mean moral virtue only. This limited meaning occurs in § 2, a 42, see n. (978). SUSEM. (976)

38 οὐδὲ φανερόν—ἦθος] Cp. IV(VII). 14 § 8 ff with n. (903) and *Introd.* p. 45 ff., 47 ff. As here τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, 'character of the soul' is a fuller form of expression for ἦθος, so also in c. 5 § 16 we have τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἦθους cp. n. (1043). SUSEM. (977)

§ 2 39 τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας] From the standpoint of the ordinary, current education.

40 ταραχώδης = perplexing: ταραχή for ἀπορία in II. 8. 12, 1268 b 4. The three theories of the end of education are that it should be (1) directly utilitarian i.e. subservient to a livelihood, or should cultivate (2) the moral, or (3) the intellectual faculties. They still find supporters in the modern controversies on the subject.

42 πρὸς ἀρετὴν] Here and in the following clause (b 1) ἀρετῇ is evidently restricted to 'moral virtue' combined with φρόνησις, practical wisdom. SUSEM. (978)

ἢ τὰ περιττά] The fragment which has come down to us does not include a discussion of the question whether and to what extent these higher sciences should also be taken into account in the education of the young, cp. c. 3 §§ 10, 11, with n. (999) and n. (1015), Exc. I; also *Introd.* 50 ff. SUSEM. (979)

εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας] Have found



- 1337 b τὰς τινὰς)· περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκήσιν αὐτῆς).
- § 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, II 5 οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερόν· ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσῃ τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ
- § 4 βάνανσον. βάνανσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ 10 τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ
- § 5 σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χεῖρον διακείσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνι-

1337 b 4 δεῖ omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 5 ἐλευθέρων? Schneider (perhaps the reading of Γ Ar.) and 6 ἀνελευθέρων P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Ar.; both possibly right || 11 [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] Susem. || 12 τε omitted by M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ, hence [τε] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || παρασκευάζουσι after τὸ σῶμα II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>6</sup> Bk.

partizans, supporters; literally 'umpires to decide for them.' The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests: cp. *Metaph.* I. 8. 5, 989 a 6 ff.

1337 b 2 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες] See 1332 a 2 n. and for the thought cp. *N. E.* I. 3. 2, 1094 b 14 ff.

3 πρὸς] not περί, after διαφέρονται, as after ἀμφισβητεῖν in III. 13. 1, 1283 a 23, 24: 'with regard to' (cp. 1283 b 15).

What is ἀσκήσις ἀρετῆς? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1341 a 8, πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκ., 1333 b 30, 38, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσιν... μελετᾶν.

§ 3 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some 'utilitarian' studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of βαναυσία.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Rs. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV(VII). 14. 14, 1333 b 1—4. There is no need to limit the expression to τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἔργων as in I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5, III. 4. 11.

5 ὅτι δεῖ] There is nothing strange in the repetition of ὅτι after φανερόν. Comp. III. 13. 7, 1283 b 16 f., where ὡς is picked up by ὅτι, as also in *Phys.* I. 7. 9, 190 b 17, 19: other instances from *Phys.* VI. 2. 9, 233 a 13 f., VIII. 7. 1, 260 a 23, 25 (Bonitz). We may render: "as to all not being required, in view of the distinc-

tion made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student." τῶν τοιούτων limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἔργων, because τοῦτο is predicate.

11 ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] If διάνοια is a part of the soul, we should expect ἦθος for ψυχὴν [cp. 1340 a b πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντελεῖται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν]. But if it is the soul as opposed to the body (cp. *Plat. Theaet.* 173 E, τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια... πανταχῇ φέρεται), then ψυχὴν must be regarded as a gloss upon διάνοιαν, ultimately incorporated in the text. See p. 622 ff. SUSEM.

§ 5 13 βαναύσους] What is meant by παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακείσθαι comes out in I. 11. 6, 1258 b 37 τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται. See n. (103). SUSEM. (980) This is the best description of "sordid occupations": see Newman I. p. 111 f.

τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας] "Trades plied for hire" including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See notes (102, 103). But in I. 11. 4, 1258 b 25, μισθαρνία is used in a different sense, = 'working for wage,' to denote merely the manual labour of artisans and unskilled labourers as distinct from ἐμπορία and τοκισμός, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). SUSEM. (981)

καὶ ἐργασίας. ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα- (II)  
 15 πεινὴν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν<sup>2</sup>  
 τινὸς ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν  
 § 6 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ  
 πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μαν-  
 θάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ  
 20 ἀνελεύθερον, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους  
 θητικὸν καὶ δουρικὸν ἂν δόξειε πράττειν.

15 <μή> ἐλευθερίων or ἀνελευθερίων? Götting (wrongly), ἀνελευθέρων Ridgeway: but see Comm. n. (982) || 16 ἀνελευθέριον perhaps Γ Ar. || 16 τὸ...20 ἀνελεύθερον omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> (supplied in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>) || τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν omitted and a lacuna left by P<sup>5</sup> (1st hand), προσεδρεύειν δὲ (supplied by a later hand in P<sup>5</sup>) Bk. || 17 ἀκρίβειαν] τὸ τέλειον P<sup>5</sup>, perfectionem William, extremum Ar., τὸ ἐντελὲς Vettori Bk. || εἰρημέναις] ῥηθείσαις P<sup>5</sup> || δὲ] γὰρ? Susem. (a very doubtful suggestion) || 18 ἔνεκεν] χάριν P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P<sup>5</sup> Bk. with hiatus in pausa || αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ P<sup>4</sup> in the margin, αὐ M<sup>8</sup> || τῶν inserted before φίλων by P<sup>5</sup> || 20 ἀνελευθέριον perhaps Γ Ar. || πράσσω Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> cp. 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16 || πολλάκις (πολλάκις P<sup>4</sup>) after δι' ἄλλους Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 21 ἂν (in P<sup>3</sup> a correction by a later hand) after δόξειεν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

15 ἔστι δὲ... 17 βλάβαις] The sense, which Götting and Ridgeway have mistaken, is: "And even as to studies not in themselves illiberal, while (μὲν) there are some which it is liberal to pursue [ὧν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα 1255 b 28] within certain limits, too close application to them with the aim of scientific mastery is subject to the drawbacks above mentioned." Aristotle is thinking more particularly of Gymnastics and Music, but also of Drawing and Painting. See c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), c. 5 § 8, n. (1029), c. 6 §§ 3—8, §§ 15, 16, nn. (1065, 1080). But on the other hand consult Exc. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (982) Of the two clauses introduced by μὲν and δὲ Bonitz' dictum holds: "prius sc. membrum, grammaticae coordinatum, re vera subiectum est alteri membro."

16 προσεδρεύειν] to work closely at: II. 5. 6, 1263 a 29; infra c. 4 § 4, 1338 b 25. Comp. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι I. II. 5, 1258 b 34.

§ 6 17 ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν=πολὺ διαφέρει, it makes a great difference; cp. II. 8. 25. Otherwise c. 6 § 1 below.

19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν κτλ.] Cf. III. 4. 13, n. (488), IV(VII). 4. 7 nn. (900, 901). SUSEM. (983)

20 ὁ δὲ...πράττειν] Comp. n. (103) and Metaph. XII (A). 10. 3, 1075 a 19 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (984)

πολλάκις] This word goes with ἂν δόξειε while δι' ἄλλους (=in obedience to others) goes with πράττων as contrasted with αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων, and accordingly Π<sup>2</sup> have transposed it. But the hyperbaton is not stranger than in many other passages. Cp. 1255 b 3.

21 θητικόν] Cp. 1341 b 14. The strait conjunction between βάναισος and δοῦλος is laid down I. 13. 13, n. (122). The day labourer, θῆς, was mentioned III. 5. 4, 1278 a 13, 18, 22: see nn. (507, 486). The word is used in *De Rep. Ath.* of the lowest property classes, as reconstituted by Solon: τοὺς δ' ἄλλους θητικόν, οὐδεμίᾱς μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ δὴν ἐρηται τὸν μέλλοντα κληροῦσθαι τιν' ἀρχὴν, ποῖον τέλος τελεῖ, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς εἰποι θητικόν: c. 7, s. f.: a very close parallel to II. 12. 6, 1274 a 21.

c. 3. Of the ordinary subjects of instruction Grammar (Letters), Gymnastic, Drawing have a practical value: § 1. A consideration of Music leads us to determine the higher end of all Education, which is the right employment of leisure: §§ 2—7, as Homer attests: §§ 8, 9. Recapitulation: §§ 10, 11.

The proper treatment of subjects of practical utility: §§ 11, 12. Gymnastic should precede: § 13. Cp. Anal. p. 118.



3 αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημένοι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἴρη- (II)  
ται πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παι- 3  
δεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ  
25 τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν  
ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ  
γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν  
§ 2 ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ  
πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παι-  
30 δείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρη-  
ται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύ-  
νασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν  
§ 3 εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δ' ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ  
αἰρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον (P. 13)

22 εἴρηται] ἐλέσθη Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 25 τὴν μὲν...γραφικὴν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by P<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 27 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν] περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς P<sup>5</sup> and perhaps Γ (*de musica autem dubitabit utique aliquis* William) || 28 ἤδη omitted by P<sup>5</sup>, untranslated by William and Ar., [ἤδη] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, εἰ δεῖ Koraes, needlessly || 33 δ' Susem., γὰρ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || 34 τῆς...σχολάζειν omitted by Π<sup>2</sup> (supplied in the margin of P<sup>4</sup>), τῆς ἀσχολίας over an erasure P<sup>5</sup>, καλ...σχολάζειν omitted by Ar. || [τέλος] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly, τελευτῶν P<sup>5</sup>, ὅπως Vettori Bk.

§ 1 22 καταβεβλημένοι] Here and 1338 a 36 used for ordinary, current i.q. τὰ ἐγκύκλια, or ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία. Apparently from καταβάλλεσθαι = 'lay down a foundation' mid. So Pl. *Latius* 803 A. Late writers use the passive in the sense of 'to be published,' committed to writing, so already *N.E.* I. 5. 8, 1096 a 10: cp. Antigonus Caryst. *De Mirabilibus* c. 60 ἐβδόμηκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν καταβέβληται βιβλία.

23 πρότερον] In c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 39—b 2. SUSEM. (985)

ἔστι δὲ...25 γραφικὴν] Comp. Plin. *N. H.* XXXV. 10. 77 (Vettori): huius (Pamphili) auctoritate effectum est Sicyone primum, deinde et in tota Graecia, ut pueri ingenui omnia ante Graphicen, hoc est picturam in buxo, docerentur, recipere-turque ars ea in primum gradum libera-lum: Plato *Protag.* 325 D, *Crito* 50 D, *Rep.* II. 376 E, *Latius* VII. 795 D, Xen. *De Lac. Rep.* 2. 1, Pseudo-Plat. *Theages* 122 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (986) Under γράμματα came reading, writing, counting (λογιστική), and the elements of arithmetic. Most of the authorities given above recognize the threefold division e.g. Pl. *Prot.* I. c. (1) γραμμάτων τε καὶ (2) κιθαρῳδίας, both in the διδασκάλειον (*ib.* εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες) and (3) physical training

(εἰς παιδοτρίβων πέμπουσιν) at first in the palaestra. So *Theages* l.c. οὖν (1) γράμματα τε καὶ (2) κιθαρῳδίας καὶ (3) παλαίεον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν.

§ 2 30 ζητεῖν] Nature, personified, is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as she is said to define, to make a division, to place at man's disposal: I. 8. 5, 1256 a 26 f., IV(VII). 14. 5, 1332 b 35 f., I. 10. 1, 1258 a 23.

πολλάκις] E.g. II. 9. 34, IV(VII). c. 14 § 9, c. 15 § 6. SUSEM. (987)

32 αὕτη] "This is the principle which determines all." The pronoun is attracted into the gender of the predicate. See IV(VII). 1. 8, 1323 b 15, n., Vahlen *Aufs.* II. p. 34. Another instance IV(VII). 7. 5, 1327 b 41.

πάλιν] That is, after 1333 b 1.

§ 3 33 δὲ] *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 418. Hoc loco γὰρ (Γ Π Ar. Bk.) plane absurdum est. Immo si Aristoteles omnino voluisset haec cum antecedentibus nexu causae et consecutionis coniungere, certe multo magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutio. Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius peccatum est γὰρ et δὲ conjunctionibus propter compendiorum similitudinem inter se permutatis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituendum est. SUSEM.

35 ὃ τι δεῖ ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας· τέλος (II)  
 § 4 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιάν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο  
 ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς  
 παιδιαῖς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δέεται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παι-  
 διὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει  
 40 μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγε-  
 σθαι καιροφυλακοῦντα τὴν χρῆσιν, ὥς προσάγοντα φαρ-  
 μακείας χάριν. ἄνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς,  
 1338 a καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις. τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν 5  
 αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν  
 § 5 μακαρίως. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τοῖς ἀσכולούσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς  
 σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσכולῶν ἔνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ  
 5 τέλους ὥς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἣν  
 οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι.

35 ὃ τι Susem., τί P<sup>5</sup> Bas.<sup>3</sup> Bk., ὅτι the other authorities || δεῖ after ποιοῦντας  
 Γ (if William has translated closely *quod facientes oportet vacare*) P<sup>6</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in  
 the text || 36 <ἀν> ἀναγκαῖον Schneider, ἀναγκαῖον <ῆν> Spengel; one or other  
 seems needed || 38 ἡ τε ? Susem. || 41 καιροφυλακοῦντας Π<sup>2</sup>, which may also be  
 right, καιροφυλακτοῦντας P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || προσάγοντας Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., which may also be right

1338 a 3 γὰρ Susem., δ' Γ Π Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text

33—36] With the punctuation now adopted (comma after τέλος): "If both are necessary but leisure more desirable and more truly the end than occupation, we must next inquire what should employ our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or else amusement would be made the end of life." With ἀναγκαῖον there is the less need to express ἀν.

35 οὐ γὰρ δὴ κτλ] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 6. 6, 1176 b 27 ff.: οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν (Eaton). Also *infra* c. 5 § 10, n. (1033), § 13 n. (1038). SUSEM. (988)

§ 4 41 φαρμακείας χάριν] Cp. *N. E.* VII. 14 § 4, 1154 a 26 ff., διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὥς οὖσης ἰατρίας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι; §§ 6, 7, b 9 ff. ἐξελαίνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην...κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδεα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα (Eaton). See below c. 5 § 10, n. (1031). SUSEM. (989)

42 ἄνεσις γὰρ...τῆς ψυχῆς] This is seen most plainly in the case of sleep, which is sweet because it affords pleasure of this kind: c. 5 § 3 (cp. n. 1021). Further comp. *N. Eth.* VII. 7. 7, 1150 b 17 f. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἐστὶν εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις: 'amusement is recreation, and

consequently of the nature of relaxation.' SUSEM. (990)

1338 a 2 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] Here καὶ is explicative; translate, 'and indeed,' 'and what is more.' For the pleasure here mentioned is not something apart from Happiness (i.e. Wellbeing), but is contained in it. It is incredible that Döring *op. c.* p. 155 (cp. p. 109 f.) should have been satisfied with the absurdity "happiness," or as he says, the life of happiness (which is much the same), "consists of happiness accompanied by pleasure." To complete the logical absurdity he should have added "together with the sense of existence." SUSEM. (991)

§ 5 3 The violent hiatus—ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ—can be removed by emendation, or we may relegate the whole clause τοῦτο...σχολάζουσιν to the margin.

6 μεθ' ἡδονῆς] Pleasurable. The use of μετὰ and a genitive as an equivalent for an adverb or adjective is noticed in the lexicons s.v. Ast II p. 310 f., Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 458 a 2 ff. Döring's difficulty (see n. 991) partly arises from overlooking the fact that Happiness is a misleading term for εὐδαιμονία. The English reader need not be reminded that Welfare, Wellbeing (of which 'well-doing' is the primary



ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ (II)  
καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὃ δ' ἄριστος  
§ 6 τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι  
10 δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἅττα  
καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύ-  
τας τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν  
§ 7 ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν  
μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον  
15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμ-  
ματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν [καὶ πρὸς  
μάθησιν] καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλὰς, δοκεῖ δὲ  
καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τε-

8 αὐτῶν P<sup>4</sup> Ald. and corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup>, αὐτὴν M<sup>8</sup> and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand) || 10 ἐν τῇ σχολῇ  
διαγωγῇ Koraes, cf. § 8, a 22, [ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ] σχολὴν Spengel, ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ [σχο-  
λῇ] Jackson: but Postgate has satisfactorily defended the text || 16 [καὶ πρὸς  
μάθησιν] Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>, but more probably μάθησιν is corrupt, μαθηματικὴν ? Flach, hardly  
right || 18 χρησίμη P<sup>4-5-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>8</sup>

constituent), or even Real Interest, would often better express man's ultimate good, because these terms do not necessarily imply "a whole of which the elements are pleasurable feelings": Prof. H. Sidgwick *Methods of Ethics* p. 76 n. 1, *History of Ethics*<sup>2</sup> p. 48 n., p. 56 n. 2.

7 ταύτην μέντοι... 9 καλλίστων] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 8. 10 ff., 1099 a 7 ff. (Congreve). I cannot understand how Döring p. 109 f. is able to prove from these words, that the pleasure which belongs as a necessary condition to the life of happiness is not the pleasure which arises from virtuous action and theoretical knowledge, but something which taken by itself is an integral factor of happiness. (To this view Döring's reviewer Walter, *Jen. Litts.* 1877 p. 29, rightly took exception.) From what other source can it arise? Every pleasure, as Aristotle rightly maintains (see *Zeller op. c.* II ii p. 617 ff.), can only be conceived as a consequence of some bodily or mental activity—even the pleasures of taste or the agreeable sensation of falling asleep: for eating and drinking are bodily activities, and the very act of falling asleep (inasmuch as the cessation of a movement is itself a movement) is also an activity. Döring is no less mistaken when he goes on to state that the pleasure which is introduced as an integral factor into the end of life itself contributes to the highest intellectual enjoy-

ment (διαγωγῇ), whereas the latter is really due to the cognitive faculties and the pleasure inseparably associated with their strenuous exercise. The thought of Aristotle is a very simple one: that those activities alone can belong to happiness, which naturally produce the purest possible joy with the smallest admixture of pain. Comp. further c. 5 § 10, n. (1032). SUSEM. (992)

§ 6 10 Dr Jackson writes: "in the face of τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ § 8, a 21, I cannot reconcile myself to this phrase. Is it possible that σχολὴν is the interpolation of a scribe, who, finding πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ, did not see that with these words ἡδονὴν should be understood from the preceding sentence?" Dr Postgate *Notes* p. 15 defended both phrases, explaining this as 'our training must include certain studies available for leisure to be spent in rational amusement,' and a 21 as 'rational amusement to be pursued in leisure time.'

§ 7 14 εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν] Ranked under, with: so 1339 b 14 and θετέον εἰς, 1339 b 12. But § 8, 1338 a 23, ἐν ταύτῃ ταῦτον.

17 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικῇ] "While drawing too has its use in making us better judges of works of art," so that we are less liable to be taken in when purchasing such works, c. 3 § 12, 1338 b 1. SUSEM. (994)

χνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον, οὐδ' αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστική πρὸς (II)  
 20 ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκὴν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὀρώμεν γινόμενον  
 § 8 ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς)· λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ  
 διαγωγὴν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν. ἦν  
 γὰρ οἶονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάτ-  
 τουσιν. διόπερ Ὀμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν (p. 133)

25 ἀλλ' οἶον μὲν ἐστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖν,

§ 9 καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἑτέρους τινάς, οἳ καλέουσιν  
 ἀοιδόν,

27 φησὶν,

ὃ κεν τέρπησιν ἅπαντας.

28 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι δια-  
 γωγὴν, ὅταν εὐφραϊνομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων

30 δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκούζωνται ἀοιδοῦ  
 ἤμενοι ἐξείης.

§ 10 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὥς χρησίμην παιδευ- III  
 32 τέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὥς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὥς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλὴν,  
 φανερόν ἐστιν· πότερον δὲ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἢ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὐ-

25 οἶον Schneider || μὲν is corrupt, μὴν ? Schneider, μὲν γ' ? Göttling, μὲν τ' ? Spengel, γε μὲν Welldon, μὲν ἔοικε ? Schmidt || καλεῖν (καλεῖσθαι ? Γ) after ἐπὶ δαῖτα Π<sup>1</sup> || θαλεῖν Π<sup>1</sup>, θαλεῖων Μ<sup>2</sup>, *congaudere* William || 26 οὗς καλοῦσιν or οἳ καλοῦνται Spengel, rightly || 27 φησὶν] φέσιν Γ || δ] ὡς Π<sup>1</sup>, δς Π<sup>4</sup> || 31 χρῆσιμον Π<sup>1</sup> || 32 ἀναγκαίαν Π<sup>5</sup>, ἀναγκαῖον Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 33 μίαν Π<sup>1</sup> || τὸν ἀριθμὸν Π<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus, and this may be right

§ 8 21 λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν] See n. (921). Aristotle seems mistaken in asserting that the only remaining end, which music can subserve, is to educate men for rational enjoyment in leisure. There is still the end of moral training, and below c. 5 §§ 1—8 he goes so far as to demonstrate that this is the only object to be considered in the education of the young. He has then expressed himself hastily and inaccurately. Comp. nn. (1000, 1024). SUSEM. (993)

23 διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων] Intellectual enjoyment worthy of free men. So a 28, ἀρίστην διαγ. the noblest enjoyment. References to both passages will be found in n. (921) on IV(VII). 15. 2, 1334 a 17. SUSEM. (995)

25 Though not found in our texts, nor cited in Plato *Rep.* 389 D, in Aristotle's *Odyssey* this line must have followed XVII. 383 (Spengel). SUSEM. (996)

§ 9 27 φησὶν] This is *Od.* XVII. 385.

Our present texts give ἀείδων instead of ἅπαντας. SUSEM. (997)

We may conjecturally restore Aristotle's text as follows:

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξείνων καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐ-  
 τὸς ἐπελθὼν |  
 383 ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἳ δημοεργοὶ  
 ἔασι; |  
 <ἀλλ' οἶον μὲν τ' ἐστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ  
 δαῖτα θαλεῖν>  
 384 μάντιν ἢ λητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα  
 δούρων |  
 ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν  
 ἅπαντας.

The discrepancies in the Homeric citations (indicated by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v.) are numerous enough to exclude the hypothesis that slips of memory would sufficiently account for all of them. See Wachsmuth *De Arist. Studiis Homericis* p. 12 ff.

28 Ὀδυσσεὺς] *Odys.* IX. 7 f. With all this comp. n. (1021). SUSEM. (998)



§ 11 ται καὶ πῶς, ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν (III)  
 35 εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν  
 τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ  
 μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίων ὅτι  
 δεῖ τινα παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,  
 39 οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολ-  
 § 12 λὰς δι' αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὁμοίως  
 41 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὠνίοις μὴ δια-  
 μαρτάνωσιν ἀλλ' ὥσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν  
 1338 b ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἣ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ  
 περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρή-  
 σιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόζει τοῖς μεγαλοφύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

36 \* \* ἐκ Conring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneider thought, the passage needs any alteration: but this is extremely doubtful. <ὅτι τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἐξείργον> ἐκ ? Susem. || 37 τῶν χρησίων after ὅτι δεῖ Γ' (if William has translated accurately *quod oportet utilium*) P<sup>5</sup> || 40 δι' αὐτῶν after γίνεσθαι (γίνεσθαι Bk.<sup>2</sup>) Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. (in P<sup>1</sup> ἐνδέχεσθαι is omitted) || 42 ἀλλ' ἢ Reiz || [ὥσιν...b 1 ἢ] Koraes

1338 b 1 ἢ transposed by Postgate to follow μᾶλλον || ἢ] ἀλλὰ Ar.(?) Reiz Thurot || πρᾶσιν. ἢ μᾶλλον...2 κάλλους; Jackson formerly || θεωρητικὴν (θεωρητι-  
 κὴν S<sup>b</sup>) Π<sup>2</sup>, θεωρητικὸς P<sup>5</sup> || 3 ἀρμόττει Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || ἐλευθέρους ? Susem.

§ 10 34 ὕστερον] Another of the unfulfilled promises. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4). SUSEM. (999)

§ 11 νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον...37 δῆλον] The sequence of thought here is liable to be misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has proved, or tried to prove, that the ancients had regarded poetry and music as being preeminently a means to intellectual training, which in his eyes is more important than moral training, and to the highest intellectual enjoyment associated with it. It is true the evidence he has produced suffices for no more than the inference that the ancients considered music and poetry in the light of higher rational amusements for men of riper age, but not that they adopted music in the education of the young with the view of training them for this rational enjoyment in the future: cp. *nn.* (993, 1024). He does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the question, see *n.* (993), whether this art may not be utilized for the development of character: this he discusses later on, c. 5 § 1, where he expressly states that he will resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11, which had been left incomplete: see *nn.* (1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrasting the intellectual and theoretical aim of education not with its moral aim, the

development of character, but only with the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of what is absolutely necessary and practically useful. All three aspects are more intimately concerned with the mental side of education. The third is disposed of in §§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the difference between intellectual and moral training, without however pursuing the inquiry more precisely into particulars, his attention being at present especially directed to the proper development of the body. SUSEM. (1000)

35 εἶναι] Lobeck in his ed. of Phrynichus p. 275 treats this as a case of the absolute inf. See *n.* on 1330 a 37.

§ 12 42 πρὸς] This preposition as in 1261 a 13, 1262 b 3, 1284 a 1, 1336 b 31, 1338 b 2.

1338 b 2 περὶ τὰ σώματα] The prepositional phrase an equivalent for the adjective 'corporeal.' So Plat. *Timaeus* 35 A, *Phaedr.* 246 D. See *Ast Lex.* s. v. of whose exx. *Soph.* 251 c περὶ τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως = 'poverty in mental endowment' is perhaps the best.

τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν κτλ.] See III. 8. 1, 1279 b 13 f., Eucken *Methode* p. 35.

3 τοῖς μεγαλοφύχοις] Editors comp. *N. E.* IV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. SUSEM. (1001)

- § 13 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν παιδευτέον ἢ τῷ (III)  
 5 λόγῳ εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν,  
 δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικῇ  
 καὶ παιδοτριβικῇ· τούτων γὰρ ἢ μὲν ποιᾶν τινα ποιεῖ τὴν  
 ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.  
 4 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε- 3  
 10 λείσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λω-

4 πρότερον P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), πρότερον Ar. with all the other authorities || παιδευτέον after 5 λόγῳ P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus || 5 εἶναι omitted by P<sup>1</sup> || 6 <πρότερον> παραδοτέον ? Susem.

§ 13 4 πρότερον] IV(VII). 15 §§ 6—10. SUSEM. (1002)

7 τούτων γὰρ κτλ.] From what follows, as well as from c. 3 § 1, compared with IV(VII). c. 14 § 9 ff., c. 15 § 8 ff., it is plain that instruction in gymnastics does not conduce merely to physical development, but also to the moral education of the mind in courage. For the difference between παιδοτριβικὴ and γυμναστικὴ see also Galen *De valet. tuenda* II. 9, T. VI. p. 143 Kühn, where the relation between trainer (παιδοτρίβης) and teacher (διδάσκαλος) is compared to that between a cook and a physician. See VI(IV). I. 2 n. (1115), and for this passage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e. Exc. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (1003)

ποιᾶν τινα ποιεῖ] The phrase recurs c. 5 § 3, 1339 a 13 f., § 24, 1340 b 11, c. 6 § 16, 1341 b 18. Like τοιοῦτος (see n. 1. 8. 7, 1256 a 37) the precise import of ποῖός τις = "of a definite character" is determined by the context: in 1339 a 24 = δυναμένην χαίρειν ὁρθῶς (cp. 1339 b 24); in 1341 b 18 = βάναντος simply; while in 1340 b 11 it is as vague as ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά 1340 b 3. In our present passage it is substantially βελτίω ποιεῖν, πρὸς ἀρετὴν (τὸ ἥθος) συντελεῖν; in short, παιδεύειν, "develope," "influence." A correlative phrase, ποιοὶ times γινόμεθα, occurs c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 7 f., where see note. Comp. *N. E.* I. 9. 8, 1099 b 31, *Rhet.* I. 1. 9, 1354 b 20.

c. 4 Athletic training. Two errors to avoid: we do not desire to make professional athletes, or to realize the Spartan type: §§ 1—7. Bodily exercises to be relaxed in favour of other studies for three years after puberty: §§ 7—9.

The censure of an athletic training was passed IV(VII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13, 1335 b 2—12. The criticism of the exercises of the Spartans widens into a condemnation

of their political system in general on the lines of B. II. c. 9, IV(VII). c. 14 §§ 15—22, c. 15 § 6.

10 αἱ μὲν...ἐμποιοῦσι] Some endeavour to make their sons professional athletes. Aristotle evidently considers that such a career is βάναντος: cp. § 6, b 33, n. (1012), § 9, n. (1015), i.e. Exc. I., and IV(VII). 16. 12, 1335 b 5 ff., n. (944). SUSEM. (1004)

In his condemnation of the mania for sports, Aristotle had predecessors in Xenophanes *Frag.* 2, Euripides *Autolyce. Fr.* 1, as well as Plato *Rep.* III. 404 A, 407 B, 410 B—D, VII. 535 D, IX. 591 C. The judgment of poets and philosophers was confirmed by practical soldiers like Epaminondas and Alexander, and later Philopoemen (Plut. *Vita Phil.* c. 3, p. 357 C), by medical authorities like Galen (*Προτρ. Λόγος* cc. 9—14, I. p. 20 ff. K.; cp. Plut. *De sanit. tuenda* c. 16, p. 130 A ff.), and by the Romans. On the degradation of the athletic sports, see P. Gardner *New Chapters* pp. 300—303, Mommsen *The Provinces* I. p. 269, 287—289 Eng. tr. The chief causes for the prominence of the professional element were (1) the increasing popularity of the heavier sports, boxing and the pancratium; (2) the change of diet, see n. (1015); (3) the progress made in the science and art of training. "But it was Herodicus of Selymbria who ruined athletics, by introducing elaborate rules for eating and drinking and exercise. He first discovered that the human body can by scientific tending be made, not healthy and beautiful, but muscular and adapted to this or that special service: he improved the speed of the races and the skill of the wrestlings, but spoiled athletics as a means of education for life and happiness" (Gardner). The evil increased until in Roman times no pro-



βώμεναι τά τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ (III)  
 12 δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θη-  
 ριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὥς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν  
 § 2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε (p. 134)  
 15 πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον  
 τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρί-  
 σκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν  
 ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ  
 § 3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἦβειν. πολλὰ 4  
 20 δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω-  
 ποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον  
 Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα,  
 τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τοῦτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἃ ληστρικὰ μὲν ἔστιν,  
 § 4 ἀνδρίας δὲ οὐ μετελήφασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας

15 μίαν <ἀρετὴν> Susem. (after Alb. and Ar.), μίαν <ἐξιν> Ridgeway. It is better to understand ταύτην || 20 δ' ] τ' or γὰρ Susem., *que* Ar. || 23 ληστρικὰ M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald., ληστικά Bk. with all the other authorities || 24 τοὺς omitted by P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald.

vince of the empire possessed so many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

12 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the pancratium is found in Plutarch *V. Lycurg.* 19, *Apophtegm. Lycurg.* 4, 189 E, Seneca *De Benef.* v. 3. 1, Philostr. *De Gymnast.* 9, 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πυκτεύουσι διὰ τὴν ἔρην ὅπου ἂν συμβάλωσι, *Rep. Lac.* 4 § 6. Epaminondas saw the difference between the corpulent athletic habit and that of a spare, wiry soldier: Plut. *Apopht. Ep.* 3, 192 C.

13 τοῖς πόνοις] Cp. II. 9. 24, 1270 b 33, ὑπερβάλλει (ἢ διαίτα) ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν.

§ 2 14 πολλάκις] II. 6. 34 n. (344), IV(VII). 14. 15 ff., n. (910), c. 15 § 5; cp. IV(VII). 2. 9, n. (719). SUSEM. (1005)

15 With μίαν understand ταύτην: 'neither to this alone, nor to this principally' (Ridgeway). An omission of ἀρετὰς to be found I. 13. 9, 1260 a 24.

19 λεοντώδεσιν] The character of the lion is given *Hist. Animal.* IX. 44. 2—6: 629 b 8 ff. ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατός ἐστι, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρωκὸς πραότητος, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἦθος οὐχ ὑπόπτῃς οὐδενὸς οὐδ' ὑφορώμενος οὐδέν, πρὸς τε τὰ σύντροφα καὶ συνήθη σφόδρα φιλοπαλῖμων καὶ στερηκτός. ἐν δὲ ταῖς θήραις ὁρώμενος μὲν οὐδέποτε φεύγει οὐδὲ πτήσσει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν

καὶ διὰ πλῆθος ἀναγκασθῇ τῶν θηρενώντων ὑπαγαγεῖν βάδην ὑποχωρεῖ καὶ κατὰ σκέλος, κατὰ βραχὺ ἐπιστρεφόμενος. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treatment and criticism of γυμναστική (see *Rep.* III. 404—412), gives the dog as an example of the 'spirited' temperament in *Rep.* II. 375 c ff.; comp. also III. 410 E, to which Aristotle alludes in IV(VII). 7. 5, n. (783, ff.). SUSEM. (1006)

§ 3 21 εὐχερῶς ἔχει] "are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and cannibalism." These wild races lead the 'natural' ληστρικὸς βίος of I. 8. 7 f., 1256 b 1 (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν... 24 μετελήφασιν] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 5. 2, 1148 b 21 ff (λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις)... οἷος χαλεπὸν φασιν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὁμοῖς τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανεῖν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν: Herod. IV. 18, 106, Ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἥθεα, οὔτε δικὴν νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμον οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι, νομάδες δὲ εἰσι: Scylax *Peripl.* 75 f. p. 60 (Müller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be of kindred origin with themselves: Strabo IX. 416 A (colonists of the Orchomenians, who had wandered thither with Ialmenus after the capture of Troy), XI. 495 f. φασὶ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰάσονος στρατίας τοὺς μὲν Φθιώτας Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν ἐνθάδε Ἀχαιῶν οἰκίσαι (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue

25 ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερ- (III)  
 έχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ  
 τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους  
 28 γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον πρὸς  
 μὴ ἀσκούντας ἀσκεῖν. 36 <δεῖ δὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων 37 ἔργων  
 <κρίνειν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς 38 παιδείας νῦν  
 5 <ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.> 29 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηρι- 5  
 30 ὠδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θη-  
 ρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον  
 6 ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας

25 αὐτοὶ <μόνοι> Eucken; but why should not αὐτοὶ alone have the sense of  
 μόνοι, as often? || 26 γυμνασίους Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || ἀγῶσι after 27 πολεμικοῖς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.  
 || 27 λειπομένοις M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || οὐ γὰρ] οὐκ ἄρα ? Susem. doubtfully || 28 μόνον τῷ  
 Reiz || 36 δεῖ δὴ... 38 εἶχον transposed by Susem. and Böcker to precede 29 ὥστε  
 ... 36 ἐτέρων. See *Introd.* p. 89 f. || 36 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the  
 text || πρότερον] πρότερον Spengel, needlessly

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ Π<sup>1</sup>, οὐ γὰρ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || τι inserted after θηρίων by Vettori Bk.;  
 Camot inserted οὐθεῖς, Koraes οὐθέν || 31 οὐδένα] οὐθέν Götting, <οὐθέν> οὐδένα  
 ? Susem., but perhaps no change is needed

(see *Nic. Eth.* IV. 2. 7, 1122 b 6, and often), the motive must be purely the noble, the beautiful, the good: the virtue must be exercised τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, cf. § 5, n. (1009). See *N. E.* III. c. 7 § 6, 1115 b 19 ff., § 13, 1116 a 10 ff., c. 8 §§ 1—17 (Congreve). SUSEM. (1007)

§ 4 Cp. Pl. *Protag.* 342 B, c, where Wroschel says: haec Platonis verba tangit, opinor, Aristoteles Pol. VIII. 4.

25 αὐτοὶ] By themselves, alone: αὐτὸς = μόνος. Very near to this is the sense αὐτῇ (but is it right?) would bear, II. 9. 19, 1270 b 8 "iam per se" and I. I. 2, 1252 a 14, I. 6. 4, 1255 a 18. SUSEM. Add 1335 a 39.

27 λειπομένους ἐτέρων] This criticism repeated from II. 9 § 16, § 34, IV(VII). 14 §§ 16—18; see *nn.* (308, 345, 912). SUSEM. (1008) The simple verb here in the sense of ὑπολείπεσθαι, IV(VII). 16. 3, 1334 b 39.

28 πρὸς μὴ ἀσκούντας] So Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν.

§ 5 29 τὸ καλὸν] With this and b 30 καλὸν κίνδυνον, cp. n. (1007). SUSEM. (1009)

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κτλ] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (1010)

τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων] With this genitive should be compared I. 13 § 2, 1259 a 25, § 13, 1260 b 2, III. 5 § 7, 1278 a 27, 13 § 21, 1284 b 11 (if Π<sup>1</sup> gives the true reading); 'genetivus partitivus non addito e quo penderet vel εκαστος vel pronomine indefinitivo.' SUSEM.

§ 6 32 οἱ δὲ λίαν κτλ] In Sparta, reading and writing were not included among the subjects taught by the state. But this did not prevent individuals from learning them on their own account, if it seemed expedient to do so (Plut. *Lyc.* 16), and it is therefore a rhetorical exaggeration for Isocrates to make the sweeping assertion (*Panath.* § 209) that in the most ordinary education they were so backward as not even to know their letters (Schömann Eng. tr. p. 259). Yet the author of the *Hippias Major* (258 c) says very few Spartans understood figures (Eaton). Plato *Rep.* VIII. 548 B f. conclusively proves that they attached far greater importance to gymnastics than to music. Chamaeleon in *Athen.* IV. 184 D asserts that all the Lacedaemonians learnt flute-playing, but this cannot be accepted in the face of Aristotle's statement, c. 5 § 7 n. (1026), that they were not taught music. This disposes of Schömann's assertion to the contrary. And yet strictly speaking this would include singing as well; but the expression should probably



καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγωγούς ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους (III)  
κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἓν τε μόνον ἔρ-  
35 γον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χεῖ-  
§ 7 ρον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέ-  
ρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς  
παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμο- IV  
40 λογούμενον ἐστίν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια  
προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόρους  
§ 8 ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν, σημείον  
1339 a γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς  
ὀλυμπιονικαῖς δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὖροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας  
ἄνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσχοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι (p. 12)  
§ 9 τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων ὅταν δ' ἀφ' 2  
5 ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε  
ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις κατα-

33 ἀπαιδαγωγῆτους P<sup>2</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, perhaps rightly || 34 ἀπεργάζονται P<sup>1</sup> ||  
40 μὲν omitted by Γ M<sup>a</sup>, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || κουφότερα Γ M<sup>a</sup> Ar., κου-  
φοτέρα P<sup>1,2,4</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>, κουφοτέρα Ald. W<sup>b</sup> || γυμνασία P<sup>2</sup>, γυμνασία M<sup>a</sup> T<sup>b</sup> V<sup>b</sup> Ald.  
W<sup>b</sup>, γυμνασί L<sup>a</sup>

1339 a γ δύνανται Π<sup>1</sup> L<sup>a</sup> Ald. W<sup>b</sup>, δύνανται P<sup>2,3,4,5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Bk. || ταῖς Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> || 1  
ὀλυμπιονικαῖς P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand) || ἄν ἄνθρω Π<sup>1</sup> (corrected by p<sup>1</sup>) || 3 ἀσχοῦν-  
τας] ἀκοντας Γ || 5 γίνονται Π<sup>1</sup> || 6 ἀναγκοφαγίαις] ξηροφαγίαις Γ, from a gloss  
which is retained as such in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> from corr.<sup>3</sup>

not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed part of the prescribed course of study. Many too must of their own accord have learned to play the lyre and flute, or else it would be difficult to explain how the choregus of whom Aristotle tells a story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have attained such mastery of the flute. From Aristotle's language c. 5 § 7, it may be inferred that the Spartans who simply listened to others, as well as those who could themselves play, held music to be a means of moral training, and not simply a source of pleasure and amusement. SUSEM. (1011)

33 The form ἀπαιδαγωγῆτος appears N. E. IV. 1. 36, 1121 b 11.  
βαναύσους] Comp. nn. (103, 1004). SUSEM. (1012)

35 χεῖρον ἐτέρων] Comp. again the passages quoted in n. (1005). SUSEM. (1013)

§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἥβης] Comp. Plato *Laus* VIII. 833 c: τριτὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλή-  
ματα διανοηθῶμεν, ἐν μὲν παιδικόν, ἐν δὲ

ἀγενείων, ἐν δὲ ἀνδρῶν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἀγενείων τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μήκους τοῦ δρόμου θήσομεν, τοῖς δὲ παισὶ τὰ τοῦτων ἡμίσεα (Eaton). SUSEM. (1014)

To the "lighter" course are opposed the "heavy" or "violent" (βία) contests: ἐστὶ τοίνυν ἀγωνίας ξυμπάσης τὰ μὲν κούφα ταῦτα· στάδιον, δόλιχος, ὀπλί-  
ται, δίαυλος, ἄλμα· τὰ βαρότερα δὲ, παγ-  
κράτιον, πάλη, πύκται. πένταθλος δὲ ἀμ-  
φοῖν συνηρμύσθη Philostr. *De Gymnastic*. 3. These terms are also applied to the athletes, 'heavy-weights,' 'light-weights,' Galen VI. 487 K.

§ 8 1339 a 2 δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὖροι] The order is artistic; four short syllables.

§ 9 6 ἀρμόττει] But 1338 b 3 ἀρμόττει Π<sup>1</sup>, ἀρμόττει Π<sup>2</sup>.

ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις] The compulsory diet of the athletes consisted principally of vegetable food: dried figs, porridge, cheese. Only in later times was meat allowed: Dromeus of Stymphalus in Arcadia is credited with the change, Pausan. VI. 7. 10 (according to Pliny

λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν, ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ (IV)  
καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τὸναντίον γὰρ ἐκάτε-  
ρος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὁ μὲν  
10 τοῦ σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα).  
5 περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ 3  
πρότερον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαμβάνοντας αὐτὰ  
προαγαγεῖν, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὗς  
§ 2 ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα  
15 δύναμιν ἔχει ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χά-  
ριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύ-  
σεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ  
μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα μέριμναν

11 διηπορήσαμεν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 13 ἵν' ἵνα M<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bk. || γίνηται? Susem., and so perhaps Γ Ar. || 14 εἴπειεν P<sup>2</sup>, εἴποιεν the other authorities || 15 δύναμιν after ἔχει Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., allowing a slight hiatus (cp. 1341 b 2) || 16 ἔνεκα P<sup>1</sup>, χάριν P<sup>5</sup> || 18 οὐδὲ οἱ οὔτε <τῶν καλῶν οὔτε> Reiz, rightly || ἅμα...19 αὐτὴν first sus-

N. H. XXIII. 7 (63). 121 and Diog. Laert. VIII. 13 a trainer named Pythagoras, ἀλείπτῃν τινὰ, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laert. VIII. 12, ἰσχάσι ξηραῖς καὶ τυροῖς ὑγροῖς καὶ πυροῖς σωμασκοῦντων. Plato *Rep.* III. 404 A says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any departure, however slight, from the prescribed regimen made them liable to long and serious illness. Aristotle himself states *De Gen. Animal.* IV. 3. 42, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In *Problems* XXXVII. 5, 967 a 11 ff., VIII. 4, 887 b 22 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἄχροι, δύσριγοι); and *Probl.* I. 28, 862 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (Bonitz). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), IV(VII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13 n. (944) and Exc. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (1015)

7 ἅμα γὰρ...10 σῶμα] Plato practically lays down the same principle: *Rep.* VII. 537 B. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς τοῖς τε πόνους καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις ὅς ἂν ἐντρεχέστατος αἰὲ φαινῆται, εἰς ἀριθμὸν τινα ἐγκριτέον...ἦν ἡλικία τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθιένται. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ἔαν τε δύο ἔαν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι. κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμοι. He differs slightly in his mode

of carrying it out; see IV(VII). 17. 15, n. (990) and Exc. I. SUSEM. (1016)

cc. 5—7 discuss the place of Music in education. See *Anal.* p. 119.

The corresponding passages in Plato are *Rep.* III. 398 B—403 B, 404 E, 410 B—412 A, IV. 424 B, C, VII. 522 A; *Latius* II. esp. 653—660 C, 664 B—671 A, VII. esp. 796 E—804 B, 809 B—813 A.

§ 1 11 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 3 §§ 1—11. SUSEM. (1017)

12 καὶ νῦν ἀναλαμβάνοντας κτλ] The discussion breaks off, c. 3 § 11, 1338 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν ὅτι κτλ. See n. (1000). SUSEM. (1018)

13 ἵν' The variant ἵνα M<sup>2</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> is valuable for the treatment of elision and crasis in the manuscripts.

14 ἀποφαινόμενος] For the absolute use Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. quotes I. 13. 16, 1260 b 23, VI(IV). 1. 5, 1288 b 35. With οὕτως 1289 b 5; with the direct object (τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν), IV(VII). 14. 16, 1333 b 12. In II. 12. 1, 1273 b 27, there is a variant.

§ 2 15 διελεῖν] As in III. 13. 6, 1283 b 11, "decide." Ex distinguendi significatione abit in notionem disputandi, explorandi, explicandi: Bonitz s. v. who quotes 1299 a 12, 1300 b 18. Also V(VIII). 7. 2, 1341 b 31: but see note.

16 The first use: for amusement and recreation merely.

17 μέθης] See IV(VII). 17. 11, n. (966). SUSEM. (1019)



§ 3 παύει, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ (IV)  
 20 χρώνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ·  
 τιθέασιν δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἣ μᾶλλον οἰητέον·  
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ  
 ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιοῦν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν  
 24 μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιοῦν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαί-

pected by Vettori, ἅμα παύει μέρμυαν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup>, avoiding hiatus, ἀναπαύει μέρμυαν Götting Bk.<sup>2</sup>, not badly; ἅμα transposed by Schmidt to follow 19 διὸ καὶ; [ἅμα] here, but 19 f. καὶ <ἅμα τούτοις> τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρώνται πᾶσι [τούτοις] ὁμοίως Flach, not badly || 19 τάττουσιν <eis τάξιν ταῦτα τὴν> αὐτὴν Lambin, τάττουσιν αὐτὴν <ἐν παιδιᾷ> Reiz, τάττουσιν <ἐν> αὐτῇ Koraes; cp. Comm. n. (1020 b) || 20 ὕπνῳ Ar. and a marginal note in a codex of William's translation, οἴνῳ Γ II Bk. || 21 οἰητέον (οἴητεον P<sup>1</sup>) after 22 μουσικὴν M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, after 22 τείνειν τι Γ || 22 τι after τείνειν Γ, omitted by M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || 23 παρασκευάζειν Γ M<sup>2</sup>, perhaps rightly || [καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν] Flach, needlessly || 24 δύνασθαι omitted by Γ M<sup>2</sup>, hence [δύνασθαι] Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>

19 The quotation is from the *Bacchae* 381, ἀποπαῦσαι τε μερμύας. The preceding line is μετὰ τ' αὐτοῦ γελάσαι, and the choral ode continues ὅπότεν βότρυος ἔλθῃ | γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, | κισσοφόροις δ' ἐν θαλάισι | ἀνδράσι κρατὴρ ὕπνον ἀμφιβάλλῃ. SUSEM. (1020)

§ 3 διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν κτλ] The sense of this corrupt passage is quite plain. Lambinus has perhaps made the best attempt at its restoration. Postgate would explain the text as it stands, taking τάττουσιν = prescribe, recommend as in VI(IV). 2. 18: "and so it (music) is also appointed for the purpose of recreation alone, and all these things are employed in like manner." But then the words in italics have to be supplied. With Flach's transposition ἅμα τούτοις τάττουσιν = "and so they rank music with all these, and employ them all alike." SUSEM. (1020 b)

21 τὴν ὄρχησιν] Reiz correctly quotes Ath. 1. 9 f. in illustration of the passage, but he should not have adduced *Od.* 1. 151 f., for in Homer's description of dancing and singing as "ornaments of the feast" (τὰ γὰρ τ' ἀναθήματα δαιτός) Aristotle perceives, c. 3 § 8 notes (995-998), a higher estimate of these arts as a means of refined amusement and the best intellectual enjoyment. In Ps-Plato *Alcib.* 1. 108 c the term μουσικὴ is used in the widest sense to embrace the whole of the rhythmic arts, music, poetry, and dancing; but Plato himself only uses the word to include music and poetry. He makes dancing a part of gymnastics, *Latous* II. 673 A, VII. 795 E, 813 A ff.; and distin-

guishes between imitative dancing and non-imitative, called 'gymnastic' dancing in the narrower sense of the term, 795 E τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἄλλη μὲν Μούσης λέξιν μιμουμένων, τό τε μεγαλοπρεπὲς φυλάττουσα ἅμα καὶ ἐλεύθερον, ἄλλη δὲ εὐεξίας ἐλαφρότητός τε ἕνεκα καὶ κάλλους τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν (Eaton). Aristotle *Poet.* 1. 5. 6, 1447 a 27 f. finds it necessary to lay special stress on the fact that either this first kind of imitative dancing—or artistic dancing properly so called—or else (as I have assumed) all dancing belongs to the group of imitative arts of the rhythmical or musical class (the defective text of the *Poetics* admits of more than one explanation, and one explanation can be extorted from the words as they stand, see Vahlen *Beiträge zu Arist. Poet.* 1 p. 3 [267]). As to sleep, see n. (990). SUSEM. (1021)

ἡ μᾶλλον] The second use: for moral training and formation of character, as gymnastic trains the body.

24 ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς] According to Aristotle's theory, which is diametrically opposed to that of Kant, moral virtue is only found where love of the good is present, and where the moral activities are really exercised with pleasure and delight. The main thing in the formation of character, as Plato teaches, *Latous* II. 653 B, C, is to awaken and render habitual this right feeling of pleasure: see *Nic. Eth.* II. 3. 1, 1104 b 3 ff., X. 1. 1, 1172 a 19 ff., X. 9. 6 ff., 1179 b 23 ff., and below c. 6 § 17 ff. with n. (1044). Compare *Nic. Eth.* III. 9. 2 ff., 1117 a 32 ff., III. cc. 11 and 12, IV 1 § 13, 1120 a 26,

§ 4 ρειν ὀρθῶς, ἣ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς (IV) φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παῖζουσιν μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει  
30 καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐδὲ γὰρ  
§ 5 ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἢ τῶν παί- 5

25 ἦ] ἦ P<sup>2</sup> Ald. and P<sup>3</sup> (later hand), ἦ <καὶ> Koraes wrongly || καὶ πρὸς εὐφροσύνην Spengel, [καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν] Döring *Philologus* xxvii p. 704 f. So Heidenhain (*De doctrinae artium Aristotelicae principiis* p. 49) who considers the words as a gloss upon 22 πρὸς ἀρετήν. See Comm. n. (1023) || 29 τε παισὶν Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> (παι over an erasure) Bk.<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, γε παισὶν P<sup>1</sup> Newman *Class. Rev.* vii. 305 n. 1, παισὶν M<sup>1</sup>, pueris William, [τε] παισὶν Bk.<sup>2</sup>, παισὶ τε Flach, τοῖς παισὶν Reiz, τε <καὶ φρόνησιν> παισὶν ? Götting, ἀτελεσσω Schmidt Susem.<sup>2</sup> || 30 οὐδὲ] οὐδὲν M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, οὐδενί Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk. Either may be right

§ 24, b 30, c. 2 § 8, 1122 b 7 f., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful feeling of pleasure and pain, see *Nic. Eth.* iii. 4. 4 f., 1113 a 29 ff., vi. 5. 6, 1140 b 12 ff., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance: see below § 13 f., 1339 b 31 ff., n. (1039). Cp. Döring *op. c. p.* 106 f., 110 f. SUSEM. (1022)

§ 4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intelligence.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 831 b 4: φρόνησις latiore sensu, syn. γνώσις, ἐπιστήμη. The passages cited, amongst them 1288 b 22, 1289 a 12, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction: while c. 5 § 8 he can equally well emphasize the other element by inserting εὐημερίαν καὶ before διαγωγὴν εὐεθέριον: see n. (1027). There is nothing therefore to justify alteration, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion εὐφροσύνην, on the analogy of the second passage, is least open to objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is εὐφροσύνη and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as εὐημερία. SUSEM. (1023)

27 παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 6 §§ 3—8, 1176 b 6 ff.

28 μετὰ λύπης] But Happiness is οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς, c. 3 § 5. 1338 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult: a tacit contradiction of the Sophists' belief that education is no more than cramming: see Pl. *Rep.* 345 B, 518 C: and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities *De Soph. El.* 33 § 17, 184 a 2—8 (Butcher). On the pleasures of learning see *Rhet.* i. 11. 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application to art, *Poet.* c. 4 § 4, 1448 b 12 ff.

29 τε] See IV(VII). 3. 1, 1325 a 19, n.

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος] Döring p. 137 is right then in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying art either as an amusement (παιδιᾶ) or by deriving from it the highest intellectual gratification: although it is really only in the latter sense that the 'enjoyment' of art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. c. 6 § 2, n. (1062). In IV(VII). 14 § 9 ff., 15 § 1, cp. n. (903), Aristotle says intellectual training is the highest aim of education, and moral training only a means thereto; while V(VIII). 3. 6 he says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn certain things, adducing (c. 3 § 2 f.) the fact that the ancients considered Music in this sense a part of education: cp. n. (993), n. (1000). This inconsistency can only be reconciled by assuming (a) that in the passages from IV(VII),—παιδεύετον 1333 b 4, τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν μελέτην 1334 b 16, τὴν ἐπιμελείαν b 25—he does



δων σπουδὴ παιδείας εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ (IV)  
 τελειωθείσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἔνεκα δέοι  
 μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ (p. 13)  
 35 Μήδων βασιλεῖς, δι' ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιοῦντων μεταλαμβάνειν  
 § 6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον  
 ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην  
 τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον.  
 εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν  
 40 ὄψων πραγματεῖαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ'  
 § 7 ἄτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἥθη  
 βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ'  
 1339 b οὐχ ἐτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν,  
 ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύ-  
 νανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ  
 § 8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ πρὸς εὐήμε-

33 δέοι] δέ Π<sup>1</sup> (emended by corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup>) || 35 δι' omitted by P<sup>2</sup> Bk. || 36 καὶ  
 <ἀνευ> Susem., [καὶ] Spengel, καὶ Madvig || 39 τὰ τοιαῦτα after δέ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. ||  
 40 ἂν omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>

1339 b 1 καὶ transposed to follow δύνασθαι Spengel, perhaps rightly if § 3, a 24  
 δύνασθαι is to stand || 4 εἰ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>, εἴη P<sup>2-3-5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald.

not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the education of the young up to their twenty-first year, and (β) that, as appears from c. 5 §§ 5, 6, n. (1025), § 8, n. (1027), § 11, n. (1036), cp. nn. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (ἥθος) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is to flow therefrom. See also § 7 n. (1026), Excursus I, and n. (875) on IV(VII). 13. 5. SUSEM. (1024)

§ 5 32 παιδείας χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις] In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle's own opinion: see c. 5 § 11, n. (1036). SUSEM. (1025)

35 βασιλεῖς] So Philip of Macedon: Plut. *Vita Periclis* c. 1, p. 152 s. f. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν νῦν ἐπιτερώς ἐν τινὶ πότῳ ψάλλοντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν· "Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλον;" ἀρκεῖ γὰρ, ἂν βασιλεὺς ἀκροῦσθαι ψαλλόντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῖς Μούσαις ἐτέρων

ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατῆς γιγνόμενος.

§ 6 37 ἀπεργάζεσθαι] The absolute use: give a performance. Note that πεποιημένους is perfect of the middle ποιεῖσθαι (ἔργον).

39 τὰ τοιαῦτα] All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment.

40 ὄψων] We find ὀψοποιητικὴ an example I. 7. 3, 1255 b 26, and condemned as δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Comp. also III. 11. 14, 1282 a 17—23, III. 4 §§ 11—13, 1277 a 23—b 7; on the whole principle V (VIII). 3 §§ 3—6.

§ 7 41 δύναται] The subject is ἡ μουσική, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 22—24, though it is obscurely indicated a 37 by αὐτὸ τοῦτο, i.e. the execution.

1339 b 2 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κτλ] See notes (1011, 1024): also c. 5 § 17 nn. (1022, 1044, 1045): comp. c. 6 § 1 ff. with nn. (1061, 1066). SUSEM. (1026)

§ 8 4 ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κτλ] Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, n. 1025) is extended to intellectual enjoyment, see n. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly

5 ρίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μανθά-(IV)  
 νειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκο-7  
 πῆν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ  
 γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς αἰδεῖ καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ  
 10 ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

§ 9 ἀλλ' ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη V  
 ζήτησις ἐστὶ πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θε-  
 τέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παι-  
 14 δείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται  
 § 10 καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς  
 ἐστὶ, τὴν δ' ἀνάπανσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ  
 διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τις ἐστίν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν  
 ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν  
 19 ἡδονὴν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν).  
 § 11 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἰναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψι-

6 χρωμένων] χειρουργούντων Flach || 8 ἄδει P<sup>5</sup>, ᾄδει Bk. || 13 παιδιὰν ἢ παι-  
 δειαν Vettori<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly || 14 παιδιὰν] ἀρετὴν ? Jackson

serve as preparation for the elevated enjoyment of music in riper years. Cp. also *nn.* (921, 1023). SUSEM. (1027)

7 ὑπόληψιν] See Bonitz ad *Meta.* 1. 1. 2, 981 a 7, b 6, p. 41, p. 47 f.: Waitz ad 66 b 19, *Org.* 1. p. 523. Such 'unproved assumptions,' like other *ἐνδοξα*, contain a germ of truth.

8 ὁ Ζεὺς] Schlosser thinks that here Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As to representations of Apollo and other gods with the cithara or lyre (cp. *n.* 1071), see particularly L. van Jan *De fidibus Graecorum* (Berlin 1859), pp. 17, 20 f., 24 ff. Zeus is not among the number. SUSEM. (1028)

ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ] See *n.* (982), Exc. 1. to this book, and c. 6 § 4, c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with *n.* (1067). SUSEM. (1029)

10 Plato *Laus* II. 665 D f. *pās pou γιγνόμενος πρεσβύτερος ὄκνου πρὸς τὰς ψῆδας μεστός, καὶ χαίρει τε ἡττον πράττων τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενης αἰσχύνειτ' ἂν μᾶλλον.*

§ 9 11 ὕστερον] I.e. c. 6 § 1, 1340 b 20 ff. where this point is again taken up. See *n.* (1060). SUSEM. (1030)

13 παιδείαν] The end to which Plato confined all poetry and all art: see Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 317 ff.

"Aristotle allows that for childhood the use of poetry and music is to convey moral instruction"...but "for the grown man the poet's function is not that of a teacher, he is only so by accident" p. 322 f.

§ 10 17 ἰατρεία τις] This has been set forth c. 3 § 4, *φαρμακείας χάριν*: cp. *n.* (989). SUSEM. (1031)

18 μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν κτλ] The highest intellectual (or aesthetic) enjoyment implies the highest nobleness (τὸ καλόν), because it is the highest activity of soul: it implies the highest pleasure, because from this highest human activity flows the pleasure appropriate to it: see *n.* (992) on c. 3 § 5. SUSEM. (1032)

19 ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων] Cp. c. 3 §§ 3, 4 (*μεθ' ἡδονῆς*), with *nn.* (988, 991, 992): also IV (VII). 1. 6, 1323 b 1 f. τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως εἶτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν εἶτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ εἶτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, *n.* (698). SUSEM. (1033)

§ 11 20 ψαλῆν] Instrumental music, unaccompanied by the voice: § 17, 1340 a 12 ff. ἀκροῦμενοι...χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

Comp. *Nic. Eth.* 1. 9. 1, 1098 b 25, 11. 8. 9, 1169 a 20—25: also VII. 11. 2, 1152 b 6, c. 13. 2, 1153 b 14 (Newman).



λην οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι <sup>2</sup>

βροτοῖς ἡδιστον αἰδεῖν.

διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνου-  
<sup>24</sup> σιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ὑπολάβοι (p. 137)  
<sup>§ 12</sup> ἂν τις παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῇ  
 τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς  
 τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς  
 ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται  
 καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλεόν ἀλλὰ καὶ  
<sup>30</sup> διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ

<sup>21</sup> γὰρ Π<sup>1</sup>, γοῦν Π<sup>2</sup> Bk., δὲ P<sup>5</sup> || <sup>24</sup> ὑπολάβοι after <sup>25</sup> ἂν τις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoid-  
 ing hiatus || <sup>28</sup> γενέσθαι? Susem. || <sup>29</sup> καὶ διὰ δι' αὐτὴν Spengel, but the text  
 can give the same sense

<sup>21</sup> Μουσαῖος] Not an historical character, but a mythical personage. Under this name went a variety of ancient poems, the real authors of which were unknown, including (α) hymns—Pausanias, IV. 1. 4, maintains that a hymn to Demeter is by Musaeus, and is the only genuine fragment of his which has been preserved—(β) oracular responses (χρησμοί); collected by Onomacritus of Athens under the direction of Hipparchus and esteemed of such importance that Onomacritus was banished from Athens for the interpolation of a single line, which was discovered by Lasus of Hermione: Herod. VII. 6, VIII. 96, IX. 43; also (γ) a gnomic poem addressed to his son Eumolpus, referred to by Plato *Repub.* II. 363 C, called 'Eumolpia' by Pausanias, X. 5. 3, but 'Προθῆκαι', 'Precepts' or 'Advice,' by Suidas. SUSEM. (1034)

<sup>23</sup> διαγωγὰς] The plural has a concrete meaning 'social gatherings,' 'the more playful forms of social intercourse,' approximating to παιδιὰς, from which διαγωγή is in general carefully discriminated. Comp. *n.* (921), and III. 9. 13, *Nic. Eth.* X. 6 § 3, § 8 there cited. SUSEM. (1035)

<sup>24</sup> καὶ ἐντεῦθεν] In order that in mature life they may find in music a recreation: cp. c. 5 § 5 with *nn.* (1024, 1025). The difficulty there raised, as to why in that case boys should learn to sing and play themselves, has been postponed for future discussion: § 9, *n.* (1030). SUSEM. (1036)

The order of the words in Π<sup>1</sup> must be modified. There is authority for ὑπο-

λάβοι τις ἂν, 1265 b 6: or we might comp. 1277 a 32, *κάντεῦθεν ἂν κατῖδοι τις*. Yet as at § 14, b 39, all mss. give *ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι*, we should probably adopt the same order from Π<sup>2</sup> here.

§ 12 <sup>25</sup> ἀβλαβῇ τῶν ἡδέων] A Platonian conception: *Phil.* 51 A—52 B, 66 C, *Rep.* II. 357 B αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς, *Latius* II. 667 D, E. The harmless pleasures, especially those of imitative art, "conduce both to our great end, Happiness, and to rest by the way. Few men have the fortune to find themselves at the goal. All, however, take frequent rest and pastime" (Jebb).

<sup>27</sup> ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι] An unusual phrase, which must mean τοῦ τέλους τυχεῖν, to achieve that highest end of life.

Possibly the following is a burlesque of some encomium on music: εὐθὺς ἀπολαύει τῆς τέχνης ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μαρθάνειν, καὶ ἅμα τε ἀρχεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τέλει ἐστίν, *Luc. De Parasito* 14.

<sup>29</sup> οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλεόν] "Not merely for the sake of a good beyond it, but also for the sake of the pleasure." Even the man who spends his leisure in contemplative activity requires a change: the most cultivated would then seek repose not in difficult but in easy music, though not perhaps such music as is described c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff., cp. *nn.* (1097—1099). But Congreve is right in calling attention to the fact that in *Nic. Eth.* X. 6. 3, 1176 b 6 ff., virtuous activities and pleasant pastimes (αἱ ἡδέαι τῶν παιδιῶν) are declared to be the only two things which men pursue purely for their own sakes and with no other end in view. SUSEM. (1037)

- § 13 ταύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι<sup>3</sup> (V)  
 τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἕως ἡδονὴν τινα καὶ τὸ  
 τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβά-  
 νουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων  
 35 ἔχειν ὁμοίωμά τι. τό τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων  
 χάριν αἰρετόν, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενὸς εἰσι τῶν

33 δὲ omitted in Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> of P<sup>1</sup>) || 34 τῷ omitted by P<sup>4-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> L<sup>a</sup>  
 Ald. || 35 ὁμοίωμα (μα over an erasure) P<sup>5</sup>, ὁμοιώματα Π<sup>3</sup>

31 ταύτης] τῆς μουσικῆς.

§ 13 συμβέβηκε δὲ κτλ] "It is incident to men to regard their pastimes as an end." The expression might have been altered slightly for clearness: 'but perhaps it is not right to do what is so often done, that is, to make amusements the end of life.' SUSEM. (1037 b) The verb συμβαίνειν has before been used of awkward consequences which overtake an argument or an opponent: II. 3. 5, 1262 b 4, II. 5. 10, 1263 b 7.

32 ἔχει γὰρ... 37 λύπη] "The true end, no doubt, is fraught with pleasure too,—though not of the commonplace sort. Pursuing the commonplace pleasure, men mistake it for the true pleasure, because it is a faint image of that to which all their actions tend. The true end is desirable independently of things to come after it. So it is with pleasures of this sort; they are desirable independently of what may come after them, and solely on account of what has gone before them, such as toil or pain" (Jebb).

With οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν cp. IV(VII). 9. 8, 1328 b 17 (where πᾶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν does not mean an extraordinary number, but a number definitely defined) and *Poet.* c. 26 § 15. 1462 b 13, δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς (τὴν τραγωδίαν καὶ τὴν ἐποποιίαν) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην. Take τῶν πράξεων with τέλει: often in *N. E.* τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. Pleasures are πόνων ἕνεκεν, because § 10, b 16 f., they heal the pain which comes of toils: in Pindar's words ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκρimeνων ἱατρός *Nem.* IV. 1; ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὖσης ἱατρίας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι *N. E.* VII. 14. 4, 1154 a 27 f.

34 διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει... ἔχειν ὁμοίωμά τι] One consequence of the similarity here explained is that men forget the essential difference, viz. that the higher intellectual pleasure contains its end in itself, whilst ordinary sensuous pleasure, so far as it is

harmless and necessary, has its end in recreation, becoming (when used at the right time and in moderation) something positively useful and not merely harmless. Cp. c. 3 §§ 1—4 with *n.* (988). Döring *op. c. p.* 107 f. points out the apparent inconsistency with the parallel passage *Nic. Eth.* x. 6. 6, 1176 b 27 ff., quoted in that note, but without attempting to clear it up. In the *Ethics* Aristotle says: Happiness does not consist in amusement. For amusement is closely connected with recreation, and man needs recreation because he is not capable of supporting unbroken exertion. Consequently recreation is not an end but a means to activity. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἀρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ γὰρ ἀποπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεῖσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρον ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾷ χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ἀναπαύσει γὰρ εἰκεν ἡ παιδίᾳ ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὲ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπανσις· γίνεταί γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. Here the end of recreation is said to consist in the work to be done, not the work already done, and rightly enough: recreation is naturally to lead from the labour of the past to new labours. But although a man may know this very well, nevertheless, in the midst of recreation (if it is to be a real and enjoyable rest) he will forget the fact, and without any thought of future labour give himself up entirely to a feeling of satisfaction at having happily ended the past toils, for which the present holiday is a recompense and restorative. This appears to me to be the idea which Aristotle wishes to express in the *Politics* in contradistinction to the idea in the *Ethics*. Cp. also *n.* (1143). SUSEM. (1038)



- ἐσομένων ἔνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἷον πόνων καὶ λύ- (V)  
 § 14 πης. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίνε-  
 σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπο-  
 40 λάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ  
 διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς  
 § 15 τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε  
 1340<sup>a</sup> τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ  
 κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρεῖαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς  
 ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει  
 γὰρ ἢ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις  
 5 καὶ πᾶσιν ἦθεςιν ἢ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλέης), ἀλλ'  
 ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.  
 § 16 τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοῖ τινες τὰ ἦθη γινόμεθα δι'

37 οἷον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> (supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>1</sup>), [οἷον] Susem.<sup>1</sup> perhaps rightly  
 || 39 εἰκότως after ἂν τις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. || 40 τὴν αἰτίαν transposed by Flach to follow  
 41 μόνην || 41 διὰ...42 ἔοικεν supposed to be defective. [διὰ] Spengel: Sylburg  
 conjectured a lacuna after 42 ἀναπαύσεις, Koras one after 42 ἔοικεν, Schmidt the loss  
 of <φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν> before 41 διὰ τὸ, Susemihl of <φιλοῦσιν αὐτὴν> after 41 μόνην.  
 Yet it may be sufficient to understand ζητοῦσιν (αὐτὴν) from the preceding || <πᾶ-  
 των μάλιστα> χρήσιμον or χρησιμώτατον Flach, perhaps rightly

1340 a 1 ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν P<sup>1</sup>, ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ M<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup> || 6 πῃ τι P<sup>1</sup> and  
 P<sup>4</sup> (corrector) || The second πρὸς is omitted by M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, [πρὸς] Susem.<sup>1</sup>, perhaps rightly

§ 14 38 δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κτλ.] See  
 § 3, 1339 a 24 f. n. (1022). SUSEM. (1039)  
 Notice the repetition of αἰτίαν, and the  
 omission of a verb with περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοι-  
 νωνεῖν. It is best with Flach to repeat  
 εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, understanding  
 ζητεῖσθαι or γίνεσθαι. See *Quaest. crit.*  
*coll.* p. 419.

§ 15 42 μὴ ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέ-  
 βηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' κτλ.] For the use of  
 μὲν=while, see n. (982) on c. 2 § 5, 1337  
 b 15. "Let it be granted that such ser-  
 vice is incidental to Music. Still we must  
 ask,—Does not the nature of Music range  
 above this sphere of service?" (Jebb).  
 The real complement to ζητητέον is the  
 clause introduced by δέ.

1340 a 3 ἔχουσι...αἰσθῆσιν]=αἰσθά-  
 νοῦνται I. 2. 12, 1253 a 17.

4 διὸ πάσαις...προσφιλέης] Cp. c. 6  
 § 8, 1341 a 15, τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, n.  
 (1069). SUSEM. (1040) The pleasure is  
 natural, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. In this sense  
 used of self-love II. 5. 8, 1263 b 1; and  
 III. 6. 5, 1278 b 30.

6 εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει]  
 "Whether Music has not somehow a  
 bearing on the character." So c. 6 § 7,

1341 a 10.

καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν] Evidently an  
 emphatic expression, 'the soul's depths,'  
 'the inmost soul.' For as the mere  
 pastime of recreation music also affects  
 the soul: it is the soul and not the body  
 which feels pleasure [cp. *N. E.* x. 6. 3,  
 1173 b 10, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν  
 καὶ ἦδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ]. Cp.  
 n. (1043). But the transition is abrupt.  
 After the preceding comparison between  
 this sensuous pleasure and the highest con-  
 templative enjoyment of elevated mental  
 satisfaction, it is strange to find that  
 nothing is said about the latter as an  
 effect of music, but the question is raised,  
 whether Music is capable of producing a  
 higher ethical delight, as well as διαγωγῆς;  
 and whether it is thus qualified to pro-  
 mote the moral education of the young:  
 for it is this with which Aristotle in the  
 context is chiefly concerned. SUSEM.  
 (1041)

§ 16 7 ποιοῖ τινες τὰ ἦθη] So c. 6  
 § 16, 1341 b 18, ποιοῖς τινες τὰ σώματα.  
 Cp. also II. 5. 23, 1264 a 39, where τὸ  
 πόλεις τινες εἶναι τοῦτους=whether they  
 are to be communists or not. The idiom

αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερόν διὰ<sup>5</sup>  
 πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμ-  
 10 ππου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς  
 ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους  
 § 17 πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται  
 πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν  
 αὐτῶν· ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκε τὴν μουσικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἡδέων, (p. 138)  
 15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν,  
 <καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηδὲν οὕτως ὥς

8 ποιοί...9 δὲ καὶ omitted by P<sup>6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ar. Ald. and P<sup>3-4</sup> (1st hand, supplied in the margin of P<sup>4</sup> and by a later hand in the margin of P<sup>3</sup>, afterwards erased) || φανερόν] δῆλον P<sup>5</sup> || 9 ἐτέρων] ἄλλων P<sup>5</sup> || 12 ἔτι δέ] ἐπειδὴ Susem. who transposes 12 ἐπειδὴ...14 αὐτῶν to follow 23 τοιούτων, a transposition approved by Spengel: see *Introd.* p. 90 || 14 ἐπεὶ δέ] ἔτι δὲ with a change in the punctuation (a series of separate clauses replacing the one long protasis); or if the punctuation be retained, ἔτι δὲ <ἐπεὶ>? Susem. || τὴν μουσικὴν after εἶναι P<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 16 καὶ added by Susem. || δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ P<sup>5</sup>, δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι Bk., δεῖ δηλονότι M<sup>6</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Ar. and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), δηλονότι P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand)

is used to include two alternatives, e.g. πότερον πρῶτο ἢ ὀργίλοι, ἀνδρείοι ἢ δειλοὶ (Newman).

9 διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν] On this exciting ecstatic music, see Excursus II. p. 621 and c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8, n. SUSEM. (1042)

10 ταῦτα γὰρ κτλ] "It is undeniable that they rouse the soul to ecstasy, but ecstasy is an emotional state of the moral nature." On ecstasy and ungovernable excitement generally as wrought by Greek music, see Excursus III. p. 622 ff. SUSEM. (1043)

§ 17 The clause ἔτι δὲ...αὐτῶν is not a further reason for inferring ποιοὺς τινας διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι: it gives the ground for the reason already alleged in § 16. If the melodies of Olympus inspire ecstasy, that is because they express ecstasy: quod rhythmis et modulationibus eundem animi affectum exprimebant. And why does such an effect follow upon such a cause? 'Quia eosdem omnino semper in auditoribus omnibus excitant affectus, qui eis exprimuntur, rhythmi atque modulationes': *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 420. Hence ἔτι requires emendation, and the whole clause finds a better place below. There is no difficulty in taking χωρὶς as an adverb: apart from the words, when the performance is instrumental solely (ψαλῇ). SUSEM. There is possibly a tacit correction of Plato who in *Laws* II. 669 E condemns instrumental music

without words: ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἀνευ λόγου γινόμενον ῥυθμὸν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γινώσκειν, ὃ τί τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτω ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων.

14 ἐπεὶ δέ...b 13 νέους] This is all one portentous period (*monstrum periodi*, perhaps the most extended in Aristotle), employed to formulate the second reason for the inference ποιοὺς τινας διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι.

The first clause ἐπεὶ...τῶν ἡδέων finds an echo § 25, 1340 b 15—17. The succeeding clauses are continually interrupted by parenthetical remarks: still the logical connexion, if harder to detect in a 14—18, is plain for the remaining links of the chain. *Music can give most realistic imitations (ὁμιώματα) of certain feelings, love, hatred, courage, temperance, § 18; habituation to feel pleasure in the imitations tends to create sympathy with the realities, § 19: it is peculiar to the sense of hearing that it can thus be the channel of a moral imitation (forms and colours are not expressions but only symbols, σημεία), §§ 20, 21: melodies are imitative expressions of character, § 22: hence, there is a definite affection of the soul produced by Music, and if the music be rightly chosen it can be used to educate the moral nature, § 24.*

15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν...μισεῖν] With this and what follows comp. n. (1022). Observe that moral, not intellectual, virtue is here intended. SUSEM. (1044)

16 δεῖ μανθάνειν κτλ] "and clearly



τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπικείσιν ἦθεσι καὶ (V)  
 § 18 ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ  
 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς  
 20 καὶ πραότητος ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων  
 τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν (δῆλον δ' ἐκ  
 22 τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι  
 τοιούτων, 12 <ἐπειδὴ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται  
 13 <πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν  
 § 19 <αὐτῶν>), 23 ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἔθισμός τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ

12 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἔτι δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text. See *Comm. crit. coll.* p. 419 f. || ἀκροώμενοι untranslated by William, ροώμενοι omitted by the 1st hand of M\*, leaving a lacuna, supplied by a later hand || 13 τῶν before ῥυθμῶν omitted by Γ and M\* (1st hand, supplied by a later hand), <τῶν λόγων διὰ> τῶν ? Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>, perhaps rightly

no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing aright in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term *μανθάνειν* is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of *ἦθος*, character, still no *ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ*, no moral virtue = excellence of character, exists apart from *φρόνησις*, practical wisdom or insight: and the converse is true, *Nic. Eth.* vi. c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 1144 a 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, n. (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, nn. (1061, 1066), and Excursus I. SUSEM. (1045)

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 20, 1181 a 17 ff.: ὥσπερ οὐδὲ...τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικῇ. οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα (results: in music, the performances).

χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπικείσιν κτλ.] Comp. n. (1101); i.e. Excursus v. SUSEM. (1046)

§ 18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις] The real things, objects. As in 1256 b 14, γάλακτος φύσιν (see n.), the content of φύσις is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν] Music can

give the fullest expression to all the moral virtues and vices, and to all the emotions without exception, e.g. fear and pity. Such is Aristotle's view (Liepert). Cp. Excursus III. and n. (1089). SUSEM. (1047)

§ 19 Aristotle fully believes, as Plato had done before him, that an educated ear and correct musical taste are no inconsiderable aids to a right discipline of the emotions. On the other hand, the Epicurean Philodemus maintains a negative attitude to all the fundamental propositions of the Peripatetics and Stoics respecting Music. He appears to be controverting in his *De Musica* the arguments of Theophrastus and Diogenes of Babylon. He denies that Music is *μῆσις* and musical strains *ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἡθῶν*. He further denies that music can effect any change in character; fr. 55 Kemke τὰς δὲ μιμήσεις...αὐτὸ πῶς ἄγειν καὶ κ[ι]νῆν] τὸ πάθος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τὰ λελεγμένα τ[ῆν] μουσικὴν καὶ τὸ μιμοῦ[με]να ὑπ' αὐτῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν [ἐπ]ωφελεῖν τι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ [με]τὰ τῶν μυρίω μιμητικῶ[τε]ρων, διεψενσμένον ἐδείκνυεν, also B. IV. col. III. 23 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ μιμητικὸν ἡ μουσικὴ, καθάπερ τινὲς ὀνειρώττουσιν, οὐδ' ὥς... οὗτος [Diogenes, the Stoic] ὁμοιότητος ἡθῶν οὐ μιμητικὰς μὲν ἔχει, πάντως δὲ πάσας τῶν ἡθῶν ποιότητας ἐπιφαίνεται τοιαύτας ἐν αἷς ἐστὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀνδρώδες καὶ ἀνάνδρον καὶ κόσμιον καὶ θρασύ, μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ ἡ μαγειρικὴ (Kemke's restoration *De Musica* p. 65). Though we too have the saying, 'Let me make the songs of a country, and I care not who makes its laws,' the belief in a peculiar ethical influence of music is quite

χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν (V)  
 25 τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ  
 δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφήν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον  
 τούτῳ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,  
 § 20 ἡδεῖαν εἶναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς 7  
 ἄλλοις μὴδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἡθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς  
 30 ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἡρέμα  
 (σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθή-  
 σεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα  
 ὁμοιώματα [τῶν ἡθῶν], ἀλλὰ σημεία μᾶλλον τὰ γινόμενα

27 καὶ] κατ' M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, καθ' Γ || αὐτὴν Γ, αὐτοῦ Ar. Lambin Scaliger Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps  
 rightly || ἐκείνου Lambin Scaliger Bk.<sup>2</sup>, perhaps rightly || οὐ after τὴν εἰκόνα M<sup>a</sup>  
 P<sup>1</sup> (thus causing hiatus). William translates 27 καὶ αὐτὴν...28 εἶναι in this order:  
*illam visionem, cuius videt imaginem secundum se esse delectabilem* || 32 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ  
 μικρόν after 31 τοιαῦτα Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>, transposed to follow 32 κοινωνοῦσιν by  
 Spengel, Susem.<sup>2-3</sup>. Ed. Müller (pp. 348—353) discovered the error, but conjectured  
 <οὐ> πάντες without any transposition. Welldon transposes 31 καὶ πάντες...  
 32 κοινωνοῦσιν to precede 28 συμβέβηκε, wrongly || ἔτι δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup>,  
 ἐπεὶ Heidenhain *op. cit.*, ἐπειδὴ Susem.<sup>2</sup>, see Comm. n. (1050) || 33 [τῶν ἡθῶν]  
 Flach Susem.<sup>3</sup>

foreign to the 'modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere.

27 τὴν θεωρίαν (ἐκείνου) οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ: the contemplation of the original must also give him delight.

§ 20 This is maintained even more strongly in the *Problems*: XIX. 29, 920 a 3, διὰ τί οἱ ῥυθμοὶ καὶ τὰ μέλη φωνῇ οὔσα ἡθεσιν ἔοικεν; ἢ ὅτι κινήσεις εἰσὶν ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ πράξεις; ἥδη δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια ἡθικὸν καὶ ποιεῖ ἥθος: so XIX. 27, 919 b 26 ff., esp. b 35 αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὐταὶ πρακτικαὶ εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἥθους σημασία ἐστίν. This points to an exaggeration of the rhythmical element: see Butcher *op. c.* p. 271 ff. Ordered movements reproduce the moral life which is itself an activity, i.e. a movement.

29 τοῖς ἡθεσιν] For the meaning see Exc. III. p. 622 ff. Comp. also generally n. (1084). SUSEM. (1048)

30 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς] We may translate "The objects of sight do indeed, in a slight degree, [present an image of moral affections]—since forms have this moral suggestiveness, and the perception of it is universal, though it does not go far. Besides, these forms are not *images* [of moral character]: forms and colours are rather symbols of the characters on

which they usually attend." It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32] The words ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν are a poor qualification of τοιαῦτα, which they follow in the mss. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Müller to alter to οὐ πάντες. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχήματα] There is no word which denotes all that is signified by σχήματα, viz. forms, gestures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes in dancing (cp. σχηματίζειν). Statuary, it should be remembered, imitates by forms only: painting by forms and colours, *Poet. c.* I § 4, 1447 a 18 ff. with n. (4) of my edition. Cp. also Athen. XIV. 629 b, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων δημιουργῶν ἀγάλματα τῆς παλαιᾶς ὀρχήσεως λείψανα. SUSEM. (1049)

32 ἔτι δὲ] To make this a second point of dissimilarity is awkward. The slight alteration to ἐπειδὴ makes it the explanation of the preceding unlikeness. SUSEM. (1050)

οὐκ ἔστι...ὁμοιώματα...ἀλλὰ σημεία] "Painting and sculpture working in an inert material cannot indeed reproduce the life of the soul in all its variety and successive manifestations. In their frozen



- § 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ (V)  
 35 σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ  
 περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς  
 νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γρα-

34 σχήματα omitted by S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, added in the margin) || ταῦτ' Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. Bk., ταῦτ' Döring (*Kunstlehre des Aristot.* p. 151) wrongly || ἀπὸ] ἐπὶ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk. and P<sup>1</sup> in the margin || 36 πᾶσωνος P<sup>2</sup> 3.5.6 S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. and P<sup>4</sup> (1st hand)

and arrested movement they fix eternally the feeling they portray... Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance; and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm." Butcher, *Some Aspects* p. 274 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called "ideal motion." Plato, *Phaedrus* 250 A ff. makes the most lustrous copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight: Thompson *ad loc.*, "by ὅσα τίμα ψυχᾶς he seems to mean *moral* ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth."

34 χρώματα] Blushing and paleness would serve for examples, *Nic. Eth.* IV. 9. 2, 1128 b 11 ff. (E. Müller). SUSEM. (1051)

καὶ τοῦτ'... 35 πάθεσιν] I.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrectly explained by Döring *op. c.* p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (*Poet.* c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (*γελόιον*, *Poet.* c. 5 § 1). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds:—"and not fear or pity itself," or "and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter;" he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Döring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However,

both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Döring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint measure of similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naïveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero's feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. SUSEM. (1052)

36 δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος... ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the 'art' of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period so full of the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pausan was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Ach.* 854. *Thesm.* 949, *Plut.* 606. See *Poet.* c. 3 § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἰκαῖν: the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In *Poet.* c. 6 § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. οἶον καὶ τῶν γραφένων Ζεύς πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Π. ἀγαθὸς ἡθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύς γράφῃ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἥθος, Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portraiture of character and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 ἡθικὸς must be understood in the sense proposed Exc. III.

φέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέ-<sup>(V)</sup>  
 § 22 λεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανε-  
 40 ρόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούον-  
 τας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον

41 ἔχειν after τρόπον P<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ, ἔχει P<sup>4</sup>

n. (1043) p. 624. As the originator of that 'ethical' style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parthenon frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphael of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Pheidias among sculptors. Pausan however was not precisely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, or satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Brunn *Gesch. der griech. Künstler* II<sup>a</sup> pp. 14—46, 49—51; Vahlen *Aristoteles Lehre der Rangfolge der Theile Tragödie in Symb. Philol. Bonn.* p. 159 ff. Comp. also IV (VII). 17. 10 with n. (963) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUSEM. (1053)

38 ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς κτλ.] "Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves imitations of character." Prof. Butcher has written an able commentary on this *op. c.* p. 267 ff. Premising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as *μίμησις* "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and directness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotle, as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'imitative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection, of character....Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality outside itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is weak in proportion

as the impression it produces is vivid and definite."

§ 22 40 ἢ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν φύσις] Besides its general meaning of 'music,' 'musical sounds' (for which see § 25 below; the soul assumed to be a 'harmony') *ἀρμονία* has a special musical signification: scale, octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately 'harmony' in modern music has totally different associations: as a technical term in music it denotes the 'combination of simultaneous sounds' or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (not quite) unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is *συμφωνία*. The best rendering for the technical term *ἀρμονία* is not 'key' or 'scale', but Mode, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated scales 'in the Major or Minor mode.' Comp. the Miltonic description of the Dorian Mode, *Paradise Lost* I. 550 ff. 'to the Dorian mood | Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised | To highth of noblest temper heroes old | Arming to battle, and instead of rage | Deliberate valour breathed, firm and unmoved | With dread of death to flight or foul retreat; | Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage, | With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase | Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain.' See further *Excursus IV* on Greek Music generally, p. 624 ff. SUSEM. (1054)

Trans. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and do not affect the hearers alike. Some, like the mixolydian, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the relaxed modes, soften the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate frame of mind, an effect which seems peculiar to the Dorian mode: while the Phrygian excites to ecstasy." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old national minor scale of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major scales (from a modern standpoint abnormal), borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.



πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως (V)  
 1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλου-  
 μένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς  
 τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς  
 4 ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ δωριστὶ μόνῃ τῶν ἁρμοनिῶν, ἐνθου- (p. 139)  
 § 23 σιαστικούς δ' ἢ φρυγιστὶ—ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ 9  
 τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ  
 μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων—, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ  
 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἔχου-  
 9 σιν ἥθος στασιμώτερον οἳ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἳ μὲν

1340 b i συνεστηκότως P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand), συνετεηκότως Madvig, συννενοφότως Schmidt  
 || μιξολυδιστὴ M\* and perhaps Γ. Similarly b 4 δωριστὴ M\* P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and perhaps  
 Γ || 5 φρυγιστὴ S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> M\* (1st hand) and perhaps Γ || 6 παιδείαν Ar., παιδίαν Γ Π  
 || 7 δὲ Π<sup>1</sup> Paris. 2042, γὰρ Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk., untranslated by Ar. || 8 τὰ omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>3</sup>  
 and P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, supplied by corr.<sup>1</sup>), untranslated by Ar., [τὰ] Bk.<sup>2</sup> || ἔχουσι after  
 9 ἥθος Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>2</sup> Bk.

1340 b i συνεστηκότως] Affect the spirit with restraint, 'oppressively'. For this effect of the mixo-Lydian mode Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, *Rep.* 398 D f. *τινες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; Μιξολυδιστὶ, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦτα τινες. Οὐκοῦν αὖται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι· ἀχρηστοὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν, ἃς δεῖ ἐπικεκῆς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν.*

2 τὴν διάνοιαν] Not the subject of the infinitive (ἔχειν or διατίθεσθαι) but the adverbial acc. after it.

3 τὰς ἀνειμένας] The modes called here "relaxed" are obviously those which Plato calls χαλαραί, *Rep.* 398 E: *τινες οὖν μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποτικά τῶν ἁρμοιῶν; Ἰαστί, ἦν δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.* The terms refer to pitch: ἀνειμένη (χαλαρά) = low, low-pitched, σύντονος = high, high-strung. See Pratinas *Frag.* 5: *μήτε σύντονον δίωκε, μήτε τὰν ἀνειμένην Ἰαστί μούσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν... νεῶν ἄρουραν αἰόλιζε τῷ μέλει... πρέπει τοι πάσιν δοιδὰ λαβράκταις Αἰολίς ἁρμονία* (Athen. XIV. 624 F). Plainly the Aeolian mode or 'key' is described as intermediate to 'high-pitched Ionian,' and 'low Ionian.'

§ 23 5 οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην π.] Amongst others, no doubt, Aristotle refers to Damon mentioned in *n.* (1054), i.e. Exc. IV p. 630, whose inquiry into the different effects (ἥθος and πάθος) of the various modes and rhythms, probably a special work on the subject, is quoted as an authority by Plato *Rep.* III.

400 B (cp. IV. 424 C). Also to the author of that arrangement of the Modes which he has adopted c. 7 § 3, (?) Aristoxenus, see *n.* (1083); probably also to his fellow-pupil Heracleides of Heracleia in the Pontus Athen. XIV. 624 C, who preferred to call the three chief Modes by Greek names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon was also a politician, an associate of Pericles: most probably it was he who started the idea of providing pay for the Dicasts and Bouleutae (μισθὸς δικαστικός, μ. βουλευτικός), as Wilamowitz *Hermes* XIII. 1880. p. 318 ff. has shown. Cp. II. 12. 4, *n.* (408). See *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 27 § 4, p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: *πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν (sc. τὴν Κίμωνος) ἀπολειπόμενος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, συμβουλευόντος αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἰήθεν (ὃς ἐδόκει τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διὸ καὶ ὠστράκισαν αὐτὸν ὕστερον), ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἡττάτω διδόναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατεσκεύασε μισθοφορὰν τοῖς δικασταῖς*: also *Frag.* 364, 365 Rose in *Plut. Per.* c. 4, c. 9 and *Plut. l.c.* c. 4, Steph. Byz. *s.v.* "Οα. SUSEM. (1055)

Plutarch however may have confused Damon the musician with a Damonides, the politician (Gomperz).

7 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κτλ.] "As with the different Modes, so is it with the different times or measures. Some measures have rather a grave character, some a brisk one: of the latter, again, the movements are sometimes less, sometimes more refined." On Rhythms in Greek Music, see Exc. IV. p. 632. SUSEM. (1056)

- 10 φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας), (V)  
 17 <καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ  
 18 <τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν, οἱ  
 § 24 19 <μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχουσιν ἀρμονίαν)>· ἐκ  
 11 μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερόν ὅτι δύναται ποιεῖν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς  
 12 ἦθος ἢ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν,  
 δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.  
 § 25 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἢ δι-  
 15 δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν  
 ἀνῆδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἢ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν

10 *ἐλευθεριωτέρας* apparently Γ Ar. || 17 *καὶ τις...* 19 *ἀρμονίαν* transposed by Böcker to follow 10 *ἐλευθεριωτέρας*. See *Introd.* p. 90 || 17 *cognatio ad animam* one codex of William's translation, as if Γ had <πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν> ταῖς ἀρμονίαις || 18 <ἡμῖν> εἶναι Ar., <μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς> εἶναι Conring, <πρὸς ἡμᾶς> εἶναι ? Reiz, <πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν> εἶναι Bk.<sup>2</sup>, adopting another conjecture of Reiz, perhaps the best || 14 ἔστι Γ P<sup>5</sup>, ἔστι P<sup>1</sup>, ἔχει all other authorities || γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text || ἀρμοζόντως P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>8</sup> Ald. || 16 ἂν ἐνδυντον P<sup>4</sup>, ἂν ἡ δυνατὸν P<sup>1</sup> L<sup>8</sup>

17 *καὶ τίς ἔοικε...* 19 *ἀρμονίαν*] The transposition is recommended by Böcker for the simple reason that the words in the traditional order do not suitably follow on the remarks immediately preceding, that music is adapted for the education of the young. If we could be certain that Aristotle always fitted in his notes at the right point, and never turned back to a subject he had just dismissed, this would be ample justification: see Böcker's own remarks p. 32 (cited above *Introd.* p. 95 n. 5).

17 *συγγένεια*] Butcher compares Pl. *Tim.* 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία συγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φράς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις. 'Musical tones and measures have a certain affinity'—the context plainly shows the meaning to be 'with the soul': but the extraordinary brevity and allusiveness of Aristotle's style seem to have permitted the ellipse. The Aristotelian text-books, οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, were composed, it should be remembered, for the members of the school; in their peculiar terminology, Diels observes, they resemble a system of shorthand to which only the pupils possess the key: and he compares Galen *De sophism.* xiv. 585 K. σίνηθες δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο τάχος τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σημείων ἐκφέρειν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκηκοῦτας ἡδὴ γράφεισθαι.

18 *πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν*] This was a Pythagorean doctrine. After them two pupils of Aristotle, Aristoxenus, who had

previously been trained among the Pythagoreans, and Dicaearchus held this same view without any essential difference: see Zeller *Phil. d. Griechen* 1.<sup>3</sup> p. 444 (ed. 4 p. 413), II. ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 888 ff. Eng. tr. *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 476. SUSEM. (1057) The earliest evidence is Plato *Phaedo* 85 E, on which see the note of Mr Archer Hind who thinks Simmias must be the exponent of a widely received opinion. The examination of this doctrine in *De Anima* I c. 4 assumes that ἀρμονία = κρᾶσις, a blending of diverse or opposite elements (λόγος τις τῶν μυχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις): and so Simmias in one place of the *Phaedo* 86 B, though again he compares the soul to the music or tune i.e. something immaterial played upon the material lyre, which answers to the body. The present passage certainly favours the latter interpretation of the ambiguous term ἀρμονία.

19 *οἱ δ' ἔχουσιν ἀρμονίαν*] Pl. *Phaedo* 93; the soul has in it virtue, which is a harmony. Cp. Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* I. p. 440 f., 443. SUSEM. (1058)

§ 24 11 *φανερὸν ὅτι κτλ*] The problem of § 15, 1340 a b, is thus solved. And in b 16 we have an echo of 1340 a 14.

§ 25 14 *ἔστι γὰρ*] Quae secuntur causam afferunt, cur ad iuvenilem potissimum aetatem aptissima sit musicae exercitatio. Quare hoc quoque loco γὰρ pro δὲ scribendum esse crediderim. SUSEM.

16 *ἢ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει κτλ*] "Music



ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις (V)  
καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι (διδὼν πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἷ  
μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν).

6 πότερον δὲ δεῖ μαθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρου- VI  
21 γούοντας ἢ μὴ, καθάπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον.  
οὐκ ἄδηλον δὲ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίνε-  
σθαι ποιούς τινας, εἴαν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν  
24 γὰρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας  
§ 2 τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς  
παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτα πλαταγήν

17 ἡδυσμάτων ? Bywater || 20 τοὺς inserted before αὐτοὺς by Π<sup>1</sup> || χειραγω-  
γούοντας S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>o</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ald., χρηραγωγούοντας P<sup>4</sup> || 22 δὴ P<sup>1-2-3</sup> perhaps rightly ||  
24 τοὺς inserted before μὴ by Susem.<sup>1</sup>, and perhaps by Γ || 26 ἀρχύτου Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.  
and P<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>)

has this sweet seasoning in its nature." Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. SUSEM. (1059)

c. 6 *Practical instruction in music is indispensable*: §§ 1, 2. *Nor is some measure of skill in execution unsuitable or degrading*: §§ 3—8, *provided wind-instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course*: §§ 9—16. Cp. *Anal.* p. 119.

§ 1 20 *χειρουγούοντας*] Apparently only here and c. 7 § 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of 'playing on a musical instrument,' 'becoming performers,' and so 23 *κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων*, where *ἔργα* = musical performances, as below b 36 f. and in *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 20, 1181 a 20.

21 *πρότερον*] C. 5 §§ 4—8. Comp. 5 §§ 9, 10 with *n.* (1030). SUSEM. (1060)  
22 *πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν*] See c. 2 § 6. Here 'it makes a great difference' = it is a great advantage: *multum praestat*.

23 *ἐν γὰρ τι κτλ*] This is directly opposed to the Spartans' boast, c. 5 § 7, 1339 b 2 ff. cp. *nn.* (1026, 1045). SUSEM. (1061)

25 *κριτὰς*] Amplified below, § 4, 1340 b 38 f. Cp. c. 5 § 17.

§ 2 26 *διατριβήν*] Occupation; somewhat analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults: though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4, *n.* (1024): cp. Döring p. 137. SUSEM. (1062)

*Ἀρχύτα*] A famous Pythagorean phi-

losopher of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see VIII (v). 7. 2 *n.* (1592), for its fortunes ib. 3 § 7 *n.* (1517), for its constitution VII (vi). 5. 10 *n.* (1441): also *n.* (141).—Archytas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times *στρατηγός*, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Strab. vi. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, III. 22). Archytas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodor. in Athen. XII. 519 b). The rattle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodor. *l. c.*), cp. Aelian *Var. Hist.* XII. 15, Suidas s. v. *Ἀρχύτας*, Poll. IX. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-

οἶσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδῶσι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως (VI)  
 χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν  
 οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἀρ-  
 30 μόττουσα τοῖς νηπίοις τῶν παιδίων, ἣ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγὴ  
 τοῖς μεῖζοσι τῶν νέων.

§ 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κοι-  
 νωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ 2  
 34 μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς

§ 4 φάσκοντας βάνανσον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, (p. 140)  
 ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους  
 μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους  
 τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφείσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ

27 γίνεσθαι Γ P<sup>1</sup>, λέγεσθαι Koraes, wrongly || 29 ἀρμόττουσα after 30 τοῖς νη-  
 πίοις Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk. || 30 παιδίων P<sup>1</sup>, παιδικῶν L<sup>1</sup> Ald., παιδιῶν with all other authorities  
 Ar. Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 32 καὶ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [καὶ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 37 γενομένους Reiz Bk.<sup>2</sup>, per-  
 haps M<sup>2</sup>, γιγνομένους P<sup>4</sup>, γνομένους with the other authorities Bk.<sup>1</sup> and perhaps Γ  
 (factos William)

tainly not genuine, see Westphal *Metr.*  
 2. ed. i. p. 71. But at any rate the  
 science of Geometry was substantially ad-  
 vanced by him (Procl. on Eucl. p. 19).  
 In particular we know his interesting at-  
 tempt at solving the problem of squaring  
 the cube (Eudem. *Fr.* 110. Speng.  
 Eratosth. quoted by Eutok. in Archim.  
*De Sph.* p. 135, 143, Ox. and Diog. Laert.  
 viii. 83). He was also the first to treat  
 Mechanics methodically according to  
 geometrical principles (Diog. Laert. i. c.,  
 cp. Favor. in Gell. x. 12. 9 f., Vitruv. vii.  
 Praef.) See Hartenstein *De Archytae Ta-  
 rentini fragmentis philosophicis* (Leipzig  
 1833), Gruppe 'On the Fragments of  
 Archytas' (Berlin 1840), Zeller *op. c.* i.  
 p. 267. iii. ii. p. 88 f., 91 f., 112 f.  
 SUSEM. (1063)

The Doric form Ἀρχύτα, which was  
 altered to Ἀρχύτον by corr.<sup>1</sup> in P<sup>1</sup> as well  
 as by Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup>, makes another instance for  
 Prof. Ridgeway: see n. on i. 2. 5 (p. 144).

29 οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν]  
 This remark is made by Plato *Latos* 11.  
 653 D: φησὶ δὲ [ὁ λόγος] τὸ νέον ἅπαν, ὥς  
 ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς  
 ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι. SUSEM.  
 (1064)

30 Learning to play an instrument  
 will keep them out of mischief.

§ 3 33 τὸ δὲ πρέπον] The forti-  
 fications of the city are to serve as an  
 ornament, IV (VII). 11. 11, 1331 a 13.  
 The Lydian Mode suits youthful singers

διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ παι-  
 δεῖαν, c. 7 § 15, 1342 b 30 f. Aristotle's  
 own account of Propriety *Topics* v. 5. 8,  
 135 a 13, is vague: ταύτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν  
 καὶ πρέπον. The above usages in this  
 treatise seem to justify the writer of *Eth.*  
*Eud.* (iii. 6. 1, 1233 a 34, τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, cp. 1233 b 7 κατ'  
 ἀξίαν ἐστίν) in making grace or charm  
 the leading feature.

34 διορίσαι καὶ λῦσαι] Define and  
 refute the objections of those who maintain  
 that to take up music practically is de-  
 grading. The absolute use of λύνειν  
 instead of λύνειν λόγον, ἀπορίαν recurs b 41;  
 cp. *Meta.* N. 2. 5, 1089 a 3, λύσει καὶ  
 ὁμῶς βαδιέεται τῷ λόγῳ, *Rhet.* 11. 25. 1,  
 1402 a 31, 26. 3, 1403 a 26. Aristotle's  
 own explanation of this metaphor is  
 explicit enough: ἡ γὰρ ὑπερον εὐπορία  
 λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορομένων ἐστὶ.  
 λύνει δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμὸν  
*Meta.* B. 1. 2, 995 a 28.

35 βάνανσον] Repeated § 5, b 41,  
 § 6, 1341 a 7. Comp. notes (103, 982,  
 1080). SUSEM. (1065)

§ 4 Some degree of skill in execution  
 is needed to make a connoisseur.

36 τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν] Comp. *nn.*  
 (1026, 1045, 1061). SUSEM. (1066)

37 πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους] Ex-  
 cept at a drinking party, or in jest c. 5  
 § 8 n. (1027). See also c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with  
 n. (1113); IV (VII). 17. 11 n. (966). Comp.  
*Introd.* p. 56. SUSEM. (1067)



39 χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι (VI)  
 § 5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμῆσεως ἣν τινες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὡς ποιούσης 3  
 τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λύσαι σκεψαμένους  
 μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν  
 1341 a παιδευομένοις πολιτικὴν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυ-  
 θμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν  
 § 6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ  
 λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμῆσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς  
 5 τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν.  
 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδι- 4  
 ζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάνανσον  
 καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν  
 § 7 τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὕστερον. συμβαίνοι δ'  
 10 ἂν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνι-  
 κούς συντείνοντα διαπονοῖεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ  
 τῶν ἔργων, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν  
 § 8 ἀγῶνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ  
 ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς, καὶ  
 15 μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ἔνια ζῶων ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλήθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων.

39 γενομένην M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup>

1341 a i παιδευομένοις] πολιτευομένοις Γ M<sup>a</sup> || 9 μαθήσεις—χρήσεις Bojesen, χρή-  
 σεis—μαθήσεις Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text. But Spengel transposed ἤδη and  
 ὕστερον, which is also possible. Schneider, who discovered the error, proposed to  
 transpose 8 πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις and 9 χρήσεις; [χρήσεις] and [μαθήσεις]  
 Göttling || 13 παιδιῶν M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> || καὶ inserted after ἄλλα by II<sup>2</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Bk., “probably  
 right, though hard to interpret” Newman, ἀλλὰ <κατὰ> Madvig || 15 κοινωνῶν M<sup>a</sup>  
 P<sup>3</sup> II<sup>2</sup> (corrected by P<sup>2</sup>)

§ 5 The censure passed on music im-  
 plies that the pursuit of excellence as a  
 performer degrades the youthful citizen  
 into a professional. It is remarked in  
 Exc. I. p. 620, that the feeling of the  
 Greeks in the fourth century towards  
 artistic specialists seems to have varied  
 with the eminence of the artist much  
 more than it does amongst us. While the  
 artists of genius were recognised as great  
 men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic,  
 who had left the true political life for a  
 bread-and-butter study.

§§ 6, 7 There must be no practising  
 upon instruments which unfit the citizen  
 for taking his part in war and in athletic  
 exercises. Musical training must not be  
 such as to fit the learner for contests of  
 artists.

1341 a ii τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ]  
 “Brilliant pieces of extraordinary dif-  
 ficulty.” Even in the present day it  
 would be sound advice to leave these out  
 of the musical education designed for the  
 young. SUSEM. (1068)

12 ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας  
 κτλ] Comp. Athen. XIV. 629 b, καὶ τὰ  
 σχήματα μετέφερον ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐκ τῆς  
 χειρονομίας) εἰς τοὺς χοροὺς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν χορῶν  
 εἰς τὰς παλαίστρας.

§ 8 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] I.e. the practice  
 of pieces not thus excluded, on instruments  
 (such as the lyre) which are not prohibited  
 μέχρι περ=only until.

14 Comp. with this stock phrase c. 5  
 §§ 17—19. This tends to form character.

15 τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς] Cp. c. 5  
 § 15, 1340 a 4 with n. (1040) on τῇ

ἡδὺν δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον.<sup>5</sup>  
 § 9 οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν  
 ὄργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ἔστιν, ἀλλ'  
 20 ὅσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-

18 τι omitted by Π<sup>3</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Ar. Bk. || 19 ἄλλο ἔστιν Π<sup>1</sup>, ἄλλο ἑτερόν ἔστιν P<sup>4</sup> (corr.),  
 ἑτερόν ἔστιν with all other authorities Bk. || 20 παιδιᾶς Γ M<sup>a</sup>

ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν. Aristotle means that sensuous charm, that tickling of the ears, produced by every kind of music, good or bad, simply as music by its native means of expression, harmony, melody, rhythm. A feeling for rhythm is, to a greater or less extent, innate in all men: *Poet.* c. 4 § 7, 1448 b 20 f. Comp. Döring p. 114 f. SUSEM. (1069) See *Probl.* XIX. 38, 920 b 29—36. It will be seen, c. 7 § 6, that some scope is allowed to this inferior pleasure. Plato indeed, *Laus* II 655 D, shrinks from adopting the standard of pleasure: καίτοι λέγουσί γε οἱ πλείστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὔτε ἀνεκτὸν οὔτε δσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι.

τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων [φων] The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined *Eud.* *Éth.* III. 2. 8, 1231 a 2 ff.: οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα [sc. τᾶλλα θηρία] αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκρόασει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μὴ τί πού συμβέβηκε τερατώδες.

§ 9 18 αὐλοὺς] Usually translated by 'flute.' But in reality the instrument had a mouth-piece (ξεῖρος), with a vibrating reed (γλωσσο) fitted in it, so that it more closely resembled our 'clarinet.' The σύριγξ μονοκάλαμος may have represented the modern flute. Hom. *Il.* x. 13 mentions both, αὐλῶν σύριγγων τ' ἐνοπήν. The αὐλός was always played in pairs (Latin *tibiae*, cp. § 13, 1341 b 4, αὐλοὺς), the two instruments being connected by a leathern strap, φορβεία, worn round the mouth. SUSEM. (1070) Consult further L. v. Jan Art. 'Flöten' in Baumeister's *Denkmäler* and A. A. Howard in *Harvard Studies* IV. 1893, p. 1 ff.

οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν κτλ] By these words Aristotle excludes every instrument except the κιθάρις, or lyre, also called φόρμιγγις in Homer (as L. van Jan conjectured to be the case before Westphal; though on insufficient grounds, as appears to me, he afterwards withdrew the conjecture, and pronounced κιθάρις and φόρμιγγις to be the same as κιθάρα but distinct

from λύρα). The lyre was the most ancient and the most easily handled of Greek stringed instruments: beside those here represented Jan gives (p. 45) other shapes of the lyre and κιθάρα.



Kepion a pupil of Terpander, Plut. *De musica* c. 6, 1233 c, invented the κιθάρα about 700 B.C. This was the ordinary instrument used by professional players and solo-singers. It possessed greater resonance, being of the shape here shown.



See Westphal *Gesch. der alten Musik* p. 86 ff.; cp. L. van Jan *De fidibus Graecorum* p. 5 ff. Plato *Rep.* IV. 399 D permits both Lyre and κιθάρα to be used in teaching: on the other hand, he restricts the instruction to be given to a yet greater extent than Aristotle. Comp. *Laus* VII. 812 c ff., and *infra* c. 7 § 9, n. (1105). SUSEM. (1071)

20 αὐτῶν = ὀργάνων. The gen. παι-



δείας ἢ τῆς ἄλλης· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἀλλὰ (VI)  
 μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους αὐτῷ καιροῦς  
 χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μά-  
 § 10 θησιν. προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον πρὸς  
 25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὐλησιν. (b. 1)  
 διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ  
 τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶ- 6  
 § 11 τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας  
 καὶ μεγαλοφυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔτι τε πρότερον

21 ἢ καὶ P<sup>1</sup> || ἔτι δὲ Γ Π Ar. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, ἔτι δ' Bk., ἐπειδὴ Susem.<sup>2</sup> ||  
 ὁ αὐτὸς M<sup>2</sup>, id ipsum William || 23 δύναται before κάθαρσιν Γ, after μᾶλλον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup>  
 Bk., thus allowing hiatus || 24 αὐτῷ after ἐναντίον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus ||  
 28 γενόμενοι Schneider, γινόμενοι M<sup>2</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, γινόμενοι Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.<sup>1</sup> || 29 τὴν omitted by  
 P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> Ald. Bk.

deias must depend on ἀγαθούς: 'such only as will improve the hearers of them in respect of their musical or general education.'

21 The change of ἔτι δὲ το ἐπειδὴ is thus defended *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421: Aristoteles dixit quidem v. 17 sqq. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ τοῖς ὀργάνοις κτλ, sed pondum docuit cur hoc sit δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. Secuntur demum hae causae. Ergo hoc quoque loco non ἔτι δὲ scripsit, sed ἐπειδὴ. SUSEM.

22 ὀργιαστικόν] I.e. it produces an ecstatic frame of mind, it intoxicates with excitement and elevation of the feelings. This appears plainly from c. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8, 9. Cp. also c. 5 §§ 22, 23, Excursus IV. p. 628 nn. (1054, 1092), and especially n. (1107). SUSEM. (1072)

Since ἡθικόν = expressing character, ὀργιαστικόν should mean expressing orgies or fanatical excitement. It is because this wild, excited music interprets the excesses of religious frenzy, that it also accompanies and stimulates them. See n. on c. 5 § 17.

ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους κτλ] "Hence the flute should be used at such times when the effect of the concert is to purge the emotions and not to instruct."

23 κάθαρσιν] Here occurs for the first time the idea of purging or curing emotion by means of emotion. How is this effect of music related to the three already discussed (1339 a 16 ff., b 13 πρότερον παιδεῖαν ἢ παιδίαν ἢ διαγωγὴν sc. δύναται)? For the present we are only told that it differs from παιδεῖα, that pleasurable enjoyment which goes to form character. But we receive no informa-

tion as to its relation to the recreation which music affords (παιδιά, ἀνάπαυσις), or the full aesthetic enjoyment which belongs to διαγωγή, the highest intellectual gratification. See p. 638, Excursus v. n. (1101). SUSEM. (1073)

Besides its literal meaning *cleansing* (καθαίρειν) which is necessarily vague, κάθαρσις has two definite metaphorical senses: (1) religious, or rather liturgical, *purifying*=lustratio, expiatio; (2) medical (or rather pathological) *purging*. The latter metaphor is prominent in Aristotle: but his usage of the term constitutes a distinct application (3) in a psychological sense, *emotional relief* followed by *refinement* of the emotions. See the passages cited in the 'Note on κάθαρσις' p. 641 ff.

24 αὐτῷ is αὐλῷ. "Besides, it happens to tell against the educational use of the flute, that playing upon it hinders singing." Here λόγος approximates to the meaning of φωνή, cp. n. (26).

26 Probably ἐκ implies that they not only 'disallowed its use' but excluded it or withdrew it from the hands of the young. So 1336 b 7, 1321 a 25.

§ 11 28 σχολαστικώτεροι] More fitted for leisure, qualified to use it intelligently: cp. VIII(V). 11. 5 συλλόγους σχολαστικούς. 'Better fitted by their increased resources for leisure, fired with loftier aspirations after excellence, even earlier as well as in the full flush of their achievements after the Persian wars they began to lay hold on every form of learning without distinction, pushing their research onward.' "To this stirring generation, active in striking out new paths, belonged Hippodamus" (Newman).

30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, (VI)  
 πάσης ἥπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντας ἀλλ' ἐπιζη-  
 τούντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις.  
 § 12 καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἠύλησε τῷ  
 χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθήνας οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὥστε σχεδὸν οἱ  
 35 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετεῖχον αὐτῆς· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ  
 πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδῃ χορηγῆσας.  
 ὕστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον 7

31 ἥπτοντο M<sup>a</sup> and apparently Γ, ἥπτοντο S<sup>b</sup> || 33 αὐτὸς omitted by II<sup>1</sup> (supplied in the margin by P<sup>1</sup>), [αὐτὸς] Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 35 ἐλευθέρων Schneider, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐκφαντίδῃ P<sup>2-5</sup>, ἐκφαντίδῃ L<sup>a</sup>

§ 12 33 The χορηγὸς was a rich citizen, selected to defray the expenses incurred in the training and equipment of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a 36 χορηγῆσας. SUSEM. (1074)

τῷ χορῷ] This was undoubtedly a lyric chorus. For dramas proper do not appear to have been performed at Sparta. SUSEM. (1075)

34 ἐπεχωρίασεν] As in 1335 a 16 n. The flute was more at home in Boeotia, where it is recorded of Epaminondas, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the lyre.

35 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος] There can be no question this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4 to the statue of Diphilus.

36 πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε κτλ.] The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chionides and Magnes, *Poet.* 3 § 5, 1448 a 34 (cp. 5. 2, 1449 b 3), the next in order Ekphantides and Cratinus, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the pen of Ekphantides, who on this account is erroneously described by the anonymous commentator upon Book IV of the *Nic. Eth.* (iv. 2. 20, 1123 a 23 f.) as the earliest poet of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholiast; but we know the title of one of his works 'the Satyrs' (*Athen.* 1. 96 c). See Meineke *Fragm. com. Gr.* 1. p. 35 ff., II. p. 12 ff. At the time when Thrasippus was his choregus, Ekphantides won the first prize. The word πίναξ refers to the custom which compelled the victorious choregus to dedicate in honour of himself and his tribe a brazen tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre or at one of the

temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact received the name of (τρίποδες) the street of tripods. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. See Paus. 1. 20. 1 f., cp. Plut. *Them.* 5, Demosth. XXI. 6. We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to dithyrambic (cyclic) choruses, and in these the names of the flute-player, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actor are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the choregus belonged and the species of drama represented. SUSEM. (1076)

See however Haigh *Attic Theatre* p. 52 f. "The memorials of victory erected by the choregi to the dramatic choruses appear to have taken the form of tablets (πίνακες). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a 'tablet' in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the mean man in Theophrastus, that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he erects merely a wooden scroll (*Char.* 22 ταῦτα ξυλινῇ) in commemoration of his victory."

37 ὕστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη] Plutarch, *Vita Alcib.* c. 2, tells the story that Alcibiades threw away the flute in disgust, with the words αὐλείτωσαν οὖν Θηβαίων παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι. He adds that both by jest and earnest Alcibiades tried to stop the practice of learning the flute: ὅθεν ἐξέπεσε κομῆς τῶν ἐλευθέρων διατριβῶν καὶ προεπηλακίσθη παντάπασιν ὁ αὐλός. The connexion of cause and effect can hardly be accepted. Still, no doubt the famous αὐληταὶ who were applauded at Athens were as a rule strangers, and two of the greatest, Antigenidas and Timotheus, were Boeotians.



δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν (VI)  
 § 13 συντείνον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων,  
 40 οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα  
 τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ  
 1341 b σαμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης.  
 εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων  
 μεμυθολογημένον. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὐροῦσαν ἀπο-  
 § 14 βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλοὺς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ  
 5 τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν  
 τὴν θεόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

38 καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν omitted by M\* and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand) || 40 πηκτίδες P<sup>2</sup>,  
 ποικτίδες P<sup>4</sup>, ποιητίδες P<sup>5</sup>, πηκτάδες Thomas Ar.

1341 b 1 σαμβύκαι Götting, λαμβοί Π<sup>1</sup>, σαμβύκαι Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Ar. and p<sup>1</sup> in the margin,  
 λαμβύκαι Susem.<sup>1</sup> || 2 αὐλῶν] ἄλλων Γ M\* || 3 δὴ omitted by Π<sup>1</sup>, [δὴ] Susem.<sup>1</sup> ||  
 4 μὲν οὖν] enim William, οὖν omitted, a lacuna being left, in M\* (1st hand, supplied  
 by a later hand) || 6 θεάν P<sup>5</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup>

§ 13 39 πολλὰ...ἀρχαίων, sc. ἀπεδο-  
 κιμάσθη.

40 οἷον πηκτίδες κτλ] All foreign  
 stringed instruments, on which consult  
 Excursus IV. p. 632 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

1341 b 3 μεμυθολογημένον] Comp. the  
 similar reference to legend II. 9. 8, 1269  
 b 28, n. (288).

εὐροῦσαν ἀποβαλεῖν] The Satyr Mar-  
 syas is said to have picked up the flute  
 which Athene threw away, and to have  
 played upon it: and for this the goddess  
 punished him. The earliest extant allu-  
 sion to this legend is in a dithyramb  
 'Marsyas' by Melanippides *Frag.* 2. ἃ  
 μὲν Ἀθᾶνα | τῶργαν' ἔρριψεν θ' ἱερὰς ἀπὸ  
 χειρὸς | εἰπέ τ' ἔρρετ' ἀσχεα, σώματι λύμα:  
 to which the contemporary poet Telestes  
 replied in his 'Argo' *Frag.* 1, ὃν σοφὸν  
 σοφὸν λαβοῦσαν οὐκ ἐπέλπομαι νόῳ δρυμοῖς  
 ὀρείοις ὄργανον | διὰν Ἀθᾶναν δυνόφθαλμον  
 ἀσχος ἐκφοβηθεῖσαν αἰθῆς ἐκ χειρῶν βα-  
 λεῖν, | νυμφαγενεῖ χειροκτόπῳ φηρὶ Μαρσύᾳ  
 κλέος. | τί γὰρ νῦν εὐφράτοιο κάλλεος ὀξὺς  
 ἔρως ἔτειρεν, | ᾧ παρθενίαν ἄγαμον καὶ  
 ἀπαυδ' ἀπένειμε Κλωθῶ; see *Athen.* XIV.  
 616 c, f. (J. G. Schneider). In other  
 legends the Phrygian Marsyas is himself  
 the inventor of the flute; as an enthusiastic  
 singer and flute-player in the service of  
 Cybele, he is, like all Satyrs and Sileni in  
 Asiatic myths, one of the deities of rivers  
 and fountains in the train of the Phrygian  
 Dionysus. In this character he encounters  
 Apollo, the representative of the music

of the κιθάρα, by whom he is defeated  
 and punished. In Lydian legend Pan re-  
 places Marsyas as the rival of Apollo and  
 the teacher of Olympus. See Preller  
*Griech. Mythol.* I. p. 176 f., 508, 510,  
 576 ff., 585. Hyagnis also, a Phrygian,  
 or Mysian, the supposed father of Mar-  
 syas, was sometimes called the inventor  
 of the flute: and Olympus himself, who  
 was believed to be the pupil of Marsyas,  
 is at one time called a Phrygian and at  
 another a Mysian, pointing to the origin  
 of this kind of music in Asia Minor,  
 whether in Phrygia, Mysia, or Lydia (see  
 Exc. II and IV). The authorities to con-  
 sult for the above are Plut. *De musica* 14,  
 1135 E, Alex. Polyhist. *Fr.* 52 apud Plut.  
*ib.* 5, 1132 F, Heracleid. *ib.* 7, 1133 E,  
 Strabo x. 324, Schol. in *Aesch. Persas*  
 933, Suidas s. v. Ὀλυμπος. Comp. Pl.  
*Latos* III. 677 D, *Symp.* 215 C, Ps-Pl.  
*Minos* 318 B: and for the whole section  
 nn. (288, 297). SUSEM. (1078)

§ 14 6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κτλ] "Not but  
 what a more likely reason is the fact, that  
 instruction in the flute contributes nothing  
 to the culture of the intelligence. For  
 to Athene we ascribe science and art."  
 SUSEM. (1079)

For διάνοια cp. n. (1023) on φρόνησις:  
 it has been opposed to ἦθος c. 2 § 1, and  
 in III. II. 2, 1281 b 7. With περιθεῖναι  
 in this sense Bonitz joins *Rhet.* I. 9. 40,  
 1368 a 29, μέγεθος περιθεῖναι (ταῖς πράξεσι)  
 'to invest exploits with importance.'

οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως. τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ἐπι- (VI)  
στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην.

- § 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζο- VII  
10 μιν τὴν τεχνικὴν παιδείαν (τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς  
ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πρᾶττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται  
χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορ-  
τικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν,  
§ 16 ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν, καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι·  
15 πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ (p. 142)  
θεατῆς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικὴν, ὥστε  
καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοὺς  
7 τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις·  
σκεπτέον [δ'] ἔτι περὶ τε τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, 2  
20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον ταῖς ἁρμονίαις πάσαις χρηστέον

7 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ' II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text, *cum* Ar. || 10 παιδείαν Π<sup>1</sup> (emended with γρ. prefixed by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || 11 τῆς] τὴν P<sup>4,6</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. || αὐτοῦ Γ, αὐτοῦ Π || 13 ἐλευθερίων ? Susem. || 14 βαναύσους Koraes, omitting the comma before καὶ || 18 ποιούς] πτοίους Lindau (a very rare word), *illius modi* Ar. as if he had read τοιούτους for ποιούς τινας, τοιούτους? or φορτικούς ? Susem. || αὐτοὺς τε ποιούς τινας] εἰαυτῷ εὐκότατος Flach || 19 δ' omitted by P<sup>6</sup>, [δὲ] Schneider Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>, δὲ M<sup>1</sup> Reiz, δὲ P<sup>3</sup>, δὴ ? Susem. But it is a repetition of δὲ in the protasis || ἔτι] τι P<sup>3</sup>, τὰ Reiz || 20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] Bonitz, παιδείαν ? Orelli *Aristot. Pädagog.* pp. 110—116 || ταῖς ἁρμονίαις after χρηστέον Π<sup>2</sup> P<sup>5</sup> Bk.

§§ 15, 16 With these two sections cp. *nn.* (103, 982, 1065): also c. 7 §§ 6, 7 *n.* (1097), and *supra* III. 11 2 f., 1281 b 5 *n.* (565 b). SUSEM. (1080)

12 φορτικῆς] Because the spectator is φορτικός, b 16. Comp. *Poet.* c. 26 § 1, 1461 b 27 ff. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἥττων φορτικῇ (sc. μίμησις) βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατῆς: also *Latius* II. 655 D (quoted in *n.* on 1341 a 15).

14 θητικωτέραν] *Supra* 1337 b 21 *n.*

§ 16 14 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι] Cp. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει κτλ c. 6 § 6, 1341 a 4 f.

17 αὐτοὺς τε] This is rightly opposed to τὰ σώματα. But whether ποιούς τινας 'of a certain character' should be emended to τοιούτους τινάς = φορτικούς is altogether uncertain. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421. SUSEM.

c. 7 Which musical modes and measures are to be accepted, (1) in general §§ 2—7, (2) for education, §§ 8—15. Which is more important for educational purposes, melody or rhythm (time). The latter question is not considered. Cp. *Anal.*

p. 120. The subject is discussed by Plato at *Rep.* III. 397—399.

§ 1 19 With σκεπτέον commences the apodosis corresponding to a protasis ἐπεὶ δὲ...κινήσεις, b 9—18: so that unless δὲ is changed to δὴ, it had better (with Schneider and Bonitz) be omitted: *Qu. cr. coll.* p. 421. The difficulties of this long period are discussed by Bonitz *Aristot. Stud.* III. pp. 95—99 (61—65). SUSEM.

Bonitz suggests b 20 the excision of καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν, (1) because no satisfactory sense can be given to καὶ, (2) because two questions are distinguished, and it is the second one, beginning at εἴπειτα, which has to do with Education. Further he is inclined to extend the period as far as b 32 περὶ αὐτῶν, reading ἐπεὶ δὴ at 23, and making νομίσαντες μὲν οὖν begin the apodosis to this (secondary) protasis b 23 ἐπεὶ δὴ...26 εὐρυθμον, on the ground that it is impossible for ἐπειδὴ to introduce a second protasis referring to the preceding apodosis σκεπτέον...ἕτερον.



21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἡ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παι- (VI)  
 δεῖαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ  
 τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ  
 μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὔσαν, τούτων δ' ἐκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λε-  
 25 ληθῆναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον  
 προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθμον.  
 § 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν 3  
 μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν  
 ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν  
 30 καθ' ἑκάστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλο-  
 μένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς omitted by P<sup>4-5-6</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>s</sup> || 23 τρίτον δεῖ (δὲ P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>s</sup>)  
 before τινα ἕτερον Γ II Bk., τρίτον δὲ with the transposition Susem. δεῖ untranslated  
 by Ar., [δεῖ] Koraes; Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be  
 corrupt || 25 δύναμιν after ἔχει P<sup>3-5</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Bk., cp. 1339 a 15 || [καὶ] ? Susem. ||  
 31 νομικῶς] in *genere* Ar., γενικῶς Bas.<sup>3</sup> in the margin, λογικῶς Koraes, συντόμως  
 Flach || διέλωμεν P<sup>4</sup> S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and M<sup>s</sup> (1st hand), διέλωμεν or διελωμεν apparently Γ

21 τοῖς... διαπονοῦσι] The *dativus  
 commodi*, not the dative after τὸν αὐτὸν.  
 "Whether for those whose work is edu-  
 cational we shall make the same division."  
 After this ἢ τρίτον δεῖ τινα ἕτερον Γ II seems  
 hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be un-  
 derstood by τρίτον? Not to speak of the  
 harshness, if not impossibility, of sup-  
 plying an infinitive for δεῖ from θήσομεν.

22 ἢ τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ] Veram  
 mihi emendandi rationem inventam esse  
 spero, cum ea coniecerim. Si haec spes  
 me non fefellit, v. 25 καὶ significat "etiam,"  
 et sic quidem ferri forsitan, sed vel sic  
 eicere malim: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421.  
 SUSEM.

25 καὶ πότερον κτλ] In the *Introd.*  
 p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the  
 discussion of this question is no longer ex-  
 tant in our present treatise. SUSEM. (1081)

The whole passage may be rendered:  
 We have still to consider the question of  
 musical modes and rhythms: whether  
 all the modes and all the rhythms should  
 be employed or a distinction made be-  
 tween them: secondly, whether the same  
 distinction will serve for those whose work  
 is teaching, or whether we shall make a  
 new one: thirdly, as we find Music to  
 consist of melody and rhythm, and the  
 influence which each of them has upon  
 education ought not to be overlooked,  
 [also] whether the preference must be  
 given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.

§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention

to the close similarity of phrase between  
 this passage and IV(VII). 1. 2, 1323 a 22.

28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κτλ] See *nn.*  
 (1055, 1083, 1103). Perhaps intended to  
 intimate that Plato passed judgment on  
 these matters without sufficient musical  
 knowledge. See § 9. SUSEM. (1082)

31 νομικῶς] 'Formally.' Idem fere  
 significat atque νόμου χάριν *Meta.* XIII(M).  
 1. 4, 1076 a 27: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421.  
 SUSEM.

The passage from the *Metaphysics* runs  
 thus: ἔπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν  
 ἰδεῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου χάριν.  
 Here ἀπλῶς seems to mean 'in general  
 terms,' much as καθόλου (so Eudemus  
 συντόμως in the parallel passage *E. E.* 1. 8,  
 1217 b 19), and not with Bonitz = simply  
 (a sense nearly akin to χωρὶς: quae-  
 tionem de numeris et de principiis cum  
 hac de ideis quaestione nondum vult con-  
 iungi). The precise reference in νόμος too  
 is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle's  
 own practice of criticizing his predeces-  
 sors: Bernays rendered νόμου χάριν by  
*dicis causa*: Diels disapproving of this  
 remarks that νόμιμον is not ὅσιον, nor does  
 the phrase = ὁσίας χάριν, and prefers to  
 render it "to comply with the prevailing  
 custom, the fashion." It seems best to  
 modify Bernays' interpretation a little.  
 The original meaning is "only so far as  
 to avoid a conflict with the law," i.e.  
 'under compulsion and reluctantly.' Other  
 authors use the phrase thus, of what is

§ 3 μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδε-  
 χόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιρουσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ,  
 τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες,  
 35 καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν

done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched: e.g. Diphilus Ζωγράφου *Fr.* 2 l. 13 apud Athen. VII. 292 A: οὐθὲν ἡδέως ποιεῖ γὰρ οὗτος, ἀλλ' ὅσον νόμου χάριν, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Bernays *Die Dialoge* p. 150, Forchhammer *Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden* p. 51 f., Diels *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 488, Susemihl in *Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, p. 273. τοὺς τύπους] With the plural comp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 1, 1179 a 34, ἱκανῶς ἐρηται τοῖς τύποις instead of the more usual τύπων, 1276 b 19 n. "Contenting ourselves with a formal discussion in outline only."

§ 3 The construction is ἐπεὶ δὲ... ἀποδεχόμεθα... ὡς διαιροῦσι... καὶ... τιθέασιν, φανέν δ' οὐ μᾶς... χάριν (καὶ γὰρ... ἀνάπανσιν) all of which is the protasis, the apodosis beginning with φανερόν. Translate: "We accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into ethical, scenic, ecstatic [literally, according as they represent (1) character, (2) action, and (3) ecstasy], as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative—what we mean by purgation will here be stated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry:—while, thirdly, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the ecstatic modes as well, when we listen to the performances of others."

33 τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Bergk *Rhein. Mus.* XIX. p. 603 plausibly suggests that the reference is to Aristotle's own pupil Aristoxenus. Cp. also § 8 n. (1104). SUSEM. (1083)

34 τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ κτλ.] This division

is based upon the threefold nature of the subject-matter of all imitative art, viz. ἦθος, πράξις, πάθος: characters, actions, emotions (c. 5 §§ 18—22, IV[VII]. 17. 10, cp. n. (963), *Poet.* c. 1 § 5, 1447 a 27 f.). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiasm pure and simple, but also to other painful emotions, see §§ 4—6, § 8 with nn. (1089, 1096, 1101), cp. nn. (1047, 1054). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions as such, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, as in the case of the famous Pythian νόμος (see Hiller 'Sakadas the flute-player' *Rhein. Mus.* XXXI. 1876, p. 79 ff., Guhrauer *Der pythische νόμος Jahrb. für Philol. Suppl.* N. S. VIII. p. 309 ff.). This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the πρακτικὰ ἁρμονίαι express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced by the ecstatic Modes. Nor must we forget that πράξις includes the idea of 'scene' as well as 'action,' and at times, e.g. IV(VII). 17. 10, 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression. SUSEM. (1084)

The second of the three classes (πρακτικὰ μέλη, πρακτικὰ ἁρμονίαι) has no direct English equivalent: we must be content to designate them 'modes and melodies of action.' Clearly the first is like ecclesiastical music now, calm and serious: the third the wild excited airs, at once significant of, and fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicted some stirring action, as in the Pythian νόμος, or arming for the fray, as in a lost tragedy: *Probl.* XIX. 48, ἦθος δὲ ἐχέει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρακτικόν, διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ Γηρύνῳ [cp. Nauck *Frag.* 2 p. 762] ἡ ἐξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπισις ἐν ταύτῃ πεποιήται.



ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέλος τιθέασι, φάμεν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἔν  
 ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεονόνων  
 ριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ  
 40 ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—, τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγω  
 πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαιον  
 1342 a φανερόν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ  
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν  
 παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἑτέρων

36 μέλος Tyrwhitt (on *Poet.* c. 6), μέρος Γ II Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text; Koras  
 pects τιθέασι || 38 καὶ inserted before παιδείας by P<sup>1</sup>.<sup>2</sup> || παιδείας Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup>, πο  
 apparently P<sup>5</sup> (corr.) || 40 τρίτον δὲ] καὶ ταῦτα Liepert (*Arist. u. d. Zweck*  
*Kunst*, Passau 1862 p. 13, n. 3), ταύτης δ' ἢ, or at least ταύτης δὲ, Susem.  
 Comm. n. (1101). Spengel would transpose τρίτον δὲ to follow διαγωγὴν, wro  
 || διαγωγὴν <καὶ> Liepert and Susemihl, διαγωγὴν <ἢ> Susem.<sup>2</sup>, which is be  
 and absolutely necessary if ταύτης δ' ἢ just before is right. See n. (1101). [  
 διαγωγὴν] Welldon, wrongly || 41 [πρὸς] τὴν ? Susem.

1342 a 1 οὐ...2 χρηστέον omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> || 3 ἀκρόασιν] καθάρσιν Paris. 2043  
 Twining *Poet.* p. 243 (ed. 1), II. p. 7 (ed. 2), decidedly right: see Comm.

39 πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς]  
 Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the  
*Poetics* is no longer extant. Vahlen gives  
 good reasons for believing that it came  
 after the discussion of Comedy now lost:  
 see *Arist. Aufsätze* III. p. 13 s.f. (*Wiener*  
*Sitzungsber.* LXXVII. p. 293 ff.) SUSEM.  
 (1085)

40 τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν] At first  
 sight there is a difficulty, if καθάρσις and  
 διαγωγὴ constitute separate ends. What  
 else than διαγωγὴ, as described above,  
 see n. (1000), could express the aim of  
 the concerts and musical exhibitions which  
 are productive of καθάρσις more than  
 μάθησις (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that  
 it is strange to find, in the received text,  
 διαγωγὴ apparently explained by ἀνάπαιον  
 with which it is so often contrasted. Nor  
 is it possible to reconcile the three ad-  
 vantages attendant on the use of music  
 here with the three ends of musical  
 education enumerated c. 5 §§ 2—4 and  
 easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp.  
 Bernays *Rhein. Mus.* XIV. 1889 p. 371 f.,  
*Ueber die tragische Katharsis* (ed. 2) p.  
 125 f. See however Exc. v. p. 638. If the  
 two passages in c. 5 refer exclusively to mu-  
 sic as a means of education, all the three  
 ends there given (διαγωγὴ, παιδεία = ἀρετή,  
 ἀνεσις = ἀνάπαιον) are summed up under  
 the single phrase παιδείας ἕνεκα of our  
 context. That is, though preparatory to

διαγωγὴ (since those who have not le  
 when young can never fully enjoy mu  
 the educational use must be conce  
 as distinct. Then there is further  
 emotional or pathological use (κάθα  
 now introduced for the first time. Pla  
 that does not attend on the music  
 played in education. It should be n  
 that Zeller (*op. c.* p. 771 n. 1) insists  
 fourfold use here: he would separate  
 (3) πρὸς διαγωγὴν, the following cl  
 (4) πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ...ἀνάπαιον.

1342 a 3 ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις] In  
 class the Dorian Mode stands fir  
 Aristotle says himself § 8. But  
 Excurs. IV n. (1054) it seems strang  
 should speak of more than one ἠθικω  
 ἁρμονία, since only the Aeolian and  
 haps the antiquated Locrian and Boe  
 can go with the Dorian; indeed ever  
 Aeolian forms a transition to the c  
 νίαι πρακτικά: cp. n. (1103). I  
 Excurs. IV it would appear that Lye  
 Hypo-phrygian (Ionian), and pos  
 Hypo-lydian constitute the next grou  
 πρακτικά: while the ecstatic are  
 Phrygian, Mixolydian, high-pit  
 Lydian and high-pitched Ionian (u  
 this was identical with the Mixolydi  
 see pp. 630, 631. SUSEM. (1086)

πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἑτ. χ.] "But  
 listening to while other people p  
 ἀκρόασις is a conveniently general

§ 4 ρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. δ (VII)  
 5 γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν (p. 143)  
 πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἦττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον,  
 οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ

4 After ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς Reinkens (*Arist. üb. Kunst* pp. 145, 156) supposes that a definition of κάθαρσις has been lost and the words following mutilated; wrongly

under which κάθαρσις and διαγωγή can be included.

4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς] Here καὶ = 'as well as.' For Aristotle would not separate from πρακτικαὶ and ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἄρμ. such others as, though ἠθικαί, do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exc. IV these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian. Since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἠθικώταται would be exceptions: yet this is not expressly stated: much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes,' as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see *n.* (1101) p. 638 ff. (That this is my view and was maintained by me in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* LXXXV. 1862, p. 416 is admitted by Döring *Philologus* XXVII. p. 724, though I regret that in *Kunstlehre des Aris.* p. 283 he reprints unaltered an incorrect statement about it which appeared *Philol.* XXI. p. 501.) Not to mention others, the Dorian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of πρακτικαὶ ἁρμονίαι should be noticed. Comp. Exc. IV. *n.* (1054), and § 5, τὰ μέλη with *n.* (1096). SUSEM. (1087, 1088)

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education. Zeller, p. 774, *n.* (2).

§§ 4, 5 The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic 'modes' calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 256): "Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in παιδεία, the 'ecstatic' in κάθαρσις [see however *n.* 1007], the πρακτικά perhaps as military music. Besides this, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs no further proof, so far as the first two

species ἠθικά and πρακτικά are concerned: in respect of ecstatic music it sounds a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term κάθαρσις as well, Aristotle proceeds with §§ 4, 5. This enables him to give the explanation of κάθαρσις in general terms (ἀπλῶς) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, κορυβαντισμός." The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aristides Quintilianus II. p. 157 Meib.; Döring p. 332. Translate: "For the emotion which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to seizure by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purgation." It is also possible to take ἐκ τῶν ιερῶν μελῶν with ὁρῶμεν: 'we see from the sacred melodies etc.' Cp. Hagfors p. 13 f.

7 οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος] From the whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here adduced *not* with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my *Introd.* to the *Poetics* pp. 36—67), but like ecstasy, with reference merely to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See c. 5 § 18 *n.* (1047), 7 § 3 (1084), § 5 (1096), § 8 (1101). SUSEM. (1089)

With this view Mr Newman appears to concur: *Introd.* p. 366 "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-fraught spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure."

Bernays in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: 'e.g. pity and terror



8 ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινες εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν δ' (VI)  
 10 ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιά-  
 ζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυ-  
 15 χόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν

8 δ'] δὲ before τῶν P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ald. Bk., after 9 ἱερῶν P<sup>6</sup> || 9 [δταν...10 μελεσι] Susem.<sup>3</sup>, see p. 640 || 10 καθισταμένους Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>2</sup> (corrected by P<sup>1</sup>) || τύχοντα M<sup>1</sup>, τυχοῦσας possibly Γ || 11 [καὶ] Spengel, τῆς ? Ueberweg formerly, <τῆς> [καὶ] Susem., see Comm. n. (1094) || δῆ] δὲ Γ, perhaps rightly

(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακώχιμοι 'Liable to be possessed, attacked.' So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, κορυβαντισμός. Plato uses κατοκωχή for inspiration, *Phaedr.* 245 A, *Ion* 536 C. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. 1. (Note that all the mss. agree here and 1269 b 30 in an irrational form. But in *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 3, 1179 b 9 K<sup>b</sup> gives κατοκώχιμον.)

ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν] Join with καθισταμένους, not with ὀρώμεν. See Bursian's *Jahresber.* LVII. p. 174 [and Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 356 a 41]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. 5 § 16. See Exc. II. p. 621. SUSEM. (1090)

9 ὅταν χρήσωνται] "When they have used the melodies" in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 f. SUSEM. (1091)

Like κινήσις, καθίστασθαι, κουφίεσθαι, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. III. 712 K. τῆσι φαρμακίῃσι χρέεσθαι, III. 859 κλυσμοῖσι χρέεσθαι, I. 82 τὴν αὐτὴν χρῆσιν (remedy, treatment) ἀεὶ προσδέχεσθαι (Döring). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang, the maddening strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; *l.c.* κατασταλτέαν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) φασὶν εἶναι τῇ μελωδίᾳ, ἥτοι καὶ αὐτοὺς μμήσει τινὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄλογον ἀπομειλιττομένους, ... ἢ καὶ δι' ἀκοῆς [δύσεως] φόβον τὸν τοιόνδε ἀποτρεπομένους, "the soul must, they say, be soothed by melody, either the patients themselves must appease its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation (of the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening."

ἐξοργιάζουσι] See ὀργιαστικόν, 1341 a 22, n. (1072), and ὀργιαστικά, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). SUSEM. (1092)

10 καθισταμένους] The expression pro-

perly means 'are cured,' 'recover' = return to themselves, as Döring has shown [see Steph. s. v. L. and S. quote only ἐς ἑσιν καθ. Hippocr. 97, add l. 206, 208]. These terms however are not used of temporary, or palliative, restoration (such as is referred to here), but only of a permanent cure. In other passages of Aristotle καθίστασθαι simply means 'to calm oneself,' to settle down after excitement, with no suggestion of a medical sense: e.g. *De Memor.* c. 2 § 29, 453 a 271, διὰ καὶ ὀργῶν καὶ φόβου, ὅταν τι κινήσωσιν, ἀντικεινόντων πάλιν τούτων οὐ καθίστανται, *De Somn.* c. 3 § 25, 461 a 25, ἢ δὲ τρόφιμος καὶ μὴ ροσώδης (ἀναθυμίασις) καταφέρεται ἀνισταμένη. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. κατὰστασις *Rhet.* I. II. 1, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1095), p. 640. SUSEM. (1093)

ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως] The ὥσπερ marks the introduction of a metaphor: both ἰατρεία and καθάρσις then are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, nor of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take bodily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the excitable and not the purgative side of this homoeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homoeopathic element will be least represented. SUSEM. (1094)

Comp. II. 7. 11, 1267 a 7 f., διὰ τὴν ταύτης (sc. ἐπιθυμίας) ἀδικήσουσιν ἰατρείαν.

§ 5 "So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in

καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως πα- (VII)  
θητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων  
ἐκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι  
15 μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ †καθαρκτικά† παρέ-

12 τοὺς ἄλλως Ar., τοὺς <ἄλλως> ὅλως? Susem., ὅλως τοὺς Reiz not badly; but perhaps no change is needed. Döring (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 713) once conjectured [καὶ] τοὺς ὅλως: now (*Kunstlehre des Arist.* p. 257 n.) he prefers to accept the suggestion of Reiz || 15 καθαρκτικά Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.<sup>1</sup> in the text and Thurot, who assumed a lacuna before ὁμοίως needlessly, see Comm.; πρακτικά Sauppe

general, and with the rest of men in such measure as they are susceptible of this or that emotion; they have a like experience; they all undergo a purgation of some sort and feel a pleasurable relief." Under the former case (Corybantism) come only morbid patients: here the world at large are included. However slight the degree in which they are subject to pity and fear, still, so far as these passions have a hold upon them, they participate, in every-day life, in the same beneficial effect which frees the 'o'er fraught heart' from its accumulation of emotion in critical moments. This is the normal effect of music and upon it attends the constant concomitant of normal activity, pleasure (μεθ' ἡδονῆς).

13 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει] In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1260 a 19, 1261 b 35 n. Bernays p. 88 (188) shows that the principle of the cure of Bacchic delirium (Corybantism) was observed by Plato (*Lysis* VII. 790 f.), though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. "Aristotle," observes Butcher, "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and hints at even a wider application." However, on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emotion, Bernays p. 46 (164) ff.

14 τινα κάθαρσιν] This implies that the *catharsis* is not in all cases precisely of the same kind. The *catharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of 'enthusiasm' or morbid ecstasy. See the note on *kátharosis* p. 641. SUSEM. (1095)

κουφίζεσθαι] For the medical sense see *Probl.* III. 17, 873 b 22 (of the disease): II. 22, 868 a 36, b 6; IV. 30, 880 a 33 (of the patient). Cp. Hippocr. I. 177, III. 715 K. (Döring).

§ 6 15 τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρκτικά] Thus

the authorities. Sauppe's emendation τὰ πρακτικά was adopted in Susem.<sup>2,3</sup> See Excursus V. p. 638 f. especially p. 640 n. 1, and generally n. (1088). SUSEM. (1096)

In handling a *locus classicus* like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the reading of the MSS. leaves the sentence enigmatical. (1) Does it merely emphasize τὰ μέλη as opposed to ἁρμονίαι, a 4? This can hardly be, though apparently Mr Newman thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after n. 1089). For μέλη are mentioned a 9 f., not to urge with Thurot *Études* p. 103 that Aristotle as little distinguishes between ἁρμονίαι and μέλη as a modern critic between the keys in which music is written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with ῥυθμοί; see e.g. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1, 7 § 10, 1342 b 5 f. (2) Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, those treated in a 4—15 must be καθαρκτικά. The new species should be πρακτικά—of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against n. (1089), that the effect of tragedy is alluded to § 5, a 11—15, and this apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (3) Or does it introduce a new effect (χαρὰ ἀβλαβή) of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4—15? If so, the 'harmless delight' would be contrasted with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with, and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 n. (2) says that music purges the παθητικός, and affords enjoyment to all. Döring p. 260 finds a contrast between (1) the extraordinary, curative effect, κάθαρσις ἀπλῶς, of morbid patients (whether suffering from the malady of Bacchic frenzy, or hypochondriacs through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of ecstatic music heard at concerts under ordinary circum-



§ 6 χει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις (VII) ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι \* \* θετέον τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὃ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὃ δὲ 20 φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγ- § 7 κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε- στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν

16 χώρων Π<sup>1</sup> (emended in Π<sup>1</sup> by corr.<sup>1</sup>) and Π<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) || 17 θετέον Π<sup>2</sup>-5 S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> L<sup>1</sup> Ar. Ald. and Π<sup>1</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>) Π<sup>4</sup> (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed), <χρη- σθαι> ἐάτεον Ed. Müller II. p. 63, <χρησθαι> θετέον Spengel, both plausible: Koras detected the error: παιδευτέον Jebb || τοῖς] πρὸς S<sup>b</sup> T<sup>b</sup> and Π<sup>4</sup> (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed): omitted by M<sup>o</sup> || 18 θεατρικὴν written above the line as a gloss by Π<sup>2</sup>, omitted by Π<sup>1</sup> Ar. and Π<sup>2</sup> (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities || 19 ἐλευθέριος ? Susem. || 22 εἰσὶ] ἐστὶ Bk.<sup>2</sup>

stances. Bernays translated (from Bekker's text): "now in the same manner as other means of *catharsis* the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre" which is intended to provide innocent delight "should come forward with such modes and melodies." The objection to this is the forced meaning of *ὁμοίως*. The means of catharsis just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in *ταῦτο τοῦτο πάσχειν*. Busse moreover *op. c.* p. 49 accepts the correction *πρακτικά*.

§ 6 "Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuosi, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation."

16 τοιαύταις] Namely, *καθαρτικαῖς*: see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421 f.

17 θετέον] The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if *χρησθαι* were supplied, or *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* in place of *ἀγωνιστάς*. Still the meaning is clear. In *τοῖς...μεταχειριζομένοις* it is not hard to discover *τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην* of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The care shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the *Republic*.

20 ἐκ βαναύσων...συγκείμενος] As an attribute of *θεατὴς* this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. *De Finibus* II. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negotii est, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, or *ad Att.* IV. 15. 1, ut est ex me et ex te iunctus Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21 ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας] These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 "Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falsely coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow the artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music."

22 ὥσπερ αὐτῶν...23 ἔξεως] Comp. n. (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, n. (1080). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art III. 11. 2, n. (565 b). SUSEM. (1097)

23 καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the 'wailing and mournful' music of the mixo-Lydian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the 'lax and effeminate' low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 § 22, also Exc. IV. n. (1054). SUSEM. (1098)

παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακε- (VII)  
 25 χρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν  
 οἰκεῖον, διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς  
 τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς  
 30 μουσικῆς)· πρὸς δὲ παιδεῖαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τῶν  
 μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη  
 30 δ' ἡ δωριστί, καθάπερ εἵπομεν πρότερον· δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ  
 καὶ τινὰ ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φι-  
 9 λосоφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὁ  
 δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην

24 παρακεχωρημένα II<sup>1</sup> (emended by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin with γρ. prefixed) and P<sup>2</sup>

|| 28 παιδιάν II<sup>1</sup> (emended by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) and P<sup>2</sup> (1st hand, emended by corr.<sup>1</sup>)

|| 30 δωριστή P<sup>4,5</sup>

24 παρακεχωρημένα] A technical term for varieties of the three *genera*—diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic. See Excursus IV. p. 636. SUSEM. (1099)

25 ποιεῖ δὲ κτλ] Apelt *Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 325 (1) thinks this, in connexion with *N. E.* VII. 14. 2, 1154 a 12, points to a division of pleasures into *φυσικαὶ* and *ἀναγκαῖαι*. He compares Epicurus' division of *ἐπιθυμίαι* and Nemesius *De Natura Hominis* c. 18 *περὶ ἡδονῶν*.

27 τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ] I.e. a corrupt, depraved style, in which 'colourings' and *nuances* i.e. transposed scales abound.

§ 8 28 ὥσπερ εἴρηται] In § 3, 1342 a 3, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδεῖαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις. See Exc. V. p. 638. SUSEM. (1100)

We have now reached the end of the long digression, §§ 4—7, following on the mention of modes suitable for public performance πρὸς ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων: we have in fact answered the first question of c. 7 § 1 πότερον πάσαις χρηστέον. The connexion of the whole passage, and the best way of meeting the difficulties presented by the text, is discussed Exc. V. p. 638 ff. SUSEM. (1101)

30 πρότερον] In c. 5 § 22, 1340 b 3 ff. Comp. n. (1054) p. 628. The previous statement (ὥστε ἔχειν μέσως καὶ καλεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δ. μόνη ἀρμονίῳ) is not quite to the same effect. In one sense it includes more than is found here; cp. n. (1109). What has been pointed out n. (1086) agrees with this. SUSEM. (1102)

δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κτλ] See n. (1086) for a conjecture as to the modes here intended. SUSEM. (1104)

31 οἱ κοινωνοί... 32 παιδείας] Here the author of the division into three classes mentioned in § 3 is again most probably intended. See n. (1083). SUSEM. (1103)

Aristoxenos was at once a pupil of Aristotle's and an ardent musician, while on musical theory his *Harmonics* and the fragments of his *ῥυθμικά στοιχεῖα* are our highest authority. In Westphal's monumental works, the series *Theorie der musischen Künste der Hellenen* and the now completed edition *Aristoxenos, Melik und Rhythmik* (Leipzig, 1883 and 1893) everything has been done for this author. English readers unacquainted with Westphal's writings may with advantage consult Mr C. F. Abdy Williams' article on 'Ancient Metre' in *Classical Review* VII. p. 295 ff.

§ 9 Socrates in the Republic is inconsistent: he rejects the flute, but tolerates the Phrygian Mode.

ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ.] This is the normal, explicit manner of referring to Socrates, the character in the dialogue 'The Republic,' and sufficiently accounts for the article in the abbreviated form ὁ Σωκράτης. Cp. n. on II. 1. 3, 1261 a 6.

The passage in *Rep.* III. 399 A runs thus: ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστὶ λελπεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστὶ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφη ἐγώ, τὰς ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἀρμονίαν [i.e. the Dorian], ἣ ἐν τε πολέμῳ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βίᾳ ἐργασία πρεπόντως ἀν' ἀμύσηται φθόγγους τε καὶ προσωδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραγῳδία ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἰς τινα ἄλλην ξυμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πάσι τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ [the Phrygian]



- καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας (VII)  
 1342 b τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἢ  
 φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἥνπερ' αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις  
 § 10 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποιή-  
 σις. πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις (p. 11)  
 5 μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δ' ἁρμο-  
 νιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον.  
 οἶον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.  
 § 11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-  
 σιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν

1342 b 2 φρυγιστὴ Γ || 8 δειγμάτων P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>1</sup>

ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἄλλ' ἐν ἐκούσιῳ  
 πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινὰ τι κείθοντός τε καὶ  
 δεομένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νοουθε-  
 τήσει ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τούναρτίον ἄλλῃ δεομένῳ  
 ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπεύθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχον-  
 τα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ  
 μὴ ὑπερφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε  
 καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τοῦτοις πράττοντά τε  
 καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο  
 ἁρμονίας βλαῖον, ἐκούσιον, δυστυχούτων,  
 εὐτυχούτων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων αἰτίνας  
 φθόγγους μμησονται μάλιστα, ταύτας  
 λέγει. As with the musical instruments,  
 n. (1071), so in the case of the modes  
 Aristotle is stricter than Plato, since in  
 truth—see III. (1086, 1102, 1104, 1109)—  
 the Dorian Mode is the only one which  
 he retains for the purpose of moral  
 education. SUSEM. (1108)

34 ἀποδοκιμάσας.....τὸν αὐλόν] Pl.  
 K<sup>er</sup>. III. 399 D: τί δέ; αὐλοποιούς ἢ αὐλη-  
 τὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο  
 πολυχорδόντα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια  
 αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μμημα; The ostensi-  
 ble ground for its rejection is the com-  
 plexity of its music. SUSEM. (1106)

1342 b 3 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικά κτλ]  
 We were told this before of the flute, c. 6  
 § 9, 1341 a 22 ff., οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικόν  
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν; it has an in-  
 toxicating effect, tending not to form, but  
 to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode  
 again was described as relatively the  
 most maddening and ecstatic, c. 5 § 22.  
 The addition of the more general term  
 παθητικά = 'passionate' here is a fresh and  
 striking proof that the ecstatic modes, αἱ  
 ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁρμονίαι, are not restricted  
 to the expression or impression upon  
 others of Ecstasy pure and simple. On  
 the contrary, like the flute amongst musi-  
 cal instruments, they are adapted gene-  
 rally to portray and call up all emotions,

or at least all painful emotions:—in the  
 words of the text, 'all Bacchic frenzy and  
 similar mental excitement.' Comp. Exc.  
 IV. p. 628 and notes (1089, 1047), also  
 n. (1096) p. 643. SUSEM. (1107)

§ 10 Poetry shows this. When the  
 subject is wild and delirious, as in a  
 dithyramb, the music is set for the flute  
 and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode.  
 The cogency of this illustration depends  
 on the fact, which must always be borne  
 in mind, that the Greek poet set his own  
 words to music (precisely as in the Wag-  
 nerian opera): he also chose his own  
 dance measures.

5 τῶν δ' ἁρμονιῶν ἐν τοῖς...μέλεσι]  
 See Thurot p. 103 (cited above p. 611  
 upon § 6, 1342 a 15).

6 ταῦτα=βακχεία καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνη-  
 σις (subject).

§ 11 8 οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην]  
 An extraordinary phrase where we should  
 expect οἱ περὶ ταῦτα συνετοὶ ὄντες: i.e.  
 musical critics or connoisseurs. In Bonitz'  
 words, σύνεσις is used 'obiective' = ἡ μου-  
 σικὴ τέχνη.

9 Φιλόξενος] Of Cythera, born 489  
 B.C., one of the most famous of the dithy-  
 rambic poets. He lived for some time at  
 the court of the elder Dionysius, who  
 imprisoned him in the stone quarries of  
 Syracuse, where (according to one ac-  
 count) he wrote his most noted dithyramb  
 Κύκλωψ. When brought out to listen to  
 Dionysius' own compositions, he is said  
 to have addressed the attendants in the  
 words Εἰς λατομίας, "Take me back to  
 the quarries." See further respecting  
 him Bernhardt *Gesch. d. griech. Littera-  
 tur* II<sup>2</sup>. p. 669 ff. (ed. 2), SUSEM. (1108)  
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criti-  
 cism of the later dithyrambic poets, in-  
 cluding Philoxenus, specially mentions

10 τῇ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς μύθους οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν, (VII)  
 ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν  
 12 προσήκουσαν ἀρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες 10  
 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης  
 ἀνδρείον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαι-  
 15 νοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει  
 τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρμονίας, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ Δω-  
 § 13 ρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. [εἰσὶ  
 δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ  
 δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἐκά-  
 20 στοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὠρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς  
 ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνου οὐ ῥάδιον ἄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἀρμο-

10 διθύραμβον τοὺς] διθύραμβικούς Ramus || Μυσοῦς Schneider Bk.<sup>2</sup>, μεθύσου  
 ? Schmidt, [τοὺς μύθους] Sauppe || 11 τὴν προσήκουσαν... 12 δωριστὶ omitted by P<sup>2</sup>  
 || 12 δωριστὶ Γ, δωριστικὴ Ald. || 17 τοὺς νεωτέρους Koraes, possibly Γ, rightly  
 || [εἰσὶ... 34 πρέπον] Susem.<sup>2,3</sup>; see Comm. n. (1113) || 19 ἐκάστοις P<sup>5</sup>, ἐκάστους  
 Π<sup>1,2</sup> || 21 χρὸς M<sup>2</sup>, χρόνον P<sup>3,5</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> Bk., avoiding hiatus

their intermixture of styles and license in rhythm: οἱ δὲ γε διθύραμβοι καὶ τοὺς τρόπους μετέβαλλον, Δωρίους τε καὶ Φρυγίους καὶ Λυδίους ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ποιοῦντες· καὶ τὰς μελωδίας ἐξήλλαττον... καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς κατὰ πολλὴν ἀδειαν ἐνεξουσιάζοντες διετέλουν· οἱ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ φιλόξενον καὶ τιμώθεον καὶ Τελεστήν· ἐπεὶ παρὰ γε τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τεταγμένοι ἦν ὁ διθύραμβος, *De composit. verb.* 19, p. 131, 14 ff. ed. Reiske.

11 ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς] See § 13, 1342 b 27, ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει: also *Meta.* I. 3. 14, 984 b 9 f., ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἐξήτησαν, and *Phys.* I. 5. 6, 188 b 29 f.

§ 12 13 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς οὔσης] See 1262 b 12 n. Comp. VI(IV). 9. 7, 1294 b 20. The best explanation and parallels in Lobbeck ad Soph. *Aiac.* 281. Frequent in Plato, e.g. *Phil.* 16 c, *Latous* 624 A, B.

στασιμωτάτης] That the Dorian is the only mode which produces a sober and sedate frame of mind was said c. 5 § 22, 1340 b 3. Comp. notes (1102, 1105). SUSEM. (1109)

14 ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον κτλ] See VI (IV). II. 4, 1295 b 3 f., ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἀριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον, n. (1290 b). SUSEM. (1110)

15 ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ κτλ] I.e. the Dorian melodies are principally of a middle compass. In contrast to this, melodies composed in the 'high-strung' (σύντονοι) and low-pitched (ἀνεμῆναι, χαλαραὶ) modes diverged from this middle compass to the

higher and lower parts of the register respectively. This is explained in *Excursus III. n.* (1054) p. 625. SUSEM. (1111)

§ 13 18 σκοποί] πρὸς οὓς ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, 1341 b 15. That the choice of melodies must be regulated by what is practicable and what is becoming (sc. for the age and voice of the performers) is a truism, whoever enunciates it, see c. 6 § 3, n.

20 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ] "But these conditions (viz. what is practicable and what is becoming) are defined by the age of the performers. For instance, it is not easy for those who are old and feeble to sing in the high-strung modes: nature suggests the low-pitched modes at their age."

21 διὰ χρόνου] Διὰ c. gen. means (1) "after the lapse of some time" as in III. I. 6, 1275 a 25, and VI(IV). 15. 1, 1299 a 6, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ δὲ ἐλάττους ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς. So in *Rhet.* I. 11. 20, 1371 a 29 f., σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου, a thing seen after an interval, an occasional enjoyment. Hence the distributive sense of διὰ τρίτου ἔτους 546 b 10, διὰ τρίτης (ἡμέρας) 594 b 21. (2) In διὰ βίου (4 times, cp. διὰ τινος χρ. 1272 b 13) it implies duration. With the accusative (as P<sup>3,5</sup> Π<sup>3</sup> see *Crit. n.*) the sense is causal: those who fail by reason of age. This reading avoids the hiatus, which is in its favour. But the causal sense with gen. is admitted by Eucken p. 38, Hagfors p. 46: cp. 1337 a 36 (?), 1316 b 14 (αἰτιῶν δι' ὧν).



νίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἢ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλι- (VII)  
 § 14 κούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο <τῷ> Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ 11  
 τὴν μουσικὴν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκι-  
 25 μάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς,  
 οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἢ γε  
 μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκνίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν  
 ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-  
 § 15 των ἁρμονιῶν ἄπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι  
 30 δ' εἴ τίς ἐστι τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἣ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παί-  
 δων ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ  
 παιδείαν, οἷον ἢ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονημένοι μάλιστα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὥστε <εἰ> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by Wil-  
 liam, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἐτι δὲ may answer to this καὶ || 28 καὶ untranslated  
 by William and Ar., [καὶ] Koras || 30 ἢ ΓAld. || 31 παιδῶν C. E. Ch.  
 Schneider (on Pl. *Rep.* III. 399 A) || παιδεῖαν οἷον P<sup>3</sup> (1st hand, corrected by later  
 hands), διάνοιαν II<sup>1</sup> (οἷον added in the text and γρ. παιδεῖαν by P<sup>1</sup> in the margin of  
 P<sup>1</sup>) and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.)

§ 14 23 <τῷ> Σωκράτει] I.e. in  
 Plato *Rep.* III. 398 E: τινες οὖν μαλακαὶ  
 καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; ἴασθι, ἢ δ'  
 ὅς, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αἵτινες χαλαρὰ καλοῦνται.  
 Ταύτας οὖν, ὃ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 ἔσθ' ὅτι χρήσῃ; SUSEM. (1112)

25 ὡς μεθυστικὰς κτλ] "On the  
 assumption that this is drunken music,  
 not in the sense of intoxication—indeed  
 intoxication rather tends to excite mad  
 revelry—but as being enervated." Bonitz  
 is probably right in making 27 ἀπειρηκνίας  
 acc. plur. *Ind. Ar.* 71 b 47, comparing  
 24 τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας: and so 'en-  
 ervated,' languid, exhausted. Schneider  
 preferred to regard it as gen. sing., but if  
 that were so, surely we should expect  
 αὐτῆς τῆς μέθης or some equivalent as  
 the antithesis of τῆς μέθης ἀπειρηκνίας.

§§ 13—15 17 εἰσὶ δὲ... 34 πρέπει] That this close of the chapter is a foreign  
 addition is indicated by the square  
 brackets, and must be admitted unless  
 we choose to believe that Aristotle would  
 again partially introduce by a side-wind  
 the musical modes which he has already  
 openly banished from education. Arist-  
 otle recommends Dorian melodies for  
 the instruction of the young on account  
 of their middle compass: all other modes,  
 'the most ethical' alone excepted, are  
 excluded: also, he expressly warns us  
 against any education for amusement, c. 5  
 § 4. He distinctly forbids adults to sing

or play, c. 6 § 4, and consequently re-  
 stricts the introduction of 'practical'  
 (πρακτικά) or 'ecstatic' Modes, as well  
 as the less 'ethical' Modes, see n. (1087),  
 to performances at which the citizens are  
 auditors. The author of this addition,  
 on the other hand, is anxious that the  
 youth should also learn to sing in modes  
 which, from the low compass of the melo-  
 dies, are least suited to them and best  
 adapted to be actually sung in riper age.  
 Now it is no doubt true that these low-  
 pitched modes do not belong either to  
 the 'practical' (πρακτικά) or to the  
 'ecstatic' but to the 'ethical' class and  
 appear to constitute the less ethical; see  
 nn. (1054, 1087). It is further true that  
 Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal  
 state an occasional banquet for relaxation  
 and recreation, IV(VII). 17. 11, cp. n.  
 (966), and at such times probably also  
 permits them the exceptional privilege of  
 singing (see c. 5 § 8 with nn. 1028, 1067).  
 It is true that the description of the low-  
 pitched keys here given (ἀπειρηκνίας)  
 points, like Plato's *Rep.* 398 E, see n.  
 (1112), to the appositeness of their em-  
 ployment on such occasions. Finally it  
 cannot be denied that the idea of learning  
 something in youth, which may afford  
 amusement in later life, is not wrong in  
 itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present  
 instance inadmissible, because for mere  
 amusement it is not necessary to learn to

33 ἀρμονιῶν, ἡ \* \* δῆλον ὅτι τρεῖς τούτους ὄρους ποιητέον εἰς τὴν (VII) παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον \* \*]

33 ἡ after ἀρμονιῶν added by P<sup>1</sup> and P<sup>2</sup> (corr.<sup>1</sup>), omitted by all other authorities Ar. Bk. || \* \* δῆλον Conring, δῆλον <ὄδν> ὅτι Schneider || τρεῖς after ὄρους M<sup>1</sup> P<sup>3-5</sup> II<sup>3</sup> Bk. || ταύτας Γ || οὗς ὄρους omitted by P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand), the lacuna left being filled in with another ink, ὄρους omitted by Γ P<sup>2</sup> || 34 παιδιὰν P<sup>2</sup>, παιδιάν P<sup>1</sup> (1st hand, corrected by p<sup>1</sup> in the margin) || πρέπον \* \* William (*residuum huius operis in greco nondum inveni*)

sing and play yourself, when you can get others to perform to you, c. 5 § 8: cp. *μη.* (1024, 1025, 1036). However, this is quite enough to condemn the proposed instruction of boys in melodies to be hereafter sung at drinking parties. Aristotle would have been much more concerned to practise the young in the 'practical' (πρακτικά) and ecstatic melodies, in order to educate their taste for the end of the highest intellectual enjoyment. But he obviously thought: teach a boy to sing and play minor tunes, and amid the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will surely, if so inclined, be able to sing melodies in the major modes, and appreciate them at musical performances intended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one moment the illogical sequence of the whole passage. The introduction: "but in musical instruction, as in all else, we should keep in view what is practicable and what is fitting" stands in no conceivable logical connexion with what precedes. Has the previous restriction of musical teaching to the Dorian and the related Modes any other object except to secure for the young what is practicable and fitting, because suited to their capacity? Even the casual remark at the close, 1342 b 14 ff., that just on account of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is specially adapted to induce moral virtue, which is a mean between two extremes (see *n.* 1111), is directed simply to what is fitting. This the interpolator has failed to recognize, for he brings in the Mean as a third aim, different from the possible and the fitting. He has not then perceived that the medium compass of the Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason and not the sole reason for preferring it. Starting from the strangely perverse notion that this was the only reason, he felt bound to assign some part to propriety and the possible, and so he goes on to remark that not only the possible but also the fitting is determined by gradations

tions of age, a mere truism as regards the latter point, since the interpolator has expressly stated that by what is fitting for youth he understands (κόσμος ἅμα καὶ παιδεία) grace (decorum) and moral culture. But, first, a word as to possibility or capacity. It might have been thought that according to this standard boys should be taught to sing in the modes best adapted to their age from the compass of the melodies. Instead of this exactly the opposite inference is drawn, that they require further instruction in those modes which are better adapted, or only adapted, to older people. Secondly, from the point of view of what is becoming for boys the Lydian Mode is especially recommended:—just as though Aristotle had not himself prescribed the Dorian Mode from the same point of view as almost the only one permissible. Had he intended to assign to the Lydian Mode a special place beside or next to the Dorian, he would have found an opportunity in § 8, 1342 a 30, instead of merely referring to the decision of professional musicians, who are at the same time philosophers, the question what modes, other than the Dorian, may be employed in the education of the young. As we shall see in Exc. IV, Aristotle himself probably did not reckon the Lydian among the ethical modes at all, but among the πρακτικά. The distinction made by the interpolator between outward decorum and inner moral culture, κόσμον ἔχειν καὶ παιδείαν, cannot appear genuinely Aristotelian to any reader of the *Ethics*, for in Aristotle's view the man of moral virtue and he alone behaves with outward propriety, and the habit of behaving thus even counts among the moral virtues: see *Nic. Eth.* IV. cc. 6—8 (12—14 Bekker). And is not decorum just as fitting for adults as for children? Or has κόσμος a different meaning from decorum? A further error of the writer is apparent from a lacuna in the text where even the sense cannot be supplied. The ἡ pre-



served in two MSS. would seem to indicate (a) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (b) this  $\eta$  marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, τὸ μέσον, which, as well as τὸ δυνάτον and τὸ πρό-  
 πον, is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has

fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from *notes* (993, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1024, 1027, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. SUSEM. (1113)

## EXCURSUS I.

### ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME OF EDUCATION.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστὸν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστὸν, ὁμολογούμενον ἔστιν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον)...ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γίνωνται, τότε ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν. V(VIII). c. 4 §§ 7—9, 1338 b 39—41, 1339 a 4—7.

This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338 b 5 f. *n.* (1003). He makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year, IV(VII). 17. 15, to the age of puberty; gives the next three years, from 14 to 17, to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, *n.* (970), in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the *Introd.* p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338 a 31—34, with c. 5 § 4, 1339 a 29 f., *n.* (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in Plato's scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects, most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy (*παιδεία ἐλευθέριος καὶ καλὴ*). These are the higher sciences (*τὰ περὶ τὰ*) mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 42, *n.* (979), of which it is not true, as it is of other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, *n.* 982) that, while not in themselves derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point without risk of *βαρανσία*.

Aristotle's ideal state is not therefore, like Plato's Republic, in the last resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality. It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality: it is in the former aspect that its highest end is attained, cp. *Introd.* p. 48 f. But in the sequel wherever the word *παιδεία* is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1339 b 12, c. 6 § 7, 1341 a 13, § 9, 1341 a 18, 20, c. 7 § 1 ff., 1341 b 25, 29, 38, 1342 a 3, 28, 32 etc., it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the term, before the twenty-first year (even *μάθησις* is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23), and hence that development of character of which the young are susceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable



at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see *n.* (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with *τεχνῖται* or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., *n.* (1067) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, "no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest" (*καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος*, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, *n.* 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycletus (*Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theodectes. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money's worth. "It is inconceivable," remarks Bradley, *Hellenica* p. 214 *n.*, "that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of *βαναυσία* applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: 'If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies': καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐφυὴς νέος ἢ τὸν ἐν Πίσῃ θεασάμενος Δία γενέσθαι Φειδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν Ἥραν τὴν ἐν Ἀργεὶ Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ' Ἀνακρέων ἢ Φιλῆτας ἢ Ἀρχίλοχος ἢ σθεῖς αὐτῶν τοῖς ποιήμασιν: Plutarch, *Vita Periclis* c. 2, p. 153 A." SUSEM. (1018)

## EXCURSUS II.

## THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικᾶς, v(viii). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 9 f. Cp. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τοῦτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιζούσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως, c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8—11.

Olympus, like Musaeus *n.* (1034), is not an historical character, but personifies in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute: see Exc. iv. *n.* (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle's times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk *Poet. Lyr.*<sup>4</sup> p. 809 f.) or nothing but αὐλητικὸὶ νόμοι, as they were called; cp. *n.* (17) to my edition of the *Politics*. Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, then extant (Glaucus apud Plutarch. *De Musica* 5, 1132 E, F)<sup>1</sup>, and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the originator of artistic music: Plut. *op. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 11, 1135 B: cp. Glauc. *l. c.* But others were of later date than Terpander, and even than Thaletas<sup>2</sup>, see *nn.* (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Pratinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those νόμοι of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a νόμος πολυκέφαλος, so called from the number of its preludes. Others went further and invented a pupil of this younger Olympus, Crates by name, to whom they assigned the authorship of the πολυκέφαλος. Another of these airs (νόμοι), called ἀρμάτιος, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus: see Plut. *l. c.* 7, 1133 D ff. Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Exc. iv) in honour of Athene, called ὄρθιος, the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. i. ad init., Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 33, 1143 B; cp. Plat. *Crat.* 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. *op. c.* 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch. 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cybele called μητρῶοι (Plut. *l. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 19, 1137 D).

<sup>1</sup> The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, αὐλητικὴν and αὐλητικῶν should be read in this passage, instead of ἀλφιδίαν and ἀλφ-

δικῶν.

<sup>2</sup> For the introduction of the paeonian or cretic rhythm into artistic music is rightly ascribed to Thaletas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athene ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.



As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship<sup>1</sup>. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV. p. 628 and *n.* 1107), are the 'sacred melodies' from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, *n.* (1090), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homocopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle's mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 f., c. 7 § 3 ff.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. SUSEM. (1042)

## EXCURSUS III.

## ETHOS OR CHARACTER.

ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους πάθος ἐστίν, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

Döring *Kunstlehre des Aristoteles* p. 335 ff. (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 705 ff.) has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, *n.* (977), and elsewhere, the expression 'character of the soul,' τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν) ἥθος, or 'character' only, must be taken to mean *not* the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature<sup>2</sup> itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. *nn.* (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, *n.* (1022), it appears that this 'orectic' soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that "because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices" is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

<sup>1</sup> Plato *Sympos.* 215 C: Socrates is like Marsyas; ὁ μὲν γὰρ δι' ὀργάνων ἐκλήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ ὅς ἂν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῇ. ἃ γὰρ Ὀλνιμπος ἡθλει, Μαρσύου λέγω, τοῦ διδάξ-

αντος. τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἔάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς αὐλῇ ἔάν τε φαύλη αὐλητὴς, μόνον κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, the 'orectic' soul.

be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (*ἔξεις*) called moral virtues. 'Influence upon the character' means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us 'attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character'<sup>1</sup> through the intervention of music (cp. *Poet.* 6 § 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.)<sup>2</sup>. Thus the phrase 'character,' or 'character of the soul,' cannot mean that part of the soul *in itself* but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites,—*φυσικαὶ ἕξεις, φυσικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* (καὶ κακίαι) as Aristotle calls them, *N.E.* VI. 13. 1 f., 1144 a 1—14 (cp. above *Pol.* IV[VII]. 13. 11, n. 888), and (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, *πράξεις*, but with emotional excitements or feelings (*πάθη*, *N.E.* II. 6. 10, 1106 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral 'habit' may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: "because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits." Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called 'character' precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character. Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. *nn.* (1022, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from *Rhet.* II. 9. 1, 1386 b 12 ff., § 5, b 33 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character<sup>3</sup>: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring's explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle c. 5 § 18, cp. *n.* (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (*ἡθικά*) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. *n.* (1048) themselves characters (*ἡθῆ*), whilst in other places, such as c. 7 §§ 3—11, *Poet.* I. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. *n.* (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly recognized among the Greeks between emotion (*πάθος*),

<sup>1</sup> *ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἡθῆ γινόμεθα*, 1340 a 7.

<sup>2</sup> *εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἡθῆ ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τούναντιον· οὐκ οὖν ὅπως τὰ ἡθῆ μιμῶσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡθῆ συμπαραλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς πράξεις.*

<sup>3</sup> *καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη* (sc. *ἐλεεῖν καὶ νεμεσάζειν*) *ἡθῶν χρηστοῦ*. [Döring argues thus: *πάθη* are in this and other passages ascribed to *ἡθῶς*, but *Nic. Eth.* II.

5. 1, 1105 b 20, *πάθη* are said to be *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*, while from *Rhet.* II. 12. 1, 1388 b 30, we gather that *ἡθῶς* (like *ψυχή*) includes more under it than *πάθη* only. Hence he considers himself justified in equating *ἡθῶς* with *ψυχὴ ὁρεκτικῆ*, and would explain *Pol.* V(VIII). 5. 16, 1340 a 6, as a case where the more special term *ἡθῶς* is combined with the more general term *ψυχή*.]



in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (*ἦθος*) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whittle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. *π.* (1052), an artist 'full of character' (*ἡθικός*) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called 'characters' *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13. 1, 1144 b 4, or as we should say 'qualities of character.' The expression *τὴν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἦθους πάθος* 'an emotion of the character of the soul' = *ὁ πάσχει τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἦθος*, suggests the radical meaning of *πάθος* 'suffering.' SUSEM. (1048)

## EXCURSUS IV.

ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC: MODES, RHYTHMS,  
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, SCALES:  
NOTES 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

## MODES.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μνημάτα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανερόν· εἰθὲς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν δίδωσκει φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκτόως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μίξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκτόως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνῃ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικοῦς δ' ἡ φρυγιστὶ.....) c. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

"Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive *imitations* of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lydian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer ease; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm."<sup>1</sup>

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (la) and C (ut)<sup>2</sup>, and

[<sup>1</sup> This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see *Translations* p. 121.]

[<sup>2</sup> *Do* is often used instead of *ut*.]

so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (*ἁρμονίας*), or 'Species of Octaves' (*εἶδη τῶν τοῦ διὰ πασῶν*)<sup>1</sup>, as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy:—

- (1) BC D EF G a b<sup>2</sup>, Mixolydian;
- (2) C D EF G a bc<sup>3</sup>, Lydian;
- (3) D EF G a bc d , Phrygian;
- (4) EF G a bc d e , Dorian;
- (5) F G a bc d ef , Hypolydian;
- (6) G a bc d ef g , Ionian;
- (7) A BC D EF G a, Aeolian.

The Aeolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracleid. apud Ath. XIV. 624 E), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three; the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo-," and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles our Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal<sup>4</sup> and Gevaert<sup>6</sup> was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Aeolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. *Eg.* 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (*σύμτροποι*) and low-pitched (*ἀνεμύναι*) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names,

<sup>1</sup> Also called *τόνοι*, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word *species* itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'MUSIC,' for *ἁρμονία* or *εἶδος τῶν τοῦ διὰ πασῶν*: for *τόνος* the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see *n.* p. 637 f.]

<sup>2</sup> Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart;

for an interval of a semitone they are closer together.

<sup>3</sup> ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si.

<sup>4</sup> *Gr. Metrik* first edition II. 1. p. 342 ff., second edition I. p. 266 ff., *Gesch. der alten und mittelalterlichen Musik* (Breslau 1865) p. 21 ff., 167 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité* (Gent 1875) I. p. 146.



but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be expected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added, a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. *Harm.* p. 18, Bacch. p. 19, Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocritus of Locri (Callim. in Schol. Pind. *Ol.* XI. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see n. 419), commonly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out of use (Heracleid. in Ath. XIV. 625 E). As Gaudentius expressly states that the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as either the fifth (as is the case with the Aeolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case represents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff., that, as the ancients observed (Plut. *De Mus.* 16, 1136 E), it was the counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in the one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending :

BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian (ascending)  
 b A G FE D CB, Mixolydian (descending)  
 F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian (ascending),

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reversely into the fifth and fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished, and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented :

Fourth      Fifth  
 BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian ;  
 diminished Fifth  
 Fifth      Fourth  
 F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian ;  
 augmented Fourth

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with the 'highly strung' Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (*Rep.* III. 398 E) says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation. Lastly in regard to the terms *σύντρονοι* 'highly strung' and *ἀνεμμένοι* 'relaxed,' which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to

explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13 f., though not by Aristotle (see *n.* 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-strung keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian<sup>1</sup>, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed

<sup>1</sup> That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan *Die Tonarten bei Platon im dritten Buch der Republik, Jahrb. für Philol.* xcv. 1867, p. 815 sqq. According to him the high-strung and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-strung and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, ef g a bc d e, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (παρυπάτην) half a tone higher (f#); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (c#); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (f#, g#, c#, d#) or lower three (eb, ab, bb); and for an Ionian

there was a similar choice between raising three (f#, g#, c#) or lowering four strings (eb, ab, bb, db). A double method was similarly possible for obtaining a Mixolydian scale, either by raising six notes (e#, f#, g#, a#, c#, d#) or lowering b (παράμεσος) to bb, but only the first was called Mixolydian, and it cannot be decided how this came about. The Hypolydian, he thinks, could be derived in both ways, but had originally no special name, because it was not readily capable of practical employment owing to the augmented fourth f b. (In this assertion Jan has omitted to consider the fact that this mode occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical music of the middle ages, also in a Swedish national air still current at the present day, indeed Beethoven has composed a Canzonetta in this mode; see Gevaert, pp. 137 f., 172, 175.)

Mixolydian	E#	F#	G#	A#	B	C#	D#	E#
[Low Hypolydian	E	F#	G#	A#	B	C#	D#	E ]
High-pitched Lydian	E	F#	G#	A	B	C#	D#	E
High-pitched Ionian	E	F#	G#	A	B	C#		E
Phrygian	E	F#	G	A	B	C#		E
Aeolian	E	F#	G	A	BC		D	E
Dorian	E	F	G	A	BC		D	E
[High Mixolydian	E	F	G	A	Bb	C	D	E ]
[High Hypolydian	Eb	F	G	Ab	Bb	C	D	Eb ]
Low-pitched Lydian	Eb	F	G	Ab	Bb	C	D	Eb
Low-pitched Ionian	Eb	F	G	Ab	Bb	C	Db	Eb

The reason why I have not been convinced by this explanation, which has been carefully thought out, may be gathered from my exposition generally and the more detailed account of Gevaert, the main outlines of which I have repro-

duced, with the necessary reservations where I could not concur. Still in view of the difficulty of the subject I did not wish to withhold Jan's opinion from the reader. [See further Jan's article 'Musik' in Baumeister's *Denkmäler* II. 974—983.]



from the rest by ending on the third<sup>1</sup>, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (*Lach.* 188 D), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato *Repub.* l.c. omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale :

A B C D E F G a = Aeolian;

A B C D E F $\sharp$  G $\sharp$ a = our A minor;

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (*ἡθους*) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonous music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see *nu.* 1042, 1078)<sup>2</sup>. It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new *ἀρμονίαι*, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major: the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh :

F G a bc d ef = Hypolydian;

F G ab $\flat$  c d ef = F Major;

G a bc d ef g = Ionian (Hypophrygian);


G a bc d e f $\sharp$ g = G Major.

<sup>1</sup> [See note on p. 637 f.]

<sup>2</sup> We hear even of a Phrygian tetrachord, d ef g, and a Lydian tetrachord, c d ef, side by side with the Dorian tetra-

chord ef g a. See Helmholtz *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 405 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].

## DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).



## Modern A minor.



## PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).



## Modern G major.



## LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).



## Modern F major.



There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or *authentic* order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or *plagal* order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which *πάθος* is a more correct expression than *ἦθος*) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our 'major mode' is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aristox. in Plut. *De*



*Musica* 16, 1136C sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Ceos, a musician living at Athens (Aristox. *ibid.*), or according to another more detailed account (Lysis *ibid.*) by another musician of somewhat later date Lamproclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (Schol. Plat. *Alcib.* I. 118C). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see *n.* (1055) (Plut. *ibid.* 1136E). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato *Rep.* I.c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see *n.* 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into *ἠθικαί*, ethical, *πρακτικά* (Modes of action = scenic?) and *ἐνθουσιαστικά*, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class 'ethical'; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (*πρακτικά*); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class 'ecstatic.' He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (*Rep.* 399A ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 f. (see *n.* 1107) strongly disputes Plato's assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. There would then be joined to it the two other 'high-strung' modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. *nn.* 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In *Problems* XIX. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective *πρακτικός* applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (*ἡθους ἔχει μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον*). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as *πρακτικά*, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions<sup>1</sup>. The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

<sup>1</sup> ἡ [ὑπο]φρυγιστὶ (ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχικὴ). κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι...κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδυριστὶ καὶ ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρᾶττομεν. The insertion of *μάλιστα* δὲ

ἡ μεζολυδιστὶ (from Gaza) before *κατὰ μὲν οὖν*, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.

with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty: either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character, ἡθικαί, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 7 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle's pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see *n.* (1113). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see *nn.* 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure<sup>1</sup>. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see *n.* 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the κομμοί, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Cratin. in Ath. XIV. 638 f.); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. *De Musica* 17, 1136 f), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by VI(IV). 3. 4 (cp. *n.* 1159) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental ἀρμονίαι, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, and rested the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydo-Phrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular music of all European nations until after the Reformation: they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. SUSEM. (1054)

<sup>1</sup> The explanations given by Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xciv. 1867, p. 231 require considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.



## MUSICAL RHYTHMS.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἥθος στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας. V(VIII) c. 5 § 23, 1340 b 7—10.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metre: (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metre are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeonian time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of  $1\frac{1}{2} : 1$ . The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeonian, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest. The Ionic measure  $\sim \sim \sim$ ,  $\sim \sim \sim$  was considered specially wanting in nobility, loose and effeminate (Arist. Quint. p. 37 Meib., Demetr. *De eloc.* § 189, *Metr. Ambros.* p. 9 Keil, p. 262 Nauck, Mar. Vict. II. 8. 7, p. 122 Gaisf. p. 90, 19 sq. Keil, Schol. A Heph. p. 190 Westph., Dionys. Halic. *De Demosth. vi admirabili* p. 1093). The Ionic monopody, dipody, and tripody correspond to our  $\frac{3}{4}$ ,  $\frac{4}{4}$ ,  $\frac{3}{2}$  time. Cp. Westphal *Metrik* 2 ed. I. p. 534 ff. SUSEM. (1056) See now the third edition of Westphal's work, *Griechische Rhythmik* (1885), p. 99 ff. esp. p. 156, *Aristoxenus* I. p. 35 ff. An example of (3) is the Delphian hymn to Apollo in  $\frac{3}{2}$  time.

## MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS: HARPS, ETC.

οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάμβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ σαμβύκαι. V(VIII). c. 6 § 13, 1341 a 40—b 1.

None of these stringed instruments were of Greek origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. IV. 182 F) speaks of the φοίνικες, πηκτίδες, μαγάδιδες, σαμβύκαι, τρίγωνα, κλειψιάμβοι, σκινδαψοί, and ἐννεάχορδοι as uncommon (ἐκφυλά). The πηκτίς was a Lydian harp (Hdt. I. 17, Pind. *Fr.* 102 in Athen. XIV. 635 D, Soph. *Fr.* 375, *ibid.* 635 C and IV. 183 E, Telestes *Fr.* 5, *ibid.* XIV. 625 F) of high register (Telest. *l. c.*, cp. Pind. *l. c.*). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho *Fr.* 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon *Fr.* 17, 22, by Plato *Repub.* III. 399 C as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. IV. 183 B as a two-stringed instrument. Like


the magadis, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (Aristox. in Athen. XIV. 635 B). Menaechmus asserts in Ath. 635 B, E that Sappho was the first to use<sup>1</sup> the instrument, stating that he follows Aristoxenus in regarding it as the same as the magadis, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the μάγαδις and the πηκτίς (Ath. 636 A ff.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the μάγαδις seems to have been a modification of the πηκτίς. At any rate the μάγαδις also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 F and perhaps before him by Anacreon (ibid. Fr. 18), and the latter calls the πηκτίς (Fr. 17) and the μάγαδις (Fr. 18 in Ath. 634 C, 635 C) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Posidonius thinks (ibid. 634 C, D), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristoxenus (ibid. 635 B), who quotes Pindar *l.c.* in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Telestes (Fr. 4 in Ath. 637 A) apparently describes the μάγαδις as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sopater *l.c.* we must suppose that the πηκτίς had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phillis however (ibid. 636 F) says the πηκτίς and μάγαδις (which he distinguishes from one another), the σαμβύκη, λαμβύκη, τρίγωνον and κλεψιάμβος, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphorion (in Ath. IV. 182 F, XIV. 435 A) the μάγαδις—or rather the σαμβύκη, a modification of it (see below),—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the πηκτίς this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Alcman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the μάγαδις (Fr. 91 in Ath. 636 F) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the βάρβιτον (neuter), also βάρβιτος (masc. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Strabo x. 471 says that all the names σαμβύκη, βάρβιτος, πηκτίς, are foreign, and Pindar *l.c.* designates the βάρβιτον as an adaptation of the Lydian πηκτίς. Like this, it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar *l.c.* ascribes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Horace (*Carm.* I. 1. 34) calls it 'Lesbian' and assigns its use to Alcaeus (*Carm.* I. 34. 5 ff.). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphorion in Athen. 182 F=Sapph. Fr. 154, Anacr. Fr. 143). Critias calls the βάρβιτον Sappho's favourite instrument (in Ath. XIII. 600 C); Neanthes (Fr. 5 in

<sup>1</sup> So also Suidas *s.v.* Σαπφώ, where the mention of the plectrum in the received text is due to corruption.



Athen. 175 C) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon<sup>1</sup>. Jan (p. 15 f.) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcæus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton :



The only particular difference between this instrument and the *λύρα* consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the *πηκτίς*, as appears from Pindar *l.c.* Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*R. A.* VII. 72) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the *κιθάρα* and *λύρα*, as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 E and Pollux IV. 8. 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreontea. Anaxilas apud Ath. 183 B mentions only three strings, Plutarch *De Monarch.* 4. 827 A, and Theocritus XVI. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (Pauly's *Realencycl.* IV. p. 1289 *u.*) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of *βάρβιτοι* with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between *βάρβιτοι* and *πηκτίδες* on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the *βάρβιτος* and even than the *πηκτίς* and *μάγαδης*. In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a *σαμβύκη* :—

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Pseudo-Simonides *Fr.* 184, Anacreontea 2, 14, 23, 40, 41, 59.



The *τρίγωνον* or triangle is called by Juba (*Fr.* 73 in *Ath.* 175 D) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians<sup>1</sup>; by Ptolemy *Harm.* III. 7, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles *l.c.* gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Diogenes (in *Ath.* 636 A, see Nauck *Trag. Gr. Fragm.* p. 602 sq. ed. 2), it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (*s.v.* *Σίβυλλα*) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Aelian apud Porphy. on Ptolem. p. 216 sq.), and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. *l.c.*, Arist. *Probl.* XIX. 23). The *σαμβύκη* was likewise triangular (Athen. 634 A, Suidas *s.v.* *Ἰβυκος*) and, the strings being short, had a very high register (Aristid. Quintil. p. 101, Athen. 633 F). Euphron represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the *μάγαδις* (in *Ath.* 635 A); the same writer (in *Ath.* 633 F on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Parthians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato *l.c.* The statement of Skamon in Athen. 637 B that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Neanthes *l.c.* says either of the *τρίγωνον* or more probably (agreeing with Suidas *l.c.* and Schol. in Aristoph. *Thesm.* 168) of the *σαμβύκη*—which instrument is meant, is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music; but Juba (*l.c.*) attributed the (?) *λυροφοίνιξ σαμβύκη*<sup>2</sup>, as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the *τρίγωνον*, and more especially the *σαμβύκη*<sup>3</sup>, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the *σαμβύκη* by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 638 E<sup>4</sup> and the phrases “ballet girl and player on the triangle,” *τὴν ποδοκτύπην τε καὶ*

<sup>1</sup> Heliodorus *Aeth.* IV. 17 speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the *πηκτίς* indulge in wild Assyrian dances.

<sup>2</sup> In Kaibel's edition of Athenaeus an hiatus is assumed at this place, 175 D, between *λυροφοίνικα* and *σαμβύκην*.

<sup>3</sup> Both were introduced into Rome,

Dionys. Hal. *R. A. L.* 33, *Ath.* 183 C, *Liv.* XXXIX. 6.

<sup>4</sup> ὁ δὲ Γνήσιππος ἔστ' ἀκούειν  
ὅς νυκτερίν' εὖρε μοιχοῖς ἀέσματ' ἐκ-  
καλεῖσθαι  
γυναικας ἔχοντας λαμβύκην τε καὶ τρι-  
γωνον.



τραγουίστριον 'Lucian *Lexiph.* 8. χαρμίστρας καὶ σαμβουστρίδας Plut. *Athen.* 9. ἄγαστε σαμβουστρίδας καὶ κοινίδους Plut. *Cleon.* 35. κοινίδους ἄγαστε σαμβίνας Polyb. v. 37. 10. and others Tib. Gracch. in Macrobi. *Sat.* II. 10, Arnob. II. 42. This explains what Eupolis meant by mentioning triangle-playing 'Fr. 1 in Ath. 183 C, F, in his comedy of the *Σέρτα*, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotyua. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly *σαμβίνα*<sup>1</sup> and not *ιαμβίνα*, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The *ιαμβίνα* was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the *αλεψιαμβος* being used when they were melodramatically<sup>2</sup> recited (Phyllis *l.c.*, cp. Hesych. and Suidas s.v. *ιαμβίνα*). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the *αλεψιαμβος* among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Böckh *De metr. Pind.* p. 260 ff., Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, *De fidibus Graecorum* pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister *Denkmäler* III. p. 1444 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

#### SCALES.

τῶν μάλ' ὅντινα καὶ παρακχρωσμένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The "colour" of notes (*χρῶμα*) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or 'genera' of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order e f g a b c d e. Terpander omitted c, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. II.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. *Probl.* XIX. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

e f            a        b c            e

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (*δίεσις*):

e f\* g\*        a        b c\*d\*        e

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion, which D. Volkmann *De Suidae biogr.* p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the Dialogue *On Poets*) to attribute the original employment of the

*πηκρίς*, *τρίγωνον*, and *σαμβύκη* to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Sibyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

<sup>2</sup> See n. 10 on the *Poetics* (ed. Susem.).

In the case of the former there is between *f* and *g* rather more than a whole tone ( $\frac{9}{8}$ ), and between *g* and *a* rather less than a whole tone ( $\frac{8}{7}$ ), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone ( $\frac{15}{8}$ ) and a diminished whole tone ( $\frac{16}{15}$ ), a tone being inserted in the minor third *B D* in the place of the *C* omitted by Terpander, which was separated from *D* by the first, and from *B* by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third *E G* the intermediate tone *F* was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes *G* and *D*, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive *F* $\sharp$  and *C* $\sharp$ . Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of *C*, and with the enharmonic the omission of *G*, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 1134 F, 20, 1137 E), has only the usual whole tones and semitones:

e f g  $\flat$  a b  $\flat$  b d e

semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone. The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or *nuances* (*χρῶαι*) of sound. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he defends it with great spirit (Plut. *De Musica* §§ 37—39). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Ptolemy's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for chorus-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tetrachord or the eight of an octave. See Westphal *Metr.*<sup>2</sup> I. p. 412 ff., Gevaert p. 269 ff., also Helmholtz p. 403 ff. By unnatural 'colouring' Aristotle probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also, differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. SUSEM. (1099)

NOTE.—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 n. 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the accom-



paniment ended on the key-note, how can we account for the fact that the chord of the third was held by the ancients to be semi-dissonant, *παράφωνος*, like the tritone? While if Gevaert is right in supposing accompaniment and melody alike to end on the third, then the assumed key-note is *not* the final note: what data then are left for determining the key-note of an ancient composition? On p. 625 this is taken to be the *ὑπάτη*; compare now Th. Reinach in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* XVII. 1893, p. 597 ff. In the article MUSIC in the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) Mr D. B. Monro pertinently remarks, "the chief difficulty is the want of any direct statement regarding the tonality of the ancient modes, or the note in which the melody ended." The hypothesis, that the *μέση* of each mode was its key-note (Grundton, Tonica), based upon Ar. *Probl.* XIX. 20 (cp. Dio Chrys. 68, 7) and doubtfully accepted by Helmholtz, *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 367 ff. (cp. p. 412), is only true, as explained above p. 625, of the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian Modes.

A protest against Westphal's assumption of 'Modes ending on the third' appeared in *Allg. Musik. Ztg* for 1878 p. 737. Ultimately Westphal withdrew his assumption in the preface, dated 1890, of the posthumously issued second volume of his *Aristoxenos' Melik und Rhythmik* (Leipzig 1893). C. v. Jan, to whom the concession is due, treats it in his review (*Berliner philolog. Wochenschrift* XIII. 1893. 1285) as terminating a controversy which has lasted since 1863.

## EXCURSUS V.

## SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF V(VIII). C. 7

§§ 3—8, 1341 b 32—1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the *ethical* (*ἠθικαί*), those relating to *action* (*πρακτικάί*), and the *ecstatic* (*ἐνθουσιαστικάί*). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of *catharsis* and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 f. (*ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μάθησιν*). But now the question there left unsettled (see *n.* 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of *catharsis* to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (*ἀνάπαυσις*) and the highest rational enjoyment (*διαγωγή*). According to the *textus receptus* both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end<sup>1</sup>. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons. (1) In the preceding chapters *διαγωγή* and *ἀνάπαυσις* have always

<sup>1</sup> See the translation of the *textus receptus* p. 607.

been opposed to each other; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment: but this they undoubtedly share with the other ends of 'moral training' (*παιδεία*) and 'purgation' (*κάθαρσις*): consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradistinction to these other ends<sup>1</sup>, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (b 40, *πρὸς διαγωγὴν <ἢ> πρὸς ἀνεσί τε κτλ*). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Liepert has seen, to exclude from purgation (*κάθαρσις*) the elements of *διαγωγὴ* and *ἀνάπαυσις*: and (4) grammatically the change from *ἐνεκα* with the two first ends to *πρὸς* with this alleged third (*τρίτον δὲ πρὸς*) throws suspicion upon *τρίτον δὲ* also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a *cathartic* effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions: and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, *catharsis* is only a means to one or other of these two ends; to *διαγωγὴ*, or to *ἀνάπαυσις*. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration *ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἀνεσί τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν*.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Modes (again according to the *textus receptus*) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (*πρακτικά*) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of *κάθαρσις* (§ 4 f.), which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 38 *τί δὲ λέγομεν κτλ*) and is now added in the form of a reason (*ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας κτλ* a 4 ff.), proves by the very form in which it is cast that *catharsis* is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by 'listening to the performances of others' (*ἀκρόασις ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων*) merely this is meant<sup>2</sup>. It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for *catharsis*, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies: the otherwise meaningless final remark *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ*, a 15, can

<sup>1</sup> Zeller is so sensible of this that, as mentioned in *n.* on § 3 b 41, he would separate *ἀνεσις* and *ἀνάπαυσις* as a *fourth* end from *διαγωγὴ*, which he makes the third.

<sup>2</sup> Even this suggested solution, which leaves the main question unaffected, appears untenable. For even if we understand *ἀκρόασις ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων* to mean *κάθαρσις*, yet the very term *ἀκρόασις* implies the absurdity that the Greeks heard only melodies of action and ecstatic melodies (together with the less

ethical) played and sung by others: that they never listened in this way to the most ethical, i.e. to the Dorian. Were this implied, it would seem necessary to admit the correction *κάθαρσιν* for *ἀκρόασιν*. But then arises the question whether 1342 a 4 *καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς* should not simply be translated 'both those of action and the ecstatic,' especially as, when afterwards *κάθαρσις* comes to be discussed and explained, these two classes of musical modes and melodies are alone taken into account.



only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word *πρακτικά* 'melodies of action' for *καθαρικά* 'melodies of purgation'.<sup>1</sup> In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words *ὅταν χρήσονται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι* may be a gloss upon *ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν* which precedes<sup>2</sup>.

From this investigation into the nature of *catharsis* it is inferred that the proposition<sup>3</sup> it was adduced to prove is really correct (*διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις κτλ* §§ 6—8, a 16—29). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (see *n.* 1100), in a less strict form, *τοῖς ἥθικοις τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις* a 28 f., i.e. *ethical* modes replacing the 'most ethical,' *ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις*, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to *ἀκρόασις ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων*, i.e. to *catharsis*, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of artisans, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and "chromatic" scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the nobler musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to *ethical*, and more especially to Dorian melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (*διαγωγῇ*). And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. *n.* 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression. SUSEM. (1101)

<sup>1</sup> With this change the words will mean: "so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight." It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the 'ecstatic' (*ἐνθουσιαστικά*) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked *n.* (1084), with which *notes* (1054, 1089) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homoeopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions "of action." Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

SUSEM. (1096) Cp. *Rhet.* II. 5. 21, 1383 b 7, *θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή*. If Hieraclides is rightly reported *Athen.* XIV. 625 E, *δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶδος ἔχειν ἡθους ἢ πάθους*, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by *πρακτικά μέλη* insuperable. Cp. however *n.* (1084).

<sup>2</sup> See Bursian's *Jahreshr.* LVII. p. 174. Both expressions *ἱερὰ μέλη* and *τὰ ἐξοργιάζοντα τὴν ψυχὴν* must refer to the melodies of Olympus: cp. *Pl. Symp.* 215 c quoted p. 622 *n.* 1.

<sup>3</sup> The proposition *φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον ἀλλὰ κτλ* § 3, 1342 a 1—4.

## NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως [sc. φαμέν τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν]—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἑρῶμεν σαφέστερον. V(VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38—40.

ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιοι τινες εἰσὶν· ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἑξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. § ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἑδονῆς. c. 7 §§ 4, 5, 1342 a 4—15. Comp. ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ αὐλῷ] καιροῦς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μάθησιν· c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 f.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homœopathic treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the time and usually called by them *κάθαρσις*: in regard to this it is sufficient to refer to the Introduction of Susemihl's edition of the *Poetics* p. 44 f. and to the fuller investigations of Döring<sup>1</sup>. Two points have been properly emphasized by Döring: in the first place he has brought out the strong medical colouring which a number of Aristotle's expressions bear<sup>2</sup>; and secondly, that with the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as *κορυβαντισμός*, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc. while on the other hand the subject of treatment by the musical *catharsis* is not compared to a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is actually suffering from it. Even the term *κατακώχιοι* (§ 4, a 8), though it reminds us of 'possession' and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more, as Döring points out, than 'liable to be attacked' by a certain form of excitement. So too the phrase *ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρῶς*, a 4, "the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds," in itself ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual seizure by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle's chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (cp. *n.* 1094), and with their æsthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotion lying

<sup>1</sup> *Aristotelische Kunsttheorie* p. 319 ff. (*Philologus* XXI. p. 524 ff., XXVII. p. 714 ff. cp. p. 712 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> See 1342 a 8 *κινήσεως* and the notes on *κατακώχιοι*, a 9 *χρήσωνται*, a 10 *καθισταμένους*, a 14 *κουφίζεσθαι*.



dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the æsthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of æsthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Döring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term *πάθος* itself recalls *τὸ πάσχειν*, suffering or ailment<sup>1</sup>, a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering "emotion"; see Excursus III. n. (1043), p. 624. Aristotle no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful "emotions," but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all "emotions" without exception are included, this is, as Döring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable *πάθη* (e.g. *φιλία* *Rhet.* II. 4. 1, 1380 b 33 ff., *θάρσος*, II. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. æsthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (*πάθη*), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the 'violent occurrence' (*συμβαίνει ἰσχυρῶς*) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the 'employment' of melodies by those suffering from corybantism (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in n. (1093): it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical terms *καθίστασθαι*=recover (but see n. 1093) and *ἰατρεία*=regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (*κουφίεσθαι* 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily 'relief' which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render *κάθαρσις* by 'homœopathic purgation of emotions' (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of *κάθαρσις παθημάτων* *Poetics* 6. 2, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music æsthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer "cleansing" to "purgation." There also, p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle's time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of *κάθαρσις* "cleansing" in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. SUSEM. (1095).

<sup>1</sup> Bonitz *Aris. Stud.* v. p. 44: mental emotion has the term *πάθος* applied to it as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (*πάθος = νόσημα*).

## Κάθαρσις as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connexion of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the *Sophist* 226 D—231 E. The Eleate stranger starts with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (καθαρός) is the general name for any such process<sup>1</sup>. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (a) the *internal* purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (b) the merely *external* washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or 'dress-reviver<sup>2</sup>'. With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleate is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (c) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as καθαρός, and the elenchus as a purge:—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

## The liturgical or religious sense: lustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term καθαρός was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application<sup>3</sup>. Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablution and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and περιρραντήρια for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides' *Ion*, 101 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The Ecclesia was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet, like Epimenides, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

<sup>1</sup> πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις (sc. ἡ καταλείπονσα μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβάλλονσα) λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρός τις, *Sophist* 226 D. Hence the definition Ὅροι 415 D, καθαρός ἀπόκρισις χειρόνων ἀπὸ βελτιόνων. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between καθαρός and καθαρός.

<sup>2</sup> τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρ-

σεων...τὰ τε τῶν ζώων (α) ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς τε ὁρθῶς διακρινόμενα καθαίρεται, καὶ (β) περὶ τὰ κτὸς, εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῖλα, ὅσα βαλανευτικῇ παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γραφευτικῇ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικῇ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη...πολλὰ ὀνόματα ἔσχε, *Sophist* 226 E f.

<sup>3</sup> Döring *Kunstlehre* p. 251.



The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the detergents (περιψήματα) used to 'suck up' the pollution<sup>1</sup>, the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these καθάρματα (καθάρσια), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple<sup>2</sup>. In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown: Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, *Odyss.* xv. 222 ff., 256 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the *Aethiopis* of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angry gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod. i. 35.

#### Lustration as a cure for madness.

But along with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not inconsiderable evidence that *κάθαρσις*, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the 'medicine man' is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells<sup>3</sup>. The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρός* indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato's

<sup>1</sup> Compare also Διὸς κώδιον· οὐ τὸ λερεῖον Διὶ τέθνται...χρῶνται δ' αὐτοῖς...πρὸς τοὺς καθαρμούς ὑποστρωννύντες αὐτὰ τοῖς ποσὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν (Suidas), ἐφ' οὗ οἱ καθαιρόμενοι ἐστήκεσαν τῷ ἀριστερῷ ποδὶ (Hesychius).

<sup>2</sup> Porphyry. *De Abstinencia* II. 19: δεῖ τοίνυν καθηραμένους τὸ ἦθος ἵεναι θύσαντας...ἐν γοῦν Ἐπιδαύρῳ προσεγγράπτο·

ἀγνὸν χρὴ ναοῖο θυώδεος ἐντὸς ἰόντα

ἔμμεναι· ἀγνείη δ' ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὅσια.

The quotation from Bernays *Theophrastus über Frömmigkeit* p. 67 f.

<sup>3</sup> θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν (Ζάμολξίς) ἔφη ἐπὶ φθαῖς τισι, Pl. *Charm.* 157 A. Not only ἐνθουσιασμός but lumbago and epi-

lepsy were said to be cured by music: Theophrastus περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, *Fr.* 87: ὅτι δὲ καὶ νόσους ἴσται μουσικὴ Θεόδωρος Ἰστόρησεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, Ἰσχυακοὺς φάσκων ἀνόσους διατελεῖν εἰ καταλήσῃ τις τοῦ τόπου τῇ φρυγιστὶ ἀρμονίᾳ (*Ath.* XIV. 624 B), *Fr.* 88 Θ. ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμῶν...φησὶ...τὴν μουσικὴν πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γιγνομένων παθῶν ἰατρικῶν καθάπερ λιποθυμίας φόβους καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γιγνομένας τῆς διανοίας ἐκστάσεις. ἴσται γάρ, φησὶν, ἡ καταύλησις καὶ ἰσχυάδα καὶ ἐπιληψία (an instance is appended, Apollon. *Hist. Mirab.* c. 49).

*Cratylus*. There Socrates, speaking of the attributes of Apollo, whose name he connects with ἀπολούων, ἀπολύων, says: "the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul<sup>1</sup>." The strange nature of primitive remedies is what we might expect; 'the hair of the dog that bit you' is but one instance of crude homœopathy, which might be indefinitely illustrated. The fact that to cure madness the Greeks resorted to noisy excitement is beyond all doubt. In Plato, madness itself is said to suggest this remedy to the clairvoyant patient, the 'lustrations and religious rites' which for his malady are alone of avail<sup>2</sup>. In the legends we naturally find this method of treatment (ἡ διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θεραπεία) referred to an individual inventor: Melampus, a well known seer, is represented as healing the madness of the daughters of Proetus by such lustral rites<sup>3</sup>. Dionysus himself was the subject of another legendary cure<sup>4</sup>. The case of Orestes, Paus. II. 31. 4, is less clear seeing that he was 'cleansed' of matricide as well as madness<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, in a picture of real life from the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, Bdelycleon in all seriousness endeavours to cure his father's madness by initiating him in the Corybantian rites<sup>6</sup>. Not less sober is the statement of the phenomenon as an acknowledged fact—the frenzy that music is supposed to excite and to cure—in the questions put by Porphyry and answered, in the person of Abammon, by Iamblichus<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ κάθαρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν λατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς λατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρά τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις καὶ αἱ περιρράνσεις, πάντα ἐν τι ταῦτα δύναται ἂν, καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, 405 A, B. The translation is Jowett's.

<sup>2</sup> ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τισι τῶν γενῶν, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγὴν εὐρετο, καταφυγούσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἔχοντα, *Phaedr.* 244 D, E. In view of this and the other Platonic passages it seems impossible to endorse the objection of Reiz, *op. c.* p. 104, "expiari et lustrari dicuntur ii dumtaxat, qui polluti sunt aliquo scelere, tum qui mysteriis initiandi, aut qui rem sacram facturi sunt: non etiam ii quorum animus ab aliqua perturbatione tanquam morbo purgatur et liberatur."

<sup>3</sup> ἐς τοῦτο ἀναφυγεῖν τὸ σῆλαιον τὰς θυγατέρας τὰς Προίτου μανείσας λέγουσιν ἃς ὁ Μελάμπος θυσίας τε ἀπορρήτοις καὶ καθαρμοῖς κατήγαγεν ἐς χωρίον καλούμενον Λουσούς... καὶ ἡέσατο τῆς μανίας ἐν Ἀρτέ-

μιδος ἱερῷ, Pausan. VIII. 18. 3. The account of Apollodorus (II. 2. 2 ff.) makes the cure depend on counter-excitement, Μελάμπος δὲ, μάντις ὢν καὶ τὴν διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θεραπείαν πρῶτος εὐρηκώς, παραλαβὼν τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν νεανιῶν μετ' ἀλαλαγμοῦ καὶ τινος ἐνθέου χορείας ἐκ τῶν ὁρῶν αὐτὰς ἐς Σικῶνα συνεδίωξε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν διωγμὸν ἡ πρεσβυτάτη μετήλλαξεν ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς τυχοῦσαις καθαρμῶν σωφρονήσαι συνέβη.

<sup>4</sup> Ἦρας μανίαν αὐτῷ ἐκβαλοῦσης αὐθις δ' εἰς Κύβηλα τῆς Φρυγίας ἀφικνεῖται, κάκει καθαρθεὶς ὑπὸ Ῥέας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἐκμαθὼν... Apollodorus III. 5. 1. This is alluded to by Plato *Latius* 672 B.

<sup>5</sup> The same remark applies to the cleansing of Alcmeon, Apollodorus III. 7. 5. 2—4.

<sup>6</sup> εἴτ' αὐτὸν ἀπέλου κάκῃθαιρ' ὁ δ' οὐ μάλα | μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐκορυβάντι' (120). *Ibi* schol. ἀντὶ τοῦ, τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἐποίει αὐτῷ μυστήρια, ἐπὶ καθαρμῷ τῆς μανίας: and to the same effect Hesych. s. v. Κορυβαντισμός· κάθαρσις μανίας.

<sup>7</sup> ὡς τῶν ἐξισταμένων ἐνιοὶ τινες αὐλῶν ἀκούοντες ἢ κυμβάλων ἢ τυμπάνων ἢ τινος μέλους ἐνθουσιῶσιν, ὡς οἱ τε κορυβαντιζόμενοι καὶ οἱ τῷ Σαβαζίφ κάτοχοι καὶ οἱ μητρίζοντες... with the ordinary explanation (which Abammon of course rejects)



The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in *Aglaophamus*, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, portraying various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe<sup>1</sup>, which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds<sup>2</sup>; then the wild frenzied dances<sup>3</sup>, the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient<sup>4</sup>, causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes<sup>5</sup>. To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details<sup>6</sup>, but the philosophic reflexions in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, *Laus* 790 C—791 B, leave little more to be said: "this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent

τὸ μὲν οὖν κινήτικόν τι καὶ παθητικὸν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν αὐλῶν ἐμποιεῖν ἢ ἱατρεῦειν τὰ πάθη τῆς παρατροπῆς, καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κράσεις ἢ διαθεσεις τὴν μουσικὴν, καὶ τὸ ἄλλοις μὲν μέλουσιν ἀναβακχεύεσθαι, ἄλλοις δὲ ἀποπαύεσθαι τῆς βακχείας, καὶ πῶς αἱ τούτων διαφοραὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκστάτας διαθεσεις προσαρμόττουσι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἄστατον καὶ ἀκατάστατον μέλος πρὸς τὰς ἐκστάσεις οἰκείον, οἷα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ Ὀλύμπου, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα λέγεται, πάντα ἄλλοτρίως μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν Iamblich. *de Mysteriis*, 3, 9.

<sup>1</sup> *Ion* 536 C, οἱ Κορύβαντες ἐκείνον μόνου ἀσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως δ' ἂν ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσι.

<sup>2</sup> *Crito* 54 D, ταῦτα εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν ὥσπερ οἱ Κορυβαντιῶνες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκοῦεν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῦεν.

<sup>3</sup> *Ion* 533 E, οἱ Κορύβαντες οὐκ ἐμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται.

<sup>4</sup> *Laus* 790 E, αἱ μητέρες.....ἀτεχνῶς καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βαγγειῶν ἰδσεις ταύτη τῇ τῆς

κινήσεως ἅμα χορεῖα καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι. From the expression βαγγειῶν ἰδσεις Döring *op. c.* 252 strangely infers that the religious or liturgical signification of the phenomena must be rejected. Quite the contrary: in the same context 790 C we find αἱ τῶν Κορυβαντῶν λάματα τελοῦσαι; τελεταὶ are joined to καθαρμοὶ in *Phaedr.* 244 E (cited above, p. 645 n. 2); and Dionysus in the legend is not only 'cleansed' but instructed in the Bacchic rites (καθαρθῆς ὑπὸ Πέρας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἐκμαθὼν p. 645 n. 4). The common belief attributed Bacchic frenzy to the fact that the god had himself been driven mad by his step-mother: *Laus* 672, λόγος τις ἅμα καὶ φήμη ὑπορρεῖ πως, ὥς ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Ἡρας διεφορήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνώμην, διὰ τὰς τε βαγγείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μακρὴν ἐμβάλλει χορεῖαν τιμωρούμενος, i.e. in retribution.

<sup>5</sup> *Symp.* 215 E: πολὺ μοι μάλλον ἢ τῶν Κορυβαντῶντων ἡ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχέεται.

<sup>6</sup> *Lucian Deor. Dial.* xii. 37, *De Salt.* c. 79, p. 167, *Plut. Amat.* xvi. 7, p. 758 E, 12, 759 A, *Strabo* x. 21, p. 473, all cited by Lobeck p. 1152 ff.

internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy<sup>1</sup>. Corroborative testimony is borne by Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage cited above p. 609, f.<sup>2</sup>

#### Κάθαρσις as purification or purging of impurity.

In the applications of the term hitherto considered the object has been the person (or occasionally the thing) cleansed. In some of the metaphorical uses, however, and in the technical medical sense, the object of καθαίρειν is not the person but the impurity removed. With this construction the verb means not merely to *purge* [the system] but to *purge away* [what is noxious]; accordingly κάθαρσις denotes riddance and removal of impurity. The term has a wide range of metaphorical applications: e.g. 'separation' Plato *Phaedo* 67 C<sup>3</sup>, and moral 'purification,' which is a sense frequent in the *Phaedo*<sup>4</sup>. In the *Sophist* the elenchus is termed a purge. Socratic education, aped by the younger Sophists, was directed to ridding the pupil of that "false conceit of knowledge," which is the primary hindrance to the acquisition of true wisdom<sup>5</sup>. Other usages, e.g. λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων (*Rep.* 364 E, cp. *Phaedo* 82 D), support this meaning of riddance or removal. From Plato it passed to the Neo-Platonists: in Stobaeus *Ecl. Phys.* I c. 49 § 65 there is an extract, probably from Iamblichus *περὶ ψυχῆς*,

<sup>1</sup> *Latius* 790 C—791 B, Jowett's translation. Ed. Müller *Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst* I. 121, II. 70 (cp. *Jahrb. f. Kl. Phil.* CI. 1870, p. 405 f.) called attention to this passage in connexion with κάθαρσις. Especially noteworthy is 790 E f. ὅταν οὖν ἐξωθέν τις προσφέρῃ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις πάθεσι σεισμόν, ἡ τῶν ἐξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς φοβεράν οὖσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν, κρατήσασα δὲ γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀπεργασμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἐκάστων πηδήσεως, παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι τοὺς μὲν ὕπνου λαγχάνειν ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἐργηγορότας ὀρχουμένους τε καὶ αὐλουμένους μετὰ θεῶν, οἷς ἂν καλλιερῶντες ἕκαστοι θύωσι, κατεργάσαστο ἀντὶ μανικῶν ἡμῖν διαθέσεων ἕξεις ἐμφρονος ἔχειν. An objection made by Döring p. 252 to the whole idea of a 'lustration' of Bacchic enthusiasts as involving a contradiction, since the votary of the god, full of his enthusiasm, cannot possibly be unclean, or stand in need of consecration, is fully answered by this and similar passages.

<sup>2</sup> *De Musica* II. p. 157 M: διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἐχέσθαι φασιν· ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτόησις διὰ βίον ἡ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελωδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται, cited and explained by Döring p. 332, cp. Bernays *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 128.

<sup>3</sup> κάθαρσις...τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν. Cp. *Soph.* 227 C, ψυχῆς καθαρμός = κακίας ἀφαίρεσις, i. e. λιπεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ τὸ φλαυρόν.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. 69 B τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν τοιούτων πάντων...καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἦ: "whereas in truth it is really a purgation from all such things...and wisdom itself is probably a mode of purification." See also 69 C ὁ κεκαθαμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, 113 D, 114 C.

<sup>5</sup> τὸν ἐλεγχὸν λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, 230 D. The sophist is δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτῆς, 231 E. The analogy to the medical treatment is brought out fully 230 C—E.



which fully explains in what sense *κάθαρσις* was a technical term<sup>1</sup>. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purged from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle's pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

**The usage of the medical writers : purgation, discharge.**

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen *κάθαρσις* as a technical term denotes 'purgation,' i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foësius has well defined it: *κάθαρσις* purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocrati, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura molitur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four 'humours,' blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile<sup>2</sup>. Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame<sup>3</sup>. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt: preparatory to a discharge it must however be

<sup>1</sup> Πλωτίνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεσιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγνώσεων, δόξης τε πάσης ὑπεροφίαν [τε] καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων διανοήσεων ἀπόστασιν, πλήρωσιν τε ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ἀφομοιῶσιν τε τοῦ κατανοουμένου πρὸς τὸ κατανοοῦν τὴν τελεωτάτην κάθαρσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν p. 454, 10 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish κρίσις, δίκη, κάθαρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι assigns as the end of the last ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀπόδοσις τῆς οἰκίας οὐσίας, τελειότης, ἀποπλήρωσις, αὐτάρκεια, ἀνοδος ἐπὶ τὴν γεννησαμένην αἰτίαν: whereas others confine it to the humbler functions of λύσις ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν καταδέσμων καὶ φθορᾶς ἐλευθέρωσις καὶ γενέσεως ἀφesis. Plotinus discusses the relation of κάθαρσις to the virtues in *Enn.* i. 2 περὶ ἀρετῶν, and decides (1. 6. 6) that κάθαρσις is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (πολιτικαί) and below the intellectual (θεωρητικαὶ ἀρεταί): see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* III. ii.

661, 711, 757, 819 n. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering "purification," so common hitherto and so unhappily ambiguous.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν τε καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι αὐτῷ ἢ φύσει τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγέει καὶ ὑγιάει. Hipp. *De natura hominis* II. 3 p. 83 (i. p. 352 K.).

<sup>3</sup> *i.e.* ὑγιάει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὁκῶν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλα κρήναις τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ἢ ἀλγέει δέ, ὁκῶν τι τούτων ἑλασσον ἢ πλέον ἢ ἢ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκραμένον ἢ τοῖσι ἕρπασιν. Plato has a similar theory in his *Timaeus* cc. 39, 40, 82 A ff. except that he has transferred the 'unnatural' excess and defect' and the 'displacement' in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humours. Still he follows the Hippocrateans in referring fevers to the bile and catarrhs to phlegm (*Tim.* 85 B).

reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, (2) their reduction, πέψις, itself a species of transformation, or μεταβολή, (3) their expulsion, κρίσις. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (ταράττει) without however effecting a purge<sup>1</sup>. The inducement of excitement (ταραχή) is somewhat of a parallel to homœopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated ἐνθουσιασμός in the Corybantian worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame<sup>2</sup>. The medical process (ταραχή) goes on until the reduction (πέψις) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasizes between the sense of καθάρσις and of κένωσις in the Hippocratean corpus: the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: κένωσιν ἀπλῶς εἶωθε λέγειν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ὅταν ἅπαντες οἱ χυμοὶ ὁμοτίμως κενῶνται, καθάρσιν δὲ ὅταν οἱ μοχθηροὶ κατὰ ποιότητα. This distinction is rendered prominent in such phases as καθάρσις χολῆς, κ. αἵματος, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague<sup>3</sup>: Demosthenes allows a singularly naive and unsophisticated client to employ the word<sup>4</sup>. Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocrateans<sup>5</sup>: but in the biological works he has specialized this word in a slightly different sense<sup>7</sup>. Nor can it be said that the distinction enforced by

<sup>1</sup> ὁ γοῦν ἐλλέβορος ἀρχὴν τοῦ καθαίρειν ἔχει τὸ ταραττεῖν τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλ' ἢν ἐλάσσωσιν τοῦ μετρίου δοσῇ, ταραττεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν δὲ καθαίρει. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* III. 8. 8, p. 656 f.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Plato's reflexions on the Corybantic rites, *Laws* II. 790 c ff. as quoted above p. 646 n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Galen *Comm. in Hippocr. De Humor.* v. 12 (XVI. 105 K.). Compare also καθάρσις δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λυπούμενων κατὰ ποιότητα κένωσις Galen *Comm. ad aphor.* 2. I. 1 (XVII. B. 358 K.); καθάρσιν γὰρ εἶωθεν [sc. ὁ Ἱπποκράτης] ὀνομάζειν οὐ μόνον τὰς ὑπὸ φαρμάκων γενομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως *In Epidem.* (XVII. B. 167 K.); ὀνομάζω δὲ κένωσιν μὲν τῶν οἰκείων, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλῃ τῷ πλήθει, καθάρσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κατὰ ποιότητα *Comm. in progn.* (XVIII. B. 134 f. K.). Here Galen is speaking in his own

person. Other passages are cited by Siebeck *Zur Katharsisfrage* in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882, p. 225 ff.

<sup>4</sup> ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι, δεῖναι ὑπὸ λατρῶν ὀνομασμέναι εἰσὶν, II. 49.

<sup>5</sup> c. *Conon.* § 12, εἰ μὴ καθάρσις αἵματος αὐτομάτῃ μοι συνέβη *Or.* 54, p. 1260, 24.

<sup>6</sup> Littré ed. of Hippocr. I. 73: plus on examine comparativement les écrits hippocratiques, ceux de Platon et d'Aristote, plus on trouve de conformités entre eux et de points de comparaison. Döring *op. c.* p. 319 ff. collects a few instances of κινεῖν, κίνησις, ταραττεῖν, ταραχή—e.g. 450 b 1, 70 b 9 ff., 1106 a 4, 1382 a 21, 1386 b 19, 23, 865 a 6, a 15 ff., 864 a 2, 873 b 31 f. Add *Probl.* I. 42, 864 a 34 (quoted below p. 650 n. 8).

<sup>7</sup> See Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. 354 b 28 'syn τὰ καταμήνια.' The references adduced take up rather more than a column



Galen between *κένωσις* and *κάθαρσις* is much observed by unprofessional writers<sup>1</sup>.

#### *Κάθαρσις* as an æsthetic term.

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of *κάθαρσις* in reference to Music in the *Politics*, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the *Poetics*<sup>2</sup>. All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation<sup>3</sup>. Whether this æsthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated<sup>4</sup>: whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller's opinion<sup>5</sup> that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of the Corybantian frenzy in the manner above described<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context<sup>7</sup>, certain points in the process of relief<sup>8</sup>, and the consideration urged by Bernays<sup>9</sup> that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

"Are we to imagine," it has been asked, "that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato's 'psychiatry' in the *Latos*, but

(64 lines), and those for all other meanings less than 20 lines (one of these latter is *De gen. anim.* II. 4. 11, 738 a 28 K. τῶν περιττωμάτων). Bernays *op. cit.* p. 91 (191) is able to adduce the parallels ἀπόκρισις τῶν καταμνηνίων, ἐκκρίσις.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. Pl. *Phaedo* 69 c *κάθαρσις*=total removal.

<sup>2</sup> μῆμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης ἡδυσμένην λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις ὁρῶντων καὶ οὐ δ' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνονσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν *Poet.* 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Pol.* v (VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38. We have lost the fuller exposition of the *Poetics* (ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον, *cp. n.* 1085).

<sup>4</sup> Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CI. 1870, p. 404 ff. The view taken in the text follows Susemihl *Intr. to Poetics* p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> *Phil. d. Griech.* II<sup>2</sup>. ii. 775.

<sup>6</sup> P. 642. Ed. Müller *loc. cit.* p. 406 n. (190) insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato *Latos* 790 d ff., and Aristotle *Pol.* v (VIII). is so great as to be unmistakeable (τῶν

ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν λύσεις in Plato, ὥστε τοιὰς λατρείας τυχεῖν καὶ καθάρσεως in Aristotle; ἔξεις ἐμφρονος ἔχειν in the former, καθίστασθαι in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called *κάθαρσις* is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only eked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charms, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which, as Susemihl remarks *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xcvi. 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

<sup>7</sup> See the notes *ad loc.* p. 610 f.

<sup>8</sup> The operation of drugs is the subject of *Probl.* I. 42, διὰ τί τὰ φάρμακα καθάρει; The illustration conveyed in the words οὐ πεφθότα δὲ ἀλλὰ κρατήσωντι ἐκπίπτει φέροντα τὰ ἐμπόδια αὐτοῖς καὶ καλεῖται τοῦτο κάθαρσις 864 a 32—34, is very apposite. *Cp.* Pl. *Soph.* 230 c νομίζοντες γὰρ οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτοὺς, ὥπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίσαντες μὴ πρότερον ἢ τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαβεῖν δύνασθαι σώματα, πρὶν ἢ τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ... The relief follows upon excitation which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

<sup>9</sup> *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 13 (143).

of Hippocrates' emetics and purges?" The incongruity is only apparent: it is just the assimilation of the mental effect to the bodily cure, the attempt to explain the 'psychiatry' on the analogy of the purge, that constitutes Aristotle's original contribution to Aesthetics.

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Corymbantian frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homœopathic nature<sup>1</sup>: that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 646), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself off. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the *Attis*. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music<sup>2</sup>. Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the *Politics*<sup>3</sup>. Lastly, there is the passage from Aristides Quintilianus already cited (p. 610).

Not quite so clear is the operation of tragedy: "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude, by means of language embellished with each of the different kinds of embellishment, which are separately employed in the several parts; in the form of action not of narrative; effecting through pity and fear the proper purgation of these emotions<sup>4</sup>." If we are to choose between Lessing and Bernays, between "the conversion of the passions into virtuous aptitudes" and "the relief of disburdening the emotional tendencies"—there can be no question that the former is an erroneous view and the latter, in principle, right. The whole hypothesis is pathological; tragedy has, directly at least, no moral effect. In the *Poetics* we are told in so many words that tragedy creates a specific aesthetic enjoyment, a pleasure peculiar to itself<sup>5</sup>: about its moral or educa-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homœopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 95 (193), by Milton in the preface to his *Samson Agonistes*: "(Tragedy) said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terroure, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passages well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his assertion, for so, in physick, things of melancholick hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours."

<sup>2</sup> μία δὲ φύσις τῆς μουσικῆς, κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ κατὰ ἀπόλυσιν γεγνημένη τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν *Frag.* 89 ed. Wimmer. He made ecstasy one of the three primary constituents of music (ἀρχαὶς μουσικῆς λύπην ἡδονὴν ἐνθουσιασμόν): *Fr.* 90.

<sup>3</sup> In *Quaest. Conv.* 111. 8 Plutarch is

discussing the effect of wine; 2 § 10, 656 F ff. εἰκὸς δὲ πού καὶ ταύτην τὴν περὶ τὸν ἀκροθώρακα ταραχὴν, ὅταν ἀκμὴν λάβῃ, μαραινέσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο συνεργεῖν τὸν οἶνον· πολλὸν γὰρ εἰσελθὼν τὸ σῶμα συνεξέκασκε καὶ κατανάλωσεν τὸ μανιώδες τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνηδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [cp. p. 646 n. 5], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἴκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἂν τὸν οἶνον κτλ. With μαραινέσθαι cp. *Pol.* v (VIII). 7. 14, 1342 b 27, ἀπειρηκνίας. Again the assuaging effect, but not the previous excitement, is mentioned *Sept. sap. conv.*, 13, 156 C: αἱ δὲ Μοῦσαι καὶ παντάπασιν [μέμψαντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς] εἰ νομίζομεν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι κιθάραν καὶ αὐλοῦς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ παιδεύειν τὰ ἦθη καὶ παρηγορεῖν τὰ πάθη τῶν χρωμένων μέλεσι καὶ ἀρμονίαις.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Butcher's translation, *op. c.* p. 348. The Greek is given p. 650 n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Poet.* 14 § 4, 1453 b 10: οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν



tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama exerts must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempt is made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted. For there may be a total or a partial removal, a 'purging away' i.e. expulsion, or 'purging' i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements)<sup>1</sup>: further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the *materia peccans*? They are never expelled, and to speak of them as 'secreted' is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until sated with over indulgence they at length subside. While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the *purgation* of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence<sup>2</sup> (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotional excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an impure element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in its manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate<sup>3</sup> between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect this relief, viz. those artificially excited by the action of the drama<sup>4</sup>: (3) to

δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν..., 26 § 15, 1462 b 13: δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτάς [sc. τὴν τραγωδίαν καὶ τὴν ἐποποιίαν] ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην.

<sup>1</sup> Siebeck in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1882, p. 225 ff., Baumgart *Poetik* p. 435 f.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Plut. *De inim. util.* 10, 91 f: τῶν παθῶν τοῦτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις "indulging [lit. venting] these feelings upon his enemies." Bernays thought he could distinguish πάθημα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητικὴ ποιότης), from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, *Arist. Studien* v, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the 'painful emotion' of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the *Rhetoric* (II. c. 5, c. 8) make each of these—fear itself and pity itself—'a sort of pain' (λύπη τις), although the emotions generally are defined as οἷς ἐπεταὶ λύπη καὶ ἡδονή *Rhet.* II. 1. 8, 1378 a 21, *Nic. Eth.* II. 5. 2, 1105 b 23.

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müller *Gesch. der Kunstth.* II. p. 63 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter who interpret τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων καθάρσιν in the definition of tragedy as the "expulsion," i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing πάθος = emotion, from πάθημα = disposition, tendency to emotion:—a distinction which in view of Bonitz' careful investigation (*Arist. Studien* v) cannot be maintained. See n. (2). But there is no reason why the phrase should not mean the *purgation* of the emotions, i.e. the freeing them from what is superfluous, the diminution of the whole by the expulsion of what is noxious, and consequent clarifying or refinement of what is left.

<sup>4</sup> The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that in real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: *Rhet.* II. 8. 6, 1385 b 33, οὐ γὰρ

associate the cure of the o'erburdened heart with that universalising element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealisation of experience<sup>1</sup>.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of *κάθαρσις*. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation for it in subsequent writers. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of *De Mysteriis*), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adducing the now familiar argument that "suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicious gratification quiets them" proceeds as follows: "hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others' emotions we still and moderate and purge our own: and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring<sup>2</sup>." If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the *Republic*—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato's—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (*συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν*) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says "it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied<sup>3</sup>." From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched<sup>4</sup>, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascesis with the compromise proffered by Aristotle<sup>5</sup>. But while the dim outlines of the

ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκίῳ πάθει: § 12, 1386 a 22 f., τὸ γὰρ δεῖν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου. Whereas the drama excites both pity and fear: *Poet.* 14 § 2, 1453 b 3, ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίποδος μῦθον, § 5 τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου. Cp. c. 13 § 4, 1453. a 2 ff.

This distinction affords the best possible explanation of τῶν τοιούτων in the definition (Reinkens *op. cit.* p. 161): τούτων would have postulated the complete identity of the two. Compare Ed. Müller *Gesch. d. Kunsttheorie* II. p. 63 ff.

<sup>1</sup> Bernays *Zwei Abh.* p. 72 (181) ff. with whom E. Müller, Brandis, Zeller, Susemihl, and Reinkens substantially agree. See Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 366 ff.

<sup>2</sup> ἔν τε κωμῳδία καὶ τραγῳδία ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκία πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν· ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς θεάμασι τισι καὶ ἀκούσασιν τῶν αἰσχυρῶν [e.g. τῶν φαλλῶν] ἀπολυόμεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμπιπτούσης βλάβης I. 11. p. 403 Parthey. Again in 3. 9, p. 119, 14 ἀπάρασιν

δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν λατρεῖαν οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ [sc. τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπιπνοίαν] κλητέον. οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρῶτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται there can be no doubt that these are Peripatetic technical terms which are rejected.

<sup>3</sup> τί δήποτε τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμικὴν οὐ παραδέχεται καὶ ταῦτα συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἀ μὴτε παντάπασιν ἀποκλίνειν δυνατόν μῆτε ἐμπιπλάναι πάλιν ἀσφαλές, δεδομένα δὲ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ταῖς τοῖς ἀκροάσεσιν ἐκπληρουμένην ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν (p. 360 ed. Bas.)—ἐπεὶ διὰ τούτων δυνατόν ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλήσαντας ἐνεργὰ πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχειν, τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας (p. 362).

<sup>4</sup> διευλαβησόμεθα μὴ...ἀντὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάθη μετρίως ἀφοσιώσεως ἔξιν πονηρὰν καὶ δυσέκνιπτον ἐντήκωσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς (*ibid.*).

<sup>5</sup> δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμνηχανῶσθαι τινὰς τῶν παθῶν τοῖς ἀπεράσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' <οὐχ> ὥστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προσπαθείας συντείνειν· τούναντίον μὲν οὖν ὥστε χαλινοῦν καὶ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστέλλειν, ἐκείνας δὲ ἄρα



theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phrase or two (*ἀπέρσις*, *ἀφοσίωσις*, *ἐμέτρως ἀπομιμνάναι τὰ πάθη*), the rest is coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of *κάθαρσις*.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information: the utterances and indications of Plato's own æsthetic views in his dialogues<sup>1</sup>. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy<sup>2</sup>. His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds that emotional nature which ought rather to be starved<sup>3</sup>. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: "If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's... Few persons ever reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own<sup>4</sup>." Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: but granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means for their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate 'the feeling kept under control in our own calamities' with the pity of real life, and that which is 'satisfied and delighted by the poets' with the pity which (in Aristotle's definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions:

τὰς ποιήσεις... πολλοῦ δὲ εἰς ἀφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους· αἱ γὰρ ἀφοσίωσις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις [the neoplatonic view], σμικρὰν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔχουσιν ὧν εἰσιν ἀφοσιώσεις (*ibid.*). In this and the previous citations from Proclus the corrections of Bernays (*op. c.* pp. 46—50) are given.

<sup>1</sup> See C. Belger *De Aristotele etiam in arte poetica componenda Platonis discipulo* (Berlin 1872), esp. p. 58 ff., Siebeck *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882, p. 226 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Phædr.* 268 C, ῥήσεις ποιεῖν... οἰκτρὰς καὶ τοῖναντίον αὐτοῖς φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς, *Rep.* x. 606 A.

<sup>3</sup> τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητικά τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ] ἀρδουσα, δέον αὐχεῖν, καὶ ἀρχοντα ἡμῶν καθίστησι

δέον ἀρχεσθαι αὐτά, 606 D. Cp. *Leg.* 790 E.

<sup>4</sup> 606 A, B: εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο, ὅτι τὸ βλάπτειν χόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκταῖς συμφοραῖς ἐπιπληκὸς τοῦ δακρύσαι τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὅν τούτων οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὸτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χύρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, αἷμα ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἐν ἡσὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνηῶντος τοῦτον, ἐπὶ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν... λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτεστιν, ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ αἰεὶ θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὰ τὰ ἐν ἐνὸν οὐ βῆδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσι ἐπέχειν. The translation is Dr Jowett's. The last remark is endorsed by Aristotle *Pol.* v (VIII). 5. 19, 1340 a 23.

(1) to convey truth 'in a glass darkly,' as he himself does in his myths, and (2) to conduce to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle's *παιδεία*: habituation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the Aristotelian *κάθαρσις* is something wholly distinct from this. It might be defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and so transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only an indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventive: it might be urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato has specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the principle of 'that indispensable minimum' of gratification which even Plato does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the *Republic*, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little but just enough to send it to sleep<sup>1</sup>.

In an Eudemian book of the *Ethics* an even more advanced position is taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame; where the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 a 16 *χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ*), even artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such 'intense' pleasures being natural remedies for pains<sup>2</sup>. But that Aristotle was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shewn e.g. by his care for the education of the feelings in youth<sup>3</sup>.

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points in the exposition. In the *Philebus* (47 E ff.) there is an interesting and valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful, which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable concomitants of various phases of emotion<sup>4</sup>. We have every reason then to

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.* IX. 571 E f.: τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἐνδεία δοὺς μήτε πλησμονή, ὅπως ἂν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θόρυβον τῷ βελτίστῳ χαίρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' αὐτὸ [sc. τὸ βέλτιστον] καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν... ὥσαυτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πρᾶν καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν κεκινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθειδῇ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τῷ ὀνόματι εἶδῃ, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας... οὕτως ἀναπαύεται. It seems then that while ἀποσιμπλάειν is prohibited as immoral, ἡσυχάσαι is a condition essential to the efficient

working of the rational soul. Of course the two philosophers differ wholly as to the application of this principle.

<sup>2</sup> *N.E.* VII. 14. 5, 1154 b 3: αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτιμίηται... b 13 f. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχούσα, ἐὰν ἡ ἰσχυρά.

<sup>3</sup> See V (VIII). 5. 17, 18, 1340 a 12 ff. (cp. 1341 a 13 f.).

<sup>4</sup> See Bernays *op. c.* p. 143 f. Esp. cp. 1378 b 1 (πάση ὀργῇ ἔπρεσθαι τινα ἡδονὴν) with *Phil.* 48 A and the Homeric citation



conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem not only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master's condemnation of the drama on grounds of morality, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

common to the two: also *Pol.* VIII. 2. 12, 1239, b 25 ff. with *Phil.* 51 A ff. But the detailed analysis in respect of comedy appears inadequate, and of tragedy little

is said beyond the remark that the tragedy is more serious than the comedy. *Phil.* 48 A. Cf. 50 B.

## ADDENDA.





## INTRODUCTION.

**Page 1, line 3.** The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

**P. 2, note 1.** After *θυσίαι* add: and 1271 a 27 (1272 a 3, b 34) *φιλιτρία* Π<sup>1</sup> *φιλιτρία* Π<sup>2</sup>.

**P. 7, l. 17.** As Plutarch *Περὶ Εὐγενείας* is a fabrication of the renascence, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1556 (Lugduni apud Seb. Gryphium), the citations from the *Politics* would not in any case have carried us far back: although, if at the time the forger himself used a manuscript, or even emended the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even entitled to such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1724 J. Christopher Wolf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood, and Wolf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorius. In his preface to Vol. IV of *Anecdota Graeca* (Hamburgi 1724) Wolf says of the manuscript of the *Περὶ Εὐγενείας* which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, "membranae illae uno alterove ante inventam typographiam saeculo, meo iudicio, luculente quidem, sed non sine frequentibus oscitantis librarii indicibus exaratae... Veterum scriptorum loca, a Plutarcho allata, omnia in his penitus erant, asterisco vicem eorum supplente... Eleganter et erudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferroni interpretatio) confecta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ubi exstarent, locis exhibet. Atque hanc ipsam... cum Graecis in lucem profero, additis si pauca exceperis, auctorum testimoniis, quae non sine cura aliqua ex monumentis eorum adhuc exstantibus acquisivi." Compare his footnote p. 196 [it should be 296]: "Aristoteles lib. I. c. VI. Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hoc loco vertendo liberius versatur Interpres" i.e. Ferron "nisi in opusculo Plutarchi eum alia quaedam legisse censeas, quam quidem hodie apud Aristotelem exstant. In MS. hic loc' deest."

**P. 9, l. 29.** Add: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* I. 165 ff. (Berlin 1885).

**P. 9, l. 3 from end.** Add: *De Politicis Aristoteleis Quaestiones criticae* Lipsiae 1886 (reprinted from the Supplement to *Jahrb. f. Philol.* Vol. XV. pp. 329—450, often hereafter cited as *Quaest. crit. collectae*). *Quaestionum Aristotelearum criticarum et exegeticarum* Pars I Gryphiswaldiae 1892: Pars II ib. 1893: Pars III ib. 1894: and *Prolegomena* II pp. XXVIII—XLIII of the 'nova impressio correctior' of the third edition in Teubner's series (Lipsiae 1894). Articles in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLVII. 1893, pp. 817—824: Bursian's *Jahresberichte* I. 592 ff., III. 372 ff., V. 278 ff., IX. 354 ff., XVII. 279 ff., XXX. 66 ff., 97 ff., XXXIV. 40 ff., XLII. 36, 253 ff., L. 12, LXVII. 137 ff., LXXV. 102 ff.



- P. 10, last line.** Add: *Zu Arist. Pol.* *ibid.* CXXIX. 1885. 544.  
**Jowett.** Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.  
**Gomperz.** *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller*; Wien, 1890.  
**Diels.** Article in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* IV. 1891. 484.  
**Häberlin.** Article on *Arist. Pol.* II. 9 in *Rhein. Mus.* XLV. 1890. 311 ff.  
**Maehly.** Article in *Philologus* LI. 1892. 197.  
**Zeller.** In *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* VI. 1893. 153 n. 1.  
**Stoehr, Engel, Wildemann, Schmidinger, Vogel.** *Curae criticae in Ar. Pol.* in *Commentationes philologicae Monacenses*, 97—114: Munich, 1891.  
**Niemeyer.** Article in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLIII. 1891. 412 ff.  
**v. Wilamowitz.** *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 64—71, 187 f. n. (3).  
**P. 11, n. 1.** Add references to Zeller in *Hermes* xv. 1880. 547—556, Dümmler in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. 179 ff., Shute *History of the Aristotelian writings*, Oxford, 1888, esp. c. 8, Newman *Introduction* to edition of the *Politics* I. 478—491, II. pp. xxx—xl, v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff. The discovery of the *Constitution of Athens* has called special attention to the connexion between the *Politics* and the *Polities*.  
**P. 14, n. 3.** Add a reference to Birt *Das antike Buchwesen* p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of one book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δὲ inserted after *περὶ* by P<sup>2</sup> and P<sup>6</sup> (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman *op. c.* II. p. xxi ff. xxvi f.  
**P. 15, n. 2.** At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the athetesis of the last clause of B. I. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [*καὶ πρῶτον...πολιτείας*], II. c. 6 § 13, 1265 b 12—17 [*φείδων...ὅσπερ*], § 22, 1266 a 22—25 [*ὥς...σκέψαι*], V (VIII). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [*ὅταν...μέλει*], although these passages are not, in this edition, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by VII (VI). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [*ἡ δὲ λυγὰς*], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [*τρίων...δημοτικόν*]. As regards II. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [*ἐπεὶ...τινός*], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1266 b 5—8 [*Πλάτων...πρότερον*], Prof. Susemihl is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare II. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [*καὶ...οἰκεῖν*], the discrepancy between this passage and IV (VII). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—23 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle's opinions, if he wrote B. II. after B. IV (VII) —as well as II. 7. 16 f., 1267 a 28—37 [*δεῖ...πολιτείας*] in spite of note (246). On most of these passages see Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* Pars III, p. iii. Possibly even VIII (V). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 483 f.  
**P. 16, n. 3.** Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. Γ. B. H. Θ. Δ. Z. E. Of these H. Θ. (and probably A. Γ.) were written earlier than the *Constitution of Athens*, the other four almost certainly later.  
**P. 16, n. 4.** Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first: II. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (5)=VIII (v) and B. 8 (6)=VII (vi) of St Hilaire and Bk.<sup>2</sup>  
**P. 18, n. 3.** Cicero's acquaintance with the *Politics* has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmekel's *Die mittlere Stoa* (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmekel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannion provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero

*De Republica* with Polybius vi. cc. 3—10 shows that both used a common authority, doubtless a political work by Panaetius. The suggestion was first made in a thesis appended to the dissertation published by P. Voight *Sorani Ephesii lib.* (Greifswald 1882). See Susemihl's edition of Aris. *Oeconomica* p. ix n. 16, *Griechische Litteraturgesch. in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig 1892) Vol. II. p. 75 n. (57), p. 180 n. (184). Direct acquaintance with the *Politics* is thus established for Panaetius whose life (circa 185—110) nearly covers the century between Hermippus and Apellicon of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scala *Die Studien des Polybios* 1. (Stuttgart 1890) p. 102 ff., 222 ff. who endeavours (pp. 128—151) to prove that Polybius had himself read Aristotle's *Politics*. This hypothesis is combated by Susemihl *Litteraturgesch.* II. p. 81 n. (4), p. 106 n. (97 b), p. 127 n. (147).

P. 18, n. 7. The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political doctrine which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The former may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the *Ethics*: see now the academic edition Michael Ephesius ed. Heylbut 504, 8 ff., 520, 31 ff., 521, 5 ff., 610, 7 ff., 16 ff., 611, 10 ff., 615, 20 ff., 616, 6 f., 619, 14 ff., 18 ff., 620, 10 ff., Anon. p. 190, 4 f., p. 214, 36 ff.

The latter must commence with the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Susemihl's editions (Leipzig, 1883, 1884). Similarly with the *Oeconomica*: see again Susemihl's ed. (ib. 1887) p. v n. (1) for Book I and p. x n. (25) on the expansion in Book II of the idea suggested, and partly worked out, in the *Politics* I. II §§ 7—13, 1259 a 3—36. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 27—29: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of *Politics* I. c. 11. See below.

Mr Newman has compiled in Vol. II. p. x—xix, a list of similar parallels from *Rhetorica ad Alex.* 3, 1424 a 12 ff., b 3 ff., *De animal. motu* 7, 701 b 24 ff., [Plato] *Erastae* 135 c, 138 c, Aristoxenus *Fr.* 19, 20, Philodemus *De Musica* (ed. Kemke) besides B. 3, *Fr.* 24, 52, 53, 54, 65, 66 noticed by Kemke and Gomperz, B. 1, *Fr.* 16, 17: B. 3, *Fr.* 45, 55: B. 4, col. 3, 23 ff.; 15, 5 f.; 16, 17 ff. Plutarch *Vita Crassi* c. 2, p. 544 A (esp. the words τὴν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν ἐν ἀψόχοις χρηματικὴν οὖσαν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικὴν γενομένην ὀρῶμεν, though this is nowhere said by Aristotle), *Moralia* 9 c, 527 A, 787 C—D, 812 B, D ff., 825 A—C: Dio Chrysostom, 3, 115, 7. 267, 14. 439, 36. 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Susemihl holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the *Politics*, but hardly with the *Politica*. Even his direct acquaintance with the 'Aθ. Πολ. is denied by some: e.g. v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893) I. pp. 299—303.

P. 20, n. 1. Add references to Blass *De Antiphonte sophista* (Kiel 1889), Dümmler *Prolegomena zu Platons Staat* (Basel 1891), Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. 161 ff., esp. 169—185.

P. 35, n. 3. Gilbert's hypothesis, that Ephorus used the *Politics* of Aristotle, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία, which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 329 and 325 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Ephorus (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the 'Aθ. Πολ. under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates' pupils, Androtrion. See A. Bauer *Forschungen zu Arist. 'Aθ. Πολ.* (Munich 1891) p. 155. v. Wilamowitz is again sceptical *op. c.* I. p. 306.



P. 37, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. II. c. 12 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία. See Diels in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in *Des Arist. Politik u. d. 'Αθ. Πολ.* (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the athetesis should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 ἦν...κλήπων, and 1274 b 23—26 ἐγένετο...ἄν. Against this view see Susemihl *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi f.

P. 66, IX. The date of the *Politics* has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens*, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the *Constitution*, which can confidently be dated circa 329—325, is separated by an interval of years from the *Politics*. Thus Mr Newman notes (in *Class. Rev.* v. 1862) that in the first part of the *Constitution of Athens* "we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the *Politics* is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer " of 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41 § 2 " *Pol.* 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?" Similarly Bruno Keil in *Die Solonische Verfassung* (Berlin 1892) confidently assigns the *Politics* to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the *Constitution*. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to restate the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Susemihl has done *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* II. p. x—xii, III. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the *Ethics* and *Politics* were undoubtedly written later than the *Physica*, *De Caelo*, *Meteorologica*: that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the Encyclopaedia with the exception of the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric* and *Metaphysics*. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the *Ethics* to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the *Politics* we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the *Constitution of Athens*, i.e. say, to 327 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books IV (VII), V (VIII): possibly also to Books I, III. The rest of the treatise, B. II, no less than Books IV—VI of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, *Metaphysics*, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining *Politics* (other than that of Athens), the *Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά*, the *διδασκαλία*, and other similar works.

v. Wilamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on *Politics*. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books HΘ were composed after "the comprehensive historical studies on which ΔΕΖ are based." I.e. he thinks that ΔΕΖ are later, or at least not earlier, than the *Politics*, which according to him they presume: *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman II. p. xxxi: Aristotle "had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean *Ethics*, and

yet he framed no fresh one to take its place:" a most important admission. Comp. also Birt *op. c.* p. 459 f. If the transition from B. I is an editor's addition, and δὲ an insertion of the family II<sup>2</sup> in 1260 b 27, the place of B. II itself becomes doubtful, as Susemihl remarks Prolegomena II to the revised impression of the Teubner text: "nisi tamen admodum fallor, Aristoteles totum opus si ita, ut voluit, perfecisset, etiam libros II. III. VII sic retractasset, ut II<sup>um</sup> locum magis idoneum inter III<sup>um</sup> et novi ordinis IV<sup>um</sup> (veteris VII<sup>um</sup>) invenisset." (This view is further developed in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. iii ff., as explained above.) v. Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. 360 n. defends the genuineness of 1181 b 12—15, παραλιπόντων...τελειωθῆ as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.

P. 71, n. 4. Mr Newman examines the Vetus Versio *op. c.* II. pp. lxi—lxv. With the whole of section x compare below p. 454 ff., Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXXIII. 1887. 801—5, CXLVII. 1893. 817—824, *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. II., and for the other side Newman *op. c.* II. xli ff. and in *Class. Rev.* VII. 304 ff.

P. 74, n. 4, line 5. After αὐτοκράτωρ insert 1287 a 39 πεισθέντας. See *Corrig.* and *Addenda to Critical Notes* ad loc.

P. 90, n. 4. Mr Newman admits that VI (IV) cc. 1—4 "are little better than a chaos." See his appendix, Vol. I. p. 565 ff. and compare Vol. II. p. xxvi, xxxviii, liv, lxvii.

P. 96, n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp. 1—448 had been struck off) before the appearance of Mr Newman's volumes I. and II.

## CRITICAL NOTES.

- P. 139, line 1. 1252 a 14 αὐτὸς Tyrrell (cp. Eur. Troad. 1208).  
 P. 140. 1252 a 22 λέγειν and 23 διαιρεθέντων Maehly, not rightly.  
 P. 141, line 2. 1252 a 33 [ταῦτα] and (for ποιεῖν) διαπονεῖν Gomperz.  
 P. 142. Add: No MS. gives the second article 1330 b 1 τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς: some omit it 1261 b 25.  
 P. 143, line 2. 1252 b 14 ὁ μὲν Χαρώνδας] Χαρώνδας μὲν II<sup>2</sup> Bk. Newman ||  
 Ib. line 5. Add: Shilleto followed Giphanius (p. 22 f.), who however preferred ὁμοκάπνους.  
 P. 144, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. κατὰ φύσιν after ξοικε Γ M\* Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||  
 P. 146, line 3. After 28 insert: ἤδη Γ P<sup>1</sup>.  
 P. 147, line 5. 1253 a 2 Stöhr *Comm. phil. Monac.* p. 97 f. comparing 1253 a 2, a 7, 1278 b 20, *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 11, 1162 a 17, 1169 b 18, *Eth. Eud.* 1242 a 22 would read ἀνθρώπος. See *Dem. Olynth.* I. 3, *In Midiam* § 198 ||  
 Ib. line 6. See *Corrigenda*. 1253 a 3 ἐστὶ after ξῶον added by Γ M\* Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||  
 P. 149, line 1. After Bk. add: avoiding hiatus.  
 P. 153, line 2. 1253 b 15 πρῶτον... 1254 b 39 σώματος noticed by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* Δ f. 55<sup>a</sup>, p. 190, 4 f. Heylb. ||  
 P. 157, line 9. After ἀπὸ add: See Hagfors *De praepositionum in Aris. Politicis etc. usu* (Berlin 1892) p. 5.  
 P. 160, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. After Bk. add: Susem.<sup>3</sup>  
 P. 161, line 1. After Bk. add: (ἐστὶν Bk.<sup>2</sup>).  
 P. 163, line 1. Add: See however *Addenda* to p. 7 above.



P. 176, line 1. *After* Ar. *add*: (but two Oxford MSS. of Aretinus have *geniis*: Newman II. p. 71).

P. 180, line 7. *After* Susem. *add*: Diebitsch would omit  $\omega$  altogether.

P. 183, line 1. 1257 b 12. For *οὐτε* Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.

P. 190, line 2. c. 11, 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mr Newman a later addition.

P. 194, line 3. 1259 a 31 *δράμα* Campbell, but see Dem. *Prooem.* 55, p. 1460,  $\delta$ : *δραμα τοῦτο ἐποιεῖτο ὁ δῆμος*, In *Aristocr.* XXIII. § 19 (*δράτε*), etc.

P. 197, line 2. 1259 b 32. See *Corrigenda*. *After* Γ M<sup>a</sup> *add*: bracketed by Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>

Ib. line 3. 1260 a 4. Cod. Oxoniensis (Coll. Corp. Chr. 112) had in the margin *ἀρχόντων καὶ*, afterwards erased ||

P. 203, line 4. 1260 b 20—24 [ $\omega$ στ'...πολιτείας] bracketed by Birt, as an addition of the publisher. Cp. Susem.<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena* p. xli: Neque tamen ipsi Aristoteli hac ratione succurro, sed compositor, qui perperam ultima libri I<sup>i</sup> verba 1260 b 23 sq. *καὶ πρῶτον κατὰ* adiecit.

P. 232. 1263 a 2. The change in punctuation (*ἔχει πᾶσι, τὰς*, see *Corrigenda*) is due to Mr Newman ||

P. 252. 1265 a 40 *Add to line* 12: *δὴ* for *ἀν* Mr H. Richards *Class. Rev.* VI. p. 339.

P. 261. 1266 a 31 [*φιλοσόφων*] Zeller (*Archiv f. d. Ges. d. Philos.* VI. 153 π.): i.e. he would read *αὶ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αὶ δὲ καὶ πολιτικῶν*.

P. 269, last line. On the genuineness of 1267 b 20—28 see now Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLVII. 1893, p. 192.

P. 270. 1267 b 26 *εὐτελοῦς* *εὐσταλοῦς* O. Apelt.

P. 274. 1268 b 1 *γεωργήσει* *γεωργ* < *ὅς οἱ* > *ἔσει* Mr A. G. Peskett (1891).

P. 289, line 2. *Add*: Comp. *Crit. Notes* on 1329 a 34.

P. 290, line 2. 1270 b 8 M<sup>a</sup> P<sup>1</sup> omit *ἐστίν* ||

P. 294. 1271 a 7 [*τὸ*] *δῶρον*, or *τι δῶρον* C. Häberlin ||

P. 295. 1271 a 20. Comp. *ἀλλὰ μὴν* *εἰ γε* 1276 b 18, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαυεῖται γε* 1277 a 25 (Newman).

P. 305. See *Corrigenda* to 1272 b 9. *δυναστῶν* Π<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||

P. 312. See *Corrigenda* to 1273 b 6. *ἀπορῶν* Γ M<sup>a</sup> Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||

P. 314, line 2. *After* Götting *add*: Bernays (*Ges. Abh.* I. 172), Böckh (*Staatshaush. d. Ath.*<sup>3</sup> I. p. 295, 580 d).

P. 316, line 3. *Dele* probably rightly. *καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς* Diels, rashly (in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. p. 484 n. 1).

P. 317, line 3. 1274 a 18—20 *After* Diels *add*: But comp. Susemihl *Jahresber.* XLII. p. 255 n. 36.

Ib. last line. 1274 a 20. Wilamowitz defends *τρίτου τέλους*, but hardly with success, *op. c. i.* p. 69 n. 41.

P. 320, line 1. 1274 b 9—15 [*Φαλέου...ἀχρηστον*] Newman followed by P. Meyer and v. Wilamowitz. See however *Quaest. Ar. crit. et text.* I. p. xvi f.

P. 354. V<sup>m</sup> is Prof. Susemihl's notation for the Vatican fragments in the Teubner text of the *Politics* (Susem.<sup>3</sup> nova impressio correctior 1894), so that our fr. = V<sup>m</sup>.

P. 356. 1275 a 23 *κρίσεως καὶ* defended by Wilamowitz *op. c. i.* p. 205 n. 32.

P. 362. See *Corrigenda*. 1276 a 10—13 (*τὸτε...συμφέρων*) *εἴπερ* the parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLIII. 1891, p. 412 ff.).

P. 363. 1276 a 14 [*καὶ*] Niemeyer || *τινες κατὰ* and comma after *τρόπον* Niemeyer

- P. 363. 1276 a 15 ταύτης (before τὰς) defended by Niemeyer ||  
 Ib. 1276 a 16 τυραννίδος; (with interrogation) Niemeyer, partly following Koraes ||
- P. 364. 1276 a 26. See *Corrigenda*.
- P. 366. B. III. c. 4 is vaguely referred to by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 214, 36 ff. ed. Heylb.
- P. 369. 1276 b 39—40 [ἐπειδὴ...πολλὰς] Widemann.
- P. 371. 1277 a 30 [καὶ] Spengel ||
- P. 372. 1277 a 32 τοῦνομ' Π<sup>2</sup> fr. Bk.
- P. 374. 1277 b 17—25 noticed by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 231, 38 ff. Heylb.
- P. 379. 1278 a 34 δασῶν Cod. Berol. Hamiltonianus 41 (merely on conjecture; the MS., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of Π<sup>2</sup>. Possibly even in fr. the reading is conjectural).
- P. 380. 1278 b 8. See *Corrigenda*. καὶ εἰ Γ P<sup>1</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> (omitted by M<sup>o</sup>).
- P. 381. 1278 b 10—15 noticed (amongst other passages) by Mich. Ephes. in *Eth. Nic.* IX. f. 157<sup>a</sup> 504, 8 ff. ed. Heylb.
- P. 383. 1279 a 8—16 [διὸ...ἀρχὰς] Stöhr (hardly right).
- P. 397. 1281 a 41 ἔχει (with colon after λύεσθαι) Welldon (hardly adequate).
- P. 401, last line. Add: But see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 539 b 18 ff.
- P. 402. 1282 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers μέγιστον as avoiding hiatus. It is however in *pausa*.
- P. 411, line 1. 1283 b 15 Insert: δόξειαν P<sup>1</sup>.
- P. 412, line 3. Delete Plutarch.
- P. 431, line 10. See *Corrigenda*. That 1287 a 39 πεισθέντας is right (*persuados* William) was seen by Schneider and has recently been demonstrated by Engel in *Comm. phil. Monach.* p. 103.
- P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. [τοὺς...συνάρχους] Widemann (not rightly).
- P. 442, line 5. 1288 a 13. If Heylbut's conjecture be accepted, the punctuation will be changed: ἦθος πολεμικόν, δυνάμενον ||
- P. 473, line 3. 1323 b 8. Vahlen's conjecture requires εἰς τι. See Hagfors *op. c.* p. 43.
- P. 475. See *Corrigenda*. 1323 b 18 καὶ added by Γ M<sup>o</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup> ||
- P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of Γ M<sup>o</sup> is retained because neither the order of P<sup>1</sup> nor that of Π<sup>2</sup> will stand without Congreve's emendation. Besides it is best suited by the context.
- P. 439. 1325 b 34 [καὶ περὶ...πρότερον] would be bracketed even if the preceding chapter were allowed to be by Aristotle.
- P. 490. 1326 a 9—b 24 noticed by Mich. Ephes. in *Eth. Nic.* IX. f. 161<sup>b</sup>, p. 520, 31 ff. (cp. 521, 5 ff.) Heylb.
- P. 493. 1326 a 40 οὐκ...41 σταδίων noticed by Mich. Ephes. *ubi supra* p. 520, 35.
- P. 495. 1326 b 39 f. The punctuation (δεῖ...ἐμπείροις) is due to Mr Wyse.
- P. 497. 1327 a 23 [πρὸς] Argyriades, rightly, in Διορθώσεις εἰς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους Πολιτικά. Α' (Athens 1893).
- P. 503, line 5. 1328 a 16. See *Corrigenda*. πέρα...πέρα Nauck, perhaps rightly || οἷδε Gomperz, of δε with all other authorities Bk. Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>
- P. 521. 1330 b 30. See *Corrigenda*. μὴ ποιεῖν after πόλιν Γ M<sup>o</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>
- P. 529. 1332 a 13. See *Corrigenda*. καὶ inserted before ἀναγκαῖαι Γ M<sup>o</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>
- P. 535. 1332 b 31. See *Corrigenda*. πάντων after 32 τούτων Γ M<sup>o</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>
- P. 537. 1333 a 26. See *Corrigenda*. διηγήσθαι after μέρος Γ M<sup>o</sup> Susem.<sup>1,2</sup>



- P. 541. 1334 a 8. See *Corrigenda*. ἀνίσω Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>  
 P. 546. 1334 b 24. See *Corrigenda*. ἐγγίεσθαι after 25 πέφυκεν Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> St  
 P. 549. 1335 a 27. See *Corrigenda*. ὠρισμένος after χρόνος Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1</sup>  
 P. 559. 1336 b 34. See *Corrigenda*. αὐτῶν after δσα Γ Μ<sup>s</sup> Susem.<sup>1-2</sup>

## COMMENTARY.

P. 139. 1252 a 8. Add after *note* (2): The identity of βασιλική with πολι asserted Pl. *Euthyd.* 291 c and *Politicus* 259 D. The question, What is the of this science, which in *Euthyd.* is left open, is answered in *Politicus*. That στρ is subordinated to it, is asserted *Polit.* 305 A as in *Euthyd.* 290 C, D (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν ἐφηγημένην μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined ( this participle against Bonitz here and c. 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense method which has led the way.' Mr Wyse has independently proposed this sense.

Ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate separately, cp. *De part. anim.* 1. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ἥ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἶδει ἐκράτιστον, εἰ τις δύναιτο περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἶδει θεωρεῖν ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ περὶ δυνίως (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well served "not only for killing the victim (σφαγίς Eur. *El.* 811) but also for flaying and cutting it up (*κοτὴ* *ibid.* 837)."

P. 143. 1252 b 8. Add after *note* (12): Eur. *Hel.* 246 τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πλὴν ἐνός.

P. 143 f. 1252 b 15. Add after *note* (17): Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, d ὁμοκάπους, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion th term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to on the Cretan constitution, Diog. Laert. 1. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery late \* Aristotle's time: see Hiller in *Rhein. Mus.* xxxiii. p. 527 f.

P. 144. 1252 b 16. See again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 332. As in b 10, α πρώτη must be predicative, = as the first, primarily: συνεστηκυῖα being unde from b 13. "From these two relationships the family is first formed.... From number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the of every day is the village." Both passages should be omitted from the exa given by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 652 b 53 ff.

P. 145. 1252 b 18. The literature bearing upon ὁμογάλακτες and ὀργεῖ continually increasing: see the authorities cited in Busolt *Gr. Gesch.* 1<sup>1</sup>. p. 390 1 pp. 394—398 with *notes*, K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. gr. Alt.* Vol. 1. *Staat thümer* ed. V. Thumser § 58 [98] pp. 313—324, Töpffer *Attische Genealogie* p. For the later organization consult *C.I.A.* II. 596, 597, 605, 'Εφ. ἀρχ. 1883. 83.

Mr W. R. Paton, *Class. Rev.* v. p. 222, thinks that ὁμογάλακτες = those wh was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked "What of the *present* tense (οὗτ καλοῦσ ὁμογάλακτας)? For from Philochorus *Fr.* 94 (Suid. s.v. ὀργεῶνες)... τοὺς ὁμ. οὗτ νήτας καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it curr Aristotle's time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the p cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διαψήφισις ἐπὶ Ἀρχίου ἀρχοντος 346/

Philochorus cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which as we know from Lysias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Aristotle refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to lawyers? I do not think the word occurs in the Orators, having been expelled by *γεννήται*. It manifestly assists Aristotle's argument if the word is a relic from old times, not in use among the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks *ἴδιον τῶν Ἀττικῶν*).... As to the remark," p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, "that no place in the development is found for 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,' was not this just the aspect under which the *γένος* presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The *γένος* implied *κοινωνία ἱερῶν*."

P. 145, right col. To the note on *διδ* add: Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the primitive family, supposed independent anterior to the rise of any government, is accustomed to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are adduced as evidence of this earlier state of society (*σποράδες*) without any king, patriarchal or other, not of course 'to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times,' but rather to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (*ἐκ βασιλευμένων*).

P. 146. 1252 b 28. The place of *τέλειος* illustrates Dr Jackson's remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantive (hyperbaton).

P. 148. 1253 a 7. Add to note (25): comp. Becq de Fouquières *Jeux des Anciens* p. 372 ff.

P. 150. 1253 a 22. Add to note (28) a reference to the note on p. 212, and to *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 334—336, 449 f.

Ib. 1253 a 26. Add to note on *χωρισθῆς*: Possibly Aristotle has in mind Soph. *Phil.* 1018 *ἀφίλον ἔρημον ἀπολιν ἐν ζῶσιν νεκρὸν* (Newman).

P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 336 f. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, *φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετήν*. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety: prudence and perseverance (on Susenmihl's conjecture), prudence and skill (on Freudenthal's)<sup>1</sup>.

Against those who, with Jowett, by *φρονήσει* understand *δευνότης* (*N. E.* 1144 a 23 ff.) and by *ἀρετῇ φυσικῇ ἀρετῇ* or *ἔξις* (*N. E.* 1144 b 1 ff.), it is urged l. l. that (1) such a use of *ἀρετῇ* is unexampled and (2) that the natural germ of virtue is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals: *N. E.* 1144 b 8, *Hist. an.* i. 1 § 32 ff. 488 b 12 ff., VIII. 1, IX. 1.

Spengel, who understands by *ἀρετῇ* intellectual virtue, is met not only by the invariable usage of the phrase *φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή*, but also by the fact that *φρόνησις* is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with conduct. There is also the improbability that the term *ἀρετῇ* would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

<sup>1</sup> Quamvis recte monuerit Montecatinus, si Aristoteles prudentiam homini et virtutem tamquam arma data esse dicere voluisset, scribendum ei potius fuisse *φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετήν*, quid impedit, ne prudentia et id quod sub corrupto vocabulo

*ἀρετῇ* latet non ipsa arma sed res sint, quibus arma offerantur, armis autem praesidia illa varii generis atque adiumenta significentur unicuique necessaria, quotienscunque opus vel iustum vel iniustum tute perpetrare velit? *Qu. cr. coll.* p. 337.



Aristotle himself says *Rhet.* 1. 1. 12, 1355 b 4: τοῦτό γε (i.e. abuse) κοινόν ἐστι καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς.

Bernays again *Zwei Abh. iib. d. aristot. Theorie* (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who adopts Montecatino's explanation (arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem), quotes Seneca *De ira* 1. 17: Aristoteles ait adfectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent industria arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: not surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Bernays interprets the words, they are 'arms for insight and virtue.' Not to mention the objection, stated on p. 151, that ἀδίκητα ἔχουσα δπλα shows the arms must be used by φρόνησις and ἔπει not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests 'language' as one of these weapons, and admits that 'certain emotions, anger especially' are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]

P. 151. 1253 a 37. Add after *note* (28 c): Perhaps Aristotle had a saying of Pindar in mind: cp. Plut. *Praec. reip. ger.* c. 13, p. 807 C: ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ἀρετῆς τέχνης τις ὡς κατὰ Πίνδαρον, καὶ δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δικῆς (Newman).

P. 152. 1253 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἐστὶ but of ἐκείνων the antecedent to δσα. But in Greek idiom the genitive case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence 'The parts of Economics are of the constituents of the Household' the meaning of the words supplied *are of* is 'correspond to,' or 'relate to,' and not 'treat of.' Mr Newman compares 1258 b 17 (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz *Index Ar.* 533 b 6—13, with Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* 1. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

*Ib.* 1253 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμικός is 'nuptial' and not 'conjugal': cp. *n.* on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

P. 153. 1253 b 20. Lest the expression 'speech delivered' in *note* (31) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεσσηνιακός was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the 'Archidamus' of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a 11 ff.): cp. Blas *Attische Beredsamkeit* 11.2 pp. 350, 289.

*Ib.* 1253 b 21. Zeller *Pre-Socratics* Eng. tr. II. p. 477 n. (3) observes that νόμος γὰρ δὲ μὲν δοῦλος δὲ δ' ἐλεύθερος forms a trimeter, so that under τοῖς δέ, b 20.1 poet may be included.

P. 153 f. 1253 b 23 ἐπεὶ οὖν...33 ὑπηρέτης. The commentary may again be supplemented from *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the string of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἐπεὶ. As οὕτω introduces the apodosis to ἐπεὶ in 1. 10. 3, 1258 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* 1. p. 29 f. (Gotting. 1866), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. Spengel *Ar. Stud.* III. p. 5 (57) f. and Thurot *Études* p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 31 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation ὁργάνων· ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἐστὶ). Eucken's punctuation is as follows: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτηνικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα, εἰ μὲλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ<sup>1</sup>, τῶν δ' ὁργάνων τὰ

<sup>1</sup> sc. ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα presumably.

μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ' ἐμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶτος ἐμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἰδὲ ταῖς τέχναῖς ἐστίν<sup>1</sup>): οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζῶν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων<sup>2</sup> ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης.

The criticism of these conflicting views suggests the result adopted in the text.

P. 155. 1253 b 35. τοῦ=the Homeric Hephaestus (Bywater). "Aristotle's rule is to prefix the article to the names of personages in a poem or dialogue." Cp. *note* on 1261 a 6.

P. 156. 1254 a 12. To the ref. from *Eth. Eud.* add *Magna Moralia* I. c. 34, 1194 b 18 τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί ἐστὶν ὁ οὐκ ἐπὶ.

P. 159 f. 1254 b 8. Add to *note* (40): What is called *δρεξις* in 1254 b 5, and τὸ δρεκτικὸν *De Anima* III. 7. 2, 431 a 13, is plainly that which is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον: comp. III. 15. 5, 1286 a 18. Here as in IV(VII). 15. 9, 1334 b 18 ff., τοῦς and τὸ μόριον τὸ λόγον ἔχον are opposed to *δρεξις* and the irrational part (τὸ δλογον 1334 b 18 and 1260 a 7; here τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον). But in *N. E.* I. 13. 15, 1102 b 13 f., the latter is called φύσις δλογος μετέχουσα πρὸς λόγον.

P. 161. 1254 b 23. Cp. again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 343, where it is suggested that if λόγῳ be kept, the genitive λόγου may be understood from it as the object of αἰσθανόμενα, while both datives are governed by ὑπηρετεῖ. Comp. however for the ellipse of the copula IV(VII). 14. 9, 1333 a 17 f. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν διωκόμενον.

P. 162. 1254 b 32. συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις κτλ. "But often the contrary also occurs so that [where this contrary occurs] the one have [only] the bodies, the others [only] the souls of free men" [and hereby the former are after all natural slaves, and the latter natural free men]. This is the translation of Prof. Susemihl's second edition and the words inserted should have sufficiently indicated his position, which is that τοὺς μὲν = actual slaves who have the noble erect frames which Nature intended freemen to have, and τοὺς δὲ = actual freemen who have not such bodily excellence but *only* the souls of freemen.

P. 163. Add after Excursus II: and the addenda to p. 209 below.

Id. 1255 a 8. With τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις = jurisconsults Dittenberger compares οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις = dialecticians *Meta.* IX. 8. 20, 1050 b 35, οἱ περὶ φύσεως = physical philosophers 1006 a 2, 1050 b 24, 1053 b 14, 1062 b 26. Nor does καὶ before a 11 σοφῶν make any real difficulty in taking τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις = qui de legibus philosophantur; for not all who engage in philosophical discussions are really philosophers. (From *Quaest. cr. coll.* p. 344.)

P. 165. 1255 a 15. With ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός comp. III. 12. 2, 1282 b 24, κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ explained by κατὰ χρῶμα, κατὰ μέγεθος.

P. 166. 1255 a 20, 21 ὡς οὐ δεῖ. Comp. Plato *Sympos.* 216 b ἀντιλέγειν μὲν οὐ δυναμένῳ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ οὗτος κελεύει, [Dem.] XXXIII. § 27, p. 901, 9: καὶ οὐκ ἰσχυρίζομαι τῷ νόμῳ ὡς οὐ δεῖ με δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ ἡγγυησάμην.

P. 170. 1255 b 25. Note that ἐγκύκλιος is an epithet of ἀρχαί in c. 26 § 2, and of διοικήσεις in c. 43 § 1 of the *Ἀθ. πολ.* (routine offices, routine of administration).

P. 172 f. 1256 a 13—19. See additional remarks on this passage, *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 349 ff.

<sup>1</sup> οὕτω...ὑπηρέτης is the apodosis of οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζῶν ἐστι of Eucken [and Newman].

<sup>2</sup> ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος...ὑπηρέτης is the

apodosis of Spengel, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος...ὑπηρέτης of Thurot.



P. 174. 1256 a 36. To note (71) add, that Aristotle is speaking of Euxine piracy (Bywater). See *Journal of Philol.* II. p. 60 ff., *Frag.* 60 in Rose's last edition (partly given 1480 b 31 ff.).

P. 175. 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato *Menex.* 237 E, τῶν γὰρ τέκον τροφήν ἔχει ἐπιτηδεύειν ᾧ ἂν τέκῃ· ᾧ καὶ γυνὴ δόλῃ τεκοῦσά τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὑποβαλλομένη, ἔαν μὴ ἔχῃ πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γενημένῳ.

P. 176. 1256 b 19. τῆς τροφῆς] Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theophrastus apud Porphyrium *De Abstinence* II. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to controvert it.

Ib. 1256 b 23. Add a reference to the fuller discussion *Quaest. crit.* α' p. 346 ff.

P. 179. 1257 a 3 ἐκείνης] "This last," comp. VIII(V). 6. 10, 1306 a 10: ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεία· ἐκείνοι γὰρ ὅλγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοι εἰσι (Busse).

P. 180. 1257 a 18 ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀλλαγὰς. There is another way of taking this sentence: ἀναγκαῖον = ἀναγκαῖον ἂν, "For *like-wise* exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the ex-changers' own wants": and so Bernays and Jowett translate. Thus retail trade is proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historical explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

P. 182. 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vicious circle in the reasoning of § 10 see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 353 f. As it stands, 1257 b 3: διδ= διὰ τὸ καπηλικὸν γενέσθαι; "owing to the growth of Retail Trade Chrematistic is (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money *because Chrematistic and Retail Trade are concerned therewith*." At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in διδ.

P. 185. 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. IV(VII). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see note. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch *De cupid. divit.* 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch *Life of Pelopid.* 3, 279 B: τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν οἱ μὲν οὐ χρῶνται τῷ πλούτῳ διὰ μικρολογίας, οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται δι' ἀσωτίας κτλ. See *Frag.* 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

P. 186. 1258 a 10. Comp. *Magna Moralia* I. c. 25, 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 1 ed. Susem.).

Ib. 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their 'art' a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find pay. Hence the author of *Oeconomica* B. II. cc. 23, 25, 26 records the devices of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Chares is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud *Athen.* 532 B, *F. H. G.* I. 297.

P. 187. 1258 a 21 f. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ] So c. 2 § 15, 1253 a 31 f., II. 2 § 22, 1269 a 9, c. 9 § 25, 1270 b 40 ff. Similarly καθάπερ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ VIII(V). 4 § 4, 1309 b 12 ff.

P. 188. 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes ἐκ τούτων = starting with this food.

P. 190. As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. II. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

Ib. 1258 b 10. Add to n. (99) that others, as Jowett and Newman, take the

meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occupations, but to embark upon them is servile. In any case compare V(VIII). 2. 5, 1337 b 15—17.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrrell holds that in every case where ἐλεύθερος is of two terminations, the adjective = *liberalis*.

Ib. 1258 b 12. In the island of Carpathus mules are called κτήματα (quoted by Newman from J. T. Bent *Journal of Hell. Studies* VI. p. 241).

Ib. 1258 b 12—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato *Laws* 842 C, D may have suggested this passage.

P. 191. 1258 b 21. On the subdivisions of μεταβλητική see Büchschütz *Besitz u. Erwerb* p. 455 ff., who supports Cope's view respecting φορηγία. Prof. Susemihl is not convinced.

Ib. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same ellipse as in 1253 b 3: τριτόν εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς <ἐστὶν ἐκείνων> ὅσα κτλ.

P. 193. 1259 a 5 δεῖ συλλέγειν. This has been done by the author of *Oeconomica* B. II: see Susemihl's ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. 1X ff. n. (25), and for the age of the writer (*circa* 260—200 B.C.) p. XII.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction ἐπιδείξαι ὅτι is found 213 a 25, *Ind. Ar.* s.v.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Susemihl, defending the reading ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a conjectural emendation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of Vet. Transl. has *quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum* (and so rc. bl), this is what William of Moerbeke must have written. Whether he took the reading ἀρχόντων καὶ from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know for certain: but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latter case older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in Vet. Transl. to mere conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventy odd right readings of K<sup>b</sup> in the *Nicomachean Ethics* might with just as good reason be entitled 'conjectures.' If the oldest authorities are thus impugned how are we to come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscript? And do the good readings of the Vet. Transl. look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammarians in those times we should have found more of their interpolations (say rather emendations) in the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which best suits the sense, in favour of exegetical subtleties. Moreover, of what avail are these latter? If we do translate ὥσπερ by "corresponding," we obtain no real correspondence: for the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the differences between the virtue of the rulers and the virtue of the ruled: it is at the most the differences between the *virtues* of the different persons ruled that correspond, in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conjecture καὶ <τῆς> τῶν. Why not then follow the more suitable reading of the Vet. Transl.? Had he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρχομένων.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With ὁ ἡγούμενος leader, chief, qui principem locum obtinet, comp. Dem. c. *Aristocr.* XXIII. § 113 δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν... τοῦ μὲν ἡγουμένου καὶ μεγίστου πάντων, Plato *Laws* IX, 875 B, τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγούμενον τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον



ἐπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ, Xen. Cyr. IV. 1. 8 τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς στρατιᾶς φύλον = the corps of the whole army.

P. 202. 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of τὸν: the cor part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently run τελέαν ἔχα ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικὴν, "it is fi master *γὰρ* master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐς that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess (1) if so, ἀλλ' οὐχ <ῆ> would be required. (2) It should be remember c. 7 § 2, 1252 b 22 ff., teaching slaves their duties (διδασκαλική) is called ἐπιστήμη as opposed to issuing the requisite commands which is δεσποτικὴ s.c. i λικὴ (ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν). It is no part of a master's business to teach their duties, but merely to educate them to the moral virtue indispensable duties are to be rightly performed.

Ib. 1260 b 5. Against the view adopted by Mr Newman, following Boni λόγον here = reason, it would be superfluous to urge that (1) Plato does not withhold reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper an to ἐπιτάττει 'rational conversation' does.

P. 205. To Excursus 1 on Epimenides add: Niese's conclusions can no be accepted. Compare now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 1 s. f. 'Ἐπιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρής ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν πόλιν, which is also decisive evidence for the *earlier* of the two dates assign him (*circa* 600 B.C., not *circa* 500 B.C.). See H. Diels *Sitzungsber. der Berl. Ak.* 1891 p. 387, Busolt *Gr. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 136 n. 1.

P. 209. Addenda to Exc. II. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. II. p (1) He distinguishes the objectors to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 πολλοὶ τοῖς νόμοις) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 20, who hold all slavery to be contrary and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which captives war become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) ἐπ' ἀγροὶ λόγοι as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (E) then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the principle that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslave superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman takes with δίκαιον. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes as follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid in the contending views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the master the right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support the law arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and the which is so authorized is *ipso facto* just."

Prof. R. Y. Tyrrell has published remarks of his own and of the late Dr Mill on the Slavery passage in a review of Mr Newman's edition published in *Hermes* Vol. VI., No. 14 pp. 342—345.

P. 212. The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1253 a 20 ff.,

independently several years ago, does not greatly differ from Mr Newman's explanation, except that he makes *τοιαύτη* = probably *λιθίνη*, not *ὁμωνύμως λεχθεῖσα*. He translates: 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its *οὐσία*) 'will be no better than a stone hand.'

P. 213. 1260 b 30. After 'Nic. Eth. I. 13. 3' add '1102 a 10 ff., Plato *Rep.* 544 C, *Protag.* 342 A.'

P. 215. 1261 a 12 οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον. To be rendered with Mr Newman 'evidently does not result' (not, as in the note *ὅν* a 11, does not appear to result). Comp. 1266 a 5, 1270 a 33 n.

Ib. 1261 a 13. The adverbial *πρὸς* is found in Aristophanes e.g. *Frogs* 415 *κἀγωγε πρὸς*, 611 *κλέπτοντα πρὸς τάλλοτρία*, 697 *πρὸς δέ, τοῦτοις εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς...παρεῖναι*, *Ach.* 1229, *Knights* 578, *Pax* 19, *Lysistr.* 665 *ἀλλ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν διαλυθῆναι προσέτι κινδυνεύομεν*. Also in Demosthenes *Adv. Lept.* xx. § 112 s. f. p. 491, 7 *πρὸς δέ καὶ οὐδὲ δίκαιον*, *Adv. Leocratem* § 13, p. 1084, 12 *πρὸς δέ καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν*.

P. 216. 1261 a 17. Mr Newman prefers to render *μία μᾶλλον* by 'more and more of a unity.'

P. 219. 1261 a 35. ὥσπερ ἄν] According to Mr Newman the ellipse is thus to be supplied: "as (all would be shoemakers, i.e. in turn) if shoemakers and carpenters interchanged occupations."

P. 220. 1261 b 2. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.

Ib. 1261 b 7. On *πέφυκε* Vahlen observes that the meaning is given by the Platonic equivalent, *φύσιν ἔχει*. Thus *Rep.* 473 A *ἡ φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἥττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι*; 489 B *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*. Comp. Demosth. xiv. 30 *τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν*, and for Ar. *Politics* vi(IV). 12. 3, 1296 b 26 *ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν*.

P. 222. 1261 b 18. Mr Newman translates *κατὰ τὸν λόγον* in connexion with (or 'in') the expression i.e. *τὸ λέγειν πάντας ἅμα τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ*. Perhaps however it is more nearly parallel to § 4, b 32, *τὸ λεγόμενον* = the scheme in question. For plainly *τὸ λεγόμενον*, *de quo sermo est*, i.e. *τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν*, is not 'the expression' itself but 'the general adoption of the same expression': and so too with *κατὰ τὸν λόγον*.

Ib. 1261 b 24. Complete the reference to Plato *Rep.* 462 E by adding the words *ἐνὸς δὴ, οἶμαι, πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστα τε φήσκει εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἡ ξυνησθήσεται ἢ ξυλλυπήσεται*.

Ib. 1261 b 26. Besides 1281 b 2 and 1192 a 11 f. (quoted in the note) the ambiguity of *πάντες* is prominent also in IV(VII). 13. 10, 1332 a 36 ff.

P. 224. 1262 a 1 ff. Add a reference to the fuller discussion in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 361 ff.

P. 225. 1262 a 7. After (Thurot) add: Or this may be another instance of *μὲν* without *δὲ* following; see 1270 a 34 and Susemihl's Critical Edition (Susem.) Index grammaticus s.v.

P. 226. 1262 a 19. *Ἰῆς περίοδοι* had been written by Hecataeus and others before Herodotus: the allusion may be to one of them (Bywater).

Ib. 1262 a 21 f. *καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων*. Probably *γυναῖκες* = 'females' both here and in the passage from *Hist. Anim.* 586 a 12, quoted in n. (143): *εἰσι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκες ἐοικότα αὐταῖς γεννώσασαι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ Ἰππος ἡ Δικαία καλουμένη*. Mr Newman prefers to take *καὶ...καὶ* = both...and. He also prefers to derive the name of this famous mare from her special quality, comparing Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 3. 38.



P. 227. 1262 a 32. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one λύσεις should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1262 b 23. The connexion between the two meanings given by Plato *Euthyd.* 304 B τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον.

P. 232. 1263 a 1. For the clause τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν see *Quaest. crit.* Mr Newman is quite right in taking πᾶσι with ἔχει in the next line.

P. 235. 1263 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 ἐπιδώσουσιν is not, Mr Newman think, αἱ ἐπιμέλειαί, but as all other commentators and text seen οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὧν αἱ ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι διηρημέναι: for the increased trouble which private ownership brings with it (1261 b 33 ff.) have this advantage that they are merely means to the owner's increased advantage. ἐκαστῷ προσεδρεύοντες suits this construction alone, the other προσεδρεύοντος (adopted in the reprint of Sussem.<sup>3</sup> 1894, see *Corrigenda*) with either: but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αἱ ἐπιμέλειαί subject to ἐπιδώσουσι.

Ib. 1263 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the exx. in the *J.* 431 a 10.

Ib. 1263 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which has escaped some critics, is that κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων = καὶ τοῖς ἐφοδίοις, ἂν τῷ sc. χρώνται κοινούς. 'In case they need provisions on a journey' imply have none of their own 'they share them in common.' Whose? we Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1264 a 2. Comp. Dem. 36 § 64, p. 960, 24 ἔτεσι καὶ χρ. For Bernays' ingenious correction ἔθνεσι, which has Mr Bywater's approval. *Ges. Abhandlungen* I. p. 177.

P. 240. 1264 a 10. καὶ νῦν. "In his verbis νῦν male de tempore in factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nonne semper Helotae id fecerunt novum non vetus institutum civitatis Laconicae hoc μὴ γεωργεῖν τοὺς Aristotelem affirmare crederet; Schneider contra ea Giphanium seculi philosopho etiam sui temporis Lacedaemoniis retinendi illius instituti sed studium tantum (ἐπιχειροῦσι), iam enim eos coepisse a vetere more dicit si hoc Aristoteles voluisset, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ νῦν verum ἔτι καὶ cum ita sint, alia explicanda ratio probanda neque nimis longe ea quae Nῦν enim saepissime id significat quod revera extat"; even as it is, even actually. "Fictae igitur Platonis civitati haec opponuntur. Sed quid sibi ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, pro quo expectas ποιοῦσιν? Ni fallor, ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν eis dumtaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dici potest, quid faciunt, si ea ipsa actione dubiae rei experimentum instituunt et quae haec res procedat et sibi et vel nolentes simul aliorum in usum experientiae the experiment." "Quae loquendi ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis rei, de qua loquitur, institutionem, qualis apud Lacedaemonios invenitur optimam esse ipse postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1296 a 34—b 10." *Quaest. crit.* p. 367. Comp. the limiting expression Isaeus VIII. § 1: ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγχειροῦσι 'which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case'.

P. 241. 1264 a 15. With ἤ καὶ 'or again' cp. *De Gen. Anim.* I. 1. 724 b 5 (Newman).

P. 242. 1264 a 27. After πολλὰς is predicate add: as ἀρχοντας in b 7, αἱ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας.

P. 243. 1264 a 33. ἀποφορὰν. Add the reff.: Plutarch *Lyc.* 8, *Inst.*

P. 246. 1264 b 33. ἐκ τούτων. Mr Newman aptly compares *De Part. Anim.* II. 1 § 4, 646 a 20 δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις, and Plato *Philebus* 27 b πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν.

P. 249. 1265 a 13. πλῆθος] Mr Newman has here an admirable observation. "In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ὑποθέσεις of the State—the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1325 b 38." On the relation between criticism in B. II. and construction in B. IV(VII). see *Introd.* p. 32 n. (2), p. 33 n. (8).

P. 250. 1265 a 18. To n. (203) add the reference: *Law* 625 c (Newman).

P. 251. 1265 a 28 ff. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 368 f.

P. 252. 1265 a 40. On ἄν with future participle see Goodwin *Moods and Tenses*<sup>2</sup> §§ 197, 208, 216. He concludes: "The possibility of such a construction is open to a certain doubt and suspicion." See also Mr H. Richards in *Class. Rev.* VI. p. 339.

P. 253. 1265 b 7. Add to note (209): Aristotle's suggestion in b 7—10 much resembles that of Plato *Rep.* 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχοῦσι ποιήσομεν, ἢ ὡς μάλιστα διασφύξωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόστους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες (Newman).

P. 255. 1265 b 29. After "adapted" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of κοινοτάτην = most suited to, within the reach of, cp. 1265 a 3.

P. 258. 1266 a 5. οὐδ' ἔχονσα φαίνεται = obviously presents no monarchical element either. Cp. *Addenda* to 1261 a 12.

Ib. 1266 a 7. After VIII(V). 7. 7 add: 1307 a 21 (cp. II. II. 5, 1273 a 5 ἐκκλίνειν). In 'Aθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2 occurs the compound παρ-εγκλίνουσα.

Ib. 1266 a 8. To the references at the end of n. (223) add: *Law* 945 B. As is now clear from the *Constitution of Athens*, c. 8 § 1, Plato in the *Law* is merely reviving an old feature of Solon's constitution. Dr Sandys *ad loc.* has collected confirmatory evidence from Isocr. *Areop.* 22, *Panath.* 45, [Dem.] c. *Neaeram* LIX. § 75.

Ib. 1266 a 11. After 2 § 6 add: 1261 b 2 (cp. 1329 a 9—11).

P. 259. 1266 a 14—20. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 370 ff.

P. 263. 1266 b 17. Add a reference to Busolt *Gr. Alterthümer*<sup>2</sup> p. 137 n. 3.

P. 265. 1267 a 3 ff. "Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch *De cupid. divit.* 3, 524 A" (Newman).

P. 268. 1267 b 2. Add to n. (245): As to the form, although διωβολία occurs in the papyrus of 'Aθ. πολ. c. 28, yet Meisterhans<sup>2</sup> p. 18 shows that the proper form is διωβελία. On Attic inscriptions δβελός itself occurs only once with ε (in an inscription of date before 444 B.C.): but the derived forms preserve the older ε, unless the ending (as -βολον) includes an ο. Hence δβελίσκος, δβελεία, διωβελία: on the other hand τριώβολον, πεντώβολον, δεκώβολον.

As to the introduction of the θεωρικόν, cp. now the passage referred to above, 'Aθ. πολ. c. 28 § 3, where it is ascribed to Cleophon (ὁ λυροποιός, ὃς καὶ τὴν διωβελίαν ἐπόρισε πρῶτος), not (as Plut. *V. Pericl.* 9 might lead us to conjecture) to Pericles. The increase in the grants must be due to the increased number of shows, for Dem. *De Corona* § 28, ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν, shows the price to have been only two obols in 330 B.C. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (*C. I. A.* I. 188 where the Treasurer of Athene pays διωβελία from the funds in hand, ἐπέτεια), just about



the time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. *Xen. Hell.* 1. 7. 10 of Archedemos, 406 B.C., ὁ τοῦ δήμου τότε προεστηκὼς καὶ τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελούμενος.

P. 270. 1267 b 28. λόγιος=πολυλόγος] ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ λέγειν καὶ ὑψηλοῦ οὐ τιθέασιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔθνει ἐπιχώρια ἐξηγουμένοι ἐμπείρως: Phrynichus p. 198 Lobeck, p. 284 Rutherford.

P. 272. 1268 a 9. Add to the note on σὺν: Comp. Pl. *Symp.* 222 C, ὡς οὐ πάντα τούτου ἕνεκα εἰρηκώς.

Ib. 1268 a 10. Add to n. (259): The regulation in force at Athens, which Diog. Laer. 1. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the *Constitution of Athens* c. 24 § 3 καὶ ὄρφανοι...ἀπασιν γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἦν. Mr Wyse refers to *C. I. A. I.* 1, *C. I. A. IV.* p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

Ib. 1268 a 12. "δήμου δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως is added because the word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25" (Newman).

P. 274. 1268 b 5. Here ἀπλῶς ought to have been rendered "couched in absolute terms," and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀπλῶς δικαίως="duly framed in an unqualified form."

P. 275. 1268 b 19 f. Mr Newman observes: "It is possible that Hippodamos had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature... There is much force in Aristotle's plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer."

P. 276. 1268 b 24 f. Add the case of Theramenes as given in *Lysias* XII. 68, 70.

P. 277. 1268 b 41. Add to note (271) the reference: Plato *Latius* 841 D (Newman).

P. 278. 1269 a 2. παρασχέσθαι is technical of witnesses: see *Antiphon* 5 §§ 20, 22, 24, 28, 30.

P. 279. 1269 a 21. Comp. Plato *Latius* 798 A, B οἷς γὰρ ἂν ἐντραφῶσι νόμοις σέβεται καὶ φοβέται πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ τό τι κινεῖν τῶν τότε καθεστῶτων. Prof. Sidgwick has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the place which the Laws (νόμος, νόμοι) hold for him.

P. 282. 1269 b 20. This use of κατὰ is not uncommon: e.g. *Dem.* xxiv. § 109 κατὰ πάντ' ἀδικεῖ.

Ib. 1269 b 21. With τοιοῦτος comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι.

P. 284. 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καὶ> ἐν ἐτέραις. See 1094 b 13, 14 οὐχ ὁμοίως...ὥσπερ οὐδ'. But Mr Newman's reference to b 34 πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not πρὸς τὰ ἐγκύκλια, but πρὸς πόλεμον. It is true that the 110 baking-women were of service at Plataea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained in III. 74, where he says of the Corcyraeans: τολμηρῶς ξυμπελάβοντο...παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυβον.

P. 285. 1270 a 8. Note that § 12 is strikingly like the language of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 s. f. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν.

P. 287. 1270 a 34. Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 86.

P. 291. 1270 b 11. Add to note (317): Mr Newman suggests, with great

plausibility, that the events of 333 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. See A. Schäfer *Demosthenes* 3. 1. 163 who refers to Arrian 2. 13. 409: Curt. 4. 1. 37." If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr Newman points out) but also that its date is earlier than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the 'battle of mice' in Arcadia.

P. 294. 1271 a 8. With οὐ τοῦτον comp. 1267 a 15 οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον.

P. 295. 1271 a 9. Add to note (333) a reference to the election of the Gerusia of the Ninety at Elis VIII(v). 6. 11, 1306 a 15 ff. τὴν δ' αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ γερόντων.

P. 296. 1271 a 22. Add to note (339) a reference to Busolt *Gr. Alt.* 2 p. 118 n. (6).

P. 298. 1271 b 8. Add to note (346) a reference to *Rhet.* I. 6. 23, 1363 a 8 ff. τὸ περιμάχον φαινόμενον (sc. ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ). οὐ γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν.

P. 300. 1271 b 24. Add to note (352) a reference to *F. H. G.* I. 249.

1b. 1271 b 30—40. See also *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 377. Add to note (355) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 58 ff. He thinks (p. 96) διὸ καὶ νῦν κτλ a marginal note of date later than 220 B.C., comparing Polyb. IV. 53. See however against his assumption Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. v f.

P. 301. 1271 b 35—39. This is Ephorus again (*Fr.* 61) as quoted in the geographical poem of Scymnus Chius, *F. H. G.* I. 249; πρώτους δὲ Κρήτας φασὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς | ἄρξαι θαλάττης, ἃς τε νησιωτίδας | πόλεις κατασχεῖν, ἃς τε καὶ συνοικίσαι | αὐτῶν Ἐφορος εἴρηκεν, εἶναι φησὶ τε | ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὴν νῆσον ἀπὸ Κρητῶν τινοῖς, | τοῦ δὲ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχθονος | πλοῦν ἡμέραι ἀπέχειν δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. Mr Newman, to whom the discovery is due, adds: "The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3—4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus."

P. 303. 1272 a 18. φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν] "The word φόρος need not have political associations. It can mean *rent for land* and nothing more: here probably 'rent paid to the owners of private lots by the serfs who cultivate them.' See the inscriptions in *Bull. Corr. Hell.* v. (1881), p. 108 ff. and for the fact Dosiadas apud Athen. IV. 142" (Wyse).

1b. 1272 a 22. Supplement (and in part correct) this note by a reference to Plato *Laus* 677 E, where Epimenides' device (μηχανήμα)—apparently ἄλιμος, i.e. penniless—is mentioned (see Stallbaum *ad loc.*), and to *F. H. G.* II. 30, III. 40 (Newman). To the next note (367) add a reference to Plato's strong censure *Laus* 835 B—841.

P. 307. 1272 b 30. Mr Newman keeps ἔχουσιν sc. τὴν πόλιν and for the ellipse appeals to 1266 b 1, 2, where however it presents no such intolerable harshness.

P. 308. 1272 b 37. The meaning of ἀριστινδην here is clear from the antithesis to ἐκ τῶν τυχεύων: 'to this office they elect for merit.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that ἀριστινδην αἰρεῖσθαι=election from privileged families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and



'merit' or 'capacity,' as shown by such passages as Isocr. *Areop.* § 37 of καλὴ γεγονότες καὶ πολλὴν ἀρετὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐνδεδεγμένοι, Philochorus *F. H. G.* I. 2: πρωτεύοντες ἐν τε γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ βίῳ χρηστῷ (where πρωτεύοντες echoes ἀριστοῦς) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning than that attested by Timaeus, κατ' ἀνδραγαθίαν ἀρετὴν.

P. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τοῦτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος where all the authorities give καὶ τούτων ὁ δ., and the change was defended by Prof. Tyrrell in *Hermaeus* Vol. VI., No. 12 p. 31 f. (cp. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seem imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τοῦτων in the text and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For Mr Newman has shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τοῦτων: "over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion" (between Shofetes and Senates) "as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity." But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture? In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: Mr Newman has an alternative assumption that ὁμογνώμονοι = are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.

P. 313. 1273 b 12—15. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 380 f.

1273 b 13. κοινότερον τε κτλ.] Mr Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render "for it is not only fairer to all, as we said" sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: *The Constitution of Athens* cc. 5—12 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will be found in Mr Kenyon's and Dr Sandys' editions. Amongst the numerous publications which deal with the relations of this treatise to the *Politics* may be specially mentioned Mr Newman's review in *Class. Rev.* v. 155—164, Mr R. W. Macan's in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* XII. 17—40, P. Meyer *Des Aristoteles Politik u. die 'Aθ. πολ.* (Bonn 1891), B. Keil *Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles* (Berlin 1892), U. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893). See also the second editions of the *Griechische Alterthümer* of Busolt and Gilbert, the *Gr. Gesch.* of Busolt, and the 6th edition of K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. griech. Alterthümer* Bd. Theil II. *Der athenische Staat u. seine Geschichte* edited by Thumser (Freiburg 1892).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commentary on B. II. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the incautious mention of Aristides p. 317 for which Mr Hicks is alone responsible.

Π. 1273 b 36. ἐνιοι μὲν οἴονται... b 41 εἴκοι δέ... 1274 a 3 διὸ καὶ μέμφοι τινες... a 11 φαίνεται δέ...] In general structure this whole account may instructively be compared with two criticisms in 'Aθ. πολ. (1) c. 9 § 2, οἴονται μὲν οὖν τινες... οὐ μὲν εἰκός (cp. εἴκοι above)... οὐ γὰρ... (2) c. 6 §§ 1—4, ἐν οἷς πειρῶνται τινες διαβάλλειν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πιθανώτερος ὁ τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγος: οὐ γὰρ εἰκός... ταύτην μὲν οὖν χρηνομήξειν ψευδῇ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι. Provisionally we may identify the ἐνιοι of 1273 b 36 with οἱ δημοτικοί of 'Aθ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in *Hermes* XXVII. p. 267 ff. would refer μέμφοι τινες to Critias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add a reference to the summary of Solon's constitution 'Aθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: τρίτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν (cp. 'Aθ. πολ. c. 2 ad init.) μεταβολή, ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, πρῶτον ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης sc. Solon.

Π. 1273 b 37. λαν ἀκρατον κτλ.] Compare 'Aθ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding Draco and Solon: ἦν γὰρ [τότε] ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικῇ πᾶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις... ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ὀλίγων ἦν κτλ.: c. 4 s.

c. 5 § 1 τῶν πολλῶν δουλεύοντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, c. 6 § 1 τὸν δῆμον ἡλευθέρωσε, and (what were undoubtedly the writer's authorities for his facts) Solon's verses copied in c. 12 § 4.

**Ib.** 1273 b 38. δημοκρατίαν τὴν πατρίον] Comp. the use in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 29 § 3 of οἱ πατριοὶ νόμοι οὓς Κλεισθένης ἐθήκεν with the comment subjoined ὥς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν τὴν Κλεισθένης πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος; also c. 34 § 3, τὴν πατρίον πολιτείαν (bis). Unquestionably πατριος had become at the end of the fifth century a synonym for Solonian.

**Ib.** 1273 b 41. δικαστήριον] Fully explained by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 1, which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: δοκεῖ δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ δημοτικώτατα· πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι, ἔπειτα τὸ ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλευμένῳ [τιμωρεῖν] ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρίτον δέ, <ψ> μάλιστα φασιν ἰσχυκεῖναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐφεσις· κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου, κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας.

**Ib.** εἰοικε] This, like εἰκὸς 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6, c. 9 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the *Constitution* and not unknown in the *Politics*. In default of direct testimony, in criticising current tradition or suspicious evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin or a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in *J. H. S.* XII. p. 37 f., who calls attention to the 'signals of this method' in style.

**Ib.** 1274 a 1. τὴν βουλήν] That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon's time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the *Constitution of Athens*. It confronts us in the sketch of the ἀρχαία πολιτεία c. 3 § 6; ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλή τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, διώκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ ζημιοῦσα πάντας τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως. It was then filled up from ex-Archons (*ib.*). Under Draco's constitution it was made φύλαξ τῶν νόμων and received complaints of their violation (εἰσαγγεῖλια), c. 4 § 4. Before Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 2. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of inflicting fines, and holding trials for treason by the νόμος εἰσαγγελλίας, c. 8 § 4.

**Ib.** 1274 a 2. τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν] According to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 8 § 1 the mode of choice enacted by Solon was a combination of selection with sortition, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων, a statement which sets in a proper light the tolerably correct (but hitherto neglected) conceptions of the Solonian practice found in Isocrates *Areop.* §§ 22, 23, *Panath.* § 145, and [Dem.] *c. Neaeram* LIX. § 75. Since the lot was limited by the previous selection (or nomination by election) Aristotle can perfectly well speak of the people, here and in 1281 b 33, as *electing*.

Thus Aristotle's own qualifications of the democratic panegyrics passed upon Solon's constitution amount to this: "Solon did not found the Areopagite Council, though he confirmed it in its censorial prerogatives, and he did not introduce the election of magistrates." The exact sense in which the last comment is to be taken is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon's reform comes from 'Αθ. πολ. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the civic body (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armour) used to elect the nine archons: ἀπεδόδοτο (not ἀπεδόθη ὑπὸ Δράκοντος) μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς ὅπλοι παρεχομένοις· ἡρῶντο δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐννέα ἀρχοντας. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 2 it is said vaguely that in olden time the Areopagus



used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ ἀνακαλεσαμένη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἐφ' εἰσὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἐνιαυτὸν διατάξασα ἀπέστελλεν.

**Ib.** τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι κτλ] The importance of the appeal to the court where the people interpreted the laws is emphasized 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἐτι δὲ αὖτις διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἀπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς...ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γῆνεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὸ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch *V. Sol.* 18 (τὸ συνεκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν) κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐδὲν ὕστερον δὲ παρμενίδου ἐφάνη τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν διαφορῶν ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς (namely through appeal from the sentences of the magistrates). Comp. Busolt *Gr. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 150 n. (5).

**P. 316.** 1274 a 3. μέμφομαι τινες] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ 1, 2 (πειρῶνται τινες διαβδάλειν αὐτὸν...οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν). Aristotle's acquaintance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz *op. c. l.* p. 74, p. 165 ff.

**Ib.** 1274 a 8. Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς] The most remarkable novelty contained in 'Αθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes and Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagus: c. 25. The part ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagus lasted 17 years after Salamis (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens circa 462 B.C., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia circa 466 B.C. See Mr E. M. Walker in *Class. Rev.* vi. 95 ff. Few at any rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to insert that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the *Politics* we have to decide whether one or two attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys *Constitution* p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion ('Αθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἐνιαυτοῖς) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of *Politics* and *Constitution* would be reconciled. But Susemihl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the *Politics* Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in the famous attack: *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* 111. p. IV. He goes on to infer (1) that it is more likely the correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. II of *Politics* later than the *Constitution of Athens* (comp. above *Addenda* to p. 66), and (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of B. II as to Draco's constitution by reminding us that B. II. only professes to deal with εὐδοκίμοῦσαι πολιτεῖαι, 1260 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the *Constitution of Athens*, a plausible hypothesis in view of the facts (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

**Ib.** 1274 a 9. Add to note (408): See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the story of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch *V. Cim.* 10, *V. Pericl.* 9) Busolt *Gr. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions can be paralleled from 'Αθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th μεταβολαί): while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (117 a 11 φαίνεται δὲ κτλ) agrees with the defence of Solon in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 s. f.

**P. 317.** 1274 a 14. Add to note (410): Compare 'Αθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὰ ταῦτα συνέβαινε ἀνίσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμους δημαγωγοὺς. The

mention of Aristides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly unfortunate: for in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 2 he finds a place on the list of *προστάται τοῦ δήμου*: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles, (8) Cleon, (9) Cleophon; and in c. 23 § 3 ff., c. 24 a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to c. 26 § 1 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cimon.

*Frag.* 369 mentioned in this note is of course Plutarch's careless paraphrase of the eulogy of Theramenes in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

*Ib.* 1274 a 15. *To* note (411) *add*: This is supported by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 3, *τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον*. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all: 'Αθ. πολ. 4 § 2, 5 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in *n.* (411) is nearer the truth; neither is exactly right.

*Ib.* 1274 a 17. No notice is taken of *εὐθύνειν* in 'Αθ. πολ. Nor is *εὐθύνειν δικὰς σκολιὰς* technical where it occurs in Solon's fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the famous lines *Δῆμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα κτλ* *Fragg.* 5 and 6 Bergk.

*Ib.* 1274 a 19. *To* note (414) *add*: From 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 3, c. 7 § 3 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon: for even if c. 4 be rejected as an interpolation, there is the clause *καθάπερ διήρητο τὸ πρότερον* when Solon's *τιμήματα* are first discussed. Comp. Busolt in *Philologus* L. 393 ff.

*P.* 318. 1274 a 21. Note even the verbal similarity to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 s. f. *τοὺς δ' ἄλλους* [sc. *ἔδει τελεῖν*] *θητικόν, οὐδεμῶς μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς*. See p. 573 *note* on 1337 b 21.

*Ib.* 1274 a 22. *Add to* note (415): In *Frag.* 505, 1561 a 5, Zaleukos is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with *πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, § 1, 1273 b 32*.

*Ib.* 1274 a 23. *Add*: The laws of Chairondas (probably another form of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herondas 2. 48: from Strabo XII. 539 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger *Sylloge* n. 126 lines 61, 65, 121, 123, Antigonos permits the people of Lebedos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (I. 65 *n.*) conjectures that the laws of Charondas, introduced deliberately when in 366 B.C. the state of Cos was refounded, had spread from that place as a centre.

*Ib.* 1274 a 25. *twice*] Mr Newman adduces reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo VI. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Areopagus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace laws to a Cretan origin, to Rhadamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locrian Onomacritus, if indeed he be the same as the oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the tradition to a Locrian origin, cp. Scymnus Chius v. 314 ff.

*Ib.* 1274 a 30. *To* note (419 b) *add*: Comp. the similar exposure of a chronological error in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 17 § 2: *φανερῶς ληροῦσιν οἱ φάσκοιτες...οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαις, ἐὰν τις ἀναλογίζηται τὸν ἑκατέρου βίον καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἀπέθανεν ἀρχοντας*. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks in Dr Sandys' edition of the *Constitution* p. lvi.

*P.* 319. 1274 b 7. Add a reference to Dr Sandys' *note* in his Demosthenes *Private Orations* Vol. II. p. 115, and the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) s. v.



P. 320. 1274 b 14. ταῖν] In *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* II. 504 Prof. B remarks that τοῖν is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, ταῖν θεοῖν at least times in inscr.: yet ταῖν θεαῖν does occur, see *C. I. A.* II. 3, n. 1559. In the poets there is no instance of τοῖν, τοῦτον as feminine; but Menander *Fr.* 520 K ταῖν ἀδελφαῖν ταῖν θυοῖν ταύταιν. On the other hand τῷ, τοῦτω, τῷδε, αὐτῷ, αὐ, are found as feminine, although τᾶ, αὐτά, ταῦτα, τᾶδε, with substantives of the declension, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that τᾶ, ταῖ nowhere attested, while τοῖν is found more often than ταῖν, e.g. in Plato τοῖν six times, ταῖν four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Thesm.* 566 has τῷ θεῷ] ὡς τῷ οὐκέτι δὲ τοῖν θεοῖν ἀλλὰ ταῖν θεαῖν. In Isaeus ταῖν occurs six times, in Aristoph. six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Hyperides once each.

See Röper *De dualismo Platonico* (Danzig 1878) and E. Haase *Ueber den Dual bei Xenophon u. Thucyd.* (Bartenstein 1889), *Ueb. den Dual bei den attischen Dikern* (Bartenstein 1891), also in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLIII. 1891 p. 416 ff.; S. *Ueb. d. Dual bei den gr. Rednern* (Würzburg 1882).

P. 321. 1274 b 15 f. Δράκωντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ πολιτεία δ' ἐπαρχοῦσι νόμοις ἐθηκεν. Add to note (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle's omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained above, that Draco's was not one of the εὐδοκιμοῦσαι πολιτεῖαι), especially in view of 1274 b 34 οὗτοι γὰρ (Λυκοῦργος καὶ Σόλων) καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. Assuming that the sentence is a spurious addition it is not surprising that it is incompatible with 'Aθ. πολ. c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have to account for a glaring discrepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in chapter: which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in 'Aθ. πολ. c. 4 at the last moment. See again *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. XVI, III. p. III ff.

Ed. Add to note (428): See now 'Aθ. πολ. c. 4 with the increasing literature on the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Headlam and E. S. Thompson in *Class. Rev.* v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in *Revue Cr.* 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P. 1274 b 34 p. 31 ff. and Busolt in *Philologus* L. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theramenes' oligarchical pamphlet 404 B.C.: it was reconstructed from the θεσμοὶ of Draco, upon inferences to which Theramenes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that Draco's laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished (Aθ. πολ. c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco's work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato *Axiarchus* 365 E: ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Δράκωντος ἢ Κλεισθένης πολιτείας οὐδὲν περὶ σε κακὸν ἦν.

P. 324, line 18. Add: Mr Barclay Head *Hist. Num.* p. 372 states plainly that federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual dissensions something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Athens during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

P. 330. To note (8) of p. 329 add after σύνθητες: This evidence is disputed by Mr F. B. Jevons *Kin and Custom* in *Journal of Philol.* XVI. 1887 p. 104. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry to the Athenians.

Spartans and Celts respectively, the 'Joint Undivided Family' having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 334, line 5. To note (250) add: O. Apelt *Beitraege zur gr. Philosophie* (Leipzig 1891) p. 382 ff. suggests that Hippias of Elis was a pupil of Hippodamos [Hegesidamos apud Suidam].

P. 336, note 1. Add a reference to the excellent article by C. v. Holzinger *Aristoteles' u. Herakleides' lakonische u. kretische Politien* in *Philologus* LII. p. 56 ff.

P. 337, line 18. See *Addenda* to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. 'Oxen' would appear to be meant by *καπραιπόδα*, 'cattle' ('sheep.'

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Carthaginian constitution implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek *Πολιτεῖαι* and the *Νόμματα βαρβαρικά*. The bearing of this fact upon the date of B. II. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. cr. et exeg.* III. p. iii f.

P. 352. To note (403) add: Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens* the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question: see 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 355. 1275 a 10. To note (435) add: See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 59 § 6, *καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι κυροῦσι, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀπὸ συμβόλων εἰσάγουσι, where οὗτοι = οἱ θεσμοθέται*.

P. 356. Comm. left col. line 17 add: Meier u. Schömann *Attische Process* ed. Lipsius pp. 994—1006, *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) II. 734 ff. Also Roberts *Int. to Greek Epigraphy* I. p. 355. In the absence of *σύμβολα* the only right was the right of reprisals, *συλῆν*; cp. *σύλῃν διδόναι κατὰ τῶς*, Dem. *adv. Lacritum* XXXV § 26 p. 931, 21.

Ib. 1275 a 15. *ἐγγεγραμμένους*. Comp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42 § 1.

P. 357. 1275 a 25. *οὐκ ἐξεστίν*] The rule at Athens in the fourth century is thus laid down 'Αθ. πολ. c. 62 s. f. *ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἐξεστὶ πλεονάκεις, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν πλὴν βουλευσάαι δεῖ*. Comp. c. 31 § 3, and *Politics* 1299 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1275 b 8. At Acragas and Melite *σύγκλητος* was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly: Swoboda *Die griechischen Volksbeschlüsse* p. 307.

P. 360. 1275 b 22. *πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν*] See below, *Addenda* to p. 379. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42, *μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστών*.

P. 361. 1275 b 30. *ἀπλοῦν*] Comp. Plato *Politic.* 306 c *πότερον οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔχει διαφορὰν*.

P. 362. 1276 a 8—16. See the discussion of this passage in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. XVII, following Niemeyer in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLIII. 1891, p. 412 ff. With the changes indicated in the *Addenda* to *Critical Notes* the passage runs thus: *ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἐπραξε καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, ὅταν θῶν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ οὐτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἐνιοὶ βούλονται διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, οὐτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὖσαι, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρειν)· εἴπερ οὖν [καὶ] δημοκρατοῦνται τινες τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος; "Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not, responsible for public acts, for instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny: some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not contracted by the state but by*



the tyrant, and would decline many other such the basis of certain forms of government is superior suppose now men to be somewhere living under state just as responsible for the acts of this govern the oligarchy or tyranny?" In a 14 τοῦτον τὸν ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. Th have been put in the reverse way: is the state deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts them? But Aristotle's inexactness in such matte the ταύτης bracketed above, as if the question c more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the to the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 f. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent *Grammatik d. a. Insch.*<sup>3</sup> p. 25 n. 2; Christ prefa series) p. xv, who cites the variants in the mss. 4 The whole question of orthography is complica (1) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions. been content to reproduce faithfully the best man rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non p sed suadente Stapfero ad Meisterhansi grammatican semperque scriberem non solum, id quod nunc f μέχρη, γίγνεσθαι, γιγνώσκειν, πλέον et forsitan e parativorum species in ους et ω desinentes sempe *Studien zu Aris. v. d. Seele* (Landshut 1890) p. 7 ff Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the mar the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retenti (θαλάσση 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16, πράσων 1 v. Wilamowitz, *op. c. l.* 319, sees in Aristotle's Gre

P. 366. *To* note (467)—comp. n. (455) p. c. 39 s. f. (τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἃ ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν τ and c. 40 § 3 (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα Λακεδαιμονίου ἔλαβον, ἀπέδωκαν κοινῇ, κελευουσῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν now informs us that there was a special clause reconciliation (διαλύσεις) agreed upon between the t justice that in the 'Ath. πολ. the notice of the repay ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ ὅτι προστιθέασιν τῶν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνάδαστον ποιοῦσιν.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. *To* note (470) add: Mr ἀγαθὸν as the predicate with εἶναι.

P. 369. 1277 a 6. For εὐθὺς cp. Aristoph. *Cl τυννουτονὶ ἐπλαττεν ἔνδον οἰκίας.*

P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. *Mid.* p. 53 κορυφαῖοι and α ἡγεμῶν κορυφαίων.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. *To* note (490) add: A tra XI. 29 ἐν τῷ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ πρότερον ἂν of the Spartan military system is thus brought ou γάρ...ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ sc. ἀπορεῖται

P. 377. 1278 a 14. With φανέν cp. 'Ath. πολ. c

P. 379. 1278 a 30. We owe to Mr Wyse the proper antithesis to γνήσιος πολίτης, viz. νόθος πολίτης: see *Scholia in Euripidem* ed. Schwartz I. *Orest.* 903 καὶ τῷ λέγειν δὲ Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος ἦν [see the line] εἰς τοῦτον βλέπει [sc. Κλεοφῶντα]. θέλει γὰρ εἰπεῖν Ἀθηναῖον οὐκ Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ νόθον πολίτην παρῶσαν Θράξ ἦν ὁ Κλεοφῶν. Again in *Schol.* on l. 904.

Tb. 1278 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for χρώται = thus apply the law.

Tb. 1278 a 32. παραιροῦνται = (virtually) disfranchise: so 1285 a 16, 1311 b 6.

Tb. 1278 a 34. Add to note (516): By Ἀθ. πολ. c. 26 § 4 this famous law of Pericles is assigned to the year 451/0 ἐπὶ Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, Περικλέους εἰπόντος, ἐγνώσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως οἱ ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀσπῶν ἢ γεγονῶσι. An error in the date is not so serious as to have maintained (with Duncker, Schenkl, Buermann and at one time Busolt) that no such law could have been proposed by Pericles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see c. 42 § 1 cited in *Addenda* to p. 360. Cp. 1275 b 21. Add a reference to the reverse process at Byzantium according to *Oecon.* II. 2 § 3, 1346 b 26 ff. ὅντος δὲ νόμου αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι πολίτην οἱ ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀσπῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἢ, χρημάτων δεηθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν ἐξ ἐνὸς ὄντα ἀσπῶ καταβαλόντα μῶς τριάκοντα εἶναι πολίτην.

P. 381. 1278 b 20. Comp. *End. Eth.* 1242 a 6, and note in Susemihl's ed.

Tb. 1278 b 22. See p. 457 n. (4). Add to the note on 1278 b 23: Dubito. Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: cp. Demosth. *De Corona* § 254, p. 312, 2 τὸ ἐπιβαλλὼν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς μέρος: but it may well be that δσον agrees with μέρος, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 269 b 9 ff. who apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the present passage with *Pol.* IV(VII). 1. 10, 1323 b 21 and after adding 'inde explicandum videtur 1260 a 41' proceeds to the unmistakable usage δταν ἐπιβάλλῃ... ἡ σκέψις 1266 a 25.

P. 382. 1278 b 27. ἂν μὴ κτλ = unless existence is outweighed with ['exceeds too much in'] the evils of life.

P. 385. 1279 a 26. Add a reference to n. (523).

P. 386. Comm. left col. line 32. For "409 (or 408)" it would perhaps be better to read "410": payment for public services seems to have been restored soon after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. 9. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's *Protagoras* (Spengel).

P. 391. 1280 a 24. ἐλευθερίᾳ] Free birth; the abstract noun answering to ἐλεύθερος = free born. See Newman I. p. 248 n. 1. Compare 1281 a 6 ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος, 1283 a 33 οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγυὲς ἀλλήλων, 1290 b 9 ff. ἂν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ὅλγοι ὄντες πλειόνων [καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων] ἄρχωσι; lastly, the *locus classicus* which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον = the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes Plato Comicus *Hyperbolicus* 3, 4 for ἐλεύθερος) (ξένος, and refers to Diog. Laer. VI. 1 and VI. 4 for Antisthenes.

P. 396. 1281 a 17. Mr Newman (II. 145) understands this differently: "taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty" like ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

P. 400. 1281 b 31. With βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν cf. 1274 a 15 ff. and reff. there.

P. 402. 1282 a 21. Mr Newman cites *Phys.* II. 2. 9, 194 a 36: δύο δὴ αἱ ἀρχοῦσαι τῆς θλῆς καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἣ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. The ship-captain, representing ἡ χρωμένη, ποῖόν τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδαλίου γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει.



**Ib.** 1282 a 22. Mr Wyse calls attention to the poetic colour of the *δειτυμῶν* (1338 a 30) and *θολῶν* (1324 b 39) in this line; with which *τιμαλφεῖν*, 1336 b 19.

**Ib.** 1282 a 28. The plural *δῆμοι* in 1294 a 13, 1310 b 21, 1320 a 4, 1321 a 40 § 3, Thuc. III. 82. 1, VIII. 65. 1.

**Ib.** 1282 a 31. *ταμεινοῦσι*] *Add* to note (576): Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 2 (On constitution), c. 8 § 1 (Solon's): *σημείων δ' ὅτι κληρωτὰς ἐποίησεν ἐκ τῶν τιμημὶν περὶ τῶν ταμῶν νόμος, ὃ χρόμενοι διατελοῦσιν ἐτι καὶ νῦν· καλεῖται γὰρ κληροῖ ταμίας ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίωνων*, c. 47 § 1 *ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίωνων κατὰ τὸν Σ νόμον* (ἐτι γὰρ i.e. *circa* 329 B.C. ὁ νόμος κύριος).

**P.** 410. 1283 b 5. *ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις*] Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 35 § 2 *πο ἀναμφισβήτητον τὴν πολιτείαν*.

**Ib.** 1283 b 14. Mr Wyse compares 1281 a 9, *οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμ ταῦντες*.

**P.** 415. Comm. left col. line 24. *Add*: The recent additions to our knowledge enable us to arrive at the following provisional results respecting Aristotle's judgment upon Ostracism. Having been wholly disused in the fourth century the institution had become the subject of antiquarian research. Two theories about its origin appear, with something like confidence, to facts in their favour: (1) the view of text, 1284 a 17 ff. and of VIII(v). 3. 3, 1302 b 15—18, which agrees with Diod. 13. 97. 1, Plut. *V. Themist.* c. 22, *Arist.* 7, *Nic.* 11, *Alcib.* 13 (cp. *Nepos Them.* 8, *Cim.* evidently the view of Ephorus and Theopompus, i.e. of the school of Isoc (2) the view expressed by Philochorus, *Fr.* 79 b (cited in *sc.* 603), which is also in Androtion, *Fr.* 5 (quoted by Harpocration s.v. *Hipparchus*). Both explanations appear in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22, the writer showing himself here as elsewhere well acquainted with the latest researches of historians and Attidographers.

**Ib.** line 39. The extract is preceded by an account of the procedure in case of ostracism: *προχειροτονεῖ μὲν ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἡ' πρυτανείας, εἰ δοκεῖ τὸ δεῖν εἰσφέρειν· ὅτε δὲ δοκεῖ, ἐφράσσεται σάνισιν ἡ ἀγορὰ καὶ κατελείποντο εἰσοδοὶ δέκα, εἰσὶνότες κατὰ φυλὰς ἐτίθεσαν τὰ ὄστρακα, στρέφοντες τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν. ἐπεστάντι οἱ τε ἐννέα ἀρχόντες καὶ ἡ βουλὴ· διαριθμηθέντων δὲ ὅτι πλείστα γένετο καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἑακισχιλίων, τοῦτον ἔδει τὰ δίκαια δόντα καὶ λαβόντα ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστήναι τῆς πόλεως ἑτη δέκα (ὅστερον δὲ ἐγένοντο πέντε) καρποὶ τὰ ταυτοῦ, μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ Εὐβοίας ἀκρωτηρίου· μόνος δὲ κτλ.*

**Ib.** After note (603) *add*: Compare now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22 § 1 *ἐν οἷς* [sc. *ν* ἐτέθη καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμος seemingly about 507 B.C., § 3 *διαλιπόντι μετὰ τὴν νίκην* [Marathon], *θαρροῦντος ἤδη τοῦ δήμου, τότε πρῶτον ἐχρήσαντο τῷ τῷ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν, ὅς ἐτέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη* § 4 *καὶ π ὀστρακίσθη τῶν ἐκείνου συγγενῶν Ἰππάρχος Χάρμου Κολλυτεύς, δι' ὃν καὶ μὲν τὸν νόμον ἔθηκεν ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐξελάσαι βουλόμενος αὐτόν. εὐθὺς δὲ τῷ ὕ ἔτει* [i.e. 487/6 B.C.]...*ὀστρακίσθη Μεγακλῆς Ἰπποκράτους Ἀλωπεκῆθεν* [a nephew of Cleisthenes]. *ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ἑτη τρία τοὺς τῶν τυράννων φίλους ὀστράκιζον, ὡς χι νόμος ἐτέθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει* [probably 485/4 B.C.] *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων* *τις δοκοῖν μείζων εἶναι μελίστατο* καὶ πρῶτος ὀστρακίσθη τῶν ἀπῳθεν τῆς *νίδος Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρωνος*. Unquestionably the motives assigned, (1) jealousy of preeminence (Eph. Theopomp.) and (2) fear of a restoration of Hippias (And are inferences from the persons ostracized. The fragment of Androtion in Harpocration runs thus: *ἄλλος δὲ ἔστιν Ἰππάρχος ὁ Χάρμου, ὃς φησι Λυκούργος ἐν τῷ*

Λεωκράτους· περί δὲ τούτου Ἀνδροτίων ἐν τῷ β' φησὶν ὅτι συγγενὴς μὲν ἦν Πεισιστράτῳ τοῦ τυράννου καὶ πρῶτος ἐξωστρακίσθη τοῦ περί τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν νόμου τότε πρῶτον τεθέντος διὰ τὴν ὑπόψιν τῶν περί Πεισιστράτου, ὅτι δημαγωγὸς ὦν καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐτυράννησεν. The coincidence of language is unmistakeable, cp. VIII(v). 5. 6, 1305 a 7.

P. 417. To note (609) add: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 § 2: τοῖς συμμάχοις δεσποτικώτερος ἐχρῶντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων· τοὺς δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐὼντες τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχεῖν ὦν ἐτιχον ἀρχοντες. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not dislodged until they revolted. Comp. Mr Newman in *Class. Rev.* v. 162.

P. 423. 1285 a 16. Add: Busolt *Die Lakedaemonier* p. 141 ff. compares the Tageia in Thessaly, the βασιλεια of Arcadia (which is also a στρατηγία), and the 'Herzogthum' of the ancient Germans.

P. 424. 1285 a 35 et al. Note that according to Meisterhans *Grammatik*<sup>2</sup> p. 23 n. (132) the true spelling is Μυτιληναῖοι.

P. 426. 1285 b 14. Cp. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 § 3 ἀρχαὶ δ' ἐνδημοὶ μὲν...ὑπερόριοι δέ.

Ib. 1285 b 15. παρίεντων] In Ἀθ. πολ. c. 3 § 3 the word is παραχωρεῖν.

Ib. 1285 b 16. Add to note (629): For βασιλεὺς at Athens cp. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 3 § 2 ἐπικατέστη ἡ πολεμαρχία διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὰς τῶν βασιλέων μαλακοῖς. But as to the 'shadowy kingship' see now J. G. Frazer *Golden Bough* I. 44 ff., 118 ff., 158—165, 217—235, an epoch-making work which is calculated to shatter many fond beliefs.

P. 428. 1286 a 3. Add: This is the distinction between τάξις and θεσμός in Dion. Halicar. *Ant. Rom.* v. 167 A.

P. 431. 1287 a 38. In Ἀθ. πολ. c. 35 § 3 πρὸς χάριν happens to occur.

P. 434. 1286 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of Ἀθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2; after mentioning the absolute personal sway of Demos (ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατὼν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύθασιν) the writer continues καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς· εὐδιαφορώτεροι γὰρ <οἱ> ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν καὶ κέρδει καὶ χάρισιν.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. After turn out insert anyhow i.e.

P. 439. 1287 a 6. Comp. for this sense of διοίκησις, 1331 b 9; also 1330 a 7 for διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, and Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 s.f. ἀπασι γὰρ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις (maintenance) ἦν.

P. 442. 1287 b 19. περιληφθῆναι] In Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 περιλαβεῖν.

P. 454. Add to Excursus II.: See further remarks on the date of Pittacus, in reply to Beloch, by Toepffer in *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. 1894, pp. 230—246.

P. 467, line 5. See *Corrigenda*. *Dele the sentence*: Again, one might...πολιτεία.

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Susemihl in *Quaest. crit. et exeget.* II. (1893) and *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1893, p. 817 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in *Classical Review* VII. 1893, pp. 304—309. In such enumerations mistakes are apt to creep in, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the articles published in 1893 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made concessions, either from change of view (as when Prof. Susemihl admits that 1272 b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant δυναστῶν by δυναστεία in the next line, and accordingly



returns to *δυνατῶν* II<sup>2</sup>, and Mr Newman 1263 a 23 now accepts *ἔθεσι* II<sup>1</sup> in I *ἡθεσι* II<sup>2</sup>) or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposi- (which may account for Prof. Susemihl's surrender of 1256 b 1 *κομίζονται*, 1 μεταβολικῆς, 1258 b 7 νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος in *Quaest.* II. p. IV. although he still regard these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Ne omission to count 15 passages on the side of II<sup>2</sup>, for which see *Class. R.* p. 306 n. 1, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing st tables in their latest form.

Let us start with Book I. where "II<sup>1</sup> is certainly wrong 15 times" (text line 40): deduct *three* of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall ba the uncertain class, and add *seven*, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 12 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7: this the total of errors in II<sup>1</sup> to 19. But again, in B. I. "II<sup>1</sup> is right 24 times" (text line 3 from below): this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enum Of these *five* are very slight changes and Prof. Susemihl now refrains from c them: viz. 1252 b 28 (*ῆδη*), 1256 b 8 (*δεδομένη*), 1258 b 40 (*Χαρητρίδη*), 1259 b 1260 a 37 (*ἄρα*), but he adds *five* in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 125 1260 a 26, a 31: the total remaining 23. Thus in B. I. the problem works favour of II<sup>1</sup> by 23: 19.

Mr Newman does not agree with this statement of the case, but instead detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants c as right readings for II<sup>1</sup> on the ground that words are omitted, and that this besetting sin of II<sup>1</sup>: these five omissions are 1252 a 9 (*εἰναι*), b 20 (*σινωλήθου*), 33 (*δ*), 1257 b 7 (*εἶναι*), 1260 a 31 (*δ*). If these five claims were struck o balance in favour of II<sup>1</sup> would be destroyed.

In B. II. the alleged superiority claimed for II<sup>1</sup> is still disputed. Mr Ne accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of II<sup>2</sup> in no les 64 cases.

Prof. Susemihl again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of II<sup>1</sup> over II<sup>2</sup> 69: 40 to 67: 48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extr cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Susemihl's figures for Book II. are thus explained. "II changed the right reading at the most only 40 times" (p. 465 line 32): deduct these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 39, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 21, a 27, 127 1273 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 22, a 6, a 17, a 34, 1269 a 38, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 12, 1272 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, b 8, b 9, b 14: the new total of the errors of II<sup>1</sup> is 48. Again of the 69 pas claimed as right readings for II<sup>1</sup> (p. 465 line 23) Susemihl is now disposed to *nine*, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 22, b 19, b 32, 1274 a 5, a 2 place of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 (*καί*), b 5, 1264 b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35: the total would thus remain: but on reflexion he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. as *five*, but only *two* (or three at most). This brings out the final result for E II<sup>1</sup>=67 (or 68 at most), II<sup>2</sup>=48.

Mr Newman's divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35 transfers *nine* others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of II<sup>2</sup> 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by II<sup>1</sup>, together

1265 b 11, 1267 a 35, b 26, 1269 b 6, 1271 a 20): the remaining 23 he leaves doubtful, though strongly of opinion that they also should be counted for  $\Pi^2$ . Thus  $\Pi^1$  falls with him from 67 to 35: and  $\Pi^2$  rises by the addition to the 48 (which Susemihl really admits) of seven other variants, which Susemihl regards as doubtful: viz. 1264 a 21, 1265 a 12, 1268 b 17, 1267 a 40, 1273 b 32, 1274 a 4, b 6. This makes the total for  $\Pi^2=55$ . Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Susemihl reckons for  $\Pi^1$  and Newman for  $\Pi^2$  and we get the result,  $\Pi^2=64$ ,  $\Pi^1=35$ .

On the question of the text generally we quote with pleasure Prof. Tyrrell's opinion as expressed in 1888, *Hermathena* Vol. VI. No. 14, p. 335. "The course taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristotle's rules for attaining the mean, *ποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου*. Bekker having completely neglected  $\Pi^1$  and  $\Gamma$ , Susemihl's recoil carried him perhaps too far from Bekker's method, and now Busse and Dittenberger"—may we not add Newman?—"seem to be dragging him too near it again. Without free emendation and transposition we can have no readable text."

P. 517. 1330 a 14. After note (835) add: Comp. Plato *Critias* 112 B: *ὥκειτο δὲ αἰ. prehistoric Attica*] τὰ μὲν ἐξωθεν, ὑπ' αὐτὰ τὰ πλάγια αὐτῆς, ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν γεωργῶν ὅσοι πλησίον ἐγεώργουν· τὰ δ' ἐπάνω τὸ μάχιμον αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον γένος περὶ τὸ τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς 'Ηφαίστου τε ἱερὸν κατωκίειν, οἷον μᾶς οἰκίας κῆπον ἐνὶ περι-βάλλῃ προσπεριβεβλημένοι. τὰ γὰρ πρὸς βορρᾶν αὐτῆς ὥκουν οἰκίας κοινὰς καὶ ξυστίτια χειμεριὰ κατασκευασάμενοι (Wyse).

Pb. 1330 a 15. *ἵνα...ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν*] No one can fail to notice the striking similarity between this sentence and the following in the account of Cleisthenes' local tribes: *ὅπως ἐκάστη μετέχη πάντων τῶν τόπων*, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 21 § 4.

P. 520. 1330 b 11. For *μὴ παρέργως* see now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5 τοῖς μὴ παρέργως ἰποφαινομένοις.

P. 522. 1331 a 3. After 1269 a 6 add: and III. 3. 2, 1276 a 14 ff.

P. 535. 1333 a 2. After *οὔτε γάρ*. add: Comp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 1. 5, 1129 a 19 *ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία* and X. 7. 2, 1177 a 21 (where Bywater brackets *τε*).

P. 539. 1333 b 12. With *ἀπεφάνησαντο* comp. the passage cited in *Addenda* to p. 520 above, from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

P. 540. 1333 b 34. To note (915) add: Comp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 23 § 4.

P. 541. 1334 a 5. Compare the parallel phrase of *Metaph.* 1. 2. 11, 982 b 22, *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός*.

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. *Crito* 50 D etc. and Dem. *De Corona* § 205 (*οὐχὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι*).



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